Two Ukraine and one solution
With all its relevance and obvious chances for successful implementation, the Eurasian integration proclaimed by Putin may stumble upon a serious obstacle in the form of Ukraine
Vladimir Putin dedicated his programmatic article to the Eurasian Union. Society this message was taken very seriously. The article itself was very cautious and moderate, it once again emphasized the importance of integration processes in the economy for post-Soviet countries. However, those familiar with the issue saw something more in it - a brief and succinct presentation of a very specific strategic course, which is likely to become the axis of Putin’s reign after his return to the presidency in March 2012.
Putin speaks mainly about the economy, but nonetheless does not limit himself to listing economic integration initiatives (the Customs Union, EurAsEC, CES) and at the end of the text utters the cherished phrase - “Eurasian Union”, unambiguously hinting at an analogue of the European Union. And this cannot be an accident: Putin outlines a higher geopolitical and political goal over the processes of economic integration. Creation of a new supranational entity in the territory of Northern Eurasia, built on a community of civilizational belonging.
As the European Union, uniting countries and societies belonging to the European civilization, began with the unification of coal and steel, in order to gradually develop into a new supranational entity with its own, while nominal, but president, parliament, with its currency and general socio-economic strategy, and the Eurasian Union is designated by Putin as a long-term reference point, goal, horizon of the historical path. And this is serious.
Declaration of the Eurasian Union: semantics
The ideas of the Eurasian Union from the beginning of the 90-ies were developed in parallel in two countries - in Kazakhstan by President N. A. Nazarbayev and in Russia by the "Eurasian Movement". Nazarbayev, in 1994, in Moscow, voiced this project of political integration of the post-Soviet space and even proposed a draft constitution of the Eurasian Union, which in general repeats the constitution of the European Union. In the epoch of general collapse and intensive separatist processes, this looked extravagant and clearly out of time. But Nazarbayev’s insight can be envied, he clearly understood then that sooner or later the moment for political Eurasian integration would surely come.
On the other hand, the ideas of the Eurasian Union were actively developed by the Eurasian Movement in Russia, continuing the line of the first Russian Eurasians who laid the foundations of this political philosophy. The creation of the Eurasian Union has become the main historical, the political and ideological goal of Russian Eurasians, since this project embodied all the basic values and ideals of Eurasianism as a complete political philosophy.
Thus, Putin, referring to the Eurasian Union, designated a political concept, loaded with colossal political and geopolitical sense.
The Eurasian Union as a concrete embodiment of the Eurasian project contains at the same time three levels: planetary, regional and domestic.
On a planetary scale, we are talking about the establishment of a multipolar model instead of a unipolar or "non-polar" (global) world, where only a powerful integrated regional entity can be a pole (exceeding in scale, its aggregate economic, military-strategic and energy potential separately even the largest powers).
On a regional scale, it is about creating an integration education capable of representing the pole of a multipolar world. In the West, such an integration project can be the European Union. For Russia, this means the integration of the post-Soviet space into a single strategic bloc.
At the domestic political level, Eurasianism is identical to the assertion of strategic centralism, which does not allow even a hint of the presence within the country of the prototypes of national statehood represented by the subjects of the federation. But at the same time it means strengthening the cultural, linguistic and social identity of those ethnic groups that traditionally belong to Russia.
In his assessments of the international situation, Putin has repeatedly declared multipolarity. In recent years, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov regularly mentions a “polycentric world order” as the most desirable model for organizing the structure of international relations.
Putin started talking about the need to distinguish between a nation (political education) and ethnic groups in domestic politics from the spring-summer of 2011, and this means that here the Eurasian model was adopted.
Thus, the mention of the Eurasian Union is not something isolated, but enters the context of the system model that Putin is consistently building on the eve of his new presidency. All three Eurasian vectors are available.
So, we need to prepare for the fact that it is Eurasianism, and not liberal democracy (as many supporters of the current President Dmitry Medvedev expected) to become the prevailing political philosophy in Russia in the very near future.
But from this joyful statement for Eurasians and not very joyful for atlantists and Westerners, one should turn to the question of what are the real prospects for the creation of a Eurasian Union? What resources for this integration do we have? What obstacles and challenges await us on this path? Which of the neighboring countries can we count on? Who should be expected to counter or trick?
