Tsushima Myths (PS)

In this article we will try to deal with the question of what was the maximum speed of the Borodino-type battleships in Tsushima? Unfortunately, there are not so many data on this score as we would like. The most detailed on speed is expressed by V.P. Kostenko in his memoirs “On the Orel” in Tsushima ”and in his testimony of the Investigation Commission for the Tsushima battle, but to my deep regret, the usefulness of these data is minimal.

I was repeatedly asked the question: why I do not consider the materials of V.P. Kostenko? Indeed, it would seem, because Vladimir Polievktovich is an engineer by profession, and therefore, mechanisms are his diocese, and he must understand them much better than regular officers fleet. But the fact is that by training Kostenko was an engineer-shipbuilder, not a mechanic who is trained to operate boilers and steam engines, and by no means a development engineer of these same machines. Upon graduation, Kostenko received the title of “junior assistant shipbuilder”, i.e. civilian navy rank like a naval doctor. The release itself took place on May 6, 1904, and immediately after that Kostenko was appointed to the building "Eagle". In other words, by the time the 2nd Pacific Squadron left, yesterday’s graduate had only four months of experience working on a single building ship and had not the slightest experience in operating a ship undercarriage. This, frankly, is far from an expert level, but even mindful of the lack of experience, it is extremely difficult to explain the constant contradictions that an attentive reader will regularly meet with Vladimir Polievktovich.

To begin, consider what V.P. Kostenko about admissions tests of the battleship "Eagle". In his memoir “On the Eagle in Tsushima” we read:

On the test of the 26 mechanisms of August, the Eagle developed the 17,8 node during the design task of the 18 nodes. Given the overload of the ship, this should be considered a fairly satisfactory result.

It seems to be all clear: the battleship did not reach the design task, the ship’s construction overload was to blame, but if it hadn’t been there, then ... But it’s interesting, and with what overload did the Eagle come to the test? To do this, it would be nice to first find out the normal displacement of the ship, and why not “ask” Vladimir Polievktovich about it? Directly about this V.P. Kostenko does not speak, but in the testimony of the Commission of Inquiry indicates:

Being on the battleship "Eagle", in the march conducted observations on stability and load of the ship. Upon leaving Libau, at the first stop near Langeland Island, I determined ... displacement - 15300 tons ... overload - 1770 tons.

By simple calculations we get the normal displacement of the battleship in 13 530 tons. Well, and with what displacement the battleship came to the test? V.P. Kostenko (in the testimony of the Investigation Commission) gives a very clear answer:

On trial, the battleship Eagle gave a 17,8 node at 109 revs, but then its displacement was equal to 13.300 tons.

But let me, if the battleship "Eagle" was tested with a displacement of 13.300 tons, while according to Kostenko, its normal displacement was 13.530 tons, then what kind of overload can we talk about? After all, it turns out that the eagle went to the 230 tons underloaded, and if it were not for the underload, the speed of the battleship would be even lower, but the reason for this was not at all overload!

This is the first, but not the last example of how a person who reads V.P. Kostenko, the author will be misled. Here is what V.P. Kostenko about the speed of the "Eagle" in the bay of Nossi-Be (parking in Madagascar, where Rozhestvensky arranged training shooting):

Today, on the way back to Nossi-Be (January 18), the Eagle made revolutions 85, and the extreme limit for our 109 revolutions mechanisms. Meanwhile, while it was possible to develop the course of the entire 11 ½ nodes. The overload in the 3 thousands of tons and fouling of the underwater part.

I would like to note that the overload during firing could not make up 3000 tons, moreover, V.P. Kostenko, there would be a desire to read it carefully. But we will leave the overload and note for ourselves only that as one of the reasons for the reduction in the speed of the “Eagle” in Nossi-Be Kostenko indicates fouling of the bottom. The reason is not worse than others, but only Vladimir Polievktovich reported to the Investigation Commission something completely different:

The underwater parts of the ships overgrown very little ... in Japan, Japanese officers who saw the battleship "Eagle" entered the dock told me that the underwater part of the battleship was completely clean from the shells, which they were surprised to know that the ship stayed 7½ months in salty waters. They were very interested in the composition of our paint ... Due to this state of underwater parts it cannot be assumed that vessels could lose their speed at least in part due to fouling.

They are strange, these shells: in Madagascar they clung to the bottoms of Russian battleships and braked with all their might, but Tsushima, they were embarrassed to see, fell away ... because of what, but the battleships of the Russian battleships did not pass.

The speed that our 5 armadillos could develop in the Kostenko battle is a separate one. storybut before we begin to study it, let us remember what the speeds of a ship are in general - of course, not in the whole diversity of maritime terminology, but only applying it to our case.

The ship has the highest (or maximum) speed that it develops when forcing mechanisms, and there is a full speed - the maximum speed of the ship, which he is able to develop without forcing. There is also a squadron speed - the speed of the connection of ships. Squadron speed is selected based on the task of connection, hydrometeorology, etc., and all this is not very important for us, and we are interested in the concept of “Highest Squadron Speed” - this is the maximum connection speed, and it is defined as follows: the maximum speed of the slowest connection ship is taken and decreases by the amount necessary to maintain its place in the ranks. Why do I need this amendment?

The fact is that ship navigation is much more complicated than a computer game, where at the touch of a key, the system of ships unfolds completely synchronously. In life, unfortunately, this does not happen - even with the same type of ships, the turning radius is not constant, and therefore, for example, squadron ships, following the wake column at the command of “turning successively”, say, by 90 degrees, will complete this turn not in the wake column, and separately, sludge from the place where they are supposed to be on 1-1,5, or even more cable, left or right - just because someone has a turning radius more, someone less. In addition, the intervals between the ships are broken, for some have spent more time on the turn than others, and during the turn, the ship has a tendency to lose speed ... that the line is broken a little more than completely, and it is possible to reassemble into the wake column at equal intervals only at the expense of additional speed — the ships are accelerating and quickly take their place in the column. Obviously, the more this additional speed is, the faster the system will recover. If, however, we measure the highest squadron speed over the speed of the most low-speed ship, then this ship will not have such a reserve and will break the formation without the hope of returning to it.

Understanding this, let us return to the speed of the Russian newest battleships in the 14 battle of May - in the memoirs “At the Orel in Tsushima” Kostenko gives his own report to the Assembly of officers on the results of the Tsushima battlefield, where he writes:

... in his column there were five battleships moving from 16 to 18 nodes.

And in the same place:

... Only high-speed ships were supposed to enter the squadron for breakthrough: armadillos moving to 16 nodes ... If Rozhdestvensky had attacked the enemy in this decisive period before opening fire with four new battleships of the same type, going full speed to 16 nodes ...

So all the same: what was the full speed of the battleships like Borodino, 16 or 16-18 nodes? But perhaps it was meant that armadillos of the Borodino and Oslyabya types, having a maximum speed from 16 to 18 nodes, could have a full speed or the highest squadron speed at the level of 16 nodes? All anything, only in the future, Vladimir Polievktovich pleases us with new and new data. In a report to the Maritime Technical Committee “Borodino-type Borodino” in the Tsushima battle, ”Kostenko reports:

Thus, not equaling the entire squadron on the weakest ships, it was a complete opportunity to divide it into the following units: 1) five high-speed strike battleships with a course of 15-16 nodes.

And in the same report:

The commander did not single out four battleships of the Borodino type into one tactical independent unit, and with them Oslyabya, with proper training squadron in the 15-16 nodes.

In other words, the declared Kostenko 16-18-nodal course of Russian battleships somehow imperceptibly took and was reduced to 15-16 nodes, but even such speed could be achieved only with some special training. And what kind of training is this? And with what speed could 5 of the leading Russian battleships walk without being trained? The answer to this question from V.P. Kostenko look useless.

No less leapfrog at V.P. Kostenko is obtained when he tells us about the maximum speed of the battleship "Eagle" after the May 14 battle. In his memoirs, in chapter №28 "Analysis of the course of the battle and the reasons for the defeat," in the section "Night battle with Japanese destroyers" Kostenko points out:

The Eagle always kept Nicholas’s wake-fire all the time and, keeping a distance of two cables, developed the 92 turn, the course of the 13 nodes. Mechanics said that a couple of missing enough, and the machines work fine. If necessary, you can develop a full stroke. Judging by the number of revolutions, the ship could easily develop to 16 nodes.

In the same chapter, in the section “Correcting Damage and Preparing for the Continuation of the 15 May Battle,” the clarification follows:

Due to the consumption of shells, coal, water, oil and items thrown overboard during the battle, the battleship was unloaded to 800 tons, surfaced to 16 inches, the main armor belt appeared from the water. The mechanisms and the steering wheel are intact, the fuel remains 750 tons. The full stroke is preserved to 15 1 / 2-16 nodes.

This is not so optimistic, but nevertheless, according to Kostenko, it seems that in the morning of May 15 a battleship could easily develop 16 nodes or so. However, in the testimony of the Investigation Commission V.P. Kostenko already says something completely different:

The Eagle was not prepared to give full speed in advance. Meanwhile, he could count on the 16 — 16,5 node only at full stress. For a full speed, it would be necessary to remove from the tops of the majority of people from the filing of shells, from the bilge and fire battalion, to help the firemen and machinists. Consequently, in preparing to give full speed, it was necessary to abandon combat targets in advance, to concentrate all forces and attention on coal, machinery and boilers. The Eagle, until the last moment, was preparing for battle, repairing damage, repairing holes, throwing debris, breaking wood, preparing artillery. The detachment was surrounded by the enemy in a few minutes; there was no time to get ready to give full speed, as the descent of the flag on the br. "Nicholas I" occurred already under the fire of the enemy. "Emerald", being ready to make a move and having a 24 node, immediately managed to rush in that direction, where the ring of enemy ships has not yet closed. The Eagle would not have done it. In addition, if he even gave 16 nodes and began to leave, it would not change the situation, as he could not, like Emerald, escape from the enemy without a fight.

So what do we see? In his memoirs, where Vladimir Polievktovich admiral Rozhestvensky scolds the light for not using the opportunities that Borodino-type battleships provided him with high speed, the Eagle in his morning 15 can easily develop 16 nodes. But giving testimony to the Investigation Commission of the Tsushima battle and being forced to explain why such a high-speed battleship did not try his luck and made no attempt to break through after the Emerald, VP Petrov. Kostenko reports that the battleship would probably give these 16 units, but not immediately, but only with full exertion of forces, driving the polo-team to the help of the firemen and thus abandoning the battle, because shells and bilge-fire divisions would be sent to stokers!

And then there are big questions to Vladimir Polievktovich. Suppose the battleship "Eagle" went all night 13 knots, and then being within "several minutes" surrounded by the Japanese fleet (Admiral Togo had armadillos on hydrofoils? Did not know ...) could not give full speed. But why then V.P. Kostenko reproaches Rozhestvensky for the fact that his high-speed battleships in the battle of the 14 battle of May, marching at the speed of 11 nodes, did not rush at 16 nodes into the Japanese fleet that made the “Togo Loop”? Somehow it turns out strange, is not it? During the time it took the Japanese to encircle the remnants of the Russian squadron, the Eagle did not have the opportunity to give full speed, but at the beginning of the battle, he not only could give full speed, but he also had to? By magic, Vladimir Polievktovich want?

And the second question is when V.P. Kostenko said that:

... four battleships of the Borodino type, and with them Oslyabya, which, with proper training, had a squadron course at 15-16 nodes.

What was meant here? Also driven by artillerymen and bilge fire divisions in the stokers with a refusal "from combat targets"? And in this form send 5 battleships to attack a dozen ships of Togo?

Okay, according to V.P. Kostenko, we will not understand the squadron speed of the Russian battleships, but perhaps we will try to find out at least the speed of the battleship "Eagle"? Kostenko has a few more materials for this. Here, for example, in the testimony of the Investigation Commission V.P. Kostenko reports:

At 78 revolutions in the campaign, the Eagle produced 11 — 11½ knots, having a displacement of at least 15500 tons. Mechanical engineers on the "Eagle" in the campaign were of the opinion that, in case of need, the battleship with full voltage and selected angle can develop the same number of revolutions as in the test. When adding 6 revolutions, the stroke increased by the 1 node. Therefore, with 108 revs, you could count on 16 — 16½ nodes. The decrease in stroke can be explained by the effect of overload, reaching 15% of displacement.

Notice that not a word about fouling is right, but right now we will ask ourselves another question: why is V.P. Kostenko believes that when you add 6 revolutions, the stroke increases by the 1 node? Data for calculations we take EXCLUSIVELY according to VP Kostenko.

During tests, the Eagle showed a speed in 13.300 of a node at 230 revs, or an average of 17,8 revolutions per 109 node at a displacement of 6,12 tons (underload 1 tons) at a displacement of XNUMX tons.

In the bay of Nossi-Be, the Eagle shows the 11,5 node on the 85 revolutions when overloaded (according to Kostenko) to 3.000 tons. This is the 7,39 turnover at the speed node, but Vladimir Polievktovich writes (“At the Orel in Tsushima”, chapter “The Rainy Period. Training Shooting. Messages from Russia”):

Judging by the steam consumption, the Eagle will not be able to develop more than 100 revolutions. Since one node has 8 revolutionsthen his marginal move is obtained not more than the 13,5 node, whereas in Kronstadt on the test he developed 18 nodes, and Borodino gave 16 1 / 2.

Why, in Nossi-Be, did the Eagle need 8 revolutions per knot of speed, and only 6 on the trip? Obviously, the heavier the ship, the slower its course, which means that the greater the overload of the ship, the more turns per node speed required. This is logical.

So, in Kosysenko, in Nossi-Be, the overload was already 3.000 t (which is wrong, but oh well), and the battleship on the 11,5 node has an 7,39 rotation per node. And for each successive node, 8 revolutions are required - i.e. MORE than average.

And in the campaign, with a displacement of 15.500, the overload is almost 2.000 tons, and the battleship for 11 — 11,5 of the node is forced to hold not 85, but only 78 turns, respectively, on average, only 6,78-7,09 has a turn per node. It would be logical to assume that for each additional speed node it will need some more than 6,78 or 7,09 turnover, well, or at least an equal value, wouldn’t it? However, V.P. Kostenko only lists 6 revolutions per node, i.e. significantly less than the average 6,78 — 7,09 turnover per node. This is even less than the 6,12 turnover per knot of speed, which on average was shown by the underloaded “Eagle” on the test! What kind of mystic is this?

If an armadillo overloaded with 3 thous. Tons needs 8 revolutions per node at speeds above 11 knots, and an armadillo overloaded with 2 thousands of tons requires only 6 revolutions per knot, so if you completely deprive the ship of overload, it goes and at all 3-4 turnover for each additional node speed will need? Using such arithmetic, we find that the “Eagle”, which does not have an overload, would have to develop speed on tests ... on the order of the 21,1 — 24,3 node ?! “Everything is stranger and stranger,” as Alice in Wonderland used to say.

