Military Review

How many tanks did Stalin have?

38
How many tanks did Stalin have? Having been researching the initial period of the Great Patriotic War for many years, I periodically come across questions about how many armored vehicles were in the USSR on June 22, 1941? how many tanks was in the mechanized corps of the border military districts on the eve of the attack of Germany and its allies on the USSR? How many combat vehicles were combat-ready and which were not? What was the ratio of our tank fleet to a similar fleet of enemy combat vehicles? There are quite comprehensive answers to the questions asked. But in the beginning, a little about the background of the study of the problem of the number of Soviet tanks on the eve of the Second World War.

For many years, doing research of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, I occasionally come across questions about how many armored vehicles there were in the USSR on 22 June 1941 of the year? How many tanks were in the mechanized corps of the border military districts on the eve of the attack of Germany and its allies on the USSR? What number of combat vehicles was efficient, and what - no? What was the ratio of our tank fleet and the similar fleet of enemy vehicles? There are quite comprehensive answers to the questions asked. But at the beginning, a little about the background to the study of the problem of the number of Soviet tanks on the eve of the Second World War.

Serial armored vehicles in the USSR began to be produced in the middle of the 20-s of the twentieth century. Already then, an understanding began all over the world that in the future "big war" tanks and other armored vehicles would play a decisive role in combat operations on land fronts. Initially, the use of tanks in various local conflicts in the period between the two world wars did not give an unequivocal answer to the question of the use of armored fighting vehicles in a large-scale war. And only the Second World War, which began in 1939, revealed to the world the “sword of the kladenets” of modern highly maneuverable military operations - large mechanized formations.

In the USSR, they independently came up with a similar concept of the use of tank forces, and also tried to take into account the experience of the use of the Wehrmacht in the Polish and Western campaigns of strike tank groups.

In 1940, in our country, mechanized corps were organized, uniting the vast majority of the Red Army armored vehicles. Mechanized corps were the main striking force of the ground forces and were very powerful units. The number of vehicles in them was a long time, as well, and the total number of tanks in the USSR on the 1941 year, "a terrible military secret." Soviet historians had a hard time recognizing that the Red Army, surpassing Germany and its allies in terms of the number of armored vehicles, about three and a half times, and twice in border districts, could not realize such a solid advantage, having lost almost all of them in border battles. all cash armored vehicles.

As a rule, the official point of view of the Soviet historical science sounded something like this: “Even before the start of World War II, Soviet designers developed a new model of the T-34 medium tank and the KV heavy tank ... However, the production of these tanks began only at the end of 1940, and therefore, the beginning of the war with the Nazi Germany, our tank troops had them in limited numbers. "[1] Or like this: “Soviet designers created first-class tanks (T-34 and KV), but their mass production has not yet been deployed.” [2] Or even so: “Since the summer of 1940, new T-34 tanks began to enter the corps, of which 1940 were produced in 115, and from the beginning of 1941, KV tanks. But there were still few new tanks by the beginning of the war. ”[3]

Even in the specialized literature at that time, neither the number of tanks in the army, nor, especially, their distribution among the mechanized corps was reported. For example, in the secret textbook of the Military Academy of Armored Forces “The History of Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Soviet Army” on the Soviet tank park on the eve of the war it was only said: “By the summer of 1941, i.e. by the time of the perfidious attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, our tank and motorized divisions and mechanized corps were not fully equipped with new military equipment, which undoubtedly had a negative impact on the course of military operations in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War ... our troops did not have enough tanks, especially medium and heavy, which at that time were just coming into service. "[4]

In 60-s, the number of new types of tanks (meaning, of course, KV and T-34) became “well known”, probably from the six-volume encyclopedia of the history of the Second World War, the number “1861 new tank” began to migrate from book to book. So, for example, the book “50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR” reports: “However, on the eve of the war, the plants managed to produce only 636 heavy KV tanks and 1225 medium T-34 tanks.” [5] Those. altogether, allegedly, before the outbreak of the war, the 1861 was released a new tank T-34 and KV. In the book of Marshal Zhukov, “Memories and Reflections,” this number is also given: “As for the KV and T-34, by the beginning of the war the plants had time to launch the 1861 tank. This, of course, was not enough. "[6]

In fact this is not true. Back in 1960, in the first volume of the history of the Great Patriotic War, the entire production of new heavy and medium tanks was painted: “The machines of the new types, KB and T-34, which were significantly superior to the German ones, were not produced in 1939, but in 1940 They were released a little: 243 KB and 115 T-34. Only in the first half of 1941, the release of new tanks increased markedly. During these six months, the industry gave 393 tank KB and 1110 tanks T-34. ”[7] That is, the 1861 tank of new types was released on 1 July 1941 of the year.

In 70-80-ies. Of the twentieth century, the “whistle-dance” with the number of T-34 and KV continued: some authors indicated the almost canonized “1861 new tank”, others continued to confuse the first half of the year and the whole period before the start of the Great Patriotic War, i.e. 1 July and 22 June 1941 dates, and sometimes 1 June: “By June 1941, the Soviet Armed Forces numbered 5373 thousand people, over 67 thousand guns and mortars, 1861 tank, over 2700 combat aircraft of new types.” [ 8] Moreover, they were confused even when the source wrote in black and white “in the first half of the year” (as is known, the first half of the year ends with June 31, and not 22 at all).

The official public (and erroneous!) Version was presented by the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, which indicated that on the eve of World War II there was an 1861 tank KV and T-34 in the army, of which 1475 was in the western border districts. [9]

But if with tanks of new types everything was more or less clear, then with the amount of the rest of the armored vehicles there was a complete mess. Soviet historians, pointing out the number of new KV and T-34 tanks, did not “modestly” explain how much all types of tanks were in the army. As a result, all other tanks (except KV and T-34) became impersonal as “tanks of outdated designs” and “with light weapons” or simply “light and outdated”. This definition, in general, was very crafty, the number of these "obsolete" tanks was not cited anyway, which allowed later writers like V. Rezun or V. Beshanov to get a little carnage and make fun of Soviet historians and memoirs.

