Boxing by correspondence, or Once again about the post-war fleet
When I was preparing my articles in the NVO (“We will build our old fleet,” “Hunters for missile carriers and the killers of“ floating airfields ”,“ Naval Reserve ”), I, of course, suspected that I would still have to return to this topic, but did not expect it for just such an occasion. I will not hide, I am also interested in vanity, and therefore, after the publication of my articles, I glanced at the forums to read what they were writing. And here is an almost literal review from one of the forums: “The author is a militarist and Stalinist,” after a dozen comments, another commentator: “The author is a liberal for the destruction of the army.” In a similar vein, unfortunately, most of the comments. From this I established myself in the opinion that I heard more than once from others that people on the Internet, with rare exceptions, are divided into readers and commentators. The first read the information, analyze, but do not spend time on comments. The second - comment, not wasting time reading. It could not be otherwise, since in days only 24 hours. And everything would go on as usual, if not for the review of Maxim Klimov on my article, published in the same newspaper "NVO" ("Once again about the myths of post-war shipbuilding"). From this review, I was inspired by the spirit of Internet forums. And here I decided to answer the printed word on the printed word.
DISPUTES ABOUT ROCKETS AND MANIES
In his article, Maxim Klimov first of all criticizes the book of my father Vladislav Ivanovich Nikolsky, written in collaboration with Vladimir Petrovich Kuzin. This scientific work is well known in the narrow circle of those interested in the Soviet Navy and does not need to be protected. Agreeing that not only the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the economy, but also the army was sick in a sick Soviet state, this book was pulled apart for a long time for quotes. Therefore, I turn immediately to the protection of their own dignity.
To begin with, Maxim Klimov writes: “First of all, I would like to dispel the myth of“ Khrushchev’s rocket-attack ”, which, as stated (A. Nikolsky), has damaged the progressive development of the Russian Navy.” Talking about the “Khrushchev rocket mania” in my articles, I do this not so much for criticizing Khrushchev, as to show that those who then criticized Khrushchev for rocket attacks during the Khrushchev era praised his military genius as well as 10 over the years pleased Stalin with the rationale for building battleships.
Reading the “scientific” confirmation of his ideas, the leader sincerely believed that he was right. A society transformed into uncomplaining sheep gave birth to ram leaders, and rams bred sheep. So close the circle. By the way, today it does not look like anything? As for Klimov’s assertion about the lack of an alternative to mass rocketization, I would like to remind you of the golden mean and that “Khrushchev rocket attack” means not flights into space and not the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (for which we are grateful to Khrushchev), but the hope that the complex (SAM) will be replaced by the fighter, and the cruise missile is a bomber, which I wrote about. And if we praise Khrushchev, then first of all, not for rocketization, but for his conversion and attempts to increase the output of consumer goods.
Another place.
Maxim Klimov writes that the Volna air defense system could, especially in experienced hands and taking into account modernization, shoot down low-flying targets, and also on the BN of the 61 project there were two AK-726 gun mounts, and AK-230 and AK-X gun guns on the Soviet ships 630. And, therefore, my assertion that the Soviet ships in the 60-e - the beginning of 70-s did not have adequate protection against low-flying targets (below 50 m), is untenable. However, my opponent somehow forgot to bring the year of modernization of Wave, and meanwhile I wrote about it: the modernized Wave-M appeared only in 1976, when the United States already had Harpoon. The same applies to AK-630. AK-230 was not put on either the 61 project or the 1134 project.
As for the AK-726, then she had a problem of a different kind. It is effective when it uses projectiles with a radio fuse, but it was impossible to use them just for the purpose below 50. It was not by chance that AK-1962 knocked down targets at a height not lower than 726 m on tests in 500. So, you have to use a contact fuse, but you can really achieve a direct hit on the transonic target, and even maneuvering, if only in a horizontal plane. from the distance 4 km. That is why artillery systems designed to destroy low-flying targets have an effective range of 2 – 4 km and a small caliber - 20 – 40 mm.
