Military Reform Platforms
"God forbid you live in an era of change." This famous phrase is attributed to Confucius or interpreted as the ancient Chinese wisdom in general. Naturally, the change is different, the difference is in whether the change is for better or worse. Recently I had a chance to read one comment on the “Military Review”, the meaning of which boiled down to the fact that, as the author put it, “thanks to the damned Taburetkin, Makarov, Popovkin (God rest his soul) that in due time placed before the military industrial complex the requirement and ultimatum to create new samples tracked and wheeled armored vehicles ".
Indeed, the reforms significantly affected our army, most of the “glorious deeds” of these reformers were mentioned many times, much had to be redone after that, but such a phenomenon as a single platform also began to be realized with them, and this somehow remained without special attention. So is this really one of the few that they donated to our army as a blessing? Let's try to figure out the topic is interesting, and, one might say, rare in discussions.
It is now known that four basic platforms are being developed for the ground forces of the Russian Federation, on the basis of which machines of different types should be created. Firstly, it is a heavy Armata tracked platform (weight category up to 65 tons), on the basis of which, in addition to tank T-14, a heavy infantry fighting vehicle has been created and other combat and auxiliary vehicles should appear. Secondly, it is the Kurganets-25 medium tracked platform (25 tons), on the basis of which a family of vehicles should also be built. Initially, it was supposed to divide such equipment into heavy and medium teams, respectively. Closing the list are two wheeled platforms - the average Boomerang in the same 25-ton category and the light one in the weight category up to 10 tons (presumably the Tiger).
It was stated that Russia was the first in the world to switch to unified combat platforms in the above-mentioned main categories of land vehicles.
As explained, uniform platforms should simplify, reduce the cost of production and maintenance of equipment, as well as facilitate the creation of machines for different purposes due to the modular design.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, our armed forces inherited a huge fleet of tracked and wheeled armored vehicles, which turned into a headache for reformers. The cumbersome and “disconnected” legacy, as it was represented, did not fit into the new requirements of a compact army, with the seeming impossibility of a global war. It was said that the NATO partners are disarming, cutting down the army, and we still have thousands and thousands of useless armored vehicles.
Admittedly, the ideally coveted concept of a single platform has been raised by engineers for a long time. However, what is interesting is that radically implement it in military equipment not in the US or NATO, not during the power of the Soviet Union, but in the new Russia, after the pogrom of industry, science, the breakdown of cooperative ties, extensive reductions in the army, in this very era of change and grand reforms.
Why did the reformers need a fundamentally new technique, why did everything created earlier and for the future appear to be instantly obsolete?
When the Russian Ministry of Defense suspended the purchase of armored vehicles for five years (reported by the RIA "News"), The then chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia Nikolai Makarov said that the military took this time to designers to develop new types of military equipment. “We have a difficult situation with ground forces. We stopped with purchases of armored vehicles, ”explained Makarov.
What was this “difficult situation”? Why did defense officials suddenly hated everything domestic, read the Soviet one? In 2011, the technical backwardness of the Russian military equipment was repeatedly declared. In particular, the commander-in-chief of the land forces, Alexander Postnikov, said then: “Those samples weaponswhich are produced by industry, including armored weapons, artillery and small arms, in their parameters do not correspond to the patterns of NATO and even China. ” Makarov himself at the time also told that some samples of Russian weapons and military equipment were inferior in their tactical and technical characteristics to the most successful foreign counterparts. The already mentioned commander-in-chief of the land forces of Russia, General Alexander Postnikov, spoke very dismissively of the combat qualities of the main Russian battle tank T-90, which, in his words, “is in fact the 17 version of the Soviet T-72, produced from 1973 onwards. Postnikov also owns that the defense industry has made its products so unprofitable and terribly expensive (Uralvagonzavod offered T-90 for 118 million rubles apiece). His famous gem: “It’s easier for us to buy three Leopards for the same money (Leopard-2 in the world market cost about 6 million dollars, that is, then a little more than 170 million rubles).