There were a lot of reasons for such classification (and intentional silence), and some were completely objective, but the main among them, I think, were the fears of the political leadership. After all, the average reader, who had no idea about the size of the Soviet tank park and brought up on another version of the beginning of the war, such revelations could cause sharply anti-Soviet sentiment, ultimately affecting not only the position of party historians, but also the state itself. What actually happened later in the restructuring. One of the tools for the destruction of the Soviet Union was a change in the mass consciousness of the population, in which all sorts of disclosures of secrets of party and state power, hidden from the people until the end of 80, played an important role. For the Soviet people who were unprepared for such revelations, such publications caused a shock first, and then a reaction that most accurately characterized the slogan “We were all lied to!” and, as a consequence, total stifling of any Soviet source and, at the same time, blind trust in any work and her and the author who argued with Soviet sources (especially if this controversy was “revealing”).

It is quite clear that Soviet historians did wrong, hushing up information about the actual state of the army for 22 June 1941, including its tank forces. But the complexity of the situation in which the leadership fell into was in the fact that, having widely announced such statistics, it would have to face new problems. After all, having received information about the number of tanks, the average reader is from the question "how many tanks were there in the USSR?" moved automatically to the question "how, having such a number of tanks, we managed to suffer such a crushing defeat at the beginning of the war?" What would the party ideologues have to do, considering that the answer to the question they had long given, and on the false assertion that the enemy was superior to us (including in the number of tank forces)? And this was only part of the general problem of misinterpreting the causes of the 1941 disaster of the year. Fearing a revision of the “approved” official version of the reasons for our defeat in 1941, the Soviet leadership chose to pretend that there was no problem, manically silencing and classifying everything that could become the basis for doubt, including statistics on the state of the army and its armored forces. .

However, the mechanism of silence about the present state of the Red Army in the 1941 year was faltering. So, in the 1964 year, in the multi-volume “History of Russian Artillery” - a book that was publicly available in libraries - the number of Soviet tanks in the spring of 1941 was indicated! By the number of tanks in the Red Army, information was given by year, starting with 1933 (4906 tanks and 244 armored vehicles) and ending with two dates - 15.09.40 (23364 units, 27 T-3) , and 34 BA) and 4034 g. (1.04.41 tanks, including 23815 KV and 364 T-537, and 34 BA) [4819]

Unfortunately, the figures given in this book were practically not noticed by professional historians, or by amateurs of military history.

However, in the works labeled "secret" or DSP, the situation was somewhat different. Regarding the number of armored troops of the Red Army in the prewar period in such works no special secrets were made. So, back in 1960, Lieutenant Colonel M.P. Dorofeev in a brochure published by the Military Academy of Armored Forces cited data on the number of personnel, tanks, armored cars, guns and mortars, cars, tractors and motorcycles in the mechanized corps of the western border districts, though from his calculations, somehow 16- MK. But without the 16 of the MK, according to MP Dorofeev in 19-mechanized corps of border western districts, there were 11 000 combat vehicles [11]:

Table 1.
DistrictHousingNumber of tanksArtilleryMortars
Lvo 1 μ 1037 148 146
10 μ 469 75 157
Pribovo 3 μ 651 186 181
12 μ 749 92 221
SOBOVO 6 μ 1131 162 187
11 μ 414 40 104
13 μ 282 132 117
14 μ 518 126 114
17 μ 63 12 104
20 μ 94 58 76
Cova 4 μ 979 134 152
8 μ 898 142 152
9 μ 298 101 118
15 μ 749 88 139
19 μ 453 65 27
22 μ 712 122 178
24 μ 222 - -
OdVO 2 μ 517 162 189
18 μ 282 83 30
Total - 11000 1928 2392

On the other hand, the actual number of armored vehicles in the Red Army before the war was a kind of “open secret”, and was quite calculated by an attentive reader, even from open sources. For example, according to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov:

"The production of tanks grew rapidly. During the first five-year plan, 5 thousands were produced, by the end of the second army there are already 15 thousands tanks and tankettes ...

The annual production of 740 tanks in 1930-1931 reached 1938 in 2271 year ...

From January 1939 to 22 June 1941, the Red Army received more than seven thousand tanks, in 1941, the industry could produce about 5,5 thousands of tanks of all types ... "[6]

Taking the calculator in hand, according to the above quotes from the book of Georgy Konstantinovich, the total number of tanks in the USSR by June 1941 of the year can be estimated in 24 000 units.

But with the beginning of “plasticity” and “restructuring,” the situation radically changed. In 1988, an article by V.V. appeared in the magazine “International Affairs”. Shlykova “And our tanks are fast”, where the author multiplied the regular number of armored vehicles in the Red Army Tank Divisions by the number of divisions, getting the upper limit on the number of 22 875 combat vehicles, but the lower limit of his calculations gave the number of 20 700 tanks and tankettes. However, despite the approximately correct result (± 1 500 units), Shlykov’s calculation method was incorrect, because not one of the Red Army's tank and motorized divisions had a regular number of tank fleets. Despite this, the article caused a huge resonance, forcing the official historical science to still get out of "hibernation".

Soon the article of the editor on the history of strategy and operational art of the Military-Historical Journal Colonel V.P. Krikunov “Simple arithmetic V.V. Shlykova ”, where, in addition to criticizing the Shlykov method, Colonel Krikunov cites archival data on the presence and distribution of tanks in the mechanized corps of the pre-war Red Army [12]:

Table 2.
DistrictHousingNumber of tanksOf these, HF and T-34
Lvo * 1 and 10 MK 1506 15
Pribovo 3 and 12 MK 1393 109
SOBOVO 11 μ 237 31
6 μ 1021 352
13 μ 294 -
14 μ 520 -
17 μ 36 -
20 μ 93 -
Cova 4 μ 892 414
8 μ 858 171
9 μ 285 -
15 μ 733 131
19 μ 280 11
22 μ 647 31
16 μ 608 -
24 μ 222 -
OdVO 2 μ 489 60
18 μ 280 -
MBO * 7 and 21 micron, 51 reject 1134 9
HVO * 25 μ 300 20
ORVO 23 μ 413 21
SCWO 26 μ 184 -
ZakVO 28 μ 869 -
SAVO 27 μ 356 -
ZabVO * 5 MK, 57 and 61 TD, 82 MD 2602 -
DVF * 30 micron, 59 td, 69 md 2969 -

The number of tanks was given by V. Krikunov, taking into account the existing ones in military formations, military schools, courses, training centers, civilian higher educational institutions.

At about the same time as pseudo-historical studies of amateurs from history and falsifiers like V. Rezun poured from the cornucopia (pseudonym - V. Suvorov). It is with the article of Shlykov that the chapter “Which tanks should be considered light?” Echoes his books “The Last Republic”. V. Rezun was not alone in his revelations; one way or another, the question of the number of tanks in the Soviet Union before the Great Patriotic War concerned almost all modern pseudo-historians - V. Beshanov, B. Sokolov, I. Bunich and others, but the author of the Icebreaker is among Of course, they are the most famous and readable. However, they all used either Krikunov’s data or Dorofeev’s data, and didn’t bring anything new to the study of the number of Soviet armored vehicles.

