Battle of Dubno: forgotten feat

When and where did the biggest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War

History and as a science, and as a social tool, alas, is subject to too much political influence. And it is often the case that for some reason — most often ideological — some events are extolled, while others are forgotten or underestimated. Thus, the overwhelming majority of our compatriots, both those who grew up during Soviet times and in post-Soviet Russia, are sincerely considered the largest battle of Prokhorovka in the history of tank battles - an integral part of the battle of Kursk. But in fairness it should be noted that the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually happened two years earlier and five hundred kilometers to the west. During the week in the triangle between the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody, two tank armada of a total number of 4500 armored vehicles met.

Counter attack on the second day of the war

The actual beginning of the battle of Dubno, which is also called the battle of Brody or the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, was 23 June 1941 of the year. It was on that day that the tank tanks, at that time, out of habit, they were also called mechanized — the corps of the Red Army stationed in the Kiev military district, launched the first serious counterattacks against the advancing German troops. The representative of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command Georgy Zhukov insisted on counterattacking the Germans. Initially, a blow to the flanks of Army Group South was attacked by 4, 15 and 22 mechanized corps, which were stationed in the first echelon. And after them, the 8, 9 and 19 advanced from the second echelon of the mechanized corps were connected to the operation.

Strategically, the plan of the Soviet command was correct: to strike at the flanks of the Wehrmacht’s 1 tank group, which was part of Army Group South and rushed to Kiev to surround and destroy it. In addition, the first day battles, when some Soviet divisions - such as, for example, the 87 division of Major General Philip Alyabushev - were able to stop the superior forces of the Germans, gave hope that this plan could be implemented.

In addition, the Soviet troops in this area had a significant superiority in the tanks. The Kiev Special Military District on the eve of the war was considered the strongest of the Soviet districts and it was he who, in the event of an attack, was given the role of executor of the main retaliatory strike. Accordingly, the equipment came here in the first place and in large numbers, and the training of personnel was the highest. So, on the eve of the counterstrike, the troops of the district, which had already become the South-Western Front by this time, had as many 3695 tanks. And from the German side, only about 800 tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive - that is, more than four times less.

In practice, an unprepared, hasty decision about an offensive operation resulted in the largest tank battle in which Soviet troops were defeated.

Tanks fight for the first time with tanks

When the tank units of the 8, 9 and 19 mechanized corps reached the front line and entered the battle from the march, this resulted in the oncoming tank battle - the first in the history of World War II. Although the concept of wars of the mid-twentieth century did not allow such fights. It was believed that the tanks - a tool to break through the enemy’s defenses or create chaos on his communications. "Tanks do not fight with tanks" - this principle was formulated, common to all armies of that time. Anti-tank artillery was supposed to fight the tanks - well, and carefully entrenched infantry. And the battle of Dubno completely broke all the theoretical structure of the military. Here, Soviet tank companies and battalions were literally head on to German tanks. And - lost.

There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the German troops were much more active and rational than the Soviet, used all types of communication, and coordination of the various types and types of troops in the Wehrmacht at that time was, unfortunately, a cut higher than in the Red Army. In the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, these factors led to the fact that Soviet tanks often acted without any support and at random. The infantry simply did not have time to support the tanks, to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery: the infantry units moved on their own two feet and tritely did not catch up with the tanks that had gone ahead. And the tank units themselves at the level above the battalion acted without general coordination, by themselves. It often happened that one mechanized corps was already rushing to the west, into the depths of the German defense, and the other, which could support it, began regrouping or retreating from its occupied positions ...

Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno. Source: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F016221-0015 / CC-BY-SA

Contrary to the concepts and instructions

The second reason for the massive death of Soviet tanks in the battle of Dubno, which needs to be mentioned separately, was their unavailability for tank combat - a consequence of the very pre-war concepts of “tanks do not fight with tanks”. Among the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps that entered the battle of Dubno, light tanks escorting infantry and raid warfare, created in the early to mid-1930's, were the majority.

More precisely - almost everything. As of June 22, in five Soviet mechanized corps - 8, 9, 15, 19 and 22 - there were 2803 tanks. Of these, medium tanks - 171 unit (all - T-34), heavy tanks - 217 units (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), and 2415 light tanks of T-26 type, T- 27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7, which can be considered the most modern. And as part of the 4 of the mechanized corps that fought just west of the Brody, there were also 892 tanks, but among them there were exactly half of the modern ones - 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34.

Soviet light tanks, due to the specifics of the tasks assigned to them, had anti-bullet or splinter armor. Light tanks are a great tool for deep raids to the rear of the enemy and actions on his communications, but light tanks are completely unsuitable for breaking through defenses. The German command took into account the strengths and weaknesses of the armored vehicles and used their tanks, which were inferior to ours, both in quality and weaponry, in defense, negating all the advantages of Soviet technology.

The German field artillery has had its say in this battle. And if for T-34 and KV it, as a rule, was not dangerous, then light tanks had a hard time. And against the Wehrmacht 88-millimeter anti-aircraft guns, rolled into the direct fire, even the armor of the new Thirty-Fours was powerless. Worthy resisted them except that heavy KV and T-35. The light T-26 and BT, as stated in the reports, "as a result of hitting anti-aircraft shells partially destroyed," and not just stopped. But the Germans in this direction in the anti-tank defense used far from only anti-aircraft guns.

Defeat that brought victory closer

And still, Soviet tankers even in such "inappropriate" vehicles went into battle - and often won it. Yes, without air cover, because of which the German on the march aviation knocked out almost half of the columns. Yes, with weak armor, which was sometimes pierced even by heavy machine guns. Yes, without radio communications and at your own peril and risk. But they did.

They walked, and sought their own. In the first two days of the counteroffensive, the balance of hesitations varied: one side or the other achieved success. On the fourth day, the Soviet tankmen, despite all the complicating factors, succeeded, throwing the enemy 25-35 kilometers in some sections. Towards the evening of June 26, Soviet tankmen even took the city of Dubno with a battle, from which the Germans were forced to move ... to the east!

Padded German tank PzKpfw II. Photo: waralbum.ru

Nevertheless, the advantage of the Wehrmacht in the infantry units, without which the tankers could only fully function in the rear raids, soon began to be felt. By the end of the fifth day of the battle, almost all of the avant-garde parts of the Soviet mechanized corps were simply destroyed. Many units were surrounded and were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts. And the tankers with each passing hour more and more lacked intact machines, shells, spare parts and fuel. It got to the point that they had to retreat, leaving the enemy with almost intact tanks: there was no time and opportunity to put them on the course and take them with them.

Today you can find the opinion that, de, then give up the leadership of the front, contrary to the orders of Georgy Zhukov, the command to move from the offensive to the defense, the Red Army, they say, would have turned back under the Dubno Germans. Would not turn. Alas, that summer the German army fought much better, and its tank units had much more experience in active interaction with other branches of the military. But its role in disrupting the Barbarossa plan, fostered by Hitler, the battle of Dubno played. The Soviet tank counterattack forced the Wehrmacht command to deploy reserves, which were intended for an offensive in the direction of Moscow as part of the Army Group Center. And the very direction to Kiev after this battle began to be considered as a priority.

But this did not fit into the long-agreed German plans, broke them - and broke so much that the pace of the attack was catastrophically lost. And although the heavy autumn and winter of 1941 was ahead, the largest tank battle has already said its word in the history of the Great Patriotic War. It was him, the battles at Dubno, echoing two years later on the fields near Kursk and Orel — and responded in the first volley of victorious salutes ...

Comments

[Tatar 174]

The more I learn, the more I become convinced that I know very little ... For the first time, now only, I read about this episode of the Great Patriotic War near Dubna ... Thank you.

[Starover_Z]

Quote: Tatar 174

For the first time, now I just read about this episode of World War II near Dubna ... Thank you.

I support! Maybe in military schools what battles are being disassembled and studied, but for ordinary residents such stories are in the shade!

Thus, the vast majority of our compatriots, both raised during the Soviet era and in post-Soviet Russia, sincerely consider the largest tank battle in the history of the battle of Prokhorovka - an integral part of the battle on the Kursk Bulge. But in fairness it should be noted that the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually happened two years earlier and five hundred kilometers to the west. During the week, two armored armadas with a total number of about 4500 armored vehicles met in a triangle between the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody.

Yes, the battle was not won, but it stopped the German offensive, slowed down this mechanized shaft and therefore should also be widely publicized for all residents of Russia and the CIS!

[Knight]

The author of the article does not have a clear idea of ​​what he is writing. So there was only one 22MK tank division in the first echelon, the remaining divisions of this MK were in the second echelon, like all the MKs listed by the author. The author correctly notes that the strategic plan is a flank tank attack units on enemy infantry divisions in order to encircle enemy armored forces. However, conceived as a flank strike at the operational level, in reality at the tactical level the attack resulted in frontal strikes. And here it was necessary for the author to talk about the reasons for the unsuccessful attack of the tank units. However, the author retells the squint half the truth, which in no way sheds light on the real causes of defeats. The main reason for the defeats is the absence in the Red Army of ideas about the tactical use of tanks. As soon as Soviet tankers learned tank tactics during the Second World War, victories over the enemy arrived. The tactics in the early days of the war were: tanks at maximum speed at the Germans, having received intelligence about the approach of the tank units, formed anti-tank strongholds, in which the Soviet avalanches stupidly rested, until the tanks were completely destroyed. When the tanks met the tanks, the Germans met Soviet tanks from an ambush, or attacking with in different directions so that Soviet tanks would set fire to their side. Katukov wrote that during the assault on the Zeelovsky heights, his units would attack with a snake if they went as they did in 41g, they would make their way, but with two tanks. As for the capture of Dubno, it is necessary to make a reservation that this fact is not confirmed by German sources, only by Soviet sources. Regarding the course of the battle, according to the author of the article, allegedly successful, so successful that the attackers were left without tanks, what was the success then? It turns out the Germans were defeated while the Soviet tanks attacked, but won only when tanks ran out The offensive from the very beginning to the end was a failure, it must be admitted, for this is true. Of course, there was the heroism of the Soviet soldiers, there were some successes, but the overall assessment of the battle of Dubno does not change

[Aleksandr72]

The article contains a lot of historical inaccuracies and frank mistakes, I don’t want to comment and paint them much, nevertheless the author tried to reveal the tragic page of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War that was little known to most (not military or historians). But here it is: "... and 2415 light tanks such as T-26, T-27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7, which can be considered the most modern." Which of these vehicles the author considered "the most modern", although perhaps I find fault with the wrong construction of the proposal and in fact the author considered modern (and justifiably) the T-34 and KV tanks mentioned by him above. But in any case, the T-27 cannot be attributed to tanks (even light ones) - it was an unsuccessful machine-gun tankette, most of which were disarmed by the beginning of the war and were used mainly for training driver mechanics (including in Osoavikhim - predecessor DOSAAF), or as tractors of light 45-mm anti-tank vehicles. In general, I agree with my colleague Vityaz about the assessment of the article.
I have the honor.

[new communist]

But BT-8 or BT-7 are not modern. Bt-8 ended the war by defeating the Kwantung army, one thing T-34 were raw, blind and a crew of 3 people.

[Stas57]

Quote: New Communist

one thing T-34 were raw, blind and crew 3 man.

and what not 2?

[new communist]

alas 3 and only then 4

[Ze Kot]

Quote: New Communist

Bt-8 ended the war by defeating the Kwantung army

What is the BT-8? The last was BT-7M

[Aleksandr72]

The crew of the T-34 tank with a 76-mm cannon was 4 (four!) People: the commander (aka gunner), the loader, the driver, the gunner-radio operator.
The crew of the T-34-85 tank with an 85-mm cannon was 5 (five!) People: they shared the functions of commander and gunner.
Of the tanks of the BT series, by the beginning of the war, only the latest version of the BT-7M with the V-2 series diesel engine could be considered modern, which, by the way, had the most problems due to its shortage and low resource, and there were problems with fuel .
The BT-8 tank was an experimental model, it was not mass-produced and accordingly did not fight. In the defeat of the Kwantung Army, the BT-7 light tanks, uniquely outdated by that time, really took part. So what? Firstly, they were few and they did not make the weather. Secondly, in the Far East, due to the remoteness from the theater of war and the lack of need for modern technology, T-26 light tanks also served in the tank units throughout the war. Do you also call them modern? Thirdly, Japanese armored vehicles even during the end of the war in their combat capabilities approximately corresponded to the BT-7 and T-26, because the Japanese in tank building of that time lagged behind the USSR by a step, if not two. The only thing that is true in your comment is that the T-34 at first really was a crude and blind machine, but no one before the war even assumed that the T-34 would become the main workhorse of the armored forces of the Red Army, because It was supposed to replace it with a more modern T-34M. Accordingly, the original T-34 no one thought to bring to mind. I had to do this already during the battles of the Great Patriotic War.
I have the honor.

[new communist]

the song is such three tankers three cheerful friends. Or 4 tankers and a dog, on t-34 -85. But what kind of modern tanks were they, for example, the BT-7s were replaced by a и и-и и где где где where there were 70 crew members, a mechanic driver was a suicide bomber, a BT-2 masterpiece compared to him. And they fought on the-7 for 70-42 years.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

And what modern tanks are they, for example, the BT-7s were replaced by the U-shi T-70 where there were 2 crew members, a mechanic driver was a suicide bomber, in comparison with him the BT-7 is a masterpiece.

Mwa ha ha ... that is, BT-7 with its 15-22 mm of armor and a three-speed gearbox, which made it one of the slowest tanks of the Red Army (BT-7 was inferior in terms of average technical speed to T-26 and T-28) - Is this a masterpiece compared to the T-70 with its 35-45 mm armor and 4-speed gearbox?
BT-7 was struck by almost all the guns of the Germans. Including 20 mm anti-aircraft guns and tank guns.

[new communist]

And you ask the mechanics about the T-70, how to get out of it if the commander in the tower is killed, and indeed a high-speed tank is slow. The T-70 was also struck by all the guns of the Germans.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

And you ask the mechanics about the T-70, how to get out of it if the commander in the tower is killed,

Through the mechanical drive hatch in the VLD.

Quote: New Communist

and indeed a high-speed tank is slow.

Say thanks to KhPZ, which simplified the checkpoint for the sake of manufacturability.

Quote: New Communist

The T-70 was also struck by all the guns of the Germans.

Not all, not from such distances as the BT-7, and not in all projections. VLD T-70 sometimes even held shells PaK-38.

[goose]

The dimensions of the T-70 (and T-60) allowed on the landscape of a shallow-hilly Russian field, as in Kursk, to approach the gun at a distance of no more than 400 m. It could not really see or shoot at the T-70 because of screen terrain. Neither KV nor T-34 could. And at that distance the machine gun was already deciding if the gun was noticed.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: goose

The dimensions of the T-70 (and T-60) allowed on the landscape of a shallow-hilly Russian field, as in Kursk, to approach the artillery gun at a distance of no more than 400 m.

Judging by the photo, for the T-70, to be invisible on the field, even the hills were not needed - only the tower sticks out over the crops.

[Vladimir 5]

The article is clearly untrue, the purpose is to hide and justify the rout of the FIVE fur. Red Army corps 4 German tank divisions. The reason for the defeat, the launch of an offensive during the arrival of the next divisions near Dubno-Brody. The Germans took turns defeating the arriving divisions. At the beginning of June 22, 1941, the mechanized corps of the Red Army, according to the instructions, made more than 800 kilometer march before, by order of the G. Zhukov Ш s general education school, to arrive near Brody. With such a non-stop march, up to 30% of tanks are lost along the road due to a malfunction. G. Zhukov then hid his main role in the defeat of the main tank forces of the Red Army in the early days of the war, but he was the NSS and the main commander and strategist in this main direction for the Red Army ..

[Alex]

Quote: Tatar 174

The more I learn, the more I become convinced that I know very little ... For the first time, now only, I read about this episode of the Great Patriotic War near Dubna.

Quote: Starover_Z

I support! Maybe in military schools what battles are being disassembled and studied, but for ordinary residents such stories are in the shade!

