Military Review

Raffle commanders

37
Kiev maneuvers 1935, the year was a grand window dressing


The thesis about the high level of combat skills achieved by the Red Army to the beginning of the repressions of 1937 – 1938 is usually accompanied by reminders of the 1935 – 1936 maneuvers in the Kiev (KVO) and Byelorussian (BVI) military districts.

“The Kiev maneuvers, and the next year the Belorussian ones,” wrote, for example, V. A. Anfilov, “showed the high combat power of the Red Army, the good training of the Red Army men and the skills of the command staff, and proved that the Red Army in those years successfully solved the issues of organization and use on the battlefield, new weapons of warfare, in particular large mechanized ones, tank and air forces ". However, none of those who made such statements covered or analyzed in detail the work of the troops during the maneuvers of the 30s.

Deep strike concept


Meanwhile, maneuvers, that is, bilateral exercises with the participation of entire corps and armies, are indeed the best indicator of the level of combat skills of the army in peacetime. After all, such teachings allow, to the maximum possible extent, to imitate the real situation of war, when the masses of people and technology are involved in fighting with each other simultaneously and in a large space.

The purpose of the Kiev maneuvers of 1935 was, first of all, to test how vital the theory of deep operation developed by that time in the USSR was. The essence of the latter was to use new means of armed struggle - tanks and Aviation, with one blow, hit the enemy’s defenses to its entire tactical as well as operational depth, that is, not only break through all the enemy’s defensive lines (tactical defense zone), but also destroy operational reserves located several tens of kilometers behind them. Thus, we could have avoided the prolongation of hostilities characteristic of the First World War, when offensive operations resulted in a slow “gnawing” of the enemy’s defense along a kilometer and turned into monstrous meat grinders. Indeed, in those years when the tactical zone of defense was breaking through, the reserves of the defenders, which remained outside the influence of the attackers, managed to approach the place of the breakthrough and close the breached gap, so that the attackers had to prepare a new breakthrough.

A breakthrough with a single blow (during a deep battle) of a tactical defense zone was to ensure the simultaneous destruction of all its positions not only by artillery, but also by aircraft, as well as by supporting the attacking infantry with tanks. And the defeat in the course of the same strike of the operational reserves and the enemy’s operational rears was achieved by throwing the development tanks introduced into the breakthrough of success and strategic cavalry, by air strikes and the landing of airborne assault forces. Thus, the success of a deep operation was determined by the achievement of the interaction of different types of troops.

Maneuver


The outer side of the deep operation on the Kiev maneuvers was indeed recreated in full. 12 – 17 September 1935 of the year on the vast expanses to the west and south-west of the capital of Ukraine, in the area of ​​Kiev-Zhytomyr-Berdichev two whole army groups clashed: 5-I army of the “red”.

On September 12, the “blue” infantry reached the fortified defensive zone of the “Reds” built in the Zhytomyr region and on the night of the 13 they reconnoitred it. The strip was occupied by the 100-Infantry Division. On it, 13 struck 1935 in September and announced the beginning of a deep offensive operation by the “blue”. After artillery preparation with the participation of 152-mm cannons and 203-mm howitzers of the 137 th artillery regiment of the RGK and the combined heavy artillery regiment, moving behind the firing shaft, the reinforced defensive strip of the "red" attacked the 17 th rifle corps - gleaming with steel helmets XNHMH - Ulyanovsk Red Banner Iron Division and the 24-Infantry Kiev Red Banner Division remaining in the new protective color of the caps.

The attacking infantry was supported by fire and tracks by light tanks T-26 of tank battalions of rifle divisions, tankettes of T-27 tanket companies and battalions of rifle regiments and 8 tank tank battalion (T-26 battalion of the 8 mechanized brigade). From the air, the defenders bombed and fired from machine guns multipurpose single-engine biplanes Р-5 from 19, 20 and 21 of the light bombing squadrons of 206.

The roofs of the towers of tanks and armored cars, descending vertical stripes and on the sides of the turret, crossed the straight white cross, on the blue planes the white stripe of 0,5 meter was ringed on the tail of the fuselage, and white instead of red stars shone. The breakthrough of the tactical defense of the “Reds” was completed by a long-range tank group consisting of two tank battalions of the RGS - 4 (10 T-28 medium tanks from 4-Tank Regiment) and 14 (light high-speed BT-5 and BT-2 from the 134 th mechanized brigade).

The 2 Cavalry Corps, the 3 Cavalry Bessarabian Red Banner Division named after Comrade 5 rushed into the breach formed in the defense. Kotovsky and the 14 Cavalry Stavropol Red Banner Division named after T. Blinov (instead of the 26 th cavalry regiment of the first and 57 th, the second in their turn were the ninth march of the cavalry of the Red Cross and the 59 of the Cavalry under the sign of the county insignia of the sign of the Nazar Red Banner and the 14 of the Cavalry Podgaytsev znakznak znakn znakonnaya red banner of XnUMX and the XNUMX Cavalry under the red banner of the insignia of the insignia of the sign of the St. Knight's Red Cross and XNUMX Cavalry under the sign of the Nazi county sign of the Nazar Red Banner of the St. Petersburg Red Banner and XNUMX of the Cavalry under the banner of the Nazi county sign of the Nazar Red Banner Youth Division named after T. Parkhomenko). Eight cavalcuts walked at long intervals and distances, dispersed in depth and along the front line squadrons, machine-gun carts, batteries, a short trot, with banners and trumpeters deployed.

The blue cavalry immediately attacked dozens of Red Star X-NUMX 5, X-NUMX and 13 X-attack X-NUMX X-NUMX air squadrons from the Proletariat of Kiev region from a strafing flight, but the mechanized 14 and 24-ky-zy regiments rushed to k-zy-ky-zy-ky-zy-ky-zy-star Kiev region, but in a breakthrough, the mechanized 256 and 3-ky-zy regiments also went in a breakthrough. BT-5 and BT-2, small T-5 tanks, medium BA-37 armored vehicles and light FAIs. Under the pressure of saber, auto armored and tank squadrons, the reserves of the “red” - 27-Infantry Division of the 46-Infantry Corps did not hold fast.

September 14 morning showed even more spectacular spectacle - the landing of "blue" airborne assault forces in the rear of the "enemy". So far, one of the squadrons of the 206 Airborne Division was distracted by the Reds fighters, attacking Kiev, the other two crossed the Dnieper, reached the airfield of Brovary, and stormed it to suppress the airfield defense. After that, accompanied by the twin-engine long-range fighter ( "cruisers") P-6 35-th squadron cruising 18-th Heavy Bomber Air Brigade in Brovary began to approach dozens of four-engined TB-3 heavy bombers Airborne Division on board.

First, about 30 airships of 22, 24 and 25-3 th Heavy Bomber air squadrons-th air brigade of special purpose Kirov threw paratroopers from 1188 man in blue coveralls and light blue flying helmet - the personnel of the motorized regiment 3-th air raids and the parachute regiment (the combined battalion of 46, 51, 96 and 2 of the Caucasian infantry divisions and the joint company of 7 and 100 of the rifle).

A company of paratroopers seized an airfield, and one after another landed 60 TB-3 from 15 and 18 heavy bombers. Of them, the landing party 57 of the Irkutsk Red Banner and Order of Lenin rifle division named after the Central Executive Committee (total 58 people).

The 3-mm anti-tank guns of the 45 model of the year, the GAZ-1932 pickups, the D-4 light armored vehicles and the T-8 tank were uncoupled from the suspension mounts of the TB-37 suspension system. The parachute assault was covered by I-5 fighters from 34 and then replacing it with 35 of fighter squadrons of 451 of the aviation brigade, and the landing of the landing party with the longer duration of the P-6 “cruiser” flight.

Having completed the landing, the airborne division rushed westward to the Kiev bridges across the Dnieper, but was stopped by the tanks that had been hurriedly thrown out towards it by a mobile reserve of the “Red” - 2-th mechanized regiment of the 2-th of Chernigov Cossacks named after the German Communist Cavalry Division, they were unloaded. the regiment of the 49-th Crimean Cavalry named after SNK of the Ukrainian SSR division; and the battalion of the 9-th shooting and machine-gun brigade mounted on GAZ-AA trucks.

The climax of the maneuvers reached 15 in September, when the "blue" forces crossed the Irpen River and reached the nearest approaches to Kiev. "Red" moved to bypass the broken through grouping 45-Mechanized Corps - 133-th Mechanized Brigade, 134-th Mechanized Brigade, 135-Infantry-machine gun brigade and two assigned to the infantry battalion from the 152-Rifle Kirov Regiment of the Red 51-th Perekop Red Banner Rifle Division named after the Moscow Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the CD and the 95-rd rifle Moldavian Division. The 133-I mechanized had 152 tanks (mainly T-26, as well as BT-5, BT-2 and T-37), about a hundred more (BT-5, BT-2 and T-37) were counted in 134-th . In addition to tanks with a white stripe on the upper edge of the sides of the tower (in the 133-th mechanized brigade and with red stars in this lane) and along the edges of its roof, dozens of armored vehicles of medium-sized BA-3 and BAI and light FAIs moved along the roads.

Forcing Irpen in the opposite “enemy” direction, the mechanized corps went into the rear of the 17 rifle rifle, but its flank, in turn, was covered by the 2 th corps, reinforced by the tank units of the RGK. On the flank of the advancing troops, the 9-th Cavalry Division interacting with the Mechanized Corps struck. In addition to her, the Reds tank reserve and the P-5 attack planes fell on the cavalcore. Finally, the mechanized corps counter strike led to the encirclement of the main “blue” grouping. With the support of the tanks, the 46-division of the “Reds” also launched an offensive, and it was not possible to seize Kiev with the “blue” ones.

The fight went on in the air. “Red” 5 from 5 and 109 named after T. Ordzhonikidze fighter air squadrons of 256 th air brigade and blue from 34 and 35 th squadron of 451 air brigade attacked groups of storming blocks of strongholds and storming-battles of storming blocks of the airframes of the airframes of the XNUMX and XNUMX XNUMX thru XNUMX XNUMX thru XNUMX and XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX and XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX X-NUMX XNUMX X-NUMX XNUMX and X-9 goals).