The next major step in researching the state of the Red Army Tank Forces at the beginning of World War II was the analytical work "1992 Year - Lessons and Conclusions" published in 1941 under the signature of the DSP. The number of new tanks at the beginning of the war in it is given approximately - "only about 1800 units", but there is a total number of combat vehicles: "over 23 thousand units." The book also contains the distribution of tanks in the mechanized corps of the western border districts "to the beginning of the war", including the 16 Mechanized Corps [13] “forgotten” by Lieutenant Colonel Dorofeev:

Table 3.
DistrictHousingNumber of tanksOf these, HF and T-34
Lvo 1 μ 1039 15
10 μ 469 -
Pribovo 3 μ 672 110
12 μ 730 -
SOBOVO 6 μ 1131 452
11 μ 414 20
13 μ 282 -
14 μ 518 -
17 μ 63 -
20 μ 94 -
Cova 4 μ 979 414
8 μ 899 171
9 μ 316 -
15 μ 749 136
16 μ 478 76
19 μ 453 5
22 μ 712 31
24 μ 222 -
OdVO 2 μ 527 60
18 μ 282 -
20 Mechanical Corps total - 11029 1306

From the above tables it can be seen that the number of tanks in the mechanized corps of the Red Army from different authors does not coincide with each other.

The article by N.P.Zolotov and S.I.Isayeva in due time delivered a peculiar feature in the disputes about the number of Soviet armored vehicles for June 1941. They gave not only the distribution of tanks by districts on June 1, but also showed for the first time the qualitative condition of the fleet of combat vehicles using the standard for reporting the time scheme of division by categories [14]:

Table 4.
DistrictTotal tanks and ACSIncluding by category
1 category2 category3 category4 category
Lvo 1857 7 1536 210 104
Pribovo 1549 378 896 203 72
SOBOVO 2900 470 1722 375 323
Cova 5465 1124 3664 298 379
OdVO 1011 178 565 151 117
ZakVO 877 6 711 122 38
SAVO 363 0 288 44 31
DVF 3201 191 2772 134 104
ZabVO 2496 131 1943 232 190
ArchVO 26 9 16 0 1
MVO 1173 29 920 150 74
HALT 443 28 307 86 22
ORVO 321 23 176 78 44
HVO 305 27 193 35 50
SCWO 157 0 133 14 10
Urvo 53 0 48 3 2
SibVO 216 10 189 5 12
Rembazy NKO 677 0 0 0 677
NKO warehouses 16 0 1 7 8
Total in the Red Army 23106 2611 16080 2157 2258

Finally, in the 1994, a truly “bible” of historians dealing with the problems of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War is published; d) ". True, the circulation of this edition is fascinating - as many as 1941 copies! The collection turned out to be a unique work, nothing like this has been published either before or after its publication. Specifically, the tank fleet provided information on the distribution of tanks by type (including a breakdown into radio and linear, chemical and artillery, etc.) and by districts, as well as by categories on 1945 June 1 and supplies of equipment in June 22 g . [1941]:

Table 5.
DistrictHFT-35T-34T-28T-26BTT-37, T-38, T-40Chem. tanksSAABronir tank-based vehicles (sapper, transport)T-27 *Total armored units
Lvo 6 - 8 89 531 897 180 146 - 19 101 1977
Pribovo 78 - 50 57 507 691 146 20 - 3 94 1646
SOBOVO 97 - 228 63 1271 661 462 110 8 50 395 3345
Cova 278 51 496 215 1698 1819 651 248 9 35 394 5894
OdVO 10 - 50 - 214 494 225 18 - 5 103 1119
ArchVO - - - - - - 26 - - - 16 42
MVO 4 2 5 8 275 553 142 184 - 44 173 1390
HALT 19 6 23 10 73 123 153 36 - 10 205 658
ORVO 8 - 16 - 67 136 94 - - 7 146 474
HVO 4 - 16 - 173 7 101 4 - 4 79 388
SCWO - - - - 2 86 66 3 - 1 80 238
Urvo - - - - - - 53 - - - 36 89
SibVO - - - - 53 - 153 10 - 2 98 316
"South" (ZakVO and SAVO) - - - - 854 160 91 135 - 3 23 1266
Vostok (ZabVO and DVF) - - - - 2735 1770 894 287 11 66 427 6190
Rembazy and warehouses - - - 39 294 138 145 77 - 19 188 900
Total: 504 59 892 481 8747 7535 3582 1278 28 268 2558 25932
Including 1 category 420 - 845 - 951 53 330 12 - 1 - 2612
2 category 81 48 46 292 6436 6104 2008 1049 16 152 1134 17366
3 category 3 5 1 100 522 822 605 92 7 34 584 2775
4 category - 6 - 89 838 556 639 125 5 81 840 3179

* - including T-27 chemical and engineering.

The statistical compendium became, without doubt, the most complete and reliable source for the number of armored vehicles in the Red Army on the eve of the Second World War for a long time.

In 2000, M. Meltyukhov published his book "Lost Chance of Stalin". In several chapters, the author on a documentary basis describes in detail the process of the pre-war construction of the Red Army and naturally cannot bypass the question of the state of its tank forces. The author focuses primarily on organizational events held in 1939-41. in ABTV, however, statistics are not forgotten either. Thus, in the annexes for the RGASPI materials, tables of tank presence in the Red Army were compiled by type and district on 15.09.40, 1.01.41, 1.04.41 and 1.06.41, the production of armored vehicles in the USSR in 1930-44 was highlighted. In addition, information is given on tanks available in the Red Army by type for different dates, starting on 1 in January 1934. Unfortunately, by the beginning of the war, the complete set of mechanized corps at M. Meltyuhova is secondary and repeats the data of Colonel V.Krikunov 1989 year

Maxim Kolomiets and Yevgeny Drig, who in their works look at the quantitative and qualitative composition of almost every mechanized corps of the pre-war Red Army in their works, demonstrate a serious approach to studying the problem of the number of armored troops of the Red Army in 1941. Maxim Kolomiets gives the following figures for the presence of armored vehicles in two PribOVO [16] mechanized corps:

Table 6.
mk.3 Mechanic Corps12 Mechanic Corps
KB-1 32 -
KB-2 19 -
T-34 50 -
T-28 57 -
BT-7 431 242
T-26 of all types 53 497
T-27 - 8
Other foreign tanks - 59 *
Total: 642 806

* - from the composition of the former armies of the Baltic states

A unique collection of documents on tank forces was released in 2004, it is called "Main Armored Directorate". Several interesting documents were published in it, incl. report of the head of GABTU, Lieutenant-General Fedorenko, who gave the total number of tanks in mechanized corps and separate divisions on 1 June 1941.

