Belgrade model

July 10 2015 1

27 May –2 June 1955, First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev was on a visit to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRY). As a result of the visit, the “Belgrade Declaration” was signed, which was the long-awaited normalization of relations between the USSR and the FNRY.

A year later, in June, the Yugoslav President, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, visited Moscow. Now both sides have already signed the "Moscow Declaration", which has become an important step towards the establishment of relations, which, as it seemed earlier, were hopelessly corrupted.

The normalization itself turned out to be possible after the death of I.V. Stalin and the overthrow in 1954 of the political Olympus of Yugoslavia Milovan Dzhilasa - "liberal" communist and one of the most ardent critics of the USSR.
Djilas was for a long time an associate of Tito, and in 1953, he was made vice president of Yugoslavia. And here he suddenly began to criticize the practice of socialist construction, not only in the USSR, but also in his own country. The Borba newspaper (the official organ of the Yugoslav Communists) published a series of his articles in which he attacked the "Stalinist methods" of the FNRY leadership. Djilas condemned the one-party system and demanded the introduction of a multi-party system. In addition, he advocated "independent justice."

For a time, the Yugoslav leadership tolerated criticism of Djilas, but it was too sharp. The vice-president even put forward the concept that a certain ruling class was formed in the country.

In the end, Djilas was removed from all posts, but he was left in the party. From there, he left himself - in March 1954. And in December, the disgraced communist gave an interview to the New York Times. He stated that Yugoslavia had become a totalitarian country, ruled by reactionaries. After such a demarche, he was sentenced to probation. And in 1956, Djilas was already planted for real, for three years. Moreover, what is very characteristic is for the condemnation of the Soviet military-political operation in Hungary. The fall of Djilas in the Kremlin was perceived as a good sign, because it was he who was responsible for the ideological substantiation of Tito’s rightness in his conflict with Stalin.

However, even after his shift, the attitude towards the Yugoslav leadership continued to remain negative. It was officially announced that the "Tito clique" decided to shift Djilas only under the "pressure of workers". There were different opinions about Yugoslavia (skeptical about the prospects for reconciliation, in particular, VM Molotov), and the leadership did not immediately decide on this issue. Still, for example, in July 1954, the Soviet official organ stated: “Having examined the materials relating to stories the rupture of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with the communist and workers' parties, as well as the subsequent withdrawal of the Yugoslavs from the commonwealth of people's democracy, the CPSU Central Committee believes that the leading core of the CPY undoubtedly allowed serious deviations from Marxism-Leninism during that period, slipping into bourgeois nationalism and opposed the Soviet Union. The leaders extended their unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union to the countries of people's democracy, to which they were arrogant before the break, demanding recognition of the special status of the CPU ... ”

Khrushchev and Tito: normalization

However, everything changed in a matter of days. Already in August 1954, Khrushchev wrote a letter to Tito, in which he suggested starting negotiations on normalization. Tito approved this initiative, but put forward a number of conditions. Moscow was asked to dissolve the Communist and Workers' Party Information Bureau (Kominform, Comintern’s light version), stop interfering in Yugoslav affairs, reject criticism of the Yugoslav model of socialism, and recognize that the conflict between the two countries is not the work of L.P. Beria, but has deep roots. Moreover, Khrushchev was required to begin to eliminate the consequences of the “wrong” Stalinist policy — then, they say, everything normalizes by itself. In addition, Tito said that the meeting of leaders is still undesirable.

The Yugoslav leader spoke with Khrushchev from a position of strength, Nikita Sergeevich was demanded to repent, to change his foreign and domestic policy. And Khrushchev came to terms with this, in fact, an ultimatum. He even paid Yugoslavia something like compensation — the USSR forgave her debts and provided new loans.
The result was a paradox: the Soviet leadership tried to make amends to “Yugoslavia” for putting pressure on it, but it did it all in the same orderly mode. This caused dissatisfaction with the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor (APT), the first secretary of its Central Committee Enver Hoxha wrote about this: “When the decision was made to condemn the anti-Marxist activities of the Yugoslav leadership, we were not in the Information Bureau. However, Stalin, the CPSU (b) and the party members of the Information Bureau many times consulted with us. They did this not only in accordance with Leninist norms, which require a broad and detailed exchange of views, but also because we had extensive experience in practical contacts with the Yugoslav leadership during and after the war. In particular, on this occasion, I met incognito with Vyshinsky in Bucharest in the presence of Dej (Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. - A.E.). The numerous and indisputable facts of the treacherous activities of the Yugoslav leadership presented by me at this meeting were highly appreciated by Vyshinsky and Dej. This once again shows how carefully and wisely the political decisions of the Information Bureau and Stalin were prepared. The Khrushchevites, who now hypocritically and falsely claim that Stalin ignored the most elementary norms of relations between the parties, are really behaving irresponsibly and arrogantly with the fraternal parties, ignoring their opinions, making decisions on their behalf behind their backs. ” ("Khrushchev").