So, if we assume that Vladimir Polievktovich slightly underestimated the required number of revolutions per 1 speed knot (who counts them?) And that when displacing 15.500 tons to the Eagle for each additional speed knot over 11 — 11,5 node was required ... no, not large, but at least equal to the average value (i.e. all the same 6,78 — 7,09 turnover per knot), then we get that the battleship “Eagle”

with full voltage and selective angle

will show the 15,3-16,07 node!

And now let us recall the testimony of the senior officer of the "Eagle" captain 2-rank Shwede:

I can say with confidence that, if necessary, the battleship "Eagle" could not give that move, which he gave on testing machines in Kronstadt, i.e. near 18 nodes ... I think that the most complete course, under all favorable conditions, when spending prior to the receipt of holes and water on the decks, no more than 15 — 16 knots could give the best grunted coal and replacing the tired firemen with another shift.

In fact, even accepting V.P. Kostenko that the “Eagle” “with full voltage and selective angle could count on the 16-16,5 node” without any additional corrective calculations, we see that it doesn’t differ much from Schwede’s estimate, since we don’t know what exactly V.P. Kostenko under the "full voltage". Schwede's statement is much more specific - for 15-16 maximum speed knots, you need a fresh change of firemen and the best rattled coal, or maybe it was still due to normal, non-stormy weather? Well, if, according to the method of Vladimir Polievktovich, there are also commanders with firefighters in boiler rooms and machine-driven ones — you see, the 16 — 16,5 node will come out. True, it is no longer possible to fight at this speed due to the lack of supply of shells to the guns and fire fighting, but to develop the Eagle 16 — 16,5, of course, can.

In this case, it becomes easy to determine the squadron’s speed: if with a fresh shift and a better angle, the battleship could count on 15-16 nodes of the “fullest stroke”, then, under not very ideal conditions, the “fullest stroke” of the “Eagle” will tend to 15, rather than 16 nodes, if not less. In this case, the "Eagle", obviously, is not the most low-speed of the newest Russian battleships Even VP Kostenko wrote about him:

From observations of the displacement of all the battleships on the march, it turned out that the Eagle was less overloaded than the others.

And about the "Borodino" with its transfer 16,5 node should not be forgotten. Although it was later repaired, but still, nevertheless ... In general, even if we consider the maximum speed of the most slow-moving battleship of the Borodino type near the 15 nodes (which, in my opinion, is still overestimated), the maximum squadron speed of the detachment from the five newest Russian battleships do not exceed the 13,5 — 14 node.

The data obtained are fully combined with the opinion of Admiral Rozhestvensky himself:

On May 14, new battleships of a squadron could develop up to 13½ turn points.

And even slightly surpass the testimony of the flagship navigator of the corps of naval navigators Colonel Filippovsky, who reported to the Investigation Commission:

Speed ​​battleships of a new type could develop 13 nodes, no more, especially under great doubt were Borodino and Eagle.

It is worth remembering also the opinion of the captain of 2 rank V. I. Semenov:

I cite feedback from mechanics with whom I had to talk more than once: “Suvorov” and “Alexander III” could count on 15-16 nodes; at Borodino, already with 12 nodes, eccentrics and thrust bearings began to warm up; "Eagle" was not sure at all in his car ...

Is the issue resolved?

However, there is one, but very authoritative opinion, which categorically does not fit into all our arguments, since it is extremely contrary to all the above evidence. The flagship mechanic of the 2 Pacific Pacific Squadron, Colonel K.I.M. Fleet Obnorsky showed the following:

By the day of the battle 14 on May 1905, the main mechanisms of all the ships of the squadron were in satisfactory condition and battleships like "Suvorov" could freely have 17 nodes go without harm to the mechanisms ... The battleship Oslabya, I believe, would probably give 17 nodes.

It is certainly strange to hear such a statement, because you don’t need to be a rocket scientist to figure out: if the same “Eagle” showed a 17,6 node with underload in 230 tons, then with an overload of 1670-1720 tons (according to VP Kostenko) “freely give 17 nodes "he could not completely.

However, the validity of the statements of the flagship mechanic can be checked. The fact is that we have at our disposal the report of the senior ship mechanic Colonel Parfenov 1 to the commander of the squadron battleship "Eagle", which begins like this:

On the basis of orders for the Maritime Office, for senior mechanics to submit to the Technical Committee through ship commanders the most detailed information about all accidents on mechanisms and boilers, I have to convey the following ...

And then follows the most detailed description of various features, including malfunctions of the machines of the battleship "Eagle", filled with so many technical details that you rarely find in the testimonies of eyewitnesses of the Tsushima battle. And this, of course, speaks in favor of the colonel. Well, in section B “Machine and boilers during the battle of 14 and May 15” Parfenov 1 shows:

During the battle had from 75 to 98 revolutions. On average 85 revolutions.

If we assume that at 109 revolutions (the limit for the Eagle steam engine), the battleship could develop 17 nodes and take the standard V.P. Kostenko - 6 revolutions per knot, then it turns out that by developing 98 revolutions, the Eagle would have to reach speeds over 15 knots. However, nobody watched such speed for Russian battleships in combat either from our ships or from the Japanese. Conversely, if we consider that during the battle, the average speed of the battleship did not exceed 10, the maximum of 11 nodes, and the minimum was approximately 8-9 nodes, then correlating the minimum and average speeds to the minimum and average speeds that were given by the Eagle machines, we will receive:

The minimum speed of 8-9 nodes at 75 revolutions is an average of 8,3-9,4 turns per node, and even if you count on 6 turns for each subsequent node, it turns out maximum speed of the battleship at 109 revolutions of the 13,6-14,6 node.

By the average speed of 10-11 nodes with 85 revolutions, the average 7,7-8,5 rotation per one node is obtained, and even if you count on 6 turns for each subsequent node, it turns out The maximum speed of the battleship at 109 revs is 14-15 knots.

Parfenov 1 also indicates the momentum that the battleship held at night from 14 to 15 on May:

From ½ 8 on the evening of May 14, all night and morning they kept from 85 to 95 turns - on average 90 turns.

This evidence is very close to Kostenko, who reports that at that time, the Eagle had a 92 turn and was traveling at a speed of 13 nodes. But there are nuances. The fact is that it is still unclear at what speed the remnants of the squadron were moving that night, but overall opinions vary between 11 and 13 nodes. As an example I cite the testimony of midshipman Baron G. Ungern-Sternberg (“Nicholas I”):

At night, we walked from 11½ to 12½ nodes, having a course of NO 23 °.

But in any case, the speed even in 11, even in 13 nodes at 85-95 revolutions does not allow to count on 17 nodes at 109 revolutions. From this we can draw a very sad conclusion: during the battle, the squadron battleship "Eagle" was unable to go faster than 15 nodes, it is even more likely that its maximum speed was somewhere between 14 and 15 nodes.

The statement of Obnorsky, the flagship mechanic, does not fit in so well with the testimony of the rest of the squadron, or within the limits of elementary logic, that I have to assume that Obnorsky is incompetent as a specialist, or ...

It should be borne in mind that one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian fleet in Tsushima was called the small squadron speed of domestic battleships. Could it be that Obnorsky ... insured, by removing from himself as the flagship mechanic, responsibility for the slow speed of Borodino-type battleships? Here, of course, it can be argued that if Obnorsky had a motive to overstate the speed of these battleships, then Admiral Rozhestvensky and Schwede had reasons exactly the opposite - to try to reduce the speed of the newest Russian ships. It can also be admitted that the head of the naval department, cavalier Semenov, fell under the personal charm of Rozhestvensky and decided to shield his admiral.

But the flagship navigator Colonel Filippovsky didn’t have such reasons obviously - why should he? Similarly, the senior mechanic of the “Eagle” Parfenov 1 didn’t have the slightest sense to exaggerate and deliberately lower the speed of the “Eagle”: he couldn’t be blamed for the surrender of the ship, so why sign the bad work of his supervising? Yes, and V.P. Kostenko was very interested in showing the rapidity of the five newest battleships of Rozhestvensky. However, for the Orla, Kostenko indicates the maximum stroke 16-16,5 node, and informs the Investigation Commission about the battleship Borodino:

The senior mechanic of the Borodino battleship Ryabinin and the ship’s engineer Shangin told me in Kamranga that rumors circulated in the squadron about the poor condition of the Borodino mechanisms were extremely exaggerated and even unfounded. If necessary, br. Borodino could have given 15 — 16 nodes and would not lag behind others.

Obviously, be in the words of Obnorsky some reason, V.P. Kostenko would not have failed to describe “battleships easily reaching 17 nodes” in his memoirs - nevertheless, this is not the case. And so I think the statement of the flagship mechanic is completely untrustworthy. But this, of course, is only my opinion.

This concludes the series of articles “Tsifima’s Myths”. From what I promised to a respected audience, only a detailed analysis of the start of the battle and the “Loop of Togo” remained unfinished. Perhaps I can still lay out this analysis in a separate article.

Thank you for attention!

References
1. Fleet actions. Documents. Division IV. 2-I Pacific Squadron. Book three. Fight 14 - 15 May 1905 of the year. (1-5 Releases)
2. Fleet actions. The campaign of the Second Pacific Squadron. Orders and circulars.
3. Top Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War at Sea in 37-38 Meiji / MGS Japan.
4. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 Meiji / Maritime General Headquarters in Tokyo.
5. Surgical and medical description of the sea war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of Maritime department in Tokyo.
6. Westwood JN Witnesses of Tsushima.
7. Campbell NJ The Battle of Tsushima // Warship, 1978, No. 8.
8. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. Reports from naval attachés.
9. Analysis of the battle 28 July 1904 of the year and the study of the causes of failure of the actions of the 1 th Pacific Squadron / Sea collection, 1917, №3, neof. otd. with. 1 - 44.
10. Artillery and armor in the Russian-Japanese war. Nauticus, 1906.
11. Artillery service organization on ships of the 2 Pacific Fleet Squadron, 1905.
12. A.S. Alexandrov, S.A. Balakin. "Asama" and others. Japanese armored cruisers programs 1895-1896.
13. V.Ya.Krestyaninov, SA Well done. Battleships like Peresvet.
14. M. Melnikov. "Borodino" type armadillos.
15. V.Yu. Gribovsky. The squadron battleship Borodino.
16. S. Vinogradov. The battleship "Glory": the undefeated hero Moonsund.
17. S.V. Suliga. The phenomenon of Tsushima (after RM Melnikov).
18. S.V. Suliga. Why did Oslyabya die?
19. S.A. Balakin. Battleship Retvizan.
20. V.V. Khromov. "Pearls" type cruisers.
21. A.A. Belov. Armadillos of Japan.
22. S.A. Balakin. "Mikasa" and others. Japanese battleships 1897 — 1905's. // Maritime collection. 2004. No.8.
23. V. Chistyakov. A quarter of an hour for Russian guns.
24. EAT. Shuvalov. Tsushima in defense of the traditional point of view.
25. IN AND. Semenov. Pay.
26. V.Yu. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History of creation and death.
27. V.V. Tsybulko. Unread pages of Tsushima.
28. V.E. Yegoriev. Operations of the Vladivostok cruisers in the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905.
29. V. Kofman. Tsushima: analysis against myths.
30. V.P. Kostenko. On the "Eagle" in Tsushima. Memories of the Russian-Japanese war at sea party in 1904 — 1905.
31. A.S. Novikov-Surf. Tsushima
32. And much more…

The author is especially grateful to his colleague “Countryman” for his series of articles “On the Question of Accuracy of Shooting in the Russian-Japanese War”, without which these materials would never have seen the light.

Comments

[adena]

Kostenko. ... .. he is, Kostenko! The fact that Kostenko is a pretentious crucian is clear to all "sea people". Depressing is the situation in which Kostenko took the place of an "authoritative" witness to the events. Judging by his pearls, his failure in prof. knowledge is large enough (not only in the section on the operation of machines and mechanisms, it also burns in matters of stability not childishly).
The article is a huge plus. The author undertook the work, clearly and with obvious examples, to explain what Kostenko's testimony is and how to relate to it.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: adena

Depressing is the situation in which Kostenko took the place of an "authoritative" witness to the events.

Including taking into account the fact that Kostenko spent the entire battle on May 14 in the infirmary. "Excellent" observation post, you can see all the nuances of the battle to the last

Quote: adena

The author undertook the work, clearly and with obvious examples, to explain what Kostenko's testimony is and how to relate to it.

Thank you!

[Angro Magno]

I knew one Andrey, a specialist in the Navy. At the Beard intersected.

[avt]

Quote: adena

.on such, Kostenko!

In general, a participant in the campaign and battle, who, moreover, left sensible memoirs about his campaign, much more qualitative than Tsushima by Novikov Surf, just a cult should not be made from his book, and not stopping to learn in comparison with other materials left by the participants, this is how the author did it. Well, it is not necessary to make a Bible from one book of memoirs, or a work of fiction and pray to the author as to an icon. With regard to the end of the series of articles - like the previous ones, very sensible. But "true" connoisseurs of the squadron move, which the tyrant Rozhestvensky did not allow the patriots to disperse the battleships, I hope to smash the arguments of the tsar's zagrebedtik to smithereens You are smart! Give help to the firemen ponimash! Yes, everything is simple - I pressed the gas pedal in the wheelhouse and the nozzles will sprinkle fuel into the boiler! Or it is even easier - the Enter button for what! ... Well, I congratulate the author on the end of a rather interesting work. It is always nice to read a reasoned opinion on a specific event, rather than propaganda panegyrics.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: avt

it’s just that you don’t have to make a cult from his book, and not stopping to learn in comparison with other materials left by the participants

Absolutely right! Kostenko’s memoirs should be treated exactly as we usually relate to memoirs. Here to take the same Manstein - according to his memoirs, the troops entrusted to his leadership during and after the Kursk Bulge destroyed a huge number of Soviet tanks. When you begin to analyze the number of Soviet losses according to Manstein with the actual number of tanks in the Red Army units that could resist it, it turns out that out of every 2 tanks that could fight against Manstein, the Germans destroyed about FIVE
Nevertheless, Manstein’s memoirs remain binding reading for anyone who wants to form their own opinion about the events of the Great Patriotic War.

Quote: avt

Regarding the end of the series of articles - good, like the previous ones, is very sensible.

Thank you!

[ABM]

By the way - losses on the Kursk Bulge of the Wehrmacht, approximately 1500 tanks - ours are about 6000

[avt]

Quote: ABM

By the way - losses on the Kursk Bulge of the Wehrmacht, approximately 1500 tanks - ours are about 6000

By the way - why not 150 and 60000? With what fright did the numbers jump out and for what "reporting period" and even "approximately"? What do you think of the losses in general, well, at least the difference between the irretrievable ones and those that after the repair are distinguished between us and the Germans? Or just like that - fart with a digital camera, and then you rake it further - look for documents, well, worry, tear yourself in evidence.

