Tsushima Myths (Part of 2)




On the incompetence of Rozhestvensky as a naval commander

We'll talk about tactics later, but now I’ll just quote the words of the British historian Westwood:

For coal steam ships of the pre-turbine epoch, a trip from Libava to the Sea of ​​Japan with complete absence of friendly bases along the way was a real feat - an epic deserving a separate book


Especially at the same time, I would like to note that some of the ships of Rozhestvensky were just from the stocks (they simply did not have time to cure all childhood diseases), and the crews were not fused - there were many newcomers. Nevertheless, not a single ship fell behind, broke, etc. It would be strange to deny the commander in this merit.

On the recall of the squadron - as the admiral of the king could not convince.

It seems just born a new myth. Alexander Samsonov writes:

The news of the fall of Port Arthur even inspired Rozhestvensky to doubt the expediency of the march. True, Rozhestvensky confined himself only to the resignation report and hints about the need to return the ships.


Generally speaking, this was the case. The news of the death of the 1 squadron caught Rozhestvensky while stationary in Madagascar. The Admiral received the Admiralty telegram with the following content:

“Now that Port Arthur has fallen, the 2 squadron must fully restore our position at sea and prevent the enemy’s army from communicating with its country.”


In other words, the role of the squadron of Rozhestvensky decisively changed - instead of serving as a reinforcement for the 1 Pacific, it suddenly became the main striking force charged with defeating the enemy’s fleet at sea. The admiral replied:

“With the forces at my disposal, I don’t hope to restore the prevailing position at sea. My only possible task is to go to Vladivostok with the best ships and, based there, act on the messages of the enemy.”


Is this now called “hint”? I just can not imagine how you can put it more clearly. However, the admiral received an order — and how a military man had to fulfill it or die.

On the “high-speed wing” of the Russian squadron

A lot of criticism is devoted to the decision of Admiral Rozhestvensky to tie in a single harness “a horse and a quivering doe” - high-speed armadillos like “Borodino” and “Oslyabya” together with the old slug-shooters “Navarin”, “Sisoy”, “Nakhimov”, etc.

From the testimony of the captain 2 rank Schwede:

I can say with confidence that, if necessary, the battleship "Eagle" could not give that move, which he gave at the trial of machines in Kronstadt, i.e. near 18 nodes ... ... I think that the most complete course, under all favorable conditions , while spending better coal roaming and replacing tired firemen with another shift, could give, before receiving holes and water on decks, - no more than 15 - 16 nodes.


It is known that on the battleship Borodino, when leaving the Baltic at an 15 speed, the eccentrics were unacceptably hot, but then this deficiency seemed to be corrected. However, the captain of the 2 rank, VI Semenov, wrote about tactical performance of the squadron more:

“I’m giving feedback from mechanics with whom I had to talk more than once: Suvorov and Alexander III could count on 15-16 nodes; on Borodino, with 12 nodes, eccentrics and thrust bearings started to warm up; Orel was not sure at all in my car ... "


Rozhestvensky reported on his newest ships to the Commission of Inquiry:

“On May 14, the new battleships of the squadron could develop up to 13½ turn points, and the rest from 11½ to 12½. The cruiser "Oleg", with a cylinder damaged in Kronstadt, tightened by a holder, could of necessity go 18 nodes, with alarm, however, for the integrity of the machine. The cruisers “Svetlana”, “Aurora”, “Ural” and “Almaz” could also have 18-nodal motion, and “Almaz”, as always, would risk the integrity of its steam pipes. The cruisers "Pearl" and "Emerald" could make short transitions on 20 nodes with a huge consumption of oil. The cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh had the maximum speed of 13 knots. "


Unfortunately, Rozhestvensky had no “high-speed wing”. Yes, his 4 "Borodino" and "Oslyabya" could indeed give a slightly larger move than the old battleships of the second and third detachments, but their speed would still be inferior to the armored detachments of the Japanese. And Admiral Rozhestvensky, giving explanations to the Commission of Inquiry, was absolutely right when he said:

Taking into account that in the second detachment of battleships, Navarin could not develop more than 12, and the third detachment had a maximum speed of 11½ knots, the main battleships, in closed ranks, had no right to hold more 10 knots. According to the current opinion, the battle could have taken a different turn, if the battleships of different mobility did not seek to keep together, but were divided into separately operating units. I do not agree with this opinion.

Twelve Japanese battleships acted in close formation, concentrating their fire in the first period of the battle, successively on the lead ones, from among our most high-speed battleships, who nevertheless received some support from the followers of the Matels.

If four or five of our battleships, having developed their maximum speed, separated from their weak comrades, the Japanese battleships, having the opportunity to develop a speed greater than our best walkers, would have kept their way and, only in a shorter period of time, would have overcome with concentrated forces the color of our squadron, in order, then, jokingly, to overtake and overcome the abandoned.


Why didn't the admiral divide the squadron into two units?

I have repeatedly met such a reconstruction - if the admiral would send the most modern ships on one route (for example, around Japan) and another detachment of old ships to Tsushima, say, the strait, then the Japanese would not be able to intercept both of these detachments and as a result some ships would go to Vladivostok. In fact, this is an extremely controversial issue. If Rozhdestvensky had divided the squadron, the Japanese could easily have intercepted the weakest part first, defeated it, then refuel with coal, ammunition and go near Vladivostok, meet the strongest part of the squadron. And if Rozhdestvensky ordered the weakest part to slow down, so that the two parts forced the straits - Tsushima and Sangarsky - simultaneously, then the Japanese, who had orders to go north, did not appear Rozhestvensky at the estimated time in the Tsushima Strait, would have caught him without the weakest part. It is possible that the weakest in this course of events and would get to Vladivostok, but ...

Rozhdestvensky did not have an order "to pass part of the ships to Vladivostok." He had the task of defeating the Japanese fleet in a general battle. It would be best to try to do this by first going to Vladivostok and giving the crew rest there, but the fact of the matter is that by dividing the squadron in two, the admiral doomed at least one of the halves to death and could no longer fight the Japanese fleet. Therefore, the admiral chose to go with the whole squadron - and either go unnoticed to Vladivostok, or give a general battle to the Japanese fleet along the road.

On the passivity of the commander in battle

Let's try to figure out what he did and what Rozhestvensky did in that battle. Let's start with a simple one - the admiral is constantly reproached for the lack of a battle plan brought to his subordinates.

What did the Russian admiral know?

First - that his squadron, alas, is no match for the Japanese. The admiral believed that the Japanese were faster, better floated and better shot (despite all the tricks of Rozhestvensky to improve their gunners). Tellingly, the admiral was right in everything.

Secondly, that geography is obviously against the Russians. The 2 and 3 Pacific squadrons needed to force a relatively narrow strait, and he was confronted by a much more high-speed adversary. In those days, the “wand over T” was considered the best method of naval warfare, when the enemy, following a wake column, bumped his head directly into the center of the enemy line. In this case, put the "wand" could fire all overboard all their battleships, in turn knocking out enemy ships, but got under the "wand" was in an extremely disadvantageous position. So, salvation from the "wand" in Rozhestvensky was not. It is not so easy to put a “stick over T” in the open sea, but if the enemy is forcing the strait, it’s another thing. Rozhdestvensky will walk in the wake of the wake and will be buried in the structure of the Japanese ships deployed to the front. Himself deployed front line? Then Togo will be reconstructed in the wake and will fall into the flank of the Russian squadron.

Being in a deliberately disadvantageous tactical situation, Rozhdestvensky, willy-nilly, was forced to give the initiative to the Japanese, hoping only that they would make a mistake and give the Russian commander some chance. And the task of Rozhestvensky in essence was only one - not to miss this chance, about which the admiral said:

"The goal, which was pursued by the squadron during the break through the Korean Strait, determined the essence of the battle plan: the squadron had to maneuver so that, acting on the enemy, to the extent possible, move north ...

... It was clear that, due to the comparative speed of the Japanese battleships, the initiative in choosing the relative location of the main forces, both for the start of the battle and for various stages of it, as well as in choosing distances, would belong to the enemy. It was expected that the enemy would maneuver in battle in the wake of the wake. It was assumed that he would take advantage of the speed and would strive to focus his artillery on our flanks.

The second squadron was left to recognize the initiative of actions in battle for the Japanese - and therefore, not only about the advance elaboration of the details of the battle plan in its different periods, as in a two-sided forged maneuver, but also about deploying forces for delivering the first strike. and speeches. "


But still - how Rozhestvensky was going to lead the battle? In order to understand this, we must also remember that the Russian commander had information about the battle at Shantung. The reports of the commanders of the ships were a document that was compiled and handed over to the authorities by the authorities strictly, no one had yet blamed the Russian imperial fleet for lack of bureaucracy. Accordingly, the admiral knew:

1) That the Russian squadron fought for nearly an hour with the enemy with approximately equal forces.

2) That during this very fierce battle, the Japanese did not manage to disable ANY Russian battleship and even the lightly armored Peresvet, having received 40 hits, still did not leave the line and could still hold

3) That the battleships of the 1 th Pacific had every chance of breaking through, and the cause of failure was the loss of controllability of the squadron, which followed the death of the admiral and the confusion that arose after that

In other words, the admiral saw that as long as the Arthur armadillos kept their ranks and the will to go forward, the Japanese could not do anything with them. Why, then, should everything be different in Tsushima? Here are the words of the Rozhestvensky Investigation Commission:

I expected that the squadron would meet in the Korean Strait or near it concentrated forces of the Japanese fleet, a significant proportion of armored and light cruisers and the entire mine fleet. I was sure that a general battle would occur in the daytime, and, at night, the squadron ships would be attacked by the entire presence of the Japanese mine fleet. Nevertheless, I could not allow thoughts of the complete extermination of the squadron, and, by analogy with the July 28 battle of 1904, had reason to consider it possible to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships.


Therefore, the admiral did exactly what he did — led his ships into the Tsushima Strait, hoping that, being guided by the situation, he would be able to prevent the “wand over T.” And then break the closed system 12 of his armored ships that have superiority over the United Fleet in numbers heavy guns, the Japanese will not. And the commanders of the ships gave the most general instructions - to keep in line and no matter what to go to Vladivostok.

Going into the Tsushima Strait Rozhestvensky not organized intelligence

Let's think about what intelligence information the cruiser patrol forward could provide to Rozhestvensky.

Why do we need intelligence before the fight? Very simple - the task of the cruisers is to detect and keep the contact with the enemy. And if cruisers are able to perform this task - well, then they will become the eyes of the commander in chief, passing him the courses / speeds and the characteristics of building an enemy. Having received this information, the commander will be able to reorganize and, by the time the enemy appears on the horizon, deploy his forces so as to bring them into battle in the best possible way.

But Togo surpassed the Russians in cruisers by about half. Therefore, the cruiser detachment, which Rozhestvensky could have sent forward, had no chance to keep contact with the Japanese for a long time — they would be driven away, and they could try to fight — they could also defeat, taking advantage of their strength and having the ability to rely on armored cruisers Kamimura. But even if cruisers were allowed, at the cost of their own blood, they would have been able to inform Rozhestvensky of the position, course and speed of the Japanese, and he would go out on them in the best way possible and put the Japanese admiral in an uncomfortable tactical situation for him. Who hindered Togo, taking advantage of the speed advantage to retreat, in half an hour to begin everything in a new way?
Sending forward cruisers, with greater chances of losing these cruisers, did not give the Russians any advantage. The only benefit from this intelligence could only be taken by Kheikhatiro Togo - having discovered the Russian cruisers, he would understand that the Russians march through the Tsushima a little earlier than it did in reality. However small the Russian squadron had the chance to slip through the strait unnoticed, they should have been used, and sending the cruisers forward significantly reduced the likelihood of passing undetected.

