Tsushima Myths (Part of 2)
On the incompetence of Rozhestvensky as a naval commander
We'll talk about tactics later, but now I’ll just quote the words of the British historian Westwood:
Especially at the same time, I would like to note that some of the ships of Rozhestvensky were just from the stocks (they simply did not have time to cure all childhood diseases), and the crews were not fused - there were many newcomers. Nevertheless, not a single ship fell behind, broke, etc. It would be strange to deny the commander in this merit.
On the recall of the squadron - as the admiral of the king could not convince.
It seems just born a new myth. Alexander Samsonov writes:
Generally speaking, this was the case. The news of the death of the 1 squadron caught Rozhestvensky while stationary in Madagascar. The Admiral received the Admiralty telegram with the following content:
In other words, the role of the squadron of Rozhestvensky decisively changed - instead of serving as a reinforcement for the 1 Pacific, it suddenly became the main striking force charged with defeating the enemy’s fleet at sea. The admiral replied:
Is this now called “hint”? I just can not imagine how you can put it more clearly. However, the admiral received an order — and how a military man had to fulfill it or die.
On the “high-speed wing” of the Russian squadron
A lot of criticism is devoted to the decision of Admiral Rozhestvensky to tie in a single harness “a horse and a quivering doe” - high-speed armadillos like “Borodino” and “Oslyabya” together with the old slug-shooters “Navarin”, “Sisoy”, “Nakhimov”, etc.
From the testimony of the captain 2 rank Schwede:
It is known that on the battleship Borodino, when leaving the Baltic at an 15 speed, the eccentrics were unacceptably hot, but then this deficiency seemed to be corrected. However, the captain of the 2 rank, VI Semenov, wrote about tactical performance of the squadron more:
Rozhestvensky reported on his newest ships to the Commission of Inquiry:
Unfortunately, Rozhestvensky had no “high-speed wing”. Yes, his 4 "Borodino" and "Oslyabya" could indeed give a slightly larger move than the old battleships of the second and third detachments, but their speed would still be inferior to the armored detachments of the Japanese. And Admiral Rozhestvensky, giving explanations to the Commission of Inquiry, was absolutely right when he said:
Twelve Japanese battleships acted in close formation, concentrating their fire in the first period of the battle, successively on the lead ones, from among our most high-speed battleships, who nevertheless received some support from the followers of the Matels.
If four or five of our battleships, having developed their maximum speed, separated from their weak comrades, the Japanese battleships, having the opportunity to develop a speed greater than our best walkers, would have kept their way and, only in a shorter period of time, would have overcome with concentrated forces the color of our squadron, in order, then, jokingly, to overtake and overcome the abandoned.
Why didn't the admiral divide the squadron into two units?
I have repeatedly met such a reconstruction - if the admiral would send the most modern ships on one route (for example, around Japan) and another detachment of old ships to Tsushima, say, the strait, then the Japanese would not be able to intercept both of these detachments and as a result some ships would go to Vladivostok. In fact, this is an extremely controversial issue. If Rozhdestvensky had divided the squadron, the Japanese could easily have intercepted the weakest part first, defeated it, then refuel with coal, ammunition and go near Vladivostok, meet the strongest part of the squadron. And if Rozhdestvensky ordered the weakest part to slow down, so that the two parts forced the straits - Tsushima and Sangarsky - simultaneously, then the Japanese, who had orders to go north, did not appear Rozhestvensky at the estimated time in the Tsushima Strait, would have caught him without the weakest part. It is possible that the weakest in this course of events and would get to Vladivostok, but ...
Rozhdestvensky did not have an order "to pass part of the ships to Vladivostok." He had the task of defeating the Japanese fleet in a general battle. It would be best to try to do this by first going to Vladivostok and giving the crew rest there, but the fact of the matter is that by dividing the squadron in two, the admiral doomed at least one of the halves to death and could no longer fight the Japanese fleet. Therefore, the admiral chose to go with the whole squadron - and either go unnoticed to Vladivostok, or give a general battle to the Japanese fleet along the road.
On the passivity of the commander in battle
Let's try to figure out what he did and what Rozhestvensky did in that battle. Let's start with a simple one - the admiral is constantly reproached for the lack of a battle plan brought to his subordinates.
What did the Russian admiral know?