I don’t know why, but there’s a lot of information about these battles. Even the pages of VO have been discussed repeatedly. So do not pass off your own ignorance as general trends.

[Severomor]

You can read books:

Ryabyshev D. I. "The first year of the war" - commander of the 8 mech corps

Rokossovsky K. K. "Soldier's duty" - commander of the 9th mech corps

[ikrut]

On the Internet there is an excellent book by Sergei Bylinin "Tank battle near Brody-Rovno. 1941".
There, hourly, with the parts, surnames and eyewitness accounts described all this battle. Without politicized assessments, with an analysis of all factors - temporary, technical, operational and strategic. Frankly, the article is very far from what was actually (according to the specified book). I recommend reading in order to have an idea of ​​real events.

[hunter]

There is a good book on this topic by Beshanov "Tank Pogrom 1941"

[Petrik66]

Beshanov -! To refer to him is all too early to refer to Solzhenitsyn.

[hunter]

Yes, and Popel's memoirs "It's a heavy time", Popel was a political instructor in a tank corps

[Alexey RA]

Beshanov ... Would you still advise Solonin and Boryusik to read.

As for Popel, he is a propagandist. And what he writes in Dubno contradicts even the documents on which he is signed. For example, at the very time when, according to Popel's memoirs, his group was going through Dubno, in reality it just went to the outskirts and started fighting there (as Popel himself reported: "By 23.00 the southern outskirts of Dubno was takenMoreover, 67 tp 34 td that reached Dubno was fired upon by the Germans from that very southern outskirts.

On Dubno-Brody there are 2 books by Isaev: a survey - "From Dubno to Rostov" and specifically on these battles - "Dubno 1941. The greatest tank battle of the Second World War."

[nikpwolf]

The exact same story. I heard from the corner of my ear. But such a scale I could not imagine. I would like more details. Thank you for the article. History needs to be studied. Especially their country. I am ashamed.

[Stas57]

Quote: Tatar 174

The more I learn, the more I become convinced that I know very little ... For the first time, now only, I read about this episode of the Great Patriotic War near Dubna ... Thank you.

but I don’t quite understand what you are proudly telling us about?
that you don’t know the history of your country?
it's unfortunate ....
with even greater surprise, I see the same unknowing "like".
for which I put you decent minuses, shame on you and shame!

I support! Maybe in military schools what battles are being disassembled and studied, but for ordinary residents such stories are in the shade!

oh and what are you saying!
and you didn’t try to look for such thick paper bricks, for example,
Bylinin S. Tank battle at Brody - Exactly 1941. - M .: Exprint, 2004. - 47 sec. - (Fund of military art).
Drig E. Mechanized corps of the Red Army in battle. The history of the armored forces of the Red Army in the 1940 — 1941 years. - M .: AST, 2005. - 830 sec. - (Unknown wars).
Hot F.M. Tank march. Ed. 4: MBAA. - SPb., 2012.
Isaev A.V. Dubno 1941. The greatest tank battle of the Second World War. - M .: Yauza, 2009. - 189 sec. - (Great tank battles).
Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. - M.: Transitbook, 2004. - 710 c. - (Military Historical Library).
Isaev A.V., Koshkin I.V., Fedoseev S.L. et al. Tank strike. Soviet tanks in battle. 1942 — 1943. - M .: Eksmo, 2007. - 448 sec. - (Military-historical forum).
Popel N.K. Tanks turned west. - M .: AST, 2001. - 480 sec. - (Military Historical Library).
Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1988. - 367 sec. - (Military memoirs).
Ryabyshev D.I. The first year of the war. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1990. - 256 sec. - (War memoirs).

[Russian]

Dear Stanislav, I think the vast majority of the population of our country do not know about this battle. And here, those present expressed their regret that they did not know about this before, which I join. And I believe that this blame cannot be entirely blamed on them, since our state does not enlighten this event in any way. In their opinion, it is better to watch house-2, real boys, crime serial on NTV and read unless Dontsov. Consumer society to him. And you could without unnecessary pathos, like you're all plebeians here, just write links to sources, where to read about it.

[Stas57]

Russian, it’s generally beneficial for the state that everyone plows on 24 hours for free, doesn’t get sick, pays 100% of taxes and dies the day before retirement.

But we have here not a forum "echo of Moscow", not a forum "Dom2" here it seems like people who love the country have gathered, who know about Ukraine, about America, and who do not know the cornerstone events of the history of their country,
Well then, there is a feat of a soldier unknown to the general public.-Here I understand.
But this, it is impossible not to know a Russian person, a Russian, a Soviet person living in Russia, this, excuse the shame! "

[new communist]

Russian, it’s generally beneficial for the state that everyone plows for 24 hours for free, doesn’t get sick, pays 100% of taxes and dies the day before retirement .-- silly, but where to get solvent buyers? This is an option of moronic communism, and the state needs harmony and solvent buyers and producers.

[jjj]

In VO, in my opinion in the spring, there was a fairly detailed publication on this battle. The conclusions there were slightly different. Most of our tanks died on the march, not even having time to join the battle. And those who entered gave the Germans heat. The publication was detailed with calculations

[Ulan]

Unfortunately for the majority of the population of the country, the main source of information is the television, in which, as you rightly noted, there is not much information on such events and social networks.
But nevertheless, we need to be interested in ourselves, if of course we are not indifferent people and we are concerned about the Great Patriotic War.
So, of course, there is the state’s fault, but as the popular wisdom says, hope in God, but don’t be fooled.

[Ulan]

The 6-year history of the Great Patriotic War published under Khrushchev talks about this operation. If I’m not mistaken, Zhukov’s in his memoirs too. So there was information about this battle in Soviet times.

[Rastas]

Baghramyan’s memoirs also describe the fighting near Dubno. In this battle, such generals as S. Kondrusev (June 24) and M. Khatskilevich (June 26) were killed.

[War and Peace]

this tragic episode of the war, it is necessary to comprehend, each defeat has a specific name, having such a huge power of 3700 tanks against 800 German ones, our just had to crush the Germans and grind into powder, because a single-shot of 3700 armada blows everything in its path and the tanks and infantry. This could not be understood by the commanders of the southwestern front, the commander Kirponos and chief of staff Purkaev, instead of planning a brilliant blow for these advancing German groupings by these generals, a brilliant blow for its senseless recklessness and aimlessness.
For example, the role of Zhukov in this operation is still not clear, why did he come, why did he actually manage and give orders? thereby leveling the participation of the front leadership, when orders begin to come from TWO COMMANDERS, chaos begins in the heads of the lower command staff. It is precisely Zhukov’s role that is absolutely not clear, who gave him the order to transfer command of the front? Is this an unauthorized action by Zhukov, or is anyone else involved in this scenario? I consider Zhukov’s role in this part of the war to be negative, among other things Zhukov’s conscience has a lot of things, the Rzhev operation, the Berlin operation, when HUNDREDS OF THOUSAND RUSSIAN LIVES were put on the line.
In general, the culprits were found, named and punished, but the questions remained the USSR had an overwhelming advantage in tanks and planes, but so stupidly disposed of its capabilities that there was nothing close in history before that and it seems to me that the version of CHANGE at the top of the USSR is very likely .. .

[Petrik66]

It is very sad that you use such epithets to address the greatest military leader of the Second World War. read at least Isaev, maybe then you will understand something about the Rzhev operation and about the Seelow heights. It's disgusting when such a marshal is spat upon. after the war, his whole life is an attempt by other, less talented (even Konev) and simply mediocre "partners", as our President says, to settle scores with him. Another's glory is unbearable.

[War and Peace]

Quote: Petrik66

read at least Isaev, maybe then you will understand something about the Rzhev operation and about the Zeelov heights.

to talk in such a spirit that "read smart people and get smart thoughts" is a standard technique for those who themselves, without reading anything, climb with advice and judgments, since you are so sure of this Isaev, you can tell what this Isaev dug up there and what is the reason for this defeat? or do not tell from the principle?

[War and Peace]

Quote: War and Peace

or do not tell from the principle?

I knew Nitsche this Petrik will not tell, can only give advice ...

[Severomor]

Quote: Petrik66

...... the greatest warlord of World War II ....

And who decided that he is the greatest?
Stalin - the great, of course, Rokossovsky - is great. So who decided that Zhukov is the most?
Threat Zhukov was the beginning of the war Gene. headquarters. Position held 6 months.

[estixnumx]

The specific name is the lack of communication, the interaction of parts loss of connection management. Before the war, there should have been 19 units in the manned infantry division according to the staffing of radio stations (in particular, 3 in reconnaissance battalion) (in the military staff deployed according to the state of war time in the infantry division 153), the rest was provided by wired communication, in conditions of a maneuverable war this is still a disaster .In addition, according to the field charter of the Red Army-39 g, radio communication was considered auxiliary and many commanders with walkie-talkies did not try to use it. By the way, Pavlov was tried and shot precisely for the loss of control by the troops. The Germans had a clear interaction between the units and the most important large number of radio stations were especially in the panzer groups. If the Germans received transceiver communications from a tank platoon commander or higher, then the receivers were on all tanks. There was also a radio station in the German infantry battalion. Our radiant tanks stood out with a handrail antenna and were quickly knocked out, and control in a tank battle with the help of flags is complete madness. That’s the whole reason for the defeat is the inability to control the troops after the units entered the battle. The situation in the Red Army changed only in the second half of 1942, when the first polnoechnye commanders of the regiments and the past and survived in the first year of the war were pulled up. in addition, in 1941, the regular structure of the parts was optimized. The bulky mechanized corps disappeared, instead of them came compact tank brigades (90 tanks and 3000 soldiers), which were more controllable in battle, and the tanks were accompanied by tank troops (thanks to Tukhachevsky for the APCs, they bought a wedge and license from the Vickers, refused to carrier), etc. Basically, there was a loss of control of the parts, which did not allow organizing the interaction of the parts. Pavlov’s front-line intelligence, instead of looking for the enemy, was looking for his units ....

[War and Peace]

Quote: esti1979

Before the war, there should have been 19 units in the manned infantry division according to the staffing of radio stations (in particular, 3 in reconnaissance battalion) (in the military staff deployed according to the state of war time in the infantry division 153), the rest was provided by wired communication, in conditions of a maneuverable war this is still a disaster In addition, according to the field charter of the Red Army-39 g, radio communication was considered auxiliary and many commanders with walkie-talkies did not try to use

in World War I, Brusilov did not have any radio stations at all, but he was able to organize the troops in such a way that he led Austria out of the war, the Red Army fought on its own land and therefore the commanders had to know their army and their land on which they were fighting and preparing accordingly, but it seems that nothing has been done, but quite the opposite ...

[Stas57]

Quote: War and Peace

in World War I, Brusilov did not have any radio stations at all, but he was able to organize the troops in such a way that he led Austria out of the war, the Red Army fought on its own land and therefore the commanders had to know their army and their land on which they were fighting and preparing accordingly, but it seems that nothing has been done, but quite the opposite ...

bzheshmy

can now fight without walkie-talkies, since Peter1 did not have them? on their land then ...

not, but nothing that the opponents of Brusilov with portable walkie-talkies identity problems were unlike the Wehrmacht?

[War and Peace]

Quote: Stas57

Quote: War and Peace

in World War I, Brusilov did not have any radio stations at all, but he was able to organize the troops in such a way that he led Austria out of the war, the Red Army fought on its own land and therefore the commanders had to know their army and their land on which they were fighting and preparing accordingly, but it seems that nothing has been done, but quite the opposite ...

bzheshmy

can now fight without walkie-talkies, since Peter1 did not have them? on their land then ...

not, but nothing that the opponents of Brusilov with portable walkie-talkies identity problems were unlike the Wehrmacht?

he understood what he said?

[Stas57]

Quote: War and Peace

he understood what he said?

I’m fine, but you wrote nonsense, compare WWI and Brusilov with a highly maneuverable lightning fast WWII, where speed solved a lot, where Communication is the nerves of war, where there is no communication and there can be no control!
aha, "mother help the earth"

[War and Peace]

Quote: Stas57

Quote: War and Peace

he understood what he said?

I’m fine, but you wrote nonsense, compare WWI and Brusilov with a highly maneuverable lightning fast WWII, where speed solved a lot, where Communication is the nerves of war, where there is no communication and there can be no control!
aha, "mother help the earth"

in any war, the MAIN THING is Loyalty to your people you are fighting for, as well as the choice of position i.e. I had to think with my head how to do better, and not how to surrender the army to the Germans, by the way the connection was ...

[Suhow]

in addition to communication, it.d.-the enemy had an overwhelming advantage in the air and was well provided with the necessary resources (fuel, ammunition, for example) and by the end of the battle it all ended, the enemy aircraft, in addition to bombing, also conducted reconnaissance, which made it possible to prepare for the battle, and to see the directions of our strikes, including partially true the number and composition of the troops of the strike group. as far as I remember about the operation near Dubno they wrote: where it was necessary to beat with a fist, we beat with open fingers.

[War and Peace]

Quote: Suhow

in addition to communication, etc., the adversary had an overwhelming advantage in the air and a good supply of necessary resources (top

damn you don’t know anything, the Germans didn’t have any advantages in the air at the beginning of the war, but on the contrary, there were more of our tenks and our planes too ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: War and Peace

damn you don’t know anything, the Germans didn’t have any advantages in the air at the beginning of the war, but on the contrary, there were more of our tenks and our planes too ...

Have you tried to look not at the glands, but at the crews?
For example, in KOVO for 1901 the aircraft had 1682 crews, of which only 1227 could take off at a time. Oh yes, 1547 of these crews could operate only during the day in simple weather conditions.
in the ZAPOV it is even cooler - 1658 aircraft, 1702 crews - and only 973 can simultaneously fly into the air.

With tanks even more interesting - the number of combat-ready tanks of the western districts is still unknown. There are several reasons: the number of trained crews is unknown (for tanks of new models there were no more than 500) and the number of serviceable tanks is unknown. For example, tanks of the 2nd category, which are often referred to as serviceable, could in fact have a joke in the park because of the lack of cheap parts — gaskets or trucks.

[estixnumx]

The army as a mechanism, if something goes wrong then everything is destroyed. It was just that the Red Army was preparing for the last war and fought on the basis of a combat charter whose doctrine no longer corresponded to realities. In addition, the experience of the French company of 1940 was not realized. There, the French and the joint command of the allied forces faced the same problem. Hourly, the lines of defense indicated by the command were captured by the Germans. Charles De Gaulle wrote about this in his memoirs. France fell in 40 days, so who held the front in 1941 are heroes and this thesis is not subject to appeal. It was the time of the real divisors of Kipronos, Kuznetsov, etc. Eternal Glory to the Nameless Heroes !!!!!

[goose]

Quote: esti1979

(thanks to Tukhachevsky for the BTR

What kind of armored personnel carriers, if the truck was less than 30% complete, would be enough to fly in the clouds !!! There were practically no tractors and tractors at all.

Even horses completeness was only 50-60%.

[estixnumx]

That's for this and thanks I ordered 10 tanks and more than one armored personnel carrier from the industry.

[goose]

Quote: War and Peace

3700 tanks against 800 German

Yeah, and under the Dubosekovo station, 44 German tanks were to powder the company without tanks and anti-tank missiles with a probability of 99,9999% and without losses. But it turned out a set. War - it’s like that, tanks and mines are blown up and burn from grenades, and a 100 kg bomb can turn it over with a close explosion, even if it didn’t hit directly.
For comparison, PzKpfw IIIh against BT-5 or T-26 is like KV-1 against the same PzKpfw III.
Do not penetrate the forehead, the return shot is fatal, because the crew is small, then visibility and rate of fire is worse. Optics and radio stations are old. A total of 2 T-26 can be exchanged for 1 PzKpfw 38t or 3 T-26 for 1 PzKpfw III or IV.