[ABM]

too lazy to google everything yourself :(
I'll find now
and you shouldn’t be rude - even if something doesn’t suit you in numbers

[ABM]

http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt
I’ll advise you to search here - for only 1943. on the Soviet-German front, the Red Army lost 20400 tanks in battles ...

Kursk defensive operation - 1614, Oryol offensive - 2586, Belgorod-Kharkov offensive - 1864

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

In general, it’s right - it remains only to find out how many tanks in these operations the Germans lost. And then it seems to me that the Germans suffered the main losses during the Kursk defensive

[ABM]

General Heinrici, claims that despite minor discrepancies, the 4th TA Gotha during Operation Citadel lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns, of which 15-20% could not be restored. This will amount to 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are to be written off. AG "Kempf" lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) irrevocably, and the 9th Army Model 647 and 130 respectively. It turns out the total losses of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irrevocably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 323 were destroyed. Taking into account that the real loss was much higher, not 193, but 290 units, the losses of both army groups would amount to about 420 armored units.

total dry residue of 1612 and 6064 tanks - EXPLAINED! Now I would like to find out why the local patriots really dislike it :)

[Serg65]

Interesting situation , on the previous discussion of the article "The Myths of Tsushima" the star of "Benson" went down, but a new star "AMV" appeared ... Hurray, the king is dead, the king is happy !!!!

Quote: ABM

By the way - losses on the Kursk Bulge of the Wehrmacht, approximately 1500 tanks - ours are about 6000

Quote: ABM

"we are not going to run away from the Japanese, but to fight" (I quote from memory, but he had such a thought)

Quote: ABM

about the displacement - if you tear directly, past Tsushima, why then was to flood the ships with coal? a normal reserve would have been enough - there are 1000 miles of travel! Rozhdestvensky ordered to ship in full, as if he decided to go around Japan

Quote: ABM

but you don’t need to overclock for this - there were 40 cable there, on the 11 nodes of the 15 minutes to the ram

Quote: ABM

Rozhdestvensky did not understand - if, in general, he knew the tactics of a naval battle, which I strongly doubt, Togo won the battle with one risky maneuver!

Words again, words alone . Here is sevtrash, he is at least somehow trying to argue his polemic with the author and of course he is a plus for his perseverance in the proof of his opinion.

[ABM]

so and what is written wrong? almost everything is axioms that do not require special evidence. About tanks - brought the link. Calculation of coal per 1000 miles - elementary calculated. The distance covered at 11 nodal moves is even easier. The fact that Rozhestvensky did not understand the maneuver - well, if he did not understand it and did nothing - then he is a traitor ... in general, axioms

[Serg65]

Quote: ABM

so and what is written wrong? almost everything is axioms that do not require special evidence.

My son, the youngest, as stated ... well, what nonsense, the earth is flat, if it was round then I would fall.

Quote: ABM

I’ll advise you to search here - for only 1943. on the Soviet-German front, the Red Army lost 20400 tanks in battles ...

At the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the army included 10 199 tanks and self-propelled guns
Now the generally accepted figure is this: the irretrievable losses of the USSR in tanks - 6000 units, and Germany - 1500 units. Proportion of 1: 4. The conclusion is immediately drawn - these are what we had, again piled up corpses around. Ok, let's look at the initial alignment of the forces of the adversaries. The USSR had in the composition of the Voronezh and Central fronts 1336 thousand people, 19100 guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2172 aircraft. Behind them, the Steppe Front was deployed consisting of 573 thousand people, 7401 guns and mortars, 1551 tank and self-propelled guns. Total: 1909 thousand people, 26500 guns, 4995 tanks. Germany was able to exhibit 900 thousand people, 2700 tanks, about 10 thousand guns. So, immediately there is a problem: in the troops of the three Soviet fronts there were less than 5000 tanks and self-propelled guns. How could they lose 6000 units, and even irrevocably? Well, there were replenishment, but still, this is impossible in principle. After all, Germany, having initially 2700 tanks, lost 1500. She still had 1200 tanks in the Kursk region and, without a co-opinion, there were also replenishment. It is not clear how the Red Army, left with a minus balance in armored vehicles, was able to defeat the enemy then, push him all the way to the Dnieper, and despite the fact that the enemy had a positive balance? But in addition to irrevocable losses, there is also a temporarily out of order equipment. And this is up to 2 / 3 of all losses, i.e. two times more irretrievable losses. It turns out complete nonsense. Losing 18 thousand tanks, having just 5 thousand before the start of the battle, is unthinkable. There remains another explanation, which seems to me the most rational. On the part of the Red Army, the figure of all losses of armored vehicles was taken (and it is called "no-return losses"), and on the part of Germany, only irretrievable losses. If my assumption is correct, then the USSR lost the order of 2000 tanks irretrievably, and 4000 tanks temporarily failed and were sent for repair. Then the data on Germany’s losses are also in good agreement - 1500 permanently lost units and the order of 3000 temporarily out of order. The excess of the total number of losses over the presence in the ranks before the start of the battle is due to the high level of work of German repair bases. The fact that the USSR suffered more losses is explained by the fact that the Red Army during the battle went on much longer than the German.
My friend AVM, before asserting something, do not use one source and I ask you to consider your answer first!

[ABM]

so who wrote forever?
some domestic tanks were restored 6-7 times!
I read the forum where you ripped off this reflection - these are all bloggers' assumptions, not based on anything. And the losses are greater - our T 60, T 70 and T 34 could not bear the same losses with the Tigers and Panthers ... however, I propose to postpone the discussion until the corresponding branch - this is not the place for this. If you don’t believe the data "Secrecy has been removed" - and this is the only serious study of losses in the Second World War, then read further bloggers on the forums - they will tell you!

[Scraptor]

German by 10

[ABM]

General Heinrici, claims that despite minor discrepancies, the 4th TA Gotha during Operation Citadel lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns, of which 15-20% could not be restored. This will amount to 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are to be written off. AG "Kempf" lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) irrevocably, and the 9th Army Model 647 and 130 respectively. It turns out the total losses of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irrevocably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 323 were destroyed. Taking into account that the real loss was much higher, not 193, but 290 units, the losses of both army groups would amount to about 420 armored units.

total dry residue of 1612 and 6064 tanks

[Scraptor]

Friends need to choose yourself.

[prosto_rgb]

Thank you for attention!

Thanks for the work !!!
Well, for the Navy

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

For the Navy! And for those at sea!

[simon]

I did not understand the meaning of this part of the article.

[jktu66]

Once again, thanks to Andrei for a thorough analysis of the facts, breaking the biased approach to the Tsushima tragedy

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

You're welcome!:)

[Serg65]

Welcome Andrew . Well, to summarize! Your article has become a hit of the season and scored a record number of comments already 715 !!!!! And this is not surprising, the article is not based on fantasies, speculation and has no political motive. Just the facts! For 110 years, the Tsushima tragedy has been stirring the minds of history and marine technology lovers. Yes, Rozhdestvensky lost the battle. Yes, Nicholas II failed to cope with the new rules of life dictated by the capitalist International. Yes, the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war was a tragedy for Russia. But back to history;
The loss of Mukden 19 February 1905 year is a tragedy?
Is East Prussian Operation 1914 of the Year a Tragedy?
The great retreat of 1915 of the year is a tragedy?
Is the Soviet-Polish war a tragedy?
The defeat of the South-Western Front 1941 year is a tragedy?
Kharkov operation 1942 year is a tragedy?
And how many more lost and tragic battles in Russian history? And how many such battles does a simple layman know? How many such battles are such active debates and discussions between experts and amateurs? So what is the mystery of Tsushima? In my opinion, the secret lies in the fact that the failed revolutionary and the same writer A.S. Novikov-Priboy was an ordinary mortal and could not physically be present in all these battles in order to thoroughly collect eyewitness accounts for a detailed description of the events.
What is the main idea of ​​Andrei’s article? Again, in my opinion, the author is quite professionally and documentedly trying to wash the Russian Navy from the lies and slander with which all kinds of false historians and letirats try to distort history.
Andrew, a big bow and many thanks from all the sailors in my face .

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Serg65

What is the main idea of ​​Andrei’s article? Again, in my opinion, the author is quite professionally and documentedly trying to wash the Russian Navy from the lies and slander with which all kinds of false historians and letirats try to distort history.

That's right, dear Serg65! Admiral Rozhestvensky may not be Ushakov, but he certainly never was the satrap and brainless tyrant that he was used to think of. Rozhdestvensky is undoubtedly a talented organizer who did a lot to prepare the squadron, and the Russian sailors under his command were not stupid at all.

Quote: Serg65

Andrew, a big bow and many thanks from all the sailors in my face

You're welcome!

[Nekarmadlen]

Probably it would still be nice for you to write a continuation of your postscript - an article "if I were Admiral Rozhestvensky, then I would ....")))))))

[Ulan]

How simple everything is. It turns out that Tsushima's mystery is that "a failed revolutionary and the same writer AS Novikov-Priboy was an ordinary mortal and could not be physically present in all these battles to thoroughly collect eyewitness testimony for a detailed description of events."
It turns out that Andrey was based only on the memories of the former "Eagle" battalion?
I've seen that the list of literature that Andrei cited is much more extensive.
I think the author himself will be offended if he is told that he only relied on Novikov-Priboy and only refuted it. I think his research is much wider than just an attempt to refute Novikov-Priboy.
I do not really agree with his enthusiastic assessment of Rozhdestvensky, but the work done is impressive and inspires respect.
But still, for me, the secret of Tsushima still remains.
Undoubtedly for me, Tsushima is not only a tragic, but also a heroic page in our history.

[ABM]

the problem with the speed is that each of the respondents names the number that seems to him! Let me explain - one thinks that PROBABLY (MAYBE) 15, the other - that PROBABLY (MAY BE) 16, etc. Rozhestvensky managed to never try, even out of curiosity, to find out what his ships are capable of during the entire trip across half the world. He said something like "we are not going to run away from the Japanese, but to fight" (I quote from memory, but he had such a thought)

[avt]

Quote: ABM

Rozhestvensky managed to never try, even out of curiosity, to find out what his ships are capable of during the entire trip across half the world. He said something like "we're not going to run away from the Japanese, but to fight"

Well, that's what I said earlier--

Quote: avt

But "true" connoisseurs of the squadron move, which the tyrant Rozhestvensky did not allow the patriots to disperse the battleships, I hope to smash the arguments of the "tsar's zagrebedtik" to smithereens! Give help to the firemen ponimash! Yes, everything is simple - I pressed the gas pedal in the wheelhouse and the nozzles will spray fuel into the boiler!

I did not have to wait long.
Moreover, the fact that Rozhdestvensky could KNOW what move his ships can develop, and also that this statement refers to the "squadron move", which the author patiently talks about in this article, mentioning that it is calculated by the slowest ship of the squadron This is not counting the time for such a ship to maneuver. But where there is! Why the heck we are "nonsense" of this lawyer of the Tsar's tyrant to read! One phrase is enough for us for a general diagnosis.

[ABM]

the worst argument in defense of ZPR - knew that they could give 15 and led to execution at 9 knots

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ABM

Rozhdestvensky managed for the whole trip through half the world to NEVER try, at least out of curiosity,

Excuse me, just who told you that? Well, yes, Rozhestvensky did not arrange regattas. But he did shootings in Nossi-Bae. For the first two days "Oryol" fired (according to Kostenko) 16 305-mm and about 67 152-mm, "Borodino" about the same - in terms of the consumption of shells, this is the beginning of the battle. However, in the evening of the second day, 2 boilers started flowing at Borodino.
On the third day of firing, the Orel scored - before the firing, the boiler tube bursts. And this despite the fact that the course of the squadron during the firing was clearly not 15 knots.
You see, "speed racing" is probably theoretically interesting. And practically after breakdowns occur in vehicles with a loss of speed in the course of ordinary firing (Borodino has lost its place in the ranks) - everything is clear to the admiral.

[ABM]

no - you will decide whether the speed DECIDED THE OUTCOME OF BATTLE, as you write in the previous article, with examples of maneuvering the English fleet in exercises, or a regatta, and this is only theoretically interesting!

about the tubes - the same Alexander III in the tests went 17,3 knots in 19 boilers, the 20th did not even warm up.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ABM

or regatta and this is only theoretically interesting!

You really don’t understand? Rozhdestvensky takes the squadron to firing. How much speed was there - too lazy to remember, nodes 10-11 maximum. And on two of his newest battleships, cauldrons flow.
What other "regattas" do you need? The conclusion is obvious - even at low speed there will be a high risk of boiler breakdown with a loss of speed. If this conclusion does not fit into your usual picture of the world, it is not my fault.

Quote: ABM

about the pipes - the same Alexander III in the tests went 17,3 knots on 19 boilers, the 20th did not even warm up

And where does the test? On tests and "Eagle" showed 17,8 knots. Only with what displacement, remind?

[ABM]

I didn’t write about the tests, the key point is that, in general, one boiler was not heated - there are only two machines and their breakdown is key, and the current boiler tubes are nothing! out of 20 boilers, you can muffle a few and change the handset - this is a routine work for drivers. Moreover, Belleville boilers differed for the better - on Varyag and Retvizan they were tormented with fire tube boilers, there tens of pipes burst. The leakage of pipes is dangerous only if there is no fresh water for a long time - then it was necessary to feed the boilers outside, and then flush the pipes with the boilers stopped. By the way, such a case was in the 28st squadron, if I am not mistaken, on Novik after the battle on July XNUMX ...

But, nevertheless, this is not the answer to my question - for Rozhdestvensky speed is not important, for the British and Togo - a key point, right? and which of them turned out to be right? :)

about the displacement - if you tear directly, past Tsushima, why then was to flood the ships with coal? a normal reserve would have been enough - there are 1000 miles of travel! Rozhdestvensky ordered to ship in full, as if he decided to go around Japan

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ABM

I didn’t write about the tests, the key point is that, in general, one boiler was not heated

Well, with an additional boiler I would give 17,6, maybe a little more. Just what?

Quote: ABM

and the current boiler tubes are nothing! from 20 boilers you can muffle a few and change the handset - this is a chore for drivers

In battle?:))
"Borodino" lost its place in the ranks during the exercises. I hope there is no need to explain the consequences of such an event in battle?

Quote: ABM

But, nevertheless, this is not the answer to my question - for Rozhdestvensky speed is not important, for the British and Togo - a key point, right?

This is exactly the answer, exactly to your, exactly the question
The key point for both Togo and Rozhdestvensky is the speed at which the squadron ships have the ability to keep the formation, jointly maneuver and fight. And the firing in Nossi-Bae showed with all reasonableness that even at low speeds, the newest Russian battleships have great risks of losing their ability to keep order and joint maneuver.

Quote: ABM

about the displacement - if you tear directly, past Tsushima, why then was to flood the ships with coal?

I already gave the answer to this question - in the first article of the series. Rozhdestvensky's battleships WERE NOT heaped up with coal, and the overload that was required on them in case of pipe damage (thrust falls and fuel consumption sharply increases), and the pipes were "raked" in fact

[Captain45]

Quote: ABM

and the current boiler tubes are nothing! from 20 boilers, you can muffle a few and change the handset - this is a routine work for drivers.