Reconcile with reality
It is possible to analyze the process of Eurasian integration and its prerequisites with any degree of detail. And such monitoring should be done regularly and at various levels. But if we talk about the hierarchy of problems, then the most serious and deepest problem today is the Ukrainian question.
The Eurasian Union will be created in its core, if it includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. This is a necessary and sufficient minimum of integration. This in no way diminishes the meaning of other states, but these four countries create a critical mass that will allow us to speak with confidence about the creation of the Eurasian Union. These countries make the Union a reality - irreversibly and decisively.
With respect to Kazakhstan and Belarus, there are no fundamental problems. Separate details can slow down integration, but the presidents of these countries consistently and steadily pursue a line on integration with Russia into a single supranational entity. This is the political will of both Nazarbayev and Lukashenko. Separate difficulties should not overshadow the main thing: our countries as a whole are ready for integration, and their political leadership as a whole shares precisely the Eurasian positions. Putin with his initiative in this matter is not the first. But the fate of the Eurasian Union depends on Moscow and its political will. Without Russia's determination, consistency and efficiency, there can be no integration at all.
But where the real problems begin is in Ukraine. This is the weakest point of integration and the biggest question for the prospects for the creation of a Eurasian Union.
Ukrainian problem: civilization dimension
In the light of the creation of the Eurasian Union, Ukraine is a real problem. This problem cannot be reduced only to the capriciousness, unprincipledness and venality of the Ukrainian political elites, who prefer to bargain with the West and Russia for volumes of influence, gaining their own capital on this. It is also wrong to reduce everything to the presence of Ukrainian nationalism or the work of American networks of influence. These factors are present, but are not decisive. Everything is much more complicated.
The fact is that regional integration presupposes the existence of a common civilizational basis. It is on this principle that the countries of the European Union were united, and it also forms the basis of Eurasian integration. Unite societies with similar civilization code.
In this sense, Ukraine is a society with a dual identity. We see in her an Eastern Orthodox Slavic country with the same historical roots as the Great Russians and Belarusians. But at the same time, since the epoch of specific Russia, the contradictions between the western and eastern Russian principalities have become not only significant, but also affect the geopolitical and sociological foundations of the respective societies. The struggle between the Vladimir and Galitsky princes for the Kiev Grand Duke's throne reflects not just the intradynastic squabbles of the Rurik elder branch, but also two types of society, which gradually establish themselves in the east and west of Ancient Russia.
Vladimir Russia to the autocratic model, Galician and Volyn Rus more reproduces the feudal-aristocratic model of its Eastern European neighbors (Poland, Hungary, etc.). In the Horde period, this civilizational division intensifies, and gradually the western regions of the former united Kievan Rus acquire quite distinctive civilizational features - with the strong influence of the Lithuanian principle, Polish gentry, Catholicism and uniatism.
At the same time, not all the territory of present-day Ukraine can be defined as the Russian West: this Western Russian identity was really deep-rooted only in Western Ukraine, where it became predominant. In eastern Ukraine, on the contrary, the all-Russian type dominates, mixed with the Cossack social tradition. In central Ukraine, a mixed society. Crimea is predominantly populated by Great Russians.
The West-Ukrainian factor claims to form, on its basis, around itself as a core, a special “Ukrainian nation” that affirms its differences primarily in the face of Russia and its social identity. The Ukrainian idea is thus an anti-Russian, anti-Moscow idea. For this segment of the Ukrainian society, Europe is a natural civilization environment, and Russia is seen as a “colonial force”. It is here that the origins of Ukrainian nationalism originate, influencing to one degree or another on all Ukrainian society.
No matter how we feel about this, it is necessary to accept an empirical fact: in the composition of modern Ukraine, there is a substantial “zapadensky” component that consistently and persistently attributes Ukraine to European civilization and considers any rapprochement with the East as “new enslavement of Ukraine under the fifth Muscovites”. This is a steady trend, not a result of surface propaganda. In this case, we are dealing with a refusal to recognize a common civilizational identity with Russia, and, therefore, a very serious objection to any integration initiatives. Given this pole, Ukraine cannot fully enter the integration process, which means that the prospect of creating a Eurasian Union is being postponed.