[Stas57]

Yeah, and under the Dubosekovo station 44 German tanks had to erase the powder without tanks and tanks with a probability of 99,9999% and without losses. But it turned out a set.

because there was not a company, but an 2 battalion with reinforcements, and tanks of 10 pieces, only 1075-15 tanks came to the 20th joint venture, which does not detract from the feat. with a bottle and PTRD not a lot of war

Quote: goose

Quite 2 T-26 can be exchanged for 1 PzKpfw 38t or 3 T-26 for 1 PzKpfw III or IV.

life is not HERE-2 tank, these are two crews of dead grandfathers and fathers

[Patton5]

first heard of this battle from Isaev

[War and Peace]

watched this "lecture" about the beginning of the war of this Isaev and I can say that this little Jew is not an analyst at all and does not analyze anything, but for a long time and tediously tells the very drawing of the battles of those years, the Germans flooded, and ours did not have time here and here and here , then the Germans went further along the "pacirstrasse", and ours did not have time again here, they wanted like this, but they could not, because the tanks are bad, the shells are bad, and the commanders are not experienced, and his whole story is a "retelling" even about Zhukova did not say anything worthwhile.
This historian does not have his own thoughts and observation, but all is some kind of retelling of someone else's vision.
The main task of the front commander is, first of all, HOLDING THE FRONT, if the doctrine of war is OFFENSIVE which could not be in the USSR because usually the one who attacks is the first to attack, and if the red army waited, then it was DEFENSE.
There is a widespread opinion that is attributed to Zhukov and it sounds like this - DETERMINE THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN STRIKE, and focus the defense on this direction, as all the actions of the German blitzkriegs in Europe have shown, this is movement along the roads and along the roads, which Isaev said as "pacirstrasse" , it was enough to study the war with France and this could be done with the intelligence and analytical services supplied, then it becomes generally clear how to fight with tanks is to BLOCK THE ROADS, detain masses of tanks with artillery and tanks on the roads and beat on the flank, bleeding the attacks, then cut off counter-attacks delivery of ammunition and fuel.
There were not many such roads along which the Germans walked, it would be possible to comprehend and rebuild the defensive lines and further identify the directions of counterattacks taking into account the small motor resources of the Red Army tanks.
It cannot be said that the USSR was not preparing for war — this is not true, everything was ready taking into account the capabilities of that time, but not only there wasn’t any real defense in the directions of the main strikes, but tanks were also used WRONG, they were chased along the roads trying to keep up with German quick breakthroughs, which led to the failure of tanks due to breakdowns, but this is NON-PROFESSIONALISM and may even be worse CRIME, the commanders knew the capabilities of their troops and by long transitions themselves disabled their own tanks as a result of losing the tanks everything fell apart.
So, historians need to identify who gave criminal orders to move the mechanized corps, what could not be done, and how did it happen that there were no defensive lines in the directions of the main strikes — the roads? Why did almost all aviation die in the early days? It is possible to carry out such an analysis, but not to Isaev ...

[goose]

Quote: War and Peace

hit the flank, bleeding

What to beat on the flank, analyst, if the Red Army had pedestrian artillery mobility?
There were not enough trucks, tractors, tankers and other types of property. Repair services were practically absent. The stock of spare parts was not. Warehousing was in the process of moving; there was nowhere to take much in a radius of 100-150 km. The country was not mobilized, like Germany, and all the scarce property was part of the national economy.

[smel]

The soldiers and officers then fulfilled their duty. Performed with honor and dignity. Eternal memory to them and gratitude of posterity. It was not their fault that there was no ammunition, fuel, support or cover. And many thanks to the author for recalling this tragic but glorious page in our military history. By the way, in those battles, the tankers performed such feats that later they would have pulled hundreds of Heroes. But, as they say, defeat is always an orphan. Victory has many parents ...

[Valery Valery]

Very interesting. thank

[KiR_RF]

Many thanks to the author, for the article presented, I learned many interesting facts about the Great Patriotic War.

[DPN]

In the fleet there is an aircraft carrier Admiral KUZNETSOV, the only person whose name is an aircraft carrier who gave orders to the troops at the time. It was his military district that went on the offensive on the very first day of the war.

[shasherin_pavel]

Since when did the admirals send the district offensive ?! Admiral Kuznetsov commanded the USSR fleet, or rather all the USSR fleets. The difference was that, according to his memoirs, after his appointment as commander, all fleets were checked several times at what speed the command "readiness number 1" reached the fleets until everything was debugged to a minimum. What was not observed in Zhukov G.K. Zhukov himself writes that he had to go to the city telegraph, across the street from the headquarters, and use it in the early days. In the last issue of Top Secret there is an article when on June 23 a telegram came from Stalin to the troops, where he called for more active use of radio communications, otherwise, some commanders begin to use the telegraph without code tables, which is why German intelligence intercepts the most important messages.

[jktu66]

Since when have admirals sent offensives in the district ?!

DPN may have confused the admiral with General Kuznetsov

[Severomor]

Quote: DPN

In the fleet there is an aircraft carrier Admiral KUZNETSOV, the only person whose name is an aircraft carrier who gave orders to the troops at the time. It was his military district that went on the offensive on the very first day of the war.

The fleets were under operational control of the commanders of the districts (later, and most likely from June 18, the commanders of the fronts).

The entire fleet was already on alert, read at least memoirs.
Kuznetsov Nikolay Gerasimovich "On the Eve"

"... The Baltic Fleet on June 19 was transferred to operational readiness No. 2. This to some extent protected it from any surprises. It was calmer in the Northern Fleet than in the Baltic, but we also transferred it to the same readiness.
On June 18, the Chernomosky fleet returned from the exercise area to Sevastopol and received an order to remain in readiness number 2. Most of the sailors and ship commanders did not go ashore. Many of them then did not see their loved ones for many months. "

“I found out later how the events developed on that night in the fleets. My telephone conversation with VF Tribets ended at 23 hours 35 minutes. The Baltic Fleet's combat log reads:“ 23 hours 37 minutes. . "

[washi]

All is correct. For some reason, the directive reached the Navy on June 18.06.41, XNUMX, and the land men ignored it, although not all of it either.
There is a simple and logical conclusion: In the defeat of 1941, the NGSh group is to blame for Zhukov, who rubbed himself with the "Trotskyist" Khrushchev

[Severomor]

Quote: Vasya

All is correct. For some reason, the directive reached the Navy on June 18.06.41, XNUMX, and the land men ignored it, although not all of it either.
There is a simple and logical conclusion: In the defeat of 1941, the NGSh group is to blame for Zhukov, who rubbed himself with the "Trotskyist" Khrushchev

The North-Western District (Kuznetsov) was put on alert 18.06.
The future South Front too.
But the Kiev district, and even more so the West is the question. Many people say that it’s now not to go to the theater (Pavlov in Minsk). I think so. In such a post, your place at the command post of the future front, especially the bell (and not one) was already.

[BM-13]

Quote: Severomor

Many people say that it’s now not to go to the theater (Pavlov in Minsk).

To go to the theater, of course, it is possible, but only Pavlov, who is it: the commander of the Special Military District or the theater critic, who is more important to watch the play than to give the necessary directives to the troops? If the first, then why didn’t he raise his ass from the box and didn’t leave for the headquarters? If the second, then why is it wearing general uniforms?

[Severomor]

Quote: BM-13

If the second, then why is it wearing general uniforms?

July 22 fixed

[Petrik66]

Aha - everything in a fleet in the fleet. Well, tell us about the Tallinn crossing, about why the Germans and Romanians were able to evacuate most of their troops by sea from the Crimea in 1944 and from the Kuban in 1943? Tell us about the combat effectiveness of Soviet submarines in the Second World War, preferably in comparison with other fleets, even with the Italian one.

[creak]

Quote: Petrik66

Aha - everything in a fleet in the fleet.

But how could it be otherwise, though the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Oktyabrsky, who is also the commander of the Sevastopol defensive region, somehow escaped from Sevastopol, leaving his defenders to their fate in early July 1942 ... What is 70 thousand prisoners in comparison with his precious life ...

[goose]

Quote: ranger

the commander of the Sevastopol defensive area for some reason escaped from Sevastopol

The reason is unequivocal - the order of the Headquarters on evacuation, documented.

[creak]

Quote: goose

the rank is unequivocal - the evacuation order order, documented

There was no order to evacuate - this is unequivocal.
In response to Oktyabrsky’s request for permission to evacuate, the Supreme High Command gave such permission. Allow evacuation in response to a request and order to evacuate if not requested, this is not the same thing.
PS Admiral Kuznetsov in his memoirs stated quite clearly how the matter was - how the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he coordinated this issue with Stalin and cites the text of the cipher Oktyabrsky.
It doesn’t work in any way from the October commander Efremov who completely shared the fate of his soldiers ...

[goose]

Yeah, we’ll tell you how in the Baltic, small submarines were stormed, blocked by nets and mines, with a constant barrage of anti-aircraft defense forces. And the Italians could not go on convoys really in the open Mediterranean Sea with the support of aviation off their shores.

[Alex]

Quote: DPN

There is an aircraft carrier in the fleet Admiral KUZNETSOV, the only person whose name is the aircraft carrier, who at the time gave orders to the troops. it his military district went on the offensive on the very first day of the war.

Young man, are you actually in the subject, or so, did you go out for a walk? Since when have admirals their districts?

[new communist]

Before Kuznetsov, aircraft carriers carried the names of the capitals of the USSR.

[Alex]

Quote: New Communist

Before Kuznetsov, carrier ships were named after the capitals of the USSR

I'm not talking about the names of aircraft carriers (I know about them, I dare to think no less than yours), but about the absurdity in the post.

[Ulan]

Apparently the man confused Admiral Kuznetsov with the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Military District (North-Western Front) General Kuznetsov.

[Ulan]

Admiral Kuznetsov was Commissar of the Navy. The front (Baltic Military District) was commanded by General Kuznetsov, a namesake who actually began to put the district’s troops on alert from June 19th. Documents were published.

[dummy]

Even as a child in Soviet times, I read Popel's book "In a Troubled Time". He was the head of the 6th mech corps near Rivne, I think. This is another part of a huge front. But ours fought there surprisingly heroically. There was everything. Even during a covert retreat to the rear of the Fritzes, the capture of German armored vehicles due to the relaxation of the sentries. Then this German armored vehicle organically entered the usual tank column of the Germans, distributed over it and at night, point-blank shot part of the Hans. Amazing facts, almost on the verge of fiction. And we are ashamed of our memory and praise Private Ryan. Shame.

[shasherin_pavel]

It was Popelya who was beaten by General Rokosovsky with his stick, because in the beginning of 1942 in his trenches eight soldiers died from exhaustion. It was about him that Stalin said: If you are to blame, then shoot him, but why beat with a stick.

[Jatviag]

And where is it at the beginning of 1942? Rokossovsky and Popel intersected? The first time I hear about this.
And I didn’t read about the beating of Rokossovsky with a stick either. Eremenko, I know he loved someone with a stick, it was attributed to him like that.

[RiverVV]

Tales of it all. Rokossovsky - from Warsaw Poles. The gentry is great. White bone, blue blood. Physical punishment is completely out of his spirit. In addition, according to the recollections of relatives after interrogations in the Leningrad NKVD, Rokossovsky was generally disgusted with the assault.

By the way: he is one of the senior commanders of that battle. He commanded the mechanized corps. I don’t remember the number, google laziness.

[ABM]

brigadier commissar, political officer of the 8th mechanized corps

[valokordin]

Quote: Dummy

Even as a child in Soviet times, I read Popel's book "In a Troubled Time". He was the head of the 6th mech corps near Rivne, I think. This is another part of a huge front. But ours fought there surprisingly heroically. There was everything. Even during a covert retreat to the rear of the Fritzes, the capture of German armored vehicles due to the relaxation of the sentries. Then this German armored vehicle organically entered the usual tank column of the Germans, distributed over it and at night, point-blank shot part of the Hans. Amazing facts, almost on the verge of fiction. And we are ashamed of our memory and praise Private Ryan. Shame.

This was imposed on us by the damned democrats of this ordinary Rain. But there is only one conclusion that the most important thing is communication and management. Therefore, we lost at the beginning of our struggle. It is a pity that as a result of times and outrage, we have killed so many lives.

[andrew42]

Communication and management. You can’t say more precisely.

[Stas57]

Quote: valokordin

This was imposed on us by the damned democrats of this ordinary Rain

Of course they are to blame, the Americans, who made a film for themselves and for themselves, it’s not us and all sorts of Mikhalkov-barin-patriots who are not to blame for not having shot this.
Spielberg, a reptile, did not make a film about Dubno, the Battle of Smolensk or Stalingrad.


but I’m reading comments and I see people who in 2015 stupidly announce that they heard it for the first time! They were probably kept in special camps, with a ban on reading books and the Internet.

[Gray 43]

I had to read about this battle, albeit very briefly. Some of the authors came across a good phrase about that difficult time, that the history of the war will begin to be written from the time when ours drive the Germans back, and these defeats of the initial period will try to forget, to be silent. There was this battle near Dubno, there was a tank near Rassenyay, there was a hero-artilleryman Sirotinin, there were border guards - everything, as they could, detained the "blitzkrieg". Because of them, and other known and unknown heroes, the dates of the German offensive crackled like rotten sacking.

[Penetrator]

"The tragic-scale encirclement and retreat on the Western Front was at the same time a chain of defenses, striking in their stubbornness, which, like sand, now in grains, now in mountains falling under the wheels, did not allow the German armored skating rink to roll to Moscow on the move" ( K. Simonov "The Living and the Dead")
Die, you can’t say better! But we know only part of the tragic history of retreats and boilers of the 41st. At a strategic level, the overall picture is clear. And here, how specific fighters and commanders perished, trying to contain the onslaught of the Nazis and knowing that it was impossible to survive in these battles and it was impossible to retreat too .. Eternal glory!

[Ulan]

That's what you need to make films about. Where is Private Ryan. And we still do not have true films about the beginning of the war - the summer of 41. The film "War in the West" can hardly be considered such. So far, in my opinion, the best are "The Living and the Dead" and "The Dnieper Border". But it shows private operations, and not the general course of events at the beginning of the war. It is necessary to shoot something like Ozerov's films at a new level.

[estixnumx]

To the listed good films, in my opinion, the following films should be added "Blockade" (as close as possible to the book, only for this), "They were known by sight", "Hot snow", "Torpedo bombers", "Chronicle of a dive bomber", "White explosion" (one of the few about the war in the mountains, though for me Gurchenko does not look there), "Autumn 44" -Moment of Truth just for being removed but the book is better. And from the bourgeois "Steiner: The Iron Cross", the rest is not worth watching.

[Ulan]

I agree. But I only talked about films about the initial period of the war, summer-fall of the 41st.

[parusnik]

In the summer of 1941, losing battles, we have already won ..

[shasherin_pavel]

Respect to the author, but about the 8 ~ 8 anti-aircraft guns, as they were called in the West, since they measure caliber in cm, you need to read the memoirs of German soldiers, then the author would know that the anti-aircraft guns of this caliber were single in the Wehrmacht, and brought them to the front by the end of the battle. They shot them almost from near Berlin, as a German writes in his book, and before that the Germans used our 76 mm F-22, which they later bore under new shells, and the size of these shells with a caliber of 76 mm is simply amazing. Note to the author, the T-II-Lux (Lynx) tank appeared at the front a little later, closer to the year 42. The T-34 is also questionable in time, since it is obvious that the tank is minimally simplified when it is released, it doesn’t even have wings over the tracks, nor does it have a ZIP box on the side walls, so the release of this tank can be attributed to the Stalingrad Tractor Plant by the spring of 1942, when the Germans moved from Voronezh to Stalingrad, but until the time when the problem of rubber on the skating rinks appeared, when they began to produce inner skating rinks with internal cushioning, without bandages. By the way, on the mountain in Sevastopol is a monument to the T-34, which refers precisely to such a party.

[Monastic]

To whom it is interesting in more detail - A. Isaev’s book was published.