Of course, it would be a great exaggeration to believe that the de-Stalinization of the USSR (which began in the same order of magnitude) was imposed by the leadership of Yugoslavia. But its demands played a role: Khrushchev began to “correct” Stalinist politics, as was demanded of him. In 1956, the XNUMXth Congress of the CPSU was held, at which the "cult of personality of Stalin" was exposed. After this, fermentation began in pro-Soviet Eastern Europe. In Poland, Vladislav Gomulka came to power, having previously received a term precisely as a “titoist”. The country was shaken, and in Moscow they decided to start a military operation. However, the Polish army expressed its readiness to offer all kinds of resistance to any attempts to resolve the situation through Soviet tanks. And in Moscow they backtracked: Khrushchev was very, very far from Stalin “exposed” by him.

And then, and much more seriously, shaken Hungary. A powerful anti-communist action flared up there, in which various forces took part. Quite a few were extreme right-wing, reactionary, pro-Nazi elements, enjoying the full protection of Western intelligence agencies. But tens of thousands of workers who oppose the bureaucratic deformation of socialism actively participated in the protest. Inspired by the Yugoslav example of “self-managed” socialism, they created workers' councils that took the fate of enterprises into their own hands. However, there was no talk about any restoration of capitalism. So, on November 14 of 1956, the Workers Council of Greater Budapest decided: “The social form of Hungary will be a social system based on the prohibition of exploitation (socialism), which specifically means ... maintaining 1945 land reform with the maximum investment in 20 – 40 holdes, ... maintaining nationalization mines, banks and heavy industry, public ownership of factories based on worker self-government and providing workers with enterprise shares or profits, complete freedom of a private or cooperative entrepreneur stva with guarantees secured by the prohibition of exploitation ... ".

Khrushchev was extremely frightened, because ideas of self-managed socialism could penetrate into the USSR.
He decided to enlist the support of Tito. For two days, Khrushchev led secret negotiations with the marshal in his residence, on the island of Brioni. There, he cried in his waistcoat, stressing that the people began to talk - "under Stalin, this was not." And Tito agreed to turn out to be Moscow with limited support, but at the same time he allowed the Hungarian prime minister, "reformer" Imre Nagy, to hide in the Yugoslav embassy. There he received guarantees of immunity from the Soviet authorities, left the territory of the embassy and was immediately captured, and two years later shot. Such treachery angered Tito, a black cat ran between him and Khrushchev.

New aggravation

Khrushchev "thanked" Marshal Tito for his support in a very peculiar way - about the same as Marshal Zhukov. He launched a powerful ideological campaign against "Yugoslav revisionism." This decision was taken at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU 24 on April 1958. There they concluded that the criticism should be real, but the tone should be maintained "comradely", specific individuals will not be affected. (Later, other Communist Parties were set on Yugoslavia.) The chief ideologist of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M.A. Suslov, who accused the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia (UCC) of excessive ambitions. In addition, Yugoslavia was criticized for “conciliation” in relation to American imperialism (ironically, the Soviet Union at that time made efforts to come closer to the leadership of the United States).

The position of the SKYU was subjected to public and very harsh criticism at the XXI Congress of the CPSU (January 27 - February 5 1959) Then Khrushchev said bluntly: "The Yugoslav leaders opposed the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of the Communist and 1957 Workers' Parties with their revisionist program in which they led an attack on the Marxist-Leninist positions of the international communist movement. " Yugoslav "revisionists were accused of denying the need for international" class solidarity. " The attacks on the "non-alignment", taken by Tito. Khrushchev remarked that he was “thoroughly smacked of the spirit of the American monopolies that feed up“ Yugoslav socialism ”. Already later, the final verdict was rendered, in the program of the ICU they found “the most complete embodiment of the ideology of revisionism”

Khrushchev’s particular anger was caused by the fact that the leaders of the FNRY “dissolve all speculation about the alleged differences between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. As the Russian proverb says, “a hungry cuma has bread on her mind.” Revisionists seek disagreement between our communist parties, but their illusory hopes are doomed to failure. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) ... You can say to the Yugoslav revisionists: do not look for cracks where there are none. Apparently, you want to encourage yourself and mislead the Yugoslav people by speculating that there are disagreements not only between us and you, but also allegedly between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Will not work. You do not see this as your ears. (Animation. Applause.) The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party are doing everything to strengthen the friendship between the two great socialist countries. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) ”.

