Tsushima Myths (PS)




In this article we will try to deal with the question of what was the maximum speed of the Borodino-type battleships in Tsushima? Unfortunately, there are not so many data on this score as we would like. The most detailed on speed is expressed by V.P. Kostenko in his memoirs “On the Orel” in Tsushima ”and in his testimony of the Investigation Commission for the Tsushima battle, but to my deep regret, the usefulness of these data is minimal.

I was repeatedly asked the question: why I do not consider the materials of V.P. Kostenko? Indeed, it would seem, because Vladimir Polievktovich is an engineer by profession, and therefore, mechanisms are his diocese, and he must understand them much better than regular officers fleet. But the fact is that by training Kostenko was an engineer-shipbuilder, not a mechanic who is trained to operate boilers and steam engines, and by no means a development engineer of these same machines. Upon graduation, Kostenko received the title of “junior assistant shipbuilder”, i.e. civilian navy rank like a naval doctor. The release itself took place on May 6, 1904, and immediately after that Kostenko was appointed to the building "Eagle". In other words, by the time the 2nd Pacific Squadron left, yesterday’s graduate had only four months of experience working on a single building ship and had not the slightest experience in operating a ship undercarriage. This, frankly, is far from an expert level, but even mindful of the lack of experience, it is extremely difficult to explain the constant contradictions that an attentive reader will regularly meet with Vladimir Polievktovich.

To begin, consider what V.P. Kostenko about admissions tests of the battleship "Eagle". In his memoir “On the Eagle in Tsushima” we read:

On the test of the 26 mechanisms of August, the Eagle developed the 17,8 node during the design task of the 18 nodes. Given the overload of the ship, this should be considered a fairly satisfactory result.


It seems to be all clear: the battleship did not reach the design task, the ship’s construction overload was to blame, but if it hadn’t been there, then ... But it’s interesting, and with what overload did the Eagle come to the test? To do this, it would be nice to first find out the normal displacement of the ship, and why not “ask” Vladimir Polievktovich about it? Directly about this V.P. Kostenko does not speak, but in the testimony of the Commission of Inquiry indicates:

Being on the battleship "Eagle", in the march conducted observations on stability and load of the ship. Upon leaving Libau, at the first stop near Langeland Island, I determined ... displacement - 15300 tons ... overload - 1770 tons.


By simple calculations we get the normal displacement of the battleship in 13 530 tons. Well, and with what displacement the battleship came to the test? V.P. Kostenko (in the testimony of the Investigation Commission) gives a very clear answer:

On trial, the battleship Eagle gave a 17,8 node at 109 revs, but then its displacement was equal to 13.300 tons.


But let me, if the battleship "Eagle" was tested with a displacement of 13.300 tons, while according to Kostenko, its normal displacement was 13.530 tons, then what kind of overload can we talk about? After all, it turns out that the eagle went to the 230 tons underloaded, and if it were not for the underload, the speed of the battleship would be even lower, but the reason for this was not at all overload!

This is the first, but not the last example of how a person who reads V.P. Kostenko, the author will be misled. Here is what V.P. Kostenko about the speed of the "Eagle" in the bay of Nossi-Be (parking in Madagascar, where Rozhestvensky arranged training shooting):

Today, on the way back to Nossi-Be (January 18), the Eagle made revolutions 85, and the extreme limit for our 109 revolutions mechanisms. Meanwhile, while it was possible to develop the course of the entire 11 ½ nodes. The overload in the 3 thousands of tons and fouling of the underwater part.


I would like to note that the overload during firing could not make up 3000 tons, moreover, V.P. Kostenko, there would be a desire to read it carefully. But we will leave the overload and note for ourselves only that as one of the reasons for the reduction in the speed of the “Eagle” in Nossi-Be Kostenko indicates fouling of the bottom. The reason is not worse than others, but only Vladimir Polievktovich reported to the Investigation Commission something completely different:

The underwater parts of the ships overgrown very little ... in Japan, Japanese officers who saw the battleship "Eagle" entered the dock told me that the underwater part of the battleship was completely clean from the shells, which they were surprised to know that the ship stayed 7½ months in salty waters. They were very interested in the composition of our paint ... Due to this state of underwater parts it cannot be assumed that vessels could lose their speed at least in part due to fouling.


They are strange, these shells: in Madagascar they clung to the bottoms of Russian battleships and braked with all their might, but Tsushima, they were embarrassed to see, fell away ... because of what, but the battleships of the Russian battleships did not pass.

The speed that our 5 armadillos could develop in the Kostenko battle is a separate one. историяbut before we begin to study it, let us remember what the speeds of a ship are in general - of course, not in the whole diversity of maritime terminology, but only applying it to our case.

The ship has the highest (or maximum) speed that it develops when forcing mechanisms, and there is a full speed - the maximum speed of the ship, which he is able to develop without forcing. There is also a squadron speed - the speed of the connection of ships. Squadron speed is selected based on the task of connection, hydrometeorology, etc., and all this is not very important for us, and we are interested in the concept of “Highest Squadron Speed” - this is the maximum connection speed, and it is defined as follows: the maximum speed of the slowest connection ship is taken and decreases by the amount necessary to maintain its place in the ranks. Why do I need this amendment?

The fact is that ship navigation is much more complicated than a computer game, where at the touch of a key, the system of ships unfolds completely synchronously. In life, unfortunately, this does not happen - even with the same type of ships, the turning radius is not constant, and therefore, for example, squadron ships, following the wake column at the command of “turning successively”, say, by 90 degrees, will complete this turn not in the wake column, and separately, sludge from the place where they are supposed to be on 1-1,5, or even more cable, left or right - just because someone has a turning radius more, someone less. In addition, the intervals between the ships are broken, for some have spent more time on the turn than others, and during the turn, the ship has a tendency to lose speed ... that the line is broken a little more than completely, and it is possible to reassemble into the wake column at equal intervals only at the expense of additional speed — the ships are accelerating and quickly take their place in the column. Obviously, the more this additional speed is, the faster the system will recover. If, however, we measure the highest squadron speed over the speed of the most low-speed ship, then this ship will not have such a reserve and will break the formation without the hope of returning to it.

Understanding this, let us return to the speed of the Russian newest battleships in the 14 battle of May - in the memoirs “At the Orel in Tsushima” Kostenko gives his own report to the Assembly of officers on the results of the Tsushima battlefield, where he writes:

... in his column there were five battleships moving from 16 to 18 nodes.


And in the same place:

... Only high-speed ships were supposed to enter the squadron for breakthrough: armadillos moving to 16 nodes ... If Rozhdestvensky had attacked the enemy in this decisive period before opening fire with four new battleships of the same type, going full speed to 16 nodes ...


So all the same: what was the full speed of the battleships like Borodino, 16 or 16-18 nodes? But perhaps it was meant that armadillos of the Borodino and Oslyabya types, having a maximum speed from 16 to 18 nodes, could have a full speed or the highest squadron speed at the level of 16 nodes? All anything, only in the future, Vladimir Polievktovich pleases us with new and new data. In a report to the Maritime Technical Committee “Borodino-type Borodino” in the Tsushima battle, ”Kostenko reports:

Thus, not equaling the entire squadron on the weakest ships, it was a complete opportunity to divide it into the following units: 1) five high-speed strike battleships with a course of 15-16 nodes.


And in the same report:

The commander did not single out four battleships of the Borodino type into one tactical independent unit, and with them Oslyabya, with proper training squadron in the 15-16 nodes.


In other words, the declared Kostenko 16-18-nodal course of Russian battleships somehow imperceptibly took and was reduced to 15-16 nodes, but even such speed could be achieved only with some special training. And what kind of training is this? And with what speed could 5 of the leading Russian battleships walk without being trained? The answer to this question from V.P. Kostenko look useless.

No less leapfrog at V.P. Kostenko is obtained when he tells us about the maximum speed of the battleship "Eagle" after the May 14 battle. In his memoirs, in chapter №28 "Analysis of the course of the battle and the reasons for the defeat," in the section "Night battle with Japanese destroyers" Kostenko points out:

The Eagle always kept Nicholas’s wake-fire all the time and, keeping a distance of two cables, developed the 92 turn, the course of the 13 nodes. Mechanics said that a couple of missing enough, and the machines work fine. If necessary, you can develop a full stroke. Judging by the number of revolutions, the ship could easily develop to 16 nodes.


In the same chapter, in the section “Correcting Damage and Preparing for the Continuation of the 15 May Battle,” the clarification follows:

Due to the consumption of shells, coal, water, oil and items thrown overboard during the battle, the battleship was unloaded to 800 tons, surfaced to 16 inches, the main armor belt appeared from the water. The mechanisms and the steering wheel are intact, the fuel remains 750 tons. The full stroke is preserved to 15 1 / 2-16 nodes.


This is not so optimistic, but nevertheless, according to Kostenko, it seems that in the morning of May 15 a battleship could easily develop 16 nodes or so. However, in the testimony of the Investigation Commission V.P. Kostenko already says something completely different:

The Eagle was not prepared to give full speed in advance. Meanwhile, he could count on the 16 — 16,5 node only at full stress. For a full speed, it would be necessary to remove from the tops of the majority of people from the filing of shells, from the bilge and fire battalion, to help the firemen and machinists. Consequently, in preparing to give full speed, it was necessary to abandon combat targets in advance, to concentrate all forces and attention on coal, machinery and boilers. The Eagle, until the last moment, was preparing for battle, repairing damage, repairing holes, throwing debris, breaking wood, preparing artillery. The detachment was surrounded by the enemy in a few minutes; there was no time to get ready to give full speed, as the descent of the flag on the br. "Nicholas I" occurred already under the fire of the enemy. "Emerald", being ready to make a move and having a 24 node, immediately managed to rush in that direction, where the ring of enemy ships has not yet closed. The Eagle would not have done it. In addition, if he even gave 16 nodes and began to leave, it would not change the situation, as he could not, like Emerald, escape from the enemy without a fight.




So what do we see? In his memoirs, where Vladimir Polievktovich admiral Rozhestvensky scolds the light for not using the opportunities that Borodino-type battleships provided him with high speed, the Eagle in his morning 15 can easily develop 16 nodes. But giving testimony to the Investigation Commission of the Tsushima battle and being forced to explain why such a high-speed battleship did not try his luck and made no attempt to break through after the Emerald, VP Petrov. Kostenko reports that the battleship would probably give these 16 units, but not immediately, but only with full exertion of forces, driving the polo-team to the help of the firemen and thus abandoning the battle, because shells and bilge-fire divisions would be sent to stokers!

And then there are big questions to Vladimir Polievktovich. Suppose the battleship "Eagle" went all night 13 knots, and then being within "several minutes" surrounded by the Japanese fleet (Admiral Togo had armadillos on hydrofoils? Did not know ...) could not give full speed. But why then V.P. Kostenko reproaches Rozhestvensky for the fact that his high-speed battleships in the battle of the 14 battle of May, marching at the speed of 11 nodes, did not rush at 16 nodes into the Japanese fleet that made the “Togo Loop”? Somehow it turns out strange, is not it? During the time it took the Japanese to encircle the remnants of the Russian squadron, the Eagle did not have the opportunity to give full speed, but at the beginning of the battle, he not only could give full speed, but he also had to? By magic, Vladimir Polievktovich want?

And the second question is when V.P. Kostenko said that:

... four battleships of the Borodino type, and with them Oslyabya, which, with proper training, had a squadron course at 15-16 nodes.


What was meant here? Also driven by artillerymen and bilge fire divisions in the stokers with a refusal "from combat targets"? And in this form send 5 battleships to attack a dozen ships of Togo?

Okay, according to V.P. Kostenko, we will not understand the squadron speed of the Russian battleships, but perhaps we will try to find out at least the speed of the battleship "Eagle"? Kostenko has a few more materials for this. Here, for example, in the testimony of the Investigation Commission V.P. Kostenko reports:

At 78 revolutions in the campaign, the Eagle produced 11 — 11½ knots, having a displacement of at least 15500 tons. Mechanical engineers on the "Eagle" in the campaign were of the opinion that, in case of need, the battleship with full voltage and selected angle can develop the same number of revolutions as in the test. When adding 6 revolutions, the stroke increased by the 1 node. Therefore, with 108 revs, you could count on 16 — 16½ nodes. The decrease in stroke can be explained by the effect of overload, reaching 15% of displacement.


Notice that not a word about fouling is right, but right now we will ask ourselves another question: why is V.P. Kostenko believes that when you add 6 revolutions, the stroke increases by the 1 node? Data for calculations we take EXCLUSIVELY according to VP Kostenko.

During tests, the Eagle showed a speed in 13.300 of a node at 230 revs, or an average of 17,8 revolutions per 109 node at a displacement of 6,12 tons (underload 1 tons) at a displacement of XNUMX tons.

In the bay of Nossi-Be, the Eagle shows the 11,5 node on the 85 revolutions when overloaded (according to Kostenko) to 3.000 tons. This is the 7,39 turnover at the speed node, but Vladimir Polievktovich writes (“At the Orel in Tsushima”, chapter “The Rainy Period. Training Shooting. Messages from Russia”):

Judging by the steam consumption, the Eagle will not be able to develop more than 100 revolutions. Since one node has 8 revolutionsthen his marginal move is obtained not more than the 13,5 node, whereas in Kronstadt on the test he developed 18 nodes, and Borodino gave 16 1 / 2.


Why, in Nossi-Be, did the Eagle need 8 revolutions per knot of speed, and only 6 on the trip? Obviously, the heavier the ship, the slower its course, which means that the greater the overload of the ship, the more turns per node speed required. This is logical.

So, in Kosysenko, in Nossi-Be, the overload was already 3.000 t (which is wrong, but oh well), and the battleship on the 11,5 node has an 7,39 rotation per node. And for each successive node, 8 revolutions are required - i.e. MORE than average.

And in the campaign, with a displacement of 15.500, the overload is almost 2.000 tons, and the battleship for 11 — 11,5 of the node is forced to hold not 85, but only 78 turns, respectively, on average, only 6,78-7,09 has a turn per node. It would be logical to assume that for each additional speed node it will need some more than 6,78 or 7,09 turnover, well, or at least an equal value, wouldn’t it? However, V.P. Kostenko only lists 6 revolutions per node, i.e. significantly less than the average 6,78 — 7,09 turnover per node. This is even less than the 6,12 turnover per knot of speed, which on average was shown by the underloaded “Eagle” on the test! What kind of mystic is this?

If an armadillo overloaded with 3 thous. Tons needs 8 revolutions per node at speeds above 11 knots, and an armadillo overloaded with 2 thousands of tons requires only 6 revolutions per knot, so if you completely deprive the ship of overload, it goes and at all 3-4 turnover for each additional node speed will need? Using such arithmetic, we find that the “Eagle”, which does not have an overload, would have to develop speed on tests ... on the order of the 21,1 — 24,3 node ?! “Everything is stranger and stranger,” as Alice in Wonderland used to say.

So, if we assume that Vladimir Polievktovich slightly underestimated the required number of revolutions per 1 speed knot (who counts them?) And that when displacing 15.500 tons to the Eagle for each additional speed knot over 11 — 11,5 node was required ... no, not large, but at least equal to the average value (i.e. all the same 6,78 — 7,09 turnover per knot), then we get that the battleship “Eagle”

with full voltage and selective angle


will show the 15,3-16,07 node!

And now let us recall the testimony of the senior officer of the "Eagle" captain 2-rank Shwede:

I can say with confidence that, if necessary, the battleship "Eagle" could not give that move, which he gave on testing machines in Kronstadt, i.e. near 18 nodes ... I think that the most complete course, under all favorable conditions, when spending prior to the receipt of holes and water on the decks, no more than 15 — 16 knots could give the best grunted coal and replacing the tired firemen with another shift.


