Military Review

Protecting the Pacific Fleet Water District in the Soviet-Japanese War

Seventy years ago, on August 9, 1945, the Soviet-Japanese War began - one of the shortest wars of the Soviet Union, ending even in less than a month. The crushing defeat of the Japanese army and fleet was the result of the heroic efforts of Soviet and Mongol warriors. Meanwhile, the events of the Soviet-Japanese war and its heroes today are almost forgotten. But the Soviet Union played a decisive role in the defeat of Japan, making an invaluable contribution to the end of World War II. Although in recent years the Anglo-American media have in every way belittled the role of the USSR in the victory over Japan, in reality without the Soviet Union the United States and their allies would hardly have been able to defeat the Japanese army, especially in such a short time period.

Soviet-Japanese relations remained tense from the very beginning of the Soviet Union. As you know, Japanese troops took part in the intervention during the Civil War, with the help of Japan, White Guard units operated in the Far East and Eastern Siberia. In the 1930s Japanese militarism posed a significant threat to the Far Eastern and Siberian borders of the Soviet Union. In addition, Japan, taking advantage of China's weakness, torn by internecine contradictions, created puppet states of Manzhou-go and Menjiang on its territory. Both countries acted fully in the wake of Japanese politics and represented a danger to neighboring pro-Soviet Mongolia. In 1938 and 1939 There were armed conflicts on Lake Hassan and Khalkhin-Gol - between the USSR and Japan, but they did not spill over into a large-scale war between the two states. In 1941, Japan did not attack the Soviet Union, focusing on the occupation of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In 1941-1945 Japan fought against the United States, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, occupying almost all of Southeast Asia and part of Oceania. Despite the fact that several developed countries fought against Japan, Japan could not be defeated and the Allies persistently demanded that the Soviet Union enter the war. Ultimately, at the Yalta Conference, I.V. Stalin promised that the USSR would enter the war with Japan two months after the victory over Nazi Germany. However, in reality, the USSR declared war on Japan three months later - on August 8, 1945. On the night of August 9, 1945, Soviet troops began military operations against Japan. Soviet aviation It attacked important military facilities located in Harbin, Xinjing and Jilin, as well as the main areas of concentration of the Japanese army and navy. The forces of the Pacific Fleet blocked the Korean and Manchu coasts, after which the Kwantung army was cut off from other Japanese formations in Northern China.

The Pacific Fleet made an enormous contribution to the victory of the Soviet troops over militaristic Japan. In fact, the creation and strengthening of the Pacific Fleet in the 1930-ies. was connected precisely with the need to block the military threat posed by Japan. The growing activity of Japan in the Pacific region was very worried about the Soviet leadership. In 1932, the Far East Naval Forces were created, which transferred several merchant and fishing vessels converted into minesweepers and barriers and sentry ships. Several warships were transferred from the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, and the personnel of the naval forces being formed were also transferred there. 12 torpedo boats were delivered from Leningrad to Vladivostok by rail, which formed the first division of torpedo boats of the fleet. It was also decided to build for the needs of the Marine Forces of the Far East 12 submarines of type "Sh" and 30 of boats of type "M". Accordingly, work began on the creation and strengthening of the coastal defense line, especially necessary in view of the risk of aggression from Japan. The first commander of the Naval Forces of the Far East was M.V. Viktorov, formerly commander of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. Viktorov commanded the UEFA, and then the Pacific Fleet, before 1937, then was transferred to the post of Chief of the Naval Forces of the Red Army. 21 April 1932 - the day when Viktorov announced the formations, units, ships and institutions of the new fleet, is considered the official date of the creation of the Pacific Fleet. In April, the naval aviation of the fleet was established by 1933, initially as part of a bomber brigade and reconnaissance aviation squadron.

11 January 1935 g. The Far East Naval Forces (UEFA) were renamed the Pacific Fleet (Pacific Fleet). Initially, the development of the Pacific Fleet was one of the priorities of the Soviet military policy in the Far East. In 1937, in Vladivostok, the Pacific Higher Naval School for them was created. C.O. Makarova, and 24 June 1941 was in the school was made early release of lieutenants. In 1938, units of the Pacific Fleet received their baptism of fire during the conflict at Lake Hassan. The submarines of the Pacific Fleet carried the coast guard service, while the surface fleet provided transportation for troops, ammunition, food and clothing to the combat area. As a result of battles at Lake Hassan, 74 seamen of the Pacific Fleet were awarded orders and medals for their valor and courage. By 1939, as a member of the Pacific Fleet were considered: 2 flotilla leader of "Baku" and "Tbilisi", 5 destroyers, patrol ships 6, 5 mine layers, mine sweepers 18, 19 antisubmarine ships, submarines 86, 145 torpedo boats. Naval aviation fleet numbered about 500 aircraft. Submarines of the Pacific Fleet, the first in the Soviet Navy began to make year-round trips. When the Great Patriotic War began, part of the crew and personnel of the Pacific Fleet was transferred to the Northern Fleet, 140 thousands of Pacific sailors were sent to the front as part of the formed naval rifle brigades. At the same time, the Pacific Fleet itself was on high alert, as the USSR was expecting at any time a perfidious attack by militarist Japan on the country's Far Eastern borders. Sailors - Pacific Ocean valiantly served, at each moment waiting for the likely start of hostilities. An important role in the service of the Pacific Fleet was played by the protection of the water area (OVR), which performed the task of ensuring the protection of coastal waters from mining, penetration of enemy ships and submarines. In fact, it was the Water District Protection that was responsible for the safe passage of Soviet vessels in the Far Eastern waters.

