Military Review

Shock power of information operations

16
Shock power of information operations



In recent years, with the emergence of new problems in international relations, further informatization and digitalization, the command of the US military has increasingly focused on developing the potential capabilities of military equipment and systems weaponsusing cyber-electromagnetic means and devices. At the same time, in the United States, the requirements for the quality of training of specialists ensuring the cyber-electromagnetic activity of troops are increasing, and their number is increasing. The US Armed Forces command includes such personnel as personnel directly using cyber-electro-magnetic tools and systems, as well as management personnel involved in the preparation and decision-making, planning operations and managing information operations (AI).

At the same time, the command of the US Armed Forces pays special attention to the introduction of new information technologies in the process of planning and conducting information operations, ensuring the use of information-related capability (IRC) in the operations of troops (i.e., the use of any military equipment or systems). weapons using cyber-electromagnetic elements or devices.

IN HELP TO COMMANDER

According to the provisions of the unified charter of the USH KSSH of the US Armed Forces JP 3-13 Information operation of November 2014, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute is one of the main parts of the commander (commander) decision.

It helps him to correctly assess the situation, predict the success and results of the hostilities, assess the possibility of achieving the goal of the operation, and develop guidelines for further planning based on the data obtained.

The charter states that evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute contributes to creating favorable conditions for identifying deficiencies or advantages in using WIS in operations, as well as determining whether it is necessary to clarify or change the ways and patterns of using WIS that are associated with changes in operational tasks or the nature of the information environment that can cause the occurrence of unintended negative information impact on their troops or allied troops.

According to its content, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute is a repeated and repeated periodic, but at the same time, continuous analysis of the existing or forecasted effectiveness in using various tasks of the operation of information-related capabilities of troops (forces) both during the operational planning cycle and during the operation . In this case, a continuous periodic analysis of the evaluation of the effectiveness of an Oncological Institute is a process that includes eight stages or steps of an algorithm that can be represented as a closed ring with various directions of continuous analysis.

COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEEDS

The first stage (step) of the process of evaluating the effectiveness of an IO is a comprehensive analysis of the information environment, taking into account the influence of both internal and external factors on it. At the same time, both its state and the expected changes are evaluated when a grouping of unified coalition forces is deployed and possible changes with the start of hostilities. Then its description is made and recommendations are developed that are necessary for developing a plan for conducting the Oncological Institute and implementing the integration of the WIS.

With the start of campaign planning, the personnel of the IO bodies, before starting the IO assessment, together with the headquarters of the planning unit of the operation, begin to analyze the information environment. The IO analysis is carried out by multidisciplinary teams of the staff of the formation and is divided into categories according to different types of WIS with the outlines of the distribution of the physical, informational and cognitive areas of the surrounding information environment in the theater of war (theater of operations) or in the area of ​​the intended operation.

The analysis of the information environment is a critical identifying function, an integral element of the analysis of the operational situation, and also provides the initial information necessary for the decision-making commander.

During the assessment of the information environment, weak links in various systems are identified, negative factors affecting the situation, insufficient integration and resources for obtaining it, and the need to be amplified by external (federal) signals.

When assessing the information environment, it is taken into account that it is not constant and that it is influenced by such factors as the technological and informational structure of theaters, national cultural and other characteristics of people, and natural phenomena (natural and artificially created by the enemy).

The second step in the process of evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute is to develop a project first, and then a general initial plan for evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute; then integration of his data into other plans developed by the formation.

In the process of defining the tasks, directions and methods of formation in the operation in order to ensure the achievement of the objective of the operation during the second step, specific - both planned and negative - information effects are determined when using different WIS, on the basis of which recommendations to troops on various issues can be developed.