[Predator]

What can I say, the soldiers are forced to commit heroism and feat because of ..... "smart" command. In this episode of the Second World War there are more questions to the front command and to the chief of the General Staff Zhukov. Was this counterattack on June 23, 1941 so necessary ?!
Recall the deployment of MK on 22.06.1941/300/400. in Ukraine. Many corps had to march XNUMX-XNUMX km, the consequence was huge non-combat losses, lack of motorized infantry and artillery (since there is no transport), complete absence of rear services (fuel and ammunition, repair units), for the same reason - transport Consequently, the combat readiness of the MK decreased significantly. Besides the tanks there was practically nothing, and they reached the enemy having lost on the march from one third to half of the combat strength of the tank units, mainly due to equipment breakdowns.
It’s even more interesting, as if the command of the Red Army completely lost all its knowledge and intelligence. To coordinate such a large-scale counterattack was simply not for anyone who was the head of the General Staff in Ukraine, the people's commissar in Belarus, deputy chief of the General Staff there. On 23.06.1941, no one in the NPO , neither in the General Staff, nor in the headquarters of the fronts, he knew the real situation on the fronts, in what directions, with what forces the enemy strikes. Without this knowledge, directive 2 became simply criminal. In all provisions (in terms of cover the same thing), it was stated that the use of large units (SK, MK, army) in operations without proper training (reconnaissance, concentration, air cover, rear training), these are just the basics that everyone knows about. So how can one explain the validity of these actions ?!
Well, the result was not long in coming, what happened could not but happen, the defeat of MK. MK strikes on the move, without reconnaissance, without concentration, with tanks alone, not coinciding in time and in diverging directions, without a single plan. And any Wehrmacht-101 division is a PTO gun, 200 anti-tank missiles and this is without attached and field artillery. the number of anti-tank missiles is almost equal to the staff of the tank division MK And all this is included in a very large topic Border battles and the preparation of the Red Army for war.

[ABM]

But somehow you got exactly where you need to! in Ukraine, there was only one enemy tank group, read the article - by its communications, and hit, i.e. did everything right

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Predator

But was this counterattack needed on June 23, 1941 ?!
Recall the deployment of MK on 22.06.1941/300/400. in Ukraine. Many corps had to march XNUMX-XNUMX km, the consequence was huge non-combat losses, lack of motorized infantry and artillery (since there is no transport), complete absence of rear services (fuel and ammunition, repair units), for the same reason - transport . Consequently, the combat readiness of MK decreased significantly

A counterattack was needed. And if it was carried out according to the order of Zhukov, then it could be successful.

The problem is that the RKKA-41 was still a freeman during the Civil War. The front commander, for example, could cancel the order of the NGSH and start a regrouping of forces for his own strike. The result is a lost day, extra marches and pulling up the forces of the Germans. The army commanders did not lag behind - for example, Muzychenko not only actually sabotaged the order for the allocation of "his" mechanized corps for the front-line operation, but also managed to detain parts of the "foreign" mechanized corps passing through the strip of his army.

As a result, the theoretically saving counterattack of two fists from mechanized corps "behind the back" of the enemy's mech units that had broken through, cutting off their communications, turned into cutting off strike groups, multi-hundred-kilometer marches, bringing formations into battle from the march in parts and gnawing through the defense of the approaching German infantry.

[Walking]

Quote: Predator

What can I say, the soldiers are forced to commit heroism and feat because of ..... "smart" command. In this episode of the Second World War there are more questions to the front command and to the chief of the General Staff Zhukov. Was this counterattack on June 23, 1941 so necessary ?!

It’s easy to talk about it now knowing what and where and how everything happened.

[washi]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: Predator

But was this counterattack needed on June 23, 1941 ?!
Recall the deployment of MK on 22.06.1941/300/400. in Ukraine. Many corps had to march XNUMX-XNUMX km, the consequence was huge non-combat losses, lack of motorized infantry and artillery (since there is no transport), complete absence of rear services (fuel and ammunition, repair units), for the same reason - transport . Consequently, the combat readiness of MK decreased significantly

A counterattack was needed. And if it was carried out according to the order of Zhukov, then it could be successful.

The problem is that the RKKA-41 was still a freeman during the Civil War. The front commander, for example, could cancel the order of the NGSH and start a regrouping of forces for his own strike. The result is a lost day, extra marches and pulling up the forces of the Germans. The army commanders did not lag behind - for example, Muzychenko not only actually sabotaged the order for the allocation of "his" mechanized corps for the front-line operation, but also managed to detain parts of the "foreign" mechanized corps passing through the strip of his army.

As a result, the theoretically saving counterattack of two fists from mechanized corps "behind the back" of the enemy's mech units that had broken through, cutting off their communications, turned into cutting off strike groups, multi-hundred-kilometer marches, bringing formations into battle from the march in parts and gnawing through the defense of the approaching German infantry.

The problem is the lack of communication (control), lack of education l / s, idiotic staffs of formations and units and their incompleteness.
More V.I. Lenin wrote: Better less, but better. And the disadvantages (followers of Trotsky and Tukhachevsky) wanted the masses, in which they were helped by the designers of the VT, because for every car they dripped into the account.
IVS could not cover EVERYTHING. GDP also does not have time to follow all.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vasya

The problem is the lack of communication (control)

In order to cure this disease, the USSR needed at least 3 peaceful years. Because its reason lay in the low level of education of the bulk of the population and, accordingly, in the absence of technically competent personnel.
In order not to be unfounded: in the spring of 1941, 2/3 of the soldiers and sergeants in the army elite - BTV - had education from 3 to 7 classes. 10-15% - less than 3 or did not have at all. A competent conscript was to go in 1942.
And what is the worst thing - educated people were needed by everyone. In parallel with the army, the Air Force was growing rapidly, washing out competent personnel from the ground forces.
Plus, there was industry holding onto its teeth with its teeth. At Training Camp 41, for example, it was forbidden to call:

... workers and engineering workers:
Commissariats of aviation, shipbuilding, chemical industry, ammunition, weapons and communications;
Kharkov plants No. 183 and No. 75, Leningrad No. 174, Moscow No. 37, Kharkov and Stalingrad Tractor Plants, bearing plants GP31 and GP32;
the fuselage workshop of the Kharkov plant "Hammer and Sickle" of the People's Commissariat for Transport;
Kirov plant of the People’s Commissariat of Mash;
NII-20, a special workshop of small series of the Electrosignal plant, factories Nos. 197 and 203 of the People's Commissariat of Electro-Industry;
Kolchuginsky plant them. Ordzhonikidze, Leningrad factories "Red Vyborzhets" and them. Voroshilov Narkomtsvetmet, as well as all tractor drivers, combine harvesters for the spring sowing and harvesting campaigns.

Quote: Vasya

unlearned l \ s,

No time. There is no teaching technique. There are no "teachers" - junior commanders. There are not even polygons. Because the army has grown 3 times in 6 years and completely changed the manning system.
And there was no alternative - the Red Army according to the standards of arr. 38 Wehrmacht would crush clearly according to plan.
By the way, the same problems were overseas. And the United States, with its education and industry, took 3 years to issue the first fifty more or less put together divisions.

Quote: Vasya

idiotic states of formations and units and their understaffing

We did not have other states. The same BTVs diligently tried to cosplay the Panzerwaffe, based on information obtained from open sources, as well as from the unbridled fantasies of our intelligence. In short, this is how to build a racing car, having in the sources a third copy of a muddy newspaper photograph and the tales of a not-so-sober neighbor who once heard a passing car.

[creak]

Quote: Alexey RA

The front commander, for example, could cancel the order of the NGS and start a regrouping of forces for his own strike

Interestingly, then, for example, then, for example, Kyroponos, the Commander of the South-Western Front several times requested the withdrawal of Front troops to the left bank of the Dnieper, when it was already clear that a catastrophe was coming - but who received a categorical order not to do this, for some reason did not ignore this order ... .. What happened as a result is already well-known - do not confuse the Second World War and the civilian of the times of the Civil War ... For obeying the order of the Stavka, not a single confrontation would have lasted for a day with all the sad consequences for it ..

[Alexey RA]

Quote: ranger

Interestingly, then, for example, then, for example, Kyroponos, the Commander of the South-Western Front several times requested the withdrawal of Front troops to the left bank of the Dnieper, when it was already clear that a catastrophe was coming - but who received a categorical order not to do this, for some reason did not ignore this order ... ..

And you do not remember - what happened between June 22 and August 1941? Does the surname Pavlov not tell you anything?

Quote: ranger

For obeying the order of the Headquarters, not a single confrontation and day would have held on to his post with all the sad consequences arising for him ..

In response to the air reconnaissance data, the order of the chief of staff of the South-Western Front No. 023 dated 23.6.41 was followed. The task was assigned to the 15th mechanized corps in it:
“In view of the appearance of enemy tanks in the Berestechko area and forests west of the enemy, firmly hold the Brody area with motodivision, securing themselves from the direction of Radzekhov, Krystynopol, attack and destroy the enemy tanks and wedges in the direction of Berestechko in cooperation with Brody in the morning of 24.6.41 8th Mechanized Corps "
Fulfilling this order, the corps command took cover from the west of the 37th Panzer Division, and the 10th Panzer Division at 7.00 sent to march in the direction of Brod. To do this, you first had to move south, and then move east to Brody. The division made a 45-kilometer march, from which it was returned only at 17.00. At the starting lines of counterattack, the main part of the division returned only by dawn on June 25th. The 19th Tank Regiment received an order to return to the metro station Holoyuv only in the forest southwest of Brody. As a result, it returned to its previous position only at 20.00:25 on June 24, having completed a 25-kilometer march for June 105 and 8, without taking part in the battle. Thus, two whole days were lost due to the panic that arose due to the breakthrough of the Germans. A counterattack in the Radziechow region was directed against the flank of the German offensive. The pressure on the flank should have been and could stop him. In addition, the 15th Mechanized Corps soon arrived in the Brod area, and there were something to counter possible surprises. The return of the connections of the XNUMXth mechanized corps to the former areas of concentration also seems completely unnecessary.
(...)
The commander of the 8th mechanized corps, D. I. Ryabyshev, received the aforementioned order No. 0015 from the command of the Southwestern Front only at 9.20 a.m. on June 25 on the way to Busk. The order, as we recall, ordered the start of the offensive at 7.00:25 on June 25 from the Brody region. Ironically, the corps passed the point on the morning of June 25, located only 30-XNUMX km from the place of its concentration two days earlier.

(c) Isaev

[Alexey RA]

And the level below was also the commanders ...

When they ask the question: “Where did several hundred T-34 and KV tanks of the 4th mechanized corps disappear?” - the answer must be sought in the throwing of this formation behind the front of the 6th Army with strikes of local significance. Each of these attacks inexorably reduced the combat capabilities of the corps. The commander of the 6th Army intervened most decisively in the fate of the 8th Mechanized Corps, which was put forward for a counterattack in the strip of his army. As early as June 23, he orders the corps commander, D.I. Ryabyshev, to push the formation into the area of ​​Yavorov and Grudek Yagelonsky. I.N. Muzychenko reflexively brought the 8th mechanized corps to the front of his army, apparently planning to use it to counter the breakthroughs of German troops. The entire day of June 23 was spent on a 200-kilometer corps march to a new concentration area. What is most sad, this destroyed the construction of the troops of the South-Western Front to strike the Germans on the flank in the direction of the main strike.

[Kilo-11]

Dear Sergei "Predator", the data you provided about the TCP of "any division of the Wehrmacht" are not correct. Let's start with the fact that "any division of the Wehrmacht" is what? The tank division of the Wehrmacht / staff of 1941 / had 54 units. anti-tank guns of 37 mm and 50 mm caliber; motorized infantry division and infantry division of the Wehrmacht / staff 1941 / -75 units. anti-tank guns of 37 mm and 50 mm caliber, 81 units. You mention in your commentary the directive of the NKO of the USSR No. 2, apparently you mean the directive of the NKO No. 3 dated 22.06.41., in which the troops of the South-Western Front are tasked with keeping the enemy on the state border with Hungary, and the main forces of the front Comrade Zhukov began to execute this directive, I agree with you that Comrade G. Zhukov did not quite have control of the situation at the front, so incorrect conclusions were drawn from the situation and At the same time, the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, Comrade M. Purkaev, proposed a more correct solution in the current situation - to withdraw to the line of the old state border, organize a stable defense, regroup the front troops, and then inflict a counterattack with the forces of mechanized corps The opinion of Comrade G. Zhukov won and it turned out that it worked out. Moreover, the mechanized corps were brought into battle in parts, without infantry, without aviation support, losing their Nick is still on the march, without interaction with neighbors and between branches of the armed forces, etc. etc. Here I agree with you, the question arises, was this counterstrike in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody area really needed ?! Heroism, devotion to military duty, readiness for self-sacrifice of our soldiers and commanders, and catastrophic non-professionalism, personal ambitions a single person with the rank of "general of the army", this is how I understand the battle in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody triangle.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kilo-11

At the same time, Commander M. Purkaev, the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, proposed a more correct solution in the current situation — to withdraw to the line of the old state border, organize a stable defense, regroup front-line troops, and then launch a counterattack by forces of mechanized corps.

A mobilized army could do this. And the compounds of the border battle, with such a retreat, would be cut by the enemy’s mechanical formations and pressed against natural barriers.

Quote: Kilo-11

Moreover, mechanized corps were introduced into battle in parts, without infantry, without the support of aviation, losing their equipment even on the march, not having interaction with neighbors and between military branches, etc. etc.

About marches - not everything is so simple. According to Zhukov's original plan, there were no 800-km marches. This is the "merit" of the front command, which began to change the plan of the NGSH, changing the areas of concentration for the MK.

Quote: Kilo-11

Here I agree with you, the question arises, did this counterattack in the area of ​​Dubno-Lutsk-Brody really be needed ?!

Incorrect formulation of the question. The correct question is: when was this counterattack needed?
If the front command had not begun to make its own corrections, but acted according to the plan of the National High School, the MK would have time to concentrate, collect equipment and reconnaissance, and the enemy would not have time to pull up the infantry.
And, by the way, about "losing equipment on the march" - maybe it was necessary to organize the march normally? Here is an example of two divisions of the same MK:

The length of the route of the same 24th Panzer Division was 160 kilometers, which it overcame in 49 hours. During the march, the division lost for technical reasons another 55 tanks out of 232. The 21st Panzer Division, located north of Leningrad, made a march of shorter length and more organized. All lagging equipment was immediately repaired by a specially designed closure service.

At the same time, the materiel of 21 TD was a "junkman's dream" - the basis of the tank fleet was made up of vehicles manufactured in 1931-1936. The division even had two-turret T-26s. The tanks produced after 1937 were received by the division "with traces of combat damage and welded holes."

[Kilo-11]

In the direct subordination of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front there were 3 rifle corps / 31st, 36,37 /, which were precisely deployed in the area of ​​the old state border in the direction of the breakthrough of the 1st tank group, on their basis the headquarters of the Southwestern Front proposed However, Comrade G. Zhukov, by his willful decision, also threw these corps into a counteroffensive in the direction of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody. So there were no forces and means to organize a stable defense. 800 km of marches were not, that's right, were 200-400 km, it was at such a distance that the mechanized corps were from the breakthrough area of ​​the 1st tank group. What is the fault of the front headquarters, it is not clear ?! With the beginning of hostilities, the commanders of the mechanized corps opened secret packages and began to act in accordance with the directives, which were in these packages. Yes, the directives were from the headquarters of the Kiev OVO, but that the headquarters of the Kiev OVO developed its directives in isolation from the General Staff of the Red Army? Of course not. and which did not change, the front troops acted in accordance with previously developed plans and directives, but in the evening of 22.06.41/3/31. NCO directive # 36,37 appears, which was signed by comrade S. Timoshenko and comrade G. Zhukov, and it was this directive that made a complete change in the actions of the front troops. By the way, comrade G. Zhukov ordered the front commander, Comrade M. Kirponos, to apply counterstrike by forces of mechanized corps, which were "at hand", without waiting for the approach of the XNUMXst, XNUMX rifle corps. So the commander and headquarters of the Southwestern Front changed, in addition to planning to organize a stable defense along the old line of the state border. You put the question, when was the counterstrike needed, exactly when? From this it follows, at another time, more prepared, thoughtful and already in another place, so I consider my question to be quite correct.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kilo-11

Directly subordinate to the headquarters of the South-Western Front there were 3 rifle corps / 31st, 36,37 /, which were just deployed in the area of ​​the old state border in the direction of the breakthrough of the 1st tank group, on their basis the headquarters of the South-Western Front proposed to organize defense at the aforementioned line. However, Comrade G. Zhukov, by his willful decision, threw these corps into a counterattack on the direction of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody. So there were forces and means for organizing sustainable defense.