The value of Ukraine
But in order for the Eurasian Union to become a truly powerful world pole of a multipolar polycentric architecture, Ukraine must necessarily be inside it. This is well understood by geopolitics, including American, unequivocally opposing the strengthening of the role of Russia and Eurasia as a whole in the world. So, Zbigniew Brzezinski warns in his articles and books about the need to embroil Ukraine with Russia by any means in order to deprive this potential bloc of even the theoretical possibility of becoming a serious independent force in the future that can limit US interests in this zone of the world and pursue its policy independent of the Americans. If Ukraine joins the Eurasian bloc, Susha wins. If it can be torn off and brought under the control of atlantism, the West acquires the most important trump card and gets into its own hands a powerful lever of deterring Russia's potential geopolitical revival.
Therefore, Moscow cannot just delete Ukraine from the integration project and the whole process of building the Eurasian Union? To become successful, he must somehow solve the Ukrainian problem.
Eastern Ukraine - integration card
In Ukrainian society, along with the Western core, there is another sociocultural field, which, on the contrary, is towards Russia, stands for integration, is aware of the proximity, if not identity, with Great Russians and Belarusians. In this vein, the factors of the common historical past, and Orthodoxy as the predominant religion, and the Russian language, and the cultural and psychological proximity of societies work. In Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, this identity is predominant, which is reflected in the constant and unchanged electoral process, when residents of the East and Crimea steadily vote for those politicians who promise rapprochement with Russia or at least establishing good neighborly relations with it. This is a powerful potential for integration, which in no case should not be neglected.
Ukraine today consists of two identities, two peoples. The Western core is aware of itself as part of Europe. Eastern and southern regions refer to the Russian-Eurasian civilization. The East has nothing against integration, the West opposes it stubbornly and purposefully. The border between civilizations, in the case of Ukraine, does not coincide with state borders, but divides this country into two almost equal parts, passing approximately along the Dnieper. The right bank to Europe, the left bank to Russia and, accordingly, to the Eurasian Union and other forms of integration (preliminary and economic - the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space, etc.).
So, there are two Ukraine, and not one, and at the same time their geopolitical vectors are directly opposite.
Three integration strategies of Ukraine
How in such a situation should we move towards the creation of a Eurasian Union, if this goal is not simple desire or election rhetoric, but a clearly set goal based on historical and political will and readiness to use serious resources in this process?
Based on the position of realism in international relations, you can call things by their own names and sketch a number of scenarios, not particularly complying with the rules and norms of diplomatic correctness.
The first scenario: the partition of Ukraine. Ukraine as a state in the current borders is something completely new, it does not have a well-established historical tradition, and the political contradictions tearing it away reflect its artificial character. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to create a common national idea capable of uniting the nation on the basis of two mutually exclusive sociological and civilizational attitudes. Associated with this is the volatility of Ukrainian politics, its grotesque and almost balagan character.
The initiators of the development of the national idea are the Westerners, but its wording is stubbornly rejected by the societies of the east and south of Ukraine. Therefore, no idea and can not be formulated. And, most likely, will not succeed. Therefore, it is possible to predict the collapse of this country into two zones - the western and south-eastern. In this case, the southeast zone is naturally integrated into the Eurasian Union and the problem is solved.
Are there any prerequisites for such a turn of events? Of course, there is, and in recent years, Ukraine has repeatedly stood on the verge of civil conflict, especially after the Orange Revolution.
Does Russia have the levers to facilitate such a turn of affairs? There is, and if necessary they can be created additionally. If we treat Eurasian integration with full responsibility, then such a scenario cannot be excluded.
The second scenario: a difficult game with the pragmatic leadership of Ukraine in order to convince him to accept the integration project under the pressure of circumstances or taking into account the serious and tangible political, economic and energy benefits. This scenario could be bloodless, but the degree of its probability would increase if Ukraine faced very serious socio-economic difficulties. The economic crisis and increasing chaos in the European and world economies create favorable conditions for this. If you wait for the right moment, if possible trying not to ease, but aggravate the difficulties, Kiev may find itself in a situation where it simply does not have any other way out than Eurasian integration.
