Fall of the Newgeorg Fortress

Fall of the Newgeorg Fortress

During the Great Retreat of the Russian Army 7 (20) in August 1915 was surrendered the St. George’s Fortress. It was one of the worst failures of the Russian weapons all his history. Lightning surrender of a first-class fortress, fully equipped with artillery, ammunition and fodder, entirely with a garrison of half the enemy’s grouping was unprecedented in the Russian military chronicle.


“The largest unexpected and shameful loss” was called the fall of the Novorgeyevsk fortress by Professor A.I. Utkin (Utkin A.I. The First World War. M., 2001). Military historian A.A. Kersnovsky spoke even harsherly: “On August X, the commandant of the fortress, the despicable General Bobyr, who had lost his head, ran to the enemy and, already sitting in German captivity, ordered to surrender to the fortress still holding. In the huge garrison there was neither General Kondratenka, nor Major Shtokvich, nor Captain Liko ... And in the morning of August 6, the Prussian landwehr drove a human herd into an inglorious captivity. The number of the garrison Novogeorgievsk was equal to 7 people. About 86000 was killed, and 3000 (of which 83000 was wounded) surrendered, including the 7000 general and 23 officers. The banners of the garrison were safely delivered to the army by pilots. The fortress lost 2100 serfs and 1096 field guns, all 108. Hurrying to capitulate, they forgot to disable most of the guns. The Germans equipped their Alsatian-Lorraine front with these guns, and the French, having won the war, set up these Russian weapons in Paris, on the Esplanade of invalids, to reproach their former brothers in arms ”(A. A. Kersnovsky. History of the Russian army).

Yielding to the main fortresses, which was right in the prevailing conditions, practically without a fight, the Supreme Commander Nikolai Nikolayevich made an exception for several strongholds — the fortresses of Kovno, Novogeorgievsk and Brest were tasked to stand to the end. Kovno fortress lasted ten days. 17 August, the fortress fell after an artillery bombardment of 1360 cannons that fired 853 thousands of shells. The commander of the fortress, General Grigoriev, behaved shamefully and fled the day before the surrender of the fortress. The Germans captured the vast reserves of the Russian army. The Kovno fortress became the base of the German army. Armaments were dismantled and taken to Germany, to strengthen the Western Front.

Then it was the turn of Novogeorgievsk. The Novorogievsky fortress was built on the site of the Polish fortress Modlin on the r. Wisla. She was ordered to be built by Napoleon in the Duchy of Warsaw to provide the crossing of the Vistula and the Narev. The fortress was built by French engineers 1807 — 1812. After the defeat of the army of the French emperor and the annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia, the fortress went to the Russian army. At the direction of Emperor Nicholas I, the Modlin Fortress was significantly expanded and in 1834 was renamed Novogeorgievsk. At the end of the XIX century, the fortress was modernized - a line of forts was built around the citadel.

The fortress was considered one of the strongest in Europe. So, military engineer Velichko, in 1892-1893. he personally participated in the work on the long-term fortifications of Novogeorgievsk, stressing that "the fortress of Novogeorgievsk was not only not inferior, but was technically stronger than the French fortress of Verdun". At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the authoritative encyclopedic dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron noted: “The triple row of fortress walls, wide and deep moats, high ramparts, lined with huge tools give the impression of impregnability; for the siege of Novogeorgievsk, the enemy would need at least 200 thousand troops, while 12 thousand is enough to defend it. ”

A decade later, the defensive power of the fortress increased even more. Before World War I, the fortress was again modernized, although the work was not completed in full. New fortifications could resist heavy weapons, including 420-mm howitzers. All researchers noted that the fortress had been improved for several decades, and it cost the treasury a very large expense. So, only the project, made two years before the war, assumed the erection of new fortifications inside the old series of forts and bundled them into forts, were going to spend 121 million rubles for its implementation, of which 3 of the year (1912-1914). ) 34 million rubles were released. At the same time, in 1913, the value of the entire expenditure part of the budget in the military department was 581 million rubles. Thus, Novogeorgievsk for a long time absorbed very large sums.