Protecting the Pacific Fleet Water District in the Soviet-Japanese War

Water District Protection Team

Back in 1932, as part of the Marine Forces of the Far East, as the Pacific Fleet was then called, the 1-I naval team of trawling and barriers was formed. 4 May 1932 G. the commander of the brigade was appointed A.V. Vasilyev, chief of staff of the brigade N.E. Bassist, military commissar - V.G. Grigoriev. The first ships included in the brigade were the steam yacht “Admiral Zavoyko”, renamed the patrol ship “Red Pennant”, minelayers “Stavropol”, “Tomsk” and “Erivan”. The sailing-steam yacht “Admiral Zavoyko” was built at 1910 in St. Petersburg, at the Okhta shipyard. The yacht was a two-mast and had a displacement of 650 tons, a horsepower 600 machine, which allowed it to reach speeds up to 9 knots. The yacht was equipped with a wireless telegraph, had a motorboat and three boats on board. The yacht was armed with two 57-mm cannons and two machine guns. The minelayer “Stavropol” was built in 1907 and initially sailed as a cargo-passenger steamer, but in 1923 it was re-equipped, armed and incorporated into the Far East Naval Forces as an auxiliary cruiser. However, three months later, in the same 1923 year, the ship was disarmed and again became a merchant steamer. In 1932, it was re-incorporated into the URA and converted into a minelayer. The ship had a displacement of 2300 T., could reach speeds up to 10,5 nodes. The minelayer "Tomsk" was built in 1913, as well as a passenger-and-freight steamer, and was originally called Vladivostok. In November 1922, the ship was re-equipped, armed and incorporated into the Marine Forces of the Far East. It was initially used as a military vehicle, but in 1923 it was disarmed and returned for civilian purposes. In August, the steamer 1932 was again given to the Marine Forces of the Far East and until 1940 was used as a minelayer, then as a mine blockhead and from April 1945 as a self-propelled floating base. The minelayer "Erivan" was also built as a cargo-passenger ship in 1912, in 1932, it was armed and re-equipped for military purposes, after which it was used as a minelayer. Following the converted passenger and passenger ships, the Pacific Fleet included the former fishing trawlers “Ara”, “Gagara”, “Cormorant” and “Plastun”, which were converted into minesweepers. The brigade also included the minesweepers Diomid, Slavyanka, Bosphorus, Skryplev and Voyevoda, who had previously served as tugs of the People's Commissariat for Water Transport of the USSR. The flagship of the brigade was the mine-layer Tomsk. By the way, on the flagship of the brigade as a navigator at one time he served SG Gorshkov is the future Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy. Later, Gorshkov was promoted and became the flagship navigator of the brigade.

19 July 1939 People's Commissar of the USSR Navy flagship of the 2 fleet, rank N.S. Kuznetsov ordered the creation of a main base of the Pacific Fleet (OVR Pacific Fleet) on the basis of the brigade of the Security Guard compound. 28 August 1939, in accordance with the order of the Military Council of the Pacific Fleet, the compound of the Water Area Protection was separated from the Vladivostok fortified area and formed an independent connection, subordinated directly to the Military Council of the Pacific Fleet. The commander of the compound was appointed captain 3 rank Vladimir Alexandrovich Andreev (1904-1994) - a graduate of the Higher Naval School. Mv Frunze 1927 of the year, before being appointed commander of the Pacific Fleet Water Conservation Union, served as chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet barrage and trawling brigade (Vladimir Aleksandrovich got to the Pacific Fleet five years after graduating from the naval school in 1932). Vladimir Andreev was an experienced and talented officer, which was subsequently noted by the command - he rose to the rank of admiral, commanded the Northern Pacific Flotilla during the Soviet-Japanese war, then the Sakhalin flotilla, and retired from 1967 as chief of logistics of the Navy THE USSR.

The compound included more than 100 ships and boats, including patrol ships, minesweepers and sea hunters that formed the 14 divisions. In this composition, the Protection of the Water District has met the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In October, 1941 from the composition of the OVR seamen was formed a detachment of marines, sent to the front and took part in the defense of Moscow. In 1942, 378 seafarers serving in the compound were sent to the front. In the spring of 1945, when the USSR was already aware of the imminent entry of the war against Japan, the strengthening of the Pacific Fleet, including the brigade for the protection of the water area, began. So, 26 March 1945 was composed of a brigade 2-th division of the Big Submarine Hunters, which included 12 anti-submarine ships. They were transferred to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease - from the United States of America, and as part of the Soviet Navy received the designation BO-1. In June, an 1945 brigade of Big Hunters, subordinated to the commander of the Pacific Fleet, was formed on the basis of the 2 division of the Big Hunters division in June. In August, 1, the Pacific Fleet Water Conservation Union, took part in hostilities against Japan. It was OVR ships that directly provided the landing of Soviet landings in the ports of North Korean cities. From the ships of the water area security compound, 1945 marines were landed. In addition, OVR ships participated in hostilities against enemy transports and enemy aircraft. 1500 of Japanese transports was sunk and damaged, and two Japanese aircraft were shot down.

