When the war is over
23 May as a result of an attack of unknowns killed the commander of the brigade "Ghost" Alex Mozgovoy. This winter, under similar circumstances, in the Luhansk People's Republic, the chief of staff of the 4 th brigade of the people's militia of the LPR, Alexander Bednov, aka Batman, was killed.
The reasons for the murder of the Brain have not yet been named. Various options were discussed - from the attack of the Ukrainian reconnaissance and sabotage group to the redistribution of power in the territory of the republic.
Similar events, as well as problems with humanitarian aid, the restoration of social and industrial infrastructure in the republics of Donbass, in the Pentagon’s governing documents (in particular, in the Concept of joint operations) are rated as “seriously destabilized situation”.
OS - what is it and why?
“Victory in the war is the achievement of political goals. To achieve these goals, it is necessary to win not only in combat operations, but also in stabilization operations, ”says the first paragraph approved in 2004 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense of the United States the Concept of the Joint Operations describing the so-called stabilization operations (OS ).
“The work of our advisers in Afghanistan has been rendered useless for the achievement of the political goals of the USSR”
OS is a complex of measures aimed at improving the humanitarian and social situation, restoring the infrastructure, and setting up the work of law enforcement officers and local authorities in the combat zone. The most important component of the OS is the maintenance of critical post-war political processes in society.
Stabilization operations are the next step behind the concept of a “war for minds and hearts” that existed earlier. But if “fighting for minds and hearts” the participants sought loyalty from the civilian population, then the OS is reformatting society in the post-war space in a way that is beneficial for the winner, which is mentioned in the first lines of the concept.
We are talking not only about cases of the introduction of regular military units (so-called white operations) into the territory of another state covered by the war, but also about those when the host country does not officially participate in the conflict, but provides assistance to one of the parties in in particular, with the help of military advisers and a contingent of special operations forces, conducting non-conventional military operations, also referred to as “gray”.
A good example of the second kind of OS is the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, when, under the control of the anti-Taliban leaders of the territory, the US military, in cooperation with the special services, not only provided humanitarian aid to the population, but also immediately established the work of the local government authorities who agreed to cooperate.
The stabilization operations involved not only the Pentagon, but also other agencies. Although the main work still falls on the military, in particular on the units related to the Command of the Special Operations of the US Army and civilian affairs units (Civil Affairs). But if the MUH is a humanitarian component, then the “force cover” is carried out by the military police, and in the conditions of non-conventional military operations, the military personnel of special purpose units and subunits.
The officers responsible for liaison with the civil administration organize the delivery of food and essential necessities to the local population, as well as rehabilitate the social infrastructure, and sometimes even conduct classes in schools. But still the main task of “humanitarian special forces” is to be advisors to representatives of local self-government bodies and politicians, to coordinate their actions.
Military police and special forces are organizing a “force cover”, not only protecting civilians, but also fighting enemy agents, preparing loyal law enforcement agencies, etc. In fact, for the time of the OS, the military police assume some of the functions of law enforcement officers - from investigating crimes before the dispersal of demonstrations and operations to free the hostages.
For example, from 2004 to 2005 the year before the newly formed Ministry of the Interior of Iraq in some regions of this country, members of the US military police, employees of the Criminal Investigation Command (CID), as well as “green berets” and “fur seals” attached to them "Remained the only law enforcement agencies.
But even after 2005, up to the very withdrawal of the American contingent, military police and special forces not only trained the Iraqi Interior Ministry employees, but also coordinated their work, if necessary, relying, as indicated in the Concept of the joint operations, on other security agencies.
The MUH servicemen continued to work with the Iraqi local authorities until 2009. In fact, all elections — state, regional, and even local — were organized, conducted, and also controlled by units and divisions for relations with the civil administration. It is noteworthy that the campaign materials were not only produced, but also developed by the battalions of psychological operations that are part of the structure of the US Special Operations Command.
