Europe's last chance
The United States measured the Allies five to six years
The US is preparing Europe to become a potential theater of nuclear war in order to divert part of Russia's nuclear potential from American territory. What can we oppose to this?
The most significant event of the beginning of June from the point of view of changes in the US nuclear strategy, undoubtedly, should be considered statements by representatives of the American establishment, which speak of the possibility of the United States withdrawing from the MFA-RMD Treaty. The formal reason was the evidence that Russia allegedly grossly violated the treaty by deploying medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBD) and ground-based cruise missiles of medium range.
Who shouts "hold the thief"?
As the Russian MRBR United States called the PC-26 "Frontier". This is a mobile complex with a small rocket. Its total mass, judging by the open data, is approximately 80 tons. The launch mass of the rocket is about 32 tons. The minimum firing range is 2000 kilometers, and the maximum claimed distance is more than 6000 kilometers (up to 10 000 km with a single-block warhead), which, in accordance with the conceptual apparatus introduced in the RSD-RMD Treaty, defines it as an intercontinental BR (MDB). At the same time, the existing ICBMs, both Russian and American, have a minimum firing range within 2000 – 3000 kilometers, which allows them to be used at distances less than 5500 kilometers, that is, as MRBD. Nevertheless, it does not occur to anyone to attribute them to the MRBD.
In addition, official statements by the Russian leadership indicated that this rocket is replacing the ICBM of the previous types, in particular the Topol ICBM. Who will replace the ICBM with the BRSD when the main adversary, the United States, is on a different continent, especially in the face of tight restrictions on the number of ICBMs according to the SALT agreements? Thus, it can be stated that the attempt to present our Frontier ICBM RS-26 as MRBM does not stand up to criticism either from a legal point of view or from an actual one.
Something similar is the case with the P-500 rocket, which is part of the Iskander-K complex. According to the stated data, the P-500 has a maximum firing range of about 450 – 480 kilometers, that is, less than 500 kilometers. And therefore it does not fit the definition of a shorter range missile. This is a classic operational-tactical missile, created in the interest of improving the reliability of overcoming the missile defense system and air defense system in the theater of war, to hit targets in the operational or operational-strategic depth of the enemy grouping. As a tool for the commander of the regional grouping of troops in the strategic (operational) direction, Iskander-K does not need to be equipped with missiles with a firing range of more than 500 kilometers. The American leadership, having established the fact of the appearance of the Iskander-K with the C-500 CU, evidently suggested that missiles with a greater range of fire could be loaded on these launchers if they were made in the C-500 dimensions, as there are similar American and Russian missiles with a range in nuclear equipment about 2500 – 3000 kilometers. However, all the tests were conducted at a distance of less than 500 kilometers, and the American side knows this well.
Meanwhile, we have every reason to believe that the Tomahawk SRBD can be loaded into the ground-based version of the Mk-41 launcher deployed in Eastern Europe to accommodate the SM-3 anti-missile missile missile pro-missile missiles as standard. . Today it takes place on the ships of the US Navy, equipped with similar PU. And there is no need for any constructive improvements. Therefore, Russia may well present the United States with claims of violation of the RSD-RMD Treaty, since the Americans actually create “deployment areas” of the KR NB of medium-range, which is a gross violation of it.
Noise cover
If Russia has not violated the RSD-RMD Treaty, the question arises: why all this noise? The answer is simple - you need to justify the right of the United States to withdraw from this treaty. This will allow them to deploy in Europe a group of medium-range nuclear forces that allow delivering a so-called decapitation and disarming strike on Russia with the destruction of the main command centers of the RF Armed Forces, primarily the strategic nuclear forces, as well as most of the ICBM and SSBN launchers at strategic locations and aerodromes aviation. Indeed, the flight time to the designated targets of such infantry fighting vehicles, such as Pershing-2, was only 6-10 minutes, which, given the high accuracy of hitting the target, did not leave time for our leadership to take adequate retaliatory measures. Today, even more advanced BMDs can be developed (or already developed).
It is necessary to take into account the factor that at present as the main carrier of the Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) favored front and long-range aviation. Given the presence of a powerful NATO air defense system in a European theater of operations and the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in fighter aviation, there are few chances for our planes to break through to the designated targets. Therefore, the emergence of such complexes as the Iskander-M and Iskander-K in nuclear equipment, significantly increases the deterrent value of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Placing the BRSD and KRBD on the European theater of war in both nuclear and conventional equipment creates favorable conditions for neutralizing the Russian TNW.