Under sail against submarines

One of the most important tasks of the protection of the water area of ​​the Pacific Fleet was the fight against enemy submarines. Japan had a sufficiently large and well-armed submarine fleet, which, long before the start of the Soviet-Japanese war, caused considerable damage to Soviet navigation in the Pacific Ocean. At the beginning of 1942, the ships “Kolkhoznik”, “Kiev” and “Ashkhabad” were sunk in the Far Eastern waters. Unknown submarines sank them - that is, officially unknown, although everyone already knew that the death of Soviet ships was the work of the submariners of the Japanese imperial fleet. The task force minimizing threats from Japanese submarines was assigned to the Pacific Fleet Water Conservation unit. In service with the Protection of the water area in 1941-1945. There were MO-4 - small hunters, which were high-speed boats with good weapons and a stock of depth charges. The construction of small hunters was in full swing before the start of World War II - boats were made and transferred both to the Navy and to the naval units of the border guard of the NKVD of the USSR. Development of the MO-4 type began in the 1936 of the Boat, with small sizes, received excellent armament and were equipped with a kite trawl or boat paravan-trawl, mines or mine defenders. But the small hunters had a very serious drawback - they practically did not have modern means of detecting submarines, and the search for the enemy was carried out with the help of outdated mechanical Pomeidon direction-finding buzzers. But these simple mechanisms did not allow the submarine to be detected if it was traveling at a long range. In addition, due to the noise of the motor of the boat itself, it was not possible to search for enemy submarines on the boat’s course. Therefore, the small hunters who went on combat duty had to stop and, turning off the machines, start listening to the waters. Since the submarines were also equipped with sonar equipment, they, as a rule, were found by small hunters before the latter established the location of the submarines. This was repeatedly tested on maneuvers of the Pacific Fleet, during which Soviet submarines successfully changed course as soon as they established the location of small hunters. Naturally, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, this feature of Soviet anti-submarine boats could seriously impede a full-fledged fight against enemy submarines, which, in turn, created the danger of unimpeded activity of enemy submarines in the Far Eastern waters. Therefore, the commanders of ships and boats of the Water District Guard constantly thought about how to make small hunters noiseless so that enemy submarines could not “calculate” them instantly.

During the period under review, Senior Lieutenant N.A. served as an assistant to the flagship mechanic for the Protection of the Water District of the Pacific Fleet. Polonsky (1914-1996). A graduate of the Sevastopol Shipbuilding College, he grew up in the legendary Sevastopol and from childhood was interested in the sea and ships. In his youth, Polonsky was fond of yachts and was a student of the Sevastopol yachtsman O. Bezrodny, a fleet veteran who had served as boatswains on sailing ships for a significant part of his life. Youth hobby has grown into a lifelong business - the shipbuilding school was followed by a job as an engineer at shipbuilding enterprises, and during the war years - service in the Navy. Captain-Lieutenant M. Sagulenko, who commanded a detachment of sea hunters, put forward an idea that was ingenious in its simplicity - to install sails on boats. Recalling that Senior Lieutenant Polonsky serving in the Protection of the Water District, well versed in the sailing fleet, Sagulenko approached him with a proposal to consider the possibility of setting sails on small hunters. The task that Sagulenko set for the senior lieutenant was not an easy one - after all, it was necessary not only to develop sketches of the sailing equipment of small hunters, but also to make the sails comfortable, not obstructing observation, and gunfire. Sailing equipment should be as simple as possible, so that sailors who did not have experience sailing on sailboats could cope with it without the need for additional training. In addition, the boats had to maintain their maneuverability - and this required an increase in the area of ​​the steering wheel. Senior Lieutenant Polonsky set about developing the sailing equipment of small hunters - and completed his task very quickly and efficiently. Wartime did not require delays, and before the war, tasks of such a level were set not for one individual engineer, but for entire design bureaus. After a short time, Polonsky presented the drawings to the command, which decided to try them out experimentally and experimentally.

The first sails were installed on the boat of Captain-Lieutenant J. Kopylov, who conducted training maneuvers to search for and destroy a submarine of a conditional enemy. It turned out that the installation of sails on small hunters dramatically affects the search, detection and destruction of enemy submarines. First of all, small hunters were able to track the submarines, without stopping the course, and also remained unnoticed, because the quiet course under the sails could not reveal the sonar acoustics. Finally, the sailing equipment allowed to a lesser extent depend on the provision of fuel and, in the event of a shortage of the latter, calmly follow the sailing course. The commander of the boat captain-lieutenant Kopylov reported to the command that during the exercises the submarine pursued by the boat could not break away from the pursuit. After the effectiveness of the innovative ideas of Sagulenko and Polonsky was experimentally proved, the sails were installed on all anti-submarine boats of the OVR compound. For a whole year, small hunters patrolled the territorial waters on a sailing course, and only in 1943, after the latest sonar equipment, underwater observation ultrasound stations, got into the protection of the water area of ​​the Pacific Fleet, and sails. But in stories The fleet experiment conducted by Sagulenko and Polonsky remained as a remarkable example of the creative ingenuity of Soviet sailors.