In fact, even accepting V.P. Kostenko that the “Eagle” “with full voltage and selective angle could count on the 16-16,5 node” without any additional corrective calculations, we see that it doesn’t differ much from Schwede’s estimate, since we don’t know what exactly V.P. Kostenko under the "full voltage". Schwede's statement is much more specific - for 15-16 maximum speed knots, you need a fresh change of firemen and the best rattled coal, or maybe it was still due to normal, non-stormy weather? Well, if, according to the method of Vladimir Polievktovich, there are also commanders with firefighters in boiler rooms and machine-driven ones — you see, the 16 — 16,5 node will come out. True, it is no longer possible to fight at this speed due to the lack of supply of shells to the guns and fire fighting, but to develop the Eagle 16 — 16,5, of course, can.

In this case, it becomes easy to determine the squadron’s speed: if with a fresh shift and a better angle, the battleship could count on 15-16 nodes of the “fullest stroke”, then, under not very ideal conditions, the “fullest stroke” of the “Eagle” will tend to 15, rather than 16 nodes, if not less. In this case, the "Eagle", obviously, is not the most low-speed of the newest Russian battleships Even VP Kostenko wrote about him:

From observations of the displacement of all the battleships on the march, it turned out that the Eagle was less overloaded than the others.


And about the "Borodino" with its transfer 16,5 node should not be forgotten. Although it was later repaired, but still, nevertheless ... In general, even if we consider the maximum speed of the most slow-moving battleship of the Borodino type near the 15 nodes (which, in my opinion, is still overestimated), the maximum squadron speed of the detachment from the five newest Russian battleships do not exceed the 13,5 — 14 node.

The data obtained are fully combined with the opinion of Admiral Rozhestvensky himself:

On May 14, new battleships of a squadron could develop up to 13½ turn points.


And even slightly surpass the testimony of the flagship navigator of the corps of naval navigators Colonel Filippovsky, who reported to the Investigation Commission:

Speed ​​battleships of a new type could develop 13 nodes, no more, especially under great doubt were Borodino and Eagle.


It is worth remembering also the opinion of the captain of 2 rank V. I. Semenov:

I cite feedback from mechanics with whom I had to talk more than once: “Suvorov” and “Alexander III” could count on 15-16 nodes; at Borodino, already with 12 nodes, eccentrics and thrust bearings began to warm up; "Eagle" was not sure at all in his car ...


Is the issue resolved?

However, there is one, but very authoritative opinion, which categorically does not fit into all our arguments, since it is extremely contrary to all the above evidence. The flagship mechanic of the 2 Pacific Pacific Squadron, Colonel K.I.M. Fleet Obnorsky showed the following:

By the day of the battle 14 on May 1905, the main mechanisms of all the ships of the squadron were in satisfactory condition and battleships like "Suvorov" could freely have 17 nodes go without harm to the mechanisms ... The battleship Oslabya, I believe, would probably give 17 nodes.


It is certainly strange to hear such a statement, because you don’t need to be a rocket scientist to figure out: if the same “Eagle” showed a 17,6 node with underload in 230 tons, then with an overload of 1670-1720 tons (according to VP Kostenko) “freely give 17 nodes "he could not completely.

However, the validity of the statements of the flagship mechanic can be checked. The fact is that we have at our disposal the report of the senior ship mechanic Colonel Parfenov 1 to the commander of the squadron battleship "Eagle", which begins like this:

On the basis of orders for the Maritime Office, for senior mechanics to submit to the Technical Committee through ship commanders the most detailed information about all accidents on mechanisms and boilers, I have to convey the following ...


And then follows the most detailed description of various features, including malfunctions of the machines of the battleship "Eagle", filled with so many technical details that you rarely find in the testimonies of eyewitnesses of the Tsushima battle. And this, of course, speaks in favor of the colonel. Well, in section B “Machine and boilers during the battle of 14 and May 15” Parfenov 1 shows:

During the battle had from 75 to 98 revolutions. On average 85 revolutions.


If we assume that at 109 revolutions (the limit for the Eagle steam engine), the battleship could develop 17 nodes and take the standard V.P. Kostenko - 6 revolutions per knot, then it turns out that by developing 98 revolutions, the Eagle would have to reach speeds over 15 knots. However, nobody watched such speed for Russian battleships in combat either from our ships or from the Japanese. Conversely, if we consider that during the battle, the average speed of the battleship did not exceed 10, the maximum of 11 nodes, and the minimum was approximately 8-9 nodes, then correlating the minimum and average speeds to the minimum and average speeds that were given by the Eagle machines, we will receive:

The minimum speed of 8-9 nodes at 75 revolutions is an average of 8,3-9,4 turns per node, and even if you count on 6 turns for each subsequent node, it turns out maximum speed of the battleship at 109 revolutions of the 13,6-14,6 node.

By the average speed of 10-11 nodes with 85 revolutions, the average 7,7-8,5 rotation per one node is obtained, and even if you count on 6 turns for each subsequent node, it turns out The maximum speed of the battleship at 109 revs is 14-15 knots.

Parfenov 1 also indicates the momentum that the battleship held at night from 14 to 15 on May:

From ½ 8 on the evening of May 14, all night and morning they kept from 85 to 95 turns - on average 90 turns.


This evidence is very close to Kostenko, who reports that at that time, the Eagle had a 92 turn and was traveling at a speed of 13 nodes. But there are nuances. The fact is that it is still unclear at what speed the remnants of the squadron were moving that night, but overall opinions vary between 11 and 13 nodes. As an example I cite the testimony of midshipman Baron G. Ungern-Sternberg (“Nicholas I”):

At night, we walked from 11½ to 12½ nodes, having a course of NO 23 °.


But in any case, the speed even in 11, even in 13 nodes at 85-95 revolutions does not allow to count on 17 nodes at 109 revolutions. From this we can draw a very sad conclusion: during the battle, the squadron battleship "Eagle" was unable to go faster than 15 nodes, it is even more likely that its maximum speed was somewhere between 14 and 15 nodes.

The statement of Obnorsky, the flagship mechanic, does not fit in so well with the testimony of the rest of the squadron, or within the limits of elementary logic, that I have to assume that Obnorsky is incompetent as a specialist, or ...

It should be borne in mind that one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian fleet in Tsushima was called the small squadron speed of domestic battleships. Could it be that Obnorsky ... insured, by removing from himself as the flagship mechanic, responsibility for the slow speed of Borodino-type battleships? Here, of course, it can be argued that if Obnorsky had a motive to overstate the speed of these battleships, then Admiral Rozhestvensky and Schwede had reasons exactly the opposite - to try to reduce the speed of the newest Russian ships. It can also be admitted that the head of the naval department, cavalier Semenov, fell under the personal charm of Rozhestvensky and decided to shield his admiral.

But the flagship navigator Colonel Filippovsky didn’t have such reasons obviously - why should he? Similarly, the senior mechanic of the “Eagle” Parfenov 1 didn’t have the slightest sense to exaggerate and deliberately lower the speed of the “Eagle”: he couldn’t be blamed for the surrender of the ship, so why sign the bad work of his supervising? Yes, and V.P. Kostenko was very interested in showing the rapidity of the five newest battleships of Rozhestvensky. However, for the Orla, Kostenko indicates the maximum stroke 16-16,5 node, and informs the Investigation Commission about the battleship Borodino:

The senior mechanic of the Borodino battleship Ryabinin and the ship’s engineer Shangin told me in Kamranga that rumors circulated in the squadron about the poor condition of the Borodino mechanisms were extremely exaggerated and even unfounded. If necessary, br. Borodino could have given 15 — 16 nodes and would not lag behind others.




Obviously, be in the words of Obnorsky some reason, V.P. Kostenko would not have failed to describe “battleships easily reaching 17 nodes” in his memoirs - nevertheless, this is not the case. And so I think the statement of the flagship mechanic is completely untrustworthy. But this, of course, is only my opinion.

This concludes the series of articles “Tsifima’s Myths”. From what I promised to a respected audience, only a detailed analysis of the start of the battle and the “Loop of Togo” remained unfinished. Perhaps I can still lay out this analysis in a separate article.

Thank you for attention!

References
1. Fleet actions. Documents. Division IV. 2-I Pacific Squadron. Book three. Fight 14 - 15 May 1905 of the year. (1-5 Releases)
2. Fleet actions. The campaign of the Second Pacific Squadron. Orders and circulars.
3. Top Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War at Sea in 37-38 Meiji / MGS Japan.
4. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 Meiji / Maritime General Headquarters in Tokyo.
5. Surgical and medical description of the sea war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of Maritime department in Tokyo.
6. Westwood JN Witnesses of Tsushima.
7. Campbell NJ The Battle of Tsushima // Warship, 1978, No. 8.
8. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. Reports from naval attachés.
9. Analysis of the battle 28 July 1904 of the year and the study of the causes of failure of the actions of the 1 th Pacific Squadron / Sea collection, 1917, №3, neof. otd. with. 1 - 44.
10. Artillery and armor in the Russian-Japanese war. Nauticus, 1906.
11. Artillery service organization on ships of the 2 Pacific Fleet Squadron, 1905.
12. A.S. Alexandrov, S.A. Balakin. "Asama" and others. Japanese armored cruisers programs 1895-1896.
13. V.Ya.Krestyaninov, SA Well done. Battleships like Peresvet.
14. M. Melnikov. "Borodino" type armadillos.
15. V.Yu. Gribovsky. The squadron battleship Borodino.
16. S. Vinogradov. The battleship "Glory": the undefeated hero Moonsund.
17. S.V. Suliga. The phenomenon of Tsushima (after RM Melnikov).
18. S.V. Suliga. Why did Oslyabya die?
19. S.A. Balakin. Battleship Retvizan.
20. V.V. Khromov. "Pearls" type cruisers.
21. A.A. Belov. Armadillos of Japan.
22. S.A. Balakin. "Mikasa" and others. Japanese battleships 1897 — 1905's. // Maritime collection. 2004. No.8.
23. V. Chistyakov. A quarter of an hour for Russian guns.
24. EAT. Shuvalov. Tsushima in defense of the traditional point of view.
25. IN AND. Semenov. Pay.
26. V.Yu. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History of creation and death.
27. V.V. Tsybulko. Unread pages of Tsushima.
28. V.E. Yegoriev. Operations of the Vladivostok cruisers in the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905.
29. V. Kofman. Tsushima: analysis against myths.
30. V.P. Kostenko. On the "Eagle" in Tsushima. Memories of the Russian-Japanese war at sea party in 1904 — 1905.
31. A.S. Novikov-Surf. Tsushima
32. And much more…

The author is especially grateful to his colleague “Countryman” for his series of articles “On the Question of Accuracy of Shooting in the Russian-Japanese War”, without which these materials would never have seen the light.
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  1. adena 1 July 2015 07: 32 New
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    +8
    Kostenko. . .on such, Kostenko! The fact that Kostenko’s pathos crucian is clear to all "sea people". The situation depresses how Kostenko took the place of an "authoritative" witness of events. Judging by his pearls, his failure in prof. knowledge is large enough (not only in the section on the operation of machines and mechanisms, it burns in a childish way in terms of stability).
    The article is a huge plus. The author undertook the work, clearly and with obvious examples, to explain what Kostenko's testimony is and how to relate to it.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 08: 01 New
      • 5
      • 1
      +4
      Quote: adena
      The situation depresses how Kostenko took the place of an "authoritative" witness of events.

      Including taking into account the fact that the whole battle on May 14, Kostenko spent in the infirmary. "Excellent" observation point, all the nuances of the battle are visible until the last laughing
      Quote: adena
      The author undertook the work, clearly and with obvious examples, to explain what Kostenko's testimony is and how to relate to it.

      Thank you! drinks
      1. Angro Magno 1 July 2015 18: 58 New
        • 0
        • 0
        0
        I knew one Andrey, a specialist in the Navy. At the Beard intersected.
    2. avt
      avt 1 July 2015 09: 16 New
      • 7
      • 0
      +7
      Quote: adena
      .on such, Kostenko!

      Actually, the participant in the campaign and the battle, who also left sensible memoirs about his campaign, is much more qualitative than the “Tsushima” Novikov Priboy, you just don’t have to make a cult from his book, but rather than stopping to learn in comparison with other materials left by the participants, that’s how the author did it. Well, you don’t need to make the Bible and pray for the author as an icon from one book of memoirs or artwork. Regarding the end of the series of articles - good like the previous ones is very sensible. But ,, the true "connoisseurs of the squadron move, which the tyrant Rozhestvensky did not allow to disperse the battleships to the patriots, I hope to smash the arguments of the tsar’s burial to smithereens” laughing You are smart! wassat Kochegara’s understand you need help! Yes, everything’s simple - I pressed the gas pedal in the wheelhouse and the nozzles spray fuel into the boiler! Or can it be even simpler - the “Enter” button on what!? So I look forward to owning, with true knowledge, enlighten us . Well, I congratulate the author on the completion of a rather interesting work good It is always nice to read a reasoned opinion on a specific event, rather than propaganda panegyrics.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 10: 26 New
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        Quote: avt
        it’s just that you don’t have to make a cult from his book, and not stopping to learn in comparison with other materials left by the participants

        Absolutely right! Kostenko’s memoirs should be treated exactly as we usually relate to memoirs. Here to take the same Manstein - according to his memoirs, the troops entrusted to his leadership during and after the Kursk Bulge destroyed a huge number of Soviet tanks. When you begin to analyze the number of Soviet losses according to Manstein with the actual number of tanks in the Red Army units that could resist it, it turns out that out of every 2 tanks that could fight against Manstein, the Germans destroyed about FIVE laughing
        Nevertheless, Manstein’s memoirs remain binding reading for anyone who wants to form their own opinion about the events of the Great Patriotic War.
        Quote: avt
        Regarding the end of the series of articles - good, like the previous ones, is very sensible.

        Thank you! hi
        1. ABM
          ABM 1 July 2015 10: 39 New
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          By the way - losses on the Kursk Bulge of the Wehrmacht, approximately 1500 tanks - ours are about 6000
          1. avt
            avt 1 July 2015 10: 48 New
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            Quote: ABM
            By the way - losses on the Kursk Bulge of the Wehrmacht, approximately 1500 tanks - ours are about 6000

            By the way - why not 150 and 60000? With what fright did the numbers jump out and for what ,, reporting period "and even" approximately "? fool What do you think of the losses in general, well, at least the difference between the irretrievable ones and those that after the repair are distinguished between us and the Germans? Or just like that - fart with a digital camera, and then you rake it further - look for documents, well, worry, tear yourself in evidence.
            1. ABM
              ABM 1 July 2015 11: 25 New
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              too lazy to google everything yourself :(
              I'll find now
              and you shouldn’t be rude - even if something doesn’t suit you in numbers
              1. ABM
                ABM 1 July 2015 11: 44 New
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                http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt
                I’ll advise you to search here - for only 1943. on the Soviet-German front, the Red Army lost 20400 tanks in battles ...

                Kursk defensive operation - 1614, Oryol offensive - 2586, Belgorod-Kharkov offensive - 1864
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 11: 58 New
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                  In general, it’s right - it remains only to find out how many tanks in these operations the Germans lost. And then it seems to me that the Germans suffered the main losses during the Kursk defensive laughing
                  1. ABM
                    ABM 1 July 2015 20: 25 New
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                    General Heinrici claims that despite minor differences in the 4th TA, Gotha lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 15-20% could not be recovered. This will be for her 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are subject to write-off. AG Kempf lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) are irretrievable, and the 9th Army of Model 647 and 130, respectively. It turns out the total loss of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irretrievably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, 323 of which were destroyed. Given that the real decline was much higher, not 193, but 290 units — the losses of both army groups will amount to about 420 armored units.

                    total dry residue of 1612 and 6064 tanks - EXPLAINED! Now I would like to find out why the local patriots really dislike it :)
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              3. Serg65 1 July 2015 11: 57 New
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                Interesting situation what , on the previous discussion of the article "Myths of Tsushima" the star of "Banson" rolled up, but a new star "AMV" appeared ... Hurray, king, the king is hello !!!!
                Quote: ABM
                By the way - losses on the Kursk Bulge of the Wehrmacht, approximately 1500 tanks - ours are about 6000

                Quote: ABM
                “we don’t run away from the Japanese, but fight” (I quote from memory, but he had such an idea)

                Quote: ABM
                about the displacement - if you tear directly, past Tsushima, why then was to flood the ships with coal? a normal reserve would have been enough - there are 1000 miles of travel! Rozhdestvensky ordered to ship in full, as if he decided to go around Japan

                Quote: ABM
                but you don’t need to overclock for this - there were 40 cable there, on the 11 nodes of the 15 minutes to the ram

                Quote: ABM
                Rozhdestvensky did not understand - if, in general, he knew the tactics of a naval battle, which I strongly doubt, Togo won the battle with one risky maneuver!