At the same time, the most complete data is contained in E. Drig in his book “The Mechanized Corps of the Red Army in Battle” released in the “Unknown Wars” series by AST in 2005. Yevgeny Drig used all available sources, including the appendix to the report of the head of GABTU, Lieutenant General Fedorenko. Naturally, we are primarily interested in the mechanized corps of the border districts. So let's start from north to south.

LenVO

1 th mechanized corps, district subordination. The Pskov Corps Department, 31348 personnel, or 87% of the state. Armored vehicles fully equipped. On 22 June, there are no new types of tanks in the corps. On 22.06.41 tanks available:

Table 7.
TotalBT-5BT-7Total BTT-26HTT-28BA
Mehkorpus 1039 187 - - - 104 - -
1-I TD 370 89 176 265 18 + 50 XT-26 - 38 53
3-I TD 338 - 232 232 68 (70) - 38 (40) 74
163-I MD - 25 - - 229 - - -

10 th mechanized corps, 23 th army. Management of the corps, the New Peterhof, 26065 personnel, or 72% of the state On 22.06.41 tanks available:

Table 8.
TotalBT-2BT-5T-26T-26HTT-38T-27BA
Mehkorpus - 139 142 - - 38 - - -
21-I TD 201 (217) - - 177 9 38 - - 41
24-I TD 282 139 142 3 - - 1 2 45
198-I MD ? - - - - - - - -

1-th MK was one of the most powerful mobile connections of the Red Army. In addition, it was a “exemplary” mechanized corps, which has always been the focus of attention of the leadership. The two mechanized corps of the Leningrad Military District numbered about 1540 tanks.

Pribovo

3 th mechanized corps, 11 th army. The Vilnius Corps Administration, 31975 personnel, or 87% of the state. On 20.06.41 tanks are available:

Table 9.
TotalKB-1KB-2T-34T-28BT-7T-26HTBA-10BA-20
Mehkorpus 669 32 19 50 57 431 41 12 166 58
Management - - - - - - - - 5 5
2-I TD 252 32 19 - 27 116 19 12 63 27
5-I TD 268 - - 50 30 170 18 - 56 20
84-I MD 149 - - - - 145 4 - 42 6

12 th mechanized corps, 8 th army. The Siauliai Corps Administration (with 18.06.41), 29998 personnel, or 83% of the state. On 22.06.41 tanks are available:

Table 10.
TotalBT-7T-26Fiat xnumxRenault FT-17WedgesHTT-26 tractorVikkersBA-10BA-20
Mehkorpus 806 242 483 6 6 13 10 4 42 23 73
Management 6 6 - - - - - - - - 18
23-I TD 381 - 350 - - 2 9 3 17 5 15
28-I TD 314 236 68 - - - 1 - 9 15 25
202-I MD 105 - 65 6 6 11 - 1 16 3 15

Thus, in the two mechanized corps of Pribovo there were 1475 tanks available (without tankettes and BA).

SOBOVO

6 th mechanized corps, 10 th army. The management of the corps of Bialystok, 24005 personnel, or 67% of the state. On 22.06.41 tanks available:

Table 11.
TotalT-26BT-2BT-5BT-5 / 7T-34HFHTother
Mehkorpus 1021 (1031) 126 30 37 416 238 (239) 113 (114) 44 127
4-I TD ND * nd nd nd nd 88 63 nd nd
7-I TD 368 42 - 37 125 150 51 - -
29-I MD nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd

*- no data

According to some data in the case there were also T-28 tanks (included in the number of T-34) and KV-2 (included in the number of KV).

11 th mechanized corps, 3 th army. Management Corps Volkovysk, personnel 21605, or 60% of the state. On 22.06.41 tanks available:

Table 12.
TotalHFT-34BTT-26HTT-26 tractorBA-10BA-20
Mehkorpus 241 3 28 44 141 19 (20) 6 96 45
29-I TD 66 2 26 - 22 16 - 38 20
33-I TD 118 1 2 44 65 2 4 47 25
204-I MD 57 - - - - - - - -

13 th mechanized corps, 10 th army. The Office of the Corps of Biala Podlaski, 17809 personnel, or 49% of the state. On 22.06.41 tanks available:

Table 13.
TotalBTT-26T-26 double-towerHTT-37 / 38 / 40T-26 tractorBA-10BA-20
Mehkorpus 295 15 196 48 19 (20) 16 1 29 5
Management - - - - - - - 1 -
25-I TD 228 - 175 30 18 5 - 1 2
31-I TD 40 - 20 18 1 - 1 15 3
208-I MD 27 15 1 - - 11 - 12 -

14 th mechanized corps, 4 th army. Management Corps Kobrin, 15550 personnel, or 43% of the state.

Table 14.
TotalT-26HTBTT-37 / 38 / 40
Mehkorpus 534 528 (of which 14 tractors) 25 6 10
Management 6 - - 6 -
22-I TD 256 251 - - 5
30-I TD 211 211 - - -
205-I MD 61 56 - - 5

17 th mechanized corps, district subordination. Management Corps Baranavichy, 16578 personnel, or 46% of the state. On 22.06.41 tanks available:

Table 15.
TotalBTT-26HTT-37 / 38 / 40
Mehkorpus 36 24 1 2 11
27-I TD 9 9 - - -
36-I TD 27 15 1 - 11
209-I MD - - - - -

20 th mechanized corps, district subordination. The Borisov Corps Department, 20389 personnel, or 57% of the state. On 22.06.41 tanks available:

Table 16.
TotalT-26HTBT
Mehkorpus 93 80 3 13
26-I TD 44 31 - 13
38-I TD 43 43 - -
210-I MD 6 6 - -

Thus, there were 2220 tanks in six ZAPOV mechanized corps. And only one of the six mechanized corps had a regular number of tank fleet, namely the 6-th MK of the 10-th army. 17-th and 20-th mechanized corps are generally difficult to consider as units of tank forces. Rather, it is educational units. Not much better things were in 13-m and 11-m MK. Both the one and the other were from the strength of a tank division. Tanks of new types in a significant amount were also received only in the 6-th MK, the material part of the other buildings consisted mainly of tanks T-26 and BT various modifications.