Well, yes, I clicked the switch and changed it like a burnt out bulb Dear, are you even familiar with the design of a simple stove furnace, not to mention a steam boiler?

[ABM]

familiar enough - and you? or just tryndet? :)

[Captain45]

Quote: ABM

familiar enough - and you? or just tryndet? :)

How long, in your opinion, does a kilogram of coal burns or, in common parlance, a "scoop" that is thrown into the furnace of the furnace? What temperature develops at the same time? -1 degrees C, it cools down in about 20-800 hours, and now estimate the boilers of the battleship's steam engine. How much will it be? Even to cool down to 900 degrees, so that a person in asbestos, doused with water continuously, climbed into the boiler, so that for 5 min. to knock out a boiled tube and rivet a new one, which is almost impossible (there are examples when this was done in battle in the Second World War and it took at least an hour. You will look for yourself) So, Dear, do not trend about what you do not know about

[ABM]

yeah ... you have to start learning from the basics - tell each other about boilers with superheated steam invented before the Second World War ... at the same time about the invention of asbestos. And when it was a costume made of asbestos, invented ... Well, let’s boldly test the temperature - since we’ve heard something about it. So, in your opinion, what was it like in the Belleville water tube boilers?

[Captain45]

Quote: ABM

About the time of the invention of asbestos at the same time.

What would you know, even Catherine II as a gift from the industrialists of the Urals presented a tablecloth of asbestos, which did not burn in the fire. Presented by Nikita Demidov. Learn the story, dear. You know, I am tormented by vague doubts about whether there was an article about two days ago about people like you about comments, like, we should crow, and at least do not dawn there

[Alex]

Quote: ABM

Moreover, Belleville boilers differed for the better - on Varyag and Retvizan they were tormented with fire tube boilers, there tens of pipes burst.

I didn't understand something. On "Varyag" and "Retvizan", EMNIP, there were Nikloss boilers, which were also water-tube. Or do you mean that their tubes were double, from two concentrically inserted into each other?

[Ulan]

The series of articles is great, for which I certainly respect. BUT! It is still unclear at what speed the squadron went directly in battle? Well, it is clear that this is a too general question, because in different phases of the battle the technical condition of the ships was different. Then more precisely, at what speed did the squadron move in the initial phase of the battle? If I am not mistaken, then I met the number -9 knots, which allowed Togo to carry out his notorious "stick over T" maneuver. If the technical condition made it possible to maintain a speed of 14 knots, then why was it not done? If, again, I remember correctly, when Nebogatov took command, he ordered the squadron to keep the course of 14 knots.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Ulan

If, again, I remember correctly, when Nebogatov took command, he ordered the squadron to keep the move at 14 knots.

Right, and what remains of the squadron?

[Ulan]

Of course. But they were in the same old and rather battered ships in battle. So I wonder why, at the beginning of the battle, the ships still serviceable and not damaged in the battle didn’t try to keep 13-14 knots? I see only one reason - the speed limit of the transports that went into the breakthrough along with the squadron.

[ABM]

yes, about the course of the ships - of course, no commandants would have to help the stokers, there were free stakes of the stokers, of course, during the battle they were in their combat places - not to sleep with the roar of shells; further - coal was gradually consumed; I think four hundred to five hundred tons.

[Adagka]

All local fans of the "creativity" of the "genius" ZPR stubbornly forget about one squadron dragged not even at 11, but at 9 knots, which artist this figure equated the ebry with the trough of Kachatka and in general why he dragged her with him they cannot explain, but of course it is better to run into Kostenko and a priori believe the cowardly admiral and other "heroes" who surrendered, they are telling the pure truth

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Adagka

All local fans of the "creativity" of the "brilliant" ZPR stubbornly forget about one squadron dragged not even at 11, but at 9 knots

So what? Than 11 nodes are fundamentally better than 9 can answer?

Quote: Adagka

what artist this leader equated the Ebras to the trough Kachatka and in general why he dragged her with him can not explain,

You know, your militant illiteracy is a little annoying. Is it okay that the Kamchatka was the most useful ship in the squadron? And that, in general, this fact is generally known?

Quote: Adagka

and so of course it is better to run into Kostenko and a priori believe the cowardly admiral and other "heroes" who surrendered, they are telling the pure truth

Yes, sure. Either Kostenko’s case, he fought heroically to the last, and died, struck by four Japanese twelve-inch shells in the chest.
Nothing that Kostenko, as it were, also surrendered along with everyone else?
Double standards - they are so double ...

[tasha]

"So what? How can 11 nodes be better than 9 in principle?"

You are seriously researching the Tsushima battle. Me not. I read the description of this battle on Tsushima.org.ru and noticed that in the daytime battle of May 14 ZPR first ordered to increase the speed from 9 to 11 nodes, and later he ordered a decrease in speed from 9 to 11. For what purpose did he give these orders? Those. for ZPR for some reason there was a fundamental difference between 9 and 11 nodes.

And another phrase from the same source
"The Japanese combat units at a speed of 14-15 knots moved quickly forward, covering the head of the Russian squadron." Can we conclude that if the speed of the Russian squadron were kept at the level of 12-13 knots, then the Japanese could not maneuver so freely ..

At the very beginning of your article, you write:
"In this article we will try to sort out the question of what was the maximum speed of the Borodino-class battleships in Tsushima?"
I may not have read / understood everything, but I did not find the answer to this question. Can you finish what you started by writing something like a conclusion? For example, "thus, the maximum speed of the battleships did not exceed ... knots due to ...."

[ABM]

everything is simple - they walked in two parallel columns, seeing the Japanese, they decided to reorganize into one, for which they gave 11 knots to the right column headed by Suvorov, rebuilt and slowed down to the usual 9-knot ... and not very successfully, the genius of domestic production hastened To give Christmas command - go to the 9-node. move - speaking in terms of automobiles, they were "cut off" by the head of the second detachment of EBR Oslyabya, who almost stopped and was immediately covered by Japanese fire, which led to his death

[ABM]

everything is simple - they walked in two parallel columns, seeing the Japanese, they decided to reorganize into one, for which they gave 11 knots to the right column headed by Suvorov, rebuilt and slowed down to the usual 9-knot ... and not very successfully, the genius of domestic production hastened To give Christmas command - go to the 9-node. move - speaking in terms of automobiles, they were "cut off" by the head of the second detachment of EBR Oslyabya, who almost stopped and was immediately covered by Japanese fire, which led to his death

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: tasha

and noticed that in a daytime battle on May 14 ZPR first ordered to increase the speed from 9 to 11 knots, and later he ordered to reduce the speed from 9 to 11. For what purpose did he give these orders?

ZPR gave the order for 11 nodes only to the 1st detachment so that it entered the head of the column of the 2nd and 3rd detachments. And then it turns out interesting. Togo turns on the opposite course - the “Togo Loop” begins. On the one hand, it gives the Russians 15 minutes of benefit - the ability to hit the turning point. But on the other hand, as soon as Togo completes his "Loop", he practically puts "a stick over T" to Rozhdestvensky.
Under these conditions, the increase in speed did not give the Russians much - Rozhestvensky could not turn away for the next 15 minutes in order not to knock down the aiming of his battleships, but at 11 knots by the end of these 15 minutes he would have gotten too close to the "stick", which was obvious to him cranial.

Quote: tasha

Is it possible to conclude that if the speed of the Russian squadron was kept at 12-13 knots, then the Japanese could not maneuver so freely ..

It is impossible to draw such a conclusion in the very beginning of the battle. Having started the Loop of Togo, the Japanese would have embraced the head of the Russian squadron - the only question is where the Russian ships would have ended up after its completion. And to meddle in close combat under the "crossing", under the dagger fire of the entire Japanese line is suicide.

Quote: tasha

I may not have read / understood everything, but I did not find the answer to this question. Can you finish what you started by writing something like a conclusion? For example, "thus, the maximum speed of the battleships did not exceed ... knots due to ....

I suppose that under normal conditions (without having to drive the crew into the fireplaces), Orel had about 15 knots, and five armadillos had maximum squadron speed of 13,5-14 knots

[Weniamin]

From the article, I still did not understand - did the author of the article take into account when calculating the speed that moment that the energy consumption for the increment of speed with increasing speed has a nonlinear dependence. The resistance of the medium in aero- and hydrodynamics with increasing speed varies nonlinearly. Something like this. Explain if not right.

[ABM]

still the propulsive coefficient and cavitation were asked to calculate :) - the author used the analog calculation method

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Weniamin

From the article, I still did not understand - did the author of the article take into account when calculating the speed that moment that the energy consumption for the increment of speed with increasing speed has a nonlinear dependence. The resistance of the medium in aero- and hydrodynamics with increasing speed varies nonlinearly. Something like this. Explain if not right.

Auto, if I'm not mistaken, already in the first or second article indicated that, technically, the ships of the squadron could not accelerate to "maximum speed" and approach the Japanese in those 15 minutes that Togo provided them. Neither triple expansion machines, nor water resistance, nor the maneuver of turning "all of a sudden" at the enemy, which also affects the speed, could do this.

[ABM]

but you don’t need to overclock for this - there were 40 cable there, on the 11 nodes of the 15 minutes to the ram

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Yeah. It remains only to wait for the ships to take their place in the ranks, the time to set the signal, etc.
And most importantly, not a single person on the site was able to give a clear answer to why, why Rozhdestvensky rush to Togo. What, so eager to lose the top five best battleships?
As I understand it, it was Kostenko who was the first to express the idea of ​​a "leap to Togo" He, of course, did not explain in any way the consequences of such a jerk. Well, given the fact that Kostenko is a CIVIL, who has the most vague idea of ​​battle tactics, given that Kostenko did not see the battle (since he was sitting in the infirmary at that time), the value of his tactical formations is difficult to underestimate

[ABM]

for what? BLOW ON THE FLAGMAN - a key moment in the history of naval battles! that is how Ushakov won all his victories in naval battles, that is how Togo destroyed ships one after another in the Tsushima battle!

Rozhdestvensky did not understand - if, in general, he knew the tactics of a naval battle, which I strongly doubt, Togo won the battle with one risky maneuver!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ABM

for what? FLAGMAN IMPACT - a key moment in the history of naval battles

Before making such stunning discoveries, you would at least look at the map of the battle!
What kind of blow to the flagship? The flagship of the Japanese at this time cut the course of the Russian system. In less than 7 minutes, the first combat detachment completed the U-turn. If the Russians had a chance to get close to someone (he wasn’t there, but IF there would be) —that would be the armored cruisers of the tail of the Kamimura’s column

[ABM]

eh, and in schematics then you turned out to be weaker than me ... there was a "double loop" That, not a loop! did not know? The cruisers Kamimura did their loop ... No need to be smart - just read what I write and take it as an axiom :) if you don't believe at all - ask for a link, it's not difficult for me

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ABM

eh, and in schematics then you turned out to be weaker than me ... there was a "double loop" That, not a loop! did not know? The cruiser Kamimura did their loop ...

Wow :))) Yes, there is such an opinion :)))

Quote: ABM

Don't be smart

Don't :))) You still don't know that there is NO RELIABLE map of maneuvering in the outset of the Tsushima battle (and the Loop of Togo) in nature. Since Russian and Japanese sources describe this maneuvering "slightly" in different ways :))

Quote: ABM

just read what I write and take it as an axiom :)

No arguments, send exhortations

Quote: ABM

if you do not believe at all - ask for a link, it’s not difficult for me

Well, please refer ... especially to the place where the "Togo's Loop" attack led to the attack on "Mikasa"

[Serg65]

Andrei, what’s worth it to you, well, tell me that Rozhdestvensky is complete dumbass ... AND EVERYTHING !!!! Dear AVM will be satisfied and his happiness will be unlimited!

[ABM]

Yes, I believe that Genius!
looking for evidence myself

[avt]

Quote: Serg65

Andrei, what’s worth it to you, well, tell me that Rozhdestvensky is a complete dumbass ...

I also have to repent publicly - "I'm leaving, forgive me Russians"

[ABM]

1. Do not believe what?

2. the Japanese know better that several survivors from the "Suvorov" "Alexander" "Oslyabi" and "Borodino" were visible there, most of whom did not even look through binoculars and were not on the bridge - I do not know (from the fourth Eagle was not visible), besides, the smoke from the first Japanese armored detachment covered the cruiser Kamimura;

3. I wrote - if something seems wrong - I will give a link;

4. "Togo's loop led to an attack on Mikasa" - at the choice of Rozhdestvensky, where he would command, the squadron was sent there, even to Vladivostok on the NO23 course;

[geniy]

Correctly! Absolutely right!

[ABM]

for what? BLOW ON THE FLAGMAN - a key moment in the history of naval battles! that is how Ushakov won all his victories in naval battles, that is how Togo destroyed ships one after another in the Tsushima battle!

Rozhdestvensky did not understand - if, in general, he knew the tactics of a naval battle, which I strongly doubt, Togo won the battle with one risky maneuver!

[sevtrash]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well, given the fact that Kostenko is CIVIL, who has the most vague idea of ​​battle tactics, given the fact that Kostenko did not see the battle (since he was sitting in the infirmary at that time), the value of his tactical constructions can hardly be underestimated

But didn’t that Kostenko communicate with 2TE officers after the battle, where various options for the battle and actions were discussed, participated in the naval game?

And nothing if Kofman in his article "Tsushima: Analysis Against Myths" writes about one of the main areas of criticism of Rozhdestvensky "... The Russian commander missed the decisive moment in the very outset of the battle, not" rushing "to the double formation of Japanese ships with a risky turn of Togo and generally behaved extremely passively ... "?

[avt]

Quote: ABM

but you don’t need to overclock for this - there were 40 cable there, on the 11 nodes of the 15 minutes to the ram

Well, now we’ve reached the ram!

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Yeah. It remains only to wait for the ships to take their place in the ranks, the time to set the signal, etc.
And most importantly, not a single person on the site was able to give a clear answer to why, why Rozhdestvensky rush to Togo. What, so eager to lose the top five best battleships?

Nah! Tsar’s tyrant deliberately overloaded the ships with coal, decomposed the commands with this

Quote: ABM

"we are not going to run away from the Japanese, but to fight"

Well, he deceived everyone, hiding the "true" high-speed capabilities of the squadron.
So that no one goes to ram. Well, the next step in exposing a tyrant - a self-propelled device will probably be that he did not roll out Baranovsky’s landing cannons and did not train boarding teams in Madagascar!

[ABM]

but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?

[avt]

Quote: ABM

but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?

Is that what Retwisan himself said?

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Have you ever heard from what position and from what distance such an attempt was made? And what did she crown with?

Although this is of course a cry into the void .... Yes - but what about the numbers on the disassembled tanks on the course of the arc? Do you want to google some FAQ?

