The defeat of the 3 Army Radko-Dmitriev. The death of the 48 "Steel" division of General Kornilov

Breakthrough Russian defense. Southwest Front Retreat


4 May 1915 was a critical day: it predetermined the success or failure of the German operation. On this day, the 11 corps of the German army Mackensen broke through the third line of defense of the 3 Army Radko-Dmitriev, trying to get out of the river. Visloka. But the German troops again failed to complete the task, advancing in the center and on the left flank of all on 5 - 6 km. It was only on the right flank that the Kneissel consolidated corps managed to penetrate deep into the disposition of the Russian troops and get close to the town of Zmigrod.

The delay of the German offensive led to the fact that the 3 Caucasian Corps approached the 3 of the Russian army of General Radko-Dmitriev, its units were thrown in different directions to reinforce the defense. However, this reinforcement could no longer correct the situation. The heroic resistance of the Russian soldiers was delayed by a German breakthrough for four days. But, unfortunately, in spite of the German offensive, neither the command of the Russian front, nor the command of the army still understood the situation, and did not use the precious time provided. Time to organize the counter-maneuver was missed.

Partly Russian command can be understood. Indeed, at the same time, on May 2, 1915, German troops launched strikes on the entire front — they attacked the positions of the 4th, 2nd, 1st and 10th armies. The Germans broke into the Baltic. In early May, German troops occupied Chawley, and German cavalry began to spread rapidly throughout Courland. May 7, the Germans assisted fleet occupied Libau. Russian troops began to drag themselves beyond the Dubissa River, and throughout May there were fights for the possession of pp lines. Vindava and Dubissa. The commander of the Eastern Front, Hindenburg even wanted to use the demonstration operation entrusted to him to carry out his plan for the wide coverage of the Russian army from the north and south. The German High Command had to upset him. The chief of the General Staff of Germany Falkenhayn did not want to deeply develop the offensive in Russia.

Alekseev, in order to fend off an enemy strike in the Rigo-Shavelsky region, transferred infantry divisions to the 7 division in this region. Our troops tightly covered the path on the right bank of the river. Neman to Vilna, Dvinsk and Riga, stretching the front to the Baltic Sea. The entire new front was included in the 10 army of General Radkevich, whose headquarters was in Grodno. In early June, Alekseev formed a new 5 Army under the command of Plehve from the forces of the Rigo-Shavelsky District. The 12 th army at Narew, which up to this point commanded Plehve, was led by General Churin, and the troops of the disbanded former 5 Army (on the left bank of the Vistula River) were transferred to General Xmirnov's 2 Army. The Baltic fleet, at the direction of the Stavka, was supposed to support the Plehve 5 army. On the 5 th Army Plehve was assigned the task of covering a vast territory from the r. Neman to the Baltic coast and ousting from there the German troops, relying on Riga and Dvinsk. The Plehwe army was able to stabilize the situation on this sector of the Russian front, but it was not possible to knock out German troops from this area. As a result, the German Ami captured a convenient base for the development of the offensive, which was used after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland.

As a result, the attention of the Russian Stavka was diverted to the north, and the command of the Southwestern Front, Ivanov and Dragomirov, was not at all concerned. Even the fact that the divisions of the 3 of the Russian army, bleeding profusely, but held the blow of the enemy, confirmed their opinion that this was only an auxiliary blow. Moreover, at the moment when the Austro-German assault force was breaking through the northern flank of the front, on the southern flank of the 9-I and 11-I Russian armies were thrown into the attack. The front headquarters were sure that they had attacked the main enemy grouping, which is going to Bukovina. They realized it only after the army of Radko-Dmitriev was driven back over Vislok. But it was too late.

By the evening of May 5, the left flank and the center of the 11 of the German army finally broke through the Russian defenses, and reached the Vislok. The combined German corps occupied the area of ​​Zmigrod - Gloyce, and the 20-division of the 10 of the German corps captured Vetrzhno, which led to the blocking and death of the 48-division of the 24 of the army corps.