A total of Kiev maneuvers involved around 470 aircraft (242 P-5, around 90 TB-3, 89 I-5, 22 P-6 and 27 connected U-2), 1040 tanks and armored vehicles and up to 60 of 100,000 H-XNUMX), and XNUMX tanks and armored vehicles and up to XNUMX of 100,000 H-XNUMX), and XNUMX tanks and armored vehicles and up to XNUMX of 500,000 H.

The game of soldiers


The external side of the modern, by the standards of those years, the war was recreated beautifully, but only external. In essence, the Kiev 1935 maneuvers of the year had very little in common with the real war, and above all because the whole course of events on them was predetermined. It was known who, where, when and with what forces the “adversary” would collide, and who will achieve what time - regardless of his or his “adversary” ability - will have the upper hand in this or that battle, come to this or that line, etc. In the instructions to the intermediaries, it was said that there and then, before the advancing mechanized and cavalry regiments, they, the intermediaries, would have to (no matter how defenders behaved) "to show strong artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire" on such and such Mezhpolk "will be detained by artillery fire", etc. The mediators must was not to suspend or accelerate the advancement of parts, depending on the literacy of their actions, and to achieve strict observance of these parts maneuvers scenario.

This scenario was brought not only to intermediaries, but also to the participants. Even 18 – 22 August 1935, the commanders of all units and formations that were taken out on maneuvers (and in corps and divisions and headquarters) could also get acquainted with the area in which they would “fight”, and with the “operation plan”. Therefore, commanders in the Kiev maneuvers were not required, therefore, what was primarily required in the war: a quick and correct response to sudden changes in the situation (all of them, we repeat, were known in advance).

Moreover, the commanders of units and formations did not receive here even the practice of making decisions in combat (albeit known in advance) the situation, and their headquarters did not practice the working out of combat documents. To take all the decisions, to make all the documents they were obliged, again, in advance, one or two weeks before the start of the maneuvers. Prepared documentation was carefully checked at the district headquarters, and if errors were found, they were forced to redo it. In the course of the maneuvers, all the combat documentation for the headquarters of the formations in essence had only to be written off from the finished text.

Generally, if you call a spade a spade, in the Kiev maneuvers, commanders and staffs were only required not to lose their units and formations on the march and during the drawing of battles and to conduct them strictly through the points indicated in the “scenario” of maneuvers - as if through checkpoints in competitions orienteering. Yes, and this "most difficult" task - not to lose people and equipment - the leadership of the Red Army and the command of the QUO commanders of the maneuvering troops tried to ease as much as possible. Therefore, in the greenhouse conditions, which can never be in a war, not only commanders and staffs, but also troops were put on the Kiev maneuvers.

According to the plan outlined in the Headquarters of the Red Army and approved by the People's Commissar for Defense K. Ye. Voroshilov, movement in the area of ​​maneuvers was greatly facilitated in advance. The old roads are given “in the carriageway state” and 150 kilometers of new roads were built, 14 kilometers of forest glades were laid, 21 new bridge was built. And local authorities provided maneuvering and at all fabulous "service". For example, the lines from the report of the political department chief of the 133 th mechanized brigade P. K. Smirnov from 4 September 1935 on the reconnaissance route to the area of ​​concentration are parody: “The condition of the roads is good, new profiled roads are carried out everywhere, and now they are already rolled . All wells are cleaned. Have an inscription on the suitability of water for drinking. On the main directions of the roads there are signs, benches under the fungi, where during the period of maneuvers there will be duty collective farmers to indicate the roads to the units, especially at night. ”

The living conditions created for the maneuvering troops were no less a parody of the real war. In the area of ​​maneuvers, a whole network of stationary and mobile medical and nutritional points of the Red Cross was deployed, where fighters and commanders could not only receive medical care, but also wash themselves in a bath, use the services of a hairdresser, get hot tea with wafers, where they not only washed their laundry, but hears fresh turnovers to the shirts! Only at the point of the Gaisinsky Committee of the Red Cross (attached to the 9 Cavalry Division) during the maneuvers were shaved to 2000 servicemen and to 9000 to drink tea with biscuits. During the period of intense and highly dynamic "fighting" the Red Army had the opportunity to make purchases in the stalls of the SSC - closed military cooperatives (as recalled by the participants of the Great Patriotic War, the arrival to the location of the front part of the Voentorg store was an incredibly rare, almost impossible phenomenon).

However, even though the commanders, staffs and troops stayed on maneuvers in greenhouse conditions, even though the outcome of the “hostilities” did not depend on them, the commanders and staffs had to demonstrate some skills in troop control and planning of hostilities. From the same troops demanded to act as in war, demonstrating the true level of their skills. What was the training of the commanders, staffs and troops involved in the maneuvers?

Surprisingly, the RGVA did not find any reports on the Kiev 1935 maneuvers of the year, compiled by those who had to assess the level of army proficiency by specialists of the 2 Division of the Headquarters (from 22 September of the 1935 of the General Staff) of the Red Army or in the fund The Red Army Combat Training Directorate (into which 9 on April 1936 was transformed by the 2 Division of the General Staff) was not in the unclassified descriptions of the funds of the Administrative Department under the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff. Reports drawn up by the command of the QUO and the participants in the maneuvers cannot be completely trusted: they, naturally, tend to exaggerate their achievements. However, they can also help: if they still mention any "their" shortcomings, then there is no doubt that the latter actually existed, and most likely on a much larger scale.

Traces of the assessments made by specialists of the 2 Division of the Red Army Headquarters can be found in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0182 of September 22 of 1935 on the results of the Kiev maneuvers, as well as in the materials to the report of the Chief of the 2 section A. I. Sedyakin on the results of the combat preparation of the Red Army in 1935. In addition, we have two more independent sources at our disposal — materials prepared by the workers of the Political Directorate of the Red Army (PU RKKA), and materials from various army meetings, as well as relatively independent reports of political workers of the maneuvering troops.

We will begin the evaluation of the skills of commanders and staffs with their ability to organize the main thing that determined the success of a deep battle, a deep operation and 30's combat operations in general - the interaction of the arms of troops.

According to the order of the People's Commissar No. 0182, on maneuvers, it was possible to achieve a skillful interaction between infantry and tanks of its direct support, as well as between cavalry and tank units of the Kavdiviziya. For the time being, we will take this assessment on faith, although we have serious reasons to doubt its truth. After all, the statement of the same order to achieve "full interaction" between infantry, tanks and cavalry - on the one hand, and artillery - on the other, is actually refuted by the maneuvering themselves.

Namely - “Report on the conduct of maneuvers by artillery units”, signed by 25 September 1935, by the head of the KVO artillery N. M. Bobrov. Assuring that “the shortcomings are drowning in the achievements that artillery has shown,” and listing in detail these achievements, the report does not mention the maintenance of interaction with infantry and tanks among them. Moreover, it further states that with the staffs and commanders of tank units, it is necessary now to thoroughly put the basics of interaction with artillery: methods of fire support, setting tasks, communications, alarms, escort aircraft, support in depth and, finally, support methods ( escorts) infantry support tanks. It seems that no interaction between the artillery and tanks commanders and headquarters of these types of troops could not be achieved.

Each by itself

The organization of the interaction of artillery with infantry was also limping. During the preparation of the Western Front offensive on the Vitebsk, Orsha and Bogushevsky areas in October 1943 - March 1944, the top artillery headquarters didn’t have much time left for their planning work, especially light, for working out tasks on the ground and the organization of interaction. There, in a real war, this was one of the reasons that our artillery, in spite of its concentration in large quantities and superiority over the enemy’s artillery, did not suppress both the artillery preparation period and the enemy’s fire system during the battle. Often, the artillery fired at an empty place, did not fulfill the requests of the infantry, lost contact with it, and sometimes fired even at its infantry. The infantry went on the attack on the enemy’s non-suppressed fire system, suffered huge losses and did not advance.

Raffle commanders

Military attaches of foreign countries are watching the BT-5 in Kiev maneuvers. Photo: m.mirtesen.ru

It is possible to give a more specific example. During the offensive of the 70 Army of the Central Front on the Oryol 8 – 12 March 1943, the lack of linkage of the interaction between infantry and artillery commanders in the field led to the fact that the support of the infantry with artillery and its support with direct fire were organized poorly, thanks to which the units 260,2 and Muravchik, who were pushed forward and captured the height, fell under strong fire and infantry and enemy counterattacks, almost completely died heroically, and the remnants retreated backwards, putting down the captured positions.

But Voroshilov at a meeting of the Military Council under the People’s Commissar of Defense 14 in December 1935 recalled that "some" combined-arms commanders simply "forgot" to set tasks for artillery during the battle. This, as it was delicately called the People's Commissar, the roughness meant that after the end of the artillery preparation and the transition of the infantry to the attack, any interaction between it and the artillery disappeared.

The draft report on the actions of the communications troops, prepared for 25 September 1935, at the headquarters of the CVO communications troops, reinforces not only the conclusion about the poor interaction of tanks and infantry with artillery, but also doubts about the clarity of interaction between infantry and tanks of its direct support. After all, this document offered to direct the main attention of the headquarters to mastering radio equipment for communication with aircraft in the air and for organizing the tactical interaction of TDD (long-range tanks), CCI (infantry support tanks) with artillery, rifle troops and air. This means that during the maneuvers the radio communication between the infantry and the tanks of its direct support was carried out poorly, but after the start of the attack, the infantry commander could coordinate with the tank commander inside the combat vehicle only by radio.

As for the long-range tank group, Voroshilov himself noted the fact of a complete lack of interaction between it and the advancing rifle units. Upon entering the breakthrough, he indicated 14 on December 1935 of the year at the Military Council under the People’s Commissar of Defense, the DD tanks simply “disappeared” and had no connection with the 17 rifle corps that followed them or the high command.

