Pandshirskiy Lion Hunting
Friendly Russia Afghanistan went into oblivion with Ahmad Shah Massoud
Afghanistan "pushed the Soviet state to collapse: the party nomenclature could not adequately respond to the challenges of the times, exacerbated by the problems associated with this war."
The cited opinion of Vyacheslav Akhmadullin, lecturer at Moscow Islamic University, candidate historical sciences, not isolated. The Afghan war has indeed placed a heavy burden on the Soviet economy. In one of the works of Professor Vladimir Toporkov, the following facts are given: “The direct losses of the Soviet Union (after the introduction of troops into Afghanistan - I. Kh.) In foreign currency caused by the US embargo on grain supplies to the USSR in 1980 amounted to two billion dollars. Noticeable losses were also incurred as a result of restrictions on the purchase of American equipment and technology. "
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan also led to the fact that for the first time in its history the USSR found itself, albeit in partial, but isolation, even among ideological comrades-in-arms. “The Afghan factor also exacerbated the already existing problems in relations between the CPSU and the international communist and labor movement,” writes Toporkov. - The Communist Party of Spain evaluated the Soviet action as interference in the internal affairs of another country, the British Communists announced intervention in Afghanistan and a forced change of government, the Italian Communist Party opposed this kind of assistance to the Afghan revolution and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The actions of the USSR were condemned by the communists of Japan, Sweden, Mexico and some other countries. A number of socialist states, in which the activity of the opposition was intensified by the ruling communist parties, also reacted disapprovingly to the Soviet foreign policy action. ”
And despite the fact that the USSR traditionally distinguished good-neighborly, although sometimes difficult relations with its southern neighbor. For example, during the Moscow 1978 talks, President Daud reacted rather harshly to Brezhnev’s concern about the appearance of Western advisers in the Afghan army, stating that his government hires someone he wants and no one can dictate to him what to do.
Nevertheless, the relationship was not spoiled, as evidenced by the figures: at the time of the Saur revolution, with the direct assistance of the USSR, the 73 facility was commissioned in Afghanistan, and 638 was still under construction. The Soviet Union accounted for 22 percent of all Afghan students studying abroad. From 1972 to 1976, the bilateral trade volume increased from 68,9 to 154 million rubles a year.
The entry of the Soviet Limited Contingent became a serious strategic miscalculation of the Kremlin, for overnight the USSR turned for a significant part of the Afghans from friend to enemy. What was Moscow guided by when making such a fatal decision for the fate of the country? Fear of creating American military bases in Afghanistan? But such predictions were unfounded: by the end of the 70's, the United States had not really recovered from the defeat in Vietnam. Recall that the Americans were removed from this country in 1973 year and would hardly have decided on a new aggression, because that would be the case when the “infidel” people of Afghanistan would appear on their land that we actually see today.
Now let us ask ourselves a question: did the Kremlin still have a chance to correct the mistake made and even turn the Mujahideen, if not allies, but at least not into enemies? It seems, yes. With which of the many leaders of resistance could the Soviet leadership establish a constructive dialogue and contribute to a relatively painless change of power in Afghanistan? In our opinion, with Pandshirsky lion - Ahmad Shah Masood. And here the interests of the country should have come to the fore for Moscow, even to the detriment of ideological preferences. And from the point of view of geopolitics, having Afghanistan as an ally (to be more precise, a state with a truly friendly population and a government supported by it) was more advantageous for the USSR than a hostile one.