The defeat of the 3 Army Radko-Dmitriev. The death of the 48 "Steel" division of General Kornilov

Germanic 77 Howitzers

Russian soldiers taken prisoner as a result of the Gorlitsky breakthrough

The position of the 3 Army was very difficult. On May 6, German troops concentrated a strike on the center and left flank of the 3 Army (on the 3 Caucasian, 24 and 12 Corps). Despite this, the headquarters and the front command demanded a counter-offensive from Radko-Dmitriev. Radko-Dmitriev took the left flank back, brought the 21 corps to the reserve, and, fulfilling the demand of the front command, threw it into a frontal counterattack. But the counter-attack of one corps did not lead to success, and the army continued to retreat to the Shchuchin-Velepole-Lutch-Bukovsk line. On the 6-th day of the Austro-German offensive, 7 in May, the depth of the breakthrough reached 40 km. The remnants of the Russian 9-th and 10-th corps, which took the brunt, no longer represented a real force and retreated in complete disarray with jumbled parts. The Germans and Austrians rushed into the breakthrough, expanding it and smashing the retreating Russian troops.

The situation was aggravated by inconsistency in the Russian command. The chief of the front headquarters, General Dragomirov, and the commander of the 3 Army, Radiko-Dmitriev, realized the need to withdraw troops in order to gain time and space in order to regroup the troops and concentrate reinforcements for a flank counterattack. However, the front commander and headquarters did not allow retreat, and all their orders at Radko-Dmitriev were imbued with the idea not to depart, not to give the occupied territory and immediately counterattack, stop the enemy. This completely disorganized the commander of 3, the army of Radko-Dmitriev, a very impressionable man who understood his delicate situation, like a Bulgarian, in the Russian army. He was confused. He didn’t have enough courage to push his opinion, and he submitted to the high command, he began to send reinforcements that arrived haphazardly.

Thus, significant reserves that were transferred to the dangerous area were wasted. At first, nothing happened from the transition to the counteroffensive of the 3 Caucasian and 21 corps, then to the 5 Caucasian and 24 corps, Guards cavalry. The corps were thrown into battle by parts, a series of small counterattacks, which did not lead to success. Instead of concentrating reinforcements and launching a powerful flank counter-strike, the front and army commanders threw them at meaningless frontal counterattacks piecemeal.

So, having made a forced march, the guards cavalry corps of Han Nakhichevan approached. Under the fierce enemy fire, the Russian cavalry rushed to the attack. The cavalry was supported by the existing infantry. German troops at one of the sites were rejected to the Visloka. But the Germans and the Austrians continued to attack in other directions, and the heroic breakthrough of the Russian cavalry was reduced to zero. Similarly, the bayonet counterattacks of the Russian infantry divisions were wasted. They temporarily discarded the enemy, detained the Germans. But the Germans bypassed them, in turn broke them with hurricane fire. As a result, the bloodless parts also began to recede, pouring into the general withdrawal.

A large role in the success of the German offensive was played by artillery. The Germans literally swept away the Russian defense. And our troops often could oppose the enemy only bayonets. “Like a huge beast, the German army crawled up with its forward units to our trenches,” Lieutenant General N.N. figuratively described the German breakthrough. Golovin, - then this giant beast was pulling up its tail - heavy artillery. The latter became in areas inaccessible to our light artillery, often even beyond the reach of its shots, and with the German methodology began to drum in our trenches. She pounded on them until they were flattened, and their defenders were killed. After that, the beast gently pulled out its paws — infantry units — and occupied trenches. ... Having fixed themselves on the position taken from us, the beast again pulled up its tail, and the German heavy artillery, with the same methodology, began to thresh on our new position. "




Commander Radko-Dmitriev asked for permission to withdraw troops for San, but the Supreme Commander categorically banned. After all, then it would be necessary to withdraw the neighboring armies - the right-flank 4-th army, which had just successfully attacked the left-flank 8-th army, holding the Carpathian passes. The withdrawal of the 3 Army poured into the general retreat of the troops of the South-Western Front. The command of the South-Western Front believed that the 3 Army now had enough troops to stop the enemy. But Radko-Dmitriev has already lost the threads of control, and the army turned into unorganized crowds. The commander rode piecemeal, trying to stop the troops. The army turned into teams of the detachment, and in some places just into the crowd. Some troops tried to break through to the east, others surrendered.