First - that his squadron, alas, is no match for the Japanese. The admiral believed that the Japanese were faster, better floated and better shot (despite all the tricks of Rozhestvensky to improve their gunners). Tellingly, the admiral was right in everything.
Secondly, that geography is obviously against the Russians. The 2 and 3 Pacific squadrons needed to force a relatively narrow strait, and he was confronted by a much more high-speed adversary. In those days, the “wand over T” was considered the best method of naval warfare, when the enemy, following a wake column, bumped his head directly into the center of the enemy line. In this case, put the "wand" could fire all overboard all their battleships, in turn knocking out enemy ships, but got under the "wand" was in an extremely disadvantageous position. So, salvation from the "wand" in Rozhestvensky was not. It is not so easy to put a “stick over T” in the open sea, but if the enemy is forcing the strait, it’s another thing. Rozhdestvensky will walk in the wake of the wake and will be buried in the structure of the Japanese ships deployed to the front. Himself deployed front line? Then Togo will be reconstructed in the wake and will fall into the flank of the Russian squadron.
Being in a deliberately disadvantageous tactical situation, Rozhdestvensky, willy-nilly, was forced to give the initiative to the Japanese, hoping only that they would make a mistake and give the Russian commander some chance. And the task of Rozhestvensky in essence was only one - not to miss this chance, about which the admiral said:
... It was clear that, due to the comparative speed of the Japanese battleships, the initiative in choosing the relative location of the main forces, both for the start of the battle and for various stages of it, as well as in choosing distances, would belong to the enemy. It was expected that the enemy would maneuver in battle in the wake of the wake. It was assumed that he would take advantage of the speed and would strive to focus his artillery on our flanks.
The second squadron was left to recognize the initiative of actions in battle for the Japanese - and therefore, not only about the advance elaboration of the details of the battle plan in its different periods, as in a two-sided forged maneuver, but also about deploying forces for delivering the first strike. and speeches. "
But still - how Rozhestvensky was going to lead the battle? In order to understand this, we must also remember that the Russian commander had information about the battle at Shantung. The reports of the commanders of the ships were a document that was compiled and handed over to the authorities by the authorities strictly, no one had yet blamed the Russian imperial fleet for lack of bureaucracy. Accordingly, the admiral knew:
1) That the Russian squadron, with approximately equal forces, fought for almost 4 hours with the enemy.
2) That during this very fierce battle, the Japanese failed to disable ANY Russian battleship and even the lightly armored "Peresvet", having received 40 hits, still did not leave the ranks and could still hold on
3) That the battleships of the 1st Pacific had every chance of breaking through, and the reason for the failure was the loss of control of the squadron, which followed the death of the admiral and the confusion that arose after that
In other words, the admiral saw that as long as the Arthur armadillos kept their ranks and the will to go forward, the Japanese could not do anything with them. Why, then, should everything be different in Tsushima? Here are the words of the Rozhestvensky Investigation Commission:
Therefore, the admiral did exactly what he did — led his ships into the Tsushima Strait, hoping that, being guided by the situation, he would be able to prevent the “wand over T.” And then break the closed system 12 of his armored ships that have superiority over the United Fleet in numbers heavy guns, the Japanese will not. And the commanders of the ships gave the most general instructions - to keep in line and no matter what to go to Vladivostok.
Going into the Tsushima Strait Rozhestvensky not organized intelligence
Let's think about what intelligence information the cruiser patrol forward could provide to Rozhestvensky.
Why do we need intelligence before the fight? Very simple - the task of the cruisers is to detect and keep the contact with the enemy. And if cruisers are able to perform this task - well, then they will become the eyes of the commander in chief, passing him the courses / speeds and the characteristics of building an enemy. Having received this information, the commander will be able to reorganize and, by the time the enemy appears on the horizon, deploy his forces so as to bring them into battle in the best possible way.
But Togo surpassed the Russians in cruisers by about half. Therefore, the cruiser detachment, which Rozhestvensky could have sent forward, had no chance to keep contact with the Japanese for a long time — they would be driven away, and they could try to fight — they could also defeat, taking advantage of their strength and having the ability to rely on armored cruisers Kamimura. But even if cruisers were allowed, at the cost of their own blood, they would have been able to inform Rozhestvensky of the position, course and speed of the Japanese, and he would go out on them in the best way possible and put the Japanese admiral in an uncomfortable tactical situation for him. Who hindered Togo, taking advantage of the speed advantage to retreat, in half an hour to begin everything in a new way?