Under the banner of Islam
However, in this case, even the ideological sympathies of the Kremlin would not have been renounced in essence, for the first leaders of Soviet Russia already understood the importance of the Islamic factor as a counterweight to the imperialistic West in the international arena. It was with Muslim countries that diplomatic relations were established at the dawn of the Bolshevik power: in 1919 with Afghanistan, a year later with Iran and Turkey. Akhmadullin recalls interesting facts: “To raise the authority of the USSR among Muslim states at a Politburo meeting in May 1926, JV Stalin supported the idea of providing Sovtorgflot ships to Soviet pilgrims to perform the Hajj ... The USSR was the first state to recognize the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, then Hejaz. He succeeded in turning the founder of the new state, King Ibn Saud, into a strategic partner of the USSR, achieving access of Soviet goods to the local market, and organizing a shipping link with Odessa. ”
In 20, the Bolsheviks even managed to push aside the traditional master in the Middle East region - the UK. This was reflected in the failure, according to Akhmadullin, "of the pro-British Ummah forum in Cairo, but very effective and spectacular work of the Muslim congress in Mecca (under the auspices of the USSR. - I. Kh.)". Recall also the close military-technical cooperation of the Soviet Union with the Islamic countries of the Middle East in the 60 – 70-s. However, in the same period, the Kremlin made a number of miscalculations in its relations with the Muslim world, in particular, relations with Sadat were spoiled. A similar mistake, alas, was made in Afghanistan. Here she expressed herself in the support of the extremely unpopular pro-Soviet regime.
However, outwardly it seemed that the Kremlin had drawn the right conclusions and was ready to return to the policy of cooperation with the Muslim world, as announced at the XXVI CPSU Congress held in 1981 year: “The liberation struggle can unfold under the banner of Islam. This is evidenced by the experience of history, including the most recent ... We will actively support all steps useful for the cause of peace and democracy. In the conditions of the current aggravation of the international situation, cooperation ... with religious circles, with all ... peace-loving forces in matters of preventing war and consolidating peace seems to us important. "
And if these were not words, but a strategic plan for establishing genuine peace in Afghanistan and reviving good relations with him, the figure of Massoud for the Soviet leadership would become the only acceptable one in the negotiation process. Below we will try to argue this statement. In the meantime, we should note that already at the beginning of 80 for the Kremlin should have become obvious: the PDPA government, torn by internal contradictions and petty intrigues, does not enjoy the support of the population and without military assistance from the USSR is doomed to a speedy crash. Actually, this was confirmed by subsequent events, which could not be affected by the change of scenery - from Karmal to Najibullah. As for the Afghan army, until the fall of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, its non-recoverable ailment was desertion, and its combat capability remained low with the exception of some units, primarily Commando, and Tsarandoi, which was organizationally subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Commander by the will of Allah
The weakness of Kabul was understood by the mujahideen, the same Masood, during negotiations with the Soviet command, categorically refused to make any direct contacts with emissaries from Kabul. But the Pandshir lion agreed to deal with the Soviet leadership, as he did with him, because, according to the commander of the 40 Army, General Boris Gromov, “Ahmad Shah sincerely took care of ordinary people and they answered him with gratitude - among the Afghan population the authority of this field the commander was huge. Of course, the limited contingent command was extremely interested in finally persuading Massoud to cooperate with us and thereby eliminate bloody clashes in Pandscher and other northeastern provinces of Afghanistan. The efforts of the 40 Army Intelligence Center brought some results. In 1982, we managed the most important thing - we established fairly strong contacts with Ahmad Shah that did not stop until the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan ... In particular, already in 1982, 40 Army representatives and personally Ahmad Shah signed agreements it’s a question of Masud’s obligations to prevent the shelling of Soviet columns in the southern section of the Salang Pass, where he reigned supreme. ”
The above quotation contains not only the details of the agreements reached with the Pandshir Lion, but also explains why it was with him that the dialogue took place. You can refer to the memories of the former chief military adviser in Afghanistan, General Makhmut Gareev. In his memoirs, generally not sharing the enthusiastic gaze of Western analysts on this field commander as a military genius, he nonetheless acknowledges that Masood was a very talented leader of the Afghan opposition with good organizational skills.