It is good that the German command also blundered, repeated its previous mistakes, and that the retreat of the 3 army could lead to a catastrophe. The German command missed the opportunity to finish off the army of Radko-Dmitriev and surround most of Brusilov's 8 army. The Germans didn’t remember about maneuvering, just like Russian troops went into frontal attacks, losing a lot of people. Where the Austrians and the Germans met strong resistance, they stopped, did not try to get around, pulled up artillery and, having shot our position, continued to move. As a result, the Austro-German offensive developed slowly, German troops could not surround the significant forces of the Russian army. Russian troops could retreat and snap at the new frontiers. The remnants of the 3 Army were able to escape, avoiding encirclement.

In connection with the continuous retreat of the 3 Army of Radko-Dmitriev, the front command, finally, on May 10, after 9 days of bloody battles, was forced to withdraw the units of the 4 and 8 armies adjacent to its flanks Western front is a new, defensive task. Our troops were to keep Eastern Galicia, clinging to the defensive lines of the San and Dniester rivers.

Thus, the 3-th Army 13 May moved to the river. San Radko-Dmitriev was replaced as commander of the army by General L. V. Leshem, downgraded to the corps commander. By May 15, the South-Western Front withdrew its troops and occupied a new location: the 3 Army stood on the r. San, 8-I army is located in the interval between the pp. San and Dniester, 4-I army pulled its left flank to the river. Wisla; the rest of the armies of the front, 11 and 9, received the task of actively defending the r. Dniester and the Russian border to Romania.

As a result of the Gorlitsky breakthrough, the successes of the Russian troops in the 1914 campaign of the year and in the Carpathian operation were frustrated, and the threat of abandoning Galicia and Poland arose. The Russian army only captured lost about 325 thousand people. 3-I army suffered a heavy defeat. The British representative at the 3 Army reported gloomily these days to London: "This army is now a crowd that is harmless to the enemy."



The death of the "Steel" Kornilov Division

It must be said that during this retreat, the 48-i "Steel" division, under the command of Lavr Georgievich Kornilov, died. The division fought in the Carpathian Mountains on the Dukla Pass as part of Brusilov's 24 Corps. Kornilov was a brave commander, whom the soldiers literally idolized. He treated with great attention to their life, demanded a fatherly attitude to the lower ranks, but also expected from them initiative, precise execution of orders. Brusilov, who disliked Kornilov, nevertheless gave him his due: “He was always ahead and attracted the hearts of the soldiers who loved him. They did not give themselves an account of his actions, but they always saw him on fire and valued his courage. ” And further: “A strange case, General Kornilov never regretted his division: in all the battles in which she participated under his command, she suffered terrifying losses, and meanwhile the officers and soldiers loved him and believed him. True, he did not spare himself, he was personally brave and climbed headlong. ”

General Denikin, another hero of the First World and Future Civil War, who commanded the neighboring 4 rifle (iron) brigade that fought alongside the Kornilov division, subsequently characterized his future associate: “... for me, the main features of Kornilov — the military leader: a great the ability to educate the troops: he made an excellent combat division in a few weeks from the second-grade part of the Kazan District; determination and extreme persistence in the conduct of the most difficult, it seemed doomed operation; extraordinary personal courage, which terribly impressed the troops and created great popularity among them; finally, the high observance of military ethics, with respect to neighboring units and comrades, is a characteristic that both commanders and military units often sinned against. ”

The “steel” division, which is being transferred to the heaviest sectors of the front, has written more than one glorious history in the chronicle of the First World War. During the Gorlitsk operation, when the 24 corps was transferred to the 3 army, the Kornilov division covered the retreat of the remaining troops. And in the chaos of retreat, she received the order of withdrawal belatedly. On the plain, two German divisions blocked the exits from the mountains. Through the pass, following the regiments of the Kornilov division, were Austrian troops. Under the “Steel” division there was a medical unit of Nikolai Rodzianko, the son of the chairman of the State Duma. The staff managed to study the local paths well and Rodzyanko suggested Kornilov to withdraw his troops using roundabout paths. But the troops were greatly stretched, Kornilov could not leave the regiments and returned with the headquarters to the troops.