                Words again, words alone crying . Here is sevtrash, he is at least somehow trying to argue his polemic with the author and of course he is a plus for his perseverance in the proof of his opinion.
                1. ABM
                  ABM 1 July 2015 12: 11 New
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                  so and what is written wrong? almost everything is axioms that do not require special evidence. About tanks - brought the link. Calculation of coal per 1000 miles - elementary calculated. The distance covered at 11 nodal moves is even easier. The fact that Rozhestvensky did not understand the maneuver - well, if he did not understand it and did nothing - then he is a traitor ... in general, axioms
                  1. Serg65 1 July 2015 13: 01 New
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                    Quote: ABM
                    so and what is written wrong? almost everything is axioms that do not require special evidence.

                    My son, the youngest, as stated ... well, what nonsense, the earth is flat, if it was round then I would fall.

                    Quote: ABM
                    I’ll advise you to search here - for only 1943. on the Soviet-German front, the Red Army lost 20400 tanks in battles ...

                    At the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the army included 10 199 tanks and self-propelled guns belay
                    Now the generally accepted figure is this: the irretrievable losses of the USSR in tanks - 6000 units, and Germany - 1500 units. Proportion of 1: 4. The conclusion is immediately drawn - these are what we had, again piled up corpses around. Ok, let's look at the initial alignment of the forces of the adversaries. The USSR had in the composition of the Voronezh and Central fronts 1336 thousand people, 19100 guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2172 aircraft. Behind them, the Steppe Front was deployed consisting of 573 thousand people, 7401 guns and mortars, 1551 tank and self-propelled guns. Total: 1909 thousand people, 26500 guns, 4995 tanks. Germany was able to exhibit 900 thousand people, 2700 tanks, about 10 thousand guns. So, immediately there is a problem: in the troops of the three Soviet fronts there were less than 5000 tanks and self-propelled guns. How could they lose 6000 units, and even irrevocably? Well, there were replenishment, but still, this is impossible in principle. After all, Germany, having initially 2700 tanks, lost 1500. She still had 1200 tanks in the Kursk region and, without a co-opinion, there were also replenishment. It is not clear how the Red Army, left with a minus balance in armored vehicles, was able to defeat the enemy then, push him all the way to the Dnieper, and despite the fact that the enemy had a positive balance? But in addition to irrevocable losses, there is also a temporarily out of order equipment. And this is up to 2 / 3 of all losses, i.e. two times more irretrievable losses. It turns out complete nonsense. Losing 18 thousand tanks, having just 5 thousand before the start of the battle, is unthinkable. There remains another explanation, which seems to me the most rational. On the part of the Red Army, the figure of all losses of armored vehicles was taken (and it is called "no-return losses"), and on the part of Germany, only irretrievable losses. If my assumption is correct, then the USSR lost the order of 2000 tanks irretrievably, and 4000 tanks temporarily failed and were sent for repair. Then the data on Germany’s losses are also in good agreement - 1500 permanently lost units and the order of 3000 temporarily out of order. The excess of the total number of losses over the presence in the ranks before the start of the battle is due to the high level of work of German repair bases. The fact that the USSR suffered more losses is explained by the fact that the Red Army during the battle went on much longer than the German.
                    My friend AVM, before asserting something, do not use one source and I ask you to consider your answer first! hi
                    1. ABM
                      ABM 1 July 2015 14: 21 New
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                      so who wrote forever?
                      some domestic tanks were restored 6-7 times!
                      I read the forum where you ripped off this reflection - these are all the assumptions of bloggers, based on nothing. And the losses are greater - our T 60, T 70 and T 34 could not bear the same losses with the Tigers and Panthers ... however, I propose to postpone the discussion to the appropriate branch - this is not the place for this. If you don’t believe the data “The secrecy stamp has been removed” - and this is the only serious study of losses in the Second World War, then read on bloggers on the forums - they will tell you!
                      1. Scraptor 1 July 2015 23: 48 New
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                        German by 10
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                    3. ABM
                      ABM 1 July 2015 20: 27 New
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                      General Heinrici claims that despite minor differences in the 4th TA, Gotha lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 15-20% could not be recovered. This will be for her 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are subject to write-off. AG Kempf lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) are irretrievable, and the 9th Army of Model 647 and 130, respectively. It turns out the total loss of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irretrievably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, 323 of which were destroyed. Given that the real decline was much higher, not 193, but 290 units — the losses of both army groups will amount to about 420 armored units.

                      total dry residue of 1612 and 6064 tanks
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                    5. Scraptor 1 July 2015 23: 48 New
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                      Friends need to choose yourself.
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    3. prosto_rgb 1 July 2015 15: 05 New
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      Thank you for attention!

      Thanks for the work !!! soldier
      Well, for the Navy drinks
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 23: 56 New
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        For the Navy! And for those at sea! drinks
    4. simon
      simon 1 July 2015 18: 33 New
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      I did not understand the meaning of this part of the article.
  2. jktu66 1 July 2015 07: 57 New
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    Once again, thanks to Andrei for a thorough analysis of the facts, breaking the biased approach to the Tsushima tragedy good
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 08: 02 New
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      You're welcome!:)
  3. Serg65 1 July 2015 08: 19 New
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    Welcome Andrew hi . Well, to summarize! Your article has become a hit of the season good and scored a record number of comments already 715 !!!!! And this is not surprising, the article is not based on fantasies, speculation and has no political motive. Just the facts! For 110 years, the Tsushima tragedy has been stirring the minds of history and marine technology lovers. Yes, Rozhdestvensky lost the battle. Yes, Nicholas II failed to cope with the new rules of life dictated by the capitalist International. Yes, the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war was a tragedy for Russia. But back to history;
    The loss of Mukden 19 February 1905 year is a tragedy?
    Is East Prussian Operation 1914 of the Year a Tragedy?
    The great retreat of 1915 of the year is a tragedy?
    Is the Soviet-Polish war a tragedy?
    The defeat of the South-Western Front 1941 year is a tragedy?
    Kharkov operation 1942 year is a tragedy?
    And how many more lost and tragic battles in Russian history? And how many such battles does a simple layman know? How many such battles are such active debates and discussions between experts and amateurs? So what is the mystery of Tsushima? In my opinion, the secret lies in the fact that the failed revolutionary and the same writer A.S. Novikov-Priboy was an ordinary mortal and could not physically be present in all these battles in order to thoroughly collect eyewitness accounts for a detailed description of the events.
    What is the main idea of ​​Andrei’s article? Again, in my opinion, the author is quite professionally and documentedly trying to wash the Russian Navy from the lies and slander with which all kinds of false historians and letirats try to distort history.
    Andrew, a big bow and many thanks from all the sailors in my face soldier .
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 10: 19 New
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      Quote: Serg65
      What is the main idea of ​​Andrei’s article? Again, in my opinion, the author is quite professionally and documentedly trying to wash the Russian Navy from the lies and slander with which all kinds of false historians and letirats try to distort history.

      That's right, dear Serg65! Admiral Rozhestvensky may not be Ushakov, but he certainly never was the satrap and brainless tyrant that he was used to think of. Rozhdestvensky is undoubtedly a talented organizer who did a lot to prepare the squadron, and the Russian sailors under his command were not stupid at all.
      Quote: Serg65
      Andrew, a big bow and many thanks from all the sailors in my face

      You're welcome! hi drinks
      1. Nekarmadlen 2 July 2015 00: 27 New
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        Probably it would still be nice for you to write a continuation of your postscript - the article "if I were Admiral Rozhestvensky, then I ....")))))))
    2. Ulan
      Ulan 1 July 2015 14: 53 New
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      How simple it is. It turns out that Tsushima’s mystery is that “the failed revolutionary and the same writer AS Novikov-Priboy was an ordinary mortal and could not physically be present in all these battles in order to thoroughly collect eyewitness accounts for a detailed description of the events.”
      It turns out that Andrei was based only on the memoirs of the former Orel bachelor?
      I've seen that the list of literature that Andrei cited is much more extensive.
      I think the author himself will be offended if he is told that he only relied on Novikov-Priboy and only refuted it. I think his research is much wider than just an attempt to refute Novikov-Priboy.
      I do not really agree with his enthusiastic assessment of Rozhdestvensky, but the work done is impressive and inspires respect.
      But still, for me, the secret of Tsushima still remains.
      Undoubtedly for me, Tsushima is not only a tragic, but also a heroic page in our history.
  4. ABM
    ABM 1 July 2015 08: 52 New
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    The problem with the speed is that each of the respondents calls the number that seems to him! Let me explain - one thinks that SURE (MAY BE) 15, the other - that SURE (MAY BE) 16 and so on. Rozhdestvensky managed for the whole trip through half the world to NEVER try, at least out of curiosity, to find out what his ships are capable of. Something said, "we don’t run away from the Japanese, but fight" (I quote from memory, but he had such an idea)
    1. avt
      avt 1 July 2015 09: 25 New
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      Quote: ABM
      Rozhdestvensky managed for the whole trip through half the world to NEVER try, at least out of curiosity, to find out what his ships are capable of. Something said "we do not run away from the Japanese, but fight"

      laughing Well, that's what I said earlier--
      Quote: avt
      But, the true "connoisseurs of the squadron move, which the tyrant Rozhdestvensky did not allow to disperse the battleships to the patriots, I hope to smash the arguments of the tsar’s grave to the smithereens" Look! Give it to the stokers, help! Yes, everything is simple - I clicked on the gas pedal in the wheelhouse and the nozzles spray fuel into the boiler! Or can it be even simpler - the "Enter" button on what!?
      I did not have to wait long.
      Moreover, the fact that Rozhestvensky could KNOW what move his ships can develop, and also that this statement refers to the "squadron move", which the author patiently talks about in this article, mentioning that he is calculated from the slowest ship of the squadron, doesn’t even come to the brain It’s not counting the time of maneuvering such a ship. But where there! Fuck us, "ravings" of this lawyer of the tsarist tyrant read! One phrase is enough for us for a general diagnosis. wassat laughing
      1. ABM
        ABM 1 July 2015 15: 14 New
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        the worst argument in defense of ZPR - knew that they could give 15 and led to execution at 9 knots
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    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 10: 09 New
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      Quote: ABM
      Rozhdestvensky managed for the whole trip through half the world to NEVER try, at least out of curiosity,

      Excuse me, only who told you this? Well, yes, Rozhestvensky did not arrange regattas. But he fired at Nossi-Bae. In the first two days, “Eagle” fired (according to Kostenko) 16 305 mm and about 67 152 mm, “Borodino” about the same - for the consumption of shells this is the beginning of the battle. However, on the evening of the second day, 2 boilers flowed from Borodino.
      On the third day of firing, “Eagle” scored - before the firing the boiler tube bursts. And this despite the fact that the course of the squadron during the shooting was clearly not 15 knots.
      You see, "speed racing" is probably theoretically interesting. And almost after the usual breakdowns occur in cars with loss of speed ("Borodino" lost a place in the ranks "), the admiral is clear.
      1. ABM
        ABM 1 July 2015 10: 32 New
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        no - you will decide whether the speed DECIDED THE OUTCOME OF BATTLE, as you write in the previous article, with examples of maneuvering the English fleet in exercises, or a regatta, and this is only theoretically interesting!

        about the tubes - the same Alexander III in the tests went 17,3 knots in 19 boilers, the 20th did not even warm up.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 10: 37 New
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          Quote: ABM
          or regatta and this is only theoretically interesting!

          You really don’t understand? Rozhdestvensky takes the squadron to firing. How much speed was there - too lazy to remember, nodes 10-11 maximum. And on two of his newest battleships, cauldrons flow.
          What other regattas do you need? The conclusion is obvious - even at low speed there will be a high risk of boiler failure with loss of speed. If this conclusion does not fit into your usual picture of the world - I am not to blame.
          Quote: ABM
          about the pipes - the same Alexander III in the tests went 17,3 knots on 19 boilers, the 20th did not even warm up

          And where does the test? On tests, and "Eagle" 17,8 knots showed. But with what displacement, to remind?
          1. ABM
            ABM 1 July 2015 11: 04 New
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            I didn’t write about the tests, the key point is that, in general, one boiler was not heated - there are only two machines and their breakdown is key, and the current boiler tubes are nothing! out of 20 boilers, you can muffle a few and change the handset - this is a routine work for drivers. Moreover, Belleville boilers differed for the better - on Varyag and Retvizan they were tormented with fire tube boilers, there tens of pipes burst. The leakage of pipes is dangerous only if there is no fresh water for a long time - then it was necessary to feed the boilers outside, and then flush the pipes with the boilers stopped. By the way, such a case was in the 28st squadron, if I am not mistaken, on Novik after the battle on July XNUMX ...

            But, nevertheless, this is not the answer to my question - for Rozhdestvensky speed is not important, for the British and Togo - a key point, right? and which of them turned out to be right? :)

            about the displacement - if you tear directly, past Tsushima, why then was to flood the ships with coal? a normal reserve would have been enough - there are 1000 miles of travel! Rozhdestvensky ordered to ship in full, as if he decided to go around Japan
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 11: 22 New
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              Quote: ABM
              I didn’t write about the tests, the key point is that, in general, one boiler was not heated

              Well, with an additional boiler I would give 17,6, maybe a little more. Just what?
              Quote: ABM
              and the current boiler tubes are nothing! from 20 boilers you can muffle a few and change the handset - this is a chore for drivers

              In battle?:))
              "Borodino" in the exercises lost his place in the ranks. The consequences of such an event in battle, I hope, need not be explained?

              Quote: ABM
              But, nevertheless, this is not the answer to my question - for Rozhdestvensky speed is not important, for the British and Togo - a key point, right?

              This is exactly the answer, exactly to your, exactly the question laughing
              The key point for both Togo and Rozhdestvensky is the speed at which the squadron ships have the ability to keep the formation, jointly maneuver and fight. And the firing in Nossi-Bae showed with all reasonableness that even at low speeds, the newest Russian battleships have great risks of losing their ability to keep order and joint maneuver.
              Quote: ABM
              about the displacement - if you tear directly, past Tsushima, why then was to flood the ships with coal?

              I already gave the answer to this question - in the first article of the cycle. Rozhestvensky’s battleships WAS NOT littered with coal, and the overload that was required on them in case of damage to the pipes (thrust decreases and fuel consumption increases sharply), and the pipes were “raked” very much upon the fact of the battle at Shantung
            2. Captain45 1 July 2015 11: 27 New
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              Quote: ABM
              and the current boiler tubes are nothing! from 20 boilers, you can muffle a few and change the handset - this is a routine work for drivers.

              Well, yes, I clicked the switch and changed it like a burnt out bulb lol Dear, are you even familiar with the design of a simple stove furnace, not to mention a steam boiler? request
              1. ABM
                ABM 1 July 2015 12: 05 New
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                familiar enough - and you? or just tryndet? :)
                1. Captain45 1 July 2015 18: 56 New
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                  Quote: ABM
                  familiar enough - and you? or just tryndet? :)

                  Me, too, and not tryndet. How much time, in your opinion, burns a kilogram of coal or vernacular "scoop" that is thrown into the furnace of the furnace? What temperature does this develop? On the basis of the stove somewhere 1h.20 min.t about 800 -900 city C, it’s cooling down in about 5-6 hours, and now estimate the boilers of the battleship’s steam engine. How much will it be? min.beat a boiled tube and rivet a new one, which is almost impossible (there are examples when this is axis in combat in World War II and then took no less chasa.Sami will look) So, dear not a trend that does not know what hi
                  1. ABM
                    ABM 1 July 2015 19: 54 New
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                    yeah ... you have to start learning from the basics - tell each other about boilers with superheated steam invented before the Second World War ... at the same time about the invention of asbestos. And when it was a costume made of asbestos, invented ... Well, let’s boldly test the temperature - since we’ve heard something about it. So, in your opinion, what was it like in the Belleville water tube boilers?
                    1. Captain45 1 July 2015 21: 09 New
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                      Quote: ABM
                      About the time of the invention of asbestos at the same time.