The third step of evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute is to develop information needs for conducting the Oncological Institute, and on their basis to develop a plan for collecting (retrieving) information that is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness and to accomplish the objectives of the Oncological Institute. At the same time, the most characteristic features of this particular information environment and its possible changes during the course of the Oncological Institute are determined. These signs reflect the physical, informational and cognitive processes, as well as the psychological characteristics of people, their motivation and perception of the information environment, which can be assessed as extreme. Detailed qualitative and quantitative signs and indicators are set out by depth, ethnography, media content, methodology, categorization of features and by the results of informational impact.

The plan for gathering information and obtaining intelligence information is thoroughly integrated across all levels (from tactical to strategic) so that the assessment of the effectiveness of the IO meets the general situation in the theater and that it is possible to correctly select performance criteria (indicators), determine resource requirements, develop recommendations for their use and timely replenishment.

DATA EXTRACT

During the fourth step, the US Armed Forces Command considers it necessary to determine the methods, procedure for obtaining, constructing and adjusting the basic data used in the process of evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, inspections and methods for their implementation during the Oncological Institute. At the same time, the basic data of the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute should not only contain the general characteristics of the Oncological Institute, but also be an integral part of the data used in the process of carrying out reconnaissance training of combat operations and data on the operational situation in the area of ​​operation of the US military group or coalition forces.

The fifth stage of the process of evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute ensures the coordination of the activities of the Oncological Institute and the activities of the headquarters for collecting information, obtaining intelligence information and analyzing it.

On the basis of the first four stages, which determined the objects of information impact, the methods and procedure for obtaining and analyzing intelligence data and the procedure for communicating them to the planning bodies of the Oncological Institute, which define the tasks of the Oncological Institute, the procedure for organizing coordination and taking actions to refine information and intelligence during the Onc; the enemy’s response is predicted and possible changes in the operational and information environment, the emergence of new objects of information impact. The main attention is paid to organizing the coordination of the use of WIS and to clarify and coordinate the various activities and actions of the forces involved in conducting the Oncological Institute both in terms of time parameters and in the objectives of the operation. In addition, the reliability and completeness of information about the situation and intelligence, as well as the possible results of information impact, are assessed, and the need to make new decisions is determined both in obtaining intelligence information and in coordinating IO activities.

The task of the sixth stage is to monitor the state and changes in the information environment, to collect, consolidate and compile new data necessary for evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, which is a continuous process of monitoring the preservation of the relevant operation conditions. Among other things, the characteristic features of the situation, the selected local zones, the errors made earlier are specified, the conclusions are made whether the desired impact of the EUT on the corresponding objects has been achieved or not.

The seventh stage of the process of evaluating the effectiveness of an IO is a stage of a complete and comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of an IO, which, according to experts of the US military, should be carried out by specially trained personnel with experience in using quantitative and qualitative assessments and having technical and operational skills for analyzing information operational conditions. This analysis, according to the command of the Armed Forces of the United States, can be performed outside the combat area by the forces of the higher command, which has a protected space communications with the theater. The analysis is a recurring and provides a continuous process of assessing the situation, allowing you to identify errors, new threats and risk levels, identify ways to minimize them, and make adjustments to plans and solutions.

The eighth stage is the final, but not interrupting, of the effectiveness evaluation process itself. It only provides information on the results of evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute at a certain stage of the operation, which is necessary for the command to decide and determine further actions. The process of evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute continues, going back to its first stage, taking into account the results of the analysis of the occurrence of negative factors during changes in the information environment and the use of WIS troops in the operation.

An analysis of the information environment, the development of a plan and the implementation in the process of seven stages of a comprehensive assessment of the possible effectiveness of the Oncological Institute in the upcoming (or during) operation allows you to prepare information for decision-making by commanders or for planning the operation and preparing instructions to troops. If the situation is stable, then the eighth step of the process is the stage of developing a report on the results of the effectiveness evaluation, the development of appropriate recommendations and information for interaction between the formations, the higher headquarters and the organizations. The forms, time, sequence and periodicity of reports are predetermined by the higher headquarters.