There were flaws in everything “Soviet”, for example, our paratroopers liked the BMD-4М, but the military department didn’t need it, then they refused to buy it, the marines liked the BMP-3F, but, again, the officials didn’t like it. The logical evolution of the evolution of wheeled armored personnel carriers, the BTR-90, was rejected because it lacked protection against explosions on land mines and there was no landing through the rear doors. And it was not the ones for whom the equipment was intended to decide, but the mediators, defense buyers, who had their own idea of weapons as a product, the army was actually excommunicated from the right to choose and order. To enhance the effect of the unsuitability of domestic technology, in contrast, it was said about the advantages of a foreign one, the purchases of which, quite seriously, could acquire a global character, become the basic basis.
At that time, the head of armaments, Deputy Minister of Defense Vladimir Popovkin spoke at a round table devoted specifically to the issues of the advisability of purchasing weapons abroad. From his words it followed that the issue had been resolved. The Russian army will be equipped, including with imported weapons. According to the head of armaments, the Ministry of Defense is closing a number of programs that were considered only yesterday as very promising domestic developments. Instead, as Popovkin said at the time, there is another simple way out - to purchase similar equipment abroad. Moreover, you need to start right away, both large and small, with a landing ship of the Mistral type and sniper rifles, you can buy Israeli Drones, Italian armored vehicles "Iveco" "Lynx" and the German light armor of the company "Rheinmetall". They were easily ready to spend billions in this, without demanding from foreign manufacturers either price cuts or wide unification. It was Vladimir Popovkin who announced in 2010 the termination of funding for the development of the practically finished T-95 tank (the tank passed state tests with a list of individual comments) and the closure of the project. According to him, the design of the vehicle is "morally obsolete", and the tank was called too expensive and difficult for conscripts to master.
From the moment when the intrigue of the T-95 tank was replaced by the news about Armat, it became known about the concept of the “platform” of military equipment, to the development of which the military department, it must be assumed, and allotted five years.
So, for the first time in the world and only here - a single platform. Up to this point, the world of such a large-scale phenomenon in military affairs did not know, and many have associated the word “platform” with another.
In technology, the first appearances of the concept of “platform” are attributed to IBM, their principle of “open architecture” made it possible to popularize the product, to make the IBM PC one of the main computer platforms. Automobile corporations have used the platform as an opportunity to increase sales, diversifying the model range on the developed chassis. In both cases, these are marketing moves, where profit came first. If, according to the generally accepted opinion, the platform of the car is its lower part, which includes the power elements, the suspension and its attachment points, that is, at present, the interpretation of the concept “platform of the car” is close enough to the interpretation of the concept “frame chassis”, which then a “platform” for our reformers?
In the “backward” USSR, on the basis of T-72, a wide variety of combat vehicles were produced long ago: the MTU-72 bridge laying machine, the TOC-1 “Buratino” flame-throwing system, the IMR-3М engineering machine, the Berloga radiation and chemical reconnaissance vehicle, the repair and evacuation machine BREM-1, military demining machine BMR-3M, BMO-T fire fighting vehicle, a tank support fighting vehicle (BMPT), 152 mm SAU Msta-S was created.
A successful and well-developed base was used in other countries of the former Warsaw Pact, and not only, for example, in South Africa, the ZA-72 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun was created on the T-35 chassis, but by the French company GIAT 155 mm SAU.
On the basis of BMD created "Nona", "Sprut", "Shell". The equipment was also produced on the basis of other types, for example, on the successful MT-LB chassis. Nothing prevented the subsequent use of the T-95 base, be it adopted. Here, the way to create a vehicle on the basis of the existing one does not fundamentally differ from the options that are now being presented as platforms. Let's try to deal with these new "platforms".
Much has been said about the unification of new platforms. What is this expressed? Perhaps they were completely unified, if not with the available technology, then between the platforms themselves? No, the whole unification of new platforms implies this unification within its weight segment. Thus, the entire model range based on Armat will be unified mainly according to the Armat platform, the same can be said about medium and light platforms. Here, all innovation except in the novelty of the technology itself.