[ABM]

see above - for the third time already writing :)

[avt]

Quote: ABM

see above - for the third time already writing :)

Once again I ask - the layout for specific combat, irretrievable losses, vehicles returned to service after repair and those that are written off for the use of motor resources. But to put everything in one heap - no mind. We have already heard this when in such a way about the reprisals of the officers they sucked in - brought down to heap the victims of reprisals of all - in criminal cases of the prisoners, pensioners from the service who had been dismissed, who, on medical grounds, had disappeared, who were not repressed again, but who were under house arrest during the trial, as well as quietly not remembering those restored in rank and party.

[ABM]

General Heinrici, claims that despite minor discrepancies, the 4th TA Gotha during Operation Citadel lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns, of which 15-20% could not be restored. This will amount to 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are to be written off. AG "Kempf" lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) irrevocably, and the 9th Army Model 647 and 130 respectively. It turns out the total losses of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irrevocably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 323 were destroyed. Taking into account that the real loss was much higher, not 193, but 290 units, the losses of both army groups would amount to about 420 armored units.

total dry residue 1612 and 6064 tanks

[avt]

Quote: ABM

total dry residue of 1612 and 6064 tanks

Powerful, however! Directly after the presumptuous "marshal", but today you had a terrible mistake with General Heinrici. Group "South" had 30.06.1943 tanks, 1303 of them are old, and "Center" 190 tanks, of which 552 are old and 194 assault guns. So what do we have on your “bottom line?” Yes, the Red Army had to march straight to Berlin in a victorious march - there were simply no tanks ahead of the German ones! But byada - as of 20.11.1943 in the group "YUG" they had a dashing figure with the replenishment of 800 pieces, of which, well, not less than 200 faulty ones and no more than 200 were thrown from the west too - it's just not a matter of counting by the piece That again according to the German registers. So it turns out - we need to be more careful about the victorious reports of both sides in terms of calculating and categories of losses, both their own and Hitler’s. Although, of course, they were excellent warriors and they had equipment at the level - not entirely, Tigers "and" Panthers ", but there was. So the glory of our grandfathers who defeated them is higher.

[ABM]

that I am a deputy behind the rear of the First Ukrainian ?!
our losses - according to "The classification of secrecy has been removed" (there are no statistics on irretrievably lost ones)
Wehrmacht losses - according to Heinrici

[kalibr]

You know, when such questions arise and you doubt everything, it is best to resort to the sources, and the sources are as follows: SOVINFORMBURO'S REPORTS in the newspaper Pravda. Just look at ALL the newspapers for the WAR and count the number of our destroyed tanks and German ones ... Forget that it was profitable for ours to underestimate our losses, and to overestimate the German ones. But let's assume that "the truth is not lying." Then contact ... the Bundesarchiv. Report that you are writing a scientific article. And to demand the data from German ... They will give! And compare !!! Yourself !!!

[ABM]

cool idea!

[ABM]

cool idea!

[avt]

Quote: kalibr

. Then turn to ... in the Bundesarchive. Report that write a scientific article. And request German data ... They will! And compare !!! Yourself !!!

Quote: ABM

cool idea!

Already and even in the USSR they published - Müller-Hildebrant "The German Land Army 1933-1945" was republished in 2003

[geniy]

The Retwisan attack culminated in the stupidity of Russian admirals and commanders. None of the modern experts understand that of the entire Russian squadron, only one single battleship rushed to the ram, while all the other ships of the Russian squadron behaved passively. And because of this, Retvisan was shelled by a squadron of Japanese battleships. But if the whole Russian squadron threw themselves into a ram, then the Japanese fire would have had to be evenly distributed over all Russian ships - and from this Retvisan would have suffered less damage. And besides, the Commander of Retvisan Brazenly stood on the bridge open to all the fragments, and not in the conning tower, and when he was wounded by a fragment in the stomach, the attack naturally fell off. And if this attack were organized in a smart way, then success could have been on the Russian side, simply because the closer the distance, the better the Russian armor-piercing shells penetrate the armor. And the Japanese armor-piercing shells were fictitious - they did not penetrate the armor, but detonated immediately from touching it. Therefore, the Russian squadron was advantageous rapprochement at the closest distance of fire, up to the ram.

[ABM]

but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ABM

but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?

Have you ever heard from what position and from what distance such an attempt was made? And what did she crown with? (leaving aside the fact that it’s not an easy task with Retwisan’s ram)

[GUS]

Quote: ABM

but did you hear that Retvisan was trying to ram Mikasu? not?

I heard that when the Tsesarevich rolled out of order to the left and began to describe the circulation, the second Matelot retvizan went first to follow the flagship, but after it became clear that the Tsesarevich did not obey the helm, the squadron between Peresvet ”and“ Sevastopol ”, and (when the Japanese began to shoot the leading“ Peresvet ”), changed course towards rapprochement with the Japanese squadron. Subsequently, this act was regarded as an attempt to ram the armored cruiser Nissin, which was marching in the rearguard, but the most probable version seems to be according to which its commander, 1 captain E. N. Schensnovich decided to go under the stern of Nissin and break through the Japanese system alone squadrons, while the head battleships were busy turning and could not fire "Retvisan" through the formation of their ships.

[ABM]

well, did you hear about the battle at Cape Lissa?

[GUS]

Understand that under Liss they fought both in the time of Ushakov and Nelson, i.e. according to the canons of the sailing fleet. The fire was almost point blank. The lack of optical sights did not contribute to the effectiveness of fire even from short distances, remember how much the Austrians suffered when breaking through the Persano system? What can we say about long distances.
The rate of fire of the guns was low, and the use of smoky gunpowder reduced both the rate of fire and accuracy of the aiming. Even assuming that the enemies at Liss had shells from the time of Tsushima, the ram was possible in pincer. But the ramming itself is difficult, because the enemy dodges and hit him aboard under correct the angle is not so simple, as proved by the loss of the Italians the only armadillo due to ramming strike.
By the time of the Russo-Japanese War, not a single ship would have been able to ram the enemy simply due to the fact that it simply did not have the opportunity to complete this maneuver, which was demonstrated by the example of the Retvizan and the Varyag, which failed to break through concentrated fire. Even small high-speed destroyers, subject to good visibility, could not approach with impunity a torpedo attack distance to a more or less combat-ready ship without the risk of being destroyed. In fact, the Suvorov, which had lost its combat capability, repulsed mine attacks for some time.
Sorry, but comparing Tsushima and Liss is like trying to solve a mathematical problem using spelling rules.

[ABM]

... so, and returning to Tsushima and the loop of Togo - what would be more logical, stupidly go under execution or try to slip under the stern? did not know how to maneuver? there is even better - a dump at close range is a mutually dangerous thing

[Ulan]

Actually, it's not funny. I still didn’t understand, if everything was so wonderful, Rozhestvensky such a genius didn’t make a single mistake, That, the Russian gunmen fired great, then why did they lose? As one of the eyewitnesses wrote that we were not at all at war with the Japanese, but with the British squadron? Or is the notorious "shimosa" to blame?

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Ulan

I just didn’t understand, if everything was so wonderful, Rozhdestvensky didn’t make a single mistake, Togo, the Russian commandos shot perfectly, why did they lose something?

Write specifically what mistake he made before being wounded?
If you abandon all the slow-moving boats and keep at least 15 knots, it turns out that Suvorov, Alexander, Borodino, Oryol, Oslyabya go into a breakthrough. Well, some were advised by Nikolai and Nikolai. Against 12 Japanese ships?
Further, in the war someone always wins, someone loses, therefore the reasons for the defeat:
1-low squadron speed and, as a result, the advantage of Yap in tactics is an objective factor that cannot be fixed
2-Russians fired well. But the Japanese are better + more volley + more explosive
3-Part of Russian shells did not burst
4-Luck was for the Japanese. You can argue about this, laugh, but the Japanese gods were stronger than the Russians. Either the egregore of the Japanese was stronger than the Russian in their native land. The last two ships were sunk at the very end, within 30 minutes.

Now let's imagine that at night Nebogatov does not develop high speed, cruisers and destroyers do not scatter but go together and not to Vladivostok, but back to the neutral port. In this case, there is no question of defeat, and Nebogatov is charged with weakness and failure to comply with the order

[Ulan]

I think not all the reasons you have indicated.
To keep the move at 13-14 knots in the initial phase of the battle was quite real. The only slow-moving that could not hold it were transports.
Overload still took place.
The ships were not prepared for battle. What had to be done was demonstrated on the "Eagle", although this is half-measure, but even this minimal was not done.
Incomprehensible rearrangements before the very beginning of the battle. If we discard all guesses and reflections about the "brilliant" course of the ZPR, then these throwing is incomprehensible, it seems the commander simply did not have a clear idea of ​​the plan for the battle.
Luck, of course, is an important matter, and she was on the side of the Japanese, but still there were mistakes.
Errors before being injured? You can’t make mistakes if you don’t do anything. All of Rozhdestvensky’s activity ended after giving two orders — to keep such and such a course and shoot in the head.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Ulan

it seems the commander simply did not have a clear idea of ​​the plan for the battle.

And what kind of plan can be when conditions dictate to you? Well, come on, suggest your plan.
Still, Rozhdestvensky did not make perestroika for the sake of narcissism, he had some reasons
http://vivovoco.astronet.ru/VV/PAPERS/HISTORY/TSUSSIMA.HTM

[Serg65]

Quote: avt

Nah! Tsar’s tyrant deliberately overloaded the ships with coal, decomposed the commands with this

Quote: avt

Well, he deceived everyone, hiding the "true" high-speed capabilities of the squadron.
So that no one goes to ram. Well, the next step in exposing a tyrant - a self-propelled device will probably be that he did not roll out Baranovsky’s landing cannons and did not train boarding teams in Madagascar!

Well, this is what was required to prove! And then sculpt with Andrey the facts of love for ZPR, Surf said that the admiral means! Kostenko said that the admiral had to drop the squadron and dump three crosses on the battleships, so it was necessary to dump !!! After all, the whole point of the dispute is that in Russia there are always bosses-fools

[avt]

Quote: Serg65

And then sculpt with Andrey the facts of love for ZPR

Yeah, paraphrasing the character of Vysotsky - yes, about the love of Rozhestvensky on the forehead is written by the tricks and Kaptsovtsi.

Quote: Serg65

! Kostenko said that the admiral had to drop the squadron and dump three crosses on the battleships, so it was necessary to dump !!!

Especially when you consider what he said after the battle and wrote in general after captivity. And so - yes - it was necessary to go to the ram ..... yes, what is there, ram-to boarding and give melee!

Quote: Serg65

After all, the whole point of the dispute is that in Russia there are always bosses-fools

Aha - exactly until the moment when, by the will of fate, the accusers fall into the bosses. Then, “due to the newly discovered circumstances,” I begin thoughtfully and floridly to talk about the correctness of my mistakes, or to bellow like Klitschko to a simple question like - when the document was signed, well, this mayor of Kiev just soaked it in an interview.

[Serg65]

Quote: avt

Aha - exactly until the moment when, by the will of fate, the accusers fall into the bosses. Then, “due to the newly discovered circumstances,” I begin thoughtfully and floridly to talk about the correctness of my mistakes, or to bellow like Klitschko to a simple question like - when the document was signed, well, this mayor of Kiev just soaked it in an interview.

What a life situation and how many times have I seen such "bosses", well done AVT!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Weniamin

energy expenditures for the increment of speed with its increase have a nonlinear dependence.

There are two aspects to this. Our energy is still steam, steam is generated in the boiler, respectively, the implementation of the principle you specified occurs with an increase in the number of revolutions. Those. if the ship goes 11 knots and "consumes" an average of 7,4 revolutions per speed knot, and for an additional uzeo it needs 8 more revolutions, then the steam energy consumption for these additional 8 revolutions will certainly be higher than for the previous revolutions.
And the second aspect - I considered strictly according to the Kostenko method :))

[Alex]

Quote: Weniamin

The resistance of the medium in aero- and hydrodynamics with increasing speed varies nonlinearly. Something like this. Explain if not right.

You are absolutely right, but at the speeds in question, it is entirely possible to use pseudo-linear dependencies as a first approximation: You obviously noticed that the author always indicates the speed intervals in which the speed increase is calculated. Plus some variation (confidence interval of accuracy). So the numerical data can be considered fairly reliable.

[sevtrash]

The last (or not?) Part of the articles "Myths of Tsushima" from the author could be called "Myths from Andrey Kolobov about the engineer" Eagle "Kostenko" The truth in the previous part of the myths was enough, or rather, not in the article itself (there was nothing new there), but in the discussion, where Andrei, among others, brought an advanced training system for 2TE, excellent accuracy of artillery fire 2TE, overloading Japanese, and not Russian armadillos. How can you evaluate such pearls? How are the myths? Or mistakes?
The next stage - it seems, in the absence of the best, evidence of the impossibility of new armadillos to reach speeds of 16-17 knots is based on the search for contradictions at Kostenko. To begin with, as always in the series of articles, it was necessary to make Kostenko a schoolboy or so.
From the author "... In other words, by the time the 2nd Pacific Squadron left, yesterday's graduate had only four months of experience working on a single ship under construction and not the slightest experience in operating a ship's chassis ..."
Either Andrei did not finish reading, or well, he does not tolerate Kostenko
Kostenko himself writes that since 1903 he has been working on the Orel during practice, was appointed an engineer to complete the ship and showed himself to be quite good, since he was appointed responsible for the completion / tuning / escort of the ship during the campaign (under his supervision several hundred artisans worked). This is not to mention the fact that he graduated from engineering with a gold medal with the entry of his name on the Marble board of the school. Almost everything (except for Andrey ) note the value of Kostenko’s memoirs, maybe Andrei will find and give the opinions of historians (not counting himself), who would be so negative about Ksotenko. Or are there none?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

According to the facts given in the article, is there anything to argue with? or again - a plentiful stream of words without a glimpse of argumentation?
The only thing that somehow resembles an argument

Quote: sevtrash

Kostenko himself writes that since 1903 he has been working on Orel during practice

Oh, yes, indeed, I did not count him as a student

[sevtrash]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Oh, yes, indeed, I did not count him as a student

Well, actually, we are talking about his knowledge, and the mechanisms of the "Eagle", you should have known that with these very mechanisms and with the "Eagle" Kostenko has been working since 1903. Is it another matter that your emotions do not allow this? The main thing is not even this, but the fact that he constantly worked with the mechanisms of the Eagle, moreover, during the entire many months' campaign, and together with mechanical engineers, it is at least ridiculous to consider him ignorant.
He had theoretical knowledge, he had experience, I will repeat the experience of a many-month trip on a ship as an engineer. His knowledge and opinions were interesting for Rozhdestvensky, Birilev, Nebogatov, members of the ITC, the outstanding Russian shipbuilder Krylov, not to mention his future activities.

Please, provide opinions and links to those scholars / historians who would refuse Kostenko to have professional knowledge and opinions.

Besides you, of course

[sevtrash]

What do you write - "... I would like to note that the overload during firing could not have reached 3000 tons .."