What were the outstanding mind and organizational skills of the Pandshirsky lion? Gareev answers this question as follows: “He sought to curb all sorts of excesses against the local population. Mosques, schools, medical facilities, homes for residents who lost their homes, roads were built and rehabilitated in the areas controlled by them, roads were provided, assistance was rendered to the peasants ... ”
Moreover, unlike many Mujahideen, Masud was humane to Soviet prisoners of war. A clear evidence of this is the fate of Nikolai Bystrov, who has traveled from Soviet prisoner of war to his personal bodyguard, the Pandshirsky Lion. Here are the lines from his memories: “I was led past this group of Mujahideen, and suddenly I saw a man of medium height in light clothes, walking towards me. I also took a few more steps towards him and suddenly, even for myself, I extended my hand to him. The man calmly and confidently shook it. It was Ahmad Shah Masood. Of course, I didn’t know about it then, everything was somehow intuitive and subconscious ... I did not feel the enemy in him, but on the contrary, I saw an interest in myself and a desire to understand me. ”
Ahmad Shah not only did not kill the prisoners, but also tried to arrange them as far as possible, which is also indicated by Bystrov: “Masood brought us all together, seven people, and said:“ So guys, who wants to go abroad? Who wants to go back to the Soviet Union? To the Soviet Union, or to America, or to England, or to Pakistan, or to Iran? Which countries do you want? But everyone at that time was afraid to go back to their homeland. All raised their hands and said: "We want to go to America." One said: "I want to go to France." But only I did not raise my hand. He says: "Why do not you raise?". I say: “I don’t want anywhere — neither to America, anywhere”.
Kremlin's fatal mistake
What is the essence of the agreement with Ahmad Shah? According to General Gromov, in accordance with the agreement, Masud ordered his gangs to suspend active activities against government forces and wage an armed struggle primarily against gangs hostile to the IOA (Islamic Society of Afghanistan. - I. Kh.) Organizations.
Both the Soviet military and Ahmad Shah observed the truce, while the Kabul authorities were trying to break it: Afghan special forces tried to kill Masud. However, the Kremlin saw only the field commander in the Pandshir lion, and only gangs in his troops. In Moscow, it was believed that Masud was using an armistice with the 40 Army extended to 1984, only for a respite and a regrouping of forces.
This approach was a serious mistake, and it went against the above statements of the XXVI CPSU Congress about the need for fruitful cooperation with the Islamic world. For the support of Masud with the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan could have confused the maps of Pakistan and the United States behind it, the puppet of which Ahmad Shah had never been and would not have.
So why precisely on Massoud should bet in resolving the Afghan conflict? It is not only a matter of charisma, organizational skills and his concern for the local population. There are several reasons. One of them is in the moderation of the religious-political (precisely so, for in the Islamic world politics and religion are identical) the positions of Massoud. In the book devoted to him by Alexander Lyakhovsky and Vyacheslav Nekrasov “Citizen, politician, warrior” we read: “After a failed uprising (directed against Daud. - I. Kh.) In 1975, and B. Rabbani’s return from Saudi Arabia to the party, there was a split. G. Hekmatyar and his extremist supporters created a new party - Hezb-i-Islam-Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan). The more moderate Rabbani called his party “Jamiat Islam Islam of Afghanistan” (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), which mainly included representatives of northern peoples, including Ahmad Shah Massoud, who considered B. Rabbani his teacher and most worthy leader of the Islamic movement in Afghanistan. "
Note that in the fight against the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, it is Hekmatyar who will become, along with Massoud, a key figure in the leadership of the Mujahideen. But, as we see, he took a more radical position and categorically opposed any dialogue with Moscow. By the way, he did not complain about Washington either, refusing to meet with then-President Reagan. Add to this that Hekmatyar was much less charismatic than Masood, and, in contrast to Ahmad Shah, did not like the Soviet prisoners of war more cruelly.
Of course, Hekmatyar is not a small field commander, and it would have hardly been possible to avoid what happened in the country on 1992 — an armed confrontation between Masud and Hekmatyar. However, if the entire arsenal of the DRA and the Limited contingent armed forces were at the disposal of the Pandshir lion, as well as the areas controlled by the 40 army would be under his control, Hekmatiar would hardly be able to effectively resist Ahmad Shah, who would have the resources to suppress the Taliban movement “In the bud and thus save Afghanistan from a lot of misfortunes.
Add to this the possible transition to the side of the Pandshirsky lion of a very colorful figure in the Afghan army - General Abdul-Rashid Dostum, who led the 53 division of the DRA, and after the fall of the Kabul regime created a virtually independent state in the north-east of the country. General Gareev, in his own words, developed good relations with Dostum, which means that there was also the possibility of influencing him.