The allegations that the Soviet technology did not have wide unification and was flawed on this issue before the new platforms, to put it mildly, is very controversial. Unification has always been given importance in the Soviet Union. By the Soviet principle, now the same BMD-4М is unified with the BMP-3, as, respectively, and all the equipment based on them. NATO countries and the United States in particular did not and did not do more, it is unlikely the Americans created the whole family of wheeled combat vehicles "Stryker" and adopting the unified family of FMTV trucks (Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles) somehow distinguished themselves in this. Moreover, it should be noted that in the case of the Stryker it was not possible to fully realize this, their combat armored fire support vehicle with an 105-mm tank gun on the Stryker chassis turned out to be extremely weighted and capricious.
Such statements that, for example, our three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1, BMP-2, BMP-3) were on two structurally different chassis, quite natural for technical evolution, the same can be said about BMD or other equipment. Having a chassis once created for all times and occasions can be an economical, but very dubious decision. Unification is designed to reduce the cost of production, improve maintainability, but unification is not an end in itself at the expense of combat qualities and capabilities. A previously assigned “platform”, and not chosen during the operation, may not only reduce the cost of production, but also make the entire range of equipment unsuccessful on its base, which did not meet expectations.
Further, a lot is said about the "modularity" of new platforms. What is their modularity has a revolutionary difference? Combat modules have long been created and their appearance is not related to new understanding of platforms, for example, such as Berehok and Bakhcha for infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers or armored vehicles, Tagilsky Proryv and Omsk Burlak, designed to significantly increase the power and protection of T tanks -80 and T-72 / T-90. Various combat modules have long been used throughout the world.
Transformation of the engine from the stern to the bow location? It is also not a discovery, nor is it a fact that this is such an urgent need. On the basis of the Soviet T-64 (of which we had reserves), in Kharkov, they received a heavy infantry fighting vehicle by moving the engine in the tank hull. The Germans did this before on the Leopard chassis, creating the Marder BMP.
Finally, the most important thing for lean reformers. Savings issues. Let's look at profitability. As already mentioned, General Makarov set aside “eternity”, for five years, to create a fundamentally new technology, and it appeared, though not yet adopted, and even not having passed the entire test cycle. From the powerful T-95 tank with the 152-mm gun they refused, but according to Vladimir Putin, 64 of a billion rubles was invested only in the development of "Armata", OKRy and R & D, and the T-14 tank itself (already with the 125-mm gun) was estimated in 400 million apiece. We spent almost five more years to roll out the undecided T-14 of the Armata platform to the Victory Parade.
At the same time, it is proposed to make other equipment on this expensive chassis. How economically similar, if the same “Coalition” self-propelled guns, which do not need powerful armor, can quite successfully be produced on the developed, cheaper T-90 chassis (as seen in the parade)? Similar can be asked for various bridge laying, repair and recovery vehicles, all other equipment that does not need thick armor and a separate armored capsule for the crew. Finally, how reasonable is it at all to disperse forces, making instead of new tanks, of which there will not be enough of themselves, a vehicle based on it? Generally, if we talk about saving, then the same thrifty Israel would remember it, who used the Trophy T-54 / T-55 and the outdated Centurion to convert into heavy armored personnel carriers in their time, they remembered historywhen the Germans during the Second World War widely used tank chassis, even outdated and discontinued, for all their SPGs. We have all the stockpiles of armored vehicles are expected to significantly reduce, simply destroy.
What prevents the use of stocks of T-72 for alterations in BMPT, for their action together with tanks in the first line, what prevents to create on this tank base a similarity to the Israeli heavy armored personnel carrier Akhzarit for infantry? They don’t want to see unification and savings here, although there are already many interesting projects and developments.
They talk about the special protection of new platforms. The protection of the T-95, if it were put into service, would now be no worse than what is assumed on the T-14.
On the T-95, the separation of the crew into a separate armored capsule was largely due to the use of powerful 152 mm 2A83 guns, in an uninhabited tower and an additional 30 mm automatic 2XXUMUM gun. With the 42 mm gun (125А2-82М) on the T-1, this already raises doubts over the decision applied on the Black Eagle tank or the solutions in the new tank modules for existing tanks.