Sanitary squad Rodzianko managed to get out of the environment. All the wounded, rear units and part of the wagon train left the “boiler”. Rodzianko was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir with swords. However, the enemy found a gap in the encirclement, blocked the last paths. Kornilov led the troops to the breakthrough, and he personally led one of the battalions, covering the withdrawal of the other units. Many of the soldiers made their way, carried the banners of the division and regiments. However, almost the entire cover squad fell in an unequal battle that lasted several days. Kornilov was twice wounded in an arm and a leg and among only 7 of the survived fighters of the battalion fell in the Austrian captivity.

The commander of the 24 Corps, General Tsurikov, considered Kornilov responsible for the death of the 48 Division and demanded a trial of him. But General Ivanov considered the com-front differently, he highly appreciated the feat of the 48 division and sent the Supreme Commander Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolayevich a petition "about exemplary rewarding of the remnants of the bravely penetrated units of the 48 division and, especially its hero, the chief of the division of General Kornilov" Emperor Nicholas II signed a decree awarding General Kornilov with the Order of St. George 3 degree. Lavr Georgievich escaped from the Austrian captivity in the summer of 1916, and continued to serve in the Russian army.


Lavr Georgievich Kornilov in 1916 year

The retreat of other troops was also accompanied by great difficulties. The enemy tried to encircle Brusilov's entire 8 army. Austrian troops were pressing on the Carpathian passes, trying to pin down the Russians in battle and give Mackensen time to go to the rear of the 8 Army. But Brusilov turned out to be wiser than Radko-Dmitriev. At the beginning of the battle, he sent hospitals and transports to the rear. And departed secretly. Until the very last moment they misled the enemy and strengthened their defenses. In the fortifications remained mobile teams with machine guns, which fired a disturbing fire while the rest of the troops retreated. Ways of departure were determined in advance, they walked quickly and broke away from the enemy. As a result, Brusilov's army safely left the prepared trap.

And on the left flank, the 11-I and 9-i armies were still advancing, pushing the Southern army of Lizingen. Their commanders did not understand why they should retreat, abandon their positions. However, they were told that if they hesitated, they would not be allowed to go down from the passes, they would block them. When the 11 Army corps turned back, walking along narrow mountain roads, 8 and 3 of the Austrian armies left on the plains to the plain, they turned south, aiming at the rear of the 2 Russian army.

At the junction of the 8-th and 11-th armies acted 4-th "Iron" division of Denikin (in April it was deployed from the "iron" brigade). Denikin's division covered the retreat of its neighbors, took a hit. Russian soldiers fought off attack after attack, suffered huge losses, but fulfilled the task. 11-I army managed to retreat. Denikin's division suffered severe losses, one of the regiments fell into a semiring, was almost completely knocked out.


Russian 122-mm howitzer at the front. Summer 1915

To be continued ...
Ctrl Enter

Noticed a mistake Highlight text and press. Ctrl + Enter

27 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. Barboskin 22 July 2015 06: 58 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    At the very beginning, what does it mean on May 4, 1914 ?! In general, thanks to the author, informative.
  2. todaygoodday 22 July 2015 07: 53 New
    • 3
    • 0
    +3
    A typo, wherever 1914 occurs, must be 1915
  3. parusnik 22 July 2015 07: 59 New
    • 5
    • 0
    +5
    this giant beast was pulling its tail - heavy artillery.... And to whom to thank you, for the small number of heavy artillery in the Russian army? The French had the same problem .. But they quickly solved it ..
    1. anip 22 July 2015 08: 51 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      Quote: parusnik
      And to whom to say thank you, for the small number of heavy artillery in the Russian army?