What Kostenko writes - "... Yesterday we were again ordered to load up with coal to the norm of 2360 tons, since during the stay we spent only up to 300 tons for the current needs of the ship. In addition, full supplies for three months of all consumables were taken and food: flour, sugar, vodka, canned food, butter and other products. To provide the ship with fresh meat, 16 bulls and 2 cows were purchased, so now we will have real cow's milk. We bought a lot of chickens and various birds. Battleships of the "Suvorov" type overloaded by 3200 tons and will not be able to develop more than 14 knots, although on the sample with normal deepening, in accordance with the project, they gave up to 18 knots ... "

Could you justify why you claim that there could be no overload? Do you have other information from somewhere? Where from? Also were on a campaign on the Eagle?

[sevtrash]

Regarding fouling. And why do not you quote the entire quotation from Kostenko’s testimony, but part?
It looks like this to you "... There are very few underwater parts of ships ... in Japan, Japanese officers ..."
And Kostenko's is a little different - "... The underwater parts of the ships were overgrown very little. Only in the vertical part of the side and along the armor belt and somewhat lower was the overgrowth of sea grass noticeable ..."
Why so selective?
And you completely "forgot" to indicate from the testimony of Kostenko that "... In Nossi-Be the divers cleaned the underwater units and said that there were no shells ..."
Also have you missed the "forgot"? from the testimony of Kostenko, tragic testimonies - "... when the Borodino and Oslyablea capsized they showed completely clean underwater units ..."

Indeed, in the book, Kostenko writes about a possible reason for the decrease in the rate of fouling with shells and algae, especially considering the duration of swimming, this could and should have been. However, do not forget that these are memoirs built on a diary. Before the survey by divers in Nossi-Be, Kostenko could well have assumed fouling with shells, but then he already had actual data on the work of divers, testimonies of witnesses of the battle.

[sevtrash]

When asked in the comments on the previous article to provide evidence that could outweigh the testimony of the flagship mechanic of the squadron, senior officer of Eagle, engineer Eagle did not assume that you would introduce yourself as such. In your:
... "Eagle" should have reached speeds above 15 knots. However, no one has observed such speed for Russian battleships in battle, either from our ships or from the Japanese. And vice versa, if we take into account that during the battle the average speed of the battleship did not exceed 10, maximum 11 knots, and the minimum was approximately 8-9 knots, then, correlating the minimum and average speeds to the minimum and average speeds that were issued by the Orla vehicles, we get ...

You rely on the assumption that the speed could be 8, and 9, and 10, and 11 knots, you take something from Kostenko, somewhere you take from Parfyonov and as a result you get a conclusion with a claim to the final. On the one hand, your conclusion is precisely Your, with another testimony of a ship engineer, which relies on the opinion of mechanical engineers Orel, the flagship mechanic, senior officer.

How do you imagine whose knowledge, experience is higher? Who can be trusted? You - who have never seen these very machines, have never worked with them and - most likely - and theoretically have no idea what it is? Or those people who every day for many months worked on this ship with these machines?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: sevtrash

Well, actually, we are talking about his knowledge, and the mechanisms of the "Eagle", you should have known that with these very mechanisms and with the "Eagle" Kostenko has been working since 1903. Is it another matter that your emotions do not allow this?

Yeah. Here's what it looked like in 1902:

Until the end of summer, we had to study the entire internal location of the armadillo, its ventilation and drainage systems, the flooding of the cellars and the heeling of the ship from the Kingstones. Yakovlev often tested our knowledge of all schemes of ship systems. This second year of practice greatly expanded our understanding of all the mutually connected devices of the ship and more fully illuminated the future responsibilities of the ship engineer on the building.

1903 Kostenko does not paint.

Arriving at the summer practice in the spring of 1903, we received assignments for the preparation of diploma projects approved by the design manager, engineer Nevrazhin

.
In 1904, classes Kostenko

The builder entrusted me with a test of the watertightness of all compartments in bulk water under the specified pressure, the condition of all the main bulkheads and the inner bottom, and then a water test of the upper corridors behind the waist armor and installation of the main belt slabs. At my disposal came the entire hammered and riveting workshop, as well as riggers.

It’s just that a man did not pour out of boilers and cars :))

Quote: sevtrash

he had experience, once again I will repeat the experience of a many-month trip on a ship as an engineer.

An engineer who did not deal much with boilers and machines on this very campaign. Kostenko didn’t mess around, but he had enough other worries

Quote: sevtrash

Please, provide opinions and links to those scholars / historians who would refuse Kostenko to have professional knowledge and opinions.

Please - either refute the facts indicated by me in the article and / or explain the discrepancies with Kostenko that I have cited. I understand that in fact you have nothing to say, but this is not a reason to drag me into abstract disputes
Do you consider Kostenko a professional? Yes please. Well, I disagree with you, and I stated my reasons in the article. If it is not clear - read the report of Parfenov 1st (who is the head of the "eagle") and compare with what Kostenko wrote. Perhaps you will understand where you are a professional and where you are not.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: sevtrash

Could you justify why you claim that there could be no overload? Do you have other information from somewhere? Where from? Also were on a campaign on the Eagle?

Overloading was, of course, only it was by no means for the 3000 tons indicated by Kostenko. And where did the information come from ... I kind of wrote Russian in white in an article - Kostenko once again refuted himself. Reread carefully the chapters related to standing in Nossi Be

Quote: sevtrash

Regarding fouling. And why do you cite not all of the quotes from Kostenko’s testimony, but part? ... ... Why so selective?

Because you again did not understand anything from what I wrote. Kostenko in one case claims that fouling is the cause of the loss of speed of the armadillo, in the other case that fouling is NOT the cause of the speed of the armadillo. The question is precisely IN THE INFLUENCE OF FILLING ON SPEED, and not whether there was fouling, was not, or was, but not much - the presence / absence of fouling in this matter does not play any role.

Quote: sevtrash

You rely on the assumption that the speed could be 8, and 9, and 10, and 11 knots, you take something from Kostenko, somewhere you take from Parfyonov and as a result you get a conclusion with a claim to the final. On the one hand, your conclusion, it is yours, on the other hand, the testimony of a ship engineer who relies on the opinion of the mechanical engineers Eagle, the flagship mechanic, and senior officer.

Twenty five again :)))
My friend, put aside your training manuals "How to refute Kostenko's detractors" and you will learn to read something, in the end.
What is the engineer's testimony? What are you speaking about? Your engineer has 16, then 18, then 15-16, but with a lot of tension. In other words, Kostenko DOES NOT give an answer about the speed of either the battleship Eagle or the latest battleships in general. And you also ascribe to him that allegedly he took into account the opinion of the mechanical engineers of the "Eagle" (the mechanic does not say anything at all about speed only about the revolutions, the rest is the calculations of Kostenko), about the senior officer (who calls the speed lower than Kostenko) and the flagship mechanic (who calls GREATER than Kostenko's speed)

Quote: sevtrash

How do you imagine whose knowledge, experience is higher? Who can be trusted?

I believe that the above is the experience of the "Eagle" mechanic, who reported 75-98 revolutions in battle and that corresponds to the maximum speed of the "Eagle" at about 14-15 knots maximum.
And I think the opinion of the senior officer deserves attention, who says that under ideal conditions the Oryol could give 15-16 knots, but since the conditions are not ideal, then his estimate roughly corresponds to the estimate of the Eagle mechanic. And the estimate of the maximum speed at the level of 14-15 knots gives a squadron speed of 13-14 knots, which corresponds to the indications of Rozhestvensky and the indications of the senior navigator.
And you - keep writing that "This is only your opinion!" Maybe someone will believe.

[sevtrash]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Overloading was, of course, only it was by no means for the 3000 tons indicated by Kostenko. And where did the information come from ... I kind of wrote Russian in white in an article - Kostenko once again refuted himself. Reread carefully the chapters related to standing in Nossi Be

Well, the fact of the matter is that about the transshipment of 3200 tons, which I indicated, he writes above in the same place. Read carefully.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

What is the testimony of an engineer? What are you speaking about? Your engineer is either 16, then 18, then 15-16

Well, you are counting on those people who do not want to see Kostenko’s testimony. There is his testimony in which he clearly indicates the speed that new battleships could give on the day of the battle at 16-16,5 knots, based on his opinion and the opinion of the mechanical engineers of Orel. In his book, he speaks several times about the speed of the ship and its change due to overload, which at different stages of the campaign was different, as, in fact, in the testimony.
He has quite logical justifications for this, unlike yours. Yours are presented on some kind of floating data - if you take either 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 nodes, multiply by Kostenko and divide by Parfyonov, you will get the number you need.
Once again, on the one hand, the testimony of the flagship mechanic, senior officer, ship engineer, indicating the opinion of the mechanical engineer Eagle (read the testimony), and on the other hand, your opinion.
By the way, Andrey, okay, Kostenko has insufficient education and experience for you, but what about you - what is your education and experience? You probably have specific knowledge and experience regarding armadillos such as Borodino in general and Orel in particular, significantly more than that of Kostenko, the flagship mechanic, senior officer combined, if you reject them so easily?
And did not answer the question - indicate historians / scholars who would just as you reject Kostenko.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: sevtrash

There is his testimony in which he clearly indicates the speed that new battleships could give on the day of the battle at 16-16,5 knots, based on his opinion and the opinion of the mechanical engineers of Orel

Listen, I’m asking you again - can you READ?
Kostenko says

At 78 revolutions in the campaign, the "Eagle" gave 11 - 11½ knots, having a displacement of at least 15500 tons. The mechanical engineer on the "Eagle" in the campaign were of the opinion that, in case of need, the battleship, with full tension and perfect angle, can develop the same speed as on the sample. With the addition of 6 revolutions, the stroke increased by 1 knot. Therefore, at 108 rpm, you could count on 16 - 16½ knots.

In other words, the mechanic did not say a word that the battleship could develop 16-16,5 knots. The mechanic said that with full tension and perfect angle the battleship will be able to develop NUMBER OF TURNS which he developed on passing tests. In other words, if you try very hard, the battleship will give 109 revolutions. But what speed will turn out at the same time - the mechanic is not a word or a word, this is the EXCLUSIVELY calculation of Kostenko

Quote: sevtrash

In his book, he speaks several times about the speed of the ship and its change due to overload, which at different stages of the campaign was different, as, in fact, in the testimony.

And you need to be completely blind so as not to see that in this case Kostenko is contradicting himself. I ask you again - apart from the mantras "Kostenko is right ... Kostenko PRAAAAV ..." will there be any refutations of the inconsistencies I have indicated in the article?

Quote: sevtrash

He has quite logical justifications for this, unlike yours

Well, yes - to indicate either 18 then 15-16 then 15-16 with additional training - this is a very logical justification
I have already shown you how "logical" Kostenko is. And you, apart from repeating "But in the main he is still right!" so you can’t argue with me. So why are you wasting your time and mine?

Quote: sevtrash

Once again, on the one hand, the testimony of the flagship mechanic, senior officer, ship engineer, indicating the opinion of the mechanical engineer Eagle (read the testimony), and on the other hand, your opinion.

I repeat once again - the testimony of the senior officer of the Swede, the chief of the Eagle, the chief navigator of the squadron, Semenov, Rozhdestvensky, etc. - On my side. And you can’t even notice this in any way.

Quote: sevtrash

And did not answer the question - indicate historians / scholars who would just as you reject Kostenko.

As soon as you tell me with specific examples what mistakes I made in the article, I will definitely answer!

[sevtrash]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I repeat once again - the testimony of the senior officer of the Swede, the chief of the Eagle, the chief navigator of the squadron, Semenov, Rozhdestvensky, etc. - On my side. And you can’t even notice this in any way.

Can you read? Already every 10 times I write about the same thing - on the one hand, the testimony of the flagship mechanic, senior officer Eagle, ship engineer (who indicates the views of mechanical engineers !!), which speak of a speed of 16-17 knots !!! This is in the official testimony !!! People who are the best primary sources about the speed of new battleships, and Kostenko is a shipbuilder who professionally owned ship speed calculations, he even had a graduation project of a high-speed armored cruiser. And on the other hand, who? You or what? Oh yes, Christmas.

It is completely clear that you are not able to prove your statement about the speed of armadillos like Borodino, despite the attempts. There is only a question in what - and you yourself seriously do not realize this?

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

As soon as you tell me with specific examples what mistakes I made in the article, I will definitely answer!

You resort to this style of response quite often - when there is nothing to answer.

[sevtrash]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Oh, yes, indeed, I did not count him as a student

But by chance, those years that passed before the book was not counted?

[ABM]

Quote: ABM

too lazy to google everything yourself :(
I'll find now
and you shouldn’t be rude - even if something doesn’t suit you in numbers

[avt]

Quote: ABM

too lazy to google everything yourself :(
I'll find now
and you shouldn’t be rude - even if something doesn’t suit you in numbers

All ? Know it? Well tsifirki, which specifically, "do not suit?" .Well, now, "google" to us unreasonable concrete statements of losses of at least German equipment after battles.

[ABM]

see above - Soviet! and on the Wehrmacht I agree to these numbers

[avt]

Quote: ABM

see above - Soviet! and on the Wehrmacht I agree to these numbers

Uh, no! This number will not rent No one asks what they agree on. Kindly answer for yours, and not smear someone else’s, moreover, specifically with confirmation by links to documents.

[ABM]

General Heinrici, claims that despite minor discrepancies, the 4th TA Gotha during Operation Citadel lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns, of which 15-20% could not be restored. This will amount to 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are to be written off. AG "Kempf" lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) irrevocably, and the 9th Army Model 647 and 130 respectively. It turns out the total losses of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irrevocably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 323 were destroyed. Taking into account that the real loss was much higher, not 193, but 290 units, the losses of both army groups would amount to about 420 armored units.

[ABM]

General Heinrici, claims that despite minor discrepancies, the 4th TA Gotha during Operation Citadel lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns, of which 15-20% could not be restored. This will amount to 629 units of armored vehicles, of which 20% (126) are to be written off. AG "Kempf" lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) irrevocably, and the 9th Army Model 647 and 130 respectively. It turns out the total losses of GA "South" amounted to 193 units of armored vehicles irrevocably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel, of which 323 were destroyed. Taking into account that the real loss was much higher, not 193, but 290 units, the losses of both army groups would amount to about 420 armored units.

[Mooh]

From what I promised to a respected audience, only a detailed analysis of the beginning of the battle and the “Loops of Togo” remained incomplete. Perhaps, nevertheless, I will be able to lay out this analysis as a separate article.

I'd love to see this material. Even from Tsushima's pillar myths, the Melnikovsky statement about the criminal passivity of Rozhdestvensky in battle was not analyzed in detail in the cycle. As far as I remember, it was argued that for the entire duration of the battle, Rozhdestvensky gave as many as 2 teams.
If we have already done such a fundamental work, it would be necessary to bring to the logical end and put it somewhere in one text. Ax unfortunately is not the best place to search for old publications, especially broken into several parts.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: MooH

I'd love to see this material

I will try.