Skyhawk passes 4 km in 14 seconds, during which time two AK-726 managed to fire 80 shells, which, according to calculations, allowed to shoot down one, at most two aircraft. Therefore, four Skyhawk were enough to ditch any of our ship. Here I have to apologize, because in the previous article, chasing spectacularity, I cited only the option of attacking four Skyhawk, since it was reminiscent of the Falkland War. In fact, the Americans had a less effective, but safer for pilots attack method. First, four F-4s — and these are 64–48 bombs with a caliber of 227 kg — come out flying at an altitude of 25 m to a distance of 5–6 km, turn on the automatic (using the radar data of the aircraft) bombing system with cabling and achieve guaranteed three to four hits into a target the size of a destroyer. This number of hits is enough for the destroyer to lose its ability to resist. After that, Skyhawk finish off the unfortunate ship. Therefore, the Americans did not need until the mid-70s aviation anti-ship missiles (RCC), because they already destroyed our ships if they were removed from the cover airfield beyond 100 km.
THIRD DIMENSION
There are people who fully share the doctrine of the Soviet Navy. There are people who criticize this doctrine. I belong to the latter. But my opponent offers a third way, which I have not yet met. He argues that everything written in the closed literature about the doctrine is only an ideological cover. Namely - that tracking the enemy SSBNs was not planned in reality.
It turns out that headquarters, research institutes (SRI) and other smart institutions engaged in imitation, solving the problem of tracking SSBNs? To declare this, we need solid evidence, but their opponent does not. There is only an indication that the task of tracking is impracticable, and therefore no one seriously and was not engaged. About the fact that this task is impossible, there is no dispute, I wrote about it in my article, but didn’t they deal with impracticable tasks in Soviet reality? Building communism is like? And where is socialism more successful - here or in Sweden? And how many millions have we ruined, now to be the country of the second, if not the third world?
"We were not going to start the war first." This is the opinion expressed by Maxim Klimov, and I fully share it. However, he, taking my sentences out of context, makes me a kind of Zbigniew Brzezinski, accusing the USSR of the desire to unleash Armageddon. I will briefly try to explain what I had in mind (for more details, in my articles mentioned above in the NVO).
At the beginning of the 70-ies with the filing of Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, in the 1976 year appointed to the post of Minister of Defense of the USSR, a new concept of the third world. Ustinov believed that the war will consist of two phases: the first is the limited use of only tactical nuclear weapons and unlimited use of conventional weapons; the second - if it was not possible to reach an agreement during the first phase of the conflict, then the thermonuclear end of mankind. There were two scenarios for starting a war: we strike the first blow, or they strike the first blow. The air force and the army were doing well in any of these scenarios. At the naval fleet it turned out well only if we beat the first. If the USA treacherously attacked us, then all our tracking by single ships and single aircraft was covered with a copper basin. Therefore, it was beneficial for Gorshkov to start the war first. That's just what I had in mind.
In my articles, I explain that the well-known disregard for ship repair and the training of naval personnel fits into the Soviet concept of a fleeting nuclear war. Denying this, Maxim Klimov writes: “The thing is that the realities of the USSR economy, many of whose plans were not fulfilled (and could not be fulfilled), and ultimately led to the emergence of a“ bias ”in the ratio of shipbuilding in the 1980-ies and ship repair, which was planned to be repaired already in the 1990-ies with the commissioning of a sharply increased volume of ship repair complexes. " Again, as in the case of “Wave”, dates are distorted, only then Klimov hid the dates, and now he falsifies them. "Skew" did not occur in the 1980-x, but in the second half of the 60-x. But the situation at the end of 80's began to be corrected not because “the time has come”, but because management has changed. In 1985, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev finally retired 75-year-old unsinkable Sergey Georgievich Gorshkov because of Chazhma. He was replaced by a more sane Vladimir Nikolaevich Chernavin, plus “detente,” and, finally, the third last change of the concept of the beginning of the third world war. Now the idea of reasonable sufficiency and the absence of ideological opposition prevailed and, as a result, recalled ship repair. It is no coincidence that it was then, relying on the American experience, in the 1 Central Research Institute, research began on extending the life cycle of a ship. But the yard was already 1989 year ...
ABOUT TREATY AND PATRIOTISM
Very extravagantly refuted by my opponent in the issue of the causes of accidents. In short, I believe that the accident rate of the Navy was higher than in the Navy of the NATO countries because of weak coastal infrastructure, which implies not only ship repair, but also the lack of available training centers for submarine crews and complete lack of industry - "quantity instead of quality." But in response, Maxim Klimov writes: “As for the talk about the accident rate of the Navy, including in comparison with the Western fleets, it can only be conducted from the standpoint of a detailed analysis of the circumstances and causes of accidents and catastrophes, rather than ideological cliches that often slip in the materials under discussion. " And that's all, and nothing more, that is, I am wrong only because I am an adherent of ideological cliches, but at the same time Klimov himself does not give his version. Well, let's wait until Klimov studies the topic; I advise the following authors to help him: B.A. Karzhavin, E.D. Chernov, D.A. Romanov, V.D. Ryazantsev and others. In the meantime, I remain unconvinced.