                      What would you know, even Catherine II as a gift from the industrialists of the Urals presented a tablecloth of asbestos, which did not burn in the fire. Presented by Nikita Demidov. Learn the story, dear. lol You know, I am tormented by vague doubts about whether there was an article about two days ago about people like you about comments, like, we should crow, and at least do not dawn there laughing
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            3. Alex 2 July 2015 18: 31 New
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              Quote: ABM
              Moreover, Belleville boilers differed for the better - on Varyag and Retvizan they were tormented with fire tube boilers, there tens of pipes burst.

              Something did not understand. On Varyag and Retvizan, EMNIP, there were Nikloss boilers, which were also water pipes. Or do you mean that their tubes were double, of two concentrically inserted into each other?
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      3. Ulan
        Ulan 1 July 2015 11: 56 New
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        The series of articles is magnificent, for which no doubt respect. BUT! Yet it is not clear at what speed the squadron went directly to the battle? Well, it’s clear that this is too general a question, because in different phases of the battle the technical condition of the ships was different. Then, more precisely, with what speed did the squadron go in the initial phase of the battle? If I didn’t make a mistake, I met a figure of -9 knots, which allowed Togo to carry out his notorious “wand over T” maneuver. If the technical condition made it possible to keep the speed at 14 knots, then why was this not done? If, again, I remember correctly, when Nebogatov took command, he ordered the squadron to keep the move at 14 knots.
        1. Pilat2009 1 July 2015 20: 03 New
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          Quote: Ulan
          If, again, I remember correctly, when Nebogatov took command, he ordered the squadron to keep the move at 14 knots.

          Right, and what remains of the squadron?
          1. Ulan
            Ulan 2 July 2015 11: 30 New
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            Of course. But they were in the same old and rather battered ships in battle. So I wonder why, at the beginning of the battle, the ships still serviceable and not damaged in the battle didn’t try to keep 13-14 knots? I see only one reason - the speed limit of the transports that went into the breakthrough along with the squadron.
  5. ABM
    ABM 1 July 2015 09: 16 New
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    yes, about the course of the ships - of course, no commandants would have to help the stokers, there were free stakes of the stokers, of course, during the battle they were in their combat places - not to sleep with the roar of shells; further - coal was gradually consumed; I think four hundred to five hundred tons.
  6. Adagka 1 July 2015 09: 50 New
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    All local fans of the “creativity” of the “genius” ZPR stubbornly forget about one squadron was dragging even at 11, but at 9 knots, which artist this artist equated ebras to the trough Kachatka, and in general why he dragged it with him, they can’t explain, and of course it’s better to run into Kostenko and a priori trust the coward to the admiral and other “heroes” who surrendered, they then tell the truth
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 10: 32 New
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      Quote: Adagka
      All local fans of the "creativity" of the "ingenious" ZPR stubbornly forget about one squadron dragging even at 11, but at 9 knots

      So what? Than 11 nodes are fundamentally better than 9 can answer?
      Quote: Adagka
      what artist this leader equated the Ebras to the trough Kachatka and in general why he dragged her with him can not explain,

      You know, your militant illiteracy is a little annoying. Nothing Kamchatka was the most useful squadron ship? And what is this fact generally known to be?
      Quote: Adagka
      and of course it’s better to run into Kostenko and a priori trust the coward to the admiral and other “heroes” who surrendered, they then tell the truth

      Yes, sure. Either Kostenko’s case, he fought heroically to the last, and died, struck by four Japanese twelve-inch shells in the chest.
      Nothing that Kostenko, as it were, also surrendered along with everyone else?
      Double standards - they are so double ...
      1. tasha 1 July 2015 11: 31 New
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        "And so? What are the fundamentally better 11 nodes than 9 you can answer?"

        You are seriously researching the Tsushima battle. Me not. I read the description of this battle on Tsushima.org.ru and noticed that in the daytime battle of May 14 ZPR first ordered to increase the speed from 9 to 11 nodes, and later he ordered a decrease in speed from 9 to 11. For what purpose did he give these orders? Those. for ZPR for some reason there was a fundamental difference between 9 and 11 nodes.

        And another phrase from the same source
        "Japanese combat units at 14-15 speed were fast moving forward, covering the head of the Russian squadron.". Is it possible to conclude that if the speed of the Russian squadron was kept at the 12-13 knots, then the Japanese could not maneuver so freely ..

        At the very beginning of your article, you write:
        "In this article we will try to understand the question of what was the maximum speed of the Borodino-type battleships in Tsushima, after all?"
        I may not have read / understood everything, but I did not find the answer to this question. Can you complete what you started by writing something like a conclusion? For example, "thus, the maximum speed of the battleships did not exceed ... knots due ...."
        1. ABM
          ABM 1 July 2015 20: 14 New
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          everything is simple - they walked in two parallel columns, when they saw the Japanese, they decided to rebuild into one, for which they gave 11 knots to the right column led by Suvorov, rebuilt and slowed down to the usual 9-node ... and not very successfully, the genius of domestic production hurried Give the Christmas command - go to 9-node. move - speaking in a car way, Oslyabya, who walked head in the second detachment of the EBR
        2. ABM
          ABM 1 July 2015 20: 14 New
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          everything is simple - they walked in two parallel columns, when they saw the Japanese, they decided to rebuild into one, for which they gave 11 knots to the right column led by Suvorov, rebuilt and slowed down to the usual 9-node ... and not very successfully, the genius of domestic production hurried Give the Christmas command - go to 9-node. move - speaking in a car way, Oslyabya, who walked head in the second detachment of the EBR
        3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 23: 52 New
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          Quote: tasha
          and noticed that in a daytime battle on May 14 ZPR first ordered to increase the speed from 9 to 11 knots, and later he ordered to reduce the speed from 9 to 11. For what purpose did he give these orders?

          ZPR gave the order of 11 nodes only to the 1st detachment so that it entered the head of the column of the 2nd and 3rd detachments. And then it turns out interesting. Togo unfolds on the reverse course - the “Togo Loop” begins. On the one hand - he gives Russians 15 minutes of gain - the ability to hit the turning point. But on the other hand - as soon as Togo completes his “Loop”, he practically puts a “wand over T” to Rozhdestvensky.
          Under these conditions, increasing the speed did little for the Russians - Rozhdestvensky could not turn away within the next 15 minutes so as not to interfere with the aiming of his armadillos, but at 11 knots by the end of these 15 minutes he would become too close to the wand, which was obvious to him a little bit skully.
          Quote: tasha
          Is it possible to conclude that if the speed of the Russian squadron was kept at 12-13 knots, then the Japanese could not maneuver so freely ..

          Just in the beginning of the battle, such a conclusion cannot be drawn. The Japanese, having started a Togo loop, would have covered the head of the Russian squadron anyway - the only question is where the Russian ships would be at its end. And to meddle in close combat under “crossing,” under the dagger fire of the entire Japanese line — is suicide.
          Quote: tasha
          I may not have read / understood everything, but I did not find the answer to this question. Can you complete what you started by writing something like a conclusion? For example, "thus, the maximum speed of the battleships did not exceed ... knots due to ....

          I suppose that under normal conditions (without having to drive the crew into the fireplaces), Orel had about 15 knots, and five armadillos had maximum squadron speed of 13,5-14 knots
  7. Weniamin 1 July 2015 10: 01 New
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    From the article, I still did not understand - did the author of the article take into account when calculating the speed that moment that the energy consumption for the increment of speed with increasing speed has a nonlinear dependence. The resistance of the medium in aero- and hydrodynamics with increasing speed varies nonlinearly. Something like this. Explain if not right.
    1. ABM
      ABM 1 July 2015 10: 10 New
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      still the propulsive coefficient and cavitation were asked to calculate :) - the author used the analog calculation method
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    3. Trapperxnumx 1 July 2015 10: 20 New
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      Quote: Weniamin
      From the article, I still did not understand - did the author of the article take into account when calculating the speed that moment that the energy consumption for the increment of speed with increasing speed has a nonlinear dependence. The resistance of the medium in aero- and hydrodynamics with increasing speed varies nonlinearly. Something like this. Explain if not right.

      Auto, if I’m not mistaken, already indicated in the first or second article that, purely technically, the squadron’s ships could not accelerate to the “maximum speed” and approach the Japanese in those 15 minutes that Togo had given them. Neither triple expansion machines, nor water resistance, nor the maneuver of the “all of a sudden” turn on the enemy, which also affects speed, could do this.
      1. ABM
        ABM 1 July 2015 10: 35 New
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        but you don’t need to overclock for this - there were 40 cable there, on the 11 nodes of the 15 minutes to the ram
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 10: 49 New
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          Yeah. It remains only to wait for the ships to take their place in the ranks, the time to set the signal, etc.
          And most importantly, not a single person on the site was able to give a clear answer to why, why Rozhdestvensky rush to Togo. What, so eager to lose the top five best battleships?
          As I understand it, it was Kostenko who first expressed the idea of ​​a “jerk to Togo”. Of course, he did not explain the consequences of such a jerk. Well, given the fact that Kostenko is CIVIL, who has the most vague idea of ​​battle tactics, given the fact that Kostenko did not see the battle (since he was sitting in the infirmary at that time), the value of his tactical constructions can hardly be underestimated laughing
          1. ABM
            ABM 1 July 2015 11: 23 New
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            for what? BLOW ON THE FLAGMAN - a key moment in the history of naval battles! that is how Ushakov won all his victories in naval battles, that is how Togo destroyed ships one after another in the Tsushima battle!

            Rozhdestvensky did not understand - if, in general, he knew the tactics of a naval battle, which I strongly doubt, Togo won the battle with one risky maneuver!
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 11: 50 New
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              Quote: ABM
              for what? FLAGMAN IMPACT - a key moment in the history of naval battles

              Before making such stunning discoveries, you would at least look at the map of the battle! laughing
              What kind of blow to the flagship? The flagship of the Japanese at this time cut the course of the Russian system. In less than 7 minutes, the first combat detachment completed the U-turn. If the Russians had a chance to get close to someone (he wasn’t there, but IF there would be) —that would be the armored cruisers of the tail of the Kamimura’s column laughing
              1. ABM
                ABM 1 July 2015 12: 21 New
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                eh, and in the schematics you were weaker than me ... there was a “double loop” of Togo, not a loop! did not know? The cruisers of Kamimura made their loop ... No need to be clever - just read what I write and take it as an axiom :) if you do not believe at all - ask for a link, it’s not difficult for me
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 12: 48 New
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                  Quote: ABM
                  eh, and in the schematics you were weaker than me ... there was a “double loop” of Togo, not a loop! did not know? The cruisers Kamimura did their loop ...

                  Wow :))) Yes, there is such an opinion :)))
                  Quote: ABM
                  Don't be smart

                  No need :))) You still don’t know that there is NOT a EXISTENT MANEUVERING map in the eyeballs of the Tsushima battle (and the Loop of Togo) in nature. Since Russian and Japanese sources describe this maneuvering “a little bit” in different ways :))
                  Quote: ABM
                  just read what I write and take it as an axiom :)

                  No arguments, send exhortations laughing
                  Quote: ABM
                  if you do not believe at all - ask for a link, it’s not difficult for me

                  Well, refer ... especially to the place where the Togo Loop attack led to the attack on Mikasa laughing
                  1. Serg65 1 July 2015 13: 12 New
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                    laughing Andrei, what’s worth it to you, well, tell me that Rozhdestvensky is complete dumbass ... AND EVERYTHING !!!! Dear AVM will be satisfied and his happiness will be unlimited! bully
                    1. ABM
                      ABM 1 July 2015 14: 43 New
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                      Yes, I believe that Genius!
                      looking for evidence myself
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                    3. avt
                      avt 1 July 2015 15: 08 New
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                      Quote: Serg65
                      Andrei, what’s worth it to you, well, tell me that Rozhdestvensky is a complete dumbass ...

                      no Still have to repent publicly - ,, I'm leaving, forgive me Russians " laughing
                  2. ABM
                    ABM 1 July 2015 14: 41 New
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                    1. Do not believe what?

                    2. The Japanese know better what was visible to several of Alexander’s survivors from Suvorov, Oslyaby and Borodino, most of whom didn’t even look through binoculars and were on the bridge - I don’t know (nothing came from the fourth Eagle was not visible), besides, smoke from the first Japanese armored detachment covered the cruiser Kamimura;

                    3. I wrote - if something seems wrong - I will give a link;

                    4. "Togo's loop led to an attack on Mikasu" - at the choice of Rozhestvensky, where he would command, the squadron was sent there, even to Vladivostok with the NO23 course;
                  3. The comment was deleted.
                2. geniy 24 February 2018 23: 50 New
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                  Correctly! Absolutely right!
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          2. ABM
            ABM 1 July 2015 11: 23 New
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            for what? BLOW ON THE FLAGMAN - a key moment in the history of naval battles! that is how Ushakov won all his victories in naval battles, that is how Togo destroyed ships one after another in the Tsushima battle!

            Rozhdestvensky did not understand - if, in general, he knew the tactics of a naval battle, which I strongly doubt, Togo won the battle with one risky maneuver!
          3. sevtrash 1 July 2015 13: 51 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Well, given the fact that Kostenko is CIVIL, who has the most vague idea of ​​battle tactics, given the fact that Kostenko did not see the battle (since he was sitting in the infirmary at that time), the value of his tactical constructions can hardly be underestimated


            But didn’t that Kostenko communicate with 2TE officers after the battle, where various options for the battle and actions were discussed, participated in the naval game?

            But it’s fine if Kofman in his article “Tsushima: analysis against myths” writes about one of the main lines of criticism of Rozhestvensky “... The Russian commander missed a decisive moment in the very beginning of the battle, without“ rushing ”to the double formation of Japanese ships during a risky turn of Togo and generally behaved extremely passively ... "?
        2. avt
          avt 1 July 2015 11: 00 New
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          Quote: ABM
          but you don’t need to overclock for this - there were 40 cable there, on the 11 nodes of the 15 minutes to the ram

          laughing laughing Well, now we’ve reached the ram!
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Yeah. It remains only to wait for the ships to take their place in the ranks, the time to set the signal, etc.
          And most importantly, not a single person on the site was able to give a clear answer to why, why Rozhdestvensky rush to Togo. What, so eager to lose the top five best battleships?

          Nah! Tsar’s tyrant deliberately overloaded the ships with coal, decomposed the commands with this
          Quote: ABM
          "we do not run away from the Japanese, but fight"
          Well deceived everyone, hiding ,, true "speed capabilities of the squadron.
          So that no one goes to ram. Well, the next step in exposing a tyrant - a self-propelled device will probably be that he did not roll out Baranovsky’s landing cannons and did not train boarding teams in Madagascar! wassat
          1. ABM
            ABM 1 July 2015 11: 43 New
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            but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?
            1. avt
              avt 1 July 2015 12: 00 New
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              Quote: ABM
              but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?

              laughing Is that what Retwisan himself said?
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Have you ever heard from what position and from what distance such an attempt was made? And what did she crown with?