      What are you? How is it possible? It was the Bolsheviks who ruined everything, but in RI everything was just wonderful, and the people drove teas to the crunch of French rolls.
    2. Russian Uzbek 22 July 2015 09: 40 New
      • 9
      • 0
      +9
      "" "And to whom to say thank you, for the small number of heavy artillery in the Russian army?" ""
      Sukhomlinov Vladimir Alexandrovich (1949-1926); general from the cavalry; from December 1908 - beginning of the General Staff; from March 1909 to 1915 - Minister of Defense; in 1915, dismissed from service on charges of treason
      He considered heavy artillery an absurd, dear whim, and in every possible way sabotaged the equipment of the Russian army with heavy artillery, as well as machine guns because "they consume a large amount of ammunition" ...
      as a result of his work: at the beginning of the war in the army there were only a few heavy batteries
      1. Alexey RA 22 July 2015 10: 11 New
        • 4
        • 0
        +4
        There, besides Sukhomlinov, many who worked. GAU, for example, through a random distribution of orders completely disorganized the work of gun factories:
        The process of producing heavy guns at factories was further complicated by the fact that the factories, not receiving orders on time, were not ready for serial production. So, Perm factory in 1906 and 1907. I did not receive orders from the Main Artillery Directorate, which forced the administration to dismiss some of the masters. The plant suffered a loss of 5 million rubles. In 1910, an erratic placement of orders began, which led to a disorganization of the activities of a number of shops (especially open-hearth).
        Not the best was the position of the Petrograd plant. He also received a wide variety of orders, requiring each time to establish a special technological process.
        The consequence was a chronic failure to fulfill GAU orders. The Investigative Commission pointed out this circumstance, noting that the GAU, having received from the General Staff “a limited program for the procurement of material parts, with a clear discrepancy with the technical facilities of the factories, distributed artillery orders between them, invariably providing orders to the Petrograd gun factory for all gun systems, not conforming the fact that this plant has neither its casting, nor sufficient forging means, nor free space for further expansion, and despite the fact that the aforementioned plant was significantly late with the execution of orders for some gun systems, and was not late for other systems able to proceed as a result of his lack of equipment, which was heavily reflected in the supply of field artillery to the army. ”
        (c) Bloodless L.G. The army and navy of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.

        As a result, another problem was added to the problem of receiving money from the Duma and the Ministry of Finance: through the efforts of the GAU, the money received with such difficulty turned into guns, howitzers and mortars extremely slowly.

        Well, do not forget about disputes of economic entities (dismantling of financial and industrial groups), which often went to the interstate level. So, the British Vickers, intending to build in Russia a gun factory for the production of guns of all calibers. including large ones, I encountered opposition from pro-French and domestic groups, and the confrontation was fought by the hands of lured groups of officials up to the level of ministers. As a result of these disassemblies, the plant was not built before the war, and during the war part of the equipment received for it was scattered at other plants. And only after the war the factory, which had changed its name to Barricades by that time, was completed, staffed and solemnly launched ... but the Bolsheviks did it already.
  4. Bagnyuk 22 July 2015 08: 47 New
    • -5
    • 0
    -5
    unlike the Red Germans, they didn’t let them go to the Volga ... they stopped on the Riga Baranovichi line and down ...
    1. anip 22 July 2015 08: 53 New
      • 3
      • 0
      +3
      Quote: Bagnyuk
      unlike the Red Germans, they didn’t let them go to the Volga ... they stopped on the Riga Baranovichi line and down ...

      So what? In contrast to William II, Hitler and Paris took.
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. Aleksander 22 July 2015 09: 11 New
        • 5
        • 0
        +5
        Quote: anip
        Quote: Bagnyuk
        unlike the Red Germans, they didn’t let them go to the Volga ... they stopped on the Riga Baranovichi line and down ...

        So what? In contrast to William II, Hitler and Paris took.