Plus, the ability to deploy much more ground-based CBRDs than by air and sea carriers allows you to organize a powerful missile attack with a minimum salvo that can quickly cause unacceptable damage to our country even using only conventional missiles.
Thus, it can be stated that the United States, raising a fuss over the violation of the RSD-RMD Treaty by Russia, pursues the goal of resuscitating the nuclear standoff on the European continent, which was largely weakened after its conclusion. Confirmation of this assumption can be considered and the decision of the American leadership to increase in Europe the potential for aviation-based TNW. It is planned to equip the F-16 and Tornado fighters of the Air Force of five NATO countries with equipment that allows the use of B61-12 nuclear bombs. That is very significant, they are supposed to equip the planes of the Air Forces of countries that are today considered non-nuclear - Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, Germany and Italy. Aircraft must be ready for the 2018 year. The same equipment is planned to be installed on all advanced F-35 fighters coming into service.
What does this give? First, the chances of eliminating the threat of a retaliatory nuclear strike by the forces of the SNF in the United States are significantly increased. Second, building the capacity of TNW in Europe will allow NATO to achieve superiority in these types of weapons over Russia. If the US succeeds in doing this, then aggression against our country with the full power of NATO is quite possible. The weakened Russian army will not withstand such a blow. And the use of tactical nuclear weapons will be very difficult due to the threat of the same retaliatory strike, the loss of most of the carriers. Thirdly, in the case of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the theater of nuclear war will be Europe, and not the United States. The American leadership may well expect that in a regional war against NATO in the European theater of operations, Russia will seek to limit the use of nuclear weapons as much as possible even under the threat of a severe defeat and therefore will not decide to use the strategic nuclear forces against the US, fearing a retaliatory strike. That is justified reliance on the conduct of a limited nuclear war within the European theater.
In the context of the tendency towards a revival of nuclear confrontation that has emerged here, the actions of large-scale deployment of the US missile defense system in Europe are very indicative. It is incapable of confronting the Russian SNF, but completely with the tactical nuclear forces carriers. That is, the meaning of this system is not in disrupting the balance of the SNF, but in neutralizing Russian TNW, especially promising complexes of the Iskander-M type. Then its creation is quite justified.
In this regard, we can note the beginning of the process of redeploying the military infrastructure of NATO and even individual formations directly to the borders of Russia, in particular, American double-based connections from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany to the countries of Eastern Europe. That is, there is a systematic and comprehensive preparation for a war with Russia. Withdrawal from the RSD-RMD Treaty is only one element of this preparation.
Meaningless catch up
How long will the US take to deploy enough to create a serious threat to Russia of the BRSD and KRNB grouping on the European theater of operations? With the universal Tomahawk KSRBD and Mk-41 PUs (as well as previously developed specialized mobile PUs for the RNSD before the Agreement on RSD-RMD), the deployment time of the ground-based KDBM grouping on a European theater system will be determined only by the speed of their mass production, and the pace of infrastructure creation. The known opportunities of the American industry, taking into account the time to overcome diplomatic problems, allow us to estimate the probability of the deployment of a group of 2000 – 3000 such missiles for five to six years since the official US withdrawal from the RSD-RMD Treaty.
As regards the deployment of MRBMs, the challenge is to develop such a rocket. However, even a simple restoration of the Pershing-2 MRBM and the deployment of such a group in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States will be quite enough not only for the guaranteed proactive destruction of the entire strategic management system of Russia, but also for the destruction of most of the nuclear forces located in its European part. Taking into account the development, mass production and deployment of the necessary infrastructure to create a grouping in 400 – 500 MRBR (which is enough to ensure the destruction of all primary targets for tactical nuclear forces and strategic nuclear forces in the European part of Russia, as well as their management system), the same five to six years are required.
That is, after the expiration of such a period from the moment of the United States denunciation of the RSD-RMD Treaty, Russia faces a real and very dangerous threat. How can I answer this challenge? At the current rates of production of the CCD and the Iskander-K complexes, to create a sufficient grouping of deterrence will take 10 – 12 years, or even more, under the most favorable conditions. To create a group of MRBD of Russia with the existing rate of deployment of ICBMs (for MRBM, it is unlikely to be much longer), 12 – 15 years and more are needed depending on the pace of development of the new rocket. As a result, there is a gap of six to seven years, when a probable enemy can have absolute superiority in medium-range missiles. And in the future, the very fact of the possibility of a decapitating strike with a flight time of 6 – 10 minutes will remain a source of constant serious and difficult to avoid threats. At the same time, it must be remembered that having such a temporary odds, our competitors will be able to preempt us in creating new systems for the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons and countering our similar means. Therefore, a symmetrical response does not allow to neutralize the emerging threat. Yes, it is also ineffective: the United States is ready to sacrifice Europe without special remorse, turning it into a theater of nuclear war for the sake of defeating Russia and establishing world domination. And the European countries of NATO without the United States will never decide on military aggression against our country. In addition, the BRSD and KRNB deployed in Europe will be American, and Washington will decide on their application.