The admiral himself stated the following:

I knew exactly the strength of the Japanese fleet, which could completely impede a breakthrough; I went to him because I could not go. What benefit could intelligence give me if, in anticipation of the now triumphant opinions of the publicists, I decided to insure myself so? It is said that with great luck, I would have known in advance the order in which the enemy was coming. But such awareness could not be used for my comparatively slow-moving squadron: the enemy, having come to see my strength, would not have allowed me to start a battle earlier than I could have settled for the first strike as he pleased.


The admiral did not take the opportunity to destroy the Japanese cruisers

In my opinion, Rozhestvensky really should have tried to drown the Izumi, attacking him with Oleg, Aurora, and perhaps other cruisers. Of course, there was no strategic sense in this, but victory would have raised the spirit of the crews, which in battle is not the last thing. Refusing to attack "Izumi" I tend to interpret as an admiral's mistake.

But the rejection of the attack of other Japanese cruisers (5-th and 6-th combat detachments), I think absolutely correct. The commander did not have enough cruising forces to destroy both of these squadrons, and there was no way to attack them with the main forces. First, given the fact that even 4 battleships like Borodino could hardly go more than on 13,5-14 nodes, there could be no attack at all - our battleships simply could not overtake the enemy. And secondly, if at that moment, when the Russians broke down the line, sending part of their battleships to chase Japanese ships suddenly descended on Togo with their 1 and 2 armored troops ... it would have turned out quite bad.

The famous "loop of Togo". Now, if Rozhdestvensky had fallen upon his high-speed armadillos on the unfolding "consistently" of the Japanese fleet, then ...

There is an interesting version of Chistyakov (“A quarter of an hour for Russian cannons”) that Rozhestvensky has misled Kheikhatiro Togo with a number of unobvious maneuvers. According to Chistyakov, Togo saw that the Russians were walking in two columns and instead of putting a “wand over T” he turned towards our squadron. As a result of the actions of Rozhdestvensky Kheykhatiro of Togo, it seemed that the 1 unit, consisting of the newest battleships, was late in rebuilding and did not have time to take its place in the head of the column. In this case, Togo, at the expense of the Russian squadron on the countercourse, would have crushed the old ships of the 2 and 3 Russian troops without any problems, and they would have won the battle. However, due to the fact that Rozhestvensky in advance brought his 1 squad forward, rebuilding took much less time than Togo had thought and would have to disperse on countercourses with the latest Russian armadillos, which was extremely fraught - especially for Japanese armored cruisers, whose armor did could not resist 305-mm projectiles. As a result, Togo was forced to urgently turn back the course - Rozhestvensky caught him. Now the Japanese ships, turning successively, were passing the same place, having shot at which, the Russians had the opportunity to bring down a hail of shells on the enemy ships.

So it was or not - we will never know. Rozhestvensky himself did not speak about the “Loop of Togo” as a consequence of his tactics, which, again, means absolutely nothing - it makes no sense to talk about the brilliant implementation of his tactical plans if your squadron is destroyed.

However, absolutely all analysts agree that in the outset of the battle X. Togo put his squadron in a very dangerous position. And here I have to repeat myself and say what I wrote earlier - the task of Admiral Togo was to realize their tactical advantages and put a “wand over T” of the Russian squadron. The task of Admiral Rozhestvensky, if possible, was to prevent the Japanese from realizing their tactical advantage and avoiding the “wand over T”. And, although we do not know to what extent it is Rozhestvensky’s merit, in the outset of the battle, the task of the Russian admiral was solved successfully, but the Japanese admiral still failed his task. One can argue for a long time about why this happened, but I do not understand how to write down the obvious tactical success of the Russians in the passivity of the Russian command.

But the Japanese flagship Mikasa, raising fountains of water, turned around and lay down on the opposite course. And here, according to most analysts, Rozhestvensky missed a brilliant opportunity to attack the enemy. Instead of going the same course, he should have commanded a “turn all of a sudden” and attacked the enemy with the force of his high-speed battleships, i.e. 1 squad and Oslyab. And then, having come close to the Japanese on a pistol shot, it would be possible to turn the battle into a dump for a short distance, which, if it did not bring us victory, it certainly would have made the Japanese pay the real price for it.

Let's take a closer look at this opportunity.

The problem is that to this very day there are no reliable schemes for maneuvering squadrons during the battle. For example, it is still unclear where exactly this most famous “Loop” was located with respect to Russian battleships, since here Japanese and Russian sources diverge in testimony. Different sources show a different course angle for the Japanese, and the range ranges from 8 to 45 degrees. We will not find out the exact mutual arrangement of the squadrons at the time of the start of the battle, this is a topic of a large and separate study, which is not the place. The fact is that regardless of whether the angle on the Japanese ships was equal to 4 points (45 degrees) or two or less, the problem of “jerk on the enemy” is ... in its obvious meaninglessness.

Let's look at one of the many schemes of the Tsushima battle - it is not quite correct, but for our purposes it is still quite suitable.

Tsushima Myths (Part of 2)


What is interesting is that by continuing to move as Rozhestvensky did, more and more of our battleships had the opportunity to connect to the turning point of the turning point - simply because as the Russian column moved forward, its ships very quickly approached the enemy. In other words, the course of the Russian squadron maximized the power of our fire.

And now let's see what would happen if the Russian advanced battleships "all suddenly" turned on the enemy. In this case, four or five Russian battleships would rapidly approach the enemy, but!

Firstly - their fire would have been weakened - aft twelve-inch towers could not shoot at the enemy.

Secondly, battleships moving to a “pivot point” would block with their corps the shelling sector of the slower ships of the 2 and 3 units following the previous course and thus, in the battlefield, Russian fire would be kept to a minimum.

Third, let us imagine for a moment that Heyhatiro Togo, seeing the Russian battleships rushing at him, commands ... a turn to the right. In this case, the first armored detachment of the Japanese will consistently place a “wand over T”, first to the attacking battleships of the Borodino type, and then to the column of the 2 and 3 of the Russian troops! The price of rendezvous for our ships would be truly brilliant.



And, finally, in the fourth. It is certainly fair to say that Togo “substituted” with its “noose”, being in a very unprofitable tactical position. But it is absolutely true that at the end of this unfortunate reversal, the tactical advantage returned again to the Japanese - in essence, having turned to the right, they set that same “wand over T” to Rozhestvensky that they were aiming for. In other words, if the Russians really possessed a “high-speed wing,” they could have fallen upon the Japanese, but the gain from this would have been minimal. Too few guns could hit the Japanese during the rendezvous, and then the advanced Russian squad would be under fire at the 12 of Japanese armored ships, and the newest Russian battleships would be easy prey for Togo’s main forces.

Of course, if the Russian battleships had the opportunity to quickly rush forward (and they did not have it) and concentrated fire on the enemy's armored cruisers, then perhaps one or two such cruisers would have been drowned. Maybe. But the price paid for this was the rapid death of the newest Rozhdestvensky battleships and a no less rapid defeat of the remaining forces. In essence, this is why the option of a “cavalry attack” seems so attractive to today's analysts - to lose, so at least not to the dry!

But such analysts forget about their after-knowledge. They know that the Russian squadron lost almost dry. But they forget that Rozhestvensky had no place to know about it!

The Japanese could not knock out any of the battleships of Vitgeft under Shantung during the nearly four-hour battle - how did Rozhestvensky even guess that both Suvorov and Oslyabya would lose combat capability in some three-quarters of an hour? Throwing the newest Russian battleships to the Japanese turning point would, at best, exchange the main force of a squadron for one or two armored cruisers of Japan. This could be done only if there was a firm conviction that, otherwise, the color of the Russian fleet would die without any good at all. But how could anyone have such confidence at the very beginning of the fight?

Based on that experience and understanding of the situation, which only the Russian admiral could have, he made a completely reasonable decision, which looked at the TOTAL moment right only - he continued to move in a column, concentrating fire on the flagship, while other ships unable to shoot according to Mikas, because of the range or unfavorable exchange angles, they were beaten at the turning point. The result - 25 hits on Japanese ships in 15 minutes - three quarters of what Witgeft’s squadron achieved in almost 4 hours.

However, it should be understood that all these arguments are purely speculative - in Rozhestvensky, in principle, it was not possible to throw their ships at the “pivot point”. He did not have a “high-speed wing”, since armadillos of the “Borodino” type to Tsushima could not develop the passport speed. By the time when Mikas turned around, lay down on the opposite course, the Russian squadron had not yet completed the rebuilding - Oslyabya was forced to break down so as not to ram the ships of the 1 squadron, but they had not yet completed the turn. Try to Rozhestvensky from this position to command a “turn all of a sudden” on the enemy, you would have an enchanting mess completely breaking the squadron's line - even if Rozhestvensky would have 18-nodal battleships, he still had to wait until the squad completed the rebuilding. And do not talk about non-glorification of Russian ships. Theoretically, the same Togo, instead of its famous "loop", could easily have commanded a "turn everything all of a sudden" and quickly break the distance with Russian ships. This would solve all the problems that had arisen for him and would not force him to substitute his ships at the turning point. However, the Japanese admiral did not dare - he was afraid of losing control of the squadron, because in this case his flagship would be the terminal in the convoy. In Russian, however, maneuvering was worse than that of the Japanese, and an attempt to rebuild from an unfinished maneuver would most likely lead to the fact that the front would be attacked by Suvorov and Alexander, rather than Borodino and Orel, which had not completed the U-turn would go to the wake of Alexandra. As for Oslyab, due to the fact that this battleship had to stop the vehicles, letting the 1 armored detachment go ahead, he would have to catch his place in the ranks.

Admiral Rozhestvensky acted rationally and competently in the battlefield, and the further actions of the Russian squadron also did not indicate the passivity of its command.

Soon after his turnaround, which initiated the "loop of Togo", Mikasa turned again, stepping over to the course of the Russian squadron. In other words, Admiral Togo nevertheless received his “wand over T,” now his flagship and the battleships following him, being at sharp course corners from the Russians, could concentrate the fire on Suvorov with almost no impunity. The only way out of this situation would be to turn the Russian squadron to the right in order to lie on a course parallel to the Japanese, but ... Rozhdestvensky does not do this. His task is to squeeze everything up to the drop from the initial advantage that the "loop of Togo" gave him and the Russian admiral leads his squadron, not paying attention to the fire concentrating on its flagship. But then the Japanese are completing the U-turn, their terminal ships leave the sectors of the Russian shelling and stay on the same course no longer makes sense - then and only then in 14.10 "Suvorov" turns right. Now the Russian squadron is in a losing position, the battleships of Togo, having gone forward, can beat the Russian column “head” unhindered, but nothing can be done about it for now — this is the price for the 15 minutes to “work” on the “loop of Togo”. So Rozhestvensky to the end used his chance, despite the powerful fire that struck his flagship and what is the “passivity” here? For some time, the battle goes on in parallel columns, with the Japanese gradually overtaking the Russian squadron, but in 14.32, almost simultaneously, three tragic events occur. Oslyabya breaks down, loses control and leaves the Suvorov line, and Admiral Rozhestvensky receives a heavy wound and loses the ability to command a squadron.