Maxim Klimov - a supporter of the slogan of the Soviet military-industrial complex "Quantity to the detriment of quality." Here is what he writes: “I would like to separately stand up for the boiler-turbine destroyers. So, A. Nikolsky claims that "the Navy wanted to abandon the boiler-turbine installations (KTU) on warships, but this went against the opinion of the industry." However, the reason for choosing a KTU on the destroyer of the 956 project is well known to specialists: the domestic shipbuilding program was not provided by the production of gas turbine units (GTU), which were also needed to repair existing ships, so the choice of KTU was not due to “opinion”, but real possibilities MIC ".
Firstly, I also wrote that the choice of the KTU was due to the possibility of the MIC. Secondly, Klimov considers the construction of destroyers with a KTU to be a forced, but the right measure, I am not. The Cold War differs from the hot one in that countries are measured not by the number of destroyers, but by the attractiveness of ideology. The construction of 14 destroyers of the 956 project did not save the USSR in any way, but the Russian shipbuilding industry was harmed. For the production of obsolete weapons does not develop, but it also slows down the civilian sector of the economy. If the destroyers construction program had been reduced, there would have been funds for building a new GTU plant (at that time they considered the option of building a plant in Izhevsk).
The Yak-141 vertical take-off and landing aircraft never hit the fleet
Eh, now I’ve again been unpatriotic on the Internet. But Klimov is a patriot. Here is how he spreads my skepticism about the endless single voyages of our ships (for more on this, see my articles in NVO): “However, by their presence, tracking the enemy, they ensured effective deterrence of the“ opposing side ”from the escalation of crisis situations, that is were quite effective impact tool. Including in local conflicts. ” This often has to be read on the Internet. However, the writers, like Klimov, do not give examples when we were able to stop American aggression. Something did not work out for us either to save Grenada, to drive the US fleet away from Vietnam, or to protect our valiant Gaddafi (in the 80s, of course). Our fleet has never participated directly in this local conflict. Yes, we landed troops in Egypt, but in the rear, west of Alexandria, so that the Israelis did not accidentally hit us with a bomb. We participated in the demining of the Suez Canal in Bangladesh, but after the conclusion of peace. On the rights of complete neutrality, escorted vessels in the Persian Gulf. And this is all that we were really capable of. Compare this with the US Navy. Well, where is the effectiveness of our fleet in local wars? Where is the vaunted deterrence? And what then restrained? It is known that. Strategic nuclear forces. It is worth recalling that it was not the pathetic attempts of our fleet, but the fear of a thermonuclear strike did not allow the seizure of our ships during the Caribbean crisis. So if anyone is given the Nobel Prize for Peace, it will be Oppenheimer and Kurchatov. It was their efforts that global war became meaningless. Otherwise, there would be no cold war, and we, unfortunately, would have analyzed the lessons of the third world war today, preparing for the fourth, if not the fifth.
WEAPONS OF AGGRESSION
Maxim Klimov devotes a significant part of his article to aircraft carriers. Where without them, damn it. I'll have to talk about them too, although I like the airships more.
My opponent begins a story about aircraft carriers with direct insults to my father and VP Cousin, calling them "the creators of the popular stories construction of an aircraft carrier fleet ". Klimov refers to the opinion of nameless specialists of an unnamed TsNII. It is called in the people OBS - "one grandmother said." So, this “grandma” declares: “As it later became obvious, the concepts of the ANC, 1160 and 1153, could not be correctly formed then due to the fact that an objective thesis was adopted as a fundamental postulate: during the construction of the USSR aircraft carrier should repeat what was done in the USA, approaching the characteristics of American aircraft carriers, as far as technical capabilities allow ... As a result, firstly, the domestic fleet for some reason had to solve the task of striking surface targets twice, as it were Stormtrooper deck again, and the second - missile "ship-to-ship."
Unlike Klimov, my father and his coauthor “held a candle” at the time of conception of at least the last three of our aircraft carriers - the Five, the Seven and the failed Eight. And they wrote about aircraft carriers back in the 90-e years, when the control bodies were not so fierce and some acting officers wrote in the marine journals, which at that time were very much in the maritime capital. And no one then called the story described by my father lubochnaya. The reason for the nonsense with a double strike (aircraft, and then - ships) was described by my father more than once or twice, and it is connected with the cover-up struggle around the birth of the Soviet aircraft carrier. I also wrote about this. Obviously, my opponent inattentively reads articles for which he writes reviews.