              Although this is of course a cry into the void .... Yes - but what about the numbers on the disassembled tanks on the course of the arc? Do you want to google some FAQ? laughing
              1. ABM
                ABM 1 July 2015 12: 17 New
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                see above - for the third time already writing :)
                1. avt
                  avt 1 July 2015 13: 01 New
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                  Quote: ABM
                  see above - for the third time already writing :)

                  Once again I ask - the layout for specific combat, irretrievable losses, vehicles returned to service after repair and those that are written off for the use of motor resources. But to put everything in one heap - no mind. We have already heard this when in such a way about the reprisals of the officers they sucked in - brought down to heap the victims of reprisals of all - in criminal cases of the prisoners, pensioners from the service who had been dismissed, who, on medical grounds, had disappeared, who were not repressed again, but who were under house arrest during the trial, as well as quietly not remembering those restored in rank and party.
                  1. ABM
                    ABM 1 July 2015 16: 31 New
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                    General Heinrici claims that despite minor differences in the 4th TA, Gotha lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 15-20% could not be recovered. This will be for her 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are subject to write-off. AG Kempf lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) are irretrievable, and the 9th Army of Model 647 and 130, respectively. It turns out the total loss of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irretrievably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, 323 of which were destroyed. Given that the real decline was much higher, not 193, but 290 units — the losses of both army groups will amount to about 420 armored units.

                    total dry residue 1612 and 6064 tanks
                    1. avt
                      avt 1 July 2015 22: 01 New
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                      Quote: ABM
                      total dry residue of 1612 and 6064 tanks

                      It’s powerful, however! It was straightway that I had gone too far with the presumptuous “Marshal”, but today the mistake with General Heinrici was terrible for you On 30.06.1943/1303/190, according to the Germans again about the staffing of the Citadel, well, I’m reluctant to print out and be in good condition by divisions, The South group had 552 tanks, of which 194 were old, and the Center had 280 tanks, of which XNUMX were old and XNUMX assault guns. So what do we have for your "bottom line"? Yes, the Red Army should have march straight to Berlin on a victorious march - there were simply no tanks ahead of the German ones! laughing But here's the trouble - as of 20.11.1943/800/200 in the group “SOUTH”, they replenished 200 with dashing reckoning, of which not less than XNUMX were faulty, and they also threw no more than XNUMX from the west - just a piece count is not a hunt , which again according to the German registers. And that’s how it is - one should carefully consider the victorious reports of both parties in terms of counting and categories of losses, both their own and those of Hitler. Although of course they were excellent fighters and their level of equipment was not entirely ,, Tigers and Panthers, but it was. So the glory of our grandfathers overpowered them is higher.
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                  3. ABM
                    ABM 1 July 2015 16: 53 New
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                    that I am a deputy behind the rear of the First Ukrainian ?! laughing
                    our losses - according to the "Vulture of secrecy removed" (no statistics on irretrievably lost)
                    Wehrmacht losses - according to Heinrici
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                  5. kalibr 1 July 2015 18: 57 New
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                    You know, when such questions arise and in all doubts, it is best to resort to the sources. And the sources are as follows: SOVINFORMBURO'S MESSAGES in Pravda newspaper. It’s only the business of looking at ALL newspapers for WAR and counting the number of our destroyed tanks and German ones ... Forget that our losses were beneficial for underestimating, and German losses were inflating. But we will assume that "the truth does not lie." Then contact the ... in the Bundesarhiv. Report that you write a scientific article. And to request the data German ... They will give! And compare !!! Themselves !!!
                    1. ABM
                      ABM 1 July 2015 20: 23 New
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                      cool idea! fellow
                    2. ABM
                      ABM 1 July 2015 20: 23 New
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                      cool idea! fellow
                    3. avt
                      avt 1 July 2015 22: 07 New
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                      Quote: kalibr
                      . Then turn to ... in the Bundesarchive. Report that write a scientific article. And request German data ... They will! And compare !!! Yourself !!!

                      Quote: ABM
                      cool idea!

                      Already and even in the USSR they published - Muller-Hildebrant ,, German Army 1933-1945 "reprinted in 2003
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              3. geniy 24 February 2018 23: 59 New
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                The Retwisan attack culminated in the stupidity of Russian admirals and commanders. None of the modern experts understand that of the entire Russian squadron, only one single battleship rushed to the ram, while all the other ships of the Russian squadron behaved passively. And because of this, Retvisan was shelled by a squadron of Japanese battleships. But if the whole Russian squadron threw themselves into a ram, then the Japanese fire would have had to be evenly distributed over all Russian ships - and from this Retvisan would have suffered less damage. And besides, the Commander of Retvisan Brazenly stood on the bridge open to all the fragments, and not in the conning tower, and when he was wounded by a fragment in the stomach, the attack naturally fell off. And if this attack were organized in a smart way, then success could have been on the Russian side, simply because the closer the distance, the better the Russian armor-piercing shells penetrate the armor. And the Japanese armor-piercing shells were fictitious - they did not penetrate the armor, but detonated immediately from touching it. Therefore, the Russian squadron was advantageous rapprochement at the closest distance of fire, up to the ram.
          2. ABM
            ABM 1 July 2015 11: 43 New
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            but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 11: 52 New
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              Quote: ABM
              but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?

              Have you ever heard from what position and from what distance such an attempt was made? And what did she crown with? (leaving aside the fact that it’s not an easy task with Retwisan’s ram)
            2. GUS
              GUS 1 July 2015 12: 12 New
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              Quote: ABM
              but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?


              I heard that when the Tsesarevich rolled out of order to the left and began to describe the circulation, the second Matelot retvizan went first to follow the flagship, but after it became clear that the Tsesarevich did not obey the helm, the squadron between Peresvet ”and“ Sevastopol ”, and (when the Japanese began to shoot the leading“ Peresvet ”), changed course towards rapprochement with the Japanese squadron. Subsequently, this act was regarded as an attempt to ram the armored cruiser Nissin, which was marching in the rearguard, but the most probable version seems to be according to which its commander, 1 captain E. N. Schensnovich decided to go under the stern of Nissin and break through the Japanese system alone squadrons, while the head battleships were busy turning and could not fire "Retvisan" through the formation of their ships.
              1. ABM
                ABM 1 July 2015 12: 25 New
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                well, did you hear about the battle at Cape Lissa?
                1. GUS
                  GUS 2 July 2015 01: 13 New
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                  Understand that under Liss they fought both in the time of Ushakov and Nelson, i.e. according to the canons of the sailing fleet. The fire was almost point blank. The lack of optical sights did not contribute to the effectiveness of fire even from short distances, remember how much the Austrians suffered when breaking through the Persano system? What can we say about long distances.
                  The rate of fire of the guns was low, and the use of smoky gunpowder reduced both the rate of fire and accuracy of the aiming. Even assuming that the enemies at Liss had shells from the time of Tsushima, the ram was possible in pincer. But the ramming itself is difficult, because the enemy dodges and hit him aboard under correct the angle is not so simple, as proved by the loss of the Italians the only armadillo due to ramming strike.
                  By the time of the Russo-Japanese War, not a single ship could ram an enemy simply because it simply did not have the ability to bring this maneuver to the end, as demonstrated by the example of Retvisan and the Varyag, who were unable to break through concentrated fire .Even small destroyers, subject to good visibility, could not go unpunished to approach a torpedo attack range to a more or less combat-ready ship without the risk of being destroyed. In fact, the Suvorov, which had practically lost its combat readiness, beat off mine attacks for some time and.
                  Sorry, but comparing Tsushima and Liss is like trying to solve a mathematical problem using spelling rules.
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              3. ABM
                ABM 1 July 2015 12: 42 New
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                ... so, and returning to Tsushima and the loop of Togo - what would be more logical, stupidly go under execution or try to slip under the stern? did not know how to maneuver? there is even better - a dump at close range is a mutually dangerous thing
              4. The comment was deleted.
          3. Ulan
            Ulan 1 July 2015 12: 10 New
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            In fact, it’s not funny enough. I just didn’t understand, if everything was so wonderful, Rozhdestvensky didn’t make a single mistake, Togo, the Russian commandos shot perfectly, why did they lose something? How did one of the eyewitnesses write that we were not at all fighting with the Japanese, but with the English squadron? Or was the notorious "shimoza" to blame?
            1. Pilat2009 1 July 2015 20: 48 New
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              Quote: Ulan
              I just didn’t understand, if everything was so wonderful, Rozhdestvensky didn’t make a single mistake, Togo, the Russian commandos shot perfectly, why did they lose something?

              Write specifically what mistake he made before being wounded?
              If you abandon all the slow-moving boats and keep at least 15 knots, it turns out that Suvorov, Alexander, Borodino, Oryol, Oslyabya go into a breakthrough. Well, some were advised by Nikolai and Nikolai. Against 12 Japanese ships?
              Further, in the war someone always wins, someone loses, therefore the reasons for the defeat:
              1-low squadron speed and, as a result, the advantage of Yap in tactics is an objective factor that cannot be fixed
              2-Russians fired well. But the Japanese are better + more volley + more explosive
              3-Part of Russian shells did not burst
              4-Luck was for the Japanese. You can argue about this, laugh, but the Japanese gods were stronger than the Russians. Either the egregore of the Japanese was stronger than the Russian in their native land. The last two ships were sunk at the very end, within 30 minutes.

              Now let's imagine that at night Nebogatov does not develop high speed, cruisers and destroyers do not scatter but go together and not to Vladivostok, but back to the neutral port. In this case, there is no question of defeat, and Nebogatov is charged with weakness and failure to comply with the order
              1. Ulan
                Ulan 2 July 2015 11: 56 New
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                I think not all the reasons you have indicated.
                To keep the move at 13-14 knots in the initial phase of the battle was quite real. The only slow-moving that could not hold it were transports.
                Overload still took place.
                The ships were not prepared for battle. What had to be done was demonstrated on the Eagle, although these are half measures, but they did not even do this minimal.
                Incomprehensible rebuilding just before the start of the battle. If we discard all guesses and thoughts about the "ingenious" course of the defense missile defense system, then these throwings are incomprehensible, it seems that the commander simply did not have a clear idea of ​​the plan for the battle.
                Luck, of course, is an important matter, and she was on the side of the Japanese, but still there were mistakes.
                Errors before being injured? You can’t make mistakes if you don’t do anything. All of Rozhdestvensky’s activity ended after giving two orders — to keep such and such a course and shoot in the head.
                1. Pilat2009 2 July 2015 21: 39 New
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                  Quote: Ulan
                  it seems the commander simply did not have a clear idea of ​​the plan for the battle.

                  And what kind of plan can be when conditions dictate to you? Well, come on, suggest your plan.
                  Still, Rozhdestvensky did not make perestroika for the sake of narcissism, he had some reasons
                  http://vivovoco.astronet.ru/VV/PAPERS/HISTORY/TSUSSIMA.HTM
          4. Serg65 1 July 2015 13: 20 New
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            Quote: avt
            Nah! Tsar’s tyrant deliberately overloaded the ships with coal, decomposed the commands with this

            Quote: avt
            Well deceived everyone, hiding ,, true "speed capabilities of the squadron.
            So that no one goes to ram. Well, the next step in exposing a tyrant - a self-propelled device will probably be that he did not roll out Baranovsky’s landing cannons and did not train boarding teams in Madagascar!

            wassat Well, this is what was required to prove! And then sculpt with Andrey the facts of love for ZPR, Surf said that the admiral means! Kostenko said that the admiral had to drop the squadron and dump three crosses on the battleships, so it was necessary to dump !!! After all, the whole point of the dispute is that in Russia there are always bosses-fools bully
            1. avt
              avt 1 July 2015 15: 06 New
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              Quote: Serg65
              And then sculpt with Andrey the facts of love for ZPR

              Yeah, paraphrasing the character of Vysotsky - yes, about the love of Rozhestvensky on the forehead is written by the tricks and Kaptsovtsi. laughing
              Quote: Serg65
              ! Kostenko said that the admiral had to drop the squadron and dump three crosses on the battleships, so it was necessary to dump !!!

              laughing good Especially when you consider what he said after the battle and wrote in general after captivity. laughing And so - yes - it was necessary to go to the ram ..... yes, what is there, ram-to boarding and give melee! laughing
              Quote: Serg65
              After all, the whole point of the dispute is that in Russia there are always bosses-fools

              Yeah - exactly up to the moment when, by the will of fate, the accusers get to the bosses. Then, according to newly discovered circumstances, I begin to think thoughtfully and ornately about the correctness of my stocks, or mumble, like Klitschko, to a simple question like - when they signed the document, well, so far this Mayor of Kiev soaked in an interview.
              1. Serg65 2 July 2015 06: 07 New
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                Quote: avt
                Yeah - exactly up to the moment when, by the will of fate, the accusers get to the bosses. Then, according to newly discovered circumstances, I begin to think thoughtfully and ornately about the correctness of my stocks, or mumble, like Klitschko, to a simple question like - when they signed the document, well, so far this Mayor of Kiev soaked in an interview.

                laughing What is the situation in life and how many times have I seen such "bosses", well done AVT! good
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    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 10: 44 New
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      Quote: Weniamin
      energy expenditures for the increment of speed with its increase have a nonlinear dependence.

      There are two aspects to this. The energy we still have steam, steam is generated in the boiler, respectively, the implementation of the principle you indicated occurs with increasing speed. Those. if the ship goes 11 knots and "consuming" an average of 7,4 revolutions per speed knot, and it needs another 8 revolutions for an additional uzeo, then the steam energy consumption for these additional 8 revolutions will certainly be higher than for the previous revolutions.
      And the second aspect - I considered strictly according to the Kostenko method :))
    5. Alex 2 July 2015 18: 44 New
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      Quote: Weniamin
      The resistance of the medium in aero- and hydrodynamics with increasing speed varies nonlinearly. Something like this. Explain if not right.

      You are absolutely right, but at the speeds in question, it is entirely possible to use pseudo-linear dependencies as a first approximation: You obviously noticed that the author always indicates the speed intervals in which the speed increase is calculated. Plus some variation (confidence interval of accuracy). So the numerical data can be considered fairly reliable.
  8. sevtrash 1 July 2015 10: 47 New
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    The last (or not?) Part of the articles "Tsushima Myths" from the author could be called "Myths from Andrei Kolobov about the engineer" Orel "Kostenko" smile The truth in the previous part of the myths was enough, or rather, not in the article itself (there was nothing new there), but in the discussion, where Andrei, among others, brought an advanced training system for 2TE, excellent accuracy of artillery fire 2TE, overloading Japanese, and not Russian armadillos. How can you evaluate such pearls? How are the myths? Or mistakes?
    The next stage - it seems, in the absence of the best, evidence of the impossibility of new armadillos to reach speeds of 16-17 knots is based on the search for contradictions at Kostenko. To begin with, as always in the series of articles, it was necessary to make Kostenko a schoolboy or so.
    From the author "... In other words, by the time the 2nd Pacific Squadron left, yesterday’s graduate had only four months of experience working on a single building ship and had not the least experience operating a ship’s undercarriage ..."
    Either Andrei did not finish reading, or well, he does not tolerate Kostenko
    Kostenko himself writes that since 1903 he has been working on the Orel during practice, was appointed an engineer to complete the ship and showed himself to be quite good, since he was appointed responsible for the completion / tuning / escort of the ship during the campaign (under his supervision several hundred artisans worked). This is not to mention the fact that he graduated from engineering with a gold medal with the entry of his name on the Marble board of the school. Almost everything (except for Andrey request ) note the value of Kostenko’s memoirs, maybe Andrei will find and give the opinions of historians (not counting himself), who would be so negative about Ksotenko. Or are there none?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 10: 51 New
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      According to the facts given in the article, is there anything to argue with? or again - a plentiful stream of words without a glimpse of argumentation?
      The only thing that somehow resembles an argument
      Quote: sevtrash
      Kostenko himself writes that since 1903 he has been working on Orel during practice

      Oh, yes, indeed, I did not count him as a student laughing
      1. sevtrash 1 July 2015 13: 05 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Oh, yes, indeed, I did not count him as a student

        Well, actually, it’s about his knowledge, moreover, the mechanisms of the “Eagle”, you should have known that Kostenko worked with these same mechanisms and the “Eagle” since 1903. Another thing is that your emotions do not allow this to be done? The main thing is not even this, but that he constantly worked with the mechanisms of the Eagle, moreover, during the course of the many months-long campaign, and, together with the mechanical engineers, it is at least ridiculous to consider him ignorant.
        He had theoretical knowledge, he had experience, I will repeat the experience of a many-month trip on a ship as an engineer. His knowledge and opinions were interesting for Rozhdestvensky, Birilev, Nebogatov, members of the ITC, the outstanding Russian shipbuilder Krylov, not to mention his future activities.

        Please, provide opinions and links to those scholars / historians who would refuse Kostenko to have professional knowledge and opinions.

        Besides you, of course smile
      2. sevtrash 1 July 2015 13: 12 New
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        What do you write - "... I would like to note that the overload during firing could not have reached 3000 tons .."