        So what? Unlike William, Hitler did NOT have Eastern frontand then under William William Paris survived by a miracle -Miraculously on the Marne ...
        1. jktu66 23 July 2015 00: 20 New
          • 3
          • 0
          +3
          So what? Unlike Wilhelm, Hitler did NOT have an Eastern Front, and then under Wilhelm Paris survived by a miracle - Miracle on the Marne ...
          The miracle on the Marne, as well as the defeat of Germany and the 1mV company, was ensured by Russia. For this, the Anglo-Saxons and Frenchmen “thanked Russia” indescribably am
    2. Nagaibak 22 July 2015 09: 27 New
      • 3
      • 0
      +3
      Bagnyuk "unlike the Red Germans, they didn’t let them go to the Volga ... they stopped on the Baranavichy Riga line and down ..."
      Some sort of comparison, weighed down by alternative giftedness.
    3. Alexey RA 22 July 2015 10: 28 New
      • 7
      • 0
      +7
      Quote: Bagnyuk
      unlike the Red Germans, they didn’t let them go to the Volga ... they stopped on the Riga Baranovichi line and down ...

      Unlike the Reds, the Empire collapsed in less than three years of war. And politically (and this collapse was organized by the elite of the Empire - political, economic and military), both economically and transport.

      Yes, by the way, almost the entire German army was required to reach the Volga. And only a third of this army pushed us to the Riga-Baranavichy line (a maximum of half, when the Austrians began to merge very indecently).
      1. Aleksander 22 July 2015 11: 07 New
        • 5
        • 0
        +5
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Unlike the Reds, the Empire collapsed in less than three years of war.


        The next regime collapsed much faster and without any war and with complete indifference of the people, "and this collapse was also organized by the elite," - now red ....
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Yes, by the way, almost the entire German army was required to reach the Volga. And only a third of this army pushed us to the Riga-Baranavichy line (a maximum of half, when the Austrians began to merge very indecently).

        Ottoman Porta — Doesn't Count?
        1. Bagnyuk 22 July 2015 14: 33 New
          • -2
          • 0
          -2
          Quote: Aleksander
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Unlike the Reds, the Empire collapsed in less than three years of war.

          The next regime collapsed much faster and without any war and with complete indifference of the people, "and this collapse was also organized by the elite," - now red ....

          Bravo! Bravo! Bravo!
      2. jktu66 23 July 2015 00: 38 New
        • 2
        • 0
        +2
        Yes, by the way, almost the entire German army was required to reach the Volga. And only a third of this army pushed us to the Riga-Baranavichy line (a maximum of half, when the Austrians began to merge very indecently).
        Why are you talking about the Caucasian front 1mv with the Turks you bashfully kept silent, or forgot ... And the Austrians did not merge on their own laughing . And the collapse of the empire occurred at a certain moment in Russia's readiness to deliver a decisive blow on the western front, from which Germany would end the war in 1917, and not in a year. Perhaps, in addition to Shaposhnikov in the General Staff, there would have been a detachment of marshals from 1mV generals who thoroughly digested the experience of the “imperialist” and did “work on mistakes”, and the head of divisions, corps and armies of the Red Army would have been hardened in the trenches of Smorgon and other former headquarters captains and captains, something in 1941-42m would have turned out differently. smile
    4. Bagatur 22 July 2015 11: 39 New
      • -5
      • 0
      -5
      It is not so easy to get to the Volga in 1914 on a boot and a horse ... it is not a mechanized war as in 1941-45 ...
      1. 97110 22 July 2015 14: 51 New
        • 5
        • 0
        +5
        Quote: bagatura
        it’s not a mechanized war as in 1941-45 ...