On this occasion there are, of course, different opinions. For example, the famous writer Novikov-Priboy, in his military science fiction work Tsushima, writes that the admiral’s injury was insignificant and did not prevent him from leading the battle. However, given the fact that subsequently the Japanese doctors in Sasebo for TWO MONTHS did not dare to remove the fragments of the skull that had gone deep into the skull of the admiral, let us doubt this. In 14.32, Rozhestvensky’s participation in the Tsushima battle came to an end, but what happened next? Disorder? Reel? Complete passivity of commanders, as taught by Folks History? Analysts usually call the time that followed the failure of the "Prince Suvorov" "a period of anonymous command." Well, maybe it is, but let's see how the “anonymous” commanded.

The commander of the following battleship Suvorov, the Emperor Alexander III, sends his ship after the flagship, but quickly realizing that he can no longer lead a squadron, he takes command. I am writing - “commander” and not “Life Guards Captain 1 of the rank of Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov” because this battleship was killed with the whole crew and we will never know who headed the ship at one time or another. I believe that the honor of leading a squadron at the appointed time was precisely N. M. Bukhvostov, but I can't know for sure.

It would seem that the situation is critical - both flagships are beaten up and out of order, and what should the commander feel? The enemy seems to be unharmed, his position is better and more advantageous, the Japanese guns spew an ocean of flaming steel, and it seems that the horizon breathes fire on you. The fate of your ship is destined, you are the next after the flagship and now the fiery hell will fall upon you, which has just crushed the one who was ahead of you. The unbearable burden of responsibility for the squadron suddenly collapses on your shoulders, but human flesh is weak ... And, probably, you want so much to break out of it all, turn away, leave the battle even for a little bit, give at least a small respite to tormented nerves, get together with strength ...

The commander of the "Alexander" saw the mistake of Togo - he advanced too far his first armored detachment and the Russian ships had a chance to slip under the stern of his battleships. But for this you need - what a little! Turn around and lead the squadron directly to the enemy. Himself substitute for "wand over T". Then a hail of shells will fall on you from all Japanese 12 ships, and you will surely perish. But the squadron led by you, having passed the path laid by you, will put the "crossing T" on both groups of the Japanese - Togo and Kamimure!

"Emperor Alexander III" turns ... ON THE OPPONENT!



Tell me, o Connoisseurs of Sea Wars, how often in stories there was such a thing for humanity that the squadron fought fiercely but without result for almost an hour, suffered losses, and suddenly, suddenly lost its flagships, but did not retreat, did not numb in despair, and instead rushed into a fierce, suicidal attack on a triumphant enemy ?!

What a spectacle it was ... A huge, black leviathan with a golden two-headed eagle on the stem, in foam and splashes pushing the lead wave, suddenly turns to the left, and mercilessly smoking with both pipes, rushes straight at the enemy line, in its very center! Through the fountains of water, uplifted by the enemy shells, through the whirlwind of fierce fire, the Russian battleship attacks the attack, as if the ancient knight were striking a mortal without asking for mercy, but not giving it to anyone. And the guns are beaten from both sides, and the superstructures smoked, marked by the rage of enemy fire, are lit up with flashes of their own volleys and fire of burning fires. Ave, Neptune, doomed to death welcome you!



But following him, stretched out in a strict line, turn the squadron ships led by him and the lights of the shots run over their dark silhouettes ...
Verily, that was their glorious hour!

Almost hopeless - but still an attempt to turn the tide of battle. Tactically, to 14.35 the position of the Russian squadron was completely losing, it was necessary to change something. "Emperor Alexander III" went on the attack, exchanging himself for a better position for the rest of the Russian ships, from which they could inflict serious losses on the Japanese. Admiral Rozhestvensky had no right and could not do such a thing in the outset of the battle - he did not yet know the true balance of power between the Russian and Japanese squadrons. But the commander of the “Emperor Alexander III”, after forty-five minutes of the battle, he knew, and did not hesitate for a second in his suicidal decision.

He almost succeeded. Of course, Heyhatiro Togo could not allow the Russians to put a “wand over T” to their squad. And so he turns "all at once" - now he is leaving the Russian ships. This, of course, is the right decision, but now the ships of Togo are turned astern to the Russian order and the situation, albeit briefly, is changing again in our favor. The effectiveness of the Russian fire increases - it was at this time that the 305-mm projectile, breaking through the armor of a tower-like installation of the Fuji battleship, exploded inside, and the Asama, an armored cruiser, received two projectiles, sat aft of one and a half meters and then stopped for some time, and then until 17.10 can take its place in the line.

Truly, if the theory of probability, this venal girl of young Japanese imperialism, would have shown justice to Russian sailors even for a second, the Japanese would have lost these two ships. Alas, history does not know the subjunctive mood ... And then, "Emperor Alexander III", who received the hardest damage, was forced to leave the line. The honor and the right to lead the squadron went to "Borodino".

As a result of the heroic attack of the Guards battleship, supported by the entire Russian squadron, our soldiers managed to temporarily knock out one Japanese ship, the Assamu, but by that time the three newest battleships of the squadron: Prince Suvorov, Oslyabya and Emperor Alexander III "were practically non-capable. All hope of winning the battle was lost. Nevertheless, in the future the Russian ships fought with dignity, fulfilling the order of their admiral: "Go to Vladivostok!"

It was. But the "grateful" descendants, on the anniversary of the thundering battle, will not find other words, except:

The passivity of the Russian command, which did not even attempt to defeat the enemy, went into battle without any hope of success, surrendering to fate, led to the tragedy. The squadron only tried to break into the direction of Vladivostok, and did not lead a decisive and furious battle. If the captains were resolutely fighting, maneuvering, trying to get close to the enemy for effective shooting, the Japanese would have suffered much more serious losses. However, the passivity of the leadership paralyzed almost all commanders, the squadron, like a herd of bulls, stupidly and stubbornly, broke through towards Vladivostok, not trying to crush the Japanese ship
(Alexander Samsonov)

The paper will endure all, because the dead are already all the same.

And us?

To be continued
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  1. VladimirRG 19 June 2015 06: 41 New
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    The article is written one-sidedly I did not like.
    1. prosto_rgb 19 June 2015 06: 56 New
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      The author has a huge "+" for the article and the work done.
      The first part was very interesting, I was looking forward to this !!! soldier
      For the navy drinks
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 13: 54 New
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        Thanks for the kind words, I tried! :)
        Quote: prosto_rgb
        For the navy drinks

        This is me forever! drinks
        1. Alex 20 June 2015 00: 06 New
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          Andrei, many thanks for the article, I will wait for the end. I was somewhat late with the comment (I read it in the morning), but I wanted to comprehend everything.

          A very interesting analysis of the actions of the squadron commanders in the first phase of the battle. But I can not resist: is there any information from the "other side"? It is extremely interesting to know what were the plans of Togo? What was his tactical (minimum program) and strategic (maximum program) objectives? Simple logic simply does not allow us to think that he initially counted on just such an outcome of the battle. After all, then it turns out that he was just a super-genius of naval battles (of course, and this is possible, but then it learns that the theory of probability that day simply played on the side of the Japanese).

          And further. Of course, I am not a great connoisseur of naval battles, but in the attack of “Alexander III” something familiar with Trafalgard Nelson seemed to me. Then his squadron, too, in an almost suicidal attack on the center of the French fleet, cut its line in half, which determined the outcome of the battle. Then, EMNIP, the British also suffered heavy losses, but won the battle. Was luck really not on our side then?
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 June 2015 00: 52 New
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            Greetings, dear Alex!
            Quote: Alex
            Andrey, many thanks for the article

            You're welcome ! drinks
            Quote: Alex
            But I can not resist: is there any information from the "other side"? It is extremely interesting to know what were the plans of Togo?

            Unfortunately, this is unknown to me. Togo's report on Tsushima is extremely small and almost does not contain the information we are interested in, but more ... Now the Japanese are quietly uploading their documents to the network, the "Tsushima" are sorting it out, but I haven’t heard anything like that
            Quote: Alex
            in the attack of “Alexander III,” it seemed to me something familiar with Trafalgard Nelson. Then his squadron, too, in an almost suicidal attack on the center of the French fleet, cut its line in half, which determined the outcome of the battle. Then, EMNIP, the British also suffered heavy losses, but won the battle. Was luck really not on our side then?

            Of course, there is a certain similarity. But there is a difference - Villeneuve in Trafalgar did not have the opportunity to retreat, the wind did not allow, so two columns of Nelson (having first undergone the very crossing T) cut his formation and made a uniform slaughter there. But the Admiral of Togo simply ordered the turn "all of a sudden." Since the Japanese squadron speed was higher, the Alexander could not cut the Japanese system.
            1. Alex 20 June 2015 01: 32 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Togo's report on Tsushima is extremely small and contains almost no information of interest to us, but more ...
              Somehow, Neta met the mention of a document such as the “Chase of Macy” (or something in this regard, hell, memory fails). It seems there is a report on Togo's actions. I'll try to search, it may come in handy.

              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              But there is a difference - Villeneuve in Trafalgar did not have the opportunity to retreat, the wind did not allow,
              Of course, the tactics of sailing ships - this is primarily a wind fight (by the way, Ushakov was an unsurpassed master in using the initial situation). It seemed to me that he was trained by the British and was able to see the trap and left it, using its advantages. True, these are my speculations, now you will not ask him.
            2. Scraptor 20 June 2015 06: 54 New
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              They are fighting for the wind now, in order to better set smokes ...
              Nelson studied with Ushakov in the Mediterranean.
          2. Nehist 20 June 2015 11: 19 New
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            Togo's minimum and maximum program was simple, inflicting the most severe damage to the RIF ships and avoiding the most serious damage. Like Rozhdestvensky, he did not realize that the EDB could be drowned in art battle. Knowing about the weak repair base of Vladivostok, he even allowed the loss of 1,2 of his ships. But he was not told lucky.
            1. Alex 20 June 2015 11: 53 New
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              Quote: Nehist
              Togo's minimum and maximum program was simple, inflicting the most severe damage to the RIF ships and avoiding the most serious damage.

              This is understandable, but I didn’t mean the end result, but the methods by which he was going to achieve this: tasks for combat units, firing ranges, instructions to battalion commanders in case of failure of the flagship - in general, what is called a battle plan. According to Rozhdestvensky, it is whiter or less known that we are discussing now, but what happened on the Japanese side? Somehow I can’t believe that Togo simply reacted quickly to the situation, rather, on the contrary, he dictated it.
        2. lelikas 20 June 2015 12: 58 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Thanks for the kind words, I tried! :)
          Quote: prosto_rgb
          For the navy drinks

          This is me forever! drinks

          This is us all forever! drinks
      2. pilot8878 21 June 2015 20: 52 New
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        Quote: prosto_rgb
        The author has a huge "+" for the article and the work done.

        Despite the ambiguity of the theses, perhaps due to their unusualness, a sharp difference from the canonical reading of those events (violations of logic, it seems, is not felt), the articles do not cause a feeling of contradiction, moreover, they cause a feeling of grief and admiration for the heroes whom they forgot (or sought to forget for many years). And therefore - there are many, many advantages "with all proletarian hatred." laughing We look forward to continuing !!!
    2. Serg65 19 June 2015 07: 55 New
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      [quote = VladimirRG] The article was written one-sidedly I didn’t like. [/ quoYou really, Vladimir! The genius of naval art, conductor Aleksey Silych Novikov-Priboy is mentioned only once and then somehow one-sided! Rozhdestvensky from a stupid admiral-sotrap, turns into a hero! This is the same mockery! Andrew. have a conscience !!!
      And the article is bold ... PLUS !!! good and many thanks for the blessed memory of the sailors of the Russian fleet soldier . For me there is no difference, the Imperial is a fleet, the Soviet or modern Russian fleet is OUR Fleet!
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 14: 02 New
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        Quote: Serg65
        and many thanks for the blessed memory of the sailors of the Russian fleet soldier. For me there is no difference, the Imperial is a fleet, the Soviet or modern Russian fleet is OUR Fleet!