Therefore, to fend off the possible threat of US MRSDs and CRNBs in Europe by creating a nuclear threat to European countries proper is ineffective. Here it is necessary to have a tactical nuclear forces grouping sufficient to ensure the defeat of the NATO armed forces strike groups, and form the main potential against the United States. It should be such that it becomes clear: the threat is not leveled by the deployment of high-precision nuclear MRSD and RNSD. And of course, to build up in accordance with the pace of the creation by the Americans of their grouping BRSD and KRNB in Europe.
States will answer for everything
This is real if initially focusing on deploying Iskander-M and Iskander-K groups on our 400 – 500 OTR nuclear missiles in our western strategic directions. These forces are enough to crush the first Allied Allied Forces group of troops into the operational-strategic depth of their construction with the destruction of the air defense and missile defense systems, as well as tactical aviation in the forward zone. Then it will be possible to use front-line and long-range aircraft for subsequent nuclear strikes, because the enemy’s air defenses will cease to exist.
At the same time, it is advisable to use the right to deploy their CRNS, which are not subject to restrictive treaties, and to create an additional threat to the US territory of the ground squadron X-101 and X-102 with its preliminary modernization to ensure ground-based carrier and to reach the 8000-10000 range of kilometers. Having placed the grouping of these missiles in the central part of Russia outside the zone of reach of ground-based MRBMs in Europe on highly mobile carriers of the automobile or railway type (which is not difficult, because the X-101 and X-102 have a weight of just over two tons - incomparably smaller than the smallest ICBMs), we We will create a guaranteed threat to the territory of the United States that is invulnerable to a disarming strike by medium-range missiles. In the absence of contractual restrictions on this type of missiles, they can be deployed 600 – 800 units, which is enough to preserve the US deterrent potential in the most adverse conditions, and also have a certain reserve for solving other problems.
Considering the seriousness of the threat, it is advisable today to begin early preparations for the deployment of the necessary Iskander group and strategic CDs, which should allow mass production at a rate of at least 300 missiles per year and appropriate means of supply within a year or two since the Americans denounced the Treaty RSD-RMD. This will allow for five to six years to form a balance of deterrence in this area by the time the United States deployed its grouping in Europe, and also to create an additional difficultly removable threat to the continental territory of the United States.
In addition to the measures to deploy these groupings of Russia, it will be important to increase the combat sustainability of the system for managing their own nuclear forces. For example, by increasing the mobile (primarily air) components. What will deprive the enemy of the possibility of a decapitating blow. An important step in ensuring the security of a counter attack on the territory of the United States should be the modernization and ensuring the full-fledged work of the Perimeter system or, as it is called in the United States, the Dead Hand.
At the same time, it is advisable to disappoint the United States with a statement that there will be no limited nuclear war within the European theater of operations. The use of American MRSD and KRSD even from ground-based launchers in Europe would mean an immediate transition to the use of strategic nuclear weapons across the US, regardless of the state of the other components of the RF Armed Forces and the negotiation process with the aggressor. This provision must be included in advance in doctrinal, operational, combat, diplomatic and public documents.
Thus, in five to six years, it is realistic to form an asymmetrical and highly effective deterrent response to a medium-range nuclear threat.
However, in the future, we must assume, the United States will begin to look for (and probably will find) neutralization measures. Therefore, the task of the subsequent stages will be the improvement of the deterrence potential. In this direction, it makes sense to consider the creation of super-large-caliber ammunition - 100 – 120 and more Mt, capable even with single blows to initiate such geophysical destructive processes that put the US and the EU on the verge of physical destruction. It is also advisable to begin the creation of a global range of ICBMs - 35 – 40 thousands of kilometers, which will neutralize the opposition of promising US missile defense systems. Other measures are possible. Their complex application will allow Russia to eliminate the threat of US MRSD and KNBR. However, it is time for Europe to think whether it should become a theater of nuclear war for the sake of American domination of the world?