Quote: MooH

If we have already done such a fundamental work, it would be necessary to bring to the logical end and put it somewhere in one text.

Yes, definitely. Although I don’t know yet where. Well, I’ll definitely post it on the alternative, but maybe where else?

[Adagka]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Adagka

All local fans of the "creativity" of the "brilliant" ZPR stubbornly forget about one squadron dragged not even at 11, but at 9 knots

So what? Than 11 nodes are fundamentally better than 9 can answer?

Quote: Adagka

what artist this leader equated the Ebras to the trough Kachatka and in general why he dragged her with him can not explain,

You know, your militant illiteracy is a little annoying. Is it okay that the Kamchatka was the most useful ship in the squadron? And that, in general, this fact is generally known?

Quote: Adagka

and so of course it is better to run into Kostenko and a priori believe the cowardly admiral and other "heroes" who surrendered, they are telling the pure truth

Yes, sure. Either Kostenko’s case, he fought heroically to the last, and died, struck by four Japanese twelve-inch shells in the chest.
Nothing that Kostenko, as it were, also surrendered along with everyone else?
Double standards - they are so double ...

You are like that stupid boss who has two points of view of mine and is wrong, in this you are a worthy couple of ZPR. Kamchatka, like hospital Orel, could have been sent separately, but it’s not necessary but necessary, but where could the ingenious organizer think of such things. And how was Kamchatka useful in battle? Did the ebony go wild on the go?

[Ulan]

I also wonder why the Kamchatka was the "most useful ship of the squadron"? It is necessary to immediately clarify - when is it useful and how? If on a campaign, this is one thing, but in battle, how did she suddenly become "the most useful." "Why did she help the squadron so useful during the battle?" Mikasu "drowned with a ram, or maybe she had 16-inch guns on board ...
And if in the campaign it really was not superfluous, then in battle it was completely useless, a burden for the squadron, like all other transports.
It is completely clear to me that the task assigned to Rozhestvensky was impossible.
Initially, the task was to connect with the 1st Pacific (Port Arthur) squadron and gain supremacy at sea. The task is quite feasible.
But after Port Arthur fell, and its squadron ceased to exist, it won’t be able to defeat the Japanese fleet and gain supremacy at sea, thereby turning the tide of the war in Russia's favor. Consequently, the further campaign turned into a pure gamble, especially the task set by Nicholas II to defeat the Japanese fleet.
To the honor of Rozhestvensky, he perfectly understood this, but as a military man he could not fail to fulfill the order.
The only thing he could do was try to break into Vladivostok with the least losses, possibly avoiding the battle with the Japanese fleet.
Did the admiral do everything for this? The answer is obvious. No.

[tasha]

Somewhere like that ...

I read materials about the Tsushima battle and start to think that Tsushima should not be seen as a battle between two more or less equal fighters, but rather as an attack by enemies on a train, which includes armed guards. Just look at the 2 TOE marching warrant before the start of the battle.

[ABM]

before the battle, Oslyabya was at the head of the left column with the second detachment! in the right column - Suvorov at the head of the first detachment

[tasha]

I agree, the figure is an illustration to the thought of the train. There in the left corner is 6: 00 14.05.

[ABM]

and the thought is true, on the one hand, on the other - none of the first three detachments paid attention to transports and was not going to cover

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Do not confuse the 2TOE marching order and order before the start of the battle

[ABM]

"Just look at the travel order of the 2nd TOE before the battle. "(C) - I looked

[tasha]

And about 7: 00 the first contact with the Japanese cruisers took place. And the battle has begun ...
So somewhere out there I’m a little bit right ... :)

An interesting topic for serious researchers is the model of building ships of the 2th TOE during the battle. At least at the level of the same pictures, broken down by the hour. What do you think?

[ABM]

only schematically you can try to depict ... somewhere I saw in our first three orders - but really, with distances, so who measured them!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Ulan

I also wonder why the Kamchatka was the "most useful ship of the squadron"?

I will explain. "Kamchatka", of course, in battle could not bring any benefit - but AFTER the battle it became priceless.
The fact that the 2TOE ships even reached Tsushima is a great merit of Kamchatka. Now look what happens. As I already wrote - before the battle, Rozhdestvensky had no reason to expect an enchanting defeat - as I said, the experience of the battle at Shantung testified that while the battleships kept the line and the will to go forward, the Japanese could not do anything to them.
Accordingly, Rozhdestvensky's expectations "to go to Vladivostok with the loss of several ships" are absolutely clear and logical (although incorrect, but how did he know this?) So, let's say that everything went as Rozhdestvensky thought (he built his plans on these reflections) and the Russian squadron would have passed to Vladivostok having lost several ships. And then what?
But nothing. Vladivostok as the base of the squadron is nonsense. There was a lack of EVERYTHING, and in particular - working specialists. It was with great difficulty that Vladivostok provided the maintenance of the VOK - and here is a whole squadron! In general, if there was any hope of somehow repairing the ships after the breakthrough, then this hope was for Kamchatka.

Quote: Ulan

Did the admiral do everything for this? The answer is obvious. No.

Maybe. But what did he not do, in your opinion?

[Denis_469]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well, yes, 370 or 400 tons according to Kostenko (really less) is the wildest advantage,

Aha - the wildest advantage. When the design full displacement is 14200 tons, and the actual displacement at the time of engagement (according to Kostenko) is 16000 tons. 1800 tons of overloading is naturally a trifle. What kind of overload should be for such a "specialist" as you to become noticeable? 3600 tons or do you need all 5000 tons of transshipment?

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

"Expert", what is there.

This is just about you.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Denis_469

explain to him why he down

Hello first.
And secondly, do not start harshly?

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Denis_469

explain to him why he down

Hello first.
And secondly, do not start harshly?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Denis_469

If we take on faith Kostenko’s words that during the battle the ship lightened by 800 tons, then it turns out that the ship entered the battle with a displacement of 16000 tons (15200 + 800)

The calculation is based on an incorrect number.

Quote: Denis_469

When the Eagle was handed over to the Japanese by the crew, its draft was 8,85 meters average.

Quote: Denis_469

We divide the values ​​by 3 (then 300 feet were taken as 100 meters and it was believed that 1 meters in 3 meter). In other words, sediment aft of 9,76 meters,

Learn to count for a start. The English foot mentioned by Campbell is 30,48 cm, therefore the draft is stern of 8,93 m, and the bow is 8,38 m.

Quote: Denis_469

The aforementioned average draft of the ship of 8,85 meters was after water was pumped out of the hull.

Yeah. It is written

When the Eagle was brought to Maizuru, it had a draft 27.5 feet forward and 29.3 feet stern.

Well, water was pumped out of it somewhere along the road :)))

Quote: Denis_469

"I would like to note that the overload during firing could not have reached 3000 tons in any way" - Kostenko is completely right, since by this time the ships had taken in excess of the standard fuel supply. This supply of fuel was stored everywhere, including on the battery deck. The ship's displacement by this time was approximately 17300 tons.

V.P. Kostenko :))) He writes in the testimony of the Commission of Inquiry

The maximum overload of armadillos, such as the Borodino, was upon leaving Nossi-be. "Eagle" then had a displacement of 16800 tons

[Denis_469]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The calculation is based on an incorrect number.

The figure is correct.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Learn to count for a start. The English foot mentioned by Campbell is 30,48 cm, therefore the draft is stern of 8,93 m, and the bow is 8,38 m.

Try to find out first how it was then. And then you will tell me. If you suddenly do not know, then I suggest that before 1950 there was exactly the same calculation scheme that I gave. That is, 300 feet were equal to 100 meters, and 1 meter was considered only 3 feet. If you are very stubborn, then you can go to the "K-21" in Severomorsk. She has an original depth gauge with which she departed throughout the war. So - it has a double graduation: in meters and feet. So the scale ends at 100 meters, which are 300 feet at the same time. And the same thing was in all the fleets of the world at that time and before him. This is not the full number of feet in 1 meter now. And during the ROE and after it, until the end of World War II, the calculation of the foot-meter was different than it is now. So my pointer is correct. At the time of the RYAV given. Yours is also correct, but according to the current state. We have different calculation methods and that's it. I'm counting on the time of the RYAV, you are on the modern time.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well, water was pumped out of it somewhere along the road :)))

Yes, on the way to Mizuru, the struggle for vitality was waged. And immediately upon arrival as well.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

V.P. Kostenko :))) He writes in the testimony of the Commission of Inquiry
The maximum overload of armadillos, such as the Borodino, was upon leaving Nossi-be. "Eagle" then had a displacement of 16800 tons

Yeah. Only he could not say about the construction overload of 600-800 tons, with which the ship was built. In his testimony, the ship was built without overload on the project. It was actually overloaded by 800 tons. And his testimony should be automatically increased by the amount of construction overload of 800 tons. What was forbidden to talk about at that time. Therefore, he does not speak.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Denis_469

Try to find out first how it was then. And then you'll tell me. If you suddenly don’t know, then I suggest that until 1950 there was exactly the calculation scheme that I brought. That is, 300 feet equaled 100 meters and 1 meter was considered only 3 feet.

Listen guy, do you even understand what you write? What are you translating feet into meters in the ENGLISH system of measures? Where did you see the British meters? I can still assume that there was something like that with the Russian foot (although for example http://blog.vilisov.info/article/20 says the opposite), but why would the British suddenly equate their feet to meters?

Quote: Denis_469

This is now 1 meter not the total number of feet

We agreed on a verified ENGLISH source.

Quote: Denis_469

Yeah. Only he could not say about the construction overload of 600-800 tons, with which the ship was built. In his testimony, the ship was built without overload on the project.

Go learn the materiel.

While on the battleship "Eagle", during the cruise, he monitored the stability and load of the ship. On leaving Libau, at the first stop near the island of Langeland, I determined, in a completely calm state of the sea, the displacement and initial stability of the battleship. The average deepening on an even keel was 28 '10 ", displacement - 15300 tons, initial metacentric height - 3,06 ft. The overdeep of the battleship was 2' 10", overload - 1770 tons, the decrease in stability was expressed in the loss of 1 'metacentric height. Having collected with the possible thoroughness information about the cargoes on the battleship, he received the following results regarding the composition of the transshipment:
Coal 450 tons.
Boiler water 150 "
Drinking water 40 "
Water for ship needs 40 "
Combat super-complete. reserves 100 "
Boiler grates 30 "
Engine oil 50 "
Food and supplies 100 "
Materials 100 "
Baggage and small cargo 60 "
Total 1120 tons, 8,3% of the water consumption.
About 650 tons of transshipment accounted for the hull, armament and mechanisms, changes in design assumptions, various additions to the project, over 5 years of construction, and during the equipment of the battleship on a difficult campaign.
During construction, significant overload was obtained for various ship systems: ventilation, drainage, fire, electrical wiring, drainage and others. In addition, there was an overload on the steering, spike devices, on tower installations, on the equipment of residential premises.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

I cannot give the exact data on the distribution of weights for these articles without a weight log, but the total figure is close to 300 tons. Approximately up to 200 tons of transhipment was caused by all sorts of deviations from the project and major alterations. So, the armor over the casemates was thickened; on the sections, protection of all elevators was made with sheets of 7/8 "; between the lower armored and battery decks, the deadwood was sealed, sections from the poop were added to the section above the battery, the mainmast was reinforced, some bulkheads and frames in the double bottom compartments were reinforced, shelving was arranged for super-complete shells.
Up to 150 tons were added to the load of the battleship with all sorts of additions not provided for by the project. These were Temperley’s arrows, Spencer-Miller winches and fixtures, counter-min buoys and trawls, rangefinders, Makarov plasters, additional machine ventilation, air bombs for bomb cellars, ventilation clinkets, metlav tiles in all cockpits. On some mine boats there were up to 10 tons of overload, on steam boats - up to 5.
During the campaign, the loads of the first category varied significantly, as a result of which the displacement varied within large limits. The minimum displacement was upon arrival in Dakar, when the deepening was 27 '3 ", the displacement was 14800 tons. The maximum overload of battleships, such as" Borodino ", was when leaving Nossi-be." Eagle "then had a displacement of 16800 tons. The overload was 3270 tons, ie 24% of displacement, overdeep - 5 '1 ". Draft fore - 31 '11 ", stern - 30' 4", average - 31 '1 ", trim to the bow - 1' 7". Metacentric height was reduced to 2,25 ". Half ports remained 4,5 'from the water ; the upper armored belt was only 2 'above the water.
2) During the battle, the displacement of the battleship was close to what it was when leaving Libau. "Eagle" had a displacement in battle from 15200 to 15250 tons, that is, the overload was from 1670 to 1720 tons, or approximately 12%, the draft was about 28 '7 ", the thick armor of the lower belt was 1' lower WL-ii. The upper belt, which had 6 "in the middle of the vessel and 4,5" at the extremities, served as the belt protection of the WL-ii. It rose 4½ above the WL. The metacentric height was slightly less than 3 ', approximately 2,8 '.
At the same time, the battleship had 1100 tons of coal and up to 500 tons of fresh water, a boiler room, drinking and for ship needs, provisions for 3½ months, engine oil for 60 running days.
Overload in battle consisted of the following cargoes:
Coal 400 tons.
Water 350 "
Provisions 70 "
Shells 80 "
Grids 20 "
Engine oil 40 "
Materials and small loads, luggage, tools, supplies. 130 "
Total 1090 tons.

[Denis_469]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Listen guy, do you even understand what you write?

I perfectly understand what I am writing about conversion. And even wrote an address where you yourself are able to verify my words. Unfortunately, there are no more boats with original depth gauges left in our country. Therefore, only on "K-21" you can see the depth gauges of that time. Although I could be mistaken, and somewhere else they remained.
And if reality contradicts your views, then this is no worse than reality - but worse for you.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

What are you translating feet into meters in the ENGLISH system of measures? Where did you see the British meters?

I already wrote what I saw. On the depth gauges of submarines built in 1905 and later. I can even tell you that on Soviet World War II depth gauges had a double scale in meters and feet. The British I did not see meters. It's right. On our boats I saw depth gauges with a simultaneous double scale.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

We agreed on a verified ENGLISH source.

I have enough domestic sources. What the British will write about there right now is not interesting to me, but at that time the British had no meters in principle. Therefore, in principle, there can be no English source of conversion. I can also report that I saw similar two-scale depth gauges in photographs of Italian and Japanese submarines. Moreover, the Japanese World War 2 depth gauges were very similar to ours. And they also graduated to 300 feet, which equaled 100 meters. When at the very end of August 1945, American submariners captured a Japanese boat, they also saw such a graduation on that submarine. Immersion depth 100 meters or 300 feet. Since it was used even in 1945 by the Japanese, there is no reason to believe that in 1905 the calculation of the foot meter was different. Although this is all I am writing in vain: you are only interested in what fits into your point of view. You ignore everything else.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

why would the British suddenly equate their feet to meters?