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION

In order to solve the tasks of the operation, in the process of evaluating the effectiveness of IT in the US Armed Forces, both general and specific criteria and performance indicators are developed, which are determined by carrying out operational and technical measures. As noted in the JP 3-13 statutes, when using and integrating information-related capabilities of troops, generally accepted, mutually agreed measures and measures are used to determine the order, volume and effectiveness of the operations performed. These are the so-called measures of performance or execution (Measures of Performance - MOPs), determining how and in what volume certain tasks of the operation are carried out, how troops operate, with what intensity, with what tactical and technical data. Measures of effectiveness (Measures of Effectiveness - MOEs) determine the effectiveness of the performance of certain tasks. At the same time, to assess the use of information-related capabilities of the troops, they have their own specific criteria and indicators peculiar only to them: MOPs and MOEs, which allow qualitatively and quantitatively assess the information situation and its changes in the process of using information-related capabilities of certain troops or forces; correctly determine the effectiveness of planned actions in a specific information environment and establish a direct or indirect relationship between the use of information-related capabilities of the troops and the activities of the United States formations.

Measures of accomplishment of tasks should be determined in the process of planning the operation and, at a minimum, evaluated and refined at the final stages of the various phases of the tasks of the operation, as well as refined when conducting the Oncological Institute.

In the US Armed Forces, certain criteria and indicators are developed for evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, but they are not published in unclassified sources. However, the JP 3-13 statute states that they are tied to the use of certain information-related capabilities of the troops for the operations of the United States and coalition forces. It is indicated that they can be used individually or integrated. Based on the provisions of the statute of the United States Forces Joint Operations Planning (JP 5-0), the development of efficiency measures by the headquarters (MOEs), as well as the measures to complete the tasks (MOPs), should be carried out in the process of planning the operation. It is emphasized that in determining MOEs, the presence and capabilities of staff and intelligence support must be taken into account.


A possible variant of the algorithm for the evaluation of information operations.
Scheme provided by the author

A specific feature of the development of efficiency measures is the ability and ability of intelligence agencies to quickly determine the method and possibilities for obtaining intelligence information corresponding to a certain informational and operational situation, as well as the timeliness of communicating them to users, including data on unclear and often unexpected sources of informational threats and sabotage attacks of the enemy in communication lines and computer networks.

It is also important that, according to the JP 3-13 statute, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute is an integral part of the assessment of the effectiveness of the conduct of hostilities and at the same time one of the main documents for the commander and his staff in determining the success of the tasks of the operation set by the higher organization. According to experts of the US military, the operational assessment of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute is at the same time a programmatic and financial assessment, depending on the capabilities of a particular formation. Moreover, the program assessment changes with changes in the training program for specialists and, therefore, with changes in the combat readiness and combat capability of troops (forces), and financial - with changes in the financial capabilities of the formation and the Armed Forces as a whole. It seems that such a question is not entirely correct, but more on that below.

In the US Armed Forces, there are three levels of assessments of MOPs and MOEs (at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels), defined by the local space and tasks of the United States combined forces, types of the Armed Forces and military branches of troops OK, which are related to time parameters, equipment of troops (forces) and specific tasks AND ABOUT.

The overall success and effectiveness of the Oncological Institute is usually evaluated at an operational or strategic level. It is emphasized that the success of the Oncological Institute is largely affected by the training of personnel of the planning bodies, their ability to conduct IOs, as well as the preparation of the planning bodies of the Oncological Institute, especially at the tactical level.

In addition, the statutory documents state that for coordination and evaluation of an IT of a multinational force, the United States KNSH headquarters should allocate its representatives to organize interaction and take measures to ensure the interoperability of information-related capabilities of the troops during the IO.

Evaluation of the effectiveness of an IO can be carried out in the following ways:

- direct evaluation - based on the results obtained at the Oncological Institute and the effectiveness of the actions of the troops in the operation, as well as reports from agent sources; on the occurrence of a negative impact on their troops and military equipment;

- indirect assessment - according to the reaction of the adversary to the informational impact in the performance of various tasks of the operation and the effectiveness of the actions of various types of combat arms, as well as in using its information-related capabilities.