As can be seen from the report of the telecoms staff, the ground troops’s interaction with aviation was also lame: after all, the airplanes that were in the air could aim (or re-target them if the situation changed) the infantry and tank commanders could only be on the radio. In the 17-m rifle and 45-m mechanized corps, the tongue-tied language was further specified in this draft document, “no more precise radio work has been achieved on troops with reinforcement aircraft (bomber and ground attack) and providing fighter aircraft in the air.”

In other words, at least half of all the infantry and tanks on the maneuvers could not take full advantage of the help from the air, but it came under the blow of its own aircraft (if after calling the last one the outline of the front edge had changed).

Both observers and participants in the maneuvers noted the often unsatisfactory intelligence organization. In the words of Deputy Defense Commissar G. I. Kulik, well-known in subsequent years, “clarity must be introduced here. As a man cannot live without air, so a commander cannot live without intelligence. Only then will the commander make the right decision if his decision fits the given situation, and it will only fit the given situation if the commander has information about the position of the enemy. ”

Meanwhile, it was noted in the order of the People's Commissar No. 0182, the assignment of reconnaissance tasks was not always clear and specific. Having received instead of the order “to open the composition of the enemy grouping in such and such area” the order “to conduct reconnaissance in such a direction”, the intelligence officers will not aim at obtaining a specific result, they will “reconnoiter”, but they will not reconnoiter.

But the continuity of intelligence is the fundamental principle of its organization. Without compliance with this rule, the command will build its plans on the basis of outdated information about the enemy, that is, largely in the sand. If the district in the report to higher authorities evaluates the results achieved by it more strictly than these institutions themselves, then the situation with the organization of intelligence at the maneuvers was very bad.

When the tops cannot


With regard to troop control, the order number 0182 stated: "Infantry commanders and junior commanders achieved a firm and precise control of the movement of battle formations and fire, especially machine-gun units." But further it was noted that there was a cluster of significant infantry groups, well observed by the defenders for a half or two kilometers. This means that the rare chains of the attackers gradually fell into a heap, that the battle formations thus crumbled and that, consequently, there was no firm and precise control of the movement of the battle formations.

And it was not very often! The guarantee is the annual report of the CEP from October 11 1935 of the year, in which the district command itself acknowledged that in the offensive there are often cases of too much concentration of battle formations. Kiev maneuvers crowned the school year, and if this “thickening” had occurred only occasionally on them, the report would not fail to report on the results of the year.

And the order number 0182 continues to refute itself, indicating that in some cases, the mounted machine guns of the attackers lagged behind their infantry, leaving it without fire support. Instead of pushing their "maxims" forward, machine-gun companies of rifle battalions and machine-gun platoons of rifle companies tried to shoot through the heads of the chains going forward - although specific combat conditions precluded the use of this method of shooting. The fact that in the offensive battle machine guns must move forward, it was found out even in the First World War. Therefore, the conclusion suggests itself that by refusing to change firing positions during the battle, machine-gun commanders tried to hide the lack of ability to control their platoons and companies. What is this "firm and precise control of the movement of battle formations and fire, especially machine-gun subunits"?

The battle formations of tank units and subunits were not upset, but on this basis we cannot assert that, as we will see below, the tank crews at maneuvers were put into “super-thorny” conditions, as we will see below.

The combined-arms headquarters involved in the Kiev maneuvers clearly did not differ in good command skills: they clearly lacked either specific knowledge or skills or a staff culture. In fact, even with a few days (instead of the usual hours) for preparing the command of a divisional commander to break through a fortified band, the staff officers of the 44 Infantry Division managed to draw up this document "extremely carelessly." A similar order from the commander of the 24 Infantry Division, also prepared in advance by its headquarters, contained an anecdotal wording: "In the future, the next task."

The commanders of large headquarters, it was noted in the report on the work on the maneuvers of the communications troops, during negotiations over the direct wire is not able to clearly and briefly express their thoughts ("verbosity is a common phenomenon"). In this regard, attention is drawn to the phrase from the political report of the chief of the political department of the 24 Infantry Division P. M. Ganusevich from September 13 of 1935 of the year: “There is still no clear command of the command personnel”.

Even worse, the headquarters did not know how to organize uninterrupted communication with the troops. As the KVO command itself noted, every time the headquarters changed location, this connection disappeared: “Radio equipment operating on the move was not used.” And with the connection, the headquarters lost control.

As for the tank headquarters, Yakir, commander of the KVO, and I. A. Khalepsky, head of the Red Army Auto-Armored Directorate (ABTU RKKA), and Sedyakin, head of the 2 division of the Red Army headquarters, clearly controlled the actions of the 45 of the mechanized corps. But these estimates could be explained not only by the professionalism of the corps headquarters, but also by the contrast with the results of the September 1934 maneuvers of the year. Then 45 was so unmanageable, 8 reminded 1935 of December at the Military Council under the People's Commissar for Defense Khalepsky, that we even endured a negative opinion about the existence of such a cumbersome organization as a mechanized corps. And the contrast, in turn, could be due not so much to the increased skill of the staff officers over the year as to the simplification compared to 1934 in the year of structure and a decrease in the number of mechanized corps. In their composition now there were no, for example, artillery units (by the way, already in December 1935, at the Military Council under People's Commissar of Defense Yakir, anxiously began to talk about the danger of attacking such forces to the troops of a potential enemy: he would have nothing to suppress their numerous artillery). Tank platoons instead of five tanks began to have three - this in itself should have increased the controllability and mobility of tank units, and therefore, units with formations. In general, it is not worthwhile to exaggerate the degree of training of the headquarters of the 45 mechanized corps.

The preparedness of artillery headquarters was clearly insufficient. After all, the above-mentioned delay by the chiefs of artillery of the 8 and 17 corps of the release of combat documents was due to the fact that the starters were replacing the staff of their headquarters - so prepared, obviously not enough ...

The level of the gunnery artillery training of the artillery commanders participating in the Kiev maneuvers is extremely difficult to characterize. Firstly, due to the fact that the maneuvers were not fired at with live shells, and secondly, due to the absence of other sources, besides the “Report on the maneuvers by artillery units” cited above by the KVO artillery staff quoted above. .

Nevertheless, the report’s admission that this section of the 17 rifle case didn’t part of the artillery divisions didn’t perform the bench marks set by the table of fire (because of which the fire, which later opened up in real combat, was less accurate) looks extremely alarming. . However, the neglect of the adjustment of benchmarks indicates that it is directly incompatible with "good training" - a clear lack of some of the commanders-gunners of the rifle culture. And if the facts of non-fulfillment by commanders-artillerymen on the Kiev maneuvers of their duties in battle were met not only in the 17 corps and not only when shooting bench marks?

Fussy Queen of the Fields


The characteristics of troop proficiency demonstrated at the Kiev maneuvers will begin with the infantry. The mediators noted the good disguise of the soldiers of the 44 th rifle division, but from the reports of the political workers it appears that the infantrymen in the maneuvers did not do much of what they would have to do in battle. So, in the 24 Infantry Division they were distinguished by the “poor use of shovels,” that is, they did not dig in badly or at all. But self-digging must have been applied in the offensive as well - to be fixed on each of the successively reached lines.

Here, for example, the lessons of several episodes of the Smolensk battle. “The infantry on the battlefield does not dig into the ground, does not dig trenches for itself,” noted the report of the senior assistant to the chief of the operational section of the Western Front headquarters, Colonel A.V. Vasilyev, on the progress of the 20 Army east of Smolensk 9 – 15 August 1941 of the year, - and therefore easily vulnerable to artillery and aviation fire. " Then, the 19 th infantry company of the 7 th infantry regiment of the 400 th rifle division advancing east of Dukhovshchina of the 89 Army, “crawling” on August 6 without digging back and forth, lost half of the squad.

Essentially, an infantryman on the Kiev maneuvers only moved around the battlefield, but did not fight. If so, these maneuvers cannot testify to any "good training of the Red Army soldiers" infantry.

As for the training of infantry units, the order of Commissar No. 0182, which illuminates it, contradicts itself here too. The tactical infantry training, it argues, is good, but it further states that "in some episodes" the battle formations "were not sufficiently applied to the terrain", "there was an accumulation of significant infantry groups well observable by the defenders within a mile or two." In other words, in the authorized battle formations, the infantry did not know how to attack, its soldiers moving with rare chains gradually knocked together and the chains turned into crowds, that is, into an ideal target.

What would such a “too much thickening of battle formations” turn out to be in a real battle, clearly shows, for example, the episode of the Demyansk operation 1942 of the year, more precisely, the attack of the 1 shock army of the North-Western Front under Old Rusa in February 1942: “During the offensive of the 47 Infantry Brigade on the village of Svyatogorm units went on the attack extremely crowded. The brigade suffered heavy losses. On the ascent to the village, a large number of the corpses of our fighters lay either side by side or half a meter apart. ” The 402 Rifle Division of the Southern Front, operating in February 1943 during the Rostov operation, “in crowded battle formations and not sustaining intervals,” lost 70 percent of personnel in five days.

Only this “too much concentration of military formations”, which doomed the attackers to enormous losses, completely obliterates the assertion of a “good” tactical training of the maneuvered infantry.

The skill of a single gunner fighter in Kiev maneuvers was not actually checked. Does this mean that in the Kiev maneuvers, ordinary gunners were not required to either monitor the targets, set the sight, or do anything else that was required of them in a real battle - except for firing a shot by pressing the trigger or jerking the trigger cord? By analogy with ordinary infantrymen, the answer, I think, should be given in the affirmative. Accordingly, the Kiev maneuvers cannot testify to any "good" training of the fighters (and, hence, artillery units).

What did not see strategists


As for the tank troops, they seemed to have demonstrated simply the excellent training of driver and unit mechanics. Huge masses of combat vehicles moved smoothly across the battlefield (the only exceptions were 4 and 14 th “RGC tank battalions”, whose battle orders were stretched due to “insufficient hardship”), the fast-moving BT-2 and BT-5 hit dashing jumps with overclocking through the moats, the accident rate was extremely low.