How marines and sailors took port seysin

The ships guarding the water area of ​​the Pacific Fleet had to play a key role in the transportation and support of the landing of Soviet troops during the Seysin landing operation. After the 11-13 in August 1945, the North Korean ports of Yuki and Rasin were rapidly landing an amphibious assault force, the command of the Pacific Fleet decided to make an amphibious landing in the port of Seisin. There was a powerful base of the Japanese army - the garrison of the port numbered about 4000 officers and soldiers, as well as units of the 3 army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Keisaku Murakami, retreated to Seisin. Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky authorized the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral I.S. Yumashev carried out a landing in the Seysin port with the help of a marine brigade and separate naval units, after which naval aviation and torpedo boats from 9 to 13 August launched daily bombing and assault attacks on Seisin. As a result of the bombing, ten Japanese ships were sunk, six more ships were sunk by torpedo boats. After 12 August, a group of Soviet torpedo boats made reconnaissance of the Japanese harbor and established the absence of Japanese military vessels there, it was decided to proceed directly to the landing operation. For its conduct, the Pacific Fleet Command allocated 1 destroyer, 1 minelayer, 8 patrol ships, 7 mine trawlers, 2 boats MO-4, 18 torpedo boats, 12 landing craft and 7 transport ships. Airborne support was to be provided by naval aviation 261 aircraft, including 188 bombers and 173 fighter aircraft. The direct command of the amphibious operation was entrusted to Major General V.P. Trushin, appointed commander of the landing force, and captain 1 of rank AF Studenichnikov appointed commander of the landing. In this case, the overall command of the operation was carried out personally by the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral I.S. Yumashev.

A few words should be said here about the famous naval commander Yumashev, who commanded the Pacific Fleet for eight years - from 1939 to 1947. - in the most difficult and responsible years of the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet-Japanese war. Ivan Stepanovich Yumashev (1895-1972) began service in the navy before the revolution. After graduating from the Kronstadt school as a junior, Yumashev served in the Baltic Fleet and rose to the rank of non-commissioned officer, was chairman of the battery committee. From February 1919, he continued to serve in the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet, participated in the Civil War, then graduated from special courses for naval commanders. In 1927, Mr. Yumashev became commander of the destroyer Dzerzhinsky, in 1932, he became commander of the cruiser “Profintern”, in 1934-1935. commanded a battalion of destroyers, and in 1935-1937. - crew of cruisers. In September, 1937, Mr. Yumashev, became Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, and in January, 1938 - Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. In March, 1939 was he who was entrusted with the honor to lead the Pacific Fleet. During the years of Yumashev’s command, the Pacific Fleet became a powerful naval unit, and the organization of the coastal defense of the Far Eastern coast was put on a high level. In August - September 1945, during the Soviet-Japanese war, Yumashev effectively managed the formations and ships of the Pacific Fleet and made a huge contribution to ensuring the victory of the Soviet weapons over the Japanese militarists. 14 September 1945 Mr. Stepanovich Yumashev was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In January 1947, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yumashev, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and in 1950-1951. He was the USSR Naval Minister (in the period of the relatively short existence of a separate naval ministry), after which he headed the Naval Academy, at the head of which he remained until his retirement. The Seisin operation was the result of the efforts of Admiral Yumashev, since Marshal of the Soviet Union K.A. Meretskov, commanding the troops of the 1 of the Far Eastern Front, still 12 in August, seeing the operational situation at the front, decided to cancel the landing of troops, and Yumashev, who won support from the commander of the troops in the Far East of Marshal Vasilevsky, was relying solely on combat operations Pacific Fleet resources and capabilities - marines, naval aviation and ship formations.

The scouts of the Soviet fleet learned that an infantry battalion of the Japanese army, an officer’s school and a naval base were deployed in Seisin. In addition, after the retreat of the Kwantung Army, the 2 Infantry Regiment arrived in Seysin, and then the whole Infantry Division. The command of the Japanese troops was carried out by the commander of the Ranan fortified area, Lieutenant-General Sokiti Nisivaki. That is, the Japanese units deployed in Seisin repeatedly outnumbered the Soviet troops allocated for the landing operation. However, the command of the Pacific Fleet did not refuse to conduct the operation and made the final decision on the landing of the marines from ships to the port of Seysin. On August 13, during the afternoon, 10 torpedo boats entered the port of Seisin and landed the 140 reconnaissance detachment under the command of Lieutenant V.N. Hero of the Soviet Union. Leonov, and a company of marines from the 13-th brigade. Recall that Lieutenant Leonov was one of the most experienced Soviet naval intelligence officers - behind this sailor, who received officer shoulder straps, there were more than 50 operations carried out in the rear of the Nazis during his service in the reconnaissance detachment of the Northern Fleet headquarters. The total number of the first group of troops was 181 people, commanded by a group of Colonel A.Z. Denisin - head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet. After the landing, the ships left for Vladivostok - after the next batch of troops, and a small in number advanced group had to take a foothold and strengthened, engaging in battle with the forces of the enemy many times superior in number. In the evening, 7 torpedo boats brought and landed a machine-gun company of 90 marines, but it could not break through to the battlefield of the advanced group and suffered significant losses. On the orders of the fleet commander, in the evening 1 was sent from Vladivostok to the patrol ship and 2 minesweeper, on board of which were soldiers and officers of the 355-th separate battalion of marines. However, the ships reached Sesin only the next day, so on the first day of the operation, the forward detachment had to conduct military operations on its own. The detachment was divided into three groups, which, with a shortage of ammunition, managed to repel counterattacks of the Japanese troops and hold on to the captured positions in the port and the city. It was only in the morning of August 14 that a landing of a battalion of marines from 710 people commanded by Major MP began in Seisin. Barabolko. The Marines managed to break two to three kilometers into the city, but by the night of August 14 the Japanese had managed to push the Soviet soldiers back to the port.