In short and in my transcription, the situation looked like this. The times were no longer GULAG, the people grew bolder and learned to grumble. The illegal “carrier party”, which at one time was headed by Rear Admiral B.A., was ripe, primarily in the depths of the 1 Central Research Institute. Kolyzaev. The members of the “party” (exactly how - we, probably, will no longer recognize), bypassing Gorshkov, managed to convey their ideas to the Minister of Defense Andrei Antonovich Grechko. The result of this was a memorable meeting on the approval of the 1160 project ship, when Grechko said: “Do not be clever, do it like at Nimitz.” And - oh, horror! - with his own hand he struck out all the anti-ship missiles from the armament of TAVKR, turning it into an aircraft carrier. Those present recalled that Gorshkov had just turned white. Being an experienced courtier (it’s no joke to sit around the four general secretaries), he never respected the opinions of his subordinates, but did not argue with his superiors and therefore resorted to hidden sabotage. He began to push the concept of a double strike, turning the idea of building an aircraft carrier into insanity, and at the same time extolled the developed “miracle weapon” called “Granit-Antey”, which, together with the “miracle” of Academician Yakovlev, supersonic VTOL, was to revolutionize in a sea battle.
When the miracle did not work and it became clear that the engineer, even if a member of the Communist Party, was not a magician, the “carrier party” again went for an attack and again, bypassing Gorshkov, went directly to the new defense minister, D.F. Ustinov. The latter, having familiarized himself with the colorful description of the infirmity of “Kiev” in 1981, ordered to start building aircraft carriers. Again, Gorshkov began to arm aircraft carriers with anti-ship missiles, and while he was in power, it was possible only to minimize this evil. So, on the 11435 project, he demanded to install 20 – 30 RCC, converged on 12; on the 11437 project - already 60 – 80 RCC, broken on 16. And only when Gorshkov left, they managed to agree on a project of a real aircraft carrier - the 11438 project, without a springboard and anti-ship missiles, but for obvious reasons they could not even lay it off. So it was not difficult to work out a normal concept of an aircraft carrier, if it had not interfered with Gorshkov.
KEYBOARD
In the last part of his article, Klimov no longer criticizes anyone, but explains how, from his point of view, the Soviet Navy should have been. Well, now I criticize him.
My opponent believes that it was necessary to develop long-range anti-ship missiles and arm the triad with them: submarines (submarines), surface ships (NK) and naval missile-carrying aircraft (MRA). The main role was to be played by the MRA, and success was achieved with a concentrated massive missile strike. Whoever is in the subject will immediately understand that Klimov invented the bicycle. Since his idea corresponds exactly to the views of Gorshkov. Despite Gorshkov's jealousy for the pilots and the insane love of submariners, he understood that the MPA in the fight against aircraft carriers was the queen. All the rest and do not pull on the boat. Therefore, more funds were spent on the MRA than on nuclear submarine missile cruisers (APRC). And the single blow was also worked out. At the same time, the problems of the P-700 and X-22 missiles, described by Klimov, had no effect on the concentrated strike, since the carriers did not launch missiles simultaneously, but according to the distance and flight time, so that the triad missiles fly up to the aircraft carrier at the same time. I wrote in detail about the triad and pointed out the main problem - the effective defense of the American aircraft carrier, which was never fully cracked. I described in detail what this is connected with, but Klimov, who had criticized me before, now simply doesn’t notice my words.
Also, my correspondent opponent singing the air defense aircraft carrier, which is also an old song, long ago rejected and recognized as erroneous. The fact is that Gorshkov did not want to admit that carrier aircraft do not need assistants and she alone can cope with the task without any triad, and therefore demanded that deck aircraft not in any way deal with percussion tasks, but only ensured domination in the air. The result was a stupid picture: the deck aviation was to seize air supremacy, after which, instead of hanging up the impact weapons, to finish off the US fleet deprived of air cover, our pilots had to sit down to drink tea. That is why while the Air Force was already equipped with multi-purpose aircraft (MiG-29), the Navy ordered itself only a single-purpose aircraft - Su-33, and only after Gorshkov’s resignation also decided to acquire a multi-purpose aircraft, but did not have time.