        I completely agree and understand you perfectly! drinks It is for this reason that I sat down in this series of articles.
        1. Karabanov 19 June 2015 14: 54 New
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          I once said that according to the history of the Battle of Tsushima, it is now difficult to offer a fresh and original idea ... (so much has been written down). But no, I was mistaken ... A very interesting and sensible interpretation. (+)

          I have one question for you!
          Why didn’t Rozhdestvensky try to pass the narrow part of the strait at night, but summed up this most dangerous part of the path to pass already in daylight? Afraid of mine attacks?
          But there is no guarantee that the squadron would be discovered. But anyway, the losses from the daytime battle exceeded the losses from the night attacks of the enemy destroyers ...
          What guided the admiral in your opinion?
          1. Pilat2009 19 June 2015 16: 53 New
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            Quote: Karabanov
            What guided the admiral in your opinion?

            Quote: Karabanov
            But anyway, the losses from the daytime battle exceeded the losses from the night attacks of the enemy destroyers ...

            If Rozhestvensky knew the result of the battle, he would try to go at night. But he did not have an oracle and a time machine, so he tried to minimize the risk of mine attacks. To risk a squadron at night, without the possibility of inflicting any damage on the main forces of the Japanese ... In my opinion quite adequate solution. By the way, the Japanese had prepared plans for all options
          2. KakoVedi 19 June 2015 21: 03 New
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            Sorry, what's the difference ?! Where would he skerry in the afternoon ?! Would disguise palm branches and depict a floating atoll ?! At night, the Japanese first threw destroyers, and during the day the main forces entered. All business.
            1. Karabanov 20 June 2015 13: 44 New
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              Quote: KakoVedi
              Sorry, what's the difference ?!

              Yes, actually a big difference ... There is an opinion that on May 14 (15) (old style), the day of the battle was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the coronation of the king.
              Moreover, bypassing the narrowness of the straits at night, and without being discovered by the enemy, the chance to get to the coveted Vladivostok was slightly higher.
              And as a result of the squadron hesitated ... Rozhdestvensky himself asked for a general battle.
              Now it’s clear that this was a fatal mistake ...
      2. Scraptor 20 June 2015 07: 28 New
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        In sathya again artistically it is not mentioned that the explosives of the Russian shells were tarnished by the quartermasters. Because of what the shells almost always did not explode, or had a greatly weakened brisant effect. bully
        This was done by them to the slyness "on the advice of the British, so that there would be no self-explosions in the hot climate of the tropics." VV was overshooted three (!) Times.
        Although in the comments to both the first and second parts of the article it is written about it.
    3. avt
      avt 19 June 2015 09: 21 New
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      Quote: VladimirRG
      The article is written one-sidedly I did not like.

      Across the coat? laughing Debunking the myth of self-propelled thrown by the liberalizing intelligentsia in 1905 with Peshkov's calls for the Boer, which should break out?
      Quote: Serg65
      R! The genius of naval art, conductor Aleksey Silych Novikov-Priboy is mentioned only once and then somehow one-sided!

      Yes - natural disgusting. laughing
      Quote: Serg65
      Rozhdestvensky from a stupid admiral-sotrap, turns into a hero!

      Well, perhaps in the character to whom the words are applicable, it seems Napoleon when he was touted by some general - “But is he lucky?” blowing and must be caught for career growth, good luck was over the edge, even more than real knowledge.
      Quote: kingoff
      But what about the famous "shimoza"?

      Take your time to live, as long as only the maneuvering scheme is revealed with the author’s comments. You can be sure that he will write.
      1. Alexey RA 19 June 2015 13: 12 New
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        Quote: avt
        . Here is the commander ,, Vesta ", in which Rozhdestvensky served in the Turkish campaign, and who then, when he sensed where the wind was blowing and needed to be caught for career advancement, luck was over the edge, even more than real knowledge.

        Heh heh heh ... the problem with Vesta is that its commander has already lost the coast too much. There, after all, not only Rozhdestvensky was in doubters - Makarov, too, did not believe the bravura report of Baranov:
        The bomb was torn apart in the cabin, while there was not a single damage on the floor or on the walls, only a single fragment in the upper deck. There was a fire, and there is absolutely no charred place.

        When the steam boats from Livadia were preparing for an attack in Penderaclia, Baranov certainly wanted his boats to take part as well. The practical exercises of the Livonian boats with ours showed that they do not know enough how to hide the lights, then I turned to Baranov and asked him to use influence, so that everything possible was done on his boats to hide the lights. Baranov told me that if necessary, they would close the lights on boats on boats.
        The whole armament of Vesta and their business is a series of various holes plugged in shirts. About preliminary preparation there can be neither speech nor thought; the shells did not climb into the canal, the signalmen did not distinguish the vessel, the miners could not collect the conductors. The whole calculation was based on the fact that at this moment everyone would rip off his shirt and shut up some hole or hole in it.
        If you imagine that two boats went sailing from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt, let sailors sit on one, and people completely unfamiliar with maritime affairs on the other. The former will sail, and nothing interesting will happen on their way, the latter will storm, they will most likely tear out the sail, drop the boat on its side, begin to fill, raise the shirt instead of the sail, pour out water with caps, in a word swimming will be full of Interest, in Kronstadt will be greeted with all kinds of applause, and these people will be recognized as true heroes. The ship "Vesta" just resembles this same boat with adventurers. There is no painting, no assumptions; everything is left to the will of providence. I told Baranov that I admit that the battleship could retreat thanks to their fire, but that he did not drown them solely due to bad shooting and happiness. Baranov does not want to listen and says that the enemy did not hit him because he put the steering wheel. Baranov advises me to leave mines and engage in artillery

        And then there was the Mersina affair.
        1. avt
          avt 19 June 2015 13: 27 New
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          Quote: Alexey RA
          Heh heh heh ... the problem with Vesta is that its commander has already lost the coast too much. There, after all, not only Rozhdestvensky was in doubters - Makarov, too, did not believe the bravura report of Baranov:

          But there was a lucky one! Well don't take it away. Again, a pretty Christmas scent showed - in time to betray, not to betray, but to anticipate - and kept the awards and jumped into the ladies - on career growth. Well, like - ,, I'm an honest soldier / sailor and I don’t know words of love "
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 14: 32 New
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        Quote: avt
        Debunking the myth of self-propelled thrown by the liberalizing intelligentsia in 1905 with Peshkov's calls for the Boer, which should break out?

        Greetings, dear avt!
        As for the liberalizing intelligentsia, you are 120% right, but ... not only
        1. avt
          avt 19 June 2015 14: 58 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          As for the liberalizing intelligentsia, you are 120% right, but ... not only

          hi Nah! I will not write an article! laughingOne endlessly stretches on this subject. I still regret one thing - I was holding such a thick publication in the 90s - the documents of the General Staff of the Russian Empire of that period - were put into free circulation .... well, not quite free - the circulation is scanty and I sold it to specialists in civilian clothes and not really, but I couldn’t manage to taxi myself! sad That is still terrible as I regret it!
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 15: 06 New
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            Quote: avt
            Nah! I will not write an article! laughingThis topic stretches one after another ad infinitum

            And again, you are absolutely right :))) laughing
            Quote: avt
            I still regret about one thing - I was holding such a thick publication in the 90s - the documents of the General Staff of the Russian Empire of that period - were put into free circulation, but I could not get a copy!

            Really really sorry. But only the one who does nothing is not mistaken :) hi
            Now I’m rewriting the completion (I was planning 3 articles of the Tsushima cycle, but ... maybe there will still be 4, although we'll see :)) so I can’t seriously respond to comments - thanks for doing this for me, because I could hardly answer better! drinks
    4. Russian Uzbek 19 June 2015 09: 44 New
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      The author, a brilliant couch strategist and tactician to the smithereens, smashed and smashed all the charlatans (starting with Novikov-Priboy! yeah) from military history and opened his eyes to us!
      Hallelujah! Hallelujah! Glory to you !!!
      an article for an alternative history site ... what does it do here?
      1. avt
        avt 19 June 2015 10: 01 New
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        Quote: Russian Uzbek
        an article for an alternative history site ... what does it do here?

        And all ??? All the steam has gone into this beep and even something from the same Novikov-Surf has nothing to quote? I'm not talking about Kostenko.
        Quote: Russian Uzbek
        Hallelujah! Hallelujah! Glory to you !!!

        Powerful argument technically justified by links to archival documents. laughing But before Kaptsov’s syllable, more years of training are needed.
        1. Russian Uzbek 19 June 2015 10: 43 New
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          "" A powerful argument that is technically justified by references to archival documents. But until the Kaptsovsky syllable, more years of training are needed. ""
          that is, it is still necessary to COMMENT? oooh ...
          please tell me how you can comment on statements in the style of:
          "if grandmother had horseradish then she would be grandfather" ???
          1. avt
            avt 19 June 2015 11: 18 New
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            Quote: Russian Uzbek
            oooh ...

            laughing But the remnants of the steam went off again.
            Quote: Russian Uzbek
            that is, it is still necessary to COMMENT?

            Az sinful hoped to see SPECIFIC links from an article in which the author creates
            Quote: Russian Uzbek
            article for an alternative history site ...

            this very “alternative” story and its refutation with figures and specific documents. But not fate request In response, only a train whistle
            Quote: Russian Uzbek
            that is, it is still necessary to COMMENT? oooh ...

            and thoughts on the ginetalia of the elderly with their journey.
            Quote: Russian Uzbek
            "if grandmother had horseradish then she would be grandfather" ???
            1. Russian Uzbek 19 June 2015 11: 54 New
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              again: how can you comment on something that was not there?
              the whole article consists of speculation:
              what if?
              But what if Rozhdestvensky knew? if he did otherwise? if Togo did not do as he did? if “Alexander” turned?
              that's why I say: this is not serious and rolls only for an alternative ...
              "" Based on the experience and understanding of the situation that the Russian admiral could have had ""
              How do you know about experience and understanding of the situation? Are you a biographer of Rozhdestvensky?
              and incidentally blame all authors whose opinion does not coincide with the opinion of the genius Andrei Kolobov, without a doubt, the newest luminary of historical science, who opened humanity’s eyes to this episode of history and dispelled any myths there (including direct participants in the events)
              all that remains is the feeling of something not said ... like - everything is not true, we won, and the ships we had were better, and the officers of the officers and the commander, well, just - oh yes admiral! ... but then the damned "liberals" and the "communists" together with Novikov-Pribo blasphemed and defiled everything ...
              and only the brilliant Andrey Kolobov opened his eyes to us ...
              and I repeat again: such articles should be laid out with the tag: "alternative"
              1. avt
                avt 19 June 2015 14: 40 New
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                Quote: Russian Uzbek
                the whole article consists of speculation:
                what if?
                But what if Rozhdestvensky knew? if he did otherwise? if Togo did not do as he did? if “Alexander” turned?
                that's why I say: this is not serious and rolls only for an alternative ...