Sending forward cruisers, with greater chances of losing these cruisers, did not give the Russians any advantage. The only benefit from this intelligence could only be taken by Kheikhatiro Togo - having discovered the Russian cruisers, he would understand that the Russians march through the Tsushima a little earlier than it did in reality. However small the Russian squadron had the chance to slip through the strait unnoticed, they should have been used, and sending the cruisers forward significantly reduced the likelihood of passing undetected.
The admiral himself stated the following:
The admiral did not take the opportunity to destroy the Japanese cruisers
In my opinion, Rozhestvensky really should have tried to drown the Izumi, attacking him with Oleg, Aurora, and perhaps other cruisers. Of course, there was no strategic sense in this, but victory would have raised the spirit of the crews, which in battle is not the last thing. Refusing to attack "Izumi" I tend to interpret as an admiral's mistake.
But the rejection of the attack of other Japanese cruisers (5-th and 6-th combat detachments), I think absolutely correct. The commander did not have enough cruising forces to destroy both of these squadrons, and there was no way to attack them with the main forces. First, given the fact that even 4 battleships like Borodino could hardly go more than on 13,5-14 nodes, there could be no attack at all - our battleships simply could not overtake the enemy. And secondly, if at that moment, when the Russians broke down the line, sending part of their battleships to chase Japanese ships suddenly descended on Togo with their 1 and 2 armored troops ... it would have turned out quite bad.
The famous "loop of Togo". Now, if Rozhdestvensky had fallen upon his high-speed armadillos on the unfolding "consistently" of the Japanese fleet, then ...
There is an interesting version of Chistyakov (“A quarter of an hour for Russian cannons”) that Rozhestvensky has misled Kheikhatiro Togo with a number of unobvious maneuvers. According to Chistyakov, Togo saw that the Russians were walking in two columns and instead of putting a “wand over T” he turned towards our squadron. As a result of the actions of Rozhdestvensky Kheykhatiro of Togo, it seemed that the 1 unit, consisting of the newest battleships, was late in rebuilding and did not have time to take its place in the head of the column. In this case, Togo, at the expense of the Russian squadron on the countercourse, would have crushed the old ships of the 2 and 3 Russian troops without any problems, and they would have won the battle. However, due to the fact that Rozhestvensky in advance brought his 1 squad forward, rebuilding took much less time than Togo had thought and would have to disperse on countercourses with the latest Russian armadillos, which was extremely fraught - especially for Japanese armored cruisers, whose armor did could not resist 305-mm projectiles. As a result, Togo was forced to urgently turn back the course - Rozhestvensky caught him. Now the Japanese ships, turning successively, were passing the same place, having shot at which, the Russians had the opportunity to bring down a hail of shells on the enemy ships.
So it was or not - we will never know. Rozhestvensky himself did not speak about the “Loop of Togo” as a consequence of his tactics, which, again, means absolutely nothing - it makes no sense to talk about the brilliant implementation of his tactical plans if your squadron is destroyed.
However, absolutely all analysts agree that in the outset of the battle X. Togo put his squadron in a very dangerous position. And here I have to repeat myself and say what I wrote earlier - the task of Admiral Togo was to realize their tactical advantages and put a “wand over T” of the Russian squadron. The task of Admiral Rozhestvensky, if possible, was to prevent the Japanese from realizing their tactical advantage and avoiding the “wand over T”. And, although we do not know to what extent it is Rozhestvensky’s merit, in the outset of the battle, the task of the Russian admiral was solved successfully, but the Japanese admiral still failed his task. One can argue for a long time about why this happened, but I do not understand how to write down the obvious tactical success of the Russians in the passivity of the Russian command.
But the Japanese flagship Mikasa, raising fountains of water, turned around and lay down on the opposite course. And here, according to most analysts, Rozhestvensky missed a brilliant opportunity to attack the enemy. Instead of going the same course, he should have commanded a “turn all of a sudden” and attacked the enemy with the force of his high-speed battleships, i.e. 1 squad and Oslyab. And then, having come close to the Japanese on a pistol shot, it would be possible to turn the battle into a dump for a short distance, which, if it did not bring us victory, it certainly would have made the Japanese pay the real price for it.