The US is preparing Europe to become a potential theater of nuclear war in order to divert part of Russia's nuclear potential from American territory. What can we oppose to this?
The most significant event of the beginning of June from the point of view of changes in the US nuclear strategy, undoubtedly, should be considered statements by representatives of the American establishment, which speak of the possibility of the United States withdrawing from the MFA-RMD Treaty. The formal reason was the evidence that Russia allegedly grossly violated the treaty by deploying medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBD) and ground-based cruise missiles of medium range.
Who shouts "hold the thief"?
As the Russian MRBR United States called the PC-26 "Frontier". This is a mobile complex with a small rocket. Its total mass, judging by the open data, is approximately 80 tons. The launch mass of the rocket is about 32 tons. The minimum firing range is 2000 kilometers, and the maximum claimed distance is more than 6000 kilometers (up to 10 000 km with a single-block warhead), which, in accordance with the conceptual apparatus introduced in the RSD-RMD Treaty, defines it as an intercontinental BR (MDB). At the same time, the existing ICBMs, both Russian and American, have a minimum firing range within 2000 – 3000 kilometers, which allows them to be used at distances less than 5500 kilometers, that is, as MRBD. Nevertheless, it does not occur to anyone to attribute them to the MRBD.
In addition, official statements by the Russian leadership indicated that this rocket is replacing the ICBM of the previous types, in particular the Topol ICBM. Who will replace the ICBM with the BRSD when the main adversary, the United States, is on a different continent, especially in the face of tight restrictions on the number of ICBMs according to the SALT agreements? Thus, it can be stated that the attempt to present our Frontier ICBM RS-26 as MRBM does not stand up to criticism either from a legal point of view or from an actual one.
Something similar is the case with the P-500 rocket, which is part of the Iskander-K complex. According to the stated data, the P-500 has a maximum firing range of about 450 – 480 kilometers, that is, less than 500 kilometers. And therefore it does not fit the definition of a shorter range missile. This is a classic operational-tactical missile, created in the interest of improving the reliability of overcoming the missile defense system and air defense system in the theater of war, to hit targets in the operational or operational-strategic depth of the enemy grouping. As a tool for the commander of the regional grouping of troops in the strategic (operational) direction, Iskander-K does not need to be equipped with missiles with a firing range of more than 500 kilometers. The American leadership, having established the fact of the appearance of the Iskander-K with the C-500 CU, evidently suggested that missiles with a greater range of fire could be loaded on these launchers if they were made in the C-500 dimensions, as there are similar American and Russian missiles with a range in nuclear equipment about 2500 – 3000 kilometers. However, all the tests were conducted at a distance of less than 500 kilometers, and the American side knows this well.
Meanwhile, we have every reason to believe that the Tomahawk SRBD can be loaded into the ground-based version of the Mk-41 launcher deployed in Eastern Europe to accommodate the SM-3 anti-missile missile missile pro-missile missiles as standard. . Today it takes place on the ships of the US Navy, equipped with similar PU. And there is no need for any constructive improvements. Therefore, Russia may well present the United States with claims of violation of the RSD-RMD Treaty, since the Americans actually create “deployment areas” of the KR NB of medium-range, which is a gross violation of it.
Noise cover
If Russia has not violated the RSD-RMD Treaty, the question arises: why all this noise? The answer is simple - you need to justify the right of the United States to withdraw from this treaty. This will allow them to deploy in Europe a group of medium-range nuclear forces that allow delivering a so-called decapitation and disarming strike on Russia with the destruction of the main command centers of the RF Armed Forces, primarily the strategic nuclear forces, as well as most of the ICBM and SSBN launchers at strategic locations and aerodromes aviation. Indeed, the flight time to the designated targets of such infantry fighting vehicles, such as Pershing-2, was only 6-10 minutes, which, given the high accuracy of hitting the target, did not leave time for our leadership to take adequate retaliatory measures. Today, even more advanced BMDs can be developed (or already developed).
It is necessary to take into account the factor that at present as the main carrier of the Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) favored front and long-range aviation. Given the presence of a powerful NATO air defense system in a European theater of operations and the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in fighter aviation, there are few chances for our planes to break through to the designated targets. Therefore, the emergence of such complexes as the Iskander-M and Iskander-K in nuclear equipment, significantly increases the deterrent value of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Placing the BRSD and KRBD on the European theater of war in both nuclear and conventional equipment creates favorable conditions for neutralizing the Russian TNW.
