On the possible tactics of the Russians in Tsushima (detailed commentary)
Not even feuilleton, but rather an epic. The legend is. A collection of gossip on a given topic. He himself was frightened, and he was disgraced for the readers of this opus. After all, there is why. The author is not a childish person. What is there just not!
1. Terrible 305-mm high-explosive "suitcases" nicknamed "furosiki." Natural vandervaflya. At the very end of the opus it is, in plain text, and written. I read a little heart attack. Myocardium. That’s what I think they thought up, parasites. What a scary dirty lime decided. And read it, calmed down. It is quite normal mines. Nothing scary and unusual. Is that not Russian-made, British, so the corps were of high quality. The Japanese indulged in such homemade substitutes for the whole war. And nothing. Without visible success. They actually caused them more harm than the enemy.
The author, of course, doesn’t know that the "scary furoseks" could seriously pinch a semi-armored ship. It was even possible to drown the citadel battleship overloaded with full displacement. But it is impossible to cause serious damage to the armadillo of a complete reservation. Even overloaded. Therefore, on "furosiki", if you really want, you can write off "Oslabyu". True, for this you first have to prove that he was overloaded. And to do it will be oh how difficult. There is simply no data to talk about this. Oslyabya was loaded beyond the normal displacement. But within the full. Consequently, there was no overload. There was no overload, so there was an armor-piercing projectile. The logical chain is very simple, even primitive.
But "Suvorov", "Borodino" and "Alexander" on furoshiki will not work in any way. Under no circumstances. Only armor piercing. And the point. This is also true of the famous network gossip that the Japanese almost did not shoot armor-piercing. Nonsense, of course. On a serious level, there is nothing to discuss.
2. Next come the terrible Orchelian "death rays". Although not. It is not from here. They frightened us in other places. The same "historically accurate."
3. Further, the author pleased us with messages about an experienced naval commander of Togo. No, it's in the Russian style - to call experienced someone is not too lazy. And also brilliant. You begin to clarify what is genius, where did you gain experience and in general, what fleets commanded opponents either silent or swearing. Weighty "arguments", you will not say anything.
The author does not remember in which battles participated "experienced naval commander of Togo"? I remember only the battle in the Yellow Sea. Which Togo stupidly missed. But he was lucky: after the rather accidental death of Admiral Vitgeft, “gentlemen officers” (or rather, senior officers) in a panic fled in different directions, like cockroaches from dichlorvos. Demonstrated, so to speak, high morale. On this squadron actually ceased its inglorious existence. But the merit of Togo personally as a naval commander here is minimal. The title “experienced naval commander” should have been awarded to anonymous Japanese artilleryman. So it would be fairer.
And I have not yet dealt with the second “Japanese genius,” Kamimura, who distinguished himself in the Korean Strait. He demonstrated his lack of talent in all its glory.
4. Further, the author cites a very funny "table of armor penetration." I do not know where he took it. But I very much suspect that I made it at home, on my knee. With the help of the most common accounting calculator. The table is clearly compiled by a man who in artillery does not understand anything. The first thing that frankly pleased us was the armor penetration at a distance of 00 KB. This is a fairy tale, not a column.
Further. The parity of Russian and Japanese 305-mm guns is listed as ~ 19 kbt. In fact, this indicator is ~ 11 kbt. There is no 305 / 35 and 305 / 30 Russian guns in the table. Probably because their armor penetration is somehow not kosher. Immediately get out of registry and fraud. After all, at a distance of 40 KBT. The armor penetration of the Russian 305 / 35 cannons Navarina was slightly less (!!!) than the lightweight 254 / 45 Brbo guns. In fact, from the point of view of ballistics, “Navarin” was armed not with sea, but with large-caliber field guns of the Civil Code (4 units). At least at the time of Tsushima, this was exactly the case. And in the same conditions, the armor penetration of the 305 / 30 of the “Nicholas I” cannons was slightly more than the 203 / 45 of the Garibaldi cannons. From the point of view of ballistics, the guns of the Nikolai I GC were large-caliber field howitzers (2 pieces). Those. in fact, in fact, they were not even cannons. These are the “powerful tools of the Russian EDB” drew. In general, they do not like to be singled out during the calculations, they all think in a crowd. 305 mm, which means 305 mm. Yeah. Fedot, but not the same. But here we will not stop, it's flowers.