The situation was complicated by the fact that the marine corps battalion was landed away from the three groups of the advanced detachment and could not connect with them, which put the advanced detachment at risk of rapid destruction by Japanese forces that were more numerous in quantity and quantity of ammunition. A detachment of volunteers from among sailors and naval officers sent to Seishin ships was sent to help the marines. 25 volunteers were recruited - under the command of Captain 3rd Rank G.V. Ternovsky. Georgy Vladimirovich Ternovsky (1915-1970) served as the flagship artilleryman of the patrol ships of the Pacific Fleet, and before arriving in the Pacific Ocean he served in the Guard of the water area of ​​the Odessa Naval Base of the Black Sea Fleet. Sailors landed and engaged in battle with the enemy, also capturing several bridgeheads. However, given the small number of volunteers - sailors, they still could not seriously influence the course of hostilities. The position of the Soviet airborne assault was significantly worsened by the lack of sensible air support - since there were no air spotters in the detachments, the aircraft delivered strikes away from the place of military operations in order not to accidentally bomb the positions of the Soviet airborne assault. Meanwhile, a detachment of 23 ships and boats came out of Vladivostok, on the sides of which were soldiers and officers of the 13th Marine Brigade. A little later, the destroyer Voikov and a tank landing barge from 7 left Vladivostok for Seisin tanks T-26 on board. By 4 o’clock in the morning on August 15, the landing of the main landing forces — about 5 thousand people — began in the port of Seishin. However, even the arrival of an entire brigade of marines at first did not entail any serious changes in the position of the Soviet landing in Seishin, since the Japanese garrison fought fierce resistance. Only when the shelling of the city from ships damaged the Japanese armored train did the first tangible turning point in the hostilities ensue. The Japanese units were driven out of the port, after which the marines launched an offensive in the city itself. However, the situation with aviation support remained difficult, although Soviet aviation made 157 sorties. Aviation managed to destroy the railway station, and during the bombing of the station, the Japanese armored train was destroyed. Thus, the Japanese lost one of Seishin's main defenders. But the direct support of the fighting units of the Marine Corps from the air was still lacking. The fleet command decided to rectify the situation by transferring additional marines to Seishin.

The 16 of August at Seisin arrived at the 1 destroyer, the 2 minesweeper, the 3 transport ship, the patrol and border boats that delivered the third echelon of the landing party - the 615 Marines, the 60 guns and mortars and the 94 vehicle. Then another tank landing barge with X-NUMX tanks T-7 and 26 was sent to Seisin, later a patrol ship, minesweeper, 2 landing craft and 6 tank-landing craft delivering military equipment and personnel of the 1 rifle regiment. During the day of August 16, the Soviet troops who landed in Seysin fought on the northern and north-western outskirts of the city. At this time, Japanese troops received news of the order of the emperor of Japan to stop the resistance, after which the surrender of Japanese soldiers and officers began. It lasted for the 17 day of August, and some detachments of the Japanese army did not want to surrender and continued to resist. By 11.30 17 August, the Soviet landing force met with the vanguard of the 25 Army, Colonel-General I.М. Chistyakov, after which part of the Soviet troops were reunited. The Seisin operation ended with the capture of the city. For several days of fighting, Japanese troops suffered losses in about 3000 soldiers and officers killed and captured, 27 of Japanese transport ships were captured, an armored train was destroyed and four aircraft were shot down. As for the Soviet marines and sailors. Then they lost about 300 people killed and missing. Soviet ships almost did not receive damage. The ship’s artillery destroyed the enemy’s 13 firing points, suppressed the 2 anti-aircraft and the 13 artillery and mortar batteries of the enemy, and destroyed about two battalions of Japanese infantry. After winning the Seysin operation, a number of Soviet officers, soldiers and sailors were awarded state awards, including 16 people who received the high title of Heroes of the Soviet Union. Major General V.P., commander of the Marine Brigade, was among those who received the Hero's star. Trushin, commander of a battalion of marines, major MP Barabolko, commander of a company of machine gunners of the Marine Corps, Senior Lieutenant I.M. Yarotsky, platoon commander of the reconnaissance detachment, midshipman A.M. Nikandrov, commander of the Metel sentry ship, captain-lieutenant L.N. Balyakin and other Soviet sailors and marines. The commander of the 140 reconnaissance squadron V.N. Leonov became the twice Hero of the Soviet Union. For the successful conduct of the Seysin operation, the 13 brigade of the marines, the 355 and 365 units of the marine battalions, the 34 bomber aviation regiment of the naval aviation, the 140 th intelligence unit of the Pacific Fleet headquarters were transformed into guards military units. The 10 th aviation division of the dive bomber of the Pacific Fleet, which received the name "Seysinskaya", was also noted. The Seisin operation, despite the numerous miscalculations of the command in its organization, primarily the lack of adjustment of the actions of aviation, went down in history as one of the most striking battles of the Soviet-Japanese war. Gratitude to all personnel of the protection of the water area of ​​the Pacific Fleet was declared Supreme Commander IV.