Tactics "on the sly"
With the coming to power in the United States of Barack Obama, stabilization operations began to gradually shift to the so-called gray zone - so on the American military-political slang are called conflicts, where the US forces do not officially participate, but the special forces and the CIA secretly act. A good example of a “gray” conflict is the struggle in Yemen and Somalia with “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”.
Often declared by the US government stabilization operations, carried out within the framework of humanitarian aid, serve as a cover for the secret deployment of the American contingent, as was the case when the secret base was established in Yemen, and the CIA agents were being dropped into Pakistan during a natural disaster.
A striking example of a “gray” OS is the fight against the Islamic underground in the Philippines, where American special forces and intelligence officers first killed militants and trained local military, but later began to actively assist the government in rebuilding local authorities, as well as in working with people in areas most sympathize with Islamic terrorists.
But if the Philippine stabilization operation can be called successful, then the attempt to start the OS in Libya immediately after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime ended in complete failure. CIA officers and military personnel who served as political advisers to the Libyan field commanders were urgently evacuated after the seizure of the American consulate and the death of the US ambassador. As experts now admit, the failure of the stabilization operation in Libya was in many ways the cause of a bloody civil war.
The American OS failed in Somalia. After the withdrawal of the US military contingent from this weakened continuous war of the country, the growth of radical movements immediately began there. Tired of the gangs of warlords, the local population actively came out in support of the Islamists, and soon almost the entire territory of the state passed under their control, and al Qaeda followed.
In order to fight the Somali followers of Osama bin Laden, the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command began not only the physical elimination of the militant leaders, but also the OS on the territory controlled by the opponents of the Islamists. In particular, American intelligence officers tried to create local governments, to improve the humanitarian situation. But the incompetence of field commanders, as well as the clear support of the population of their opponents, led to the failure of this “gray” stabilization operation.
We can learn, we can teach
For the first time, the concept of “stabilization operations” in the Armed Forces of Russia began to be discussed in 2012 with the suggestion of Army General Nikolai Makarov, then Chief of the General Staff. In particular, translated American documents on the conduct of the OS appeared in the central military administration, scientific research work was opened. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation had serious experience in conducting “white” stabilization operations, including in Afghanistan, as well as on the territory of rebellious Chechnya.
True, the Afghan epic cannot be considered generally successful. For example, civilian employees from various city, district, and sometimes regional CPSU committees were involved as advisers to the local administration. These specialists were often unable to adequately assess what was happening, had a poor understanding of the socio-cultural characteristics of the territory. The local population was supplied with food and necessities through the civil administration and the military, and there was no single coordination center; therefore, in many respects, such work from the point of view of stabilization operations was useless to achieve the political goals of the USSR.
But the experience of Chechnya, according to representatives of the Ministry of Defense, who are familiar with the development of the concept of Russian OS, was assessed by experts as positive and it was proposed to be developed in every possible way.
In particular, hostilities continued in the republic, but the restoration of the social infrastructure had already begun, humanitarian aid was distributed, and cash payments began.
Before the advent of local law enforcement agencies, military commandant's offices acted on the territory controlled by the federal forces, as well as temporary police departments staffed by officers from other regions. Not only local governments were created, but also district and even republican administrations, where employees and leaders from other regions of Russia acted as advisers.
“But Chechnya is a subject of the Russian Federation, Interior Ministry officials, civilian advisers from other regions were sent there, the Emergencies Ministry deployed for local hospitals, carried humanitarian aid. And the conflict itself lasted more than one year. And for example, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, this experience was almost never used. What is the legal status of a Russian adviser to the head of a local village? And will he be ready to be in a combat zone? Moreover, when time is limited and all the work is done from the wheels, ”an officer of one of the departments of the Ministry of Defense, who is familiar with the problem, explains the situation.
