Crimea as an unsinkable aircraft carrier
The past year 2014 has become one of the most significant in the newest stories The Russian Federation, the successor of the Soviet Union, in connection with the return of the originally Russian region, the Republic of Crimea and the hero-city of Sevastopol. The transfer of the Crimean region to Ukraine in remote Soviet times was one of the manifestations of voluntarism on the part of one of the country's leaders, and not the fulfillment of the wishes of the inhabitants of the peninsula, historically associated with Russia, or the people of Ukraine as a whole. A referendum on this issue was not held, and then we did not know the words of that kind.
But in the 2014, in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, a referendum was really held, as a result of which almost 90% of the inhabitants were in favor of a definite return to Russia. All subsequent actions were carried out extremely carefully and correctly, in the framework of international rules and the legal field. The Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol were officially incorporated into the Russian Federation.
That is why a year later this event, called the “Russian Spring”, was so widely, meaningfully and sincerely marked in many cities of Russia and now legally Russian cities of the Republic of Crimea and in Sevastopol.
But in 2014, the United States and the Western countries supporting them ignored the results of the referendum in Crimea, and its return to the Russian Federation was assessed as aggression and annexation of the Crimea.
CREATING A NEW GROUPING
Since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, Washington, and especially after the return of Crimea to the Russian Federation, has steadily increased pressure on Moscow, including through the introduction of economic and political sanctions and outright military blackmail.
American apologists for the Cold War and military pressure, apparently, believe that everything, including freedom, honor, conscience, love of country, can be bought. But not everything is still decided by the golden calf, although many have become subject to influence, including the pro-Western groups of the Russian elites and the bureaucracy associated with them.
I am convinced that in the near future the history will sweep out from its path the “Kolomoisky Poroshenok”, so “eloquently” today trying to win a place under the sun, even with the blood of their countrymen. Despite the help of Uncle Sam and Mother Europe in this crime. Yes, and we are to blame, for a hundred years, turning a blind eye to manifestations of nationalism in Ukraine. This is the same unforgettable Taras Shevchenko, even in the nineteenth century, he wrote: “Yak die, so povyvat on Vkraini dear ... Hole, that get up, kaydans tear it and sprinkle the enemy with evil blood bloody earth”. Whose blood? "Moskal" - as he called them and how they are called now? And we are a “national hero, a classic,” we call his name the streets, embankments, including in Russia ... That was what they called.
The return of Crimea to the Russian Federation required a guaranteed security of its security and set the task of the country's military-political leadership to immediately form a full-fledged group of armed forces on the peninsula, including maritime and land components, able to cope with the threats that had arisen. Part of this group had to be created virtually from scratch.
In a short time, a lot of work has been done. As early as December 2014, the Russian Defense Minister officially announced that in Crimea “... a self-sufficient group of troops was deployed. In addition to the available forces and means, seven formations and eight military units of various missions were created on the peninsula. ”
Created during this time in the Crimea, the grouping of only coastal and land forces is practically commensurate with its combined arms army in terms of its size and composition.
It would seem that the problem has been solved, but now it has become clear that this was only the first step. A more precise understanding of the evolving situation will allow a small insight into recent history and analysis.
LEAVE FOR QUALITY NEW LEVEL
A number of media reports on the analysis of the fratricidal war in the south-east of Ukraine and the possible involvement of the Russian Federation in this conflict rightly emphasize that the modern Russian army does not qualitatively differ much from its Soviet predecessor of the 1991 model. Therefore, in the event of an armed confrontation using only conventional means of destruction, success will most likely be on the side of the West.
This fully applies to the grouping of troops in the Crimea created to date, as a “cast” of the Russian army, although, as already mentioned, the work has been carried out incredibly voluminous and difficult.
At the same time, the most up-to-date pro-American coalition (military force), which has experience in combat operations and the implementation of the most modern military technologies, can potentially act against the grouping of troops in the Crimea.
Thus, the operation of the United States and other NATO countries against Yugoslavia and subsequent conflicts have allowed them to work out the characteristic features of military confrontations and combat actions of a new type (the fifth and sixth generation wars, as they now call it). This includes the creation of reconnaissance-strike combat groups, and the widespread joint use of air and naval forces equipped with high-precision weapons, and the use of data of all types of intelligence, including space, for the practical implementation of network-centric methods of control, the destruction of civilian and military infrastructure, minimizing the participation of ground forces in the operation and much more. And this experience can certainly be used against the Crimea, especially since both Yugoslavia and the Crimea are coastal territories (formations).