        What Kostenko writes - "... Yesterday we were ordered again to load coal to the norm of 2360 tons, since during the parking time we spent up to 300 tons only for the current needs of the ship. In addition, we took full reserves for three months of all consumables and food: flour, sugar, vodka, canned food, butter and other products. To provide the ship with fresh meat, 16 bulls and 2 cows were purchased, so now we will have real cow milk. Many chickens and various birds were purchased. Armadillos of the Suvorov type they are overloaded by 3200 tons and will not be able to develop more than 14 knots, although on the sample with normal deepening they gave up to 18 knots in accordance with the project ... "

        Could you justify why you claim that there could be no overload? Do you have other information from somewhere? Where from? Also were on a campaign on the Eagle?
      3. sevtrash 1 July 2015 13: 34 New
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        Regarding fouling. And why do not you quote the entire quotation from Kostenko’s testimony, but part?
        It looks like this for you: "... The underwater parts of the ships were very small ... Japanese officers in Japan ..."
        And Kostenko’s in a slightly different way - "... The underwater parts of the ships grew very little. Only in the vertical part of the side and along the armored belt and a little lower was fouling by sea grass visible ..."
        Why so selective?
        And at all you "forgot" to indicate from Kostenko’s testimony that "... In Nossi-Be, divers cleaned the underwater parts and said that there were no shells ..."
        Also did you miss the “forgot”? from Kostenko’s testimony, tragic evidence - "... when" Borodino "and" Oslyable "capsized, they showed perfectly clean underwater parts ..."

        Indeed, in the book, Kostenko writes about a possible reason for the decrease in the rate of fouling with shells and algae, especially considering the duration of swimming, this could and should have been. However, do not forget that these are memoirs built on a diary. Before the survey by divers in Nossi-Be, Kostenko could well have assumed fouling with shells, but then he already had actual data on the work of divers, testimonies of witnesses of the battle.
      4. sevtrash 1 July 2015 14: 22 New
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        When asked in the comments on the previous article to provide evidence that could outweigh the testimony of the flagship mechanic of the squadron, senior officer of Eagle, engineer Eagle did not assume that you would introduce yourself as such. In your:
        ... "Eagle" should have reached speeds above 15 knots. However, no one has observed such speed for Russian battleships in battle, either from our ships or from the Japanese. And vice versa, if we take into account that during the battle the average speed of the battleship did not exceed 10, maximum 11 knots, and the minimum was approximately 8-9 knots, then, correlating the minimum and average speeds to the minimum and average speeds that were issued by the Orla vehicles, we get ...

        You rely on the assumption that the speed could be 8, and 9, and 10, and 11 knots, you take something from Kostenko, somewhere you take from Parfyonov and as a result you get a conclusion with a claim to the final. On the one hand, your conclusion is precisely Your, with another testimony of a ship engineer, which relies on the opinion of mechanical engineers Orel, the flagship mechanic, senior officer.

        How do you imagine whose knowledge, experience is higher? Who can be trusted? You - who have never seen these very machines, have never worked with them and - most likely - and theoretically have no idea what it is? Or those people who every day for many months worked on this ship with these machines?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 16: 05 New
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          Quote: sevtrash
          Well, actually, it’s about his knowledge, moreover, the mechanisms of the “Eagle”, you should have known that Kostenko worked with these same mechanisms and the “Eagle” since 1903. Another thing is that your emotions do not allow this to be done?

          Yeah. Here's what it looked like in 1902:
          Until the end of summer, we had to study the entire internal location of the armadillo, its ventilation and drainage systems, the flooding of the cellars and the heeling of the ship from the Kingstones. Yakovlev often tested our knowledge of all schemes of ship systems. This second year of practice greatly expanded our understanding of all the mutually connected devices of the ship and more fully illuminated the future responsibilities of the ship engineer on the building.

          1903 Kostenko does not paint.
          Arriving at the summer practice in the spring of 1903, we received assignments for the preparation of diploma projects approved by the design manager, engineer Nevrazhin
          .
          In 1904, classes Kostenko
          The builder entrusted me with a test of the watertightness of all compartments in bulk water under the specified pressure, the condition of all the main bulkheads and the inner bottom, and then a water test of the upper corridors behind the waist armor and installation of the main belt slabs. At my disposal came the entire hammered and riveting workshop, as well as riggers.

          It’s just that a man did not pour out of boilers and cars :))
          Quote: sevtrash
          he had experience, once again I will repeat the experience of a many-month trip on a ship as an engineer.

          An engineer who did not deal much with boilers and machines on this very campaign. Kostenko didn’t mess around, but he had enough other worries
          Quote: sevtrash
          Please, provide opinions and links to those scholars / historians who would refuse Kostenko to have professional knowledge and opinions.

          Please - either refute the facts indicated by me in the article and / or explain the discrepancies with Kostenko that I have cited. I understand that in fact you have nothing to say, but this is not a reason to drag me into abstract disputes
          Do you consider Kostenko a professional? Yes please. Well, I do not agree with you, and outlined my reasons in the article. If it is not clear - read the report of Parfenov 1st (which is the head of the "eagle") and compare with what Kostenko wrote. Perhaps you will understand where we are professional, and where he is not.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 16: 09 New
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            Quote: sevtrash
            Could you justify why you claim that there could be no overload? Do you have other information from somewhere? Where from? Also were on a campaign on the Eagle?

            Overloading was, of course, only it was by no means for the 3000 tons indicated by Kostenko. And where did the information come from ... I kind of wrote Russian in white in an article - Kostenko once again refuted himself. Reread carefully the chapters related to standing in Nossi Be
            Quote: sevtrash
            Regarding fouling. And why do you cite not all of the quotes from Kostenko’s testimony, but part? ... ... Why so selective?

            Because you again did not understand anything from what I wrote. Kostenko in one case claims that fouling is the cause of the loss of speed of the armadillo, in the other case that fouling is NOT the cause of the speed of the armadillo. The question is precisely IN THE INFLUENCE OF FILLING ON SPEED, and not whether there was fouling, was not, or was, but not much - the presence / absence of fouling in this matter does not play any role.
            Quote: sevtrash
            You rely on the assumption that the speed could be 8, and 9, and 10, and 11 knots, you take something from Kostenko, somewhere you take from Parfyonov and as a result you get a conclusion with a claim to the final. On the one hand, your conclusion, it is yours, on the other hand, the testimony of a ship engineer who relies on the opinion of the mechanical engineers Eagle, the flagship mechanic, and senior officer.

            Twenty five again :)))
            My friend, put aside your training manuals “How to Refute Kostenko’s Detractors” and learn how to read it in the end, after all.
            What is the testimony of an engineer? What are you speaking about? Your engineer is either 16, then 18, then 15-16 but with great strain. In other words, Kostenko DOES NOT GIVE an answer about the speed of either the armadillo Eagle or the latest armadillos in general. And you also attribute to him that he allegedly took into account the opinion of the mechanical engineers of Orel, (the mechanic generally does not say anything about speed only about speed, the rest is Kostenko’s calculations), about the senior officer (who calls speed lower than Kostenko) and the flagship mechanics (which calls BIGGER than Kostenko’s speed)
            Quote: sevtrash
            How do you imagine whose knowledge, experience is higher? Who can be trusted?

            I believe that the experience of the “eagle” mechanic is higher, which reported a 75-98 turn in the battle and that corresponds to the maximum speed of the “Eagle” at about 14-15 knots maximum.
            And I think the opinion of a senior officer who says that under ideal conditions the Eagle could give 15-16 knots, but since the conditions are imperfect, his assessment roughly corresponds to the assessment of the mechanic “Eagle”. And an estimate of the maximum speed at the level of 14-15 knots gives a squadron speed of 13 -14 knots, which corresponds to the testimony of Rozhdestvensky and the testimony of a senior navigator.
            And you - continue to write that "This is only your opinion!" Maybe someone will believe.
            1. sevtrash 1 July 2015 19: 26 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Overloading was, of course, only it was by no means for the 3000 tons indicated by Kostenko. And where did the information come from ... I kind of wrote Russian in white in an article - Kostenko once again refuted himself. Reread carefully the chapters related to standing in Nossi Be

              Well, the fact of the matter is that about the transshipment of 3200 tons, which I indicated, he writes above in the same place. Read carefully.
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              What is the testimony of an engineer? What are you speaking about? Your engineer is either 16, then 18, then 15-16

              Well, you are counting on those people who do not want to see Kostenko’s testimony. There is his testimony in which he clearly indicates the speed that new battleships could give on the day of the battle at 16-16,5 knots, based on his opinion and the opinion of the mechanical engineers of Orel. In his book, he speaks several times about the speed of the ship and its change due to overload, which at different stages of the campaign was different, as, in fact, in the testimony.
              He has quite logical justifications for this, unlike yours. Yours are presented on some kind of floating data - if you take either 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 nodes, multiply by Kostenko and divide by Parfyonov, you will get the number you need.
              Once again, on the one hand, the testimony of the flagship mechanic, senior officer, ship engineer, indicating the opinion of the mechanical engineer Eagle (read the testimony), and on the other hand, your opinion.
              By the way, Andrey, okay, Kostenko has insufficient education and experience for you, but what about you - what is your education and experience? You probably have specific knowledge and experience regarding armadillos such as Borodino in general and Orel in particular, significantly more than that of Kostenko, the flagship mechanic, senior officer combined, if you reject them so easily?
              And did not answer the question - indicate historians / scholars who would just as you reject Kostenko.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 23: 06 New
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                Quote: sevtrash
                There is his testimony in which he clearly indicates the speed that new battleships could give on the day of the battle at 16-16,5 knots, based on his opinion and the opinion of the mechanical engineers of Orel

                Listen, I’m asking you again - can you READ?
                Kostenko says
                At 78 revolutions in the campaign, the "Eagle" gave 11 - 11½ knots, having a displacement of at least 15500 tons. The mechanical engineer on the "Eagle" in the campaign were of the opinion that, in case of need, the battleship, with full tension and perfect angle, can develop the same speed as on the sample. With the addition of 6 revolutions, the stroke increased by 1 knot. Therefore, at 108 rpm, you could count on 16 - 16½ knots.

                In other words, the mechanic did not say a word that the battleship could develop 16-16,5 knots. The mechanic said that with full tension and perfect angle the battleship will be able to develop NUMBER OF TURNS which he developed on passing tests. In other words, if you try very hard, the battleship will give 109 revolutions. But what speed will turn out at the same time - the mechanic is not a word or a word, this is the EXCLUSIVELY calculation of Kostenko
                Quote: sevtrash
                In his book, he speaks several times about the speed of the ship and its change due to overload, which at different stages of the campaign was different, as, in fact, in the testimony.

                And you need to be completely blind so as not to see that in this case Kostenko contradicts himself. I ask you once again - besides the mantras "Kostenko is right ... Kostenko PRAAAAAV ..." will there be any refutations of the discrepancies indicated by me in the article?
                Quote: sevtrash
                He has quite logical justifications for this, unlike yours

                Well, yes - to indicate either 18 then 15-16 then 15-16 with additional training - this is a very logical justification laughing
                I have already shown you on fingers how "logical" Kostenko is. And you, besides the repetition "But in the main he is still right!" so you can’t argue with me. So why are you wasting your and my time?
                Quote: sevtrash
                Once again, on the one hand, the testimony of the flagship mechanic, senior officer, ship engineer, indicating the opinion of the mechanical engineer Eagle (read the testimony), and on the other hand, your opinion.

                I repeat once again - the testimony of the senior officer of the Swede, the chief of the Eagle, the chief navigator of the squadron, Semenov, Rozhdestvensky, etc. - On my side. And you can’t even notice this in any way.
                Quote: sevtrash
                And did not answer the question - indicate historians / scholars who would just as you reject Kostenko.

                As soon as you tell me with specific examples what mistakes I made in the article, I will definitely answer! lol
                1. sevtrash 2 July 2015 16: 10 New
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                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  I repeat once again - the testimony of the senior officer of the Swede, the chief of the Eagle, the chief navigator of the squadron, Semenov, Rozhdestvensky, etc. - On my side. And you can’t even notice this in any way.


                  Can you read? Already every 10 times I write about the same thing - on the one hand, the testimony of the flagship mechanic, senior officer Eagle, ship engineer (who indicates the views of mechanical engineers !!), which speak of a speed of 16-17 knots !!! This is in the official testimony !!! People who are the best primary sources about the speed of new battleships, and Kostenko is a shipbuilder who professionally owned ship speed calculations, he even had a graduation project of a high-speed armored cruiser. And on the other hand, who? You or what? Oh yes, Christmas.

                  It is completely clear that you are not able to prove your statement about the speed of armadillos like Borodino, despite the attempts. There is only a question in what - and you yourself seriously do not realize this? wassat
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  As soon as you tell me with specific examples what mistakes I made in the article, I will definitely answer!


                  You resort to this style of response quite often - when there is nothing to answer. laughing
      5. sevtrash 1 July 2015 14: 32 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Oh, yes, indeed, I did not count him as a student

        But by chance, those years that passed before the book was not counted?
  9. ABM
    ABM 1 July 2015 11: 33 New
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    Quote: ABM
    too lazy to google everything yourself :(
    I'll find now
    and you shouldn’t be rude - even if something doesn’t suit you in numbers
    1. avt
      avt 1 July 2015 11: 49 New
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      Quote: ABM
      too lazy to google everything yourself :(
      I'll find now
      and you shouldn’t be rude - even if something doesn’t suit you in numbers

      All ? Know it? laughing Well, tsifrovki that specifically, do not like "? I will facilitate the work - according to Müller Hildebrant, on the Citadel it was planned to detach 1700 units of armored vehicles including assault guns. Of them under repair on 31.06.1943/147/52 - 19 units of new, XNUMX old and XNUMX assault guns . Well, now ,, google "for us it is unreasonable specific statements of losses of at least German technology after the fighting.
      1. ABM
        ABM 1 July 2015 12: 07 New
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        see above - Soviet! and on the Wehrmacht I agree to these numbers
        1. avt
          avt 1 July 2015 12: 45 New
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          Quote: ABM
          see above - Soviet! and on the Wehrmacht I agree to these numbers

          Uh, no! This number will not rent laughing No one asks what they agree on. Kindly answer for yours, and not smear someone else’s, moreover, specifically with confirmation by links to documents.
          1. ABM
            ABM 1 July 2015 16: 07 New
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            General Heinrici claims that despite minor differences in the 4th TA, Gotha lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 15-20% could not be recovered. This will be for her 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are subject to write-off. AG Kempf lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) are irretrievable, and the 9th Army of Model 647 and 130, respectively. It turns out the total loss of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irretrievably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, 323 of which were destroyed. Given that the real decline was much higher, not 193, but 290 units — the losses of both army groups will amount to about 420 armored units.
          2. ABM
            ABM 1 July 2015 16: 07 New
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            General Heinrici claims that despite minor differences in the 4th TA, Gotha lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 15-20% could not be recovered. This will be for her 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are subject to write-off. AG Kempf lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) are irretrievable, and the 9th Army of Model 647 and 130, respectively. It turns out the total loss of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irretrievably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, 323 of which were destroyed. Given that the real decline was much higher, not 193, but 290 units — the losses of both army groups will amount to about 420 armored units.
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  10. Mooh 1 July 2015 12: 17 New
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    From what I promised to a respected audience, only a detailed analysis of the beginning of the battle and the “Loops of Togo” remained incomplete. Perhaps, nevertheless, I will be able to lay out this analysis as a separate article.

    I'd love to see this material. Even from Tsushima's pillar myths, the Melnikovsky statement about the criminal passivity of Rozhdestvensky in battle was not analyzed in detail in the cycle. As far as I remember, it was argued that for the entire duration of the battle, Rozhdestvensky gave as many as 2 teams.
    If we have already done such a fundamental work, it would be necessary to bring to the logical end and put it somewhere in one text. Ax unfortunately is not the best place to search for old publications, especially broken into several parts.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 12: 50 New
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      Quote: MooH
      I'd love to see this material

      I will try. hi
      Quote: MooH
      If we have already done such a fundamental work, it would be necessary to bring to the logical end and put it somewhere in one text.