Let's take a closer look at this opportunity.
The problem is that to this very day there are no reliable schemes for maneuvering squadrons during the battle. For example, it is still unclear where exactly this most famous “Loop” was located with respect to Russian battleships, since here Japanese and Russian sources diverge in testimony. Different sources show a different course angle for the Japanese, and the range ranges from 8 to 45 degrees. We will not find out the exact mutual arrangement of the squadrons at the time of the start of the battle, this is a topic of a large and separate study, which is not the place. The fact is that regardless of whether the angle on the Japanese ships was equal to 4 points (45 degrees) or two or less, the problem of “jerk on the enemy” is ... in its obvious meaninglessness.
Let's look at one of the many schemes of the Tsushima battle - it is not quite correct, but for our purposes it is still quite suitable.
What is interesting is that by continuing to move as Rozhestvensky did, more and more of our battleships had the opportunity to connect to the turning point of the turning point - simply because as the Russian column moved forward, its ships very quickly approached the enemy. In other words, the course of the Russian squadron maximized the power of our fire.
And now let's see what would happen if the Russian advanced battleships "all suddenly" turned on the enemy. In this case, four or five Russian battleships would rapidly approach the enemy, but!
Firstly - their fire would have been weakened - aft twelve-inch towers could not shoot at the enemy.
Secondly, battleships moving to a “pivot point” would block with their corps the shelling sector of the slower ships of the 2 and 3 units following the previous course and thus, in the battlefield, Russian fire would be kept to a minimum.
Third, let us imagine for a moment that Heyhatiro Togo, seeing the Russian battleships rushing at him, commands ... a turn to the right. In this case, the first armored detachment of the Japanese will consistently place a “wand over T”, first to the attacking battleships of the Borodino type, and then to the column of the 2 and 3 of the Russian troops! The price of rendezvous for our ships would be truly brilliant.
And, finally, in the fourth. It is certainly fair to say that Togo “substituted” with its “noose”, being in a very unprofitable tactical position. But it is absolutely true that at the end of this unfortunate reversal, the tactical advantage returned again to the Japanese - in essence, having turned to the right, they set that same “wand over T” to Rozhestvensky that they were aiming for. In other words, if the Russians really possessed a “high-speed wing,” they could have fallen upon the Japanese, but the gain from this would have been minimal. Too few guns could hit the Japanese during the rendezvous, and then the advanced Russian squad would be under fire at the 12 of Japanese armored ships, and the newest Russian battleships would be easy prey for Togo’s main forces.
Of course, if the Russian battleships had the opportunity to quickly rush forward (and they did not have it) and concentrated fire on the enemy's armored cruisers, then perhaps one or two such cruisers would have been drowned. Maybe. But the price paid for this was the rapid death of the newest Rozhdestvensky battleships and a no less rapid defeat of the remaining forces. In essence, this is why the option of a “cavalry attack” seems so attractive to today's analysts - to lose, so at least not to the dry!
But such analysts forget about their after-knowledge. They know that the Russian squadron lost almost dry. But they forget that Rozhestvensky had no place to know about it!
The Japanese could not knock out any of the battleships of Vitgeft under Shantung during the nearly four-hour battle - how did Rozhestvensky even guess that both Suvorov and Oslyabya would lose combat capability in some three-quarters of an hour? Throwing the newest Russian battleships to the Japanese turning point would, at best, exchange the main force of a squadron for one or two armored cruisers of Japan. This could be done only if there was a firm conviction that, otherwise, the color of the Russian fleet would die without any good at all. But how could anyone have such confidence at the very beginning of the fight?
Based on that experience and understanding of the situation, which only the Russian admiral could have, he made a completely reasonable decision, which looked at the TOTAL moment right only - he continued to move in a column, concentrating fire on the flagship, while other ships unable to shoot according to Mikas, because of the range or unfavorable exchange angles, they were beaten at the turning point. The result - 25 hits on Japanese ships in 15 minutes - three quarters of what Witgeft’s squadron achieved in almost 4 hours.