Unfortunately, the grouping that is being created in Crimea is still a set of heterogeneous forces that are not united in a single defense system and does not meet the requirements of fifth and sixth generation wars, the methods of which have been practically worked out by our "friends" in recent decades.
This situation has developed not only because of the lack of time during the creation of the military group in the Crimea, but also because, as the former chief of armaments of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel-General Anatoly Sitnov, noted in the media, unfortunately, we still have “... no the concept of the fifth generation army, a single information space, no one creates ... Everything should be linked to a common system. A single information space requires the creation of a phono-target environment, the creation of a data exchange system ... ”, that is, the construction of a modern defense system that meets the highest requirements. Modern weapons and military equipment, new military units really should be used in a single information space.
In general, it should be noted that everything created artificially, that is, with the mind and creative efforts of a person, pursues the achievement of certain goals and the solution of specific tasks. This fully applies to the situation with the military group being created in the Crimea, which must effectively solve the tasks in the name of which it is being built.
There are fears that without taking these factors into account, the further “development” of the diverse military grouping of the Crimea, in which large funds will be invested, will go “as always”, and not as it should.
It seems that, taking into account the evolving situation and all that has been said above, a modern integrated automated air-sea defense system should be built and built in Crimea. It must ensure the unification of all forces and means, both land and sea, on the basis of a single information-control space and use them according to a single plan to ensure a comprehensive reflection of the attacks of opposing dissimilar means. The task of such a system is to ensure joint use of anti-aircraft, anti-ship and coastal defense tools to repel aggression.
COMPLEX DEFENSE
The US URO "Donald Cook" destroyer and other NATO warships in Constantza in Romania "support the allies." Reuters Photos
The proposed adaptive integrated automated air-maritime defense system is focused on providing protection against attacks of modern and prospective means of air attack, primarily cruise missiles of various bases, the most important coastal critical objects and troops, as well as for destruction of air and sea carriers of cruise and anti-ship missiles , including to the turn of their application.
The basic requirements that a WMO CAS must meet are as follows:
- The WMO CAS should provide effective combat against all types of EAS, which can be used in the region, including stealth-made aircraft and high-precision weapons in the context of the extensive use of intense interference of all kinds;
- The WMO CAS should be a complex of information and fire forces and air defense systems, including specialized coastal anti-ship defense, shipborne reconnaissance, combat and defense tools, technically and logically linked to each other in a single system based on highly automated combat control systems;
- management of the WMO system should be as automated as possible and organized on the basis of network-centric principles. The entire cycle of combat work on targets (from their detection to destruction) should be carried out almost automatically, in the online mode;
- The reconnaissance of air and sea (surface) targets should be given special attention. It should be organized using coastal over-the-horizon radars, ground-based long-wave radars, airborne radars (helicopters, UAVs), as well as shipborne radars;
- as part of the WMO system, it is necessary to provide for the use of both modern and promising classical means of destruction, and means of struggle (functional damage) based on new physical principles, which should significantly increase the resilience and effectiveness of the proposed defense system and preserve its permanence in the medium term.
To effectively address these tasks, the proposed integrated automated air-sea defense system should include:
- A subsystem of intelligence and warning about aggression, about the invasion of the aggressor into territorial waters and about the violation of air space and air attack from his side;
- subsystem anti-aircraft missile cover, consisting of ground-based (coastal) basing and ship-based air defense systems;
- subsystem of anti-ship warfare and defense, including ground-based and ship-based combat vehicles, as well as air-based means for fighting submarines;
- subsystem aviation multifunctional forces and assets, including forces and assets of fighter air cover, naval and support aviation and electronic warfare aviation.
These subsystems must be closed to unified means of automated combat control, telecommunications and communications, which, in fact, ensures the functioning of the mating subsystems and facilities as part of a single integrated automated combat system in the network-centric mode.
As the analysis shows, some preliminary calculations and existing experience, each of the subsystems should be based on modern non-traditional principles and have its own specifics. In general, this predetermines the high combat effectiveness of the proposed ASA VKO and its superiority over similar systems in the medium term and can be implemented with minimal financial costs, which is important in the current situation.
So, in the intelligence and warning subsystem, the coastal over-the-horizon radar of a decameter range of the “Sunflower” type should undoubtedly be used, capable of detecting sea surface targets in the economic zone and beyond its limits (at distances up to 350 – 400 km), as well as air targets practically on the same ranges. These radars are our "know-how", but on the coastal areas (where they are effective) have not yet been unreasonably used.
For detection and tracking of airborne and surface targets, modern low-frequency radars (meter radars), insensitive to stealth technology, but perfectly using the effect of the surface wave in coastal zones, as well as airborne radars, including helicopter radar, should also be widely used. complex (VK RLD) type "Eye".
In the subsystem of anti-aircraft missile cover, anti-aircraft defense systems (existing, modernized and promising) are proposed to be used not in a “standard” homogeneous structure, but in a certain combination, that is, to create polygamous (combined) reconnaissance-firing combat modules based on them. tasks.
The polygamous air defense combat modules allow many times (8 – 12 times) to increase resistance from the attacks of anti-radar missiles, to retain the ability of protecting concealed objects from subsequent main attacks and, in general, to raise the effectiveness of air attack damage in typical raids (such as in Yugoslavia or Libya) to 0.9 and more. Due to the effective and specialized use of these air defense weapons, it becomes possible to predict their acceptable combat effectiveness for at least the next 20 – 30 years. An additional and significant increase in the combat effectiveness of the air defense subsystem and the WMO CAS as a whole can be realized by introducing functional destruction tools into the system that implement new physical principles.
In the subsystem of anti-ship combat and defense, including coastal-based combat vehicles, ship-based facilities, as well as air-based anti-submarine weapons, the emphasis should be primarily on the organization of combat use in a single network-centric control system of the coastal anti-ship defense system "Bastion" with anti-ship missiles "Yakhont", as well as shipboard means of anti-ship and air defense.
IN TIGHTNESS INTERACTION
It should be noted that in the single system of information on the World Ocean (ESIMO), created in accordance with the Federal Target Program “World Ocean” and started to work from 2013, CAS of the WMO Crimea can be considered as a regional subsystem and should be part of it.
In turn, the created unified state system for lighting surface and underwater conditions, primarily in terms of reconnaissance and mapping the location of underwater objects (of their own and potential enemy), would have to provide information to the CSC of the WMO Crimea as well.
In the missile defense and air defense part, the subsystem of the WMO Crimea CAS anti-aircraft missile cover, of course, must interact with the relevant structures of the East Kazakhstan air defense forces and the air defense forces of the Southern strategic direction. Moreover, the proposed WMO Crimea CAS for implementation territorially covers only coastal areas and does not extend into the interior of the peninsula. To a certain extent, this also applies to the exchange of information on the air situation between the CAS WMO Crimea intelligence and warning subsystem of aggression and the relevant structures of the East Kazakhstan armies and the air defense forces of the Southern Strategic Direction. Such interaction will create the macrostructure of the action of all the forces and means of the region in a single information space.
In conclusion, I would like to note that, in general, proposals for the creation of an integrated air-sea defense system of the Crimea represent an attempt to determine the appearance, structure, intended composition, construction and capabilities of the system, regarding it as an adequate response in the prevailing situation. It is clear that the creation of the UAS of the WMO Crimea will require the solution of supraspecific tasks and can be achieved only by the implementation of relevant initiatives by the General Staff and the goodwill of the leadership of the Armed Forces.
The advantage of the proposed WMO Crimea UAS for implementation is that it is focused and based on mass-produced samples of weapons and military equipment of various types of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and does not require, as already mentioned, significant additional economic costs. Moreover, it appears that CAS WMO Crimea is the beginning of a long journey. Such systems are equally important and effective for Primorye, for Kamchatka, for the Kola Peninsula, and for the Baltic. This becomes a kind of attribute of the wars of the fifth and sixth generations. Therefore, a certain cost-effectiveness of creating such systems and their basing on serially produced weapons and military equipment are of paramount importance.
The end of the Cold War seemed to send military conflicts in the civilized world to the dustbin of history. It was not there. Therefore, it must be remembered that defense spending is always much less than the cost of compensation for damage.
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