Cova

4 th mechanized corps, 6 th army. The Lviv Corps Administration, 28097 personnel, or 78% of the state. The corps attracts attention primarily because of its commander, the notorious General Vlasov. However, in reality, the 4-th MK is interesting to others: the corps was QUALITATIVELY the most powerful mobile unit of the Red Army for June 1941. Although quantitative estimates of the tank corps of the corps and do not match in different sources. On 22.06.41 tanks available:

Table 17.
TotalT-40T-26HTT-27BT-7Total BTT-28T-34HFTotal T-34 and KV
Mekhkorpus * 892, (950), (979) 13 103 23 38 62 290 75 313 (327) 89 (101) 414
8-I TD 325 - 36 - - 31 - 68 140 50 -
32-I TD 361 - 70 - 38 31 - nd 173 49 -
81-I MD 283 13 - - - - - - - - -

* Total number of tanks in the hull: 892 according to A. Isaev, 950 according to the Kiev Museum of the Second World War, 979 according to the book "1941 Year - Lessons and Conclusions". - M .: Military Publishing, 1992.

8 th mechanized corps, 26 th army. The Drohobych Corps Department, 31927 personnel, or 89% of the state. A very powerful compound is the hero of the counterstroke on Dubno. On 22 June available tanks:

Table 18.
TotalHTSU-5BT-2BT-5T-34T-35HFT-26
Mehkorpus 858 * (899) (932) 50 2 14 109 100 48 71 (69 HF-1 and 2 HF-2) 344
12-I TD - - - - - - - - -
34-I TD - - 2 - - - 48 6 HF-2 (?) -
7-I MD - - - - - - - - -

* Total number of tanks in the hull: 858 according to A. Isaev, 899 according to the book "1941 year - lessons and conclusions." - M .: Voenizdat, 1992, 932, according to the memoirs of l. DI. Ryabyshev.

9 th mechanized corps of district subordination. Office Corps Novograd-Volynsk, 26833 personnel, or 74% of the state. On 22 June available tanks:

Table 19.
TotalT-37T-26HTBT
Mehkorpus 300 - - 4 -
20-I TD 36 - 3 3 30 BT-5
35-I TD 142 - 141 1 -
131-I MD 122 18 - - 104

15 th mechanized corps, 6 th army. The Office of the Brody Corps, 33935 personnel, or 94% of the state. On 22 June available tanks:

Table 20.
TotalHFT-34T-28BT-7T-26HT
Mehkorpus 733 (749) 64 72 51 439 44 9
10-I TD 363 63 38 51 181 22 8
37-I TD 316 1 34 - 258 22 1
212-I MD ? - - - - - -

16 th mechanized corps, 12 th army. The head office of the Kamenetz-Podolsk Corps, 26380 personnel, or 73% of the state. On 22 June available tanks:

Table 21.
TotalT-28BTT-26HT
Mehkorpus 680 (608) 75 360 214 31 (32)
15-I TD 347 75 - - -
39-I TD 209 - - 196 13
240-I MD 112 - - - -

19 th mechanized corps of district subordination. Management of the corps of Berdichev, 22654 personnel, or 63% of the state. On 22 June available tanks:

Table 22.
TotalT-26HTT-34HFKV and T-34other
Mehkorpus 280 (453) 291 47 2 (9) 5 7 (14) 152
40-I TD - - - - - - -
43-I TD - - - > = 5 - - -
213-I MD - - - - - -

22 th mechanized corps, 5 th army. Management Corps, Exactly, 24087 personnel, or 67% of the state. On 22 June available tanks:

Table 23.
TotalKB-2BTT-26HTT-37
Mehkorpus 707 31 163 464 49 -
19-I TD 163 - 34 122 7 -
41-I TD 415 31 - 342 41 1
215-I MD 129 - 129 - -

24 th mechanized corps of district subordination. The Office of the Corps, Proskurov, 21556 personnel, or 60% of the state. On 22 June available tanks:

Table 24.
Total body222 *4 XT
45-I TD ? ?
49-I TD ? ?
216-I MD ? ?

* On 30.06.41 available: BT-7 glad. - 10, T-26 pleased. - 52, T-26 ling. - 70, T-26 dvuhbash. - 43, XT - 3, T-27 - 7. Total 185 tanks and tank shoes.

Thus, in eight mechanized KOVO hulls on 22 June from 4672 tanks to 4950 tanks according to different sources. Moreover, two of the five most powerful mechanized corps are deployed precisely in KOVO.

OdVO

2 th mechanized corps, 9 th army. The Tiraspol Corps Department, 32396 personnel, or 90% of the state. On 22 June available tanks:

Table 25.
TotalHFT-34BTT-26BA
Mehkorpus 450 10 50 318 62 185
Management - - - - 6 20
11-I TD 193 10 50 117 56 73
16-I TD 90 - - 34 - 51
15-I MD 167 - - 167 - 4

18 th mechanized corps, 9 th army. The Akkerman Corps Administration, 26879 personnel, or 75% of the state. On 22 June available tanks:

Table 26.
TotalBTT-26T-37 / 38HT
Mehkorpus 282 (280) 106 (BT-5 - 14) 150 (153) 14 (29) 12
44-I TD ? - - - -
47-I TD ? - - - -
218-I MD ? - - - -

Therefore, in two mechanized corps of OdVO in the presence of the entire 732 tank. That given the minority of the county is not surprising.

In all the mechanized corps of border districts from 10639 to 10917 combat vehicles (although of these, the 3 tank belonged to the 4 and 2232 category). And this is only in mechanized buildings, without taking into account other parts and formations that were armed with tanks.