Plus, the ability to deploy much more ground-based CBRDs than by air and sea carriers allows you to organize a powerful missile attack with a minimum salvo that can quickly cause unacceptable damage to our country even using only conventional missiles.
Thus, it can be stated that the United States, raising a fuss over the violation of the RSD-RMD Treaty by Russia, pursues the goal of resuscitating the nuclear standoff on the European continent, which was largely weakened after its conclusion. Confirmation of this assumption can be considered and the decision of the American leadership to increase in Europe the potential for aviation-based TNW. It is planned to equip the F-16 and Tornado fighters of the Air Force of five NATO countries with equipment that allows the use of B61-12 nuclear bombs. That is very significant, they are supposed to equip the planes of the Air Forces of countries that are today considered non-nuclear - Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, Germany and Italy. Aircraft must be ready for the 2018 year. The same equipment is planned to be installed on all advanced F-35 fighters coming into service.
What does this give? First, the chances of eliminating the threat of a retaliatory nuclear strike by the forces of the SNF in the United States are significantly increased. Second, building the capacity of TNW in Europe will allow NATO to achieve superiority in these types of weapons over Russia. If the US succeeds in doing this, then aggression against our country with the full power of NATO is quite possible. The weakened Russian army will not withstand such a blow. And the use of tactical nuclear weapons will be very difficult due to the threat of the same retaliatory strike, the loss of most of the carriers. Thirdly, in the case of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the theater of nuclear war will be Europe, and not the United States. The American leadership may well expect that in a regional war against NATO in the European theater of operations, Russia will seek to limit the use of nuclear weapons as much as possible even under the threat of a severe defeat and therefore will not decide to use the strategic nuclear forces against the US, fearing a retaliatory strike. That is justified reliance on the conduct of a limited nuclear war within the European theater.
In the context of the tendency towards a revival of nuclear confrontation that has emerged here, the actions of large-scale deployment of the US missile defense system in Europe are very indicative. It is incapable of confronting the Russian SNF, but completely with the tactical nuclear forces carriers. That is, the meaning of this system is not in disrupting the balance of the SNF, but in neutralizing Russian TNW, especially promising complexes of the Iskander-M type. Then its creation is quite justified.
In this regard, we can note the beginning of the process of redeploying the military infrastructure of NATO and even individual formations directly to the borders of Russia, in particular, American double-based connections from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany to the countries of Eastern Europe. That is, there is a systematic and comprehensive preparation for a war with Russia. Withdrawal from the RSD-RMD Treaty is only one element of this preparation.
Meaningless catch up
How long will the US take to deploy enough to create a serious threat to Russia of the BRSD and KRNB grouping on the European theater of operations? With the universal Tomahawk KSRBD and Mk-41 PUs (as well as previously developed specialized mobile PUs for the RNSD before the Agreement on RSD-RMD), the deployment time of the ground-based KDBM grouping on a European theater system will be determined only by the speed of their mass production, and the pace of infrastructure creation. The known opportunities of the American industry, taking into account the time to overcome diplomatic problems, allow us to estimate the probability of the deployment of a group of 2000 – 3000 such missiles for five to six years since the official US withdrawal from the RSD-RMD Treaty.
As regards the deployment of MRBMs, the challenge is to develop such a rocket. However, even a simple restoration of the Pershing-2 MRBM and the deployment of such a group in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States will be quite enough not only for the guaranteed proactive destruction of the entire strategic management system of Russia, but also for the destruction of most of the nuclear forces located in its European part. Taking into account the development, mass production and deployment of the necessary infrastructure to create a grouping in 400 – 500 MRBR (which is enough to ensure the destruction of all primary targets for tactical nuclear forces and strategic nuclear forces in the European part of Russia, as well as their management system), the same five to six years are required.That is, after the expiration of such a period from the moment of the United States denunciation of the RSD-RMD Treaty, Russia faces a real and very dangerous threat. How can I answer this challenge? At the current rates of production of the CCD and the Iskander-K complexes, to create a sufficient grouping of deterrence will take 10 – 12 years, or even more, under the most favorable conditions. To create a group of MRBD of Russia with the existing rate of deployment of ICBMs (for MRBM, it is unlikely to be much longer), 12 – 15 years and more are needed depending on the pace of development of the new rocket. As a result, there is a gap of six to seven years, when a probable enemy can have absolute superiority in medium-range missiles. And in the future, the very fact of the possibility of a decapitating strike with a flight time of 6 – 10 minutes will remain a source of constant serious and difficult to avoid threats. At the same time, it must be remembered that having such a temporary odds, our competitors will be able to preempt us in creating new systems for the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons and countering our similar means. Therefore, a symmetrical response does not allow to neutralize the emerging threat. Yes, it is also ineffective: the United States is ready to sacrifice Europe without special remorse, turning it into a theater of nuclear war for the sake of defeating Russia and establishing world domination. And the European countries of NATO without the United States will never decide on military aggression against our country. In addition, the BRSD and KRNB deployed in Europe will be American, and Washington will decide on their application.