In Russian literature, they like to recall the French General L. Loiseau, who was present at the maneuvers: “With regard to tanks, I would consider it right to consider the army of the Soviet Union in the first place”. The opinion of the well-known military theorist, English captain B. Liddel Garth can also be added here: “A small number of breakdowns is an indicator of the health of their mechanisms and standard (as in the translation text, should be read - exemplary) crew training.”

However, the French general and the English captain did not know and could not know that most of the tanks on the maneuvers were not led by the people who should lead them in battle: not the driver mechanics (many of whom were trained not so "exemplary" that Were afraid to let out on maneuvers), and commanders of cars.

Another fact, which Luazo and Liddel Garth did not know, testifies to how “exemplary” the bulk of the “mechanical drivers” of the units brought to Kiev’s maneuvers was prepared, how competently it exploited the equipment. A few days before the maneuvers a significant part of their tank armada was not capable. Thus, in 45-m mechanized corps outputs maneuvers 260 tanks (97 BT-2 and BT-5, 98 T-26 and 65 T-37) from the position of the state 303 (126 BT-2 and BT-5, 112 T -26 and 65 T-37), in the last five to six days, we had to replace the motors on the 39 BT-2 and BT-5 and carry out a bulkhead of the motors (in the amount of factory repair) on 66 T-2658.

In other words, start the teachings a week earlier - and the beauty and pride of Kiev maneuvers would not be able to move or lose in the very first hours due to a malfunction of the 34,7 engines, the percentage of full-time and 40,4 percent of the tanks that went on maneuver. And if you take into account only linear tanks, eliminating reconnaissance T-37 from the calculation, then these figures will increase, respectively, to 44,1 and 53,8 percent.

Loiso and Liddel Garth did not know that the tankers on the Kiev maneuvers acted in even more greenhouse conditions than the infantrymen. Not only were all the necessary for the march tank sections of the road laid out or improved in advance, but also ... the terrain on which the tanks then attacked was leveled. And tankers - again in advance, before the maneuvers - also carefully examined the fields of future “battles”.

And so it was achieved with pride presented in the 1935 QUO report in the year "a small percentage of accidents during maneuvers and the ability to drive at high speeds in conditions of rough and swampy areas." In a real combat situation in the same 45 mechanized corps, up to half of the tanks would break or be stuck on heavy roads even on the march, while most of the rest would slow down in an attack before each ditch. Visual confirmation of this is the failure of the 7 of the mechanized Leningrad Corps during the exercises of the Leningrad Military District, which took place immediately after the Kiev maneuvers, 18 – 22 of September 1935 of the year in the Bottom - Porkhov - Pskov area.

These exercises did not rehearse the troops as thoroughly as the Kiev maneuvers, and the “theater of operations” did not advance in advance. As a result, "a lot of tanks 19 and 31 th name Uritsky mechanized brigades out of action and out of order for technical reasons and the difficulty of the way." And “wheeled vehicles and tanks were generally bogged down in dirty, unexplored roads” so that the 33-I Voskov shooting and machine-gun brigade “was forced to abandon their cars and march on the battlefield on foot.”

The same scam was achieved on the Kiev maneuvers and a formally good tactical training of tank units. However, not everyone: the 4-th tank battalion of the RGC "proved to be insufficiently naked and insufficiently disciplined." When entering September 13 into a breakthrough, its battle formations were stretched, and two out of ten of its T-28 even collided with each other.

The tank crew’s fire training - in the same way as that of infantry infantrymen - was not actually tested on the Kiev maneuvers. Many tanks were generally without commanders (who sat, as we remember, on the site of a driver), and therefore without full-time gunners (whose duties were carried out by tank commanders). Thus, Kiev maneuvers cannot testify about the "good" fire training of tankers. Moreover, they noted instances of the low level of this training: it happened that the tankers opened fire at direct distance from a distance of two to three kilometers, that is, without really seeing the target.

Late landing


In the Airborne Forces, the consolidated parachute regiment assembled quickly after landing, but the collection of the special purpose 3 motorized regiment was "very slow" (in the draft of the reporting document, the title of which was not preserved, such wording was crossed out, but writing instead of it, collection was held "with a delay", this last word was considered necessary to emphasize). As a result, a company of paratroopers to capture the airfield of Brovary was sent too late, and the TB-3 with the landing force actually landed on an untapped airfield, the battle for which was still going on. The maneuver scenario was sustained, but in a real combat situation the landing of the landing assault force would have to be delayed. And "parachute units, without receiving timely support of the landing regiments, can be destroyed by the enemy."

The personnel of the liaison forces of the QUO appeared to be prepared satisfactorily. According to the order of the People's Commissar No. 0182, the connection on the maneuvers acted even “well”, but such an assessment was apparently given (as was the case with the handling of the 45 Mechanic Corps) according to the contrast noted in the same order with the teachings of previous years and even 1934 of the year. The organization of radio communications, as we have seen, was often not up to par, and the “single technical training of a fighter” in many cases was still “incomplete”.

Performance for attache


As we see, the Kiev 1935 maneuvers of the year, in principle, cannot testify to the high level of combat training of the then Red Army. After all, the army is preparing for war, and here it was placed in such hothouse conditions as the war can never be:

a) the course and outcome of the operations played on them were predetermined and in no way depended on the skill level of the maneuvering maneuvers;

b) all their actions and decisions, as well as the actions of the enemy, to the commanders and staffs were known long before the start of the "operation";

c) commanders, staffs and troops rehearsed their actions in advance in one or another specific episode of the “operation”;

d) the troops were not required to do a lot of what they have to do in a real war: from building bridges to installing a sight;

e) the troops on the maneuvers were put in greenhouse living conditions that have nothing to do with real front-line life;

(e) Tank troops — the “trump card” of the Red Army — brought mainly manned, not regular, but improvised crews, which they would never have managed to do in a war, and attacked artificially leveled terrain.

We are not saying anymore that before the maneuvers the troops "threw away all other types of combat training and were engaged in only one thing - preparation for maneuvers."

In general, the Kiev 1935 maneuvers of the year were a grandiose pretense, and their true essence was well defined even the day before they began, September 11 of the 1935, the Red Army Ornlov 8 Regiment: “Maneuvers are eyewash, we try to rub glasses into representatives of the foreign army ".

Actually, in 1935, no one denied the fact that the Kiev maneuvers very remotely resemble a real war. In the same order, Commissar No. 0182, it was explicitly acknowledged that these exercises were “educational-experimental”, why their “responsible” episodes were previously worked out with the personnel of the maneuvering troops and “thoroughly lost with intermediaries”. But then it turns out that more than elementary things for a regular army were tested on Kiev maneuvers:

the ability of commanders and staffs to organize the movement of troops on the ground according to a previously developed plan and the rally of a number of previously planned combat episodes by troops;
the ability of troops to carry out orders and move on the ground.
Contrary to the generally accepted view, the Kiev maneuvers showed not “good”, but weak “training of the Red Army” and the same “skills of commanders”. That is, the orders of the chiefs are already capable of carrying out, the theory is also known, but they still do not know how to fight ...

The fact that the Kiev 1935 maneuvers of the year were not at all an indicator of the high preparedness of the Red Army, Voroshilov also explicitly acknowledged. Having endorsed in a speech at a meeting of the Military Council under the People’s Commissar of Defense 14 of December 1935, the ostentatious method of preparing Kiev maneuvers, in which Yakir carefully prepared the area, “and then the bosses played the maneuver well”, openly said: “During the exercises, one must act until the troops and commanders are properly prepared. ”
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  1. erased
    erased 11 July 2015 08: 03
    +9
    The top of the Red Army at that time was involved in conspiracies. She was preparing to remove Voroshilov and Stalin. "Soviet Napoleon" - Tukhachevsky already saw himself on the throne. In which he was actively supported by the top generals of Germany. At that time, it was still the Reichswehr, not the Wehrmacht. By the way, in the German army, the position of Seeckt's supporters was still strong, and he wanted to be friends with Soviet Russia. Hitler, even after 1933, was not considered a leader and conspiracies were also prepared.
    In a word, real combat training was not up to par. Although on the ground, the commanders tried to train the personnel. Khalkin-Gol, Khasan and Finnish highlighted all the gaps and problems of the army, after which, in fact, a radical restructuring began. The act of "receiving the army" by the new People's Commissar Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov is very interesting. There is so much written there - the hair stands on end from the realization of the fact in what state the army was! But in a year and a half, they did not have time to radically correct the situation. And the war, urgently increased in the states, but poorly prepared, the Red Army began with something. Together with the delay in the strategic deployment of troops along the western borders, this became the basis of summer failures and huge losses. Learned to fight, choking on blood. And this science eats in tightly. This has been proven in the ruins of the Reichstag. But by that time, neither Tukhachevsky nor his associates were there. Showy victories were replaced by a real well-deserved Victory in the war.
    1. AZB15
      AZB15 11 July 2015 09: 39
      +5
      Yes, bl ... as much as possible. STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCES IN A THREATED PERIOD this is mobilization, and this is WAR, bl, WAR, the citizen "erased", not absurdity !!!!

      And the deployment of troops to cover the mobilization, it is an IMMEDIATE WAR, bl, IMMEDIATE WAR !!!!
    2. Roman 11
      Roman 11 11 July 2015 21: 24
      -3
      Quote: erased
      "Soviet Napoleon" - Tukhachevsky already saw himself on the throne.