It is clear that the participation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in non-conventional military operations makes it absolutely impossible to involve civilian specialists, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Emergency Situations and other departments in stabilization operations. “It was already clear then that in order to solve problems in“ gray ”conflicts, it was necessary to build the same system as the Americans. And it's not even about any Afghanistan. Look at what is happening now, as we were then told, to a “friendly” Ukraine, ”said the interlocutor of the Military Industrial Courier.
True, the development of the Russian Concept of Stabilization Operations did not advance further than the analysis of the American guiding documents, and after the resignation of Nikolai Makarov, they stopped altogether.
In the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, there was not even the concept of OS, when the 130-I separate motorized rifle brigade (special) deployed in Moscow appeared in the structure of the formed military police, which was to become a model for the formation of other similar military units.
It should be noted that the leadership of the Ministry of Defense justified the increased requirements for manning the 130 omsbr (c) personnel, as well as the presence of snipers and psychological operations specialists in its structure with the possible participation in stabilization operations. It is noteworthy that the commander of the brigade was appointed previously serving in one of the special purpose centers of the Defense Ministry, Hero of Russia, Colonel Alexei Galkin. It was assumed that the 130-I brigade was to participate in the OS, similar to the fighting in Chechnya and in Afghanistan, that is, in the "white" stabilization operations. Unfortunately, the 130-I ombr (c) is now disbanded.
One victory is not enough
"The participation of Russian soldiers in the fighting in the south-east of Ukraine" - one of the most discussed topics in the media. Especially now, when in the captivity of the Ukrainian side there are two citizens of Russia - Yevgeny Yerofeev and Alexander Alexandrov, according to the Ukrainian side, who are servicemen of special forces units of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate.
One cannot deny that in the current situation Russia needs to take certain actions to protect its territory in the south, and not only from Ukrainian shelling.
During the conflict in Novorossia, according to the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation, illegal transportation weapons, not to mention the various smuggling in both directions, turned into a continuous stream. The deterioration of the crime situation in the regions of our country bordering on the south-east of Ukraine is not excluded. Admittedly, fighting in the Donbass is a serious destabilizing factor, the impact of which must be stopped immediately.
If we turn to the American Concept of Stabilization Operations, what is happening now in the south-east of Ukraine can be transferred to the OS plane in non-conventional hostilities, when the hidden participation of the Russian side would not only alleviate the humanitarian situation, but also ensure a normal political situation in the southeast. not allowing the sharing of power leading to the killings.
Are the Russian military ready, if such a team arrives, to conduct a stabilization operation? Or will the experience of Afghanistan and Chechnya repeat, when will you have to recruit civilian specialists, police officers and do everything from the wheels?
Stabilization operations, as indicated in the American concept, is the second component of the victory over the enemy.
Until recently, it was believed that the American contingent, led by General David Petraeus, was able to militarily defeat Iraqi terrorist fighters, as well as create loyal law enforcement agencies capable of maintaining order in the country and capable local authorities.
True, with the beginning of the invasion of militants under the black flags of the Islamic State, various analyzes and studies on success in Iraq were immediately forgotten. Moreover, in modern work on the situation in the Middle East, experts admit that the Pentagon was able to militarily defeat the enemy in 2006 – 2008 years, but, alas, did not succeed in stabilizing the situation, despite all the resources attracted and the money invested.
The goal — the maintenance of critical post-war political processes — was never achieved, nor were effective national law enforcement agencies. Therefore, already in the first battles, not only individual local residents, but also towns and villages in full force, switched over to the ISIL. And in most cases they did it voluntarily.
The current situation in Iraq proves that without a successful stabilization of the situation, victory could not be achieved. The enemy was defeated, but after a few years the war broke out with a new force, with even worse consequences, which could not be stopped in the near future.
The American experience in Iraq, as well as the "gray" stabilization operations in the Philippines and Somalia, superimposes very well on the situation in New Russia. The Ukrainian side can be crushed by force of arms, but without the subsequent stabilization and creation of a stable political, social and humanitarian situation advantageous for Russia, the conflict will recur in a few years with a new force, seriously threatening Russia's national security.
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