But the British really did not need it. This was needed by countries with a metric system for synchronization. Therefore, on submarines of countries with a metric system there were two-scale depth gauges. And on them all in all countries, 100 meters equaled 300 feet. Do you like it or not. But that was so. Therefore, as of 1905 to 1950, I can definitely say that the method of calculating the foot meter was exactly this: 1 meter was 3 feet. And 300 feet was 100 meters in depth gauges.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Denis_469

I already wrote what I saw. On the depth gauges of submarines built in 1905 and later. I can even tell you that on Soviet World War II depth gauges had a double scale in meters and feet. The British I did not see meters.

Who cares about the graduation of Soviet submarines? Campbell, author of the article - ENGLISH. This is clear? And there was an English foot and will eat exactly 30,48 centimeters. And the values ​​indicated on the depth gauges of the submarine do not matter here.

[Alexey]

Quote: "But excuse me, if the battleship Oryol was tested with a displacement of 13.300 tons, while according to Kostenko its normal displacement was 13.530 tons, then what kind of overload can we talk about? It turns out that the Eagle went out to the measured mile underloaded by 230 tons, and if not for this underload, the speed of the battleship turned out to be even lower, but the reason for this is not at all overload! "
I speak as a shipbuilding engineer.
Kostenko made no mistake. Confused the author of the article. Not being a specialist.
The thing is that the displacement of the former is different. A contract speed of 18 knots was probably negotiated for standard displacement, if memory serves for "Borodino" it is about 12500 tons. Overload 1770 tons Kostenko calculated in relation to full displacement. Standard displacement and total displacement are different values.

[Denis_469]

Exactly. Tests for maximum speed were carried out at that time in a standard displacement by the stokers of the plant and using Cardiff coal, as the most high-calorie coal. Ordinary brown coal is less caloric and the power plant power on it was less. The power decreased even more during operation due to the fact that the stokers were draftees, and not specially trained stokers for the operation of boilers of that type. Since boilers of different types differed among themselves by the features of operation.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Alex

I speak as a shipbuilding engineer.
Kostenko made no mistake. Confused the author of the article. Not being a specialist

Well, let's see what the author messed up there :))

Quote: Alex

The thing is that the displacement is different. The contract speed of 18 knots was probably agreed for the standard displacement, if memory does not change for Borodino it is about 12500 tons. Kostenko calculated 1770 tons overload in relation to the total displacement. Standard displacement and full displacement are different values.

First of all, tell me, as a professional, to an amateur who thinks about himself - WHEN YEAR did the concept of standard displacement appear? Don't you remember? Could it be that the term "standard displacement" first appeared in 1922, the Washington Agreement?
You see, in those years, the very concept of standard displacement did not exist. Therefore, tests in it could not be carried out.

Quote: Alex

A contract speed of 18 knots was probably negotiated for a standard displacement

The second - you see, the standard displacement is the displacement that a ship has with all the cargo, but without fuel, oil and drinking water. Explain how to test without fuel?
Thirdly, the tests are carried out in the NORMAL displacement, which, according to various sources, should have been 13 - 516 tons for battleships of the "Borodino" type.

[Alexey]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The second - you see, the standard displacement is the displacement that a ship has with all the cargo, but without fuel, oil and drinking water. Explain how to test without fuel?
Thirdly, the tests are carried out in the NORMAL displacement, which, according to various sources, should have been 13 - 516 tons for battleships of the "Borodino" type.

Do not dig into the words, it will not change the essence of my comment. Yes, this is not a standard displacement in the modern sense, in any case, there was a standard or some other called provision for loading a ship that was going out on a measured mile. It was, of course, not a complete displacement. I don’t remember exactly, maybe 30% of the reserves. in any case, the displacement was very different from the full in a smaller direction.

[unknown]

Even if there is no doubt in Kostenko's words about the speed of the Borodino-class battleships of 15,5-16 knots, even this speed is higher than the speed of the first armored detachment, which was slowed down by the Fuso. The battleship of the outdated design could not go more than 15 knots. Moreover, the Japanese ships were also overloaded, and during the construction: "Mikasa" -900 tons, - and fuel.

I understand that it’s hard to accept. But maybe it’s worth moving away from the standards of the Soviet era, when the technical characteristics of German technology were shamelessly underestimated, and Soviet ones were overstated.
With the Russian-Japanese war, everything is somehow the opposite.

I understand that the defeat needs to be explained somehow. But I would like more objectivity, rather than sweeping

[ABM]

"Fuji" only ... "Fuso" is a very ancient trough

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ignoto

Even if there is no doubt in Kostenko's words about the speed of the Borodino-class battleships of 15,5-16 knots, even this speed is higher than the speed of the first armored detachment

Do not confuse the maximum speed of the battleship and the maximum squadron speed of the squad. Even if the maximum speed like Borodino would be 15,5-16 (which is a bit big), then the maximum squadron is about 14 knots.

Quote: ignoto

The battleship of an obsolete project could not go more than 15 knots.

According to many other opinions - 16. And it is not clear whether 16 knots for Fuji are at maximum speed or full speed (i.e., without boosting boilers that the battleship can support for a long time)

[kig]

Personally, I really liked Kostenko’s book precisely as a business approach in describing the ship and the circumstances of the campaign. However, you should not make an idol out of it, nor should you try to catch it on inaccuracies. He was where we were not and could not be, and we do not know those circumstances. Well, Madagascar shells, for example, could simply die in water with a different salinity and temperature and fall off the hull. In addition, it is unlikely that the Japanese drove Eagle into their dock immediately after the capture, they had enough of their own worries. As for the different number of revolutions per node, then here you can find an explanation. There is such a value as the pitch of the screw, and such a value as the sliding of the screw. The higher the resistance to movement of the vessel (large draft / overload, wave, headwind, hull fouling, shallow depth under the keel), the greater the slip and the more revolutions must be developed in order to obtain the speed that was obtained under more favorable conditions at lower revolutions. So I personally do not see any crime in Kostenko’s descriptions.

[kig]

And when describing the battle, one must take into account the fact that at that time Kostenko was on a hospital ship, where he got with a leg injury a few days before Tsushima. No luck man. Or maybe vice versa.

[Adagka]

The author’s logic and the taking of convenient opinions on faith and the categorical rejection of other points of view and testimonies of Tsushima participants is an attempt to justify the mediocrity and cowardice of ZPR, a reference to the fact that Borodino went out of order during training firing at a speed of 11 knots, so when Tsushima squadron crawled at 9 knots this generally nonsense. This is from the opera that the author has a Ferrari and once at a speed of 120 his box flew, and so until the end of his life he will now not ride on it for more than 60 km, but it’s better to put the garage forever then nothing will break.

[ABM]

"In the battleship race, which began on September 30, the first was, of course, the" battleship-cruiser "Peresvet, but this new ship, due to several stops caused by heating of the bearings, more than once allowed itself to catch up with a marching 13-14 knot speed (it had to go full only at the southwestern tip of the Korean Peninsula, Peresvet finally left behind the horizon pursuing Poltava. At 8 o'clock in the morning on October 2, at Encounter Cliff, he slowed down, making a 566-mile run from with an average speed of 15,7 knots. The steam pressure was kept from 8,4 to 12,6 atm., the highest frequency of rotation of the shafts -94 rpm "(R.M. .417, l. 1) is about the potential speed at a distance slightly less than from Tsushima to Vladivostok

[simon]

things are good. So, the author, what was the course of the squadron and why not 16 knots? It is good to do pure arithmetic while sitting at home and keeping your feet in a basin of warm water. At home, all the "strategists" !!!! But there would be to shove. Then they would have looked at you. We will never know the true reasons that influenced these or those decisions. But there is a fact that this is the only squadron in world history (its crews, officers, sailors, volunteers) that, having no bases, passed without losing a single ship and vessel during the transition and took the battle! and to count and "wash the bones", to look for the guilty, we were taught well.

[ABM]

three years later, the Americans freaked out and, in general, sent their squadron around the world - like, to see that it would be with them ... also wow - there were no losses

[Serg65]

Quote: simon

It is good to do pure arithmetic while sitting at home and keeping your feet in a basin of warm water. All the "strategists" are at home !!!!

Quote: simon

But there is a fact that this is the only squadron in world history (its crews, officers, sailors, volunteers) that, having no bases, passed without losing a single ship and vessel during the transition and accepted the battle! and to count and "wash bones", to look for the guilty, we were taught well.

Requiem for officers, conductors and lower ranks of the 2-th Pacific Squadron
Immediately after the end of the Russian-Japanese war, it was decided to build a memorial temple, which would become "a symbol of a mass grave for those who perished without the burial of heroes-sailors." All of Russia responded to the construction of this monument, rubles and copper were carried by sailor's widows, invalids of the Russian-Japanese war, large sums were donated by members of the imperial family, relatives of the dead officers, crews of ships.
The Church of the Savior on the Waters was built at the end of the English Embankment, not far from the shipyards where the ships of the Russian fleet were born. On the walls of the upper church there were bronze memorial plaques with the names of the dead ships and the names of the sailors who died on them.
Years passed, the Russian Empire sank into summer, the workers and peasants came to power. In 1932, the leaders of the country of the Soviets decided that this temple is a relic of a rotten past. By order of comrade Kirov temple was BLASTED!
Russian Glory, Pride
and Love, For Your Feat,
Suffering and Blood
We pay sorrow
To you and rapture

[Adagka]

Actually, the whole series of articles is named incorrectly, it would be more correct to title this work "Admiral Rozhdestvensky - the incomprehensible genius of his era or how to fail the preparation for war, drown the entire Baltic fleet in a day and get out of the water". And what's wrong, after Tsushima, the ZPR remained the head of the General Music School for himself, drowning state property for hundreds of millions of rubles))
By the way, Rozhestvensky in our time would definitely be an "effective manager", for example, he would have squandered all state policy in the Ukrainian direction, pumping hundreds of billions of ever-green American presidents there, but instead of being shot and exiled to uranium mines, he would receive some kind of order and transfer to another front of work)) In general, history likes to repeat itself))

[ABM]

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE

- we won the Tsushima battle! Hooray!
(15 pluses, one minus from a personal enemy on the forum on Tsushima)

- our sailors are the most heroic sailors!
(25 pluses, s minus from enemies on the forum on "Tsushima")

- we will always win pin-s !!!
(50 pluses)

- we will not return the Kuril Islands to China!
(62 pluses, one minus from a Chinese intelligence officer registered for information)

I TIRED THIS SITE - I WILL DRAW ON TSUSHIMA AND I WILL LEAVE! YOU ARE NOT STORIES, IN MOST OF YOURSELF. AND DO NOT WISH TO REALLY UNDERSTAND

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ABM

I TIRED THIS SITE - I WILL DRAW ON TSUSHIMA AND I WILL LEAVE! YOU ARE NOT STORIES, IN MOST OF YOURSELF. AND DO NOT WISH TO REALLY UNDERSTAND

We will miss you ... And - with joy!

[Captain45]

and "Loops of Togo."
Andrey, to the author, on this topic i.e. "Togo loops" let me disagree. There was no "Togo loop" was the so-called "crossing T" or "stick over T" developed by S.O. Makarov when he was a captain of the 1st rank, which was his article about " The naval collection "on tactics of squadron action in battle, taking into account the increased speeds, armor and artillery of ships. It's just that our admirals reacted to this as always, well, let's just give a damn, but the British were very serious. And since the Japanese learned from the British, they too respectively took note.

[Vladislav 73]

The author is definitely a plus! Let someone disagree with his calculations and conclusions, but that tremendous work on various sources and processing of the material cause undoubted respect! And the comments, well, read them ... and why? In most cases, they are poured from empty to empty, exaggerating a long-standing chewing gum on the Tsushima-type theme, everything is known a long time ago, the author beguiled something, but (name) long ago put all the dots on and ... As an example: I have long met 2 mutually exclusive statements-C .O. Makarov, even during the construction of battleships of the "Borodino" type, established their insufficient stability, and therefore they de-sank. Other authors, with drawings in their hands, prove that rumors of insufficient stability, to put it mildly, are greatly exaggerated ...

[not main]

Thanks to the author! A very informative series of articles! For many years I was not satisfied with the version "coal overload, high humidity of pyroxylin, Rozhdestvensky's incompetence" Now many "white spots" became clear. Thanks again for posting!

[Scraptor]

She did not suit you because you are a descendant of the quartermasters who drenched him?
They needed that war and the defeat of the Russian fleet in it, to create a revolutionary situation. So they created it a hundred specially - Blank even wrote about it.

[Victorio]

By simple calculations we get the normal displacement of the battleship in 13 530 tons. Well, and with what displacement the battleship came to the test? V.P. Kostenko (in the testimony of the Investigation Commission) gives a very clear answer:

there is no abnormal displacement; when the displacement exceeds the ship / vessel sinks, displacement = weight of cargo + crew weight + weight of supplies (food, water, fuel) + hull weight. who knows how to know these common truths

[brn521]

Quote: Victorio

there is no abnormal displacement

Список водоизмещений: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C2%EE%E4%EE%E8%E7%EC%E5%F9%E5%ED%E8%E5 .
Determination of normal displacement from there: Normal displacement - displacement equal to the standard displacement plus half the supply of fuel, lubricants and drinking water in tanks.
Of course, there is no displacement on the list when the warship water slurps, but stays afloat and keeps moving. Also an abnormal displacement. Nevertheless, they are at war with him and even keep the system.

[aiw]

Thank you for the article. I just didn’t really understand all these manipulations with the number of revolutions per node - EMNIP the speed of a surface ship grows like a power cube of hl. mechanisms (and even without taking into account the propulsion efficiency). Turnover is not about power, but nevertheless the dependence there is clearly non-linear, and the propulsors there were clearly not VRS ... can we talk about a linear approximation in the vicinity of a certain move and is it rather arbitrary?

[aiw]

Ugh, the speed grows like a cubic root of the power of the EU-no ;-)

[Scraptor]

This is if the resistance force is independent of speed ... With most of its components, this is not so:
http://www.trans-service.org/ru.php?section=info&page=teor_kor&subpage=moreh_kac
hest_01

[aiw]

Ugh, the speed grows like a cubic root of the power of the EU-no ;-)

[Grafova Irina]

The dear author of the article somehow overlooks, discussing the squadron speed, the moment that transports were present at our squadron. And all discussions about revolutions and nodes should be guided precisely by them, because the squadron could not drop transports, and those, with all the efforts, did not go more than 11 nodes in better times.
And we must remember that no ships of any fleets in combat conditions showed the declared running characteristics - with the rarest exceptions, which, as you know, confirm the rules
And Kostenko V.P. (my hobby for the fleet began in a certain way in the 78th year), having fallen “from the ship to the ball”, in the sense that, being in such a battle, he, out of inexperience, could have mixed up something. Starting with the number of hits in your "native" EDB.
And the article itself is, by and large, about nothing. In my opinion. When calculating the revolutions and nodes (the thing, no doubt, the right one), the process itself, that is, the battle, is overlooked. His greatness and tragedy