At the same time, if for one reason or another the personnel performing the assessment of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute does not have direct access to the analysis of the situation and the results of the Oncological Institute, he should make the most of the second, that is, indirect method of assessment through the implementation of permanent observation.

FAULTS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

Now let us dwell on the issue of the degree of objectivity and correctness of the methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of IT, recommended by non-secret statutory documents of the US armed forces. One of the most difficult and difficult factors for evaluating the effectiveness of an IO is that the information environment has no clear boundaries, does not depend on state borders on an operational and strategic scale, and also has no long-term consistency.

In some cases, the information environment is uncertain, influenced by the entire environment. This is especially true for operations in mountainous areas, as well as in desert or urban conditions. Therefore, it is very difficult to predict the information environment, which is characterized by unforeseen, unexpected natural or artificially created by the enemy, force majeure circumstances, especially in computer networks where the virus can “sleep” and start working on a command from the outside, whether it is an enemy or just a sabotage group. In such conditions it is difficult to select the most important indicators in advance or during the planning of the Oncological Institute and determine the measures of MOPs and MOEs.

The second difficult and important factor in evaluating the effectiveness of AI is that the objects of influence of AI are not only military equipment, weapon systems, but also people whose behavior and reaction are often unpredictable and not amenable to early registration. All this greatly complicates the correct selection of criteria for MOPs and MOEs. It is impossible to predict in advance the traffic of accidents, the breakdown of equipment and the resulting changes in the information environment.

There are also other factors affecting the effectiveness of IO, such as programmatic and financial - the training and preparedness of personnel, the availability of funds, as well as the capabilities and capabilities of the personnel of intelligence agencies and various specialists serving information-related funds.

Here it is worth paying attention to the fact that not only the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, according to the statutes of the US Armed Forces, is specifically programmatic and financial.

Evaluating the effectiveness of the use of any weapons and combat equipment in the operation, not to mention the means of mass destruction, is also programmatic and financial and will have its specific criteria and indicators (MOPs and MOEs), since the overall success of the operation depends not only on the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute.

On the other hand, the specificity of the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of IO does not lie in their programmatic or financial area, as specialists in the US military believe, but in the fact that the information environment is assessed, which, as mentioned above, in some cases is very inconstant and difficult to predict. In addition, its specificity lies in the means and systems themselves, which use electromagnetic radiation in various forms and to varying degrees, which ensure their use and influence the efficiency of their use. In a number of cases, the use of information-interfaced means exerts a negative influence on each other, on personnel, on the tactical and operational environment, which particularly applies to such means and systems as means of interference and directed energy. The specificity of the choice of criteria and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute can arise spontaneously, at any phase of the hostilities, when solving any tactical, operational or strategic task, including in the area of ​​information gathering and intelligence gathering. It can also occur as a result of an unexpected reaction of the adversary to the informational impact or as a result of the inability to change the actions of their forces or their tasks. In addition, the specificity of evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute is associated with the emergence and development of conflict situations in the cyber-electromagnetic field using WIS of various types of troops and types of aircraft. The cognitive characteristics of people and the possible bias of analysts, which will affect the accuracy of evaluating the effectiveness of IO, can also be attributed to the specificity of the selection criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of an IO.

In a real situation, there may be other factors that determine the specificity of evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, which impede or impede the objectivity of this assessment, which sometimes makes it impossible to use predetermined criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute and ways to implement them in certain operating conditions, as well as to ensure early planning operations.