Interestingly, in 1910, the Russian Defense Minister Sukhomlinov decided that it was necessary to move the defense line in the advanced western theater inland to 200 kilometers, and Novorgeorgievsk remained the only outpost along its entire length. It was decided to cover Novogeorgievsk with a belt of new fortifications, and to link it with Zegrze and external fortifications of the Warsaw Fortress. That is, it was proposed to dismantle the old fortifications and even destroy them, and instead build new ones “from scratch”. On the eve of the war, when Europe already smelled of gunpowder, Sukhomlinov convinced Tsar Nicholas II of the need to abandon the defense of the advanced theater (Privislyansky Krai). The plans of the emperors and the military leadership of Russia for almost a whole century were torn down: Emperor Nicholas I, Alexander III, Milutin, Obruchev, Kuropatkin. The fortresses of Ivangorod and Warsaw on the Vistula, Zegrzh and Lomza on the Narev, all the forts connecting Zegrzh with Warsaw along the eastern front of the Vistula-Narevskogo fortified area and all the long-fortified bridge crossings across the Narev: Pultusk, Rozhany and Ostrolenka were abolished. Destroy these fortresses and fortifications commissioned as soon as possible. True, because of the silent sabotage of local authorities and the lack of money, the buildings were saved. Destroyed only part of the fortifications in Warsaw. The plan to build a new series of fortifications was not approved and implemented.

Thus, before the beginning of the war, the defense system, which for decades had been created in the western strategic direction under the emperors Nicholas I, Alexander II, Alexander III, and the beginning of the reign of Nicholas II, was largely destroyed. Blown up forts, disarmed fortresses and savings on defense, and all this in the conditions of the approaching war with the advanced military power Germany. Not surprisingly, in 1915, the war minister Sukhomlinov was considered the main culprit in the defeat of the Russian army. Sukhomlinov was dismissed by the king from the post of military minister and put on trial.

In general, the fortress was considered to be equipped with means of defense and ready for a long defense. The serfs (especially artillery) were considered the elite of the Russian army, distinguished by higher combat training, discipline, and received money for maintenance more than ordinary field troops.

But, in battles, strong-willed and decisive leadership plays a huge role. Thus, in the shortest possible time, General Schwartz was able to turn the half-ruined fortifications of Ivangorod with a fallen garrison spirit into a stronghold, about which three storms of German-Austrian troops crashed. The new George Fortress was not lucky with the commandant. During the First World War, Nikolai Pavlovich Bobyr, general from cavalry, led the defense of the Novogeorgiyevsk fortress. He served all his life in staffs and fortresses, became a prominent orientalist, participating in a number of scientific expeditions, and had almost no combat experience. Probably, Bobyr could become a good scholar, but he led the main fortress of the Russian Empire, which had an exceptional strategic position. Describing the commandant of Novogeorgievsk as a military man, A.I. Denikin calls him “an unsuccessful follower of the dragoniros of show science”.

There was no Bobyr and assistants who could raise people to the feat. Chief of Staff of the fortress N.I. Globachev in the years of the Russian-Japanese war, where he was chief of staff of the 54 Infantry Division, "became famous" for his inability to conduct military operations. And one of the key posts in the Novogeorgiyevsk fortress - the chief of the fortress artillery - was occupied for a long time by a certain professor A. A. Svechin as “an unlucky bureaucrat ... indifferent to a soldier and to a war, unfamiliar with an infantry affair” (Svechin AA The art of driving a regiment. M.-L., 1930) General Karpov, who eventually resigned due to a delicate "economic misunderstanding."

To compensate for this state of affairs could professional and brave backbone of the officers. However, the fortress was deprived of this opportunity. From the outbreak of hostilities, experienced officers, in particular, serf artillery officers, were actively transferred to the army. Together with the requisition of serf guns for the needs of the field artillery, this, if not undermined, then reduced the combat potential of the Novo-Georgievsk fortress.

At the beginning of the war, the Novorogievskaya fortress played the role of an important railway junction and basing point during mobilization. By decision of the Supreme Commander Nikolai Nikolayevich, the formation of three siege artillery brigades begins, the bases for which will be Kovno, Brest-Litovsk and Novogeorgiyevsk fortresses. Heavy weapons were removed from the fortresses, and compensation was weak. During this period, the Russian General Headquarters planned the storming of Krakow, “a campaign to Silesia” and even “to Berlin”. However, these hopes were not justified.