The defeat of Japan in September 1945 led to dramatic changes in the political situation in the Pacific region. It is precisely to the defeat of Japan that many sovereign states of East and Southeast Asia owe their existence. As for the Soviet Union, it received obvious benefits by returning South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, as well as ousting Japan from the territory of the Soviet border region, primarily from Korea and Manchuria. An impetus was given to the further development of the Pacific Fleet, which received new bases and capabilities. In 1950, the Protection of the Water District of the Main Base of the Pacific Fleet (5 of the USSR Navy) was reorganized into the 30 Division of the ships of the protection of the water area of ​​the 5 of the USSR Navy. The division included: headquarters, political department, minelayers Argun and Voroshilovsk, 100-th separate division of patrol ships, 3-th, 12-th and 16-th separate divisions of basic minesweepers, 1-th, 11- 12, 241, 242, 243 and 244 battalions of the raid guard and small submarine hunters, 245 and 1953 divisions. The division of protection of the water area was directly subordinated to the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet. The crew of the brigade took part in the demining of the coastal waters of North Korea before 1961. In 47, the division was reorganized into the XNUMX 5th brigade of water area protection.
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  1. Gray 43
    Gray 43 10 August 2015 06: 48
    For some reason, that war is somehow not particularly covered, but it can and should be proud, the war was finally over
  2. parusnik
    parusnik 10 August 2015 07: 32
    In 1941, Japan did not attack the Soviet Union..As they said in the Japanese General Staff, "Persimmon, must ripen and fall by itself" ... Thank you, Ilya ... interesting ..
    1. Russian Uzbek
      Russian Uzbek 10 August 2015 08: 27
      "" In 1941, Japan did not attack the Soviet Union .. As they said in the Japanese General Staff, "Persimmon must ripen and fall by itself."
      just in '39, "persimmon" gave the samurai such a spanking that the samurai like that ... stuck in shorter ... and since then they hoped for Hans, they say Hitler will come - put the order in place - will defeat the "persimmon" and she herself "will fall into the hands "...
      1. Gomunkul
        Gomunkul 10 August 2015 11: 13
        just in '39, "persimmon" asked the samurai such a spanking that the samurai like that ...
        In 1939, Japan expected Germany to fulfill its obligations and enter the war against the USSR, but this did not happen. The result was a truce, and the defeat of the German forces near Stalingrad postponed the declaration of war altogether for an indefinite period. hi
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. parusnik
        parusnik 10 August 2015 11: 52
        .got shorter ... and since then hoped for chances,... Yes, and on them .. but the Japanese were very seriously preparing for war with the USSR .. the topic is very extensive ..
        1. Gomunkul
          Gomunkul 10 August 2015 12: 45
          but the Japanese were very seriously preparing for war with the USSR .. the topic is very extensive ..
          One thing is being prepared, and another thing is to fight. On December 7, 1941, Japan itself determined who its target number 1 was. wink hi
        2. The comment was deleted.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 August 2015 13: 56
      Quote: parusnik
      In 1941, Japan did not attack the Soviet Union .. As they said in the Japanese General Staff, "Persimmon must ripen and fall by itself" ... Thank you, Ilya ... interesting ..

      EMNIP, the Japanese associated the entry into the war with the USSR with the capture of Moscow by the Germans. If the Germans have time to do this before the winter, then Japan will come to the north. If not, then Japan is heading south.

      However, the only member of the Japanese government who advocated rigorous enforcement marital Allied debt to Germany - Foreign Minister Matsuoka Esuke - was already in July 1941 kicked out of the government.
      1. Russian Uzbek
        Russian Uzbek 10 August 2015 19: 55
        the Japanese had two parties: the army one, which insisted on "northern expansion" and was preparing a war with the USSR, and the naval one, which advocated "expansion to the south" against the Western allies, since their colonies were all around
        after Khalkhin Gol, the completely bankrupt army party lost its influence on the emperor and the issue was resolved in favor of "expansion to the south" - a war with the United States, etc.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 11 August 2015 11: 50
          Quote: Russian Uzbek
          the Japanese had two parties: the army one, which insisted on "northern expansion" and was preparing a war with the USSR, and the naval one, which advocated "expansion to the south" against the Western allies, since their colonies were all around

          Not everything is so simple. (C)
          The Army men were far from homogeneous. The "Kwantung" party, which did not get buns from the war in China, was in favor of the "March to the North". Actually, all the conflicts on the border with the USSR were organized for the most part by them - and the Metropolis turned a blind eye to this matter, guided by the principle of "winners do not judge" tested in China. But the USSR was too tough for the Kwantung people, and the Metropolis did not really want to start a big war in the North - why does Japan need the empty taiga, abundantly watered with Japanese blood, if even Manchuria has not yet been mastered? Moreover, the only oil production area in the Soviet Far East is already half-developed by the Japanese (Japanese concessions in North Sakhalin - production continued until 1944).
          But the "Kwantungs" were not the only or even the most numerous army men with political ambitions. The main ones were the Expeditionary Forces in China - but they just advocated "the final solution of the Chinese question" and "Marching to the South".
          Quote: Russian Uzbek
          after Khalkhin Gol, the completely bankrupt army party lost its influence on the emperor and the issue was resolved in favor of "expansion to the south" - a war with the United States, etc.