                If you don’t see the difference between the myth and the analysis of the PAST event - your trouble, not the author’s lack. The author compiled an article on the specific facts that occurred with a small digression — an analysis of possible options that could have been possible based on technical capabilities, but Rozhestvensky did not. And the glitches are a myth - but Admiral Makarov would have taken and would have won at the head of the First Squadron. Makarov, of course, an outstanding personality, but in fact he was not a naval commander, well, he didn’t manage, like Rozhestvensky, Wittgeft, to lead a squadron in a real battle with a specific combat mission - he died, died tragically under the blow of Petropavlovsk, without doing ANYTHING of that which Rozhdestvensky and Wittgeft had to do, which is why we are discussing the very concrete deeds of these personalities, rather than the fantasy of what Makarov would do, which was actually from the same nest as the ones listed above, and Dubasov, Skrydlov - one upbringing people, one era.
                1. Russian Uzbek 19 June 2015 15: 49 New
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                  "" "The author compiled an article on specific facts that occurred with a small retreat, an analysis of possible options" ""
                  these maaaaalenky digressions, they then turn the ANALYSIS into fantasy!
                  ANALYSIS is analysis - dry numbers and facts, a statement of causes and effects
                  and not a single so-called The author didn’t “dispel” MYTH ... dumped a bunch of the same myths that weren’t confirmed by anything, put on facts and “archival documents” taken out of context, and barked everyone!
                  but it’s not written badly for Alt.history or ren-tv will do!
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 17: 21 New
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                    Quote: Russian Uzbek
                    these maaaaalenky digressions, they then turn the ANALYSIS into fantasy!
                    ANALYSIS is analysis - dry numbers and facts, a statement of causes and effects

                    Dear Russian Uzbek, please tell me, do you know such a thing as "LOGIC"? If - yes, then let's finally turn on this very logic when writing "crushing" comments.
                    So what do we have? Was the Tsushima battle? It was. The defeat of the Russian fleet took place? It took place. At the same time, Rozhdestvensky maneuvered exactly as he maneuvered in that battle and nothing else.
                    And Suddenly a bunch of experts come running. And it starts:
                    1) IF IF Rozhdestvensky would divide his squadron into two parts, THERE WERE ...
                    2) IF IF CHRISTMAS attacked the Japanese cruisers, THERE WERE ...
                    3) And if Rozhdestvensky at the time of the turn of Togo would have attacked the Japanese with a front line, then THEN, of course, yes, the battle would have gone differently.
                    4) AND IF ... THEN ...
                    5) AND IF .... THEN ...
                    So where is your fighting crush? Why don’t you smash the same Novikov-Priboy, the same Kostenko and others? Well, do not shout to them that they say all these "A IF ... THEN ..." are the essence of the alternative and that all this is fantasy?
                    For some reason, when all these Novikovs, Kostenko, and others and others begin to teach Rozhdestvensky about how he should have fought - this is your analysis. Although the whole analysis is precisely based on those "IF ... THEN ...". And when I begin to understand - and what would happen if Rozhestvensky would have acted as he was "recommended" by hindsight and engineers - is this a pure alternative and fantasy? Cute.
                    And where is the logic?
                    1. KakoVedi 19 June 2015 21: 06 New
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                      In my opinion, the combination of "Russian" and "Uzbek" is no longer logical! More logical - "Russian eccentric" or "eccentric Uzbek."
                    2. notingem 1 December 2016 21: 45 New
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                      Christmas fight lost. This is the verdict.
                  2. Alex 20 June 2015 00: 37 New
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                    Quote: Russian Uzbek
                    retreat -analysis of the possible options for "" "these very little digressions that they just turn ANALYSIS into fantasy!
                    IvanThe analysis of the situation is not just an analysis of all the factors that led to the known result. It is also an attempt to determine which decisions were wrong and which could lead to success. Perhaps the alternative story is somewhat similar to these actions, but you should not take such approaches so indiscriminately and hostilely. Indeed, in the General Staffs of all armies and of all times, command-and-staff games were held, scenarios of possible options for military operations were developed, but no one ever considered this a waste of time or children's amusements. In this case, the analysis of Andrei Kolobov is one of the few attempts without an engagement (as much as possible) to explain the reasons for the Tsushima tragedy. And it is as difficult as it is not easy to give a complete and adequate assessment of the tragedy of the 1941 year. After all, nothing is easier than to blame all the failures for stupidity, cowardice, backwardness, and even anything else. But experience shows that life is much more complex and multifaceted, and often trifles that are completely invisible at first glance have the most significant effect on the final result.
                2. kalibr 20 June 2015 08: 35 New
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                  What are you wasting time? All is clear ...
                  1. Alex 20 June 2015 11: 58 New
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                    Quote: kalibr
                    What are you wasting time? All is clear ...

                    Vyacheslav, welcome!

                    I’m just trying to explain (even if not to my opponent, so to others) the difference between an alternative story (although, by and large, I don’t see a big sin in it either: with the right approach, what if not a predictive model? The main thing is not to get involved) and the analysis of events. Andrei is a fairly competent author, has done a great job, I would not want the discussion of this rather interesting issue to turn into another barking and chewing on mossy arguments.
                  2. lelikas 20 June 2015 13: 05 New
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                    Quote: kalibr
                    What are you wasting time? All is clear ...

                    And to feed ?? 7 :)
              2. Trapperxnumx 19 June 2015 16: 26 New
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                Quote: Russian Uzbek
                again: how can you comment on something that was not there?

                What was missing? There was no shooting at the turning points of Japanese ships? Or was there no maneuver of Alexander 3? What was not there? There is just no alternative at all. Only bare and dry figures and facts! Or maybe the maneuvering scheme is drawn differently? If you are accustomed to believing that the Russian admirals are stupid and the Russian ships tugging self-propelled, then this is your right, and if you are told that no, the ships fought and the commanders controlled and maneuvered, but you do not believe it, then this is also your right , you can even draw a battle plan for yourself where our ships all the time went only in a straight line, and the Japanese shot them as in a dash.
              3. Alex 20 June 2015 00: 23 New
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                Quote: Russian Uzbek
                and incidentally blaspheme all authors whose opinion does not coincide with the opinion of the genius Andrei Kolobov

                Well, as far as Andrei Kolobov is a genius, it’s not for us to judge (although I personally read his articles and comments with great interest), but I didn’t understand where you saw the blasphemy and vilification of other researchers on this issue. Andrei does not mention the evidence of the authors, with whose opinion he does not agree, which in no way detracts from his analysis of the situation. The polemic with Alexander Samsonov and Oleg Kaptsov is quite normal (by the way, many authors and participants in VO need to learn from him the culture of discussion) and are in the mainstream of the scientific debate. But your statements, excuse me, are very emotional (which is quite understandable - the Russo-Japanese war is a rather sore subject and Tsushima is one of the most bleeding wounds), but they are unproven. Present your arguments and refute your opponent - and everything will fall into place.
                1. Oprychnik 20 June 2015 01: 18 New
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                  What does a genius have to do with it? A man dug up a bunch of material offers his point of view on this very controversial issue, honor to him and praise, comparing different points of view, we will approach the truth. Sorry, the comma on the clave jumped out ...
                  1. Alex 20 June 2015 01: 36 New
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                    Quote: Oprychnik
                    What does a genius have to do with it? A man dug up a bunch of material offers his point of view on this very controversial issue, honor to him and praise, comparing different points of view, we will approach the truth.
                    Thats exactly what I mean. I did not have to meet such a thorough analysis of the Tsushima battle. Especially thanks to the person who submitted such material.

                    Quote: Oprychnik
                    Sorry, the comma on the clave popped up ..
                    It happens that technology is also not eternal ... request
                2. lelikas 20 June 2015 13: 18 New
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                  Quote: Alex
                  But your statements, excuse me, are very emotional (which is understandable - the Russo-Japanese war is rather painful

                  I beg you - a typical Internet type of dispute - to crap everything, without putting forward any arguments, to force the enemy to prove his own words, while accusing him of unprovenness - nothing new.
                  I can bet - but in Russian-Uzbek history - the Varangian - the squadron merged stupidly, Gastello just fell, Matrosov slipped on the ice, Panfilovtsev was a whole regiment, rammed from stupidity and the whole world littered with our corpses because we do not have sensible commanders!
      2. Leksander 19 June 2015 11: 37 New
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        Quote: Russian Uzbek
        an article for an alternative history site ... what does it do here?

        the author is the alternative. and as a zealous enthusiast of his hobby, he often confuses sites where you can and should fantasize, and where not.
        it is very interesting how the author will explain the defeat in the Tsushima battle. I look forward to the final articles!
        1. jktu66 19 June 2015 14: 27 New
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          and where not.
          it is very interesting how the author will explain the defeat in the Tsushima battle. I look forward to the final articles!
          Certainly not the “rottenness of the tsarist regime”, the stupidity of the Russian fleet officers and the weak skills of the lower ranks. Rozhesteshsky’s squadron entered the battle, obviously losing to the Russians, the sailors squeezed the maximum to turn the tide and get a chance, but the enemy had the advantage and luck. Why continue to replace the tragedy of fallen heroes with farce and dishonor?
        2. Karabanov 19 June 2015 15: 07 New
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          Quote: Leksander
          the author is the alternative

          I have to disagree with you. Alternatives per se, by type - but if ... Actually, there isn’t. There is a fairly competent analysis and some assumptions ... But no more.
          Accurately claim that the same squadron commander or ship commanders could think, no one can now. But based on the actions taken and their results, I think you can come to some conclusions. Which the author has demonstrated.
          1. Russian Uzbek 19 June 2015 16: 50 New
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            "" "With accuracy to say what the same squadron commander or ship commanders could think, no one can now. But on the basis of the actions taken and their results, I can come to some conclusions. That the author demonstrated" ""
            this is an alternative ...
            1. Karabanov 19 June 2015 17: 17 New
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              Quote: Russian Uzbek
              this is an alternative ...

              Alternate History (AI) is a genre of fiction dedicated to depicting reality, which could have been if history had taken a different path at one of its turning points (bifurcation points or fork points). (Wiki)
              I was not going to make excuses here to your ignorant stereotypes. But where did you find the distortion of history here? This is only an author’s interpretation based on real events.
              For some reason, you think that your point of view has a place to be, but another - no.
              I also have IMHO on this score (on a number of issues that does not coincide with the author's one), but I prefer to conduct an adequate constructive dialogue on controversial issues, rather than yelling at my opponent - DOSA himself!
              1. Russian Uzbek 19 June 2015 17: 34 New
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                "" Now let's see what would happen if the Russian advanced armadillos turned “all of a sudden” to the enemy "
                and this is not a distortion of reality? because in REALITY there was no reversal! or do you have some kind of reality of your own?
                entire article from similar examples! 100% article for an alternative
                1. Karabanov 19 June 2015 18: 44 New
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                  Quote: Russian Uzbek
                  "" Now let's see what would happen if the Russian advanced armadillos turned “all of a sudden” to the enemy "
                  and this is not a distortion of reality? because in REALITY there was no reversal!