To build a barrier from mobility rifle divisions on the way to TGr? Moreover, from non-mobilized SD?
Do you remember the defense line? Now guess - where in 2 days TGr will pass to build the defense there. Just guess, since intelligence brings 50/50 truth and fiction. And do not forget that the speed of the march sd is 3-5 km / h. No more development - artillery on agricultural tractors will not.

Quote: Kilo-11

By the way, Comrade G. Zhukov gave the order to the front commander, Comrade M. Kirponos, to launch a counterattack with the forces of the mechanized corps, which were "at hand", without waiting for the approach of the 31st, 36,37 rifle corps. So the commander and headquarters of the South-West front, except that he was going to organize a stable defense along the old line of the state border.

The front headquarters spent 2 days regrouping the forces and canceling this regrouping to reflect the local German breakthrough. Missing time in order to cut the neck of the main breakthrough of the Germans.

[falcon]

Quote: Predator

In this episode of the Second World War, there are more questions to the front command and to the chief of the General Staff Zhukov. Was this counterattack needed on June 23, 1941 ?!

Definitely needed. This is the corporate identity of G.K.Zhukov. In such
in the vein, the Japanese were defeated at Khalkhin Gol,
stabilized front near Leningrad. Defense
wars are not won. Understand the simple thing is the country
before the war she gave the army everything she could. And leadership
reasonably believed that the troops of the Red Army, deployed
in the western districts, they will be able to stop the aggressor. AND
the method, personally, I know only one - the application of counterattack.

Quote: Predator

Many corps had to march 300-400 km, the result - huge non-combat losses, lack of motorized infantry and artillery (since there is no transport), complete absence of rear areas (fuel and ammunition, repair units)

Was Zhukov supposed to deal with this in the corps and armies? Recall the first job title
commanders and chiefs is maintaining in charge
parts, connections, etc. constant b / g, and
in the combat zone, full H / G (i.e., readiness
ensure the execution of the received combat order). By
more, in the states and corps and armies were acc.
combat and logistical support services. I recall the famous
the phrase I.V. Stalin - "Do I have to remind my heart,
to make it beat? "
P.S. There is a saying - the team plays like
allows the opponent to play. In 1941 (and in 1942)
painfully strong, trained, the enemy was organized,
great honor and glory to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army.
in such counterattacks, in the brutal defenses of 1941.
the Soviet Army was born, which reached Berlin.

[Predator]

Dear Falcon, It’s not necessary to shield Zhukov’s NGSH. How could you not know that the transport (automobile and tractor) will go to MK only by mobilization? That he did not know that ALL new tanks have a motor life of 50 hours and every 10 requires maintenance?! What did not know that the MK does not have a service for repair and evacuation of equipment? What spare parts are NOT even in warehouses?
That he does not know the situation, does not know where and how much power the enemy has, that there is no time to concentrate and prepare, motorized rifle units are stomped on foot, artillery remained in the places of deployment, they didn’t remember aviation at all, not to mention the provision of fuel and shells? Wehrmacht’s high mobility, it will quickly transfer its mobile units to the place of counterattack and not just tanks, but the entire motorized infantry complex, artillery and aviation?! How, instead of hitting the flanks, MK got involved in frontal battles?! And why did the MK in general end up in 200-300 km from the first echelon of cover and they had to rush like stung FIGs knows where? If the NGS did not know the situation, then the comcor did not know what was going on. Who will support them, who are the neighbors, what are their tasks, about the interaction ..... it’s only to shrug your hands. And with such an organization, head-on to the shock force .... in parts, not a single corps at the same time didn’t join the battle with their own forces. And many MK commanders were categorically against this madness, but their ban they made you flax. And you say that Zhukov was not to blame, he was there and could put things in order. Yes, and not because he was in a hurry because thanks to him and Tymoshenko the Germans slipped 60 km in a day and broke through the defense of the first echelon of cover, which they pulled in a thread with a defense front of 30 km per division?

[falcon]

Quote: Predator

And you say that Zhukov is not guilty of this, he was there and could restore proper order.

I think neither Zhukov nor anyone else per day, in those
the conditions did not have the opportunity to restore order.
In fact, maintaining order in the troops of the Southwestern Front is the direct responsibility of the command
Southwest Federal District. Plan Front Operation Details
(including organize support, interaction
units and associations of the front) - a direct task
The headquarters of the front, and not G.K.Zhukova. Here we come to
question- did you need a counterattack in those conditions?
I think yes! And what alternatives will you voice?
- Just drape to the Dnieper, hoping to gain a foothold there?
So you write yourself -

Quote: Predator

with high mobility of the Wehrmacht, it will quickly transfer its mobile connections

That is, the Germans would be faster at the Dnieper.
- Go all the front to the defense? So defense is not
less difficult type of battle than counteroffensive. And in
conditions of partial loss of command and control
The command of the SWF, the outcome was obvious.
You analyze the events of 1941. from the position of that level
operational art, which the Soviet military commander
nicks reached by 1944-1945 and on the understanding of which
Soviet military school built.
You list errors and miscalculations absolutely correctly
June 1941, but do not want to admit that they were
systemic and objective. Well, it couldn’t be front-line and
army command to correctly plan the operation, so that now, abandon the offensive,
what kind of battle? Nothing, over time, learned, and more
like! We didn’t have another alternative to the Red Army in 1941,
it appeared only in 1943, after Stalingrad. AND
appeared precisely because v41-42g.g. counterattacked at the slightest opportunity, on the teeth,
with a quarter of ammunition.

[Kilo-11]

With this "corporate style" comrade G. Zhukov ruined the forces and means of 5 mechanized corps. With this "corporate style" comrade G. Zhukov, for example, destroyed the troops of the Western Front during the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation in January-April 1942. Comrade G. Zhukov should not "do this in corps and armies ...", I remind you in the summer of 1941 as chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, then in that case, what did Comrade G. Zhukov do at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, where interferes in the work of the front commander and headquarters? Probably it is obvious where the chief of the General Staff should be and what he should be doing.

[falcon]

Quote: Kilo-11

Comrade G. Zhukov ruined the forces and means of 5 mechanized corps with this "corporate style". For example, Comrade G. Zhukov ruined the troops of the Western Front during the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation in January-April 1942 with this "corporate style".

I don’t think your scuffing is appropriate when discussing
this topic. But it’s good that they didn’t mention
"buried in corpses". History can, of course, be studied
according to the publications of the magazine "Ogonyok" for 1989-1990,
but it will be an alternative story.
Now, essentially your comment.

Quote: Kilo-11

Since Comrade G. Zhukov should not "do this in corps and armies ..."

If you read carefully, it was a question about mat.
providing corps and armies of the SWF. It really
should be engaged not in Zhukov, but in the corresponding corps service
and front (in the 9th MK this issue, by the way, was resolved).

Quote: Kilo-11

then in that case, what did Comrade G. Zhukov do at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, where he intervenes in the work of the commander and the headquarters of the front

I answer - I arrived to personally get acquainted with the situation
in place, because then another way to do this was
impossible (by the way, arrived not on his own initiative!)
If you don’t know, a similar practice existed.
until 1944 On, but the Front Headquarters Operations Division is responsible for the development of details of the frontal operation (on
SWF was headed by I.Kh. Bagramyan), and not by Comrade Zhukov at all.

Quote: Kilo-11

It is probably obvious where the chief of the General Staff should be located and what he should do.

That is, you sincerely believe that G.K. Zhukov
arrived at the SWF in "AWOL"?
Have you ever heard of Vasilevsky and Antonov?

[tokens2]

What can I say, the soldiers are forced to commit heroism and feat because of ..... "smart" command. In this episode of the Second World War there are more questions to the front command and to the chief of the General Staff Zhukov. Was this counterattack on June 23, 1941 so necessary ?!

And the answer is simple.
Or roll "wheels" to the west. Or roll ... to the east, retreating.
While retreating, the tanks will be lost no less than with a counterattack. With an impact on the enemy equal to 0.
W \ D, to the eyeballs, were occupied with other needs with the outbreak of war. The air was in the hands of the Luftwaffe. What else ... oh yes ... the evacuation of industry. Brilliant. Predicted before the war.

In this episode of the Second World War, there are more questions to the front command and to the chief of the General Staff Zhukov.

Or maybe the question is posed broader? And even higher? Weak?
For example, to Comrade Stalin?
Why was it not disbanded! Yes, yes, in fact, the tank ballast of cars with low engine life and is not mothballed for favorable future use? Where is the mobilization of motor vehicles before the war?
We needed much smaller groupings, vis-à-vis the German TGruppam. With 100% saturation with everything that can be "rolled". Without waiting for mobilization.

On June 23.06.1941, XNUMX, neither in the NPO, nor in the General Staff, nor in the headquarters of the fronts knew the real situation on the fronts, in what directions, by what forces the enemy strikes.

Initially, it was known where their own troops were. And how the enemy will "close" them ... you don't need to be a visionary for that.
Beetles villain - fullness.

[Ulan]

Ofiget. Is this Comrade Stalin had to solve all these issues? Unconservation, disband, etc.? He has nothing more to do? And why then are GSh and NCOs needed with all their departments?

[Cap.Morgan]

How is aviation to knock out columns of tanks.
The Popular Mechanics website has been discussing the article Weapon of Victory From a grenade to a fighter for several years. It proved that getting into the tank was very difficult, air guns did not take armor.
To knock out one tank, an attack was necessary by the squadron.

[dzvero]

Knocked out, unfortunately. It is difficult to get into the tank, but do not forget that in the 41st there were mainly BTs and T-26s with "bulletproof" or "anti-fragmentation", and not with anti-shell armor like the T-34 and KV. A close explosion of an aerial bomb was enough for them, and machine-gun fire could probably set fire to gasoline. Later experiments showed that even for heavy tanks such as T-34, KV, T-IV and Tiger, a close (up to 5 m) rupture of the FAB-100 leads to breakdowns of the tank's mechanisms, although the armor is not pierced. You don't even need to talk about the T-26.
As a result, the tank could be repaired, but since the battlefield in the 41st remained with the Germans, all damaged vehicles fell into irreparable losses.

[Forest]

The explosion of 250-kg bombs at a distance of 10 m tore the armor of the BT and T-26. And when thousands of planes go sunset after sunset all day long - hundreds of tanks burned.

[cth; fyn]

Or one bomber and 500 kg bombs will tear to pieces even square, even if it falls 20 meters from the car.

[Alex]

Quote: Cap.Morgan

How is aviation to knock out columns of tanks.

To knock out one tank, an attack was necessary by the squadron.

To damage a tank, especially a light one, there is absolutely no need to destroy it. Damage to the chassis, which requires only three to four hours of repair, completely uncritical in peacetime, becomes fatal in the conditions of a march and oncoming battle, as in the battle of Dubno.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alex

To damage a tank, especially a light one, there is absolutely no need to destroy it. Damage to the chassis, which requires only three to four hours of repair, completely uncritical in peacetime, becomes fatal in the conditions of a march and oncoming battle, as in the battle of Dubno.

Add - it’s not necessary to destroy the tanks themselves. BShU on a supply column or rembat - and the tanks get up without fuel or remain monuments along the curbs without repair.

Judging by the reports of the beginning of the war, the "Goering's chicks" especially loved our artillery. There are regular reports that the column of artillery on the march / when changing positions came under attack from aviation, lost its tractors and was unable to support the attack.

[Predator]

Well, it’s worth adding that the Wehrmacht massaged not only ground, but also air units. All aviation worked precisely in the strike group, without being distracted, and most importantly very quickly.

[Denis_469]

It's not about politics. It’s just that the battle took place in 1941 and there was no complete information about it at that time. Because it so happened that Prokhorovka officially became the largest tank battle. This is just a war. During which it is far from always possible to timely find out everything that is happening.

[Starina_hank]

It should be noted that in Soviet times, no emphasis was placed on heavy defeats in the initial period of the war, this period was described very briefly, without indicating the losses of the Red Army and defeats. More or less described: the defense of the Brest Fortress, the defense of Sevastopol, the defense of Leningrad. The initial period was gradually consecrated during the Khrushchev thaw: "The Living and the Dead", "The Cranes Are Flying", "The Ballad of a Soldier". During the period of publicity, a huge stream of different authors poured out with their own dissenting opinions, and so on. there are practically no participants in those events left, then no one can refute or confirm what has been published. Archives only. There is no official history, so to separate the "wheat from the chaff", you need to dig up mountains of springs. And it is not surprising that many have approximate information about these events.

[Denis_469]

Quote: Starina_Hank

It should be noted that in Soviet times, attention was not focused on heavy defeats in the initial period of the war

This is not true. In Soviet times, the heavy losses of the outbreak of war were not hidden. At least in the field of war at sea and the Soviet submarine fleet. Because I do not think that in the field of armored forces was hiding.

Quote: Starina_Hank

There is no official history

There is always an official story. Even now.

[Cyril7377]

In 2012, I traveled to these memorable places when I was traveling to Lviv, I thought I would definitely come and go I would worship the memory of the ancestors who had given their lives in the fight against the Nazis, did not have time Now you will not get there soon

[0000]

In the "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945." there are lines: "On July 6, the troops of the 20th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin, launched a counterstrike from the area north and west of Orsha into the flank of the troops of the 3rd tank group of the enemy. The 7th and 5th Army took part in the counterattack. the first mechanized corps, which had about 1 tanks of old types. "

About a thousand tanks, according to the same source, had the 3-I tank group of Germans. It turns out that about 2 of thousands of tanks took part in the battle from two sides.

[new communist]

They criticize Stalin that he prepared the army poorly, but we are looking at the balance of forces of our 3600 tanks against 800 German ones. What other correlation was needed, what would Stalin praise 800 for 10 000.? And the battle in Grodno showed the old Suvorov truth, they’re fighting not by number but by reduction. But glory to fighters, heroes to tankers !!!

[voyaka uh]

"managed to achieve success, in some areas dropping the enemy 25-35 kilometers.
In the evening of June 26, Soviet tankmen even took the city of Dubno with battle, from which
the Germans were forced to retreat ... to the east! "////

Is it not clear that this was a classic "Tatar-Mongol" technique of the Wehrmacht?
Retreat - simulating a retreat, engage the enemy in pursuit, and then close on the flanks,
go to the rear and complete the boiler.
This was repeated throughout 1941-42: Soviet tanks went on the counterattack, the Germans retreated, parted on the flanks and surrounded the attackers.

Only at the end of 42 did the Red Army learn to avoid such traps.

[new communist]

In general, the article is sort of crap, I do not beg the feat of our tank crews, BUT-- 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34. and 71 pieces (all - T-34), 217 heavy tanks (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), everything looks like a strange ratio of our best tanks, where would I add another bt-7 with a diesel, and the Germans did not have all the tanks were t-3 and t-4. It is a colossal advantage, and we also need to add our anti-tank guns for forty-five and 57 millimeters, and we also had anti-aircraft guns of 85 mm and 37 mm. Something is not right here, and the reasons for the defeat given by the author are unconvincing. For example, KV-2 in other episodes of the war, up to 200 rounds survived. The reason for the defeat is something else, and therefore hid this battle.

[Stas57]

The reason for the defeat is something else, and therefore hid this battle.

who was hiding? they?
Popel N.K. In a difficult time. - M.-SPb .: Terra Fantastica, 2001. 2001 - 480 p., ISBN 5-17-005626-5, 5-7921-0392-5
Rokossovsky K. K. Soldier's duty. - 5 ed. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1988, - 367 p .: 8 l, ill. - (War memoirs). Circulation 250000 copies. ISBN 5-203-00489-7
Ryabyshev D.I. The first year of the war. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1990. - 255 sec. - (War memoirs). / Literary record of V. M. Zotkin / Circulation 50000 copies. ISBN 5-203-00396-3

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

In general, the article is sort of crap, I do not beg the feat of our tank crews, BUT-- 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34. and 71 pieces (all - T-34), 217 heavy tanks (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), everything looks like a strange ratio of our best tanks, where would I add another bt-7 with a diesel, and the Germans did not have all the tanks were t-3 and t-4.