A huge, if not decisive role in the fall of Novgeorgievsk, played a moral factor. From the very beginning of the First World War, the Russian soldiers, although quite vaguely imagined its goals and objectives, but still believed in the slogan: “For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland!”. True, religion for a large number of our soldiers and officers was no longer of such importance as in the nineteenth century. “Fatherland” - everyone understood it differently too. At the beginning of the war, a wave of patriotism captured almost everyone. True, the bulk of the common people was infinitely far from the goals of official propaganda. Dying for the unknown “Constantinople”, incomprehensible “Straits”, or “Dardanelles” - there were few willing people. After all, the enemy did not trample the actual Russian lands. And the officers were not disposed to communicate with the soldiers and some educational work. Especially with patriotism it became bad when hundreds of thousands of people were killed, injured or captured, and the army began to suffer defeat and retreat.

In the summer - in the winter of 1914 of the year, then in the winter - in the spring of 1915 of the year, during the course of several major offensive operations in East Prussia, Poland and Galicia, the color of the Russian army personnel was lost. Indeed, in the war, the bravest and selfless warriors are the first to die. During the war, some regiments lost 300-400% of their composition, that is, they changed their main composition several times. By the spring of 1915, the number of regular officers and non-commissioned officers in many infantry regiments of the Russian army was literally counted by units. And in many parts they all died and were injured. In their place came the former teachers and students, distinguished soldiers.

In the trenches, "selfish" moods gradually began to spread and come to the fore: "Survive at any cost", "Find a reason to be in the rear", etc. The number of deserters, "self-gunners" who surrendered to captivity without serious pressure from the enemy grew, and so on. . D. It is clear that this was not a one-step process, it went gradually. It all began with the voluntary surrender, desertion, “shootouts”, escape to the enemy, and ended, after the February Revolution and “freedom”, with the refusal of entire units to carry out orders of the authorities, abandoning positions, “fraternization” with the enemies and killing their officers , robbery of warehouses, etc.

Decomposition began quietly and did not cover all parts. There were selected units, like the 48-th Kornilov Infantry Division (“Steel”), the 4-th “Iron” Denikin Brigade (later the “Iron” Division), which not only solved the assigned tasks, but also helped the neighbors, were “wand- Gain "command. There were fit, resistant parts, good fighting with the enemy, for which the command was calm. But there were also unstable parts capable of retreating and even running under weak pressure and without orders.

Exactly such weak parts defended Novogeorgievsk. After the Russian Supreme Command decided to abandon Russian Poland, the 27 Army Corps was replaced by the 114 and 119 infantry divisions formed on the basis of the militia, as well as the 58 and 63 Western Front. The combat capability of the units formed on the basis of the militia was low. Many companies in the regiments were headed by ensigns who had recently completed their studies and did not have combat experience. The command did not take care of the proper combat training of the troops.

Great damage to the morale of the garrison was caused by the death of the chief of engineers of the fortress, Colonel Korotkevich, who was killed on July 17 during an inspection of the forward positions. Colonel Khudzinsky, chief of engineers of the Northern department of the fortress, died with him. There were rumors that Major General Krenke, head of defense of the Southern department of the fortress, went to the side of the enemy with a mass of important documents; they want him not to participate in the trip at all. But these rumors had a reliable basis: the Germans seized Korotkevich's documents, among which was the master plan for the fortifications of Novogeorgievsk with the designation of the locations of the heavy batteries.

Thus, in one day, the soldiers no longer trust the command, and the Germans obtained information about the whole fortress fortification system.