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  1. Vadivak
    Vadivak 1 November 2011 09: 29 New
    +7
    What is the difference how many tanks if before the war there was a rearmament and the formation of new structures? And the German was trained and mobilized

    As you know, on November 21, 1939 the Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to disband all four of the tank corps available at that time in the Red Army. Instead, tank brigades of the RGK and mechanized divisions were created. In less than a year, the People's Commissariat of Defense makes a diametrically opposite decision and proceeds to form nine mechanized corps. Finally, in February-March 1941, the deployment of another 20 mechanized corps began - alas, for this the army did not have personnel or sufficient equipment. Nevertheless, throughout the last pre-war year, endless reformation took place: some formations were deployed, others were liquidated, units from other military branches were transferred to the tank forces, etc. All this was accompanied by the movement of parts and formations from one place of dislocation to another. So, by the beginning of World War II only those nine mechanized corps were relatively combat-ready, the formation of which began in the summer of 1940. But in them the organization of combat training in some cases left much to be desired. Widely practiced was the essentially vicious system of “saving motor technology resources”, in which the crews were engaged in combat training on worn-out vehicles of the training and combat park. At the same time, new, more advanced and often significantly different from the tanks of earlier releases military equipment was stored in boxes. There was already little use for using BT-2 tanks for training BT-7 crews, but this process turned into a complete absurdity when during the training of driver-mechanics for the T-34 the recruits were put on the old T-26! For example, by December 1, 1940, there were only 37 T-34s in the tank units of the Red Army. Naturally, such a quantity could not ensure the normal training of tankers. In addition, for reasons of secrecy, the leadership of the T-34 tank service in some tank units was not handed over not only to crew members, but even to unit commanders. Is it any wonder that, for example, on May 11, 1941, the headquarters of the 3rd mechanized corps of the Baltic Special Military District asked the manufacturer for repair documentation and specialist assistance, since a third of the T-34 tanks were disabled during training sessions. The investigation showed that all the clutches were burnt due to improper use of all tanks. On May 23, 1941, in the 6th mechanized corps of the Western Special Military District, five T-34 tanks were put out of action and needed serious repairs. Reason: because of negligence (or because of basic ignorance) they were filled with gasoline.

    What is the difference how many tanks were in the USSR before the war? There was a rearmament and reorganization, and the German lane trained and mobilized

    As you know, on November 21, 1939 the Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to disband all four of the tank corps available at that time in the Red Army. Instead, tank brigades of the RGK and mechanized divisions were created. In less than a year, the People's Commissariat of Defense makes a diametrically opposite decision and proceeds to form nine mechanized corps. Finally, in February-March 1941, the deployment of another 20 mechanized corps began - alas, for this the army did not have personnel or sufficient equipment. Nevertheless, throughout the last pre-war year, endless reformation took place: some formations were deployed, others were liquidated, units from other military branches were transferred to the tank forces, etc. All this was accompanied by the movement of parts and formations from one place of dislocation to another. So, by the beginning of World War II only those nine mechanized corps were relatively combat-ready, the formation of which began in the summer of 1940. But in them the organization of combat training in some cases left much to be desired. Widely practiced was the essentially vicious system of “saving motor technology resources”, in which the crews were engaged in combat training on worn-out vehicles of the training and combat park. At the same time, new, more advanced and often significantly different from the tanks of earlier releases military equipment was stored in boxes. There was already little use for using BT-2 tanks for training BT-7 crews, but this process turned into a complete absurdity when during the training of driver-mechanics for the T-34 the recruits were put on the old T-26! For example, by December 1, 1940, there were only 37 T-34s in the tank units of the Red Army. Naturally, such a quantity could not ensure the normal training of tankers. In addition, for reasons of secrecy, the leadership of the T-34 tank service in some tank units was not handed over not only to crew members, but even to unit commanders. Is it any wonder that, for example, on May 11, 1941, the headquarters of the 3rd mechanized corps of the Baltic Special Military District asked the manufacturer for repair documentation and specialist assistance, since a third of the T-34 tanks were disabled during training sessions. The investigation showed that all the clutches were burnt due to improper use of all tanks. On May 23, 1941, in the 6th mechanized corps of the Western Special Military District, five T-34 tanks were put out of action and needed serious repairs. Reason: because of negligence (or because of basic ignorance) they were filled with gasoline.
    1. datur
      datur 1 November 2011 13: 34 New
      +9
      Vadivak, do not you think that resembles today's picture - only now everything is much worse?
      1. Vadivak
        Vadivak 1 November 2011 14: 40 New
        +9
        I didn’t live at that time, therefore I can’t objectively compare, but I remember the powerful Soviet Army of the 70s and see what is left of it
    2. ballian
      ballian 2 November 2011 18: 46 New
      +2
      What do you mean by all this? It turns out that this is the result of the activity of the Soviet leadership - to hell with wonderful tanks that have no analogues at all with the Germans - but all to no purpose?
      .
      And the Germans, as if in advance, it was supposed everything was at the highest level?
      If you recall that they began to rivet the tanks much later than the USSR and the tank units much later than appeared in the USSR and the tanks were miserable - and all the same, everything is fine by definition?
      Which of these is the conclusion?
      1. Snoop
        Snoop 23 December 2016 00: 08 New
        0
        What makes you think that the Germans later began to produce tanks than the USSR? In fact, the first German tanks appeared during the First World War.
        1. Yevgeny
          Yevgeny April 11 2017 21: 01 New
          0
          Under the terms of the Versailles Peace, the Germans were forbidden to have tanks. Therefore, the Germans studied in Kazan. And they taught the Red Army tactics - at our training grounds. The first German so-called T-1 tank - machine gun was released only in the 35th year.
  2. Evgan
    Evgan 1 November 2011 09: 41 New
    0
    Well, if we pay attention to the difference between June 22 and July 1, then "the first half ending 31 June "- this, of course, is brain-exploding.

    The number of tanks that our country had before the war — as well as their distribution among the districts, the degree of combat readiness of the equipment, and the level of ownership of its l / s — is just one of the indicators that make up the overall picture. It is important as a detail - no more, but no less.
    1. Banshee
      Banshee 1 November 2011 17: 36 New
      +1
      By the way, an important aspect.
      tanks released in the 1 half-year, and tanks that went on combat duty are two different differences.
      Or are you hinting at the presence at each factory of your own Harry Potter, who with the help of a magic wand easily moved tanks from the factory to units?
  3. His
    His 1 November 2011 11: 57 New
    +1
    Mass betrayal was from our former border Soviet Republics. The Germans were driven when he stepped into the territory of the RSFSR. If all military force was in the Western direction, capable of theoretically stopping the enemy, but this did not happen. The army in the Baltic countries, Ukraine surrendered completely without entering into significant military resistance. Further, these "prisoners of war", except for Jews and Russians, calmly switched over to the side of the enemy as policemen, participating in the future, in raids on Russian provinces, to destroy the local population.
    1. dmitri077
      dmitri077 29 January 2012 00: 37 New
      -3
      "Massive betrayal was on the part of our former border Soviet Republics." - nonsense of a madman! a clinical case ... at first the dogs were starved, and then they were written down as "traitors" ... so then do not be surprised why you are so hated ...
    2. slan
      slan 29 January 2012 00: 46 New
      0
      Quote: Own

      Mass betrayal ..