      This nonsense is fed up with idiocy, there is an understanding that many Tukhachevsky experienced animal envy - after all, neither Budyonny, nor Belov, Dybenko, Egorov, etc. in the elite of the imperial army, the Semyonovsky regiment did not fight, they simply did not graduate from military schools like that ....... besides, Tukhachevsky met with the White emigration in 1936 in Paris from the Semyonovsky regiment. It should be noted that the officers of the elite of the army would not meet with anyone, especially the name of the marshal was very well known in Europe, which aroused envy not among the highest command staff, but among the leaders and leaders of the Central Committee. But what does this marshal have to do with it ?? He is a really bright person against the dim background of advanced innovative ideas - the war of engines, airborne forces, radar, the abolition of cavalry as a kind of troops, missile technology, a change of leader in the fleet - the battleship is giving way to an aircraft carrier and much more, he just managed to do this ... .. Prominent scientists, military leaders who have gone through the war - Zhukov, Rokossovsky and others, Charles de Gaulle, art workers - Shostakovich, many many others spoke only positively about him. The fact that Stalin could not stand him, about anything !! Maloli whom Stalin tolerated ?? So Rokossovsky miraculously survived at 37. Although later, after the war, the secretary general would say - now there is no Suvorov in the Red Army, there is Rokossovsky ... Stalin was a shtafirka, he did not know much about military affairs, and Tukhachevsky told him about it - you are not a military man, you do not understand !! Well, Stalin did not get out of the "bag" in the Chelyabinsk operation. Koba's strength was in the ability to organize a business so that it would work without interruptions, he was an excellent business executive, maybe the best in 2 centuries among the first persons, he understood culture - literature, music, etc., and hated people, for him they are an instrument ...
  2. Alekseev
    Alekseev 11 July 2015 08: 21
    +6
    The article is completely fair.
    Moreover, all this ostentatiousness was again manifested in the Soviet era, closer to the collapse of the USSR.
    Why? It is so convenient, there are fewer risks for the bosses, "everything is fine, beautiful marquise" ...
    But, sometimes, sudden inspections of BG parts were carried out.
    I remember how the commander (Gen. Kochetov) raised the SMEs on an alarm and set the task to make more than 100 km march, in a rather difficult, sometimes mountainous terrain, to the group Khaimashkersky range and immediately attack, i.e. to conduct on the move stage with live firing.
    A regiment along the generally known route to the deployment line came out, but there were so many shortcomings that the combat shooting had to be canceled, because they could shoot themselves.
    Although it was a fully-equipped part, but preparation was then conducted
    with many conventions, scenarios, etc. etc.
  3. bulat
    bulat 11 July 2015 08: 34
    +6
    You begin to understand Shoigu with his sudden readiness checks
  4. moskowit
    moskowit 11 July 2015 08: 52
    +3
    “In a word, the real combat training was not up to par. Although the commanders on the ground tried to train the personnel. Khalkin-Gol, Khasan and Finskaya highlighted all the gaps and problems of the army, after which, in fact, a radical restructuring began. "the new People's Commissar Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. There is so much written there - the hair stands on end from the realization of the fact in what state the army was!"
    I experienced similar feelings after reading this document in VIZH in 90-91. I don't remember exactly the issue of the magazine. The Red Army of 37-39 was poorly prepared. The tactical exercises of the rifle troops were held in the classes ??? !!!. I highly recommend reading ...
    1. Vladimirets
      Vladimirets 11 July 2015 20: 39
      -1
      Quote: moskowit
      Tactical exercises of the rifle troops took place in the classes ??? !!!

      90's did not serve? wink
  5. knn54
    knn54 11 July 2015 09: 04
    +4
    But the flaws of the troops of Uborevich and Yakir were typical of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army of Marshal V.K.Blyukher. It turns out that the commanders who were repressed in the 37th did not succeed (or perhaps did not want to ???) prepare the Red Army for war with Germany.
    1. avt
      avt 11 July 2015 10: 16
      +6
      Quote: knn54
      But the flaws of the troops of Uborevich and Yakir were typical of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army of Marshal V.K.Blyukher. It turns out that the commanders repressed in the 37th did not succeed (or maybe they didn’t want to ???)

      Well, not all high-ranking officials in the Far East were repressed - the main NKVD officer went to the Japanese altogether.
      Quote: AZB15
      And the first mass landing, and the number of equipment and troops?

      This technique which was lost in oncoming tank battles? Often simply because of the inability to evacuate for repairs and without fuel? Well, don't confuse God's gift with scrambled eggs. The Kiev maneuvers were really theatrical staged action, but actually like a parade on Red Square. And there is no need to howl that the de Congenial Marshal Tukhachevsky was introducing, and the "horse" marshals were destroying tank formations - everyone, almost everyone noted the inferiority of the structure of the mechanized corps being created and the inability to fully control them, that the oncoming battles of the 41st proved with the blood of fighters. The article is correct, clearly and reasonably describes what happened near Kiev.
      1. AZB15
        AZB15 11 July 2015 10: 24
        -8
        Yes, the Hurley will discuss with you, if you, citizen avt - judging by the above-mentioned simple, censorship, bl, did not miss the epithet.

        About what howls on my part about the violinist you read, wake up.
        1. avt
          avt 11 July 2015 11: 04
          +2
          Quote: AZB15
          Yes, the Hurley will discuss with you, if you, citizen avt - judging by the above-mentioned simple, censorship, bl, did not miss the epithet.

          Ettochno ,,, it is not necessary to debate - put the little head under cold water, and then I recommend more valerian drops and lie down.
    2. Roman 11
      Roman 11 11 July 2015 21: 35
      -2
      Quote: knn54
      It turns out that the commanders who were repressed in the 37th did not succeed (or perhaps did not want to ???) prepare the Red Army for war with Germany.

      There, almost the entire command staff was shot, to whom to cook ?? In May 37 the army was already buzzing like a worried beehive - commanders and commanders were constantly changing until the war ...... the exercises as such were for show, many made dizzying careers and, of course, did not correspond to duties, etc.
    3. sap
      sap 12 July 2015 01: 31
      0
      Exactly! Even during the beginning of the Second World War, at its first stage, so many treacherous steps were taken with only one purpose to remove Stalin.
  6. AZB15
    AZB15 11 July 2015 09: 17
    +1
    On the other hand, tapericha, "sudden" rises of troops on "alarm" demonstrate examples of the highest skill and high military and political training. These are not Kiev maneuvers!
    1. Alekseev
      Alekseev 11 July 2015 18: 12
      +1
      Quote: AZB15
      But tapericha

      About "tapericha" completely different stories (articles) and remember about the pre-war maneuvers so that now they do not repeat.
      You do not need to swear, we can do it ourselves, but we won’t.
      And the level of training of the Red Army was clearly highlighted in Finland, and in the first battles of WWII.
      And we should not be reassured that the Wehrmacht was very strong, that they crushed Poland, that the French, without exhausting all the possibilities of resistance, "stood up on four legs" led by Marshal Pétain.
      There were many outrages in the combat training of troops and staffs before the war, and in Soviet times, and, probably, now. They cannot be eradicated at all, for the building of an army and navy, combat training is a complex matter, but we must strive for this!
      1. AZB15
        AZB15 11 July 2015 20: 20
        +1
        Ah, citizen Alekseev ...
        Again and again you are talking about Finns. No other thoughts, or what? Well, let’s show the flaws, but only those that were not opened and identified at that time. You may want to, maybe not, it's up to you, but I read a lot of materials about THAT time, I had the opportunity to talk with people who remembered THAT time. I will tell you frankly, neither you, nor any of those present know and understand WHAT it was for TIME. How and by what our country lived, what was happening on its borders and in the world as a whole.
        But it was perestroika — paintings from the Hermitage were selling ... But did you know, for example, that the consolidated West refused to sell us everything for bread and other raw materials, but demanded currency and gold ... Here you have pictures for dollars for there was nothing more to sell.
        Ah, bl, shortcomings in the Red Army troops ... then explain to me sirom, why did the Germans freeze like the last passive homosexuals not only in winter 41, but also in 43? Where is the vaunted ordnung? And the supply of Moscow at 41 and especially Leningrad during the blockade with electricity is generally an amusing Temka, take an interest on vacation from writing stamped phrases about the Red Army. Ah, the disgrace in the headquarters ... And the first attack of the "Tigers" almost in the swamp - this is HTO, Vasilevsky, or what?

        Oh yes, about the mats. So without a bunch of words we have nowhere, don’t want to.

        About mistakes in exercises at 35 and now. What is it like? 80 years have passed and Russian commanders are still learning from the mistakes of Kiev maneuvers in 35 years? Yes, this is a slander on our valiant Armed Forces, but for this to the wall and shoot first with "Armata", and finish off with "Coalition", and move for loyalty with "Kurganets"!
      2. Vladimirets
        Vladimirets 11 July 2015 20: 44
        0
        Quote: Alekseev
        building an army and navy, combat training is a difficult matter, but strive for this!

        It's called, tell me which army is perfect.
  7. AZB15
    AZB15 11 July 2015 09: 57
    +9
    Listen to ALL specialists, 95% who did not serve in the army. Name at least ONE maneuvers in ANY army of the world, and even in the presence of potential opponents, where there would be no fraud, convenient roads for travel, falling targets, and so on and so forth. You don’t get smart about 35 the year when orders were sent on purpose, and part, which part - most of the Red Army soldiers read in syllables.

    And the first mass landing, and the number of equipment and troops? What are most of you clever hindsight generalists and strategists. Unpleasant to read, people. Put 99% of those present to command 10 people and the result will be disastrous.

    Red Army soldier Orlov, bl, defined the essence of the maneuvers, look, you her ... some words: "eyewash" ... counter-hidden and not finished.
    1. wanderer_032
      wanderer_032 11 July 2015 10: 34
      -1
      Quote: AZB15
      AZB15


      Correct comrade! good I agree with you.

      Quote: AZB15
      the hiding and unfinished counter.


      Yeah. Smell and rushing. yes
      1. dudinets
        dudinets 11 July 2015 12: 49
        +4
        it didn't smell up to you.
  8. parusnik
    parusnik 11 July 2015 10: 21
    0
    Definitely you will not comment ..
  9. cucun
    cucun 11 July 2015 10: 30
    +1
    And actually why this article?
    Maybe I'm stupid in the morning ...
  10. wanderer_032
    wanderer_032 11 July 2015 10: 32
    +9
    In general, if you call a spade a spade, at the Kiev maneuvers from the commanders and staffs it was only required not to lose their units and formations on the march

    Well, of course. Today it’s so easy to write about it. Just something business - do not lose. This is assuming that there were no modern communications at that time, and the troops were controlled mainly by wire communications (field telephone, telegraph), flag signaling (mechanized units), courier communications, etc.
    In those conditions, it was the whole thing - not to lose.

    These maneuvers were carried out with only one purpose - to show "probable friends" because of the "hillock" some of the capabilities of the young Red Army, which was created literally from the ruins of the old-regime tsarist army. In a country where civil war has recently raged, in a country that has experienced famine and devastation. In a country that was completely in decline.
    And it was this, the main task, that was completed by all the personnel of the Red Army - perfectly.
    Many foreign military attaches were really shocked, especially from those countries that took part in foreign intervention in Russia in the 20s. They saw that the young country has a combat-ready army, equipped with modern weapons and military equipment, which is focused on the use of new, operational-tactical methods and combat operations.
    Since, in no army in the world, of that period, there were neither such mechanized formations (which could operate independently), nor even airborne assault forces.

    In addition, it should be noted that such tactics of warfare at that time were generally new throughout the world.
    And so as not to embarrass the potential opponents and show them the capabilities of the army of a young country, the maneuvers were carried out in such a simplified scenario. After all, after 1935, the Red Army did not stop studying.

    At the expense of the initial period of the Second World War. If you compare how much the armies of Great Britain and France held out against the Germans then, against this background you can clearly see that the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army showed an example of great stamina and courage in such a situation. The Red Army did not capitulate to the enemy, did not give up weapons, but fought while there was even the slightest opportunity to do so. Although it was forced to retreat under the powerful and crushing blows of the enemy.

    As for the hothouse conditions, I want to say ... But weren't the French and British coalition troops in such conditions, hiding behind the Maginot Line? And yet there were beats. Although everything was in order, before the start of the war. And the troops were trained sensibly and the equipment was modern. And it all ended with the fact that the Germans threw them into the Atlantic Ocean. And it took the Germans much less time than they managed to take full control of one Soviet Brest Fortress.

    In general, it turns out interesting. Untrained and raised in "greenhouse" conditions, the Red Army repels the enemy's attack with all its might, fiercely fighting for every piece of native land, and the Anglo-French intelligently trained army eventually escapes through the English Channel ... It's all strange. Is not it?
    1. AZB15
      AZB15 11 July 2015 10: 39
      0
      wanderer_032 - do not mark the beads before ... the general staff.
      1. wanderer_032
        wanderer_032 11 July 2015 11: 18
        0
        Quote: AZB15
        wanderer_032 - do not mark the beads before ... the general staff.


        Yes, I’m not trying to do it.
        I wrote my comment so that people can look at the situation from a different point of view.
        And so that such "authors" and others like them saw and understood that the "brainwashing" in the Western way ended in failure.
        At least in my face, for sure.
    2. Alex
      Alex 11 July 2015 11: 20
      +5
      Quote: wanderer_032
      These maneuvers were carried out with only one purpose - to show "probable friends" because of the "hillock" some of the capabilities of the young Red Army, which was created literally from the ruins of the old-regime tsarist army. In a country where civil war has recently raged, in a country that has experienced famine and devastation. In a country that was completely in decline, and it was this main task that was performed by all the personnel of the Red Army - perfectly well.
      Among the foreign generals, they were also not entirely fools, they also arranged maneuvers in their countries, so they probably guessed about the existence of a scenario. But when such masses of mechanized troops passed in front of the eyes of people who had been sitting in trenches for four years, with hundreds of aircraft and excellent (at that time) tanks, I think their enthusiasm was quite sincere. As far as I remember, the German attache was seduced by a massive landing - he did not imagine that this was possible in principle. If you believe the memoirs of Dekanozov, in Berlin the report from those maneuvers was not believed for another three years, until they themselves were convinced. And mistakes ... Who doesn't have them? Exercises and maneuvers are carried out in order not so much to contemplate successes, but to identify shortcomings. So I think, hasn't 1937 become a completely natural reaction to the level of leadership of the entire army as a whole? Who then "ruled" the Red Army is well known. Maybe the reports were not found in the archive because they did not exist in nature?
      1. AZB15
        AZB15 11 July 2015 13: 06
        +2
        As far as I remember, the best in the world at the beginning of the 40's airborne forces, and these are German, began to form precisely under the influence of the Kiev landing.
  11. kunstkammer
    kunstkammer 11 July 2015 10: 47
    +6
    The article is completely NOT fair.
    Did you forget that there was 35 year in the yard? The Red Army has just begun to switch to new full-time structures. For example, tank brigades began to form precisely in the 35 year. And much more was just new. And their actions in battle were not worked out at all.
    Not only for the Red Army was much not known. In the world also, many simply did not know the tactics and strategy of using the new troops. There was no where to get the experience from.
    Of course, there were many shortcomings in the training of fighters and equipment.
    However, what are the exercises planned for? Especially this level.
    According to the author, in order to topple the troops into a heap of mala, as a result, poke all the commanders with their nose into the mud and make themselves the best connoisseur of military art.
    Everything around ....., one author in white!
    It is a shame!
    The author did not like the preparation of the teachings!
    And to throw such a mass of troops (in fact, recently formed) into the "meat grinder" of unprepared exercises is a direct way to disrupt them altogether.
    The task of any exercise is not to carry commanders and troops in the face in shit, but to show how to correctly, competently and effectively achieve the task.
    Tankmen inspected the field of the upcoming "battle"? What a trouble!
    But what about the well-known principle - equestrian on foot? When the commanders of all levels on foot practice all their possible actions on the terrain of the forthcoming "battles". And it is right!
    You can’t throw people there - I don’t know where to do that - I don’t know what.
    Each soldier must know his maneuver! Suvorov also said.
    Do you see the documents developed in advance? What a jerk!
    And why do different headquarters exist in peacetime? Namely, to work out in advance all possible, in particular, documents.
    The author does not know the work of headquarters and commanders.
    Deficiencies in the troops? So in order to do so, such exercises are held that both commanders and soldiers study and then correct these shortcomings.
    You cannot immediately build an aircraft carrier (millionth regular army), having in the track record the construction of only small minesweepers (territorial troops).
    The Red Army has just begun the construction of its future victory in World War II. It is such teachings that give the vector of further development and study. Even with many flaws.
    I think the article is simply biased.

    Py.Sy. I thought, maybe the author of the article really believes that after the exercises he needs to ride a white horse and spit through the lip to stomp all the commanders into the mud? Well this is his business.
    I always considered any exercises to be just the next, but the most important stage in the training of troops. And for me it was important that the flaws were identified and then eliminated. And if the shortcomings were eliminated during the exercises themselves - this was an occasion to note for the better the actions of the commanders.
  12. Aleksandr72
    Aleksandr72 11 July 2015 11: 19
    +6
    The state of combat training of the Red Army is well illustrated by this document: Act on the admission of the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Union comrade Timoshenko S.K. from comrade Voroshilova K.E. from 07.05.1940/1935/XNUMX - more details can be found here: http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/akt-vor-tim.shtml. And the Kiev maneuvers of XNUMX is a large army window dressing, which has nothing to do with the real situation in the Red Army in terms of the level of training of soldiers and commanders.
    1. wanderer_032
      wanderer_032 11 July 2015 16: 34
      0
      Quote: Aleksandr72
      And the Kiev maneuvers of 1935 is a large army window dressing, which has nothing to do with the real situation in the Red Army in terms of the level of training of soldiers and commanders.


      All activities are evaluated according to the final result.
      The end result is the start of the war.
      It can be seen from it that despite the heavy defeats of the first period of the Second World War, the Red Army continued to fight and inflict serious losses on the enemy. The final result of the Second World War - Soviet troops in Berlin.
      By the way, if you ask any commander, any military formation today, whether he and his subordinates have enough weapons, military equipment and other military equipment to carry out their tasks, then he will unequivocally say that there isn’t.
      The same answer would have been under the USSR at the peak of its military power, the same was under the tsarist regime. In general, it has always been so.
      Because: Bad is the commander who does not want to have more and better at his disposal to ensure the actions of his fighters. wink laughing
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 12 July 2015 18: 38
        -2
        for wanderer_032:
        "Any activity is evaluated according to the final result." ///

        If you attach your point of view to firefighters, for example,
        it turns out that the firefighters who put out the house at the cost of death
        half of its personnel, with half in the house
        tenants are excellent professionals.

        It is unlikely that they will agree ... They will say that if enough water had been prepared and the stairs were of sufficient length, then many victims could have been avoided.
  13. yurta2015
    yurta2015 11 July 2015 11: 36
    +3
    The author's stubbornness with which he tries at all costs to prove that the combat training of the Red Army for the beginning of the 1937-1938 repressions is striking. was very bad. This is his third or fourth article on the site devoted to this topic. The author, in essence, does not hide the goals of these "titanic" efforts. Its task is to present the repressed commanders as traitors or inept people harmful to the Red Army, whose work made it completely incapable of combat, from which it follows that the elimination of such commanders was a necessity, and not a crime of the Stalinist regime. However, to prove this conclusion, it is necessary to know the state of the army not only under the repressed commanders, but also before and after them. Only then can one discover exactly what harm they have done. Meanwhile, in none of his articles, the author does not even try to compare the combat training of the Red Army in 1935-1937. with the level of her training in the 20s, early 30s or at the very end of the 30s. As a result, all his accusations hang in the air and the guilt of the repressed commanders in the collapse of the army remains unproven.
    1. AZB15
      AZB15 11 July 2015 12: 38
      +2
      Yes, what kind of training is there in the middle of the 20's. I read a book on the Navy, so after the civilian one of the big problems in the port of Sevastopol (or the Navy - as you like) was the absence of VETOSHA !!!