The ruins of the fortress at the confluence of the Vistula and Narew

To be continued ...
Ctrl Enter

Noticed a mistake Highlight text and press. Ctrl + Enter

27 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. parusnik 19 August 2015 07: 29 New
    • 6
    • 0
    +6
    The military historian A.A. Kersnovsky spoke even harder...Anton Kersnovsky is one of the most significant Russian military historians of the XNUMXth century. Not being an officer of the Russian General Staff, having not received an academic education at all, he independently created his History of the Russian Army, which occupies a significant position in a number of fundamental works on Russian military history. Eccentricity and outlook, understanding of Russian geopolitics gives special value to his works. And it's hard to disagree with him ... He fought in the Volunteer Army ...
  2. Monster_Fat 19 August 2015 07: 49 New
    • 5
    • 0
    +5
    They said about Kersnovsky that his “History of the Russian Army” should be read to “beardless young ladies and embarrassing young ladies” ... not only that it was completely “children's reading matter”, but ... it was too “pathetic” written.
  3. igordok 19 August 2015 08: 02 New
    • 6
    • 0
    +6
    Everything is relative. Osovetskaya fortress is much weaker than Novogeorgievskaya. Osovetskaya fortress was not a circular position, adapted to an isolated struggle; it was a long-term fortified lane with a strong front, well-secured flanks and an open rear connected by a railway, highway and a network of dirt roads with a front front (Bialystok railway junction).
    The conclusion of the military publishing house of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on the reasons for the stubborn and prolonged defense of the Osovets fortress. Written in 1939 year.
    The Osovets fortress, unlike other Russian fortresses - Novogeorgievsk, Kovna, Grodna, fulfilled its purpose - it forbade the enemy’s access to Bialystok for 6 months, withstood bombardment by powerful siege artillery shells, repelled all minor attacks and repulsed the assault using toxic gases.
    The table below gives an idea of ​​how the huge first-class fortress Novogeorgievsk, laden with 45 battalions of landwerah, surrendered after 10 days of resistance, while the small "toy" Osovetskaya fortress, attacked by almost the same forces, resisted 190 days and was left by the garrison only by order of the highest command.
    Forces and means of the besieged German corps Forces and means of fortresses Notes
    1. Against the fortress Novogeorgievsk

    a) infantry battalions - 45
    b) heavy artillery - 84 guns
    c) including 305- and 420-mm - 15 guns

    Garrison and weapons

    a) forts - 33
    b) infantry battalions - 64
    c) heavy artillery - 1000 guns

    Surrendered, leaving the enemy 80 000 prisoners and 1200 guns

    2. Against Osovets Fortress

    a) infantry battalions - 40
    b) heavy artillery - 68 guns
    c) including 305- and 420-mm - 18 guns

    Garrison and weapons

    a) forts-4
    b) infantry battalions - 27
    c) heavy artillery - 71 gun

    The fortress was destroyed, evacuated by order of the high command

    The reasons for this stubborn defense of the Osovets fortress are as follows:
    1. The fortress had a combat-ready garrison.
    2. The fortress had a financially secure base.
    3. The fortress had the required number of casemated structures, procured from 30,5-cm bombs.
    4. Of great importance for the successful defense of the fortress were those significant mistakes that were made by the enemy during the siege.

    http://ekabu.ru/tradeunion/78996-zaschita-kreposti-osovec.-ataka-mertvecov..html

    1. Alexey RA 19 August 2015 14: 41 New
      • 2
      • 0
      +2
      Here is the plan of the fortress Novogeorgievsk for 1914:

      But it should be noted that the plan shows all the forts of the fortress according to plan, including unfinished and not built.
      According to the 1910 plan, it was decided to expand Novogeorgievsk, giving it the importance of an avant-garde fortress, which, before the approach of the Russian main forces deployed along the Kovno-Grodno-Brest-Litovsk line, should have been defended completely independently, left to itself. For this purpose, according to a project drawn up in 1912, it was assumed in front of the old forts belt, at a distance of about 8-9 km from the core of the fortress, to create a new fortress position from 10-numbered forts and several intermediate fortifications, and in some places forts and fortifications should were to be combined into fort groups. For various reasons, the new position, even towards the beginning of the siege of the fortress, was not completely completed, although it could already have put up stubborn resistance, reckoning with 42-cm shells of German artillery, since at every fort, at every strong point and group there were at least a small number of casemates capable of resisting these shells.