However, it should be understood that all these arguments are purely speculative - in Rozhestvensky, in principle, it was not possible to throw their ships at the “pivot point”. He did not have a “high-speed wing”, since armadillos of the “Borodino” type to Tsushima could not develop the passport speed. By the time when Mikas turned around, lay down on the opposite course, the Russian squadron had not yet completed the rebuilding - Oslyabya was forced to break down so as not to ram the ships of the 1 squadron, but they had not yet completed the turn. Try to Rozhestvensky from this position to command a “turn all of a sudden” on the enemy, you would have an enchanting mess completely breaking the squadron's line - even if Rozhestvensky would have 18-nodal battleships, he still had to wait until the squad completed the rebuilding. And do not talk about non-glorification of Russian ships. Theoretically, the same Togo, instead of its famous "loop", could easily have commanded a "turn everything all of a sudden" and quickly break the distance with Russian ships. This would solve all the problems that had arisen for him and would not force him to substitute his ships at the turning point. However, the Japanese admiral did not dare - he was afraid of losing control of the squadron, because in this case his flagship would be the terminal in the convoy. In Russian, however, maneuvering was worse than that of the Japanese, and an attempt to rebuild from an unfinished maneuver would most likely lead to the fact that the front would be attacked by Suvorov and Alexander, rather than Borodino and Orel, which had not completed the U-turn would go to the wake of Alexandra. As for Oslyab, due to the fact that this battleship had to stop the vehicles, letting the 1 armored detachment go ahead, he would have to catch his place in the ranks.
Admiral Rozhestvensky acted rationally and competently in the battlefield, and the further actions of the Russian squadron also did not indicate the passivity of its command.
Soon after his turnaround, which initiated the "loop of Togo", Mikasa turned again, stepping over to the course of the Russian squadron. In other words, Admiral Togo nevertheless received his “wand over T,” now his flagship and the battleships following him, being at sharp course corners from the Russians, could concentrate the fire on Suvorov with almost no impunity. The only way out of this situation would be to turn the Russian squadron to the right in order to lie on a course parallel to the Japanese, but ... Rozhdestvensky does not do this. His task is to squeeze everything up to the drop from the initial advantage that the "loop of Togo" gave him and the Russian admiral leads his squadron, not paying attention to the fire concentrating on its flagship. But then the Japanese are completing the U-turn, their terminal ships leave the sectors of the Russian shelling and stay on the same course no longer makes sense - then and only then in 14.10 "Suvorov" turns right. Now the Russian squadron is in a losing position, the battleships of Togo, having gone forward, can beat the Russian column “head” unhindered, but nothing can be done about it for now — this is the price for the 15 minutes to “work” on the “loop of Togo”. So Rozhestvensky to the end used his chance, despite the powerful fire that struck his flagship and what is the “passivity” here? For some time, the battle goes on in parallel columns, with the Japanese gradually overtaking the Russian squadron, but in 14.32, almost simultaneously, three tragic events occur. Oslyabya breaks down, loses control and leaves the Suvorov line, and Admiral Rozhestvensky receives a heavy wound and loses the ability to command a squadron.
On this occasion there are, of course, different opinions. For example, the famous writer Novikov-Priboy, in his military science fiction work Tsushima, writes that the admiral’s injury was insignificant and did not prevent him from leading the battle. However, given the fact that subsequently the Japanese doctors in Sasebo for TWO MONTHS did not dare to remove the fragments of the skull that had gone deep into the skull of the admiral, let us doubt this. In 14.32, Rozhestvensky’s participation in the Tsushima battle came to an end, but what happened next? Disorder? Reel? Complete passivity of commanders, as taught by Folks History? Analysts usually call the time that followed the failure of the "Prince Suvorov" "a period of anonymous command." Well, maybe it is, but let's see how the “anonymous” commanded.
The commander of the following battleship Suvorov, the Emperor Alexander III, sends his ship after the flagship, but quickly realizing that he can no longer lead a squadron, he takes command. I am writing - “commander” and not “Life Guards Captain 1 of the rank of Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov” because this battleship was killed with the whole crew and we will never know who headed the ship at one time or another. I believe that the honor of leading a squadron at the appointed time was precisely N. M. Bukhvostov, but I can't know for sure.