Better to see how many of these tanks reached the battlefield? How many of them had trained crews (due to the lack of diesel engines and their small resources, there were no more than 150 T-34 and KV combat training tanks in all border districts)? How many of them had fuel (10-15% of the tankers from the state and 46% of diesel fuel, even according to peacetime plans; even ordinary barrels were not enough)?
And the most interesting question - how many of the KV and T-34 had special armor-piercing shells? The answer is at 0%. According to the documents of the mechanized corps in the BBS column there are either dashes or USh - shrapnel.

Quote: New Communist

Yes, we also need to add our anti-tank guns magpies and 57 millimetry

It is better not to add 45 mm with 30 mm armor penetration from 200 meters. Unfortunately, all 45-mm AP shells produced before November 1941 worked disgustingly on the cemented armor of German tanks. And the Germans themselves, after France, built up "skins" on their tanks, even in old series.
A 57 mm was an extremely rare beast.

Quote: New Communist

and we also had anti-aircraft guns 85 mm and 37 mm

Anti-aircraft guns had their own goals. After the pogrom of the Air Force, they had enough work in air defense.
And the 85 mm PTP-41 was still small.

Quote: New Communist

For example, KV-2 in other episodes of the war, up to 200 rounds survived.

If you get to the battlefield. And if the enemy did not turn out to be something larger than 37 mm. Because it is already 50 mm conventional chamber BBS penetrated the armor KV - and according to the results of domestic shootings.

[new communist]

Better to see how many of these tanks reached the battlefield? How many of them had trained crews - and what did the tankers of the 2 year do in part? ground parade ground? the crews were trained; no need to drive a blizzard on them,
45 mm with its armor penetration of 30 mm KC from 200 meters is better not to add. Unfortunately, all 45 mm AP shells until November 1941 disgustingly worked on the cemented armor of German tanks --- and anti-tank rifles with a caliber of less than 15 mm worked fine.
Anti-aircraft guns had their own goals. After the pogrom of the Air Force, they had enough work in the air defense. - Did the Germans have enough anti-aircraft guns? And we do not.

[Stas57]

Quote: new communist

Better to see how many of these tanks reached the battlefield? How many of them had trained crews - and what did the tankers of the 2 year do in part? ground parade ground? the crews were trained; no need to drive a blizzard on them,

seriously? 34 were 2 years?
and how many were literate in 12 etc? with 1-3 classes (and this is not in the infantry!) 533 people, and where will they go?
8 TD-114 illiterate, and 1050 with 1-3 classes.
average run over in 5 etc you know which one? -to3x hours

60 mk from 70 Т34 was on conservation ... 70! Hitting = 0
3 MK, hit KV1 .... 300 meters
out of 12 mechvod 34ok only two had 6 hours of "flying" and on what they went into battle .. correctly on unknown to them KV.

exactly what parade ground

[new communist]

I agree about hitting tanks, we had it small, and practical training in the USSR army was always not enough, but that did not stop fighting, we learned quickly.
As for education, it is not a matter of education, but of a person, knowledge of the Cauchy or Lagrange theorem gives the soldier nothing. The ability to read and count is quite enough. To drive a tank or to be charging, literacy is not needed, rather health is needed. As for the gunner, I agree that he needs literacy, but there were enough literate for these positions.

[Stas57]

To drive a tank or to be charging, literacy is not needed,

True, is it possible for a driver to be illiterate?
MECHANIC! Can I not know the letters?
you burn it!

[new communist]

Not only that, my grandfather had 3 classes of education, he had a great turner, he would give a head start to any engineer, then there was a different level of education and the 3 classes of that time were equal to 10. Then they studied arithmetic thoroughly, they knew quick counting techniques, the multiplication table by the word And so on. As for the mechanics, they took tractor drivers from the collective farm into mechanics, and the USSR army itself didn’t like literate people, all the weapons were as simple as possible for a village guy, and the mechanics of the T-34 had to have strong hands to switch the gearbox rather than 10 classes of education.

[Alex]

Quote: New Communist

Not only that, my grandfather had an 3 class of education, he was a great turner, he will give odds to any engineer

Honor and praise to your grandfather, but he is most likely an exception that only confirms the general rule. The lefty, of course, was a flea shoe, but he was even in Tula alone.

then there was a different level of education and the 3 of the then class were equal to today's 10.

This is what you compare with "current"? Generation pi? then I agree completely. But the Soviet post-war - excuse me, there is simply nothing to compare. I will not arrange a discussion on this matter, the format is wrong, believe the teacher in the third generation.

the mechanics of the then T-34 had to have strong hands in order to switch the gearbox rather than the 10 education classes.

Both that, and another was not superfluous.

[new communist]

This is what you compare with "current"? Generation pi? then I agree completely. But the Soviet post-war - excuse me, there is simply nothing to compare. I will not arrange a discussion on this matter, the format is not the right one, believe the teacher in the third generation .----- about education, what do you think is the main thing, here we also learned to write with ink pens, it did not give me anything, but some girls learned to write calligraphically, now this is not, arithmetic of the 3rd grade gave the ability to count in the mind, and it is also not easy to count on the abacus, And most importantly, these 3 classes taught the boy to think and remember, now this is not. Yes, and mathematics was different then, there were no words like congruently, it was wise at the end of the 60s.

[Alex]

Michael, I don’t know how others, but it’s very difficult for me personally to follow your calculations. I do not quite understand what period you are referring to. If the pre-war, then it, of course, was beautiful (for evidence, I think, it is not necessary to go far), but it corresponded only to the level of science of the first half of the century. Post-war education, preserving the advanced system of pedagogy, could already afford to significantly expand the scientific base of secondary education. The reason is also clear: the increased complexity of production and the need for trained applicants for universities. Fountain pens are not only the calligraphy of the handwriting (although you would have seen modern student notebooks), but also fine motor skills that are directly related to the mental abilities of the child. Congruence, integral calculus, the basics of matanalysis (derivatives, extremes) and so on - all this is only a consequence of increasing the general level of knowledge of mankind. And the fact that the current victims of the Unified State Examination (CT, ZNO ...) do not have the slightest idea about elementary mathematical functions, they are not able to transform formulas, or they have such and such mysterious fields or elements - all this is the result of the Soros provocation.

So let's stay within the same time line if we want to adequately assess the events of the past.

[new communist]

Michael, I don’t know how others, but it’s very difficult for me personally to follow your calculations. I do not quite understand what period you are referring to. If the pre-war, then, of course, it was beautiful ---- The essence of my statements is as follows, the army is not fucked to blame all the failures on education. The draftee is the result of a comprehensive education. A draftee may have 2 education classes and engage in a group of OSVIAAchima in modeling bumps and know mechanics better than 10 graders. The conscript can read by syllables and this will not prevent him from orienting himself on the map, and the difference is, if I read the name of the city on the map in a second, it is in 10 seconds, and the result is the same.

[Predator]

Competent, not literate, but until June 22.06.1941, 34, the maintenance manual for T XNUMX, kv was .... SECRET! And it was stored in special departments. Crews often did not even know what to refuel it with ... gasoline! About operation the diesel engine did not know what.
And for the tank to fail, it is not necessary to break through the armor, and tracks, track rollers, etc. are enough.

[Cat man null]

Quote: Predator

.Crews often did not even know how to refuel it and refuel it ... with gasoline

And, in the end, they still won the war.

- the fact that the instruction manual for the engine was stored in the 1 department is a complete crap. I mean - I believe that it was so. But SO DO NOT DO

Quote: New Communist

This is what you compare with "current"? Generation pi? then I agree completely. But the Soviet post-war - excuse me, there is simply nothing to compare. I will not arrange a discussion on this matter, the format is not the right one, believe the teacher in the third generation .----- about education, what do you think is the main thing, here we also learned to write with ink pens, it did not give me anything, but some girls learned to write calligraphically, now this is not, arithmetic of the 3rd grade gave the ability to count in the mind, and it is also not easy to count on the abacus, And most importantly, these 3 classes taught the boy to think and remember, now this is not. Yes, and mathematics was different then, there were no words like congruently, it was wise at the end of the 60s.

New Communist, you're funny to me ..

Third generation teacher? Teacher - whom and why? Not to mathematics and not to physics explicitly (don’t mind just .. we talked - I’ll find quotes from you .. and I’ll give .. there will be little)

- How is the "questioned fascism" doing there?
“What about the imminent nuclear war?”
- What about the "unscientific nature" of nuclear winter?

New, damn it, the communist - we are waiting ... for an answer, like a nightingale of summer ..

PS:

here we learned to write with ink pens, it didn’t give me anything

But I still enjoy using an ink pen .. well, when circumstances allow, essno ..

Nostalgia, damn it ..

[new communist]

You do not understand the essence, I will explain that education is not so important as our defeat is written about and blamed on. For 90% of army equipment, 3 classes are more than enough, then when they write about education they forget that OSVIakhim and a bunch of different circles such as modeling, radio and so on were developed in the Stalin USSR. I write the main person and not education. A guy who goes to a chess club and got, even an CCM, and graduated from 3rd grade, thinks better than a regular ten-year student, For example, today if something flew in a Porsche cayenne or Nissan Murano motor, even drivers with a higher technical education do not get into the motor, but a car repairman is repairing them for which there are 10 maximum classes, and of which 3 classes he swelled. The same with the T-34, what kind of electrics are there? a battery, a starter and alternator, and a pair of light bulbs. There, the work is mainly to unscrew the physical nut, replace the truck, flush the filter-3 class is more than enough.

[new communist]

How is the "questioned fascism" doing there?
“What about the imminent nuclear war?”
- What about the "unscientific nature" of the nuclear winter? On the first two questions, everything is going normally, by 2020 it will be, about the nuclear winter - The hysteria of the 80s about the "nuclear winter" was not scientific, but political. Reagan and Thatcher created a hoax

Considering the history of the “nuclear winter” concept, we should separate our scientific knowledge about climate and weather models, the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion and their impact on inanimate and living nature, the structure of modern nuclear warheads and the practice of their application from the mass of popular “horror stories” that exploit mankind’s fear of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear and thermonuclear munitions are by far the most destructive element in the general arsenal of mankind, but the infernal, apocalyptic role that popular and fiction ascribes to them is completely incomparable with the real destructive impact that nuclear weapons can inflict on human civilization and, therefore, more, our entire planet .--- a very interesting article in KM.

[Cat man null]

Quote: New Communist

everything is going well

Damn .. remove this miracle from the scene already ..

there are no words except for mom.

[new communist]

If someone else's opinion does not coincide with yours, this does not mean that it is not true.

[Alex]

Quote: Cat Man Null

Third generation teacher? Teacher - whom and why? Not to mathematics and not to physics explicitly (don’t mind just .. we talked - I’ll find quotes from you .. and I’ll give .. there will be little)

Some of them are secondary school students (USSR, Ukraine, Belarus - this is in chronology) and students of the Faculty of Chemistry of Kiev University. T.G. Shevchenko.
What - at school - chemistry, at the university - quantum chemistry.
I don’t remember about personal communication with you, but maybe I forgot it.
I personally have not the slightest relation to the list of questions that you have cited.
And now I write with a fountain pen with pleasure (except for a school journal), which causes the genuine delight of today's students: they have not even seen such a miracle alive.

[new communist]

And where have I ever said that I am a teacher?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: new communist

To drive a tank or to be charging, literacy is not needed, rather health is needed.

Are you serious or trolling?
Do you even remember how the word mechanical driver is deciphered? Driver mechanic! Mechanic!

The driver is subordinate to the tank commander, directly controls the movement of the tank and is responsible for its full readiness for movement. He must:
a) excellent knowledge of the material part of the tank and be able to drive it in various conditions;
b) keep the tank and all its components clean, operational and always ready for movement;
c) contain the required set of tools and spare parts of the tank in full kit and serviceability;
d) fill the tank with fuel and lubricants in a timely manner;
d) keep track of consumable fuels and lubricants and spare parts of the tank;
f) timely inspections, prevent breakdowns and malfunctions, eliminate them and report to the tank commander;
g) personally participate in the repair of the tank;
h) keep a record of the operation of the tank engine (in hours).

32. On a trip, the driver is required to:
a) to study the route;
b) lead the tank according to the instructions of the tank commander, taking into account the terrain and striving to maximize its preservation for battle;
c) monitor the operation of the engine, transmission, chassis and control devices;
d) conduct surveillance forward, receive signals and commands from the tank in front, and report to the tank commander about everything that has been noticed;
e) observe the discipline of the march, distances and intervals, keep to the right side of the road;
e) to leave the tank only upon the command of the tank commander;
g) at stops, inspect the materiel and check for fuel, oil and water temperatures, and report to the tank commander on the results of the inspection, immediately eliminating any noticed malfunctions.

Before the battle, the driver is required to:
a) know the task of the platoon and company, determine the nature of the impending obstacles and outline ways to overcome them;
b) finally make sure that the tank is ready for battle;
c) at every opportunity to refuel the tank with fuels and lubricants:
d) to study the signals established for communication with the platoon commander and units of other military branches.

In battle, the driver is required to:
a) lead the tank at the indicated combat rate, observe distances and intervals, apply to the terrain and provide the best conditions for firing;
b) continuously scout the battlefield, report to the tank commander about everything that has been noticed, about favorable places for firing and about its results;
c) closely monitor the terrain lying ahead in order to timely detect natural and artificial obstacles: swamps, minefields, etc., quickly find ways and means to bypass and overcome them;
d) in case of a tank accident on the battlefield, take measures to quickly restore it, despite the danger.

After the battle, the driver is required to:
a) inspect the tank, establish its technical condition, determine methods of troubleshooting, report to the tank commander about all the problems noted and quickly bring the tank to full combat readiness;
b) determine the presence of fuels and lubricants and take measures to immediately refuel the tank.

The loader has an equally long list of duties - he is also responsible for the serviceability of the tank’s armament.

[new communist]

The driver is subordinate to the tank commander, directly controls the movement of the tank and is responsible for its full readiness for movement. --And you know how the then-mechanic drove the tank, a blow with a boot on the left shoulder, on the left, a hit on the top of the head and so on, this is life and your instructions are a fairy tale.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

and you know how the then-mechanic drove the tank, a hit with a boot on the left shoulder, on the left, a hit on the top of the head and so on, this is life

So what? This only indicates the absence of a normal connection inside the tank. And not about the level of education of the driver.
By the way, the "foot drive" of the mechanic was practiced in almost all armies where the mechanic was within the "foot reach" of the commander. For it is easier and leaves less room for error (I did not hear the command at TPU, I misunderstood it, and instead of turning to the PTP, I substituted the board for her).

Quote: New Communist

and your instructions are a fairy tale.

Sumptuously. And who do you think should do all of the above?
Or in your reality, tanks drive when they are malfunctioning and without fuel? Or does every malfunctioning / wrecked tank instantly materialize a brigade of Rembat?

Life is just that in the event of a breakdown / combat damage, the driver should primarily rely on himself. A tank that is behind the convoy or frozen on the battlefield is a target. And the faster the driver finds the cause of the breakdown and the way to eliminate it, the longer he and his crew will live.

[new communist]

This is true, but for this primary education it’s enough, and they learn to repair without any books, an old mechanic gives a task and then controls, sometimes shows, learned quickly, the tanks were fragile.

[Stas57]

Quote: New Communist

This is true, but for this primary education it’s enough, and they learn to repair without any books, an old mechanic gives a task and then controls, sometimes shows, learned quickly, the tanks were fragile.

well, we saw a wonderful result of this "teaching".

[new communist]

and those who graduated from 10 classes with a sin in half think you will have a different result?

[Stas57]

of course
Bismarck said war is not won by generals — school teachers win war.