      Yes, definitely. Although I don’t know yet where. Well, I’ll definitely post it on the alternative, but maybe where else?
  11. Adagka 1 July 2015 13: 15 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Adagka
    All local fans of the "creativity" of the "ingenious" ZPR stubbornly forget about one squadron dragging even at 11, but at 9 knots

    So what? Than 11 nodes are fundamentally better than 9 can answer?
    Quote: Adagka
    what artist this leader equated the Ebras to the trough Kachatka and in general why he dragged her with him can not explain,

    You know, your militant illiteracy is a little annoying. Nothing Kamchatka was the most useful squadron ship? And what is this fact generally known to be?
    Quote: Adagka
    and of course it’s better to run into Kostenko and a priori trust the coward to the admiral and other “heroes” who surrendered, they then tell the truth

    Yes, sure. Either Kostenko’s case, he fought heroically to the last, and died, struck by four Japanese twelve-inch shells in the chest.
    Nothing that Kostenko, as it were, also surrendered along with everyone else?
    Double standards - they are so double ...

    You are like that stupid boss who has two points of view of mine and is wrong, in this you are a worthy couple of ZPR. Kamchatka, like hospital Orel, could have been sent separately, but it’s not necessary but necessary, but where could the ingenious organizer think of such things. And how was Kamchatka useful in battle? Did the ebony go wild on the go?
    1. Ulan
      Ulan 1 July 2015 14: 42 New
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      I also wonder why the Kamchatka was the “most useful squadron ship”? You need to immediately clarify, when it is useful and with what? If on a campaign, this is one thing, but in battle, what did she suddenly become “the most useful.” “What did she help the squadron so useful during the battle?” Mikasu drowned a battering ram or maybe she had 16-inch guns on board .
      And if in the campaign it really was not superfluous, then in battle it was completely useless, a burden for the squadron, like all other transports.
      It is completely clear to me that the task assigned to Rozhestvensky was impossible.
      Initially, the task was to connect with the 1st Pacific (Port Arthur) squadron and gain supremacy at sea. The task is quite feasible.
      But after Port Arthur fell, and its squadron ceased to exist, it won’t be able to defeat the Japanese fleet and gain supremacy at sea, thereby turning the tide of the war in Russia's favor. Consequently, the further campaign turned into a pure gamble, especially the task set by Nicholas II to defeat the Japanese fleet.
      To the honor of Rozhestvensky, he perfectly understood this, but as a military man he could not fail to fulfill the order.
      The only thing he could do was try to break into Vladivostok with the least losses, possibly avoiding the battle with the Japanese fleet.
      Did the admiral do everything for this? The answer is obvious. No.
      1. tasha 1 July 2015 15: 37 New
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        Somewhere like that ...

        I read materials about the Tsushima battle and start to think that Tsushima should not be seen as a battle between two more or less equal fighters, but rather as an attack by enemies on a train, which includes armed guards. Just look at the 2 TOE marching warrant before the start of the battle.
        1. ABM
          ABM 1 July 2015 16: 14 New
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          before the battle, Oslyabya was at the head of the left column with the second detachment! in the right column - Suvorov at the head of the first detachment
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          1. tasha 1 July 2015 16: 28 New
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            I agree, the figure is an illustration to the thought of the train. There in the left corner is 6: 00 14.05.

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            2. ABM
              ABM 1 July 2015 16: 41 New
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              and the thought is true, on the one hand, on the other - none of the first three detachments paid attention to transports and was not going to cover
        3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 16: 23 New
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          Do not confuse the 2TOE marching order and order before the start of the battle
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          3. ABM
            ABM 1 July 2015 16: 43 New
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            "Just look at the 2nd TOE Campaign Warrant before the battle. "(C) - I looked
            1. tasha 1 July 2015 17: 13 New
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              And about 7: 00 the first contact with the Japanese cruisers took place. And the battle has begun ...
              So somewhere out there I’m a little bit right ... :)

              An interesting topic for serious researchers is the model of building ships of the 2th TOE during the battle. At least at the level of the same pictures, broken down by the hour. What do you think?
              1. ABM
                ABM 1 July 2015 17: 41 New
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                only schematically you can try to depict ... somewhere I saw in our first three orders - but really, with distances, so who measured them!
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      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 23: 26 New
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        Quote: Ulan
        I also wonder why the Kamchatka was the “most useful squadron ship”?

        I explain. Kamchatka, of course, could not bring any benefit in battle - but AFTER the battle, it became invaluable.
        The fact that 2TOE ships generally reached Tsushima is a huge merit of Kamchatka. Now look what happens. As I already wrote - before the battle, Rozhdestvensky had no reason to expect enchanting defeat - as I said, the experience of the Battle of Shantung testified that while the battleships kept the line and the will to go forward, the Japanese could not do anything to them.
        Accordingly, Rozhdestvensky’s expectations of “going to Vladivostok with the loss of several ships” are absolutely understandable and logical (although they are incorrect, but how did he know this?) So, let’s say that everything went as Rozhdestvensky thought (he built his plans for these thoughts) and the Russian squadron would go to Vladivostok, losing several ships. And then what?
        But nothing. Vladivostok as a place of basing the squadron is nonsense. There was a lack of EVERYTHING and especially of working specialists. It was with great difficulty that Vladivostok provided WOK service - and here a whole squadron! In general, if there was a hope to somehow repair the ships after the breakthrough, then this hope was for Kamchatka
        Quote: Ulan
        Did the admiral do everything for this? The answer is obvious. No.

        Maybe. But what did he not do, in your opinion?
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      1. Denis_469 1 July 2015 16: 44 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, yes, 370 or 400 tons according to Kostenko (really less) is the wildest advantage,

        Yeah - the wildest advantage. When the design total displacement of 14200 tons, and the actual at the time of entering the battle (Kostenko) 16000 tons. 1800 tons of overload are naturally little things. What should be the overload, so that for such a "specialist" as you it became noticeable? 3600 tons or all 5000 tons of overload do you need?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        "Expert", what is there.

        This is just about you.
    2. Pilat2009 1 July 2015 21: 15 New
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      Quote: Denis_469
      explain to him why he down

      Hello first.
      And secondly, do not start harshly?
    3. Pilat2009 1 July 2015 21: 26 New
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      Quote: Denis_469
      explain to him why he down

      Hello first.
      And secondly, do not start harshly?
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    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 16: 42 New
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      Quote: Denis_469
      If we take on faith Kostenko’s words that during the battle the ship lightened by 800 tons, then it turns out that the ship entered the battle with a displacement of 16000 tons (15200 + 800)

      The calculation is based on an incorrect number.
      Quote: Denis_469
      When the “Eagle” was handed over to the Japanese crew, its draft was 8,85 meters average.

      Quote: Denis_469
      We divide the values ​​by 3 (then 300 feet were taken as 100 meters and it was believed that 1 meters in 3 meter). In other words, sediment aft of 9,76 meters,

      Learn to count for a start. The English foot mentioned by Campbell is 30,48 cm, therefore the draft is stern of 8,93 m, and the bow is 8,38 m.
      Quote: Denis_469
      The aforementioned average draft of the ship of 8,85 meters was after water was pumped out of the hull.

      Yeah. It is written
      When the Eagle was brought to Maizuru, it had a draft of 27.5 feet in the bow and 29.3 feet in the stern.

      Well, water was pumped out of it somewhere along the road :)))
      Quote: Denis_469
      “I would like to note that the overload during firing could not have reached 3000 tons” - Kostenko is completely right, since by that time the ships had accepted an extra-standard supply of fuel. This fuel supply was stored everywhere, including on the battery deck. The ship's displacement by this time was approximately 17300 tons.

      V.P. Kostenko :))) He writes in the testimony of the Commission of Inquiry
      The maximum overload of armadillos, such as the Borodino, was upon leaving Nossi-be. "Eagle" then had a displacement of 16800 tons
      1. Denis_469 1 July 2015 18: 56 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The calculation is based on an incorrect number.

        The figure is correct.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Learn to count for a start. The English foot mentioned by Campbell is 30,48 cm, therefore the draft is stern of 8,93 m, and the bow is 8,38 m.

        Try to find out first how it was then. And then you'll tell me. If you suddenly don’t know, then I suggest that until 1950 there was exactly the calculation scheme that I brought. That is, 300 feet equaled 100 meters and 1 meter was considered only 3 feet. If you are very stubborn, then you can go to the K-21 in Severomorsk. She has an original depth gauge, with which she walked away the whole war. So - she has a double graduation: in meters and feet. So the scale ends at 100 meters, which are simultaneously 300 feet. And the same thing was in all the fleets of the world of that time and before it. This is now 1 meter is not the total number of feet. And during and after the WWII, before the end of World War 2, the calculation of the foot meter was different than now. So my pointer is correct. At the time of the REV given. Yours is also correct, but in a modern state. We have different calculation methods and that’s it. I am counting on the time of the REV, you are on modern time.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, water was pumped out of it somewhere along the road :)))

        Yes, on the way to Mizuru, the struggle for vitality was waged. And immediately upon arrival as well.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        V.P. Kostenko :))) He writes in the testimony of the Commission of Inquiry
        The maximum overload of armadillos, such as the Borodino, was upon leaving Nossi-be. "Eagle" then had a displacement of 16800 tons

        Yeah. Only he could not say about the construction overload of 600-800 tons, with which the ship was built. In his testimony, the ship was built without overload on the project. It was actually overloaded by 800 tons. And his testimony should be automatically increased by the amount of construction overload of 800 tons. What was forbidden to talk about at that time. Therefore, he does not speak.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 20: 42 New
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          Quote: Denis_469
          Try to find out first how it was then. And then you'll tell me. If you suddenly don’t know, then I suggest that until 1950 there was exactly the calculation scheme that I brought. That is, 300 feet equaled 100 meters and 1 meter was considered only 3 feet.

          Listen guy, do you even understand what you write? What are you translating feet into meters in the ENGLISH system of measures? Where did you see the British meters? I can still assume that there was something like that with the Russian foot (although for example http://blog.vilisov.info/article/20 says the opposite), but why would the British suddenly equate their feet to meters?
          Quote: Denis_469
          This is now 1 meter not the total number of feet

          We agreed on a verified ENGLISH source.
          Quote: Denis_469
          Yeah. Only he could not say about the construction overload of 600-800 tons, with which the ship was built. In his testimony, the ship was built without overload on the project.

          Go learn the materiel.
          Being on the battleship "Eagle", in the campaign conducted observations of the stability and load of the ship. Upon leaving Libava, at the first parking lot near the island of Langeland, he determined, with a completely calm state of the sea, the displacement and initial stability of the battleship. The average deepening on an even keel was 28 '10 ", displacement - 15300 tons, initial metacentric height - 3,06 feet. Over-deepening of the armadillo was 2' 10", overload - 1770 tons, a decrease in stability was expressed in the loss of 1 'metacentric height. Having collected with the utmost care the information about the loads on the battleship, I received the following results regarding the composition of the reload:
          Coal 450 tons.
          Boiler water 150 "
          Drinking water 40 "
          Water for ship needs 40 "
          Combat super-complete. reserves 100 "
          Boiler grates 30 "
          Engine oil 50 "
          Food and supplies 100 "
          Materials 100 "
          Baggage and small cargo 60 "
          Total 1120 tons, 8,3% of the water consumption.
          About 650 tons of transshipment accounted for the hull, armament and mechanisms, changes in design assumptions, various additions to the project, over 5 years of construction, and during the equipment of the battleship on a difficult campaign.
          During construction, significant overload was obtained for various ship systems: ventilation, drainage, fire, electrical wiring, drainage and others. In addition, there was an overload on the steering, spike devices, on tower installations, on the equipment of residential premises.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 20: 43 New
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            I cannot give exact data on the distribution of weights for these articles without a weighting journal, but the total figure is close to 300 tons. About 200 tons of overload was caused by all sorts of deviations from the project and major alterations. So, the armor over the casemates was thickened; sections of the elevators were protected with 7/8 "sheets; between the lower armored and battery decks, deadwoods were added, sections from the utah were added to the section above the battery, the main mast was reinforced, some bulkheads and frames in the double bottoms were reinforced, racks were arranged for super-complete shells.
            Up to 150 tons were added to the load of the battleship with all sorts of additions not provided for by the project. These were Temperley’s arrows, Spencer-Miller winches and fixtures, counter-min buoys and trawls, rangefinders, Makarov plasters, additional machine ventilation, air bombs for bomb cellars, ventilation clinkets, metlav tiles in all cockpits. On some mine boats there were up to 10 tons of overload, on steam boats - up to 5.
            During the campaign, the cargo of the first category varied significantly, as a result of which the displacement varied over a wide range. The minimum displacement was upon arrival in Dakar, when the recess was 27 '3 ", the displacement was 14800 tons. The maximum overload of armadillos, such as Borodino, was at the exit from Nossi-be. The Orel then had a displacement of 16800 tons. Overload was 3270 tons, that is, 24% of the displacement, over-deepening - 5 '1 ". Draft by nose - 31 '11 ", stern - 30' 4", medium - 31 '1 ", trim on the nose - 1' 7". Metacentric height was reduced to 2,25 '. Half-portals remained at 4,5' from the water ; armored upper belt towered above the water only 2 '.
            2) During the battle, the displacement of the battleship was close to what it was when leaving Libau. The Eagle had a displacement in combat from 15200 to 15250 tons, that is, the overload was from 1670 to 1720 tons, or approximately 12%, the draft was about 28 '7 ", the thick armor of the lower belt was 1' lower WLs. WL-belt protection was the upper belt, which had 6 "in the middle of the vessel and 4,5" at the ends. It rose 4½ above the WL. The metacentric height was slightly less than 3 ', approximately 2,8 '.
            At the same time, the battleship had 1100 tons of coal and up to 500 tons of fresh water, a boiler room, drinking and for ship needs, provisions for 3½ months, engine oil for 60 running days.
            Overload in battle consisted of the following cargoes:
            Coal 400 tons.
            Water 350 "
            Provisions 70 "
            Shells 80 "
            Grids 20 "
            Engine oil 40 "
            Materials and small loads, luggage, tools, supplies. 130 "
            Total 1090 tons.
          2. Denis_469 1 July 2015 21: 34 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Listen guy, do you even understand what you write?

            I perfectly understand what I am writing about conversion. And even wrote an address where you yourself are able to verify my words. Unfortunately, in our country there are no more boats with original depth gauges. Because only on the "K-21" can you see the depth gauges of that time. Although I may be mistaken, and somewhere else they stayed.
            And if reality contradicts your views, then this is no worse than reality - but worse for you.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            What are you translating feet into meters in the ENGLISH system of measures? Where did you see the British meters?

            I already wrote what I saw. On the depth gauges of submarines built in 1905 and later. I can even tell you that on Soviet World War II depth gauges had a double scale in meters and feet. The British I did not see meters. It's right. On our boats I saw depth gauges with a simultaneous double scale.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            We agreed on a verified ENGLISH source.

            I have enough domestic sources. What the British will write about there right now is not interesting to me, but at that time the British had no meters in principle. Therefore, in principle, there can be no English source of conversion. I can also report that I saw similar two-scale depth gauges in photographs of Italian and Japanese submarines. Moreover, the Japanese World War 2 depth gauges were very similar to ours. And they also graduated to 300 feet, which equaled 100 meters. When at the very end of August 1945, American submariners captured a Japanese boat, they also saw such a graduation on that submarine. Immersion depth 100 meters or 300 feet. Since it was used even in 1945 by the Japanese, there is no reason to believe that in 1905 the calculation of the foot meter was different. Although this is all I am writing in vain: you are only interested in what fits into your point of view. You ignore everything else.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            why would the British suddenly equate their feet to meters?

            But the British really did not need it. This was needed by countries with a metric system for synchronization. Therefore, on submarines of countries with a metric system there were two-scale depth gauges. And on them all in all countries, 100 meters equaled 300 feet. Do you like it or not. But that was so. Therefore, as of 1905 to 1950, I can definitely say that the method of calculating the foot meter was exactly this: 1 meter was 3 feet. And 300 feet was 100 meters in depth gauges.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 22: 57 New
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              Quote: Denis_469
              I already wrote what I saw. On the depth gauges of submarines built in 1905 and later. I can even tell you that on Soviet World War II depth gauges had a double scale in meters and feet. The British I did not see meters.