On the Orel, it was not the crew that was allocated to a separate armored capsule, but a new automatic loader and ammunition for the 125-mm gun, freeing up space inside the tank and strengthening its protection. The breaking of the armored capsule can lead to the death of the entire crowded crew at the same time. On the “Black Eagle” the crew, being in a spacious, well-reserved volume, was carried and had an individual hatch for everyone, breaking through the ammunition ammunition, leading the explosion through the expeller hatches upwards. Close decisions on the separation and separation of ammunition were also used on new tank modules already mentioned, Proryv and Burlak, when modernizing old tanks or releasing T-90MS. All this was cheaper and no less effective in the complex for arming the army.
The appearance in our army of a heavy infantry fighting vehicle T-15 of the Armata platform, presumably an event, for the sake of this had to fit the body of the T-14 tank to the possibility of the front and rear engine layout, but what's the point? It is unlikely that such violence over the layout has improved the dimensions of the tank itself, and in terms of economy (expensive tank base) and the combat expediency of a heavy BMP, not everything looks smooth.
The defeat of the tank in battle is fraught with the loss of the crew, we have three tankers, the defeat of a number of heavy infantry fighting vehicles, which is fraught with the loss of not only its crew, but of the entire infantry assault force, for the T-15 infantry fighting vehicles, it will be eleven people. Here, again, it is useful to remember Israel, whose emphasis on protection is so much loved by us to emphasize, advocating heavy BMPs. First, in the IDF they use not heavy infantry fighting vehicles, but heavy armored personnel carriers. Secondly, only the auxiliary machine-gun armament is put on the BTR, so that no one would even think of using them instead of tanks. Remembering the experience of others, we must remember that the same Israel is half the size of the Moscow region, that there is a dry climate and a low-water region, and the IDF operations in many respects have a police orientation against the militants. If you need a "police tank" for the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, perhaps there is a reason to do the BM-T-15 mastodons, as far as the army needs, the question.
In the USSR, for the first time in the world, the BMP appeared, a versatile and maneuverable machine. Also for the first time in the world, BMPT became a logical development of Soviet military thought, embodied in a heavy, well-reserved car, designed to help attacking tanks. Having the protection of not only inferior but superior tank, special equipment, lacking tanks, and shooters operators, instead of infantry from loopholes, BMPT and should have been the best alternative to heavy BMP. But, BMPT did not have a place in the army, which, as it were, did not specifically want to prepare for the opportunity to wage a large-scale war.
Speaking about the protection of "Kurgants-25", you can say the same thing as in T-15, adding that all of his increased booking can be nullified by its size, as a target.
The upgraded BMP-2 (“Earring”) in this seems even more preferable, both in terms of development, price-quality ratio, and reserves in the army.
The “Boomerang” platform, where special protection against explosions and unloading of infantry behind the vehicle is highlighted. Generally, this monster is impressive, if it was created only because the militants laid land mines on the roads of the marching columns of our equipment, so the land mine can always be laid more powerful, the marching columns will always be vulnerable here. The best defense of the column is its competent escort, good intelligence and skillful sappers, and not the endless reinforcement of the bottom of armored cars, under increasingly powerful land mines, especially since no one will fight on the minefields, as always only go marching columns on mined in rear roads.
What is the meaning of the new platforms, why our reformers in the field of this “ballet” with platforms in the army were ahead of the rest? For the sake of what "garden", all army armored vehicles from a clean slate were going to rewrite, billions were happy to spend on raw equipment, and decided to discard ready-made equipment and recycle thousands of pieces to start up?
Here again we have to remember the era of Anatoly Eduardovich Serdyukov (who had already forgotten - the Minister of Defense of Russia in 2007-2012). It should be noted that Vladimir Putin’s decision to appoint Anatoly Eduardovich can be explained by the fact that Serdyukov proved during his service at the Federal Tax Service (Federal Tax Service) the ability to control huge financial flows. The president then stressed that Serdyukov has experience in the field of economics and finance, and here it is necessary to control “huge budget funds” for the modernization of the armed forces. So, the first is “financial flows” in the military. To rearm them, they had to be identified and implemented.