Well, it will take quite a bit of time, and the two countries will quarrel, and thoroughly. And the words of Khrushchev will be another example of his idle talk and bragging.
A new break in relations, however, did not happen. Both sides merely quarreled with each other ... And in 1963, Khrushchev even visited Yugoslavia. Tito was well-disposed, but Nikita Sergeevich was inclined to controversy. So, the Soviet leader showed great interest in the system of workers' councils.

“At first, he seemed intent on proving that this system was inefficient:“ Every worker wants more. He says give me more money. The director says that he needs more money for investments, otherwise their production will be unprofitable. ” Plant management explained to Khrushchev that such views are outdated. Many workers' councils agreed to make very large investments in the hope that it would pay off handsomely, and even made a temporary reduction in wages below the established minimum. The main problem faced by the workers' council was the requirement of local authorities to invest all their money within the given region, without worrying about whether it was beneficial from an economic point of view. After visiting Rakovica, Khrushchev ambiguously remarked that the Yugoslav workers' councils were already "not the same as they were ten years ago." (Richard West. "Josip Broz Tito. The Power of Power").

Socialism with a Yugoslav face

Now is the time to talk about what, after all, was the Belgrade model, which so irritated Moscow. In June 1950, the FNRY adopted the “Basic Law on the Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations on the part of labor collectives.” According to it, all state-owned enterprises were owned by the whole people, but they were directly managed by labor groups electing the workers council, which, in turn, elected a management committee. The head of the enterprise was a director who was responsible both to the management committee and to the economic bodies of the state Twa.

The latter went through large-scale decentralization, management and planning functions were gradually transferred from the all-Yugoslav center to the field. In the end, the sectoral ministries in general abolished, their functions were assumed by the local authorities, as well as by special sectoral associations of enterprises - the chambers of commerce. Nevertheless, the state retained control over the economy through the financial and credit system. Planning was also preserved, although it was substantially modified. Now the prerogative of the state was to establish the principal directions of economic development, the definition of general proportions. But specific planning tasks were compiled by the workers' councils. Enterprises built direct, “horizontal” ties with each other, switched to self-supporting basis. From uniform, established by the state, prices passed to prices “economic”, formed in the conditions of the free market.

Now the main indicator of economic efficiency was income. Each company was obliged to create a special fund for contributions to the state (55% of income), the state itself had 3 / 4 of all savings. The fund of the enterprise was 45%, and part of its funds could be used for various needs, including for the purpose of salary increase. (In 1965, a new management reform began, during which the fund of enterprises already made 2 / 3.) In addition, enterprises could independently enter the external market, but only under state control.

At the same time there were changes in the political sphere. The decentralization of economic management coincided with the strengthening of the regime of personal power of Tito, for this was introduced the institution of the presidency. But the Council of Ministers was liquidated, instead of it, the Federal Executive Council began to function - the body of the Yugoslav Parliament (Assembly). At the VI Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPU), it was renamed the Union of Communists, which reflected the new realities. The Yugoslav leadership acknowledged that the party should not be a kind of parallel structure directly governing state and economic activities. Later, Tito himself admitted that such a radical conclusion was dealt a severe blow to the party. Indeed, in 1960 – 1970s, supporters of the liquidation of the party as such have become very active in the SKYU. Then a variety of antisocialist elements — especially nationalist — sharply intensified. I had to clean the batch and strengthen centralization.

In 1963, the country became known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), and in 1974, its new Constitution was adopted. (At the same time, Tito was elected president without any time limit for the mandate, for special merit).

One of the most important features was the fact that elections to all authorities were held on a multi-stage basis, and they started from the enterprises.
There was such a concept as “the main organizations of the association of labor” (LLC), they were lower basic labor (production, etc.) cells that existed within the framework of larger associations. Special attention was paid to local, territorial self-government, the basic role of the community was spelled out in the country's Constitution. Article 116-I read: “The community is a self-governing, basic social and political community based on the power and self-government of the working class and all working people. Within the community, workers and citizens create and provide conditions for their life and work, guide social development, exercise and harmonize their interests, satisfy common needs, exercise power and manage other public affairs. ”

The striking similarity with the ideas of the Russian maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries is striking. The transformation of the Communist Party into the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia itself is characteristic, demanding to focus exclusively on ideological and political work. The Maximalists, too, saw themselves precisely as the Union, but not the party — the Union of Socialist Revolutionary Maximalists. They also sought to make the real motto “Factory work!” Real. They insisted that "government" is just an organ of the elected Soviets.