                  And who claimed that?
                  Do you understand what you are writing about?
                  Excuse me, when you go to the toilet, you think what to do first - to take off your pants, and then “everything else”? Or first "everything else", and then take off your pants?
                  Sorry, I'm not interested in you. All the best.
                2. 11 black 19 June 2015 19: 24 New
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                  Quote: Russian Uzbek
                  Now let's see what would happen if the Russian advanced battleships turned "all of a sudden" to the enemy "
                  and this is not a distortion of reality? because in REALITY there was no reversal! or do you have some kind of reality of your own?
                  entire article from similar examples! 100% article for an alternative

                  Ayaiyah, how bad it is to take words out of context - the author in this place only gives us an explanation of Rozhdestvensky’s actions and nothing more.
                  In a previous article on this subject, I don’t remember who wrote it, it was said that our squadron would have made such a turn and it would have routed half of the Japanese fleet (that's for sure alt history), but here the author only gives an explanation of what such a turn could lead to. ..
                  And to you minus for base dirty tricks like taking words out of context and giving them a completely different meaning than in the article!
                3. Alex 20 June 2015 00: 47 New
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                  Quote: Russian Uzbek
                  "" Now let's see what would happen if the Russian advanced battleships turned “all of a sudden” to the enemy "and this is not a distortion of reality? After all, there was no reversal in REALITY!

                  Ivan, this is exactly what the ANALYSIS of possible actions is. ALTERNATIVE - this is when the author said that as a result of such a turn, the Russian squadron received a decisive advantage and completely defeated the enemy.

                  Such options for the development of events in the REV are more than enough, even before the Tsushima battle. Not so long ago I read what would happen if 1 TOE after the death of Makarov managed to break out of Pot Arthur and get connected to 2 TOE of Rozhestvensky and 3 TOE of Nebogatov. There, in general, everything turned out enchantingly, but this is precisely the alternative in full growth.
              2. Scraptor 19 June 2015 18: 03 New
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                do not pay attention, since childhood he has a little manech to ring door locks ... bully
        3. Pilat2009 19 June 2015 17: 14 New
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          Quote: Leksander
          very interesting how the author will explain the defeat in the Tsushima battle

          And how do you explain the defeat of Villeneuve, Spee, Craddock and Doormann?
          Following your logic, they were dumb too
          1. Leksander 19 June 2015 19: 41 New
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            Quote: Pilat2009
            Following your logic, they were dumb too

            no need to juggle! alternativeist or dreamer - yes. but at the expense of stupid speech was not. these are your words. you and disentangle.
        4. Leksander 6 July 2015 01: 48 New
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          And so, as I predicted, we see an article by Andrei Kolobov on the Alternative History website!
          http://alternathistory.org.ua/mify-tsusimy-chast-1
      3. Pilat2009 19 June 2015 17: 03 New
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        Quote: Russian Uzbek
        an article for an alternative history site ... what does it do here?

        Our dear Uzbek, have you tried at least once to be in the place of Rozhestvensky?
        To look at the world through his eyes? For myself, I have long understood one important thought: if it was done this way and not otherwise, then there were some reasons for this. There were no computers before, it was necessary to calculate the options with the brains and predict the outcome
        Quote: Russian Uzbek
        "if grandmother had horseradish then she would be grandfather" ???

        Everything is clear. Everything around is fools, I'm smart, quite in the style of Surf
        1. Russian Uzbek 19 June 2015 17: 19 New
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          I for that articles on alt.history would be published on the corresponding sites! or at least point out that an article in the genre of alternative history would not call such an article analysis because it misleads unprepared people
          by the way and Surf here rinse completely in vain! I’ve read the second article and I have big doubts that the author even read “Tsushima” poured so much dirt on innocent Novikov’s bachelor
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 17: 30 New
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            Quote: Russian Uzbek
            by the way and Surf here rinse completely in vain! I've read the second article and I have big doubts that the author generally read "Tsushima"

            I read and re-read Tsushima more than a dozen times. But the thing is, in addition to Tsushima, I read very, very many other sources, including memoirs and information from people who fought in Tsushima. And then it turned out that “Tsushima” by Novikov was just a custom-made narrative in which the author, not shying away from outright lies, tries to expose “rotten tsarism in the person of his representative - Rozhdestvensky” in the most ill-fated light.
            So do not tell tales of "innocent."
            1. Russian Uzbek 19 June 2015 17: 42 New
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              Well, according to the results of the war, everyone saw tsarism in the most mischievous light, and not just the Novikov baler!
              But what about the admiral that lied? what scuffle and foul language loved? this was the order of things in the Imperial Navy ... but Rozhdestvensky proved his mediocrity in battle! and even a coward - he surrendered along with the ship (for this alone, according to the Maritime Charter, he was to be shot)
              1. Scraptor 19 June 2015 18: 08 New
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                In the most mischievous light, you expose yourself here. In 1941-42, too, blamed tsarism is to blame? Or, as in 1904-5, someone systematically prepared specific "premises"? Compared to Tsushima, it was more than ...
              2. 11 black 19 June 2015 20: 59 New
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                Quote: Russian Uzbek
                and even a coward - surrendered

                You will forgive the adequate one - he was shot in the head in the second hour of the battle and you call him a coward !!! Everything is clear with you ...
              3. Alex 20 June 2015 01: 05 New
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                Quote: Russian Uzbek
                Rozhdestvensky proved his mediocrity in battle! and even a coward - he surrendered along with the ship (for this alone, according to the Maritime Charter, they should have shot him)

                No, well, here you grabbed over the edge. By and large, he simply didn’t have a “ship” of his own — he commanded a squadron and was simply a senior officer on the Suvorov. The destroyer "Bedovy", on which the wounded Rozhestvensky and his headquarters were located, was under the command of the captain of the 2 rank N.V. Baranov, who decided to surrender the ship. By the way, in the same Tsushima by Novikov-Priboy this episode is described quite vividly, along with Baranov’s argument. How much this corresponds to reality is not for me to judge, but as soon as you appeal to Novikov, then be faithful to him to the end.
            2. THE_SEAL 21 June 2015 01: 55 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Quote: Russian Uzbek
              by the way and Surf here rinse completely in vain! I've read the second article and I have big doubts that the author generally read "Tsushima"

              I read and re-read Tsushima more than a dozen times. But the thing is, in addition to Tsushima, I read very, very many other sources, including memoirs and information from people who fought in Tsushima. And then it turned out that “Tsushima” by Novikov was just a custom-made narrative in which the author, not shying away from outright lies, tries to expose “rotten tsarism in the person of his representative - Rozhdestvensky” in the most ill-fated light.
              So do not tell tales of "innocent."

              Something is not very visible that you read Novikov. When conducting investigative actions, they interview witnesses, which Novikov did in the book, being in captivity and after. And he gave these testimonies in the book. And the speculation of such couch strategists and land sailors who are trying to show black to white should not be taken seriously. Novikov repeatedly wrote precisely about the heroism of officers and sailors at his military posts. And the obvious reasons for the defeat.
            3. THE_SEAL 21 June 2015 01: 55 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Quote: Russian Uzbek
              by the way and Surf here rinse completely in vain! I've read the second article and I have big doubts that the author generally read "Tsushima"

              I read and re-read Tsushima more than a dozen times. But the thing is, in addition to Tsushima, I read very, very many other sources, including memoirs and information from people who fought in Tsushima. And then it turned out that “Tsushima” by Novikov was just a custom-made narrative in which the author, not shying away from outright lies, tries to expose “rotten tsarism in the person of his representative - Rozhdestvensky” in the most ill-fated light.
              So do not tell tales of "innocent."

              Something is not very visible that you read Novikov. When conducting investigative actions, they interview witnesses, which Novikov did in the book, being in captivity and after. And he gave these testimonies in the book. And the speculation of such couch strategists and land sailors who are trying to show black to white should not be taken seriously. Novikov repeatedly wrote precisely about the heroism of officers and sailors at his military posts. And the obvious reasons for the defeat.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 June 2015 15: 13 New
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                Quote: THE_SEAL
                Something is not very visible that you read Novikov. When conducting investigative actions, they interview witnesses, which Novikov did in the book, being in captivity and after. And these testimonies cited in the book

                Let's call a spade a spade. Novikov simply lied with three boxes, and in confirmation of his lies he announced that they supposedly interviewed the surviving Tsushima.
                WHO could Novikov interview? Which of the officers would pour out the soul to the battalion? WHERE FROM Novikoa are heartbreaking descriptions of events in the conning tower of Suvorov? The flagship officers reported this to him, right?
                Quote: THE_SEAL
                And the speculation of such couch strategists and land sailors

                nothing to do with it. Do you want to hurt me? Stupid. I am a couch strategist and a land sailor, how can a fact offend? :))
                But Novikov’s contradiction to OTHER eyewitnesses who survived Tsushima - wow, this is serious. On which I wrote my article. You do not argue with my "speculation." You are essentially declaring now - the Swedes, Rozhestvensky, Shamshev, Smirnov, Ryumin, and so on and so forth - they are liars, but Novikov is right.
          2. Pilat2009 19 June 2015 17: 32 New
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            Quote: Russian Uzbek
            poured so much dirt on the innocent bachelor Novikov

            So Novikov was also an alternative, along with Kostenko and others
            For everything he rested in "It was necessary ...." And he came to this idea after 10 years. That is why the next officer in the rank comes into command, and not the battalion out of turn ...
            By the way, there is an opinion that most of the materials for Tsushima were collected by Kostenko, and then Silych bought them from him when he was under investigation ....
            1. Russian Uzbek 19 June 2015 17: 52 New
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              Well, at least he was a participant in the Tsushima battle and lived at that time, so I believe in Novikov anymore! moreover, he was not an analyst but a budding writer, yesterday a semi-literate peasant who wrote from the words of the crew members of other ships and his own impressions
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 18: 31 New
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                Quote: Russian Uzbek
                Well, at least he was a participant in the Tsushima battle and lived at that time, so I believe in Novikov anymore!

                More than all the other participants in the Tsushima battle? So like Semenov, Swede and so on and so forth?
                Your cause, I respect the religion of others, you have every right to believe what you want!
          3. Alex 20 June 2015 00: 58 New
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            Quote: Russian Uzbek
            I’ve read the second article and I have big doubts that the author even read “Tsushima” poured so much dirt on the innocent Novikov bachelor

            Ivan, no one, in general, calls Novikov-Surf a liar. The fact that many authors call him a dreamer is a tribute to excessive emotionality, but his novel "Tsushima", IMHO, is a hymn to the heroism of Russian sailors. We will leave out of the box his assessment of the talents and merits of the officers, as well as his analysis (and after all, what he said about the battle was precisely an attempt to analyze, that is, to realize the events that took place), but the pathos of those events was conveyed quite strongly. I read his novel in such distant times, which is hard to remember, but the impression remains to this day. And even if he was right or wrong in many moments, but for me his romance will be an example of a description of the unprecedented feat of the Russian sailor. And the result of the battle ... I think that hundreds of copies will be broken. And this is right: the truth - it is always better than delusions. It just needs to be proved calmly, with arguments in hand and without exaltation.
      4. Victorio 19 June 2015 18: 29 New
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        Quote: Russian Uzbek
        The author, a brilliant couch strategist and tactician to the smithereens, smashed and smashed all the charlatans (starting with Novikov-Priboy! yeah) from military history and opened his eyes to us!
        Hallelujah! Hallelujah! Glory to you !!!
        an article for an alternative history site ... what does it do here?