All the above specific aspects of the command of the US Armed Forces, of course, understand and take into account, but do not disclose them in unclassified regulations, manuals and instructions. Therefore, as evidenced by the provisions of the JP 3-13, JP 5 and JP 6 charters, when evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, it is recommended to proceed from corrected versions of prospective accidents, taking into account the theory of probability, as well as the fact that in life there is no complete lack of negative factors in operational and information environment, and it is necessary to emphasize the possibility of forecasting the information environment and achieving the necessary performance evaluation as a result of the comparison and comparative with similar conditions in analysis operations; determining the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, which would ensure the establishment of interrelations of private negative accidents and the possibility of minimizing them, allowing for a relatively reliable determination of the criteria and indicators of the Oncological Institute, taking into account certain conditions of the operational and information environment and actors of its formation.

Therefore, despite the fact that the charter of JP 3-13 considers it possible with a certain degree of reliability to provide a relatively reliable level of prediction of the effectiveness of evaluating IO, it can hardly be considered that the methodology of evaluating the effectiveness of IO determined by it is final and fully completed.

It is obvious that in the secret documents of each type of the US Armed Forces there are additional instructions for improving and clarifying the general methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of informational weapons. It can be assumed that they take into account the presence of available information-related capabilities of the troops, their features in each type of armed forces, the nature and scale of operations, modern views on its conduct, conditions of the theater of operations, including features of the opposing enemy, its equipment and views on the conduct of operations ; It should be assumed that political, religious and national peculiarities existing in theaters are also taken into account.

In conclusion, we note that the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute is a complex, continuous iterative process that constitutes one of the most important parts of the process of assessing the operational situation, which is necessary for the optimal decision-making by commanders both in determining the plan of the operation and in case of changes in the operational situation. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute should be performed by specially trained personnel with the highest qualifications. All personnel of the Armed Forces should undergo special training and education in the implementation of cyber-electromagnetic activities of troops: in determining the state of informational and evaluating the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, the entire leadership of the formations, the operational planning and planning agencies of the Oncological Institute, as well as personnel related to use of information-related capabilities of the troops.

Moreover, although the statutes of the US Armed Forces allow assessment of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute at a considerable distance from the theater, this assessment should only be carried out directly in the combat area, with the involvement of operational planning personnel (with the participation of multidisciplinary WIS specialists) with high qualifications in the field of cyber-electromagnetic activities. As a duplication of the results of the assessment and expert evaluation of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, highly qualified specialists of the Ministry of Taxes and Tax Collection can be involved. If necessary, experts should be sent to the theater of operations to strengthen the EUT assessment teams.

It is hardly advisable to evaluate the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute remotely, from remote territories and using space communications systems (as recommended by the charter JP 3-13, 2014) for this, since this estimate may not correspond to the informational situation in the combat area in time parameters. In addition, space communication systems used to transmit evaluation data can be suppressed by radio interference. Automation systems used to control spacecraft may be infected with viruses, reprogrammed or blocked, and spacecraft themselves may be de-asserted or destroyed. That is, there is always a certain degree of risk of inconsistency between the assessment of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute and the actual operational or informational situation in a combat area.