So in Yugoslavia, the Federal Executive Council was created - instead of the liquidated Council of Ministers. Thanks to planned market socialism, the Yugoslav economy showed a thirty-year high growth. The level of welfare was quite high, the shops are full of a variety of goods. But there were many “black spots”. So, there was unemployment in the country, about a million Yugoslavs were forced to go to work in capitalist countries. Imports exceeded exports, the country became the largest debtor, only in 1965 - 1976 years external debt increased from 1 billion to 7 billion dollars, and over the next four years the debt was already 20 billion. They tried to find a way out of many problems by increasing the prices of manufactured products, due to this 90% of income was provided, whereas only 10% was achieved by increasing labor productivity.

If in the USSR everything slowed down and ruined bureaucratic supercentralism, then they went to the SFRY at the other extreme. They did not use the possibilities of nationwide planning. The state plan was not coordinated with the plans of enterprises and was, in fact, of a recommendatory nature. The country and the common market were torn apart by localities of all kinds, group interests came to the fore. The competition between enterprises was too fierce, and this led to a constant increase in inequality between economic units. The way out could be found in the combination of centralism and independence, indicativeness and directivity. But this required, firstly, a conceptual strategy and, secondly, a powerful scientific and technical base. However, there was neither one nor the other. (By the way, in Yugoslavia they didn’t spend much on the development of science). Both in politics and in the economy, frank voluntarism was widespread.

Modest friendship

When L.I. Brezhnev, Moscow did, reluctantly, recognize the right of Yugoslavia to its model of socialism - all the more so since it was somewhat corrected to the Soviet side, so to speak. Although there were still echoes of the old dispute over the military-political operation of the USSR in Czechoslovakia (“tanks are moving around Prague”). Tito himself was very sympathetic to the Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek and his reforms.

Shortly before the introduction of troops, Tito visited Czechoslovakia, where he met with a warm welcome, and approved the transformations, although he stressed that we must constantly fear the threat of German revanchism. (The Marshal was a visionary: the position of a united Germany played a fatal role in the history of Yugoslavia.)
Belgrade was shocked by the action of the USSR, and Tito strongly condemned her. Moreover, he declared his readiness to resist possible “aggression”. And then the marshal enlisted the support of the leader of socialist Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu. They met twice - 24 August and 4 September - on a common border. (Ceausescu himself was a supporter, albeit a critical one, of Dubcek, and also carried out reforms designed to create and strengthen the system of worker self-government). Then in the USSR for the last time they attacked the Yugoslav "revisionists", but without the former enthusiasm.

And in 1970-e began a solid "going to visit." In the 1971 year, Brezhnev visited Belgrade, and then Tito made as many as two return visits - in 1972 and 1973. Then they very fruitfully communicated during the Helsinki Conference (1975 year) and the Meeting of the Communist Parties of Europe (1976 year). In 1976, Tito again visited Moscow, and a year later Brezhnev was visiting Belgrade. The relations between the leaders were splendid, which was greatly helped by their personal goodwill towards each other.

Tito tried to set up against Brezhnev and the USSR. The European Communists (the leader of the Italian Communist Party, Enrico Berlinguer, and others) were especially zealous in this, standing on positions close to left-wing social democracy and critical of the Soviet "real socialism." They looked to the Yugoslav model, and Tito - to their views. And if the European Communists managed to attract the marshal to their side, they would have at their disposal an entire country.

On this occasion, Brezhnev and Tito had a really enchanting dialogue.

“- Well, what are you doing, Joseph, are you contacting these boys? - said the Soviet Secretary General, referring to Eurocommunists. - They don’t know life, but try to teach us. They invented some European communism there. Not a damn thing he is worth.

- What is European communism? - Tito played in amazement. - There is no and there can be no regional, parochial communism, it is one and all-encompassing. And Eurocommunism is Euroseness.

- True, Joseph, they are fools. Learn them and learn more.

(Yevgeny Zhirnov. “Missed through Tito" // "Kommersant.Ru")

In the USSR, they did everything necessary to ensure that the Euro-communists themselves learned about this unflattering assessment, moreover, from a trusted person. Those were in shock, and in the future they no longer made any attempts to "roll up" to Tito.

The Yugoslav model of socialism, like the Soviet one, failed, which led to the disintegration of a single federal state. However, it still functioned for about forty years, and much was very successful.