      Of the more defensive fortifications in the north-eastern and northern sectors of the fortress, which were subjected to a German attack, there were a fort group, including Fort 15 with two strong points; a group including one fort and 2 strong points and located near the village. Holavitsy, hence the name of her Holavitsky group; then forts 14, 16, stronghold 8 and the outlined Janowek group. In the northwestern sector, the more complete nature of the work was at forts 10, 12 and 13.

      In the southern sector of the fortress, things were worse: in addition to the old converted four forts, only forts were erected here in draft at Grohale Nove, somewhat south of it and west of Gurke and south of the village. Rybiteva. The length of the entire new fortress position was about 45 km.

      In this form, the fortress was at the end of the mobilization period of 1914. However, the fortress was not immediately besieged. For a whole year the Germans did not touch her, and during this period many works that were not completed by the beginning of the war could continue in the fortress. In addition to works on forts and groups, those were carried out at intervals and in front of the fort belt, bearing the traces of the evolution that they underwent during the indicated period of time for constructing a field, positional character. By the time the Germans approached the fortress in the second half of July 1915 much that had been done in the previous time had to be redone, and the front lines of the fortress advanced significantly, especially in the north, being at a distance of about 12 km from the river crossings. Narew. The total length of the contour of the advanced positions of the fortress reached almost 70 km. However, in view of the fact that the construction of these positions was started quite late, they were far from finished: the trenches were in part incomplete profiles, there were few shelters and communications, obstacles were weak.
      (c) Yakovlev
  4. Vladimir1960 19 August 2015 08: 37 New
    • 4
    • 0
    +4
    The defeat of the army begins with the decline in morale of the soldiers.
  5. ALEA IACTA EST 19 August 2015 08: 55 New
    • 7
    • 0
    +7
    The terrible command nullified the most powerful fortress and the 86th garrison. Incredible ...
    1. xan
      xan 19 August 2015 12: 24 New
      • 6
      • 0
      +6
      Quote: ALEA IACTA EST
      The terrible command nullified the most powerful fortress and the 86th garrison. Incredible ...

      The most offensive is that among the two thousand officers, and the senior officers were clearly personnel, there were no patriots and real military men.
      Surrender of Novogeorgievsk is the most striking example of rotting fish from the head. There are no complaints against the soldiers, the same fought in Osovce.
  6. Aleksandr72 19 August 2015 09: 04 New
    • 10
    • 0
    +10
    Unfortunately, the heroic defense of the Osovets fortress with its famous “attack of the dead” is almost the only example of the zealous fulfillment of military duty in defending the fortress from enemy attacks by the Russian army in the West European theater of operations during the First World War: Osovets survived three assaults and was surrendered by order of the Headquarters of Glavkoverh Nikolai Nikolaevich Jr., the troops retreated from the fortress in an organized manner, blowing up all the fortifications that survived the assault.
    Other Russian fortresses:
    Seaside Libava (now Liepaja) - artillery and supplies were evacuated even before the war, but a rather strong garrison remained. The fortress at the beginning of May 1915 was taken by a combined attack: from the land - the cavalry brigade! (not even a division) from the sea - amphibious assault.
    Kovno - the most modern fortress, entered the battle on August 6, 1915, its bombardment by German artillery (which included two 420 mm mortar batteries) lasted 8 days, alternating with infantry attacks. On August 17, 1915, by order of the command, the garrison left the fortress with almost all the supplies.
    The completely outdated fortress of Olita - left without a fight on August 26, 1915
    Grodno is a powerful fortress, abandoned by Russian troops on the orders of the command.
    The small fortresses of Lomza, Ostroleka, Rozhany and Pultusk were left by the Russian troops after resistance under the pressure of the enemy or on the orders of the command in the same 1915.
    The Brest-Litovsk fortress: the Germans came to it on August 20, 1915, but did not storm it, but went around, forcing the Bug River above the city. The result - Russian troops, under threat of encirclement, left the fortress without resistance.
    And finally, the most powerful Novogeorgievskaya fortress, which in fact was the center of the fortified area, built over many years. The cavalry general Bobyr commanded this fortress from February 1907, and before that he commanded the Koven and Osovets fortresses and was considered a recognized authority in this matter. The total number of the garrison of the fortress was about 92 thousand people (a significant part of which, namely the 114th and 119th infantry divisions were formed from state militia warriors - by the way, among the German troops besieging the fortress, a significant part was landver, i.e. reserve troops) at 1600 guns, including field. The fortress had a six-month supply of food. The fortress was besieged by the German siege army group "Modlin" under the command of Colonel General Hans von Bezeler, who was considered in Germany the best specialist in the construction of fortresses, and with the outbreak of the Imperialist War became the best specialist in their capture. In particular, in October 1914, the Belgian fortress of Antwerp with a garrison of 138 thousand people was captured. The siege group "Bezler" at the same time totaled only 50 thousand people, but with 177 heavy guns, including mortars of caliber 305 and 420 mm. Antwerp, under heavy artillery fire, lasted only a week.
    I will not write more, because It is interesting to read what the author will write in the continuation of his article.
    1. xan
      xan 19 August 2015 14: 37 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      Quote: Aleksandr72
      I will not write more, because It is interesting to read what the author will write in the continuation of his article.