      I met more than once that before the war the army was staffed on the principle of proximity to the duty station .. If this is true, it explains a lot. Official data on this topic probably does not exist, because HZ.
    3. Yevgeny
      Yevgeny April 11 2017 21: 07 New
      0
      Not only cross-border! Dmitry077 is absolutely right: you just have to accept as an axiom that Soviet people of all nationalities fiercely hated the Soviet regime, personally Comrade Stalin and everything connected with it. And they were not at all eager to defend the collective farm system. made them poor slaves. In principle, this can be regarded as a betrayal. But it was a betrayal of a totalitarian anti-people regime. When the people understood. that the Germans are not sugar, the situation has changed. But by this time the Germans were already in Stalingrad and on Elbrus.
  4. Mesniy
    Mesniy 1 November 2011 13: 23 New
    -11
    Quote: Own
    Mass betrayal was from our former border Soviet Republics.
    And what, did you dream that the population of the newly occupied countries would gladly die for their occupiers? Think sometimes.

    After the start of the Finnish war, America imposed an embargo on the supply of gasoline to the USSR. Therefore, tank crews had run over for 5 hours, as always thanks to the “wise” comrade Dzhugoshvilka ...
    1. Vadivak
      Vadivak 1 November 2011 14: 49 New
      +14
      And this is a respected comrade, you may be occupied by us and your relatives, but temporarily lost as Germans, for example Danzing,

      and you went too far with the embargo, there was enough Gasoline for yourself, and After the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact in 1939, the USSR began to supply Germany with oil. This is evidenced by the correspondence of the leaders of the governments of the USSR and Germany. do not confuse Lend-Lease gasoline with pre-war
      1. Banshee
        Banshee 1 November 2011 17: 34 New
        +10
        I will add that the gasoline that came from America was intended for American land-landing aircraft. And ours quite normally flew in the domestic ... Teach the materiel, gentleman ...
        1. Vadivak
          Vadivak 1 November 2011 21: 52 New
          +6
          I support Roman, absolutely right, they carried high-octane tankers
      2. Yevgeny
        Yevgeny April 11 2017 21: 09 New
        0
        Oil is not good as fuel. Indeed, a lot of oil was extracted from us. But there were problems with its processing. And now, by the way, Russia is exporting crude oil, not finished products.
    2. Alexei
      Alexei 1 November 2011 17: 48 New
      0
      Mesny, read The Young Guard.
    3. prunx
      prunx 1 November 2011 18: 00 New
      +1
      "And you, dreamed that the population of the newly occupied countries would gladly die for their occupiers? Think sometimes of the head." She is not a country or a republic has not been occupied. Take at least the same Baltic states. Why are you lying brazenly here? Type shit and ran away?
      1. Foamas
        Foamas 1 November 2011 19: 13 New
        -3
        And, what is then called the introduction of troops and the change in the existing system of state power in the independent Republic of Estonia ???
        1. vitvit123
          vitvit123 1 November 2011 20: 03 New
          +6
          Yes, these "independent" republics: Estonian, Latvian, Latvian, Hungarian, Polish, Bendery, etc. always were a bargaining chip, or puppets, were always under pressure (or control) of other - more powerful states. They consider only some to be occupiers, while others do not. Or someone tells them whom to consider occupiers.
          1. dmitri077
            dmitri077 29 January 2012 00: 42 New
            0
            “Yes, these“ independent ”republics: Estonian, Latvian, Latvian, Hungarian, Polish, Bendery, etc. have always been a bargaining chip or puppet, they have always been under pressure (or control) of other, more powerful states" - so then there was nothing to bark here, to pollute the air .. we left so much diarrhea after ourselves, we still cannot make out
      2. ballian
        ballian 2 November 2011 19: 11 New
        +2
        You’re talking nonsense here. Eastern Poland was occupied (according to the then international laws signed by the USSR), as well as the Baltic states in the summer of 40 (only fanatic communists considered it to be “attached” by the post-war international law as “joining” of the Baltic states completely falls under the occupation, and komunyaki very surprised when they bring them a simple fact - the Balts never voted for joining the USSR)
        1. vitvit123
          vitvit123 2 November 2011 19: 26 New
          -2
          Yes, they were never asked and will not be asked (unless for the sake of appearance) to whom they want to join.
        2. ESCANDER
          ESCANDER 2 November 2011 20: 11 New
          -1
          --- "By the way, after the post-war international law, the" accession "of the Baltic states completely falls under the occupation."

          Exactly, d urena, which is post-war.
          You look when they are attached.
          1. ballian
            ballian 2 November 2011 20: 51 New
            +2
            The Baltic states don’t give a damn - the events of the summer of 1940 a bit went wrong in pre-war legal casuistry of international law, if the Baltic states refused to accept Soviet ultimatums, there would be no formalities left.
  5. Igor91
    Igor91 1 November 2011 13: 48 New
    +1
    the article is not complete, bring the number of tanks what it was on paper I read the work of an assistant professor I don’t remember the name it was written there these data are a lot like everything is beautiful but only the motor life of most tanks was only a few 100 km that very few which were not in service at all from that, such a result was June 22nd, and with auto equipment in general in motorized and tank units it was even worse when the guns and supplies were more on horseback so the Germans had an overwhelming advantage in technology and as already written there was no experience
    1. Frrost
      Frrost 1 November 2011 15: 17 New
      +3
      The Germans did not have any experience either; from operetta wars, one cannot gain much experience. And with an advantage in technology, you got excited. Under Stalin, the history of the war was not published; now everyone is cast out as they can.
  6. valerei
    valerei 2 November 2011 17: 30 New
    0
    Read the memoirs of Heinz Guderian. Even if you make a discount for all memoirists - embellishment of themselves and their actions, then much will become clear. And the composition of the German tank divisions and corps and their training. And operetnye wars allowed them to gain experience and coherence in joint military operations without heavy losses, and also added courage and courage. And this, you see, also affects the results of the battle.
    1. ballian
      ballian 2 November 2011 18: 59 New
      +3
      It’s interesting - the Germans allegedly got their experience from somewhere, and here their war 39 - 40 is called operetta for some reason (although for some reason these “analysts” do not consider the war in the USSR in 41 - although they should)
      And the fact that the USSR was certainly waging no-scale large-scale war with Finland - “analysts” do not point blank, and there was Khalkhin — a goal that, although “small”, was the most valuable “food” for conclusions for the Soviet military leadership, and the campaign to Ukraine and Belarus was also useful for gaining experience.
      In general, amateurs to absolutize "experience" forget that in a normally trained army in peacetime, experience is of minimal importance for combat effectiveness.
      1. ESCANDER
        ESCANDER 2 November 2011 20: 25 New
        +3
        ballian, you yourself then understood cho said?
        --- "In a normally trained army in peacetime, experience is of minimal importance for combat effectiveness."