        Well, tell us about the full motorization of the German infantry, its full armament with machine guns and so on. Everywhere and always, and especially in 1 and 2 MB, Russia had problems only in organization and management. Gritting their hearts, they kind of agreed that the Red Army had a lot more tanks than the Wehrmacht. And that the German infantry was no better armed than ours. It is possible to arrange a debate about the merits of KARABIN Mauser and Mosin Rifles, about the repressions of Stalin and the connivance of Hitler. Here, a very good 38 (t) with a 37mm cannon, which the cook defeated with an ax, was described here a day ago. Is the T-26 really bad against it? And well, to invent what the Germans were doing with us in 1942 from near Barvenkovo ​​to Stalingrad. What kind of prodigy they had was "mechanized." They did not have Mikita the miracle worker. And generals with a surname ending in "o". They fought better. Up to the Kursk arch. Only after it the Red Army became the victorious army. In Stalingrad, we won not so much as they lost. The soldiers on both sides were worth each other, and the weapons were almost the same until mid-1943. And horse-drawn artillery of all horse-fed - both ours and Germans.
        1. jktu66 23 July 2015 00: 48 New
          • 3
          • 0
          +3
          In Stalingrad, we won not so much as they lost. The soldiers on both sides were worth each other, and the weapons were almost the same until mid-1943. And horse-drawn artillery of all horse-fed - both ours and Germans.
          In Stalingrad, we definitely won SO MUCH! True, we missed the chance to lock in the boiler a much larger 900 thousand Wehrmacht group advancing in the Caucasus, our civilian generals did not have such 1mv experience as the Wehrmacht generals. And the rest I agree.
      2. parusnik 22 July 2015 17: 09 New
        • 4
        • 0
        +4
        Eeeee do not tell me, Napoleon in 1812 in September Borodino was ... without railways, cars and tanks ...
        1. jktu66 23 July 2015 00: 54 New
          • 3
          • 0
          +3
          Eeeee do not tell me, Napoleon in 1812 in September Borodino was ... without railways, cars and tanks ...
          Napoleon also visited Moscow, so in 1914 the Russians did not allow themselves to step on the same rake, despite all the miscalculations of the generals and the stupidity of Minister Sukhomlinov in 1915 they lost the minimum of their territory smile
    5. washi 22 July 2015 11: 49 New
      • -3
      • 0
      -3
      Quote: Bagnyuk
      unlike the Red Germans, they didn’t let them go to the Volga ... they stopped on the Riga Baranovichi line and down ...

      At 14, the Germans walked, and at 41 in tanks, planes, cars. How long will it take you, without any resistance, to walk on foot from Kaliningrad to Moscow? And how much by car.
      1. Bagnyuk 22 July 2015 14: 34 New
        • 1
        • 0
        +1
        Quote: Vasya
        At 14, the Germans walked, and at 41 in tanks, planes, cars. How long will it take you, without any resistance, to walk on foot from Kaliningrad to Moscow? And how much by car.

        khe khe .. a long-debunked myth ... only tank groups were mobile ... the rest of the herd was a pearl on foot .. while managing to eliminate giant cauldrons ...
      2. 97110 22 July 2015 15: 00 New
        • 4
        • 0
        +4
        Quote: Vasya
        and in 41 on tanks, planes, cars
        horse drawn and on foot. It was they who complained that the tractors for artillery had run out near Moscow - they could not service a huge, varied mobilized vehicle fleet. And ours just left everything in the borderland. So let's confess - on horseback, and on foot mostly. For newsreels, even the Germans wash their heads with snow and snow.
  5. The comment was deleted.
  6. kvs207 22 July 2015 10: 50 New
    • 5
    • 0
    +5
    Quote: Bagnyuk
    unlike the Red Germans, they were not allowed to enter the Volga

    Unlike the Russian Empire in the USSR, they were able to evacuate production to the East and establish production of military products.
    The shell "hunger" in the Russian army was partially eliminated by the 16th year, and then to small calibers, despite the fact that the main production was beyond the reach of the Germans.
    1. Bagnyuk 22 July 2015 14: 36 New
      • 2
      • 0
      +2
      so what? and in the first it wasn’t necessary to evacuate .. and they just riveted so much in 1.5 years that they killed the entire civil without production .. at the same time they managed to ditch 8 million of our fellow citizens !!!
      1. 97110 22 July 2015 15: 04 New
        • 2
        • 0
        +2
        Quote: Bagnyuk
        and in the first and did not have to evacuate