      The most interesting thing is how their high nobility decided to cover themselves with the order of Bobryr’s earring and, by coordinatingly shutting their mouths to those who decided to fight anyway (and I hope there were such ones), surrendered the fortress.
  7. Walking 19 August 2015 09: 19 New
    • 5
    • 0
    +5
    The trouble of the tsarist army of the times of the Russo-Japanese and World War I is the personnel issue of the senior and senior command personnel, a person cannot command a regiment; they put him in command of a division and so on on a build-up basis. And there is no repression for such mistakes paid for by the blood of soldiers. In this regard, the execution of General Pavlov and others in 1941 seems correct to me.
    1. xan
      xan 19 August 2015 14: 54 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      Quote: Hiking
      In this regard, the execution of General Pavlov and others in 1941 seems correct to me.

      Yes, military history is full of examples of restoring the combat effectiveness of broken troops in a short time. And always it begins with repressions among the command staff, and then among ordinary soldiers. Now I read about how the famous Alexander Farnese restored the fighting efficiency of the Catholic League troops. Most surprisingly, in those days, the restoration and maintenance of combat readiness was the main skill of the military commander. And in tsarist times, parquet generals were only able to report beautifully, but to clean up their ass and substitute another. Just think of one Brusilov for dozens of faceless army commanders.
      1. Roman 11 19 August 2015 20: 59 New
        • 1
        • 0
        +1
        Goida, goida
        Nikolay Propirny

        Either the gates creaked
        Either the raven shouted ...
        Will work tomorrow
        Timokha the executioner.

        The tears of God are pouring from heaven
        Touching the crosses.
        Measurement of the Third Rome is alarming ...
        August nights are thick.

        And pitch darkness -
        Oh, how Moscow’s dashing dream -
        It swept through the sinful capital
        A flock of black demons.

        Rash, rash, rash, rash!
        Bittern groans in the swamp
        The dog whines at the gate
        A thief is hanging on the gate.
        Barking the king-priest
        In vain, in vain, in vain!
        We shout the tsar’s words
        There is no law
        Burn cheating rash
        Rash, rash, rash ...

        Again, the affair is rich,
        Off the gate, door off.
        And Jesus crucified for you
        Fails to help you.

        Scream and cry, but the eldest enters,
        Of them - with clothes, with a face - a thief.
        Says with a terrible smile:
        “Prince Vasily, to make it!
        In vain we bazaar
        Guilty Ali no -
        In the morning before the sovereign
        Will you keep the answer. "

        Burn, burn, burn, burn!
        You can’t look askew.
        Now everything is not that old
        Today the terrible king rules.
        Enemies will not hide!
        Burn, burn, burn ...
        Goida, goida, business is time,
        Saber in the scabbard, foot in the stirrup.
        Full, widow, do not cry.
        Jump, jump, jump.

        The ringing spread over Moscow,
        The repentant mournful ringing -
        The king was touched by the soul,
        Tired of repentance.

        Ding da dong - getting closer to paradise
        But the enemy of the people is not asleep,
        Who does not know, they will know -
        Morning evening of fierce!