There was another reason why the Soviet leadership needed to establish a dialogue with Massoud. We again appeal to the book dedicated to him: “It must be said that due to the insufficiency of agricultural land in the valley, only a small number of Pandshir people were engaged in farming and cattle breeding. Most of the natives of Pandshhera were traditionally attracted to public service, earned their living by handicrafts and trade, as well as engaged in science and technology, culture, management, which contributed to the acquisition of a certain position in society by residents of Pandscher. In a word, many educated people, and not only rural laborers burdened with constant care, joined the Masud detachments. ”
In other words, in the process of political settlement, the intellectual elite and the emerging middle class of Afghanistan would mostly side with Massoud. And in the case of creating a tandem with Rabbani, Ahmad Shah would have found support from wide circles of moderate Islamic clergy.
Thus, the Rabbani-Massoud coalition, which Moscow could contribute to, would allow the USSR to maintain friendly relations with Afghanistan, prevent the Taliban’s victory and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and also prevent the US from entering the country.
In conclusion, we note that the personality factor played a decisive role both in the collapse of the USSR and in destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. The scale of the personality of Brezhnev in the late period of his reign, and to an even greater degree of Gorbachev, proved to be incomparable with the problems facing the country. The death of two charismatic and prominent military-political leaders in Afghanistan, Daoud and Ahmad Shah Massoud, led to the actual disintegration of the country and the military-economic consolidation of the United States in its territory, seeking not to help anyone else terrorism, but only to the sole possession of raw materials, human and economic resources.
Therefore, unlike Russia, Americans benefit from bloodshed in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Ukraine, which corresponds to the White House's strategy of controlled chaos. It, in turn, is an integral part of an even more global strategy called the Anaconda Loop, in which there is no place for a single and strong Russia, not a single and friendly Afghanistan, for whose revival Ahmad Shah Masood fought and died.
Afghanistan "pushed the Soviet state to collapse: the party nomenclature could not adequately respond to the challenges of the times, exacerbated by the problems associated with this war."
The cited opinion of Vyacheslav Akhmadullin, lecturer at Moscow Islamic University, candidate historical sciences, not isolated. The Afghan war has indeed placed a heavy burden on the Soviet economy. In one of the works of Professor Vladimir Toporkov, the following facts are given: “The direct losses of the Soviet Union (after the introduction of troops into Afghanistan - I. Kh.) In foreign currency caused by the US embargo on grain supplies to the USSR in 1980 amounted to two billion dollars. Noticeable losses were also incurred as a result of restrictions on the purchase of American equipment and technology. "
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan also led to the fact that for the first time in its history the USSR found itself, albeit in partial, but isolation, even among ideological comrades-in-arms. “The Afghan factor also exacerbated the already existing problems in relations between the CPSU and the international communist and labor movement,” writes Toporkov. - The Communist Party of Spain evaluated the Soviet action as interference in the internal affairs of another country, the British Communists announced intervention in Afghanistan and a forced change of government, the Italian Communist Party opposed this kind of assistance to the Afghan revolution and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The actions of the USSR were condemned by the communists of Japan, Sweden, Mexico and some other countries. A number of socialist states, in which the activity of the opposition was intensified by the ruling communist parties, also reacted disapprovingly to the Soviet foreign policy action. ”
And despite the fact that the USSR traditionally distinguished good-neighborly, although sometimes difficult relations with its southern neighbor. For example, during the Moscow 1978 talks, President Daud reacted rather harshly to Brezhnev’s concern about the appearance of Western advisers in the Afghan army, stating that his government hires someone he wants and no one can dictate to him what to do.
Nevertheless, the relationship was not spoiled, as evidenced by the figures: at the time of the Saur revolution, with the direct assistance of the USSR, the 73 facility was commissioned in Afghanistan, and 638 was still under construction. The Soviet Union accounted for 22 percent of all Afghan students studying abroad. From 1972 to 1976, the bilateral trade volume increased from 68,9 to 154 million rubles a year.