An advance assessment of the effectiveness of the Oncological Institute, even in a combat area, can only serve as baseline data, since it is impossible to predict in advance what real informational environment will prove to be both at the beginning of the operation and during it and as a result of the enemy’s reaction (according to information obtained by its intelligence) on io. Even when conducting a comparative analysis, as recommended by the charter of JP 3-13, the real information situation may not be at all the same as it was before in this combat area, even if it exactly coincides in all parameters. This is explained by the fact that the state of the information environment is influenced not only by the composition of the group of information-related forces and assets, but also by natural phenomena, changes in the composition of the group, its characteristics and capabilities of information-related systems and facilities of various multinational forces of its troops and enemy forces in the intended operations. All these circumstances in advance are very difficult to take into account, and they are always associated with great risk.
Author:
Originator:
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2015-08-28/1_info.html
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  1. Inok10
    Inok10 30 August 2015 01: 45 New
    +4
    Even when conducting a comparative analysis, as recommended by the charter of JP 3-13, the real information situation may turn out to be completely different from what it was before in this combat area, even if it exactly matches all the parameters. This is because the state of the information situation is affected not only by the composition of the grouping of information-related forces and assets, but also by natural phenomena, changes in the composition of the group, its characteristics and capabilities of information-related systems and means of various multinational forces of its troops and enemy troops in the alleged operations. It is very difficult to take into account all these circumstances in advance, and they are always associated with great risk.
    .. eloquently .. hi .. and, how many were higher than the definitions and conclusions .. you are amazed .. by the mattresses, even the banal lodges and lies have been adopted as weapons .. although why be surprised .. Nazi Germany went the same way, there is someone to learn mattresses from .. hi
  2. Buryi
    Buryi 30 August 2015 02: 08 New
    +2
    Quote: Inok10
    Even when conducting a comparative analysis, as recommended by the charter of JP 3-13, the real information situation may turn out to be completely different from what it was before in this combat area, even if it exactly matches all the parameters. This is because the state of the information situation is affected not only by the composition of the grouping of information-related forces and assets, but also by natural phenomena, changes in the composition of the group, its characteristics and capabilities of information-related systems and means of various multinational forces of its troops and enemy troops in the alleged operations. It is very difficult to take into account all these circumstances in advance, and they are always associated with great risk.
    .. eloquently .. hi .. and, how many were higher than the definitions and conclusions .. you are amazed .. by the mattresses, even the banal lodges and lies have been adopted as weapons .. although why be surprised .. Nazi Germany went the same way, there is someone to learn mattresses from .. hi
  3. Throw
    Throw 30 August 2015 03: 30 New
    +8

    and the provisions of the statutes of JP 3-13, JP 5 and JP 6, when assessing the effectiveness of AI, it is recommended to proceed from adjusted versions of promising accidents taking into account probability theory, as well as the fact that in life it is unrealistic that there are no negative factors in the operational and information environment, and focus on the ability to predict the information environment and achieve the necessary performance assessment as a result of a comparison and comparative with similar conditions in previously conducted analysis operations; determining the effectiveness of AI, which would ensure the establishment of interconnections of private negative accidents and the possibility of minimizing them, allowing relatively reliably determine the criteria and indicators of AI, taking into account certain conditions of the operational and informational situation and the actors in its formation

    Having read this paragraph, Colonel Mac Grisby quietly closed the Charter, left the office and, wearing a dress uniform with orders and personal weapons, carefully committed suicide ...
  4. polite people
    polite people 30 August 2015 04: 20 New
    -1
    We have one answer to this - our electronic warfare will crush all the attempts of mattress covers to dust.
    1. 222222
      222222 30 August 2015 08: 56 New
      +4
      polite people (1) RU Today, 04:20
      We have one answer to this - our electronic warfare will crush all the attempts of mattress covers to dust. "
      ... before applying electronic warfare .. thousands of ways .. information exposure ..
      ..THIS A DAY IN HISTORY ...

      "AUGUST 30 IN HISTORY. NORTH WAR.
      On the same day of 1700, Tsar Peter I declared war on Sweden, considering the main priority of Russian foreign policy to access the Baltic Sea and return the lands captured by Sweden at the beginning of the 1699th century. Claims against Sweden were also held by the Polish king and Saxon elector August II the Strong, who in 150 formed the Northern Union against Sweden with Peter I, and later Denmark, led by Frederick IV, joined them. Sweden was then the most powerful power in the region, the armed forces, numbering about 42 thousand people, were well armed and had rich experience in military operations, rightfully considered the best in Western Europe. The Swedish fleet consisted of 12 battleships and 13 frigates (this is 200 thousand people). Russia, although it possessed a huge army (about XNUMX thousand people), was economically weak, and the weapons left much to be desired. Russia did not have a fleet in this theater of operations.
      The war was called the North and lasted 21 years. The Russian army, starting with devastating defeats, was so strengthened and professionally grown by the end that the Swedes were forced to make peace. In 1721, the Nishtadt peace was concluded, according to which Russia received eternal use of Livonia, Estonia, Ingria and part of Karelia with Vyborg, and Peter I, in turn, returned Finland and 2 million rubles to the Swedes. The first window to Europe was cut through. "" "
  5. afdjhbn67
    afdjhbn67 30 August 2015 04: 32 New
    +1
    It is very difficult to take into account all these circumstances in advance, and they are always associated with great risk.
    Author Yuri Gorbachev