        Oh, the synodic for the Kyoto,
        Funeral candle ...
        Okay, arguing work
        Timokha the executioner.
      2. Cap.Morgan 20 August 2015 02: 33 New
        • -3
        • 0
        -3
        The Russian army, however, did not flee, and its retreat under the onslaught of the Germans was systematic. The tsarist generals were superior in strategic thinking to the commanders of the Red Army, who failed to have multiple superiority in everything that could only stop Hitler.
    2. Pilat2009 19 August 2015 19: 42 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      Quote: Hiking
      In this regard, the execution of General Pavlov and others in 1941 seems correct to me.

      Excuse me, who put him in command? What, the rate did not know its level?
      If a person has a level of brigade commander, you don’t need to put him on the front. Before the war, it seemed to be a command-staff game, and Zhukov similarly cut off the Bialystok ledge.
      1. Roman 11 19 August 2015 21: 20 New
        • 1
        • 0
        +1
        Quote: Pilat2009
        If a person has a brigade level

        And who was there to put? It seems that later they put on the legendary Budenny and even Voroshilov, but to compose songs about them - not to throw tanks under grenades ......
        1. Pilat2009 19 August 2015 23: 00 New
          • 1
          • 0
          +1
          Quote: Novel 11
          And who was there to put?

          That is, there were essentially no cadres. That is, this is a flaw in the academy, as you teach, they will fight. The system however.
          In contrast, the level of leadership of the Germans since the 1870s was high
    3. Roman 11 19 August 2015 20: 57 New
      • 3
      • 0
      +3
      Quote: Hiking
      The trouble of the tsarist army of the times of the Russo-Japanese and World War I is the personnel issue of the senior and senior command personnel, a person cannot command a regiment; they put him in command of a division and so on in accruing fashion.

      You probably wanted to say no trouble the tsarist army, namely the trouble of RIA under Nicholas the 2nd!! Because the RIA under the other kings was excellent both under Alexander the 2nd, Alexander the 1st and the queens. Yes, maybe there weren’t good times, as under Nicholas I, if you take the stick drill and other twists of the autocracy, which generated discontent ......... on the other hand, his coming to the throne was accompanied by Senate Square.
      Quote: Hiking
      In this regard, the execution of General Pavlov and others in 1941 seems correct to me.

      And why in other countries for the defeat did not shoot ?? Dear, even "cannibal" hitler I didn’t shoot anyone for the retreat! Neither Model, nor Manstein, nor Guderian, nor others !! Only for a real conspiracy! Yes, he could of course squeal, stomp his legs, wave his fists, but NOBODY PAYED FOR LIFE WARS. In history, such cases are known to me only at Carthage and with us under Grozny. And even that, the governors paid their lives indirectly, by slander and under torture of the guardsmen. After the burning of Moscow by the Crimeans in 1571, Belsky died, but the 2nd commander Mstislavsky fell into disgrace. There was still a defeat at Nevel in 1564, but there the governor of the forward regiment Kurbsky (also the friend of the king) hid in the camp of the enemy, because knew what he would be for it. Then only Kurbsky could suffer for defeats, and even that is not a fact. Grozny did not stand on ceremony with anyone, even with the winners - for example, Vorotynsky, for the victory at Molody. Surely the entire upper class then knew about the king’s mental illness. This fragment is especially well shown in the 2nd episode of I. Grozny of Ezenshtein’s film, when Goid-Goyd exclaims at the feast of the half-mad king ... and then burn, burn, burn .. Therefore, the tyrant forbade her to be shown. If you are inclined to these things at the same time a rhyme:
    4. Prometey 20 August 2015 20: 03 New
      • -1
      • 0
      -1
      Quote: Hiking
      In this regard, the execution of General Pavlov and others in 1941 seems correct to me.