Then we immediately run into the fact that the 254 / 45 data of the Russian Brbo cannons are not given. Apparently, them. Because only they were weaker than the Kassugi 254 / 45 cannon. And they were 11, and more powerful, on Oslyab, the entire 4. There was only one Japanese, but its data (I didn’t check its accuracy) is in the table. The compiler of the table of such details (about Russian guns) clearly did not know.
But that's not all. The compiler of the table is clearly not aware that 203 / 40 guns (24 pieces) were on the eslvik, the Frenchman and the German. And only on the Garibaldians were 203 / 45 guns of the new generation (6 pcs.). Both of these types were noticeably more powerful than the Russian 203 / 45 guns (oh, but they were not at all at Tsushima). But they are in the table. And the eight-inch type (203 / 40) most common in the NEF is not in the table.
No, and 229 / 35 Russian guns (4 pcs.). But in fact, there is nothing special to mention there, at a distance of 40 KBT. these guns were even weaker than the Russian guns 203 / 45. Which in themselves were weak enough.
For the future, the author Kolobov, when he draws the following “full” table, I want to note that there was another type of Japanese eight-inch frame on the Japanese BPC, and also 203 / 40. But weakened, not like at DBK.
Laughter is a comparison of Japanese and Russian six-inch. In the Kolobov table, the Russian six-inch ones are better than the Japanese all the way. In fact, it is not. And so it could not be. DE a little more from Russian guns. But the shell is noticeably heavier in Japanese. Without any ballistics and ballistic coefficients, it is clear that as the distance increases, the light body will lose to the heavy one. This is elementary physics. In the Kolobov table this is not even close. In fact, parity was advancing on 40 kbts. Before this distance, Russian guns were more powerful, then Japanese ones.
In addition, the author of the table traditionally "forgot" another type of Japanese six-inch. This time garibaldians. Their 152 / 45 guns (28 units) were noticeably more powerful than all the other six-inch guns.
This is the strange table the author is trying to give us. The fact that the numbers are far from real, I will not even specifically write. This is so clear.
5. Then the author begins to gossip (that’s) about the tasks of calibers on the battleships. Having called some "theorists of those times" to be witnesses (and I can even call them nicknames in various forums), the author begins to follow the precepts of these "theorists". A little bit more, and the author will surprise us with a “discovery” at about this level - “the main weapons tank The Tiger was not at all an 88 mm gun mounted in a tower. The main were two machine guns, exchange rate and coaxial with a gun. " However, the 152-mm guns on the EDB performed the tasks of those same tank machine guns. And here is the problem of quick wits: what were the goals for these “machine guns”?
6. Further, the author demonstrates a lack of understanding in the field of types of armadillos in terms of their booking. He is not at all interested in their defense against GK guns. He is mainly interested in their protection from "machine guns". The conclusions of the authors are ridiculous already because he compares the ships for some kind of "protection against rapid-fire medium-caliber artillery." And, the funny thing is, he makes a very pretentious conclusion that "only 4 battleships of the Borodino type possessed protection — the other eight were vulnerable."
The fact that EVERYTHING, I repeat, EVERYTHING, the Japanese armadillos were not the armadillos of a continuous reservation on the overhead line, and NO ONE of them grunted from the artillery fire, does not bother the author at all. And of the four “Borodino-type battleships,” the same ones, with uninterrupted armoring on the high-voltage lines, seemed to be invulnerable, three grunted from artillery fire. No, I understand that the "Suvorov" was finished off by torpedoes. But he grunted even before this, and it was from the artillery fire.
About the "antidote." Is it not embarrassing that it is only the French who indulged in such “antidotes” for export to the underdeveloped countries at that time? And the British did not indulge, the British built normal powerful ships. The French are “smart guys for export”, and the British (Germans, Italians) are fools?
Then comes the song: "Accountant, my dear accountant." It becomes clear that Kolobov is not an artilleryman. He is an accountant. That would write about the annual balance sheets and reports to the FIU and the FSS. Why write about artillery? Counting "machine guns" is an exciting experience, of course. But the real artillery of the EBR (GC) is here to do with it?
This is followed by a final revelation from the "theorists of those times." It sounds like this: "... the meaning of six-inch artillery consisted in the destruction of the unarmored parts of the battleship at short distances of combat." All this is the apotheosis. There is nothing to comment on. A person signs that he does not understand elementary things. No, after all, an accountant needs about money. It will somehow harmoniously turn out.