        I had to. Russian-Baltic factory from Riga. Just could not. They clogged the railway and in the end, the carriages with machine tools were thrown downhill. When I read it, I was not a witness. I can evaluate how a transporter, a miracle (or feat) of evacuation can. Unbelievable!
      2. oldkap22 22 July 2015 15: 54 New
        • -2
        • 0
        -2
        NOT "riveted" but "bought" at speculative prices (well, of course, they did something themselves (but at the same speculative prices (they undressed their oligarchs to help foreign ...) Half of the plants are foreign ...
      3. Nagaibak 23 July 2015 05: 54 New
        • -2
        • 0
        -2
        Bagnyuk "and everything was riveted so much then in 1.5 years that the whole civil without production of everything was fought."
        Fantasy however rushing, and rushing.
    2. jktu66 23 July 2015 00: 58 New
      • 2
      • 0
      +2
      Unlike the Russian Empire in the USSR, they were able to evacuate production to the East and establish production of military products.
      The Russian Empire did not need to be evacuated, and for some artillery caliber shells fired in Russia in 1mv were destroyed (remnants) by the 1950s. There were enough shells for TWO mv!
      1. Nagaibak 23 July 2015 12: 06 New
        • -1
        • 0
        -1
        jktu66 "and in some artillery caliber shells fired in Russia in 1mv were destroyed (remnants) by the 1950s. Shells were enough for TWO mv!"
        The civilian actively produced weapons and rifles and machine guns and revolvers. I think the same for shells. Despite such an abundance. For example, in a civil war, devastation and famine.
        “In total, from the summer of 1918 until the end of 1920, 1298173 rifles, 15044 machine guns and 175115 revolvers were manufactured, 900 thousand rifles and 5200 machine guns were repaired (TsAGA f.4, op.3, d.22.l28; f.20 , op.8, d.1, l.29) For two and a half years, from the summer of 1918 until the end of 1920, 840,2 million cartridges were manufactured "p.11. D.N. Bolotin. The history of Soviet military weapons and ammunition. Landfill, 1995.
        I suspect that the shells were also set up for production.))) Therefore, to say that the Reds won the civil war by the fact that it was produced under the king and lay in the warehouses is stupid and does not withstand any criticism.))) Although of course in the initial period War stocks played a positive role in equipping the Red Army. It's just as stupid to deny.
  7. Support 22 July 2015 11: 47 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    In short, the revolution came in time. Nikolashka should have been brought down even earlier, together with his spoiled English wife. The war is on the nose and they have cupids, Romanov’s dive. They correctly said - with blood, the dynasty began with blood and ended. They also canonized. Whom? Traitor .....
    1. 97110 22 July 2015 15: 05 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      Quote: Prop
      along with his spoiled English wife
      ? All my life I thought that she was a German spy.
      1. jktu66 23 July 2015 01: 02 New
        • 1
        • 0
        +1
        ? All my life I thought that she was a German spy.
        You see how you "badly" know the story! laughing laughing laughing good
  8. barbiturate 22 July 2015 14: 23 New
    • -1
    • 0
    -1
    tsarist Russia’s level was immediately and unconditionally affected, when one German 8th Army, not even from the reservists, but from the Landshturm defeated two Russian army armies, in 1915 the Germans pressed and huge territories were immediately left and it turned out that there were no shells, no rifles or machine guns no planes, no cartridges, no guns, no cars, no trained reserves — there is simply nothing and we cannot produce anything ourselves. What a blessing for Russia was that it was not the main enemy for the Germans, it was given in the teeth and went on to fight west with an equal enemy
    1. jktu66 23 July 2015 01: 09 New
      • 4
      • 0
      +4
      What a blessing for Russia was that it was not the main enemy for the Germans, it was given in the teeth and went on to fight west with an equal enemy
      68 St. George cavalry in the Russian squadron, more than two million St. George, thousands of full cavalry, and they, crosses and weapons were given for courage. So give up your ridiculous admiration for the German and stop belittling the feat and selflessness of a huge number of Russian people
  9. ivanovbg 22 July 2015 15: 03 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    Good article. Name of the Bulgarian general Radko Dimitriev, without a hyphen. Radko is the first name.