      And it was also necessary to introduce decimation in the Red Army, following the example of Ancient Rome. What is trifling?
  8. V.ic 19 August 2015 09: 20 New
    • 7
    • 0
    +7
    Unfortunately, the author mixed up the date, passing the fortress a year earlier than this happened.
    August 7 (20), 1914 was commissioned

    In fact, this happened in 1915.
  9. Sergey-8848 19 August 2015 09: 48 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    At the very beginning of the article, some strange mistake. Everything described happened in 1915, and we are talking stubbornly about the 1914th.
    1. Roman 11 19 August 2015 21: 23 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      Quote: Sergey-8848
      Everything described happened in 1915, and we are talking stubbornly about the 1914th.

      It happens. But still, somehow it’s not easier.
  10. Alexey RA 19 August 2015 11: 46 New
    • 6
    • 0
    +6
    Thus, before the beginning of the war, the defense system, which for decades had been created in the western strategic direction under the emperors Nicholas I, Alexander II, Alexander III, and the beginning of the reign of Nicholas II, was largely destroyed. Blown up forts, disarmed fortresses and savings on defense, and all this in the conditions of the approaching war with the advanced military power Germany. Not surprisingly, in 1915, the war minister Sukhomlinov was considered the main culprit in the defeat of the Russian army. Sukhomlinov was dismissed by the king from the post of military minister and put on trial.

    In fact, Sukhomlinov had an objective reason for such a decision. And her name is a lead in deployment.
    Already at the beginning of the XNUMXth century, an extremely dangerous situation developed in the Western theater of operations because of the poor development of the Russian transport network: Germany managed to mobilize and deploy its forces earlier than Russia. Moreover, the Russian troops did not have time to turn around in the Warsaw SD and establish field positions between the forts before the Germans came to it - so there was a real danger of capturing a “bare” SD (“skeleton type fortress” - long-term fortifications are built in peacetime. The gaps between them equipped after mobilization).

    There were two ways out: to improve the road network to accelerate concentration or to bring the SD line to the rear. For the first in the treasury, as always, there was no money. I had to do the second: the Warsaw SD — to abolish, the fortifications — to tear down (so that the Germans would not use them), to leave the only fortress — Novogeorgievsk from the whole of the SD, strengthening it as much as possible so that it could stand alone until the Russian army unblocked it.

    But here 2 factors intervened - finance and the development of technology. Chronically there was not enough money for the construction of new fortifications of Novogeorgievsk. And worst of all - new projects of forts protected from German siege calibers had just been compiled - so intelligence immediately reported a 420 mm German mortar. And everything had to be redesigned again. As a result, by the beginning of the war, the outer contour of the fortress from the new forts was not completed.

    The biggest miscalculation of the Russian command was the belief in the ability of an isolated besieged fortress to hold defense for a long time. This was possible earlier, but in the twentieth century, an isolated fortress was doomed to a speedy fall. Only a fortress included in the field defense line could survive.
  11. Jääkorppi 19 August 2015 14: 30 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    The elite of the Russian Empire sold Russia and only the Great October Revolution and Comrade. Stalin saved the country from destruction by Western civilizers! In the year 15, there was no talk of decomposition of the army, although the mediocre command of the Grand Dukes and the tsar — ​​the priest, the plunder of industry by the oligarchs, the lack of supplies, Germanophilism and the liberal pro-romantic position of the bourgeoisie had already done their job! And the “hero” of the defense of General Bobyr Nikolai Pavlovich was spanked in the Cheka in the 20s, rightly so !!
    1. Cap.Morgan 20 August 2015 02: 40 New
      • -2
      • 0
      -2
      It was the Bolsheviks who made every effort to break up discipline at the front, disrupt military orders, organize strikes at military factories, and in every possible way promote the slogan about turning the imperialist war into a civil war. At first, everything and everything was destroyed, then heroically lifted from the ruins.
      1. oldkap22 20 August 2015 14: 06 New
        • 0
        • 0
        0
        Bolsheviks. at this time. "In Switzerland" sat ...
  12. Roman 11 19 August 2015 21: 26 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    The ruins of the fortress at the confluence of the Vistula and Narew It looks like the barracks of the citadel.
    1. igordok 20 August 2015 14: 13 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      Quote: Novel 11
      The ruins of the fortification at the confluence of the Vistula and Narew. It looks like the barracks of the citadel.

      Not. These are the ruins of a barn (farm building). The citadel on the other side.