          He-he-he ... the army party left the leadership for a short time. The cabinet of the "naval" prime minister Ionai lasted only until July 1940. Then Konoe was returned to replace him - and General Tojo came with him. ICHH, it was this "army" cabinet that leaned towards the southern version.
          By the way, during the last premiere of Konoe, China was chosen as the main goal of Japan
  3. miv110
    miv110 10 August 2015 07: 57
    Of course, the fact of using sailing weapons of hunting boats is very interesting, I have not heard about this before. Much has been forgotten and it’s good that there is someone to remember about it.
  4. Denis_469
    Denis_469 10 August 2015 09: 24
    "the ships Kolkhoznik, Kiev and Ashgabat were sunk." - they all did not die in the waters of the Far East. And nothing to do with Japan. In all cases, German submarines.

    Seishin had a big problem - American square She was discovered by our minesweeper and attacked. And the next night, the minesweeper was most likely damaged. Because simultaneous detonation on 2 bottom mines can not be. She left after the Soviet anti-submarine group came to the area. So the delay with Seishin was largely due to this reason.
  5. kig
    kig 10 August 2015 09: 52
    [i] The crushing defeat of the Japanese army and navy / i]
    It is said very strongly. Victory is Victory, but one must also know the measure. When did we manage to inflict a crushing defeat on the Japanese fleet?
  6. Doctorleg
    Doctorleg 10 August 2015 11: 49
    Quote: kig
    [i] The crushing defeat of the Japanese army and navy / i]
    It is said very strongly. Victory is Victory, but one must also know the measure. When did we manage to inflict a crushing defeat on the Japanese fleet?

    Yes, and about the decisive contribution to the defeat of Japan - also strongly said
    1. Cap.Morgan
      Cap.Morgan 10 August 2015 12: 25
      This is the usual ritual set of phrases for such articles.
      But after the defeat of Germany, the resistance of Japan lost all meaning. So we can say that we defeated Japan.
  7. Volga Cossack
    Volga Cossack 10 August 2015 12: 07
    good article - thanks. about sails - a discovery for me.
  8. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 10 August 2015 13: 08
    Ahem ... before writing an article, it would be nice to check the facts.
    At the beginning of 1942 the ships “Kolkhoznik”, “Kiev” and “Ashgabat” were sunk in the Far Eastern waters. They were sunk by unknown submarines - that is, officially unknown, although everyone already knew that the death of Soviet ships was the work of the submariners of the Japanese imperial fleet.

    All of these ships perished in the Atlantic:
    On April 13, the Kiev submarine (5823 brt.) Of the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FGMP) sailed from Murmansk as part of the QP-10 convoy. In the Barents Sea off Bear Island, two torpedoes of the U-435 submarine were torpedoed. Sank after 7 minutes. The crew and passengers were removed from the life rafts by the English minesweeper “Blacli” and delivered to Iceland. Killed 6 people.

    On April 29, 1942, the Ashgabat submarine (5284 brt.) FGMP, following their solo voyage from New York to Cuba, off the Atlantic coast of the USA torpedoed with a U-402 submarine. The gunners of the bow gun managed to take a few shots and forced the submarine to sink, which made it possible for the crew to leave the sinking ship. Then the sailors were discovered by an American plane, picked up by the US Coast Guard vessel and delivered to shore. The Ashgabat submarine was returning from Murmansk to the QP-9 convoy, and then to the convoy across the Atlantic. Along the coast of the United States in the spring of 1942, ships were not escorted yet.

    There are no exact reasons for the death of "Kolkhoznik" - but he also died in the Atlantic
    On January 15, the ship left Boston, but it did not arrive at the port of Halifax, and to this day there is no consensus on the causes of its death in world literature. They assume different things: that on January 17, 1942, the transport was sunk by the German submarine i-203, or that it ran into pitfalls. Some believe that the cause of the death was an internal explosion due to spontaneous operation of ammunition in the hold or a collision with an unidentified submarine. Therefore, the wording of the cause of the death of the ship, generally accepted by fleet historians, is very streamlined: “collision with an underwater object”
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. ilyaros
      10 August 2015 13: 42
      One of the sources "was mistaken" (((
      The Japanese fleet began in every way to prevent the passage of Soviet merchant ships through the Laperuz Strait and the Tatar Strait, and the warships of the Land of the Rising Sun took control of all exits from the Sea of ​​Japan. In order to disrupt normal shipping, they systematically and without any reason detained our merchant ships and moreover - in some cases they drowned them. So, only in the first half of 1942 in the waters of the Far East "unknown" submarines sunk the "Kolkhoznik", "Kiev", "Ashkhabad" ...
  9. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 10 August 2015 13: 50
    According to Seishin, there is a less bravura description from Kabanov: there was no information about the enemy and the defense of the port. The reconnaissance and the first echelon (355 RPM) landed in the city left by the enemy, but then the retreating Japanese units approached from the north - and the meat grinder began. 355 rifle heavy weapons were absent, and 13 rifle weapons went in the second echelon. Tanks came only when the fighting was over. Communication at the landing was traditionally absent. Interaction with aviation is also, although the Pacific Fleet air forces themselves worked in the Seishin area. Things came, as in the REV - to landing parties from the crews of ships. And a mess is going on in the rear: the entire fleet from Vladivostok leads the operation, the commanders are constantly changing, 335 SD assigned to support the assault force are either loaded or unloaded, the marines are left on the shore with the brigade’s chief artillery. In short, not 1945, but some kind of 1941.
    The brigade landing operation was scheduled for 17 p.m. on August 14; by this time she should have taken possession of Seishin. But at 4 hours 45 minutes came a telegram from the Military Council of the 1st Far Eastern Front, abolishing the landing of naval assaults. The commander decided to carry out a reconnaissance, having landed Leonov’s detachment in Seisin, reinforced by a company of submachine gunners senior lieutenant I.M. Yarotsky from the 390th battalion of the Trushin brigade.