It is easier for an educated person to say the purpose of devices, teach them how to read a map, and explain how not to burn a friction clutch.
An educated person can become a mechanic, radio operator, gunner, or tank commander.
There is such an understanding, interchangeability.

and ignoramus what can? To teach walkie-talkies - time, cipher-notepads, yes he can not read! a card? - he can't read! corrections for the sight? -yes he can’t count!
how he can’t count and write clearly
- record the consumption of fuels and lubricants and spare parts of the tank;
- record the operation of the tank engine (in hours).
how he can’t read the map and can study the route;
how, without knowing the map, he will drive the tank through difficult terrain, calculate the carrying capacity of the bridge,
How will he calculate the load and time of maintenance of the cyclone?
How will he fight if he does not know tactics?
even in wartime they taught 6-8 months, and this in the presence of already existing school luggage.
etc.

A Cooper writes here
Why did I go to the tank school? It must be said that when I was in high school, even for us schoolchildren, the inevitability of a war with fascist Germany was obvious. Therefore, I connected my future with the Red Army. In addition, my uncle, who was then an officer, in the 39 year told me: “Sasha, you are finishing ten years. I advise you to go to school. War cannot be avoided, it’s better to be a commander - you can do more, because you’ll be better trained. ” These words played a role in the decision, and I entered one of the best schools - Ulyanovsk Tank.

[new communist]

and ignoramus what can? To teach walkie-talkies - time, cipher-notepads, yes he can not read! a card? - he can't read! corrections for the sight? —yes he can’t count! --- stupidity, that’s why they knew how to count and the multiplication table. Three good grades and ten stand. Khrushchev did not finish ten classes, but led the great USSR, and there are many such examples. Of course, education is a great thing, but human talent is more important.

[Stas57]

Quote: New Communist

stupidity, that’s why they knew how to count and the multiplication table knew by heart. Three good grades and ten stand. Khrushchev did not finish ten classes, but led the great USSR, and there are many such examples. Of course, education is a great thing, but human talent is more important.

once again for you, I repeat

17th mechanized corps of Major General Petrov

“The acquisition of rank and file is mainly due to the March draft of recruits (70 – 90%). Parts are recruited by 100%.
The quality of replenishment by education is up to 50% with education not higher than 4 classes.
The presence of a large number of nationalities that are poorly fluent and completely fluent in the Russian language will complicate preparation ”

4 Mechanic Corps
Uneducated —1586
Illiterate —127. ”
Parts are recruited by 100%.

24 Mechanic Corps
3 class - 3431
2 class - 2281
1 class - 2468
Illiterate - 441. "
“The recruitment by rank and file is mainly due to the March draft of recruits (70 – 90%). Parts are recruited by 100%.

that's what Katukov writes to us
“Junior command staff. The division is staffed with junior staff at 21%. Incomplete - 1910 people The cover of the incomplete OU KOVO was dressed up, and the division received the rank and file of corporals from the 10 and 15 tank. divisions. The quality of the sent corporals is very low, the latter cannot fulfill the positions of junior command personnel both in their development and in training. В number of corporals sent: 211 people non-Russian nationals poorly fluent in Russian ... illiterate 7 people., illiterate 70 people ... unfit for combat service 20 people.

speak talents?

continue
“So among those sent by 15 TD were 25 illiterate and illiterate people, 17 sick people ... This is confirmed by the commander of the 15th division, who, having received people back from us, sent them to the garrison commission, as a result of which 4 people were dismissed from the army , 7 people were admitted to the hospital, the rest were recognized as fit for non-combatant service. ”Similar cadets were sent by 10 etc., among the 47 people returned to her, there were 26 patients, illiterate, illiterate, not speaking Russian and unable to be in teaching units ... As a result of such recruitment, at the present time in the units of the division entrusted to me, there are hundreds of people in their physical condition, literacy and knowledge of the Russian language completely unsuitable for service in tank units and are actually ballast, namely:
Natives of nat. non-Russian republics 1914 people or 23.2% Of these, 236 people who do not speak Russian at all ...
Illiterate - 211 people, illiterate 622 people, with the formation of 3 – 4 groups of 3571 people."

and these people will be entrusted with almost the space technology of that time, our Soviet high-tech T34 and KV tanks.
These people who came in 100% of cases with a spring draft, do not know Russian, have 3 class, in a few months should meet the best army in Europe!

tell me about talents ...

[new communist]

The usual nagging of the commanders, how many tanks were in the division? Multiply by 3, there were enough literate ones, and the rest are building battalions, security companies, sleds, and so on. Watch documentaries about tankers before the war, everywhere are brave guys of Slavic nationality.

[Stas57]

Quote: New Communist

The usual nagging of the commanders, how many tanks were in the division? Multiply by 3, there were enough literate ones, and the rest are building battalions, security companies, sleds, and so on. Watch documentaries about tankers before the war, everywhere are brave guys of Slavic nationality.

no, it’s understandable, he’s a whiner Katukov, or Michael, a specialist in the transfer of Mehbrigad, who knows the story from docfilms.

[new communist]

4 Mechanic Corps
Uneducated —1586
Illiterate —127. ”
Parts are recruited by 100%.

24 Mechanic Corps
3 class - 3431
2 class - 2281
1 class - 2468
There are 441 illiterate people. ”- It’s fun, but literate, that there weren’t any at all in these buildings, that no one even finished eight years old, it’s not directly a mechanized corps but a USSR construction battalion.

[Stas57]

Quote: New Communist

it’s cool, but literate, that there wasn’t any at all in these buildings, that no one had even finished eight years old, it’s not directly a mechanized corps but a USSR building battalion.

no, the USSR building battalion of the 1980 sample is just MSU

but everything is simple- you do not understand the obvious thing, if 50% in technical troops illiterate, illiterate and have problems understanding Russian, then in the 3 month they are unlikely to learn how to adequately reflect the Wehrmacht tanks, which means that the division is not combat capable of 50% only in terms of its human composition, and if it adds to the problems of raw tanks, lack of cars and spare parts \ then everything falls into place

[new communist]

In my opinion, according to the article - five Soviet mechanized corps - the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd - there are 2803 tanks. Of these, 171 medium tanks (all T-34s), 217 heavy tanks (33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35 of them), and 2415 light tanks of the T-26, T- type 27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7,
That is, in FIVE mechanized corps there are 388 modern tanks, alright, let them load with 3 classes, that is, you say that in five buildings there were not 800 competent Slav recruits, I'm sorry I do not believe it.

[Cat man null]

Quote: Alexey RA

Are you serious or trolling?

Alexey RA, hammer it ..

I was glad to read the duties of the mechanic driver, once I got ... the platoon commander, but after college .. well, a jacket, that is .. and it was in the tanks ..

I spent a year explaining that there really is a jacket

[BM-13]

Quote: New Communist

To drive a tank or to be charging, literacy is not needed, rather health is needed.

Well, everyone needs health in the army, but I don’t agree with the driver’s account. He is not only a driver, he is also a person responsible for the technical condition and maintenance of the tank. It also has primary repairs and repairs in field workshops (not alone, of course). He certainly doesn’t need Cauchy’s theorem, but at least a basic knowledge of mechanics, the ability to read blueprints, and a basic knowledge of electrical equipment ... I don’t think that two or three classes will be enough here, more serious preparation is needed. And experience also does not hurt. Of course, you can get it in battle, but it will cost much more. Stalin already did more than could be expected from any other in his place, but he was not a miracle worker.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: BM-13

He certainly does not need Cauchy's theorem, but at least knowledge of the fundamentals of mechanics, the ability to read drawings, and have the basics of knowledge on electrical equipment ...

... general information on engines, their arrangement and principle of operation. To avoid the thought, say, pour gasoline into the T-34 (the real case is that 3 tanks went for decommissioning).

[new communist]

General information on engines, their arrangement and principle of operation. To avoid the thought, say, pour gas into the T-34 --- for this 10 classes are not necessary, it is enough to sort out the engine with his grandfather (him). And gasoline was not accidentally poured over the USE grader with 10 classes.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

10 classes are not necessary for this, it is enough to sort out the engine with grandfather (him).

Which engine to sort out? Diesel V-2? Or maybe a personal moped?

I think I understand what your problem is. You judge the 1941 army based on the experience of the army of the late USSR. That's just a sergeant of the late Soviet army in 1941 could calmly apply for a captain's position.

Quote: New Communist

And gasoline was not accidentally poured over the USE grader with 10 classes.

Horses mixed in a bunch of people... USE in 1941.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

- What did the 2-year tankers do in the unit? ground parade ground? the crews were trained; no need to drive a blizzard on them,

What did you do? Equipped PPD. One of the tank divisions, for example, was located in outbuildings and private houses within a radius of 50 km from headquarters. In another division, motorized rifles lodged in prison and the synagogue. The third - a year knocked out a boiler for the kitchen from the district. The remaining tank formations were envious of fierce envy, which was sitting in the Brest Fortress of the tank division. It had barracks with three-story bunks and a shooting range.

And, please tell me, how are you going to train personnel without classes, without instructions, without benefits, without training grounds? With 150 training tanks of new types in all western districts. The rest are allowed to spend no more than 10-15 hours per year. Because the engine resource is small and it is required to have a 2nd reserve engine on the tank of the combat training group. And industry supplies such engines 1 in 10 tanks.
In short, read Ulanov / Shein "Order in the tank forces" - there are quotes from documents of 1941 on the situation in the MK (including from the reports of the MK commanders for March-April 1941 with the refrain "a division of non-readiness").

Quote: New Communist

and anti-tank rifles with a caliber of less than 15 mm worked perfectly.

The BS-41 bullet of the autumn 1941 model. With the pre-war PTR bullet, tests were not passed due to too low armor penetration.

Quote: New Communist

But did the Germans have enough anti-aircraft guns? And we do not.

Once again: after the defeat of our Air Force in a border battle, anti-aircraft guns became the basis of air defense. This Germans could use for even during the assault on the UD - they had a fighter cover.

On June 22.06, we have 2630 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, 4571 76-mm anti-aircraft guns and 1370 37 mm anti-aircraft guns for the whole country. For 85 mm cannons there is 1 ammunition per barrel (158 shells), for 37 mm cannons there are 2 ammunition per barrel (390 shells).

[Ulan]

A typical superficial look of a layman. Sorry to write so, but it’s true. Using tank formations is an efficient use, it is a difficult task consisting of many factors. It is impossible to take and compare the number of tanks and gun calibrations purely mechanically, as Rezun-Suvorov does. . armor thickness, etc. Tanks are not used alone; they fight as part of formations.
In order for a tank to successfully fight, it must be technically sound, have unspent engine life, trained crews, a well-coordinated connection, a repair base, with spare parts trained and fully equipped with repair services, an evacuation service, pure equipment needed - refueling vehicles, ammunition transportation vehicles and etc. Parts of air defense, artillery, and on the traction allowing you to keep up with the march, i.e. mechanized, and so on and capable of that. Ah = ah T-34 was superior to everyone. But was it superior? For example, the L-11 gun of the first series was not very successful. Diesels in the first 2 releases, had low reliability, the control of the tank was very difficult, many lacked radio communications, not to mention the fact that most crews simply did not manage to master the tank.
So you are a complex set of tasks, trying to simplify to a primitive. Here is the T-2 and here is the T-34 against each other, and who will win.
No, dear, everything is much more complicated, and here many have correctly stated it, and you were too lazy to read it. Here and write nonsense and look for a black cat in a dark room.

[alovrov]

Only heavy HF and T-35 resisted them.

This author definitely turned down because Firstly, the t-35 armor was bulletproof, and secondly, almost all of them stupidly did not reach the battlefield.
As for the causes of the defeat, then everything is obvious - MOST casualties were non-combat losses, i.e. breakdowns, lack of fuel, zip, shells, confusion and incompetence of commanders. Combat losses occurred from a total lack of infantry, lack of combat experience, the proper organization of German units and the work of aviation. Dismantled all already hundreds of times.

[new communist]

there was enough infantry, and at the beginning of the war we had a lot of cars and we had the experience of wars (Spain, Finland, Hal Kingol) here, something else. The number of non-combat losses due to equipment breakdowns in the first week of the war ???

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

there was enough infantry, and at the beginning of the war we had cars too

Did not have. Pedestrian motorized infantry is the scourge of border mechanized corps. Motor vehicles either did not manage to arrive after mobilization. or arrived in such a state that it was often impossible to use it.

By the way, a small stroke to the state of affairs with vehicles in the Red Army - this is what the head of the GABTU Fedorenko wrote a month before the war:

The Red Army has a significant shortage of VMS trucks, type “A” and “B” workshops, and marching and charging stations.
It will not be possible to count on the lack of coverage for these machines, due to mobilization supplies from the national economy, as the experience of the Polish and Finnish campaigns has shown, since a huge number of cars will arrive at the delivery points in poor technical condition and with worn out rubber.

All stocks of tires available at the People's Commissariat of Defense were used up for the period 1939-1940.
In 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense declared 525000 sets of rubber. For the first half of 1941, a fund of 195000 sets was allocated, or 35% of the annual application.

The provision of rubber on M-1 machines is completely absent, with the result that 30-40% of M-1 machines in parts are without rubber. Gusmatik BA-20 armored cars are not fully supplied with gusmatik.

Due to the lack of severely deficient spare parts, it is not possible to timely restore machines with medium and current repairs.

"Significant shortage" is the shortage of almost 41 ZIS-000 and -5 vehicles, even according to peacetime norms. In wartime, even taking into account mobilization, the shortage of 6 tons of vehicles will grow to 3.

[new communist]

Did not have. Pedestrian motorized infantry is the scourge of border mechanized corps. Motor vehicles either did not manage to arrive after mobilization. or arrived in such a state that it was often impossible to use it --- look at the number of cars in fur cases, be surprised?
this is a shortage of almost 41 ZIS-000 and -5 vehicles, even by peacetime standards. In wartime, even taking into account mobilization, the shortage of 6 cars will increase to 3 .-- you will forget this is the first week of the war, and our territory, therefore, was enough.
Yes, and how do you imagine a car without rubber, on a brick or something, there was bald tires, but you could ride in the summer, and there were enough horses, even the suits were chosen.
For the first half of 1941 - and for the whole of 1940?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

look at the number of cars in fur cases, wonder?

I won’t be surprised. For I know, for example, that instead of the ZIS-5 and -6, they introduced GAZ-AA from the calculation of 1: 1. What this led to - see for yourself:

According to wartime states, according to vehicle brands, the division was supposed to have GAZ-AA cargo ≈ 332; freight "ZIS-5-6" ≈ 586.
In fact, on 22.6.41, they brought out: "GAZ-AA" ≈ 503; "ZIS-5-6" ≈ 297. In total, considering that one "GAZ-AA" vehicle replaces one "ZIS-5-6" (according to the settings of the Armored Directorate of the Kiev Special Military District), it would seem that with a quantitative staffing divisions with transport, things are going well. In fact, in terms of carrying capacity, the GAZ-AA machine in no way can replace the ZIS-5, and this led to the fact that a significant part of the cargo (up to 450 tons) was not lifted with the units entering the combat area , and later (with the withdrawal of parts) was destroyed.
The situation with the provision of transport (and, consequently, with the rise of the property necessary for the battle) was complicated by the fact that the material part provided for by the mobilization plan did not arrive for mobilization.
According to the mobilization plan, the assigned vehicles from the national economy were supposed to end M≈2: "GAZ-AA" ≈ 188 and "ZIS-5" ≈ 194. Not a single vehicle from this number, either in M≈2, in any of the subsequent divisions received.
Eight representatives were sent to the Shepetovka attribution machine reception center for receiving the attributed cars, but they, having been there for several days, returned without a single car, stating that the vehicles intended for our division had departed to one of the fortified areas. The same picture was obtained at the second point of reception of ascribed machines in Zolochev.
The lack of the proper number of trucks also led to the fact that during operations part of the cargo (ammunition, fuels and lubricants) fell to the ground in order to be able to lift additional cargo.
Such a situation with rapid withdrawal of units and with the pursuit of the enemy led to the abandonment of the enemy part of the cargo, stacked on the ground, as cash transport (this cargo) could not be lifted.

Quote: New Communist

--You will forget this is the first week of the war, and OUR territory, so everything was enough.

What is our territory ?! Motor transport on the mobplan came from the central districts! On the ground (especially in the reunited territories) there were simply not so many cars.