    And why then did you write so many letters ?? repeat
  6. Maxim Shilin
    Maxim Shilin 30 August 2015 08: 05 New
    +1
    The Goebbels case is as lively as ever, not for nothing that after the Second World War they brought all the captured Nazis to themselves for cooperation ...
  7. Doctor Savage
    Doctor Savage 30 August 2015 08: 44 New
    +2
    Bukaff was zealous.
    Piled in an indigestible pile.
  8. Nyrobsky
    Nyrobsky 30 August 2015 09: 12 New
    +2
    "" "" At the same time, in the USA, the requirements to the quality of training of specialists providing cyber-electromagnetic activity of troops are increasing, and their number is increasing. These specialists include the command of the US Armed Forces as personnel directly using cyber-electromagnetic means and systems, as well as personnel of control bodies that are involved in preparing and making decisions, planning operations and managing information operations (IO).
    And these "students" undergo practical training, posing as daughters of Russian officers and "serving Far Easterners" ..
  9. roskot
    roskot 30 August 2015 09: 59 New
    +1
    Everything for the front, everything for victory — the distortion of facts, slander, undisguised lies. And everything about us.
  10. Vasisualiy
    Vasisualiy 30 August 2015 11: 06 New
    +2
    Apparently all this is a term paper of a student at a military institute? Weakly wound. Learn from Volkogonov.
  11. cost75
    cost75 30 August 2015 17: 23 New
    +1
    yes, it seems very abstract on the abstract
  12. Aleksey_K
    Aleksey_K 30 August 2015 18: 04 New
    +5
    About the Author: Yuri Emelyanovich Gorbachev - Leading Researcher, Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor, Retired Colonel, former Head of the Electronic Warfare Service of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
    Well, quite like Lenin, he came up with new terms that are not in the cyberspace of the Internet: "digitalization" and "cyber-electromagnetic means and systems." I decided to search in the search engine and did not find it.
    Another Gorbachev with his “consensus”. And the word "cyber-electromagnetic" is generally a tautology, because all cyber devices and so electromagnetic, other sources of energy besides electricity, i.e. electromagnetic energy, not yet.
    1. afdjhbn67
      afdjhbn67 31 August 2015 03: 26 New
      0
      great comment, I'm becoming your fan right .. good
    2. sa-zz
      sa-zz 31 August 2015 07: 41 New
      0
      It turns out - our man (albeit a SURNAME). A lot of incomprehensible words - I received money (silver pieces?) - in the airliner jelly and overload with a wedge.
      Long live the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation!
  13. Star Huntsman
    Star Huntsman 30 August 2015 21: 22 New
    +1
    a lot of unnecessary information ... you’ll go crazy on the battlefield)))
  14. Coboklo
    Coboklo 31 August 2015 03: 47 New
    0
    So what? Are we going to go now? Why runoff of scribble for all known even pioneers, circumstances?
  15. chelovektapok
    chelovektapok 31 August 2015 18: 21 New
    0
    The "exceptional" again flew in connection with the isolation of their "theories" from practice. Teretiks and theorists engaged in copulation in the Harvard library and urinating the founder’s urine, as always, confused the military action with the study of the propagation of warthogs in the conditions of the drought of Mount Kilimanjaro. Money mastered by itself. Those $ 20 million aimed at destroying the "Kremlin propaganda" were spent by Canadian dill on obscene comments on social networks and stupid copying of manuals where possible. "Shot in milk"! Congratulations to the State Department with the money thrown out to parasites, dumb with it!