Once again, I am convinced that Maxim Klimov did not read my article well, on which he wrote a review. After all, I wrote not only about the problems of the triad, but also about the system of maritime space reconnaissance and target designation (MKRTS) with US-A and US-P satellites. If my opponent does not agree with my conclusions, then where is his refutation? Since he does not write, it means that he did not read again. If simply, the problem MKRTS looks like. Only very long-wave radar can be placed in a spacecraft. It can only detect an object no less than an aircraft carrier, and in a narrow sector against the horizon. The second problem: to classify the target - an aircraft carrier or a tanker - the radar could not. And if we add to this the low reliability, poor protection from interference, the high cost and danger of nuclear US-A, then it becomes clear why after Gorshkov’s resignation, the program was quickly turned off. Therefore, Klimov’s hopes that the MKRTS could have been “limited by DRLO” are not consistent. And his indication that there was nevertheless a certain person who could turn the MKRTS into DRLO, but unfortunately, the man died in 1981 and the work was forever stopped reminds of the famous story about the loss of the heather’s honey recipe the last medovar and repeat the recipe is beyond the power of any mortal.
Since Klimov finishes his article with the recipe of the correct Navy, then, according to the law of the genre, I will have to do the same. To cope with US aircraft carriers (and only the recipe for solving this problem gives Klimov), we must understand that the search for a cheap way to destroy aircraft carriers is akin to finding a workaround on the hundred-meter mark. There is no reception against scrap, so you have to construct the same scrap.
So, the first method (relevant since 70-ies): change the MRA. Before the advent of the Su-27, we could only take a number, so instead of the 200 of the Tu-22 / 22М aircraft, we acquired the 750 MiG-23. We work on refueling in the air from 250 Tu-16. We also attract Tu-126 for management and also 100 Tu-16 as RPC carriers. Long-range anti-ship missiles are not needed, since MiGs will cope with air cover, which means that anti-ship missiles will become lighter and one Tu-16 will take more missiles. Funds for the development of airfields are obtained by abandoning the construction of APRC and RKR. We get for the same money that was spent on the triad, the air hammer, which is guaranteed not to allow aircraft carriers closer than 1500 km. The main difference between this hammer and the triad is that it can act not only over the sea, but also over land, and, of course, freedom of maneuver between theater operations.
The second method (relevant with the advent of the MiG-29 and Su-27): we completely abandon the MRA and acquire the 960 decker aircraft and 120 tankers Il-78 for the released funds. Instead of building APRS and excessive SSBNs of the 941 project, we build 15 aircraft carriers. In addition, it is not necessary to build ships of escort, since the already large surface ships were sufficient at that time. The second method is more costly, but on the other hand, the country acquires a force instrument on any third world country, plus the fleet provides protection for SSBNs in patrol areas from US PLO aircraft. Carriers are divided between the Northern and Pacific fleets (six per fleet, plus three - in long-term repair). If we step on the Federation Council, aviation with the Pacific Fleet is being deployed near Murmansk and is used as a reinforcement of the deck aircraft of the Federation Council. At the same time, it is possible to deliver a joint strike at a depth of up to 2500 km with aircraft of the Northern Fleet (from aircraft carriers) and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet (from coastal airfields) that are refueled from IL-78. If the main strike is delivered by the Pacific Fleet, then we act in the same way, only fleets are interchanged. And, of course, deck aircraft can help the army, which is difficult for the APRC and RKR.
What will the Americans answer? They will have to spend money on strengthening aircraft in Norway and Japan and build additional aircraft carriers. That is, to spend much more money than in the case of confrontation with the triad. And since the Cold War is a special war and the main thing here is to exhaust the enemy, not starting a war, military and economic success is evident.
The third method (my favorite): according to the testament of Ostap Bender - we collect more saliva and spit in the direction of the American aircraft carriers. Then we roll up our sleeves and begin to restore order in the country. By putting things in order, I do not mean the Stalinist version and not the Andropov version, but the liberal one. But not according to Gorbachev, but according to Deng Xiaoping. Quietly we turn off the ideological and military confrontation and begin to measure economy, not quantity tanks. Then the Union would be preserved, and our economy would be at least second after the United States. Well, we can’t drown one aircraft carrier now, and what did they attack after the Crimea? Let them swim, the sea is common, we do not mind. We are a continental country, the main thing for us is the army and the Air Force, and the fleet is needed to protect economic waters from violators and so that banana states do not offend our ships. And for this, border ships and 3-4 aircraft carriers with 15-20 destroyers (frigates) of protection are needed, more is not necessary.
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