        ===
        poor newcomers, the surf in the coffin tossing and turning, then he laurels, then he anathema!
      5. Lex
        Lex 19 June 2015 19: 49 New
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        However strange it might seem to you, many “non-couch” specialists agreed with the author. I will not talk about Rozhdestvensky as a genius of tactics, but the fact that he is an outstanding organizer has already shown the very fact that the ships reached the Korean Channel. This was taught as a fact in the VM schools of the USSR, this is not my assessment.
      6. THE_SEAL 21 June 2015 01: 38 New
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        Let's not forget that Novikov-Priboy also wrote to Tsushima on the basis of testimonies of officers and sailors from other ships of the squadron with whom he was captured. And I also saw with my own eyes Japanese armadillos. And do not finish the academicians in order to draw conclusions which he made.
    5. Scraptor 19 June 2015 11: 52 New
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      In response to his "only hints", he received a telegram from the Admiralty, and not from the Tsar personally.
    6. clesaryy
      clesaryy 19 June 2015 12: 27 New
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      Yeah, some author decided not to sing along to official historians, but how dare!
      I am waiting for the continuation
    7. RPG_ 19 June 2015 12: 51 New
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      The article is written based on facts and there is no one-sidedness in it.
    8. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 13: 52 New
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      I will try to survive this :))) And what, by the way, is the one-sidedness of the article?
      1. jktu66 19 June 2015 18: 51 New
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        I will try to survive this :))) And what, by the way, is the one-sidedness of the article?
        The one-sidedness lies in the "distortion of Soviet naval science" laughing Well, there should be no heroes in the "rotten Russian Empire-prison of peoples." Otherwise, one can get to the point of doubting the correct execution of the royal family. It’s easier to drive along sailors like in the 1950s with bulldozers through the cemeteries of Russian soldiers 1mv in the Kaliningrad region.
    9. Alex 19 June 2015 23: 55 New
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      Quote: VladimirRG
      The article is written one-sidedly I did not like.

      I will not pass it - you, like any other, have every right to your point of view. But maybe, in the order of discussion, at least a few words you say in support of your position?
  2. kingoff 19 June 2015 07: 16 New
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    But what about the famous "shimoza"?
    1. avia12005 19 June 2015 07: 31 New
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      Probably still will)))
      1. Andrey77 19 June 2015 11: 34 New
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        We hope so. Very interesting.
    2. Andrey77 19 June 2015 11: 31 New
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      Shimoza is another myth. I hope the author will debunk him. The truth will have to get into the design of the fuses (it is in them the problem, and not in the explosives).
  3. parusnik 19 June 2015 07: 47 New
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    The heroism of the Russian sailors, the quick wit of the officer corps is not in dispute .. But I look forward to all the same ending .. conclusion what is the reason for the defeat of the Russian squadron in the battle of Tsushima ..
    1. Miner 19 June 2015 09: 03 New
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      It is known in what - there was a battle of an experienced and seasoned fighter with an inexperienced and unfired :(


      Judge for yourself:

      - Fight in the yellow sea - both sides of the same experience, participate in the war from the same day. As a result, during the battle - practical parity.


      - The battle in the Tsushima Strait - the equality of experience and training of the warring parties should not even stutter!

      For one of the parties didn’t even smell the gunpowder, while their opponent was a seasoned rival in the ongoing military campaign, who had real combat experience in conducting operations and in direct face-to-face battles.

      With the presence of relevant experience ("experience is the son of difficult mistakes") and conclusions drawn from it.

      As a result, it is decidedly impossible for a Russian person to speak about the course of the battle without tears; (


      PS
      For decades now, the annoying and painful thought about the results of the Tsushima battle has been haunting me :(

      With her relentlessly, the memory of the course of the battle in the Yellow Sea will surely overwhelm her ...

      Well, how so? Why is the difference in the technical results of these battles of the same rivals SO SUCH terrifying and peremptory? ..


      A lot of things over the years have been read, researched, and repeatedly changed their minds: about ships, command, crews, squadrons, guns and their ammunition, and other conditions, but somehow without much sense in terms final the conclusion and reasons for such an epic and such a fatal fiasco of our fleet ...

      The thought came as if unexpectedly.

      As a result, ALL the knowledge accumulated in life led to the conclusion - a strong, experienced, seasoned in real mortal battles and well-equipped opponent, who knows the terrain of the upcoming battle perfectly, fought with a TOTALLY EXPERIENCED and not having ANY BATTLE EXPERIENCE ...


      What can I say - any more or less wiped Gopnik will be able to talk about the results of his successful battles with opponents even superior in size and growth, but not having experience of similar confrontations, and even at a gopnik unfamiliar to them territory.
      1. parusnik 19 June 2015 10: 33 New
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        You indicate to the author ... not to me .. smile He writes so well that everything was excellent .. and the combat training, sailors and officers at an excellent level .. and heroism is not discounted ..The thought came as if unexpectedly. fought with a completely inexperienced and having no combat experience of the enemy ...... This thought tormentes me too .. Therefore, I am waiting for the author’s conclusion ... and until I argue .. I agree smile hi
        1. Pilat2009 19 June 2015 17: 24 New
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          Quote: parusnik
          and combat training, sailors and officers at an excellent level ..

          Excuse me, the author does not write "at an excellent level", there is no need to distort
          The author writes that combat training was carried out whenever possible
          As for the results, I already wrote that after a day’s battle, with the loss of four main ships, the squadron crumbled, and the result was generally a foregone conclusion, although if they all turned back and interned or surrendered, then they would not have written about defeat and about treason and shame
        2. Lex
          Lex 19 June 2015 19: 54 New
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          You need to compare not the experienced with the inexperienced, but simply two fairly equal opponents in completely different starting conditions. It’s about how to make a swimmer swim 3 km for a while, and in the end to arrange a test race of 100 meters with an opponent who just lay down in the water.
    2. parusnik 19 June 2015 10: 38 New
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      Anyone who disputes the heroism of Russian sailors in the battle of Tsushima? Both privates and the officer corps? ..
  4. V.ic 19 June 2015 08: 05 New
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    The author answered my question on the previous article. The battle patterns and descriptions for them perfectly explain the course of the stages of the battle. Great advantage!
  5. sevtrash 19 June 2015 08: 07 New
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    An interesting continuation, it would be very nice if Andrei would give links to sources, in particular where there would be data confirming his idea of ​​the mutual position of the squadrons at the beginning of the battle, the movement of Alexander.
    Of course, after the battle, Rozhdestvensky could bring up / come up with a lot of justifications for his actions / inaction. In general, the author turns out that he knew and understood everything, but, for some reason, did nothing, but, according to the author, it turns out that this was nothing to do and there was his golden truth.
    The article is definitely a plus.
    1. alicante11 19 June 2015 08: 35 New
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      The turn "under the tail" of the Japanese is even Novikov-Surf. Although he said that Alexander, thus, simply took the squadron out of attack. And if in more detail, in my opinion, only special little-known and small-circulation published literature.
      1. sevtrash 19 June 2015 12: 35 New
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        Quote: alicante11
        The turn "under the tail" of the Japanese is even Novikov-Surf. Although he said that Alexander, thus, simply took the squadron out of attack. And if in more detail, in my opinion, only special little-known and small-circulation published literature.

        Novikov-Priboy Regarding “Alexander 3”, it was described as follows: “... more than once he covered Suvorov with himself and tried to break through to the north under the tail of an enemy convoy. Once he managed to take advantage of the fog and temporarily remove the squadron from under the fire ...". Kostenko’s less poetic attempt was made by “Alexander 3” to break through to the north, and Borodino had the same attempt.
    2. Pilat2009 19 June 2015 17: 48 New
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      Quote: sevtrash
      he knew and understood everything, but, for some reason, did nothing

      He did what was logical at that time. Everything else is impulsive and not justified. There is such a notion-justified risk. Nelson took the risk and won Trafalgar, But Spee was unlucky, like Phillips ...
      1. sevtrash 19 June 2015 18: 52 New
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        Quote: Pilat2009
        He did what was logical at that time.

        It would be logical to take responsibility - go back, it can still change the picture of the battle by attacking Togo during the turn. He preferred to go with the flow, “logically” follow the order, although he knew about the level of readiness of the squadron.
        Reasonably did not risk.
        But Spee - Spee acted, he took responsibility for the attack on the Falklands, although he had different opinions in his squadron, he had intelligence information about the departure of the English squadron, which could be incorrect. But Rozhestvensky did not dare in that situation when this risk could change the situation, he went with the flow, the outcome of which was predictable.
        Of course, now it’s easy to speak, knowing what happened. However, he had a database of the state of his own fleet; he had an idea of ​​the capabilities of the Japanese fleet. But Rozhdestvensky did not turn out to be a naval commander adequate to that situation. I don’t know if he can be called a naval commander. Perhaps, at best, mediocrity.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 19: 33 New
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          Quote: sevtrash
          It would be logical to take responsibility - go back, it can still change the picture of the battle by attacking Togo during the turn.

          Those. having neither speed nor time to attack, had to attack without completing the maneuver?
          In this case, you would now write:
          “Admiral Rozhdestvensky in pursuit of the laurels of the“ winner of Togo ”thoughtlessly, ignoring the technical condition of his ships, gave an inadequate order. He sent the top five of his armadillos right into the mouth of a dozen first-class armored ships of Togo. Rozhdestvensky contemptuously dismissed the experience of the 1 Pacific squadron, which, despite the superiority of the Japanese in firing accuracy, fought fiercely over 4 hours - and as long as the battleships of Wittgeft maintained their formation Togo could not do anything with them. But P the family was knee-deep, imagining himself Ushakov, he rushed forward ... Of course, the battleships that didn’t complete the rebuilding couldn’t turn around in front, and Oslyabya, forced to slow down to miss the 1 squad, couldn’t quickly gain speed and Rozhdestvensky’s planned attack turned into a bloody farce when a crowd of ships from a short distance fell under the dagger fire of Togo and Kamimura.The main forces of the Russian squadron - the 4 battleship type Borodino and Oslyabya were crushed battle, after which the beating of the 2 and 3 Russian units and the blame for this lies entirely on the Russian admiral. Instead of leading a squadron in a closed formation, which only gave chances to go to Vladivostok, Rozhestvensky destroyed the squadron entrusted to him with his insane projection and adventurism. "
          1. sevtrash 19 June 2015 20: 10 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            In this case, you would now write:

            Or maybe the contemporaries of Rozhestvensky wrote - ... as a result of a bold attack by four modern battleships on the enemy during his maneuver, with the support of the ships of the rest of the squadron, most of the ships managed to break through to Vladivostok ...
            The “science fiction” unloved by you, Novikov-Priboy, nevertheless, had some factual material and quoted the high-ranking officers about the realization of this opportunity.
            Kostenko in his report to the Marine Technical Committee writes:
            ... The Japanese command from the very first moment managed to collapse with all twelve armadillos and armored cruisers into the top five leading ships of the Russian squadron. The Admiral of Togo, with a bold maneuver, immediately seized the head of the Russian column and actually put seven old, slow-moving tail ships out of the line of fire. The entire general battle on May 14 took place in the form of martial arts, first of five, and then only three front Russian ships against twelve Japanese ...
            ... Admiral Togo unhindered this tactic of concentrating the blow of all his main forces on an isolated part of the enemy’s forces as a result of the tremendous superiority of the squadron speed of his entire convoy, bold maneuvering at the time of the first attack and opening fire, high combat training of his ships and complete passivity of the Russian command that provided the enemy with all the battle initiative. Rozhdestvensky immediately obeyed the battle tactics chosen by the Japanese commander in the form of a long-range artillery contest ...
            ... The Russian squadron half an hour after the start of the battle lost its organized command, and this made its general defeat inevitable ...
            ... Rozhestvensky’s unsuccessful maneuvering during the start of the battle eased the enemy’s targets, completely upset the Russian column, put two flagships under a crushing blow and predetermined their death ...
            ... The outcome of the battle with all its consequences and the extermination of armadillos was determined ten minutes after the opening of fire. "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov" after half an hour were out of order. “Suvorov”, “Alexander” and “Borodino” were liquidated by the Japanese 5–5 1/2 hours after the opening of the fire, when they had already lost all military significance ...
            ... The command of the Russian squadron had the opportunity to mislead the enemy, sacrifice one part of the squadron to break through, on the other, finally, a bold military initiative that would confuse the enemy’s plans.
            At the squadron, they expected that Rozhdestvensky himself would attack the Japanese at the very first moment, throwing at them four strong battleships of the first detachment, which had good armor, high speed and a favorable arrangement of 6-inch guns in the towers. The basis for these assumptions was the frequent evolutionary teachings of four of the same type of battleships and even the personal statements of Rozhdestvensky ...

