"Topol" is still indispensable
Exactly thirty years ago, the first Topol missile system was put on combat duty. Due to the specificity of the event, there are no celebrations on this account. Meanwhile, the commissioning of Topol is a turning point in the nuclear confrontation of the two superpowers. And the fact that in the defense doctrine of the Russian Federation, he still occupies an important place, has its own explanation.It is worth clarifying the important thing: “Topol”, the “birthday” of which we “celebrate”, and “Topol-M” are, after all, different things. Modern Topol-M differs from Topol thirty years ago, like Maseratti and Zhiguli, although the original principle is the same.
When the first Topol was put on combat duty, the nuclear standoff between the USSR and the USA acquired not a quantitative, but a qualitative character. Moreover, this quality was not comparable to the number of warheads in one carrier: stuffing several divided warheads into one rocket is the latest style of atomic-rocket science of that time (yes, the best scientists of the world did it, not fighters for democracy). But the confrontation between the two superpowers turned into a struggle of the so-called triads - carriers of the atomic weapons: strategic bombers, ground-based (mine-based) missile systems and submarines.
Such an arms race did not take place immediately, but because of the natural development of armaments. In the USSR, the mass production of nuclear weapons happened under Khrushchev, who openly favored missile weapons, and therefore the development of strategic aviation it was inhibited and trailed behind the American one (yes, precisely at that time air concepts were formulated, but they were based on borrowings from the American system).
And since mine-based rockets became the basis of the Soviet nuclear system, it was possible to speak of a partial rejection of the “triad”. Under Khrushchev, this seemed normal, until it became clear that the United States had superiority in mine rockets several times higher. Accordingly, a one-time missile attack not on cities, but on the location of mines, deprived the USSR of the opportunity to deliver a strike in response. The nuclear deterrence strategy flew to hell.
It was then that the idea arose of creating, if not a “triad,” then at least a system capable of avoiding a blow from the United States due to the lack of localization. The first logical answer: submarines, this led the arms race to the underwater world. Both sides tried to hide their missiles as deep as possible and lead them as far as possible from the enemy. Shark-type submarines (in NATO's Typhoon) - the largest in the world - lacked precisely because of their size. Their missiles could wipe out half of America with one volley, but they had to go to the affected area with a range of 11 000 kilometers. The monstrous dimensions of the Shark were determined not by the Soviet giant type, but by the inability at that time to create rockets smaller than the eight-story building. The design of the boat for these missiles with its "catamaran hull", the division into three compartments, was in its own way brilliant, but not practical. Especially since reaching the firing range required special training, which was not all. Even in the best of times, of all the “Sharks”, only two could be on permanent combat duty.
In addition, the Soviet naval system was initially in a losing position due to its geographical position. Due to the large number of NATO barriers on the Iceland-Faroe route (submarine cables, buoys, mines), the famous “Admiral Gorshkov Street” could bring only a small number of submarines from the Barents Sea to the ocean. A volley from the "Shark" all missiles lasts about a minute. But the wire of an adequate number of submarines to the Caribbean or to Cape Cove is already a lottery, not military planning.
And then there were "Topol". Not as a compensation for the “triad”, but as a completely new solution to the strategy of nuclear war. The very meaning of these missile systems was not in the tactical characteristics of ballistic missiles, but in the very possibility of their perpetual movement. The missile tactics marked the helplessness of the mine storage, and the rockets constantly moving on the ground came to the surface (in the literal sense of the word), their location is difficult to trace. This decision was both simple and amazing.
Around the same time, in the USSR, a kind of Topol analogs were created, which were supposed to be transported by rail. It was an adequate solution for the Soviet Union, but no one figured out that the majority of Soviet “pieces of iron” would simply not carry such weight. Then they began to additionally build secret railway lines, which immediately limited the idea itself. The satellites were already developing, and it became problematic to build a railroad with a different gauge so that the Americans could not see it. Not to mention the fact that the scheme of the railways of the Soviet Union implies their convergence at several points, which limits the movement of trains.
As a result, "Topol" precisely as mobile systems, which should avoid defeat from the first strike of the USA, turned out to be irreplaceable, because they had the opportunity to move in the conditions of complete absence of paved paths. As usual roads and off-road. It is for this reason that they constitute the “unkillable” part of the Russian nuclear triad.
Now, when the so-called unresponsive brunt of the United States (BSU) is considered to be the main threat to nuclear safety, systems such as Topol (in its modernized version) remain one of the most adequate response options. Whatever it was called in terms of the doctrine, "Topol" were and will remain in service as one of the main elements of the atomic strategic system of Russia.
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