It would seem that the situation is critical - both flagships are beaten up and out of order, and what should the commander feel? The enemy seems to be unharmed, his position is better and more advantageous, the Japanese guns spew an ocean of flaming steel, and it seems that the horizon breathes fire on you. The fate of your ship is destined, you are the next after the flagship and now the fiery hell will fall upon you, which has just crushed the one who was ahead of you. The unbearable burden of responsibility for the squadron suddenly collapses on your shoulders, but human flesh is weak ... And, probably, you want so much to break out of it all, turn away, leave the battle even for a little bit, give at least a small respite to tormented nerves, get together with strength ...
The commander of the "Alexander" saw the mistake of Togo - he advanced too far his first armored detachment and the Russian ships had a chance to slip under the stern of his battleships. But for this you need - what a little! Turn around and lead the squadron directly to the enemy. Himself substitute for "wand over T". Then a hail of shells will fall on you from all Japanese 12 ships, and you will surely perish. But the squadron led by you, having passed the path laid by you, will put the "crossing T" on both groups of the Japanese - Togo and Kamimure!
"Emperor Alexander III" turns ... ON THE OPPONENT!
Tell me, o Connoisseurs of Sea Wars, how often in stories there was such a thing for humanity that the squadron fought fiercely but without result for almost an hour, suffered losses, and suddenly, suddenly lost its flagships, but did not retreat, did not numb in despair, and instead rushed into a fierce, suicidal attack on a triumphant enemy ?!
What a spectacle it was ... A huge, black leviathan with a golden two-headed eagle on the stem, in foam and splashes pushing the lead wave, suddenly turns to the left, and mercilessly smoking with both pipes, rushes straight at the enemy line, in its very center! Through the fountains of water, uplifted by the enemy shells, through the whirlwind of fierce fire, the Russian battleship attacks the attack, as if the ancient knight were striking a mortal without asking for mercy, but not giving it to anyone. And the guns are beaten from both sides, and the superstructures smoked, marked by the rage of enemy fire, are lit up with flashes of their own volleys and fire of burning fires. Ave, Neptune, doomed to death welcome you!
But following him, stretched out in a strict line, turn the squadron ships led by him and the lights of the shots run over their dark silhouettes ...
Verily, that was their glorious hour!
Almost hopeless - but still an attempt to turn the tide of battle. Tactically, to 14.35 the position of the Russian squadron was completely losing, it was necessary to change something. "Emperor Alexander III" went on the attack, exchanging himself for a better position for the rest of the Russian ships, from which they could inflict serious losses on the Japanese. Admiral Rozhestvensky had no right and could not do such a thing in the outset of the battle - he did not yet know the true balance of power between the Russian and Japanese squadrons. But the commander of the “Emperor Alexander III”, after forty-five minutes of the battle, he knew, and did not hesitate for a second in his suicidal decision.
He almost succeeded. Of course, Heyhatiro Togo could not allow the Russians to put a “wand over T” to their squad. And so he turns "all at once" - now he is leaving the Russian ships. This, of course, is the right decision, but now the ships of Togo are turned astern to the Russian order and the situation, albeit briefly, is changing again in our favor. The effectiveness of the Russian fire increases - it was at this time that the 305-mm projectile, breaking through the armor of a tower-like installation of the Fuji battleship, exploded inside, and the Asama, an armored cruiser, received two projectiles, sat aft of one and a half meters and then stopped for some time, and then until 17.10 can take its place in the line.
Truly, if the theory of probability, this venal girl of young Japanese imperialism, would have shown justice to Russian sailors even for a second, the Japanese would have lost these two ships. Alas, history does not know the subjunctive mood ... And then, "Emperor Alexander III", who received the hardest damage, was forced to leave the line. The honor and the right to lead the squadron went to "Borodino".
As a result of the heroic attack of the Guards battleship, supported by the entire Russian squadron, our soldiers managed to temporarily knock out one Japanese ship, the Assamu, but by that time the three newest battleships of the squadron: Prince Suvorov, Oslyabya and Emperor Alexander III "were practically non-capable. All hope of winning the battle was lost. Nevertheless, in the future the Russian ships fought with dignity, fulfilling the order of their admiral: "Go to Vladivostok!"
It was. But the "grateful" descendants, on the anniversary of the thundering battle, will not find other words, except:
The paper will endure all, because the dead are already all the same.
And us?
To be continued
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