Ahmad Shah Massoud (center) was the one
a leader who could crush the Taliban
in the bud. Photo: google.com
a leader who could crush the Taliban
in the bud. Photo: google.com
The entry of the Soviet Limited Contingent became a serious strategic miscalculation of the Kremlin, for overnight the USSR turned for a significant part of the Afghans from friend to enemy. What was Moscow guided by when making such a fatal decision for the fate of the country? Fear of creating American military bases in Afghanistan? But such predictions were unfounded: by the end of the 70's, the United States had not really recovered from the defeat in Vietnam. Recall that the Americans were removed from this country in 1973 year and would hardly have decided on a new aggression, because that would be the case when the “infidel” people of Afghanistan would appear on their land that we actually see today.
Now let us ask ourselves a question: did the Kremlin still have a chance to correct the mistake made and even turn the Mujahideen, if not allies, but at least not into enemies? It seems, yes. With which of the many leaders of resistance could the Soviet leadership establish a constructive dialogue and contribute to a relatively painless change of power in Afghanistan? In our opinion, with Pandshirsky lion - Ahmad Shah Masood. And here the interests of the country should have come to the fore for Moscow, even to the detriment of ideological preferences. And from the point of view of geopolitics, having Afghanistan as an ally (to be more precise, a state with a truly friendly population and a government supported by it) was more advantageous for the USSR than a hostile one.
Under the banner of Islam
However, in this case, even the ideological sympathies of the Kremlin would not have been renounced in essence, for the first leaders of Soviet Russia already understood the importance of the Islamic factor as a counterweight to the imperialistic West in the international arena. It was with Muslim countries that diplomatic relations were established at the dawn of the Bolshevik power: in 1919 with Afghanistan, a year later with Iran and Turkey. Akhmadullin recalls interesting facts: “To raise the authority of the USSR among Muslim states at a Politburo meeting in May 1926, JV Stalin supported the idea of providing Sovtorgflot ships to Soviet pilgrims to perform the Hajj ... The USSR was the first state to recognize the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, then Hejaz. He succeeded in turning the founder of the new state, King Ibn Saud, into a strategic partner of the USSR, achieving access of Soviet goods to the local market, and organizing a shipping link with Odessa. ”
In 20, the Bolsheviks even managed to push aside the traditional master in the Middle East region - the UK. This was reflected in the failure, according to Akhmadullin, "of the pro-British Ummah forum in Cairo, but very effective and spectacular work of the Muslim congress in Mecca (under the auspices of the USSR. - I. Kh.)". Recall also the close military-technical cooperation of the Soviet Union with the Islamic countries of the Middle East in the 60 – 70-s. However, in the same period, the Kremlin made a number of miscalculations in its relations with the Muslim world, in particular, relations with Sadat were spoiled. A similar mistake, alas, was made in Afghanistan. Here she expressed herself in the support of the extremely unpopular pro-Soviet regime.
However, outwardly it seemed that the Kremlin had drawn the right conclusions and was ready to return to the policy of cooperation with the Muslim world, as announced at the XXVI CPSU Congress held in 1981 year: “The liberation struggle can unfold under the banner of Islam. This is evidenced by the experience of history, including the most recent ... We will actively support all steps useful for the cause of peace and democracy. In the conditions of the current aggravation of the international situation, cooperation ... with religious circles, with all ... peace-loving forces in matters of preventing war and consolidating peace seems to us important. "
And if these were not words, but a strategic plan for establishing genuine peace in Afghanistan and reviving good relations with him, the figure of Massoud for the Soviet leadership would become the only acceptable one in the negotiation process. Below we will try to argue this statement. In the meantime, we should note that already at the beginning of 80 for the Kremlin should have become obvious: the PDPA government, torn by internal contradictions and petty intrigues, does not enjoy the support of the population and without military assistance from the USSR is doomed to a speedy crash. Actually, this was confirmed by subsequent events, which could not be affected by the change of scenery - from Karmal to Najibullah. As for the Afghan army, until the fall of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, its non-recoverable ailment was desertion, and its combat capability remained low with the exception of some units, primarily Commando, and Tsarandoi, which was organizationally subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Commander by the will of Allah
The weakness of Kabul was understood by the mujahideen, the same Masood, during negotiations with the Soviet command, categorically refused to make any direct contacts with emissaries from Kabul. But the Pandshir lion agreed to deal with the Soviet leadership, as he did with him, because, according to the commander of the 40 Army, General Boris Gromov, “Ahmad Shah sincerely took care of ordinary people and they answered him with gratitude - among the Afghan population the authority of this field the commander was huge. Of course, the limited contingent command was extremely interested in finally persuading Massoud to cooperate with us and thereby eliminate bloody clashes in Pandscher and other northeastern provinces of Afghanistan. The efforts of the 40 Army Intelligence Center brought some results. In 1982, we managed the most important thing - we established fairly strong contacts with Ahmad Shah that did not stop until the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan ... In particular, already in 1982, 40 Army representatives and personally Ahmad Shah signed agreements it’s a question of Masud’s obligations to prevent the shelling of Soviet columns in the southern section of the Salang Pass, where he reigned supreme. ”
The above quotation contains not only the details of the agreements reached with the Pandshir Lion, but also explains why it was with him that the dialogue took place. You can refer to the memories of the former chief military adviser in Afghanistan, General Makhmut Gareev. In his memoirs, generally not sharing the enthusiastic gaze of Western analysts on this field commander as a military genius, he nonetheless acknowledges that Masood was a very talented leader of the Afghan opposition with good organizational skills.
What were the outstanding mind and organizational skills of the Pandshirsky lion? Gareev answers this question as follows: “He sought to curb all sorts of excesses against the local population. Mosques, schools, medical facilities, homes for residents who lost their homes, roads were built and rehabilitated in the areas controlled by them, roads were provided, assistance was rendered to the peasants ... ”
Moreover, unlike many Mujahideen, Masud was humane to Soviet prisoners of war. A clear evidence of this is the fate of Nikolai Bystrov, who has traveled from Soviet prisoner of war to his personal bodyguard, the Pandshirsky Lion. Here are the lines from his memories: “I was led past this group of Mujahideen, and suddenly I saw a man of medium height in light clothes, walking towards me. I also took a few more steps towards him and suddenly, even for myself, I extended my hand to him. The man calmly and confidently shook it. It was Ahmad Shah Masood. Of course, I didn’t know about it then, everything was somehow intuitive and subconscious ... I did not feel the enemy in him, but on the contrary, I saw an interest in myself and a desire to understand me. ”
Ahmad Shah not only did not kill the prisoners, but also tried to arrange them as far as possible, which is also indicated by Bystrov: “Masood brought us all together, seven people, and said:“ So guys, who wants to go abroad? Who wants to go back to the Soviet Union? To the Soviet Union, or to America, or to England, or to Pakistan, or to Iran? Which countries do you want? But everyone at that time was afraid to go back to their homeland. All raised their hands and said: "We want to go to America." One said: "I want to go to France." But only I did not raise my hand. He says: "Why do not you raise?". I say: “I don’t want anywhere — neither to America, anywhere”.
Kremlin's fatal mistake
What is the essence of the agreement with Ahmad Shah? According to General Gromov, in accordance with the agreement, Masud ordered his gangs to suspend active activities against government forces and wage an armed struggle primarily against gangs hostile to the IOA (Islamic Society of Afghanistan. - I. Kh.) Organizations.
Both the Soviet military and Ahmad Shah observed the truce, while the Kabul authorities were trying to break it: Afghan special forces tried to kill Masud. However, the Kremlin saw only the field commander in the Pandshir lion, and only gangs in his troops. In Moscow, it was believed that Masud was using an armistice with the 40 Army extended to 1984, only for a respite and a regrouping of forces.
This approach was a serious mistake, and it went against the above statements of the XXVI CPSU Congress about the need for fruitful cooperation with the Islamic world. For the support of Masud with the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan could have confused the maps of Pakistan and the United States behind it, the puppet of which Ahmad Shah had never been and would not have.
So why precisely on Massoud should bet in resolving the Afghan conflict? It is not only a matter of charisma, organizational skills and his concern for the local population. There are several reasons. One of them is in the moderation of the religious-political (precisely so, for in the Islamic world politics and religion are identical) the positions of Massoud. In the book devoted to him by Alexander Lyakhovsky and Vyacheslav Nekrasov “Citizen, politician, warrior” we read: “After a failed uprising (directed against Daud. - I. Kh.) In 1975, and B. Rabbani’s return from Saudi Arabia to the party, there was a split. G. Hekmatyar and his extremist supporters created a new party - Hezb-i-Islam-Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan). The more moderate Rabbani called his party “Jamiat Islam Islam of Afghanistan” (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), which mainly included representatives of northern peoples, including Ahmad Shah Massoud, who considered B. Rabbani his teacher and most worthy leader of the Islamic movement in Afghanistan. "
Note that in the fight against the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, it is Hekmatyar who will become, along with Massoud, a key figure in the leadership of the Mujahideen. But, as we see, he took a more radical position and categorically opposed any dialogue with Moscow. By the way, he did not complain about Washington either, refusing to meet with then-President Reagan. Add to this that Hekmatyar was much less charismatic than Masood, and, in contrast to Ahmad Shah, did not like the Soviet prisoners of war more cruelly.
Of course, Hekmatyar is not a small field commander, and it would have hardly been possible to avoid what happened in the country on 1992 — an armed confrontation between Masud and Hekmatyar. However, if the entire arsenal of the DRA and the Limited contingent armed forces were at the disposal of the Pandshir lion, as well as the areas controlled by the 40 army would be under his control, Hekmatiar would hardly be able to effectively resist Ahmad Shah, who would have the resources to suppress the Taliban movement “In the bud and thus save Afghanistan from a lot of misfortunes.
Add to this the possible transition to the side of the Pandshirsky lion of a very colorful figure in the Afghan army - General Abdul-Rashid Dostum, who led the 53 division of the DRA, and after the fall of the Kabul regime created a virtually independent state in the north-east of the country. General Gareev, in his own words, developed good relations with Dostum, which means that there was also the possibility of influencing him.
There was another reason why the Soviet leadership needed to establish a dialogue with Massoud. We again appeal to the book dedicated to him: “It must be said that due to the insufficiency of agricultural land in the valley, only a small number of Pandshir people were engaged in farming and cattle breeding. Most of the natives of Pandshhera were traditionally attracted to public service, earned their living by handicrafts and trade, as well as engaged in science and technology, culture, management, which contributed to the acquisition of a certain position in society by residents of Pandscher. In a word, many educated people, and not only rural laborers burdened with constant care, joined the Masud detachments. ”
In other words, in the process of political settlement, the intellectual elite and the emerging middle class of Afghanistan would mostly side with Massoud. And in the case of creating a tandem with Rabbani, Ahmad Shah would have found support from wide circles of moderate Islamic clergy.
Thus, the Rabbani-Massoud coalition, which Moscow could contribute to, would allow the USSR to maintain friendly relations with Afghanistan, prevent the Taliban’s victory and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and also prevent the US from entering the country.
In conclusion, we note that the personality factor played a decisive role both in the collapse of the USSR and in destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. The scale of the personality of Brezhnev in the late period of his reign, and to an even greater degree of Gorbachev, proved to be incomparable with the problems facing the country. The death of two charismatic and prominent military-political leaders in Afghanistan, Daoud and Ahmad Shah Massoud, led to the actual disintegration of the country and the military-economic consolidation of the United States in its territory, seeking not to help anyone else terrorism, but only to the sole possession of raw materials, human and economic resources.
Therefore, unlike Russia, Americans benefit from bloodshed in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Ukraine, which corresponds to the White House's strategy of controlled chaos. It, in turn, is an integral part of an even more global strategy called the Anaconda Loop, in which there is no place for a single and strong Russia, not a single and friendly Afghanistan, for whose revival Ahmad Shah Masood fought and died.
Information