            It seems that you want to almost whitewash Rozhdestvensky. Well, you think the opinions of Surf, Kostenko are biased. And the opinion of the commission investigating the circumstances of the disaster?
            ... The unsuccessful choice of the chief of the squadron, who took command without faith in the possibility of military success, did not pay the necessary attention to the combat training of the squadron, did not tolerate the independent cooperation of his subordinates, and did not have the courage to admit the impossible task, when he himself was convinced of this. Tactical mistakes made by the squadron commander further worsened the situation. Hopeless from the beginning, based not on good faith, but on the blind hope of luck, the operation of breaking through the 2nd Pacific squadron to Vladivostok should have ended in disaster ...
            1. Pilat2009 19 June 2015 21: 06 New
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              Quote: sevtrash
              Hopeless from the beginning, based not on good faith, but on the blind hope of luck, the operation of breaking through the 2nd Pacific squadron to Vladivostok should have ended in disaster ...

              That is, even if you put Nelson, the result would be the same. However, it is not a fact that Nelson would agree
              Quote: sevtrash
              who did not pay the necessary attention to the combat training of the squadron
              ?
              Quote: sevtrash
              The basis for these assumptions was the frequent evolutionary teachings of four of the same type of armadillo.

              You two quotes contradict themselves
              Quote: sevtrash
              sacrifice one part of the squadron to break through, on the other, finally

              and what would you do with one part if you reached? But in general, Togo didn’t flap his ears either, intelligence by cruisers was at a high level, like the same Surf or someone else wrote that at the time of the meeting, Togo knew the composition of the squadron, its construction and speed
              Quote: sevtrash
              Togo unhindered as a result of the tremendous superiority of the squadron speed of his entire convoy

              Ie there was a superiority in speed?
              Quote: sevtrash
              who didn’t have the courage to admit that the task taken upon himself was impossible when he himself was convinced of this

              Excuse me, but what was he supposed to do? Shoot himself, escape from the ship?
              From Madagascar, he sent a telegram that in this situation a further hike was an adventure. In response, he was advised not to panic and to pray intensely
              It is high time to understand that the commission found a scapegoat, but it could not recognize the royal persons guilty ....
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 22: 07 New
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              Quote: sevtrash
              Or perhaps contemporaries of Rozhestvensky wrote - ... as a result of a bold attack by four modern battleships on the enemy during the maneuver he performed, with the support of the ships of the rest of the squadron, most of the ships managed to break through to Vladivostok ..

              Alas, it cannot be. no timing passes.
              Quote: sevtrash
              The “science fiction” unloved by you, Novikov-Priboy, nevertheless, had some factual material and quoted the high-ranking officers about the realization of this opportunity.

              And who is this "high-ranking officer" who decided to communicate heart to heart with the bailer? :)
              Quote: sevtrash
              Kostenko in his report to the Marine Technical Committee writes:

              Now please tell me, what high officer rank did Mr. Kostenko whom you quote? :)) If anything, I can remind you.
              Kostenko graduated from Marine Engineering as a shipbuilding engineer, i.e. not even a mechanic (they were issued completely separately, and Kostenko himself wrote “On the Orel in Tsushima” about this perfectly) When graduating, Kostenko had the title of “junior assistant shipbuilder” - this is the CIVIL rank of fleet.
              Then Kostenko gets the post of assistant builder of the battleship "Eagle". His tasks
              Rozhdestvensky said that ... the presence of ship engineers on ships would make it easier for personnel to familiarize themselves with the equipment of the ships and provide quick correction of defects along the way. In general, he hopes that the participation of ship builders in the campaign of the squadron will bring great benefits to the fleet, since it will prepare the fleet of engineers who know in detail the conditions of the ocean campaign and the combat service of the ships.

              Total - Mr. Kostenko at the time of leaving 2TOE is nothing more than a graduate of a civilian specialty, with almost no work experience. An expert on strategy and tactics, right?
              Quote: sevtrash
              And the opinion of the commission investigating the circumstances of the disaster?

              Which hung all the dogs on Rozhdestvensky and other admirals who fought in Tsushima? Dismiss :) The materials of the Investigative Commission are extremely interesting. But the conclusions ...
              1. sevtrash 19 June 2015 23: 43 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Alas, it cannot be. no timing passes.

                But Kofman, with an almost identical title to his work, points out that:
                ... Most critics of his actions unanimously believe that the 1st armored detachment was to "rush at the enemy" ... Kofman V. Tsushima: analysis against myths, although it does not consider this possible.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And who is this "high-ranking officer" who decided to communicate heart to heart with the bailer?

                Well, if you read Novikov-Priboy, then he collected information from the participants of the campaign and the battle. Do you think everything is fantasy? As far as I remember, in his presentation several officers expressed such an idea, not personally to the battalion, of course. Miklouho-Maclay, in particular.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Now please tell me, what high officer rank did Mr. Kostenko whom you quote? :)) If anything, I can remind you.

                Andrey, and tell me, what is your rank, experience of military operations as a naval commander of squadrons of battleships, cruisers at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries? Or are you a participant and witness of those fights? Equally the same question regarding all the others who express their opinion, including the same Kofman.
                So why do you refuse Kostenko to have an opinion on the reasons for the defeat, the person who was a member of him, communicated with the officers before and after, had an education that would make it possible for the vast majority of people who write and speak about the battle to recognize the features of the technique that participated in this battle. And I don’t think that intellectually Kostenko was inferior to any of, again, squeaking and talking about Tsushima. Can Koffman be, Kostenko not?
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Which hung all the dogs on Rozhdestvensky and other admirals who fought in Tsushima? Dismiss :)

                That is, they are white and fluffy?
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 June 2015 00: 32 New
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                  Quote: sevtrash
                  Andrey, and tell me, what is your rank, experience of military operations as a naval commander of squadrons of armadillos, cruisers at the turn of the 19-20 centuries? Or are you a participant and witness of those fights?

                  Sagging, but what have I to do with it? laughing
                  I have mutually exclusive testimonies of eyewitnesses who participated in the Tsushima battle. Here we take the same speed of the battleships of the Borodino type. According to Kostenko, it turns out that the Eagle could well develop 17 nodes. The Swede claims that the 15-16 nodes were achievable only under ideal conditions - with perfect coal, fresh stokers, etc. Semenov writes with reference to "many conversations with mechanics" that the mechanic of the "Eagle" is not at all confident in his car, but Alexander and Suvorov will give 15-16 bonds, but Borodino will not. Rozhdestvensky writes about 13,5 nodes, but here clearly does not mean the maximum speed of an individual armored carrier, but the squadron speed of the four Borodino How to understand who is right?
                  Who is a Swede? The senior officer of the "Eagle", a cautorang, by the standards of those times - this is a lot. Who is Semenov? Captain of the second rank, military officer. Who is Christmas? It seems clear too.
                  And who is Kostenko? A novice shipbuilder, yesterday a schoolboy who does not have experience in designing and / or operating propulsion systems (the Orel mechanic actually dealt with this) is a civilian, has been noticed in many mistakes (such as 300 hits in the Eagle in the Tsushima battle)
                  So - the consistent evidence of 3 staff officers in high positions against one of yesterday's student.
                  Are you still curious that I prefer officers? :)))
                  Quote: sevtrash
                  But Kofman, with an almost identical title to his work, points out that:
                  ... Most of the critics of his actions unanimously believe that the 1-th armored squad was to "rush at the enemy"

                  Koffman IMHO did not mean eyewitnesses to the battle, but historians :))
                  According to some historians Togo himself put himself in a hopeless position, and as a result of the cunning "deception" of Rozhestvensky, who only had to reach out and pick the fruits of victory. Others fiercely criticize the Russian admiral for unnecessary rebuilding at a critical moment in the battle.
                  1. sevtrash 20 June 2015 08: 28 New
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                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Sagging, but what have I to do with it?

                    Actually, in that part of the commentary, the main person is Kostenko, you, with all due respect, like the rest, just as an example. laughing
                    ... "On the" Orel "in Tsushima" - the most interesting of this "trinity" of unofficial sources. Kostenko was one of the few “pure observers” from the Russian side and, perhaps, the only fully qualified ...
                    Kofman V. Tsushima: analysis versus myths

                    From the biography: Vladimir Polyevktovich Kostenko - study at the Marine Engineering School of Emperor Nicholas I (now the Higher Naval Engineering College named after F.E.Dzerzhinsky). He graduated with a gold medal with the entry of his name on the Marble board of the school. The topic of the diploma is the project of a new lightweight high-speed armored cruiser. In 1904, he equipped the battleship Orel with the world's first quick roll-leveling system.

                    It doesn’t really correlate with yours "... yesterday’s schoolboy who has no experience in designing and / or operating landing gears ..." lol

                    And who do you think may have the best information about the capabilities / condition of the ship’s vehicles - from the admiral, the flagship navigator / chief of the naval squadron department (Semenov), a senior officer of the ship or a shipbuilding engineer who spent several months with these same mechanisms and and undoubtedly talented? laughing
                    A poll can be arranged - whose opinion on this issue would be preferable? Do you think the admiral, the flag officer, the senior officer will bypass the shipbuilding engineer? lol
                    1. sevtrash 20 June 2015 11: 48 New
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                      More Kostenko from his book:
                      Back in Japan, with a number of officers, they organized a naval game on the battle of armadillos with armored cruisers, Kostenko made a report on the results of the battle
                      ... The moment of the beginning of the battle opened up for Rozhdestvensky a complete opportunity to seize the initiative and attack the Japanese convoy while turning Admiral Togo successively on the reverse course, when his battle convoy was doubled and “tied in a knot” ...
                      ... This moment was not only missed, but, on the contrary, Rozhdestvensky, with his first rebuilding into one wake column, confused the entire system of his squadron and from the very beginning of the battle gave the enemy the opportunity to carry out a plan to cover our head, using the huge advantage of the move. It was this passivity and Rozhestvensky’s mistakes in the beginning of the battle that predetermined the quick death of Oslyaby, the failure of Suvorov and the isolation of the three remaining armadillos of the first detachment from the tail of seven armadillos in the artillery duel ...
                      ... As a result of my report, the flag captain of Admiral Nebogatov turned to me and asked me to visit their camp, since my conclusions and observations would be extremely interesting for the admiral ...

                      How strange and surprising that “yesterday’s schoolboy” is being listened to by admirals, flag officers, his report is heard in the maritime technical committee, and Krylov is talking to him
                      1. sevtrash 20 June 2015 11: 55 New
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                        From the book of Kostenko:
                        ... The Japanese military publishing house released an album with pictures of huge damage to the battleship "Eagle". This album helped me finish compiling an accurate sketch of both of its sides with external damage and indