Syrian lull
Iranian military presence will grow, Turkey's influence will decline
The “Arab Spring”, as is known, has stalled in Syria. More precisely, the strategy of the Salafi monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula - Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, which joined them in anticipation of easy production - in this country faced not only the interests of Iran, the willingness of the Shiites of Iraq and Lebanon to support Al-Assad, the political blockade of the Western intervention in the UN Security Council from Russia and China, but also with the inability to reset the regime in Damascus with the help of the Syrian Sunnis and deserters from the national armed forces, even with the participation of foreign fighters.
The ethno-confessional mosaic of Syria meant that a large proportion of its population in the event of a victory over Assad by radical Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood (BM), Jabhat al-Nusra (NAM), Islamic State (IG) and other Sunni paramilitary structures danger of genocide. What provided the government army not only the support of the Alawi rear, but also the neutrality of such large communities as the Druze and Kurds, no less important in the context of the civil war, as the jihadists approach in battle with them.
“The option that Moscow will surrender Assad, the delegation of Saudi Arabia kept in mind during a recent visit to St. Petersburg”
Does this mean the possibility of restoring the pre-war order in Syria after the victory of official Damascus? Not. An unequivocal victory of any of the opposition forces? Moreover, no. Any alliances, including in the Islamist camp, as practice shows, are temporary and are replaced by open clashes. Fortunately, if Qatar and Turkey can still form a long-term alliance based on the general support of the BM, their relations with Saudi Arabia only give a chance to conclude short-term agreements like the recent one, which allowed the Islamists to successfully attack Ramadi, Idlib and other strategically important cities of Iraq and Syria, transferring their forces from one direction to another. So the situation on the “Syrian front” is changing dynamically and along with it - the assessments of observers and experts, whose opinion is taken into account by the powers that be, primarily the leaders of the Western powers, who calculate the possibility (and danger) of their own involvement in this civil war.
I offer our readers an analysis of the situation in Syria and around it, based on the articles of experts from the Institute of the Middle East A. Alexandrov, S. Balmasov, V. Chernin and Yu. Shcheglovina. These materials reflect the current situation, and this is valuable. So, from the point of view of experts of the CIA of the USA, it is “fraught with the imminent fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad” (assessments of this kind are given not for the first year). They believe the loss of Idlib and the Islamists' access to the operational expanse of the northern part of Aleppo province as a turning point in the war, assessing the peace agreement between opposition groups and their sponsors - Qatar, the Saudis and Turkey - as permanent. At the same time, the fact that government forces and Hezbollah troops kept under control the corridor from the Bekaa Valley through Damascus, Homs and Ham to Latakia and the coast, which allows for the supply of Assad troops in these areas, is completely ignored.
CIA forecasts
The CIA believes that the upcoming offensive of the Islamic State on Homs and Ham, with a lack of reserves at Assad, will break the situation and does not believe in Iran’s ability to change that. Government forces are keeping strategic centers under control: Damascus, Latakia and Homs, but the coordinated actions of their opponents, in the opinion of the Americans, will change this in a relatively short time, which puts the issue of Syria on Washington’s agenda after Bashar Asad is removed from power and emigrate. After that, the Alawite community, predicts the CIA, will nominate from its midst a leader who will lead negotiations on the establishment of an interim government, which will remove obstacles to participation in the talks of all opposition forces except the IG. In the long-term plans - the creation of a single bloc of political forces in Syria to inflict a military defeat on the IG.
The participation of the Alawites in the transitional government, from the point of view of the United States, is necessary not to repeat the Iraqi mistake, when the isolation of local Sunnis by Shiites and Kurds during the “de-aaization” led to the actual disintegration of the country. Sounding Alawite sentiments are currently being conducted by Washington, who believes that Ankara and Riyadh will be persuaded to put pressure on Jabhat al-Fath (DF), which they supervise, for this grouping to sit at the negotiating table with the Syrian regime "without Asad." The success of negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program, on which the US is staking, must convince Saudi Arabia and Qatar of the need, after lifting sanctions from Iran, to reduce its influence in Syria according to the American scheme. As for Russia, the United States believes that Moscow will surrender Assad. June 2 in closed negotiations, this scenario was proposed to the Saudis by the Americans and the French. It was he who kept in mind the delegation of Saudi Arabia, led by the son of the king, "heir to the heir," during a visit to St. Petersburg in mid-June.
The implementation of these plans is questionable. Islamists are on the rise, which excludes their willingness to negotiate. The task of Riyadh is to involve Syria in the orbit of its influence and complete dominance on its territory when Iran is forced out of this country. Almost inevitably, the beginning of the internecine struggle of the IG and Jabhat al-Fath. As for the alternative to the Islamists, the United States does not have it. Alawites and Kurds do not believe the plans to incorporate their representatives into the interim government, knowing that they will be pushed into the traditional areas of residence and will not be able to return to power. For the Alawites, giving up power means genocide with the same neutrality of the West as demonstrated by the US and the EU in the situation with Iraqi Yezids. There is no future in the same government of Syria with the Islamists and the Druze, the Ismailis, Christians and members of other minorities.
Tehran will not joke
Iran will also not exchange Syria for any nuclear concessions. The fall of the Alawite regime in Damascus has disastrous consequences for the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Shiite government in Baghdad. In the event that the situation develops according to the American scenario, Tehran will intervene in Syria by forces of the personnel units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Under this scenario, there, with the participation of the IRGC units, airfields are being prepared to receive transport aviation. Moreover, with the implementation of the American version and the start of the “all against all” struggle, only the IG that will begin to dominate in Syria will benefit, after which the country will turn into an analogue of Libya. And this will have extremely negative consequences not only for neighboring Turkey, but also for Europe, where the main flow of Syrian refugees and, in the long term, terrorists will go.
It is reported about the possibility of entering into Syria the 15 of the thousandth Iranian military contingent. It is about two groups: on the Mediterranean coast between Latakia and Tartus - in the Banias area and near Damascus. For Iran, this is not a cardinal change in strategy, but only an expansion of a permanent military presence (including commanders), which has been celebrated since December 2011. Already in 2012, there was evidence of the appearance in Syria of significant groups of Iranian "pilgrims", some of whom were volunteers who came to fight against jihadists. At the same time, the allies of Iran took part in the battles on the side of Damascus - the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Shiite Iraqi militia.In 2013 – 2014, fighters from the leadership of the corps, who took personal part in the fighting, appeared in Syria. In January, BNG General Mohammad Allahdadi was killed as a result of an Israeli air strike in Quneitra in January, and in April of the same year, Major General XIER Hadi Qajbaf was killed in a battle with opposition units in 2015 kilometers south of Damascus. Strengthening the Iranian military presence in Syria in a situation in which Assad does not control half of the country’s territory and two-thirds of border crossings is quite logical. Given the failures made by the Syrian security forces, which resulted in the current situation, Iranian advisers in Damascus increased their influence on the planning and implementation of military operations. Their strategy to combat jihadists is to actively defend nodal centers and communications and destroy the jihadist units with the prevailing firepower of the Syrian army in Iran’s leadership in combat operations.
Druze is in trouble
At the time of writing, one of the main changes in the operational situation was the refusal of opposition members from the Syrian Free Army (SSA) in the south of the country — in the province of Quneitra, to view the Islamists from Jabhat al-Fath as their allies. The SSA commanders claim that the DF substituted them during the battles for Damascus and attacked the close FSA structures in the north of the country. In Kuneitra, there is a struggle for local centers, including the provincial capital. DF conducts independent operations in the Hadera area. Its main purpose is to control the logistics channels, which will allow cutting off the SSA from the north of the country. The situation is typical and largely dependent on sources of financial support from abroad. The overwhelming majority of FD fighters in the south are Sunnis, who earn money from the war and, on occasion, deserting to the one who pays the most. The same thing happened in the north, when the Islamists bought up fighters from their partners in combat against Assad.
Government forces have so far managed to stabilize the situation. The loyal Kurds of Damascus took control of Tel Abyad and the road between it and Rakka, which remains one of the main IG reference points in Syria. IG detachments leave the encirclement through the Suluk area, southwest of Tel Abyad. In case of surrender to Raqqi, IG supporters take families out of the city. If they lose Raqqa, the main supply corridor of the IS on the Turkish border from its bases in Iraq will be cut, which will limit the possibility of maneuvering the IS and sending reinforcements to it. The Syrian army knocked out the Islamists from a part of the territory they previously captured an air force base in Suwayda. In addition, the SSA troops began to withdraw from the Al-Tala air force base in the south, with the Druze militia supporting the army. And their negotiations with the SSA on mutual neutrality failed. Initially, the Druze sheikhs did not support the mobilization of their youth in the Assad army. However, supporters of "true Islam", who consider Druzes to be heretics, having begun their persecution, radically changed the situation.
The situation in Syria, therefore, characterizes the relative calm. Damascus forces of Kurds and Druze partially seized the initiative, strengthening the forces of the Iraqi and Lebanese Shiites defense of the capital, Homs and Aleppo. The release of the Air Force bases created the conditions for Assad to deploy the wing and to ensure air superiority. An attempt to create an alliance of anti-Assad forces with the distribution of areas of responsibility fails both between secular and Islamist groups in the south, and in Aleppo, between the DF and the IG. Prosaudian Islamists are under pressure from the Lebanese Hezbollah in the Kalamoun area on the Lebanese-Syrian border, which threatens their connection with the rear bases in Lebanon. Given the onset of Ramadan, major military operations in the near future is not expected. Go local battles. Offensive operations are being prepared, which should begin in the second half of July.
We note that the threat of the Druze genocide, which became a reality after the Syrian army left the inhabited areas, led to the Druze of Israel, demanding from Jerusalem to intervene in what is happening in Syria, especially when the shelling of the Druze villages in the Khader region adjacent to the border with Israel began . The Jewish state media reported on the Druze talks with opposition forces about non-aggression, guarantors of which were Jordan, the United States and Saudi Arabia. It was alleged that the negotiations from the Druze were led by the Lebanese Druze Walid Jumblatt and Marouane Hamed, who heads the “Military Council of the Druze in Syria”. There was a message about the opening of the passage from Jordan to the Druze Mountains region (the Syrian governorate of al-Suwayd) for delivery to the friends weapons and military equipment.
Experts believe that if the decentralization of Syria is consolidated, an attempt by the Druze to restore the Druze state that existed in the governorate of al-Suwayd under the protectorate of France in 1921 – 1936 is possible. Druze districts are able to control their territory and have the rudiments of an army, the chief of the General Staff of which is the aforementioned M. Hamed.
The friends of Syria rely on the support of fellow believers in Lebanon and Israel, although they do not break off relations with Damascus. It should be noted that the support provided by V. Jumblat to the Syrian Druze may also affect Lebanon: if the Druze state becomes a reality, the territorial integrity of this country, which is already dubious, will be in doubt what can push Lebanese Druze with Hezbollah.
Turkish factor is weakening
One of the key countries, the situation in which affects Syria, is Turkey, whose leader - former Prime Minister and incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is among the main opponents of Bashar Assad. The defeat of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) headed by him in the recent elections, which resulted in her losing a majority in parliament, means that Turkish activity in Syria has a chance to decline compared with the pre-election period when it was unprecedented. An example of Turkish policy in this area was demonstrated when in November 2013 and January 2014, the Turkish gendarmerie detained four trucks carrying weapons to Syria. The Turkish opposition stated that they belong to the MIT special services. The conclusion of the Turkish-Saudi-Qatari agreements on mutual coordination of work with the Syrian armed opposition prompted Ankara to help both the Muslim Brotherhood and the troops of the Syrian Turkomans, and the pro-Saudi NAM, which helped the Islamists to go on the offensive in the north.
At the same time, it was their support by Erdogan that caused the defeat of the AKP in the Kurdish regions and provinces bordering Syria. The number of deputies of the AKP from the border with Syria vilayets Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa decreased by half. This is attributed to dissatisfaction of the residents of the border provinces with the influx of Syrian refugees and fears about IS militants and other jihadist structures. In five Kurdish provinces, the defeat of the AKP is even more impressive. It was caused by the fact that in the autumn battles for Kobani, the Turkish government sabotaged assistance to the Kurds, who were repelled by the IS. As a consequence, Erdogan’s Syrian policy is criticized by both the Kurds and the right-wing nationalist action party (MHP), which holds ultra-nationalist positions, and the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP), which demands to shift the focus of Turkish foreign policy from the Middle East to the European Union.
Note that, along with the onset of the Jabhat al-Fatah coalition in the north of Syria, the armed opposition is active in the Damascus region. The leader of the Jaish al-Islam group (JI) Zahran Allush 6 – 8 June in Amman met with representatives of Saudi, Jordanian and American special services. Allush in September 2013 formed a coalition of JI, which included about 30 groups of radical Islamists. His group does not fight in the north and south of Syria, occupying strong positions in the metropolitan area. Allyush is controlled by Duma, a suburb of Damascus. Abu Badr, a Saudi intelligence officer, who represented Prince Mohammed bin Naef, heir to the Saudi throne, attended the meetings with him. It was about the joining of Allyush’s troops to the “southern front” in the province of Der'aa, uniting the “Syrian Revolutionary Front” of Jamal Maaruf (remnants of the SSA) and the detachments of foreign mercenaries. Allush agreed to fight against the IG (but not against the NAM) under the flag of the Syrian national coalition. In exchange, he demands that his militants be the first to enter Damascus, which illustrates the rivalry for leadership in the “new Syria” of the opponents of Assad.
As far as can be judged, any proposals by Russia “to surrender Assad” in response to the lifting or weakening of sanctions or the proposal of “exchanges” of a different kind will be adequately evaluated by Moscow. The same applies to the ideas of weakening bilateral relations with Iran in favor of Saudi Arabia, considered by its media almost as a given. Availability in recent stories Russian-Saudi relations, more than dubious moments, from the terrorist attacks, which according to experts stood the General Intelligence Directorate of the Kingdom, to the unrealized multi-billion agreements signed at the highest level, gives Russia every reason for caution.
Iran, whose gain Russia is frightened by the Saudis, in any case will take into account only its own interests. However, the coincidence of his interests in Syria with the interests of Russia, for which the victory of jihadists in this country is unacceptable, ensures the coordination of their actions. To challenge the position of Moscow on the division of Caspian resources, Tehran will not cease, but compared to its contradictions with Saudi Arabia, this is a solvable problem. In any case, it’s more than premature to talk about the resignation of Bashar al-Assad. It makes sense to consider US plans for its post-war structure only in order to assess the vision of the situation through the eyes of American experts and politicians. Fortunately, these plans have not come true in any of the countries of the Middle East, and Syria is unlikely to be an exception ...
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