7. Further tactical considerations follow from our author. What are they talking about? The fact that the person is "not in the subject." And not only in the field of artillery. But also in the field of ballet (probably). And besides this, in the field of navigation. He does not understand that the tactic of a ship (group of ships) that does not have the advantage in speed is very simple. To spin like in a skillet and prevent the more high-speed opponent from doing his work. Everything. No more tasks and there can not be. Because there is no speed for that. Kolobov does not understand this. Rozhestvensky understood. Therefore, no "pre-orders" did not give, except for one. I thought, apparently, that along the way he would be guided and commanded. But for some reason he did not command. Perhaps, indeed, the injury did not allow. But then why did not he transfer command to anyone else?
A punching bag, hanging in the gym, tactics to anything. Let her boxer develops it. And he will determine the distance. The initiative is completely in his hands, no need to fantasize.
8. The author mocked me with the phrase "armored forehead" of the newest ships of the Borodino type. A rather exotic name for floating buckets with nuts. The author calls "to substitute them under fire 305-mm guns of the Japanese." We all know that at Tsushima it was so. And how much time these "armored foreheads" lasted on the surface is also known. But the author persistently urges them to substitute.
The author and other “Tsushima analysts” need to understand one very simple thing for themselves. The results of Tsushima and the battle in the Yellow Sea turned out to be completely different (in the sense of losing ships) for one extremely simple reason. The 4 (as many as four !!!) electronic boosters of various levels took part in the battle in the LMF from the RIF side. Some of them were too old, but they were ADB. And there were two buckets with nuts. When Tsushima on the part of the RIF was a mass of buckets with nuts with the same name. But there was not a single EDB. All ships were domestic production. And this is an extremely sad fact. Now I won’t even dwell on the exotic for Borodintsky reservation scheme ships of that era, which the French slipped and ate mugs (and maybe even corrupt officials who know them) from under the spitz. Many “analysts” of the inferiority of the scheme (and especially its Russian execution) of the “Borodino residents” are given out for their supposed advantage. Without going into discussions, I’ll just note that for all history “Technically and technologically advanced Russian military shipbuilding” of those years, the entire 2 (two) ship was built, which could be called the EBR. It is an old born (but not outdated from birth, like its systerships) XBUM-class “Poltava” electronic library. And thanks to the abundance of imported components. And the old from birth (but not outdated from birth, like its sisterships) XBUM-class Victory EHR. This one is on the domestic element base. Everything. More EBRD was not built, although attempts continued periodically. T.N. "Borodino" also applies.
I do not touch the level of crew training. This is a subjective category: how many people, so many opinions. I'm more on the part of objectivity. It’s not really possible to argue here - there’s nothing.
As for the "breakthrough in Vladivostok." I agree with the initial promise of the author: why was he needed, this breakthrough? What was there to do in Vladivostok? What the hell is there?
But if there was no way out, and I had to go, then I had to go in two groups at the same time. One, more valuable, "northern route", bypassing Tsushima. The second, "zamanushny", through Tsushima. The day and hour of approaching the straits should be coordinated and synchronized. Who watched the movie "No way back," he will understand what they mean. As soon as Togo was covering the “zamanushny” detachment, he immediately had to surrender. Maybe open the kingston. Floating litter did not represent any value. The main thing was to save people.
Togo could somehow figure out the essence of the matter and leave Tsushima north to intercept the main detachment. Then the excellent chances of a breakthrough appeared at the "enticing" detachment. After all, the Japanese 203-mm guns of Elsvik, German and French were powerless against large armored ships. True, it is not clear what was the strength of the 203-mm guns of the Garibaldi. But I do not think that they were seriously more effective. And the 254 mm Kasuga gun was just one.
On the RIF side was the fact that Togo had the entire 4 ship to intercept large armored vessels. And with these ships, he had to ripen in two places at the same time. This would have been impossible only if he had not decided to divide his linear forces. Two ships to Tsushima and 2 ships to the north. Then ... Ie the repetition of Tsushima. But this is only if decided. And if not, and it would most likely be, then one detachment would surrender. And the second would be guaranteed.
But for this it was necessary from the very beginning to realize that there is no chance. And it was fu as unpatriotic. Therefore, it was necessary to start from the beginning. With awareness of the meaning of the word "patriotism". And to separate it from the "leaven patriotism."
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