Therefore, to fend off the possible threat of US MRSDs and CRNBs in Europe by creating a nuclear threat to European countries proper is ineffective. Here it is necessary to have a tactical nuclear forces grouping sufficient to ensure the defeat of the NATO armed forces strike groups, and form the main potential against the United States. It should be such that it becomes clear: the threat is not leveled by the deployment of high-precision nuclear MRSD and RNSD. And of course, to build up in accordance with the pace of the creation by the Americans of their grouping BRSD and KRNB in Europe.
States will answer for everything
This is real if initially focusing on deploying Iskander-M and Iskander-K groups on our 400 – 500 OTR nuclear missiles in our western strategic directions. These forces are enough to crush the first Allied Allied Forces group of troops into the operational-strategic depth of their construction with the destruction of the air defense and missile defense systems, as well as tactical aviation in the forward zone. Then it will be possible to use front-line and long-range aircraft for subsequent nuclear strikes, because the enemy’s air defenses will cease to exist.
At the same time, it is advisable to use the right to deploy their CRNS, which are not subject to restrictive treaties, and to create an additional threat to the US territory of the ground squadron X-101 and X-102 with its preliminary modernization to ensure ground-based carrier and to reach the 8000-10000 range of kilometers. Having placed the grouping of these missiles in the central part of Russia outside the zone of reach of ground-based MRBMs in Europe on highly mobile carriers of the automobile or railway type (which is not difficult, because the X-101 and X-102 have a weight of just over two tons - incomparably smaller than the smallest ICBMs), we We will create a guaranteed threat to the territory of the United States that is invulnerable to a disarming strike by medium-range missiles. In the absence of contractual restrictions on this type of missiles, they can be deployed 600 – 800 units, which is enough to preserve the US deterrent potential in the most adverse conditions, and also have a certain reserve for solving other problems.
Considering the seriousness of the threat, it is advisable today to begin early preparations for the deployment of the necessary Iskander group and strategic CDs, which should allow mass production at a rate of at least 300 missiles per year and appropriate means of supply within a year or two since the Americans denounced the Treaty RSD-RMD. This will allow for five to six years to form a balance of deterrence in this area by the time the United States deployed its grouping in Europe, and also to create an additional difficultly removable threat to the continental territory of the United States.
In addition to the measures to deploy these groupings of Russia, it will be important to increase the combat sustainability of the system for managing their own nuclear forces. For example, by increasing the mobile (primarily air) components. What will deprive the enemy of the possibility of a decapitating blow. An important step in ensuring the security of a counter attack on the territory of the United States should be the modernization and ensuring the full-fledged work of the Perimeter system or, as it is called in the United States, the Dead Hand.
At the same time, it is advisable to disappoint the United States with a statement that there will be no limited nuclear war within the European theater of operations. The use of American MRSD and KRSD even from ground-based launchers in Europe would mean an immediate transition to the use of strategic nuclear weapons across the US, regardless of the state of the other components of the RF Armed Forces and the negotiation process with the aggressor. This provision must be included in advance in doctrinal, operational, combat, diplomatic and public documents.
Thus, in five to six years, it is realistic to form an asymmetrical and highly effective deterrent response to a medium-range nuclear threat.
However, in the future, we must assume, the United States will begin to look for (and probably will find) neutralization measures. Therefore, the task of the subsequent stages will be the improvement of the deterrence potential. In this direction, it makes sense to consider the creation of super-large-caliber ammunition - 100 – 120 and more Mt, capable even with single blows to initiate such geophysical destructive processes that put the US and the EU on the verge of physical destruction. It is also advisable to begin the creation of a global range of ICBMs - 35 – 40 thousands of kilometers, which will neutralize the opposition of promising US missile defense systems. Other measures are possible. Their complex application will allow Russia to eliminate the threat of US MRSD and KNBR. However, it is time for Europe to think whether it should become a theater of nuclear war for the sake of American domination of the world?
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