To implement this scenario, diplomatic services should be put on high alert, include detailed monitoring and geopolitical analysis of events that affect Ukraine in one way or another on a global or regional scale. Launch a project of close work with the Ukrainian elites, deploy network processes on the territory of Ukraine, similar to the Western, but with a reverse geopolitical sign - towards integration and rapprochement with Russia. The factor of energy, economic and legal pressure in this will undoubtedly play a significant role, but one should not forget about other multifactor opportunities to exert influence - including through social, scientific, cultural, informational and other projects. This should be a real battle for Ukraine, involving from Russia the most talented and passionary cadres thrown into the cause of integration.
One cannot ignore the importance of social problems, the existence of which will facilitate the implementation of these plans.
The third scenario (the most avant-garde) is to work closely with the core of Ukrainian zapadensky nationalism, which, ideologically, by definition and the laws of the genre cannot be fully in harmony with the cultural values of liberalism, individualism, tolerance, multiculturalism, human rights ideology and other postmodern standards dominant in modern western society. The West in recent decades has put nationalism and any form of collective identity virtually outlawed. National states merge into a single civil society. In such a situation, the construction of the “Ukrainian nation” becomes a project completely incompatible with the Western liberal system of values. For pragmatic and anti-Russian motives, Western networks of influence support Ukrainian nationalism, but in fact it will be outlawed (like all other forms of nationalism) as soon as it merges with Western society.
Ukrainian nationalism, as we have seen, is the main obstacle to the implementation of the Eurasian integration project. But you can try to turn poison into medicine, and the enemy into a friend. The Eurasian Union should be thought of as a model that preserves the traditions and cultural characteristics of societies, ethnic groups and organic groups. Consequently, Ukrainians as an identity can be preserved only in its composition, whereas in a liberal individualistic European society, collective identity will quickly undergo erosion and then be criminalized. It is precisely with this that national movements in Eastern European countries face, increasingly recognizing that, having come out of Soviet control, they find themselves in an equally dependent situation, only now from new ideological masters, liberals, who, however, also suppress nationalism, as earlier Soviet ideological instances.
Ukraine as a challenge to the next term of Putin’s presidency
Among these three strategies, one can choose one, or two can be conducted simultaneously in parallel, and with a certain skill of owning foreign policy tools, one could try to move forward in all directions simultaneously in an American fashion. If enough will, intelligence and perseverance are applied to this, it is possible to count on success.
Having dealt with the Ukrainian problem for many years, I clearly noted one circumstance: Moscow has not yet made a decisive choice in favor of integration, has not made efforts in this direction, has not developed any effective structures designed to act actively and consistently. The whole policy was hesitant; from hard pressure (as if it was a question of a simple economic competitor) turned to unjustified and unconditional concessions; at the same time, corruption schemes for mastering the budget by various rogue political consultants finally killed all hope of consistency, consistency and efficiency. The valve and the personal arrangements of the first persons were the main and only argument. It is not surprising in such a situation that today no solid and outstanding success in this direction has been made. And this is putting it mildly.
If Putin’s words about the Eurasian Union have a real content, then the situation simply has to change. Everything is quite simple here: either Russia is engaged in integration for real, or imitates the process. In the second case, everything will be exactly as it is now. If the decision is made, then everything in the sphere of Russian-Ukrainian relations should change. And in the very near future.
Eurasian integration can either be done or not done. All intermediate, escaping and containing in themselves internal contradiction scenarios, in fact, paralyzing activity in all directions, have exhausted themselves. For Putin, as the future president, a clear and consistent strategy is needed; the limit of inertial gratitude of the population for the country he saved from collapse and collapse at the beginning of the 2000-s is almost exhausted. Putin needs something new, aimed at the future, understandable to the majority of the population, implemented consistently, decisively, effectively. Eurasian integration is a worthy goal and a serious historical challenge. Putin will cope with this - he will truly strengthen his legitimacy, create it anew. He will not cope - he will continue to exploit the old services and will create a lot of problems for himself and the country and us.
Putin returns to the Kremlin as a Eurasian. And if his first appearance at the head of state depended on whether he could stop the collapse of Russia and prevent a repeat of the fate of the USSR, then the success of integration of the post-Soviet space will logically become a touchstone. If he copes with this, he will go down in the history of Russia as a great ruler.
People remember only great things. And only power and strength provide the ruler with fame, freedom, security, and respect for everyone, even enemies.
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