        Yes, you at least learn in your garden. While in real life you will not encounter the tactics and equipment of the enemy - you will learn about his capabilities.
        Student, bl ...
        1. Dart weyder
          Dart weyder 2 November 2011 20: 46 New
          +2
          ESCANDER - support! and all the more so, the Wehrmacht had enough experience, even if there were no major tank battles before entering the USSR, the capture of western Europe was a good training ground, coordination of mechanized divisions was worked out like the rest of the units, and the Finnish one had nothing to level off - there was an assault on the fortified areas, and not tank maneuvers, (the Germans had technical backwardness in communications in walkie-talkie tanks, we had flags, only commander tanks had communications - accordingly, the inability to respond quickly to changes in the situation during the battle, and the reign of the Luftwaffe in the first years of the war), experience - there is experience, it’s one thing to shoot at a target - it’s another thing when you feel like a target and shoot at you (there your hands will shake and your eyes will twitch)
      2. Joker
        Joker 2 November 2011 20: 49 New
        -4
        Stalin wasn’t up to the army, he prescribed people in the gulags, but shot personal enemies.
    2. dmitri077
      dmitri077 29 January 2012 00: 46 New
      +1
      "And this, you see, also affects the results of the battle." - against the “deaf” field defense, which for some reason we didn’t have, these courageous couragearies would have died very cheerfully! and the crazy number of tanks speaks of a very strange “defense” of ours ... what were you preparing for? ...
      1. Yevgeny
        Yevgeny April 11 2017 21: 12 New
        0
        How are you getting ready ???? Carry the light of Leninist teachings to Western Europe!
  7. ballian
    ballian 2 November 2011 20: 42 New
    -1
    Quote: ESCANDER
    While in real life you will not encounter the tactics and equipment of the enemy


    In order to know the tactics and equipment of the enemy, there are military analysts who analyze all this information and analyze how the troops are trained.
    It would never occur to anyone to train a rifle division in combat with the Teutonic Knights.
    Apparently in our army there were a lot of backward personalities like you who were not able to perceive and learn modern warfare, and the information about the actions and armaments of the Germans for 39 - 40 year was extinct.
    I’m silent about the fact that the Germans were in the same position with us in this respect
    1. ESCANDER
      ESCANDER 2 November 2011 22: 28 New
      +1
      ballian
      But cho, the nemchur also had a lot of “like retarded personalities” that they couldn’t penetrate our tactics before they stared?
      Where were their “military analysts who extract all this information and analyze the training of troops in accordance with this?” When they were with their 35 mm anti-tank. Against the frontal KV and T-34 staring? Why didn’t they count the ambush tank tactics?
      And all because, dear, why the hell are you to train and calculate for earlier, until you run into a real enemy. (This is the second time for those on an armored train).
  8. Suvorov_Rights
    Suvorov_Rights April 23 2012 19: 21 New
    +1
    I don’t know what you are all talking about, but the USSR had the best tanks in the world at that time. I do not exaggerate, because this is a well-known fact.
    Germany had approximately 2000 "tanks", although an adequate person would not call it a machine weighing 5000-6000 tons and having 2 machine guns or a 20-mm cannon. this is not a tank - but a wedge heel !!!
    Hitler fanned tank armies adding motorized rifles to them.
    By the way, a complete rearmament is impossible - this is an endless process. so such arguments are absurd.
    But actually read V. Suvorov - he verbs the truth wink

    Russia did not prepare for defense !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!
    1. chukapabra
      chukapabra April 23 2012 19: 40 New
      +1
      Quote: Suvorov_Rights
      Russia was not preparing for defense!

      And what was preparing for? This is understandable, the tank is generally an offensive unit, for the defense of the pillbox and the anti-tank trench is preferable (remember the Mannerheim line and the price that the spacecraft paid for its assault)
      Stalin was preparing to attack and 25000 tanks is an indisputable fact - the invading army. I do not whitewash Hitler, the scum will remain scum, but from a military point of view, stopping the armada of 25000 tanks (even if 20% of the bottom were under repair, etc.) was unrealistic. If anyone thinks that Germany did not know that the USSR is arming itself at such a pace, it is deeply mistaken. Therefore, Gitleo delivered a preemptive strike (at the most unfavorable moment - the troops on the march, in the marching formation, were not deployed, without bases, without a warehouse that had not passed military commissures. Having destroyed a huge stake in equipment on the ground, on the road, in trains and in warehouses, he achieved a significant advantage in the first months of the war. Why stupidly deny the facts. Hitler wanted to conquer Europe and enslave, Stalin wanted to conquer Europe and free the proletariat. War is not always bad, it all depends on goals. You can declare war and remain right (Example - Finnish war, from the point of view of safeguarding the northern borders of the USSR)
      Data on the number of tanks is present in such a huge number of open sources that it makes no sense to argue.
      Well, Hitler outplayed Stalin in the first stage, so what? The result is known - Hitler-kaput. Stalin is all in white, and the winner is not judged.
      1. Suvorov_Rights
        Suvorov_Rights April 24 2012 19: 43 New
        +1
        I quote the Germans: "The Russians have a lot of equipment, an unknown construction that far surpasses our machines in all respects!"
        By the way, according to some reports, the Soviet offensive was supposed to begin on July 6, even the borders were open, border guards gave way to the infantry!
        And a HUGE quantity of supplies were collected at the borders: from boots to the rail of the “wide Soviet format”.
  9. Archive
    Archive 13 January 2019 19: 53 New
    0
    As of June 15, 1941, 27% of old types of tanks (all cr. T-34 and KV) were operational throughout the Red Army, production of spare parts for them was stopped, and the supply of spare parts was 11%. New tanks began to arrive en masse literally on the eve of the outbreak of war and were "raw." In fact, all mech.korpusa on the eve of the war were UNMEALTHY in full.
    The article is large, but about nothing ... it is foolishly scrupulous to consider faulty tanks that are not provided with rear, communications, air defense, etc.