Quote: New Communist

And how do you imagine a car without rubber, on a brick or something, yes there was bald tires, but you could drive in the summer

On the blocks they stood.

Lorries and wheeled vehicles are provided with rubber at 60%; armored vehicles 100%. Of the presence of trucks, 200 cars are on pads due to lack of rubber. 70% average wear of rubber

Quote: New Communist

and for the whole of 1940?

And that rubber is gone - it was used up in 1940.

[Stas57]

Quote: New Communist

there was enough infantry, and cars at the beginning of the war we had too much experience and wars

the shortage of cars by divisions was up to 50%

[new communist]

Up to 30% is normal. What did they transport in the first week of the war? And then don’t forget the horses either, the fascists on horse-drawn vehicles had up to 50% of all transportation.

[Stas57]

What did they transport in the first week of the war

all
fuel, command personnel, shells, spare parts, wounded, food, mail, walkie-talkies, anti-aircraft guns, guns, things, rear services, etc., etc.

fascists on horse-drawn vehicles up to 50% had all traffic

in tank divisions? pour it is not necessary, yeah.
and in pd if 100% is mobilized ... yes even let it be rickshaws ....

[new communist]

fuel, command personnel, shells, spare parts, the wounded, food, mail, walkie-talkies, anti-aircraft guns, guns, things, rear lines, etc., etc. ------ the first line to the rear ?? 7 And where did the wounded in the early days? We walked towards the enemy, it’s a counter strike, not a retreat. And anti-aircraft guns where to carry to the rear or shoot at non-German tanks, ammunition, one tank set of shells are in the tank or in the garage. Not many cars need this counterattack in fact.

[Stas57]

Nach composition to the rear ??

and where is your headquarters heading?

And where are the wounded in the early days?

oh yes, these are the T2 terminators, they are not affected by enemy air raids, yes, I forgot completely.

.

And anti-aircraft guns where to carry to the rear or shoot at non-German tanks, ammunition, one tank shells are in the tank or in the garage. Not many cars need this counterattack in fact.

in what fucking garage did the boy replay in HERE?

Th is true, but by standards, even now it’s a column in 10 km

and cover anti-aircraft guns from the air, and also tanks need artillery, infantry, orderlies, headquarters, food, shoes, spare parts, shells, fuel,
Do you know how much fuel is needed per tank company for 100 km?

sorry, Mikhail, how old is that?

you would not disgrace the title of a communist with such nonsense, go down the army chtol ...

[new communist]

and where is your headquarters heading? -when counterattacking to the rear? I thought to the forefront. And if an air raid, the wounded are taken to the rear or treated on the spot, there is a medical battalion in every decent unit,

Do you know how much fuel is needed per tank company per 100 km? -how much? In modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles at 500 km one refueling, and then?
you wouldn’t disgrace the title of communist with such nonsense, if you had gone the army chtol-was in 1980, stop fooling around, let the young ones go on contract.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

And if an air raid, the wounded are taken to the rear or treated on the spot, there is a medical battalion in every decent unit,

In which the wounded are undoubtedly teleported directly from the battlefield. And also teleport from it further - after sorting and initial processing.

Quote: New Communist

In modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles at 500 km one refueling, and then?

And then at full fueling the T-34 tank passed 165-185 km. This is the test data of three serial T-34s in March 1941.
But besides the fuel, there was also oil, which the B-2 ate into three throats (it was even necessary to enter the column "power reserve").

[Predator]

You are so kidding yes?! And why should I believe you?! 30% of the state is normal?! That is. 30% of the division’s cargo remained in the places of deployment?! But apart from the cargo MK, there were specialized refueling tankers, oil tankers, and there weren’t enough of them at all. Where didn’t go at the place of deployment, and where are we going to search for barrels for 300-400 km? ! We will load fuel, we’ll be left without ammunition, etc. We will put motorized riflemen on horses, we’ll attach howitzers to them and become not MKs but red cavalrymen ..... and what kind of horse does this in time for the tank ?! It’s the same as me I’ll go by car, and you’ll run after me! And how long will you last?

[new communist]

You are so kidding yes?! And why should I believe you?! 30% of the state is normal?! That is. 30% of the division’s cargo remained in the places of deployment ?! But in addition to the cargo MK, specialized tankers and oil tankers relied on them, and they were sorely lacking at all --- you read it, the apocalyptic picture looms up, cars without tires and bricks, full of holes , troops not trained, horses at all yesterday. A pair of horses easily dragged a magpie, a tank doesn’t gallop across the field, you look at films of 42-44 years, infantry on tanks or on foot and kept up to date, so they took Berlin. If you organize the transportation correctly and 30% of the staff for the eyes is enough, do you think the divisions at the end of 41 had a regular number of cars? Yes, they did not dare to dream about him, one and a half trucks with one headlight, Leningrad supplied, and the staffing was then too bold.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: New Communist

you are revered, so an apocalyptic picture looms straight, cars without tires and on bricks, barrels full of holes, troops not trained

What else do you want from the compounds that began to form at best in the fall of 1940? And even in March 1941.

Quote: New Communist

A pair of horses easily dragged a magpie

Forty and a tank is. How will we drag a 122-mm howitzer or 152 mm? While it is necessary to ensure a march speed of 15-25 km / h.
Even before the war, Fedorenko wrote that of all the tractors existing in the Red Army, only "Komsomolets" and "Voroshilovets" are suitable for mechanical parts. But the first pull only 45 mm, and the second are distributed almost piece by piece between the gunners and repairmen.

Quote: New Communist

you look at the films of 42-44 years, the infantry in tanks or on foot and kept up, Berlin took

On foot after tanks, the infantry kept up only at Rybalko - and that was subject to the daily march being limited to 50-60 km.
And here is how they took Berlin:

For the transport of the advanced detachment of the 94th Guards. the infantry division assigned 77 Studebakers to the infantry division, and 266 Studebakers to transport the advance detachment of the 61th Infantry Division (Colonel Esipenko).

[Starina_hank]

The loss of control at all levels was caused by an elementary lack of communication at all levels of management, saboteurs and aircraft destroyed the wire lines, and there were not enough radio stations!

[new communist]

1 / 3 BT -7 had a walkie-talkie, there was a hoop around the tower, there was enough communication, the authorities did not answer.

[Stas57]

Quote: New Communist

1 / 3 BT -7 had a walkie-talkie, there was a hoop around the tower, there was enough communication, the authorities did not answer.

shaw, seriously?
71-TK1 / 3
But the main problem of communication facilities of the T-34 tanks in 1941 - 1942. there was not so much their quantity as the quality of the 71-TK-Z stations themselves. Tankers rated its capabilities as very moderate. “On the go, she took about 6 kilometers” (P. I. Kirichenko). The same opinion is expressed by other tankers. “The 71-TK-Z radio station, as I recall now, is a complex, unstable radio station. It very often failed, and it was very difficult to put it in order, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar.
==
I was engaged in the maintenance of the radio station. The communication range on the go she had about six kilometers. So the connection between the tanks was mediocre, especially considering the uneven terrain and forests, which interfered with the passage of the radio signal.
P and Kirichenko


but of course, illiterate tankers easily coped with such complex equipment and looked for bosses on it and it ....

[new communist]

but of course illiterate tankers easily coped with such complex equipment and looked for bosses on it and it ..-----. There were conditionally commander tanks and they knew how to control the station and why it was necessary to move, on the spot on the hill, what should I call it is impossible, or to attach the antenna to a birch, that the command centers are so long.

[estixnumx]

Teach the materiel of commander’s tanks, that is, there were about 10-15% of radiant tanks; for the rest, there wasn’t even a receiver; control in the battle was provided at night with a flashlight, day flags, In both cases, the khan’s commander. In addition, on tanks with a walkie-talkie there was a handrail antenna that distinguished it from the total mass of tanks making them a priority mess.

[Stas57]

thirty-four with photos on the archive site is given by dating 41-42
http://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de/archives/barchpic/search/_1435654719/?search[vie
w] = detail & search [focus] = 1
and not a word about the place of loss

[nivander]

modestly poor thing, but like Komrad Antonov honestly worked out

[Small Saturn]

Quote: todhunter

There is a good book on this topic by Beshanov "Tank Pogrom 1941"

He basically has numbers, how many were "before", how many non-combat / combat losses, how many are left. The data on the losses of equipment are, of course, indirect. There is little about the tactical actions of the parties in those battles. But this is already something. Thanks to such books, people will at least have an idea of ​​the beginning of the Second World War.

To the author of the article +, but not bold, I look forward to a deeper study of the topic. Interesting.

[alovrov]

About non-combat losses, you can read at least about the 34 division, where all the t-35 were. A very revealing and characteristic story.

During the first three days of the war, more than 500 km passed, losing for technical reasons 50% of the materiel.

[estixnumx]

Read the memoirs of Nikolai Popel, the book is called "In a Hard Time". There, about the actions of the 8th fur corps of the Red Army. It describes this battle very accurately. And much more interesting than this article. In addition, I have a book with a collection of military documents, one of the first editions. And so the article does not compare with the book.
For those who do not know who Popel N.K. is
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CF%EE%EF%E5%EB%FC,_%CD%E8%EA%EE%EB%E0%E9_%CA%E8%F
0%E8%EB%EB%EE%E2%E8%F7

[estixnumx]

Quote: new communist

But BT-8 or BT-7 are not modern. Bt-8 ended the war by defeating the Kwantung army, one thing T-34 were raw, blind and a crew of 3 people.

The BT-7M with the diesel V-2 was the last in a series of BT tanks. I’ve heard about BT-8 for the first time. For its time, a good machine was simply created for raid operations behind enemy lines and was valued more than the T-26 for a more powerful engine. It’s just that this tank was not created for the war in which he participated

[estixnumx]

Quote: Stas57

Yeah, and under the Dubosekovo station 44 German tanks had to erase the powder without tanks and tanks with a probability of 99,9999% and without losses. But it turned out a set.

because there was not a company, but an 2 battalion with reinforcements, and tanks of 10 pieces, only 1075-15 tanks came to the 20th joint venture, which does not detract from the feat. with a bottle and PTRD not a lot of war

Quote: goose

Quite 2 T-26 can be exchanged for 1 PzKpfw 38t or 3 T-26 for 1 PzKpfw III or IV.

life is not HERE-2 tank, these are two crews of dead grandfathers and fathers

If from an ambush, it is quite possible that the TTX 45mm could well provide such an exchange in the presence of a well-trained and well-coordinated crew. To the wish of such crews was not enough.

[Small Saturn]

[quote = Alexey RA] [quote = new communist] And if an air raid, the wounded are taken to the rear or treated on the spot, there is a medical battalion in every decent unit, [/ quote]
In which the wounded are undoubtedly teleported directly from the battlefield. And also teleport from it further - after sorting and initial processing.
[quote = new communist] There is one refueling in modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for 500 km, and then? [/ quote]
And then at full fueling the T-34 tank passed 165-185 km. This is the test data of three serial T-34s in March 1941.
But besides the fuel, there was also oil, which the B-2 ate into three throats (it was even necessary to enter the column "power reserve").
Yes, I ate shamelessly, and not only V-2 is the problem of diesel engines of that time. I heard somewhere that this was due to the poor quality of gaskets and oil seals, the oil was simply squeezed out. Even in our time, on the V-46-5 (6) V 12 engine, multi-fuel (installed on the DT-10 / 30P, by the way, from the same B series), the oil consumption is not large, but simply huge. Prapor told us: "Watch out for the oil, if it doesn’t drive it from under the root, then it’s not there already .. no!" It seems funny, but some kind of sad humor ...

[Gomel]

I have repeatedly seen the expression:
"Every hour of the border guards' battle was a strategic victory day for the army. Every hour, day the enemy loses the pace of the offensive, spends opportunities and resources - not intended for border battles, but for the second stage of the war - the completion of the defeat of the Red Army."

Dubno Brody battles from the same series. Insanely sorry for the dead. Anger and bewilderment about the lack of coordination. Understanding and respect for those who are courageous, despite the slackness and incompetence of the first months of the war, fought for their homeland.

Well, and besides, it was the first months of the fighting that showed all the shortcomings of both the equipment and the organization of the Red Army. Conclusions were quickly made. Dramatically intensified research and development. The army learned, both from its mistakes and from the successes of the enemy.

P / s / take this opportunity to congratulate all residents and guests of the Republic of Belarus on the occasion! Independence Day.

Note: July 3 1944 of the year The Soviet Army liberated Minsk from Nazi invaders.

“The decision to celebrate Independence Day on July 3 was made during the republican referendum in 1996. Prior to that, the main state holiday was celebrated on July 27 - it was timed to coincide with the date of the signing of the Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic by the Supreme Soviet of the BSSR in 1990.

The Belarusian opposition does not recognize the official Independence Day, believing that the countdown of the state's independence should be started from the moment the Belarusian People's Republic proclaimed the Declaration of State Sovereignty on March 25, 1918. Opposition representatives and their supporters celebrate Freedom Day on March 25 every year. "

Thus, the Republic of Belarus is the only post-Soviet country that does not consider separation from the USSR a national holiday.

[Jääkorppi]

The reasons for the defeat were not in the tanks (the Finns fought well on the T-26, the museum in Parola was still on the move and were in service until the mid-50s, the last tank was sent to the museum in 1961 !!). The reasons are the lack of improper tactics of use, the lack of support for infantry and artillery, the lack of communications, the absence of sub-caliber shells and, most importantly, the loss of supply! Tanks came off and stood up stupidly without fuel !!

[lemzyak]

“Tanks do not fight with tanks” - this was the principle formulated that was common to all armies of that time. Antitank artillery was supposed to fight the tanks - well, and thoroughly entrenched infantry. And the battle of Dubno completely broke all the theoretical constructions of the military. Here, Soviet tank companies and battalions were literally head-on to German tanks. And - they lost.

That's where this stupidity came from. It was the other way around, our tanks were looking for enemy tanks, and they dodged. Examples as you like 1. 23.06 Vladimir Volyn at the Germans 150 tanks at our 100 t-26! tank battles nebylo ours lost 80 Germans 0
2. 23.06 Radekhov battle near Romanovka is attacked by up to 30 of the 10th TD of our tanks, the Germans hid for at least 60 anti-aircraft guns and artillery, west of Radekhov I attack our 100 t-34s from the 4th MK Germans also did not dare to attack the anti-aircraft guns. Our lost 60 Germans 20.
3. 24.06 Voynitsa .u Kremesha is attacked by our 10th t-26 Germans 13th TD will attack 100 tanks in this scenario, of course, we lost. Field near Khlopich “Death Field” that in the photo our tank company 16-t-26 counter attacks the German 14th and receives a blow from the rear 100 tanks of the 13th that broke through at Kremesh. Here really our tanks lost against our tanks in a day 100 Germans 50.
3. The 32nd TD 25.06 receives an order to destroy the enemy’s tanks at Sudovaya Vishny’s march; 80 km of the enemy’s tanks weren’t found; the return march. Why should these marches be done if tanks do not fight tanks.
4. 26.07 attack of the 43rd TD to 70 tanks, mainly T-26 Germans 11th TD 100 tanks retreat behind the blown up bridge.
5. The defeat of the 7th MD and other remnants of Ryabyshev’s corps on 28.06 was not a major tank battle.
6. On June 29.06, the attempt of the 16th TD to attack the Popel group near Verba ended in a drape and the loss of 10 only serviceable tanks.
So there wasn’t any I-lost.
But the Germans really did not want to fight against tanks against tanks and won.

[1970mk]

medium tanks - 171 units (all - T-34), heavy tanks - 217 units

89 KV-1 and 327 T-34.

Here it is very interesting to hear that the rest of the total number of 3695 tanks with bulletproof armor!
Do the Germans have 800? Of these, 600 are pt38 and t-2? The remaining 200 (at best 200) is the T-3 in a different configuration and a little T-4 with a short barrel 75mm gun.
Enough to tell again, "there was not enough of everything" ... Our technology and aviation were not inferior to the German in quality. Quantitatively superior. Everything was killed by complete unpreparedness for war and mediocre actions of the command ... Zhukov, by the way oh well done ..... Genius commander!