      There were no rags in the country, read this carefully, experts x ..... And after 14, hundreds of tanks traveled and aircraft flew.
    2. Princely
      Princely 11 July 2015 13: 25
      -2
      Oh, how smart, and what else you need to prove. The Patriotic War proved to all the cunning and crooks that the training of the army turned out to be extremely low in reality.
      And the command staff is not capable of at least on equal terms to conduct military operations against the Wehrmacht. The article shows very well how the shortcomings identified in the 1935 year at the Kiev maneuvers were not corrected and were fought with them until the middle of the 1943 year.
      It’s mediocre scoops and the fifth column trying to protect the scum and hidden enemies who did not allow the Red Army to be an effective modern army at a time when all the opportunities for this were, including the support of Stalin, who at that time was successful in the so-called “military opposition” temporarily cheat.
      I was not surprised by the howling and fury of the current fifth column and liberals against clarifying the role of the mediocre scoops and fifth column at that time in military construction and the conduct of the Second World War.
      The enemies and methods of sabotage are traditional, in the war against our people. I propose to continue to clarify the role of the Red Army command staff at that time in military construction and the conduct of the Great Patriotic War.
      The article is a huge plus.
      1. kunstkammer
        kunstkammer 11 July 2015 15: 42
        +2
        This mediocre scoops and the fifth column are trying to protect the scum and hidden enemies

        и
        the howl and rage of the current fifth column and the liberals are against trying to figure out the role of worthless scoops

        So scoops and 5 column with the liberals already together?
        And who else in your sophisticated imagination exists? What do you yourself relate to what camp?
        Potreotov?
        But these persons, by definition, should stand for "sovoks" ... And the scoops, along with the liberals (this is your opinion) ... just some kind of mysticism!
        You already decide: "either put on your panties, or remove the cross"!
        1. Princely
          Princely 11 July 2015 17: 12
          0
          "So the scoops and the 5th column with the liberals are already together?" For now, so sure.
          Today, scoops, and liberals, and the fifth column, and the sixth column (masters of underground wrecking) are friends in the struggle to distort history.
          Your Jewish jokes are not applicable to me!
      2. wanderer_032
        wanderer_032 11 July 2015 16: 52
        0
        Quote: Prince
        Oh, how smart, and what else you need to prove. The Patriotic War proved to all the cunning and crooks that the training of the army turned out to be extremely low in reality.


        And in what years was she tall?
        As my friend (hereditary Cossack, by the way) says:
        We are constantly preparing for war - and are not always ready for it. laughing
      3. radar1967
        radar1967 12 July 2015 04: 24
        -1
        I agree. The mediocre and frightened NKVD commanders of the Red Army did not know how to attack "rolls", "assault groups" and "behind the barrage". They killed millions of gullible Soviet boys. MILLIONS !!! TENS OF MILLIONS !!!
        Zhukov's quote: "..then we were just learning to fight."
        If someone says that our commanders knew how to attack otherwise than to run at once with the whole crowd at an unsuppressed machine gun - it’s a lie. Not in one book, in any movie have I ever seen anything like it. There is nothing in any memory. These commanders were killers. Voluntarily or involuntarily they killed the world's best people. People brought up with the highest ideals in the world. The commander must go to trial, but not comply with a criminal order. This is his task, and courage. These figures have been tearing through empty trenches for years and clearing minefields with penal battalions.

        The Great Patriotic War was taken out on its ridge by artillery, which corrected everything that the brave red commanders had contrived. Plus, nobody knows the rear, who plundered tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft.

        But any infantry lieutenant of the Wehrmacht could tell this simple tactic during interrogation. Those who have tried it know that it’s really effective. Losses are several times less. MILLIONS WOULD BE ALIVE !!!
        Question: why for so long could they not adopt his strong methods of combat work from the enemy? What prevented the interrogation of German specialists (pilots, tankmen, foot soldiers) back in June 1941? Pride? Stupidity? Bullying? Or God's punishment for what they did in 1917 and 37gg?
      4. yurta2015
        yurta2015 12 July 2015 07: 33
        0
        Quote: Prince
        The article shows very well how the shortcomings identified in the 1935 year at the Kiev maneuvers were not corrected and were fought with them until the middle of the 1943 year.

        It turns out that the repression of commanders in 1937-1938. were in vain, since nothing has changed? So it was not in these commanders? So they were not to blame? So their destruction was a crime of the Stalinist system? And now imagine that these commanders would meet in the ranks of the Red Army for 1941. Tukhachevsky and his entourage were supporters of the continuous improvement of the combat skills of fighters and commanders. To do this, they conducted annual maneuvers. Thus, before the start of the war, they would have managed to carry out 4-5 combined-arms maneuvers that would certainly add combat skill to commanders and soldiers. The experience of those commanders would increase at least threefold (before the 1935 year, large maneuvers were carried out only in the 1928 year, and also under Tukhachevsky). How much more prepared would our army be in the 1941 year.
        1. Princely
          Princely 12 July 2015 10: 38
          0
          Masters of window dressing and imitation will only improve in this in the future, and not learn a very complicated real military business.
          The creators of the imitation army under no circumstances change their brains.
          The imitators knew that they would have to answer for their many years of criminal actions and therefore planned a coup to continue the imitation of the entire state now (now the heirs of those imitators managed to seize the state apparatus in the Russian Federation)
          1. yurta2015
            yurta2015 13 July 2015 17: 05
            0
            And yet, in 1937 -1938 years. imitators repressed, or they remained to harm the Red Army until the Second World War? After all, you claim that up to the 1943 year, the Red Army was pursued by the same shortcomings as in the 1935 year. Maybe not those repressed? Or not all? Would an additional bloodletting of the commanding staff improve our army?
  14. lubesky
    lubesky 11 July 2015 12: 31
    +5
    An interesting analysis, plus the author for such work. And now about the cons. The so-called "eyewash" is recognized by comparison. I did not see where the author points out, for example - but in Germany there were large-scale exercises such and such without eyewash, but in Britain there were real large-scale combat exercises of the fleet and coastal artillery together with aviation and the development of air defense ... there was nothing close on such a scale in those years. And again, the author claims to be analyzed as a graduate of the military Academy of the General Staff, but he is unlikely to be. Did the author personally conduct the "game" at least several battalions in peacetime ? Does he know how difficult it is in practice and how many cumulative factors must be taken into account? Nothing has been said about the benefits of those Kiev games - after them more than one analysis was carried out. War "games" of the general headquarters are games, they are therefore called so that they imitate great maneuvers in peacetime. This is not the first time I have seen here the statement that the preparation of the Red Army was inadequate, this is outright disinformation. Where is the comparison with the preparation of other countries? Dean OSOAVIAKHIM only trained hundreds of thousands of highly qualified specialists, there was no analogue to this level of training anywhere in the world, arguing with me, one here compared OSOAVIAKHIM with Hitlerjungand - but excuse me, this is a children's camp for young fanatics, how can you compare at all? I repeat once again, the main problem and cause of the catastrophe in the summer of 41 was not an insignificant level of training of the Red Army. The level of training was at the level.
    Again, the author accuses the 35th General Staff of "greenhouse" conditions and knowing all the conditions in advance, and himself, conducting a deep analysis, is in the comfort zone and greenhouse conditions that the 35th General Staff could only dream of! The author proceeds in his analysis from ALREADY known facts of history and knows everything in advance. It's interesting how the author would conduct exercises of this magnitude while in the terrible situation of 1935, when the world was heading towards World War II, knowing nothing about the results of the war and facts from history ...
  15. washi
    washi 11 July 2015 12: 38
    0
    Read the discussion of actions on Lake Hassan.
    Then defend Blucher with the company.
    Then read the proposals of Tukhachevsky on the development of military equipment, count how much finance is ditched and drowned again and become a lawyer
    1. yurta2015
      yurta2015 13 July 2015 17: 16
      0
      This is about what to read? About the direct and comprehensive support of Tukhachevsky on the creation of rocket technology in the USSR? About the creation of Soviet airborne troops? About attempts to create anti-aircraft artillery, capable of fighting with enemy ground equipment? The Germans succeeded in this idea. Their anti-aircraft guns during the years of the Second World War were successfully used against the heaviest Soviet tanks. Yes, there were mistakes. But how can you do without them, following the unbeaten path of innovation in military affairs, which sometimes gives substantial superiority over the enemy in a future war (remember the same Katyusha, the work on the creation of which also began under Tukhachevsky).
  16. The comment was deleted.
  17. AZB15
    AZB15 11 July 2015 12: 48
    0
    Quote: Vasya
    Read the discussion of actions on Lake Hassan.
    Then defend Blucher with the company.
    Then read the proposals of Tukhachevsky on the development of military equipment, count how much finance is ditched and drowned again and become a lawyer


    Oh Vasya, Vasya ... Blucher drank, Blucher piled on. And who wrote this analysis and in what years? And was the USSR ready for a full-scale war in the Far East, eh? In the early days, the government did not indulge in anything with directives. And Blucher was practically the first leader in the whole Far East and thought with his head, not ...
    And if the Japanese fleet came up and leveled Vladivostok, etc., etc., and, in principle, apart from Vladik and Khabara, there was nothing more to level off. And at that time, the Japanese went to Kamchatka as if to their home. What would we be fighting off the fleet, al? Look at your composition of the Nuclear Physics and Pacific Fleet at that time.
    And if the Japanese were captured in the event of a full-scale war, the defenseless S. Sakhalin, Kamchatka, and Commanders would have landed troops from the defeated Vladik and waiting for the defeat of Komsomolsk, had arranged the massacre and calmed down on this - who would they shoot while hanging?

    It’s just that the task of the Japanese was to conduct reconnaissance in battle, and not to start a war, otherwise it wouldn’t seem to us, at least with Blucher, even without it.
  18. AZB15
    AZB15 11 July 2015 13: 20
    0
    Look, I wrote in a controversy about the fleet, it became even more interesting. As it did not think before. Indeed, what were my favorite "congas" doing at that time? Here you understand, the samurai are slaughtered for nothing, and the Moremans are somewhere in women, but in taverns. An interesting point, I'll go read it.
  19. AZB15
    AZB15 11 July 2015 13: 53
    0
    Quote: Prince
    Oh, how smart, and what else you need to prove. The Patriotic War proved to all the cunning and crooks that the training of the army turned out to be extremely low in reality.
    And the command staff is not capable of at least on equal terms to conduct military operations against the Wehrmacht. The article shows very well how the shortcomings identified in the 1935 year at the Kiev maneuvers were not corrected and were fought with them until the middle of the 1943 year.
    It’s mediocre scoops and the fifth column trying to protect the scum and hidden enemies who did not allow the Red Army to be an effective modern army at a time when all the opportunities for this were, including the support of Stalin, who at that time was successful in the so-called “military opposition” temporarily cheat.
    I was not surprised by the howling and fury of the current fifth column and liberals against clarifying the role of the mediocre scoops and fifth column at that time in military construction and the conduct of the Second World War.
    The enemies and methods of sabotage are traditional, in the war against our people. I propose to continue to clarify the role of the Red Army command staff at that time in military construction and the conduct of the Great Patriotic War.
    The article is a huge plus.