In October, 2008, Anatoly Serdyukov announced the beginning of the transition to a "new look" of the Russian army. The transition to a new look is significant because in three years the Russian army ceased to be a reduced copy of the Soviet, mass mobilization for a big war was no longer envisaged (respectively, and the reserve equipment is not needed), just like the global armed conflict itself was considered unlikely. Russia had to get a compact, professional army capable of solving the tasks of various local conflicts and conducting anti-terrorist operations (for which the army equipment of the global war became less in demand for anti-terrorist equipment for police operations).
The size of the wartime army was set at 1,7 million versus 5 million in 2008, and the cropped, incomplete mobilized units were largely eliminated. This made the Russian army more similar to the separate armies of the small NATO countries and some of our other friends and partners. In 2008-2010, the number of officers was reduced from 350 000 to 150 000 (although it was decided to increase it to 2011 220 in 000), more than 1000 cropped units and storage bases were eliminated, 24 ground forces divisions were redeveloped in about 90 and the 72 air regiment and 14 air bases, to seven first and seven second air bases, the number of military schools reduced from 65 to 10.
In the same financial course, a grand sale of non-core assets of the Ministry of Defense, the transfer of supplies to outsourcing and the reform of arms procurement began.
The purchase of weapons, housing and materials were removed from Serdyukov from the control of the military, they began to deal with manned civilian structures of the Ministry of Defense. Anatoly Eduardovich, steering the financial flows, did not understand much in military affairs, for this was a reliable reform associate, a great innovator and tactician, the future winner of Georgia and Hero of Russia Nikolay Makarov. Plus a big fan of Mercedes and Leopards, Alexander Postnikov, plus someone’s patriot of interests, Vladimir Popovkin.
The theory of a compact army for local wars gained an idea, a single economical platform, a kind of armored transformer set. If common sense can be stepped over somewhere, then the laws of physics cannot be ignored, we had to divide the platforms into weight categories and decide on the track and wheelbase. It was announced that the main condition for the creation of families of armored vehicles is the maximum possible use on the chassis of all types of machines of unified components (assemblies, assemblies, assembly units). For example, the use of engines of the same size range. From this series, for machines of the middle category, its own structurally unified series based on a tank engine, and for light-duty vehicles, its own series based on the engine for the BMP. Respectively for systems of engines, transmissions and so on.
The principles of broad unification most fully dream to realize when creating the next enlargement, concern (holding) BTT or BTVT (armored weapons and equipment).
What is the fundamental innovation here, especially if you still have to divide the equipment into families?
Just bases for technology will be less, as expected, only four. Still old stocks that "pocket pull" will destroy, that's all.
It is noteworthy that foreign media happily commented on the emergence of new “platforms” at the parade, as if they recognized their “own” and saw their “native”. Thus, the Japanese publication “The Diplomat” enthusiastically noted: “Russian armored vehicles on the Armata platform demonstrate a complete break with the legacy of the Soviet era in weapons systems.”
Indeed, you look at the new “platforms” and think: hello, the capitalist relatives of the colonial expeditionary “Bradley”, “Warriors”, LAV-25 and “Strikers”, so now we can do that.
Farewell, "backward" Soviet tank school, your armored graceful children waiting for recycling.
However, before planning extensive cuts in their tanks, throwing money on new and indisputable ideas, it would be worthwhile to think hard about what we can build now only with pieces and dozens (even trying to sell for export), and are ready to dispose of hundreds and thousands. If not a local, but a large-scale war, there will be no time to make new tanks, nothing, and nowhere else. In fact, we already have only one "UVZ".