              Who cares about the graduation of Soviet submarines? Campbell, author of the article - ENGLISH. This is clear? And there was an English foot and will eat exactly 30,48 centimeters. And the values ​​indicated on the depth gauges of the submarine do not matter here.
  14. Alexey 1 July 2015 15: 53 New
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    Quote: “But let me, if the battleship“ Orel ”passed tests with a displacement of 13.300 tons, while its normal displacement was 13.530 tons along Kostenko, what kind of congestion can we talk about? After all, it turns out that the“ Orel ”reached the measured mile underloaded by 230 tons, and if not for this underload, the speed of the battleship was even lower, but the reason for this is not at all overload! "
    I speak as a shipbuilding engineer.
    Kostenko made no mistake. Confused the author of the article. Not being a specialist.
    The thing is that the displacement of the former is different. A contract speed of 18 knots was probably negotiated for standard displacement, if the memory serves for Borodino, is about 12500 tons. Overload 1770 tons Kostenko calculated in relation to full displacement. Standard displacement and total displacement are different values.
    1. Denis_469 1 July 2015 15: 58 New
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      Exactly. Tests for maximum speed were carried out at that time in a standard displacement by the stokers of the plant and using Cardiff coal, as the most high-calorie coal. Ordinary brown coal is less caloric and the power plant power on it was less. The power decreased even more during operation due to the fact that the stokers were draftees, and not specially trained stokers for the operation of boilers of that type. Since boilers of different types differed among themselves by the features of operation.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 16: 55 New
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      Quote: Alex
      I speak as a shipbuilding engineer.
      Kostenko made no mistake. Confused the author of the article. Not being a specialist

      Well, let's see what the author messed up there :))
      Quote: Alex
      The thing is that the displacement of the former is different. A contract speed of 18 knots was probably stipulated for a standard displacement, if the memory does not change for Borodino it is about 12500 tons. Kostenko calculated the overload of 1770 tons in relation to the total displacement. Standard displacement and total displacement are different values.

      First, tell me, as a professional, an amateur who thinks of himself - HOW YEAR has the concept of standard displacement appeared? Do not remember? Could it be that the term "standard displacement" first appeared in 1922, the Washington Agreement?
      You see, in those years, the very concept of standard displacement did not exist. Therefore, tests in it could not be carried out.
      Quote: Alex
      A contract speed of 18 knots was probably negotiated for a standard displacement

      The second - you see, the standard displacement is the displacement that a ship has with all the cargo, but without fuel, oil and drinking water. Explain how to test without fuel?
      Thirdly, the tests are carried out in NORMAL displacement, which for the battleships of the Borodino type according to various sources should have been 13 516 - 13 530 tons.
      1. Alexey 2 July 2015 16: 41 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The second - you see, the standard displacement is the displacement that a ship has with all the cargo, but without fuel, oil and drinking water. Explain how to test without fuel?
        Thirdly, the tests are carried out in NORMAL displacement, which for the battleships of the Borodino type according to various sources should have been 13 516 - 13 530 tons.

        Do not dig into the words, it will not change the essence of my comment. Yes, this is not a standard displacement in the modern sense, in any case, there was a standard or some other called provision for loading a ship that was going out on a measured mile. It was, of course, not a complete displacement. I don’t remember exactly, maybe 30% of the reserves. in any case, the displacement was very different from the full in a smaller direction.
  15. unknown 1 July 2015 15: 53 New
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    Even if there is no doubt Kostenko’s words about the speed of the battleships of the Borodino type at 15,5-16 knots, even this speed is higher than the speed of the first armored squad that was slowed down by the Fuso. The battleship of the obsolete project could not go more than 15 knots. Moreover, the Japanese ships were also overloaded, and during the construction: "Mikasa" -900 tons, - and fuel.

    I understand that it’s hard to accept. But maybe it’s worth moving away from the standards of the Soviet era, when the technical characteristics of German technology were shamelessly underestimated, and Soviet ones were overstated.
    With the Russian-Japanese war, everything is somehow the opposite.

    I understand that the defeat needs to be explained somehow. But I would like more objectivity, rather than sweeping
    1. ABM
      ABM 1 July 2015 16: 47 New
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      "Fuji" only ... "Fuso" is a very ancient trough
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    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 16: 59 New
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      Quote: ignoto
      Even if there is no doubt Kostenko’s words about the speed of the battleships of the Borodino type at 15,5-16 knots, even this speed is greater than the speed of the first armored squad

      Do not confuse the maximum speed of the battleship and the maximum squadron speed of the squad. Even if the maximum speed like Borodino would be 15,5-16 (which is a bit big), then the maximum squadron is about 14 knots.
      Quote: ignoto
      The battleship of an obsolete project could not go more than 15 knots.

      According to many other opinions - 16. And it is not clear whether 16 knots for Fuji are at maximum speed or full speed (i.e., without boosting boilers that the battleship can support for a long time)
  16. kig
    kig 1 July 2015 16: 01 New
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    Personally, I really liked Kostenko’s book precisely as a business approach in describing the ship and the circumstances of the campaign. However, you should not make an idol out of it, nor should you try to catch it on inaccuracies. He was where we were not and could not be, and we do not know those circumstances. Well, Madagascar shells, for example, could simply die in water with a different salinity and temperature and fall off the hull. In addition, it is unlikely that the Japanese drove Eagle into their dock immediately after the capture, they had enough of their own worries. As for the different number of revolutions per node, then here you can find an explanation. There is such a value as the pitch of the screw, and such a value as the sliding of the screw. The higher the resistance to movement of the vessel (large draft / overload, wave, headwind, hull fouling, shallow depth under the keel), the greater the slip and the more revolutions must be developed in order to obtain the speed that was obtained under more favorable conditions at lower revolutions. So I personally do not see any crime in Kostenko’s descriptions.
  17. kig
    kig 1 July 2015 16: 04 New
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    And when describing the battle, one must take into account the fact that at that time Kostenko was on a hospital ship, where he got with a leg injury a few days before Tsushima. No luck man. Or maybe vice versa.
  18. Adagka 1 July 2015 16: 06 New
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    The author’s logic and the taking of convenient opinions on faith and the categorical rejection of other points of view and testimonies of Tsushima participants is an attempt to justify the mediocrity and cowardice of ZPR, a reference to the fact that Borodino went out of order during training firing at a speed of 11 knots, so when Tsushima squadron crawled at 9 knots this generally nonsense. This is from the opera that the author has a Ferrari and once at a speed of 120 his box flew, and so until the end of his life he will now not ride on it for more than 60 km, but it’s better to put the garage forever then nothing will break.
  19. ABM
    ABM 1 July 2015 18: 01 New
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    "In the race of armadillos, begun on September 30, the first was, of course, the" battleship-cruiser "Peresvet, but this new ship, due to several stops caused by the heating of bearings, more than once allowed itself to catch up with a speed of 13-14 knots (it was necessary to go full “without harming cars and boilers”) Poltava and Sevastopol. Only at the southwestern tip of the Korean Peninsula did Peresvet finally leave the horizon pursuing Poltava. at 8 o’clock in the morning on October 2 at the cliff Encounter he slowed down, making a 566-mile run with an average speed of 15,7 knots. The vapor pressure kept from 8,4 to 12,6 atm., the highest shaft speed was -94 rpm "(R.M. Melnikov according to TsGA Navy, f.417, op.1, d .2242, l. 1070) - this is about the potential speed at a distance slightly less than from Tsushima to Vladivostok
  20. simon
    simon 1 July 2015 18: 50 New
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    things are good. So, the author, what was the progress of the squadron and why not 16 nodes? It is good to do pure arithmetic while sitting at home and keeping your feet in a basin of warm water. At home, all the "strategists" !!!! But to put it there. Then they would look at you. We will never know the true reasons that influenced one or another decision. But there is a fact that this is the only squadron in world history (its crews, officers, sailors, volunteers) which, without bases, passed without losing a single ship and vessel during the transition and took the battle! and we were well taught to count and “wash bones,” to search for the guilty.
    1. ABM
      ABM 1 July 2015 19: 29 New
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      three years later, the Americans freaked out and, in general, sent their squadron around the world - like, to see that it would be with them ... also wow - there were no losses
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    3. Serg65 2 July 2015 06: 47 New
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      Quote: simon
      It is good to do pure arithmetic while sitting at home and keeping your feet in a basin of warm water. At home, all the "strategists" !!!!

      Quote: simon
      But there is a fact that this is the only squadron in world history (its crews, officers, sailors, volunteers) which, without bases, passed without losing a single ship and vessel during the transition and took the battle! and we were well taught to count and “wash bones,” to search for the guilty.

      Requiem for officers, conductors and lower ranks of the 2-th Pacific Squadron
      Immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, it was decided to build a memorial church that would become "a symbol of the mass grave for heroes of the sailors who died without burial". All of Russia responded to the construction of this monument, rubles and coppers were carried by sailor widows, invalids of the Russo-Japanese war, members of the imperial family, relatives of the dead officers, crews of ships donated large sums.
      The Church of the Savior on the Waters was built at the end of the Promenade des Anglais, not far from the shipyards where the ships of the Russian Navy were born. On the walls of the upper temple hung bronze plaques with the names of the dead ships and the names of the sailors who died on them.
      Years passed, the Russian Empire sank into summer, the workers and peasants came to power. In 1932, the leaders of the country of the Soviets decided that this temple is a relic of a rotten past. By order of comrade Kirov temple was BLASTED!
      Russian Glory, Pride
      and Love, For Your Feat,
      Suffering and Blood
      We pay sorrow
      To you and rapture
  21. Adagka 1 July 2015 19: 32 New
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    In general, the whole series of articles was incorrectly named, it would be more correct to title this work "Admiral Rozhestvensky - an incomprehensible genius of his era or how to fail preparation for war, drown the entire Baltic Fleet in XNUMX hours and leave it dry." And what is it, ZPR after Tsushima himself remained the head of the State Municipal School, having drowned state property for hundreds of millions of rubles))
    By the way, Rozhestvensky would definitely be an “effective manager” in our time, for example, he would scam all state policy in the Ukrainian direction, pumping hundreds of billions of ever-green American presidents there, but instead of being shot and referenced to uranium mines, he would get some order and translation to another front of work)) In general, history likes to repeat itself))
  22. ABM
    ABM 1 July 2015 19: 46 New
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    SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE

    - we won the Tsushima battle! Hooray!
    (15 pluses, one minus from the personal enemy in the forum on Tsushima)

    - our sailors are the most heroic sailors!
    (25 pluses, XNUMX minus enemies from the forum on "Tsushima")

    - we will always win pin-s !!!
    (50 pluses)

    - we will not return the Kuril Islands to China!
    (62 pluses, one minus from a Chinese intelligence officer registered for information)

    I TIRED THIS SITE - I WILL DRAW ON TSUSHIMA AND I WILL LEAVE! YOU ARE NOT STORIES, IN MOST OF YOURSELF. AND DO NOT WISH TO REALLY UNDERSTAND
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 July 2015 23: 55 New
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      Quote: ABM
      I TIRED THIS SITE - I WILL DRAW ON TSUSHIMA AND I WILL LEAVE! YOU ARE NOT STORIES, IN MOST OF YOURSELF. AND DO NOT WISH TO REALLY UNDERSTAND

      We will miss you ... And - with joy!
  23. The comment was deleted.
  24. Captain45 1 July 2015 21: 00 New
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    and "Loops of Togo."
    Andrei, to the author, on this subject i.e. “Togo loops” I allow myself to disagree. There was no “Togo loop” was the so-called “crossing T” or “stick over T” developed by S.O. Makarov when he was captain of 1 rank, about which his article in “ Marine collection "on the tactics of action of squadrons in battle, taking into account the increased speeds, reservations and artillery of ships. It’s just that our admirals, as always, didn’t give a damn, but the British took it seriously. And since the Japanese studied with the British, they accordingly noted.
  25. Vladislav 73 1 July 2015 21: 03 New
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    Unambiguously, plus to the author! Let someone disagree with his calculations and conclusions, but the enormous work on various sources and the processing of the material cause undoubted respect! And the comments, well, you read them ... and what? In the majority, they’re poured from empty to empty, exaggerating a long-standing chewing gum on the topic of Tsushima-type, everything was known a long time ago, the author got something wrong, but (name) long ago put all the points over and ... As an example: I meet 2 mutually exclusive statements-C .O. Makarov even during the construction of the battleships of the Borodino type established their lack of stability, and therefore they drowned. Other authors with drawings in their hands prove that rumors of insufficient stability are, to put it mildly, exaggerated ...
  26. not main 1 July 2015 21: 06 New
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    Thanks to the author! Very informative series of articles! For many years I was not happy with the version of "coal overload, increased humidity of pyroxylin, Rozhestvensky’s incompetence" Now many "white spots" have become clear. Thanks again for posting!
    1. Scraptor 1 July 2015 23: 52 New
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      She did not suit you because you are a descendant of the quartermasters who drenched him?
      They needed that war and the defeat of the Russian fleet in it, to create a revolutionary situation. So they created it a hundred specially - Blank even wrote about it.
  27. Victorio 1 July 2015 22: 56 New
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    By simple calculations we get the normal displacement of the battleship in 13 530 tons. Well, and with what displacement the battleship came to the test? V.P. Kostenko (in the testimony of the Investigation Commission) gives a very clear answer:

    there is no abnormal displacement; when the displacement exceeds the ship / vessel sinks, displacement = weight of cargo + crew weight + weight of supplies (food, water, fuel) + hull weight. who knows how to know these common truths
  28. brn521 2 July 2015 10: 48 New
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    Quote: Victorio
    there is no abnormal displacement

    Список водоизмещений: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C2%EE%E4%EE%E8%E7%EC%E5%F9%E5%ED%E8%E5 .
    Determination of normal displacement from there: Normal displacement - displacement equal to the standard displacement plus half the supply of fuel, lubricants and drinking water in tanks.
    Of course, there is no displacement on the list when the warship water slurps, but stays afloat and keeps moving. Also an abnormal displacement. Nevertheless, they are at war with him and even keep the system.
  29. aiw
    aiw 4 July 2015 16: 00 New
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    Thank you for the article. I just didn’t really understand all these manipulations with the number of revolutions per node - EMNIP the speed of a surface ship grows like a power cube of hl. mechanisms (and even without taking into account the propulsion efficiency). Turnover is not about power, but nevertheless the dependence there is clearly non-linear, and the propulsors there were clearly not VRS ... can we talk about a linear approximation in the vicinity of a certain move and is it rather arbitrary?
    1. aiw
      aiw 4 July 2015 16: 43 New
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      Ugh, the speed grows like a cubic root of the power of the EU-no ;-)
      1. Scraptor 4 July 2015 17: 42 New
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        This is if the resistance force is independent of speed ... With most of its components, this is not so:
        http://www.trans-service.org/ru.php?section=info&page=teor_kor&subpage=moreh_kac
        hest_01
    2. aiw
      aiw 4 July 2015 16: 43 New
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      Ugh, the speed grows like a cubic root of the power of the EU-no ;-)
  30. Grafova Irina 4 November 2017 09: 10 New
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    The dear author of the article somehow overlooks, discussing the squadron speed, the moment that transports were present at our squadron. And all discussions about revolutions and nodes should be guided precisely by them, because the squadron could not drop transports, and those, with all the efforts, did not go more than 11 nodes in better times.
    And we must remember that no ships of any fleets in combat conditions showed the declared running characteristics - with the rarest exceptions, which, as you know, confirm the rules
    And Kostenko V.P. (my hobby for the fleet began in a certain way in the 78th year), having fallen “from the ship to the ball”, in the sense that, being in such a battle, he, out of inexperience, could have mixed up something. Starting with the number of hits in your "native" EDB.
    And the article itself is, by and large, about nothing. In my opinion. When calculating the revolutions and nodes (the thing, no doubt, the right one), the process itself, that is, the battle, is overlooked. His greatness and tragedy