    I don’t have to prove anything. I myself am very smart. A nimble not me, but you, just nimble. Besides, I didn’t pass the pigs with YOU, and didn’t drink on a brooder, so please be so kind ....
    One simple idea never crossed your mind. And who actually taught the future paints? Is it not a bastard of the nobility, a white bone that has gone over to the side of the working people? Who prevented the paints themselves from self-education and improvement. Probably the same thing that hindered the officers of RIA in Kuprin's story "Duel", if you've heard and read about this.

    And the fact that the Kraskoms in the initial period of the Second World War ticked like hares from their own troops, and some people like Admiral Oktyabrsky are generally ashamed to write, is generally a fact confirmed by hundreds of evidence. Links to distribute?
    1. Princely
      Princely 11 July 2015 18: 01
      0
      The Russian imperial army did not retreat to Moscow, to Petrograd, to Tsaritsin, to Ekaterinoslav. RIA was mean, treacherously destroyed from the inside by the Jewish masons, liberals of that time, and the fifth column (from any revolutionary scum and brainless cattle).
      The level of training and action in the war among officers and podofitsery and lower ranks of the RIA corresponded to the high world level of that time.
      It was all the Tukhachevskys and other revolutionary lads who fooled everyone, including Stalin, for the time being, by the fact that it was necessary to discard all the rules and laws of the old military science, since they "see" firmly know and are able to implement the new rules and the laws of military science and the laws of military development, and the conduct of war on the basis of revolutionism, proletarianism, socialism, communism, some sort of progressiveness, etc.
      Judging by the style of your koment, you are very far from the nobility and don’t know anything about it (read more and carefully, at least the same Kuprin).
      In the twenties and thirties of the twentieth century, the Soviet Russian army could not be created due to the opposition of the explicit and implicit enemies of the Russian people.
      1. Roman 11
        Roman 11 11 July 2015 22: 00
        0
        Quote: Prince
        The RIA was mean, treacherously destroyed from the inside by the Jewish masons, liberals of that time, and the fifth column (from any revolutionary scum and brainless cattle).

        Tochnyak, Stalin was then in the ranks of the 5th column ....... although the vast majority consider him to be an agent of the tsarist secret police - they just tell me at work that you should be dry, Koba, this police officer is 6, although he in the WWI, he was also involved in the revolutionaries ........ That's how I still get confused who he was - the 5th, or the 6th ??
  20. fa2998
    fa2998 11 July 2015 18: 21
    +1
    Quote: erased
    Khalkin-Gol, Hassan and Finnish highlighted all the gaps and problems of the army, after which, in fact, a radical restructuring began.

    And why do maneuvers and exercises! To check the combat readiness of the army. And do not write laudatory reports, and reforms should begin after the maneuvers. Even before the Finnish 4 years. Or we begin to think when a lot of soldiers shed blood. hi
  21. AZB15
    AZB15 11 July 2015 19: 19
    -1
    [quote = Knyazural] The Russian imperial army did not retreat to Moscow, to Petrograd, to Tsaritsin, to Ekatirinoslav. RIA was mean, treacherously destroyed from the inside by the Jewish masons, liberals of that time, and the fifth column (from any revolutionary scum and brainless cattle).
    The level of training and action in the war among officers and podofitsery and lower ranks of the RIA corresponded to the high world level of that time.
    This is all sorts of Tukhachevsky and other revolutionary b



    It turned out interesting about the nobility ... Well, on my mother’s side, everything is clear - Ukrainian hereditary peasants, but on my father’s Volga-Tatar ... Although my father grew up in an orphanage near Stalingrad, I also had the surname Tatar-princely. Here at my current place of residence in Ukraine I have been told more than once that before, hmm, before .. let's just say: I would enjoy great respect in Crimea for changing the state of the Crimea, just because of my surname.
    Unfortunately, there are no more parents for a long time, and on the Tatar line I don’t know my roots at all. So, it is still unknown which of us is more a nobleman. Naturally, I do not know anything about the inner world of a social layer that is alien to me, just as you have no doubt, despite the nickname. Although it’s already that you didn’t begin to bullish, and switched to a polite treatment, it says that you are not completely hopeless in terms of upbringing.

    About the valor of RIA. You know, it is difficult to write about your own people, you can always freak out more freely, let's say about the Japanese-Amers-Germans, etc., but here, after all, are compatriots. But if you look from where (Poland) our army was rolling back, then a lot of questions will arise about "to Moscow" and about "to Stalingrad". In addition, if you do not know, but you do not know, our front in 1 MV was still secondary for the Germans, because Wilhelm did not give up hopes of getting his not very smart cousin out of the war. The Germans did not believe to the last that our EIV would dump such a fool and climb up to fight with them, climbed,.

    You just think that the Germans would enter the 1915 in the Baltic, pass the Central position, and they would pass it according to anyone, Moonsund is proof of this, would level Kronstadt with the Baltic elevation zero (in the well, I saw), and they would he was leveled, the Kronstad rebellion is a proof of this, and entered the Hochseeflotte with all its beauty into the Marquis puddle ... That would have been a number, right?

    Tukhachevsky and company. Y-yes. The most difficult question. I personally think that it is not me, not you, and none of those present at this forum to judge this. There is too little information for our court about what was there with the weapons, programs and conspiracy, God knows. Well, yes, Kurchevsky's guns, but who knew what and how? Then for the "Mistral" it is necessary to the entire top of the current order ... Weakly bring a charge in court?

    Enemies, Freemasons, Jewish Freemasons, Liberals, destroyed ... I don't even know if this is for you to go to the National Bolsheviks, Nationalists, or the People's Front ... About the revolutionary bastard, you are strong !!! Cool!!! Hammer, bl ...

    In conclusion. PODOFITSERS in the RUSSIAN IMPERIAL ARMY - THIS MOTHER-RENEW WHO ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????
    1. Princely
      Princely 11 July 2015 20: 07
      +1
      "PODOFITSERS in the RUSSIAN IMPERIAL ARMY - IT'S MOTHER-RENEWING WHO ?????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ”. I answer your question in your own style: these are FELDFEBEL and VACHMISTERS and all sorts of warrant officers.
      The nobility is a high calling and falling below is prohibited under any circumstances of life.
      On your part, I saw a meaningless stream of ill-conceived knowledge and desires.
      But you need to control yourself always and thereby show respect for others.
    2. Roman 11
      Roman 11 11 July 2015 22: 15
      0
      Quote: AZB15
      PODOFITSERS in the RUSSIAN IMPERIAL ARMY - THIS MOTHER-RENEW WHO ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????

      The ensigns of the tsar were different from the Soviet as heaven and earth! Many historians say this. The IRA officers were highly moral, the honor was in use ....... but not infrequently, the average and junior officers were cruel to the soldiers. And even the highest, for example, sensible, even the gifted Admiral Kolchak, beat the mountaineer for a minor misconduct, there were many cases of cruelty to subordinates and ordinary people, especially civil.
  22. AZB15
    AZB15 11 July 2015 20: 42
    0
    Quote: Prince
    "PODOFITSERS in the RUSSIAN IMPERIAL ARMY - IT'S MOTHER-RENEWING WHO ?????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ”. I answer your question in your own style: these are FELDFEBEL and VACHMISTERS and all sorts of warrant officers.
    The nobility is a high calling and falling below is prohibited under any circumstances of life.
    On your part, I saw a meaningless stream of ill-conceived knowledge and desires.
    But you need to control yourself always and thereby show respect for others.



    You, self-named vashsiyas, will learn how to say, materiel, then you will know that there are non-commissioned officers and that there are subofficers.
    Do you profess Buddhism or Confucianism? Inspired ... Maybe indulge in yoga?

    Eh, I could not resist, I will add. But at the end of the 80-beginning of 90 when no one was too lazy to gather the nobility - the noblemen wrote out letters, how does it feel like hereditary or personal, or does it relate differently?
  23. Roman 11
    Roman 11 11 July 2015 22: 36
    0
    The essence of the exercises is to demonstrate the power and try to impress military delegations by the interaction of military branches, their mass character, the presence of military branches - which were not at all in the West (Airborne Forces). Massive air strikes, landing, a large amount of equipment - all this should have affected the difficult political situation after the Nazis came to power, showing that in the east there is an army that is not equal in the world in a number of ways. It is generally accepted that the demonstration of force was a success, before the attaché had not seen such exercises ... It remains to supplement that Turovsky commanded the blue, the Dubova red. The exercises were conducted by I.E. Yakir (Photo)
  24. bbss
    bbss 12 July 2015 01: 56
    0
    By the way, we owe to the heroes of the oncoming battles of June-July of the 41st the collapse of all the Germans' plans for an early victory. Remember their unpreparedness for the autumn-winter battles. They did not intend to mess around for a long time.
  25. moskowit
    moskowit 12 July 2015 12: 23
    +1
    Quote: Vladimirets
    Quote: moskowit
    Tactical exercises of the rifle troops took place in the classes ??? !!!

    90's did not serve? wink

    You, dear, have forgotten that in the 90 years we did not have a state. And if some state institutions functioned, then thanks to a number of patriots and ascetics. So, the state of our valiant army in those years is not a good example for comparison.
    I served at the beginning of the 70's in motorized rifle troops. Classes were held in the field, in any weather ...
  26. Arikkhab
    Arikkhab 15 July 2015 16: 52
    0
    a little off topic, but there is an analysis of the Soviet tank fleet before the war
    http://maxpark.com/community/129/content/734761