For your information, as reported, Omsktransmash (Omsk Tank Plant) was in bankruptcy proceedings since 2002. For almost 14 years, almost all of the assets of the company were sold in the process of being transferred to other owners or sold. Of all the assets left only two non-residential premises in Omsk on the street. Karelo-Finnish and 10-th Cheredova - for the price on which creditors insist, nobody wanted to buy them. Two more rooms on the street. Grizodubova, 20, sold, but for some reason the money was not received for them. To bring the bankruptcy procedure to the end and with a light heart to sign liquidation acts, the bankruptcy trustee of the plant Yuri Remizov asked the court to extend the bankruptcy proceedings for another six months. After examining the arguments presented, the arbitration agreed with him, but he shortened the requested period to two months. The end date of the bankruptcy proceedings, that is, in effect, the liquidation of one of the largest tank manufacturers in the USSR, fell, by a strange coincidence, on May 9 - Victory Day.
So, if we are to thank for the new platforms of Anatoly Eduardovich and his “brothers in arms”, it’s just that these platforms have not become imported, and that so far not all of the Soviet ones have been destroyed. In general, it is somehow difficult to believe in the good deeds of those who caused so much damage to the defense of our country. They always want “the best”, justifying short-sighted or criminal decisions. If we are talking about unification, this will bring the matter to the point of absurdity, and the good attempts of the reformers will turn into even greater problems for the army. If the economy, so under its slogans will throw away and squeeze billions.
Of course, there is no point in denying the benefits of the new and the modern, everything that is being done for the good of Russia, the whole question of when, who and how will do it. It is useful to remember that many technologies were lost, entire design schools died. In addition, the Ministry of Defense, while ordering new equipment, simultaneously eliminated its own scientific research institutes and test sites. But it is not enough to design and even build new equipment; it should be tested using specially designed programs, first in closed landfills, then in the military. Only after that make a decision, what is done is suitable for service in the army, or it requires serious improvement. The introduction of the new model in the system, it is a whole science, which for a quarter of a century has practically been lost. Much to revive.
The president gave the command to equip the army with armored novelties, but they are still raw. Now, in any case, all will take?
The enterprising gentlemen would not break the firewood here, would not this new-fashioned “platform” for our army have become a bitter “panel” in the interests of the selfish business; even worse, a fatal mistake of a grandiose experiment under a good excuse.
Any technique is aging, there is always something better, and one thing is to make replacements, having a more diverse technique, and another thing is if everything becomes obsolete at the same time, if you again have to rewrite everything from scratch. Is it good when single “platforms” start to be presented as a panacea for military progress? Recall the initial idea of IBM (at one time each new Pentium, II, III, IV, buried the previous one, along with the already cracked dream of an eternal “open architecture”). It did not work out universal modularity for all times and all cases, even on the basis of a single computer platform. We will create a precedent, there will be more than one, even four platforms for armored vehicles, we will write off the “old” in the scrap. But these platforms will become obsolete, and the entire uncontested fleet of armored vehicles on it will become obsolete at the same time, even worse if the concept of such universal "economy" becomes outdated earlier or becomes untenable. At the same time, you will either have to return to the “diversity of types”, leaving the equipment from the previous platform, or each time start all over again, completely re-equipping with all the new “platforms”.
The security of the country, military equipment is hardly the level when it can be measured by the same standard as changing the population of mobile phones or updating the fleet of cars.
Naturally, I can be mistaken, sincerely mistaken and "carry excellent nonsense." There are doubts, inevitable questions arise, and it would be strange if those who make fateful decisions on Russia's security do not have questions. The war on the threshold is one thing, if I make a mistake, I will even set myself up as a fool here, we won’t lose the war, and it is incomparably worse if our leaders and commanding fathers make mistakes.
It remains to hope and simply believe that smart people will sort out everything and make the right decisions, both with the new and old equipment, and with a competent understanding of the defense of Russia in the war.
He said how he could, hardly many people will like my sad thoughts. Who cares, comment in the comments. Maybe something will change for the better from our thoughts, after all, the main thing is not personal ambitions, but order in tank units and strong defense of Russia. Peace to your home!
Used materials from sites:
http://www.vedomosti.ru
http://takya.ru
http://www.autoshcool.ru
http://3mv.ru
http://zasssr.info
http://omskgazzeta.ru
http://rufor.org
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