    There was no information about the enemy. Even about the defense of the port, whether there are coastal batteries, fort structures, nothing was known.

    But unexpectedly at the FKP, where I arrived to report my decision, I learned that the commander had appointed General Trushin as the landing commander, which was natural: who else would command the brigade and battle in the port and the city, if not the brigade commander; it was not Kravchenko who was appointed the landing commander, but captain of the 1st rank, Alexander Fedorovich Studenichnikov, who was unfamiliar to me, Admiral Yumashev took over the entire operation.

    ... unfortunately, along with artillery divisions, the chief of staff of the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel V.F. Kozlov, and the head of artillery, Lieutenant Colonel S.I. Volgushev, were left in the trading port.

    I will not begin to talk about the moods associated with the sudden cancellation of the loading of the head regiment of the army division at the time when it was already ready to leave Nakhodka to Vladivostok. The order to unload aroused general bewilderment, especially since the opposite order was soon issued.

    I asked where the tanks sent on the tank carrier, and what they took part in the battles. It turns out that they were delivered on a low-speed ship late and they did not have to participate in decisive battles.

    Later we learned that the Japanese garrison was withdrawn from Seishin to the north, facing the advancing troops of our 25th army, and only at the southernmost tip of the Komatsu Peninsula, at Kolokoltseva Cape, only one field battery remained in position and operated. But after landing and fighting in the area of ​​bridges, the commander of the Ranan fortified area, Lieutenant General Nisevani Sounichi decided to destroy the naval landing.

    Airborne commander Major Barabolko did not have radio communications with the flagship command post. Such radio communication was on the frigate "EK-2" from the landing commander Bespalov. This determined his role after the landing. He actually turned into the commander of the operation. Knowing the difficult situation on the shore by the evening of August 14, he singled out from the crew of the EK-2 and the minesweeper AM-278 a group of 25 volunteers ...

    In the evening of August 15, Pacific Fleet aircraft began to launch bombing attacks. Unfortunately, they did not meet the interests of the marine corps. Not a single bomb was dropped, there was not a single attack on strongholds at heights around Seishin.

    At Trushin’s headquarters, as well as at Studenichnikov’s headquarters, there was not a single officer from the Air Force headquarters to coordinate actions and organize interaction.
    1. ilyaros
      10 August 2015 15: 26
      Aviation operated, as I understood it, without aircraft operators. Accordingly, in order not to get on their own, bombed Japanese objects aside from the immediate places of hostilities
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 10 August 2015 16: 00
        Quote: ilyaros
        Aviation operated, as I understood it, without aircraft operators. Accordingly, in order not to get on their own, bombed Japanese objects aside from the immediate places of hostilities

        And who is to blame? That in terms of the landing operation of the fleet is not planned any interaction with their own, naval air forces?
        Moreover, in two days of the operation, the command, knowing that the landing party did not have heavy weapons, could attend to striking at least stationary strong points (or Japanese communications to the north). The square on the map + communication with the EK-2 + the primitive command from the marines (the same missiles) - worked somehow before the appearance of advanced gunners.

        In general, judging by Kabanov’s memoirs, one gets the impression that the fleet command relaxed after Yuki and Rasin and decided that in Seishin the landing force would occupy the city without a fight, and the Japanese forces would be connected by the army. But not a ride. Moreover, Kabanov himself, who had experience in organizing landings, was involved in the operation at a stage when the advanced forces in Seishin were already fighting hard.
  10. moskowit
    moskowit 10 August 2015 20: 47
    It's not true about the little publicity of the war with Japan. The history of the war has a large literature, both specialized and popular. The most complete information about the war can be found in A.M. Vasilevsky's memoir "The Work of All Life". He can be called the commander-in-chief of this war.
    That's where the real Blitz Krieg was! The troops of the 1 and 2 th Far Eastern, Trans-Baikal fronts and the group of Soviet-Mongolian troops in convergent directions, with deep coverage, where massive airborne assaults were paralyzed at the meeting places of the front forces in large cities, paralyzing the command and control structures of the Kwantung Army, Japanese army in xnumx days. The paratroopers took Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, marines with sailors of the fleet and fleets of the Kuril ridge island. And all this with the manifestation of mass heroism and the manifestation of military skill and combat experience !!!
    1. ilyaros
      10 August 2015 21: 34
      Few will be able to name at least a few Heroes of the Soviet-Japanese war or key persons in command of land and sea units.
  11. moskowit
    moskowit 10 August 2015 20: 59
    Also interested in this topic and lovers of military history, I recommend reading or reading a very informative and interesting article published relatively long ago on the VO website

    "Soviet plan for the occupation of Hokkaido and projects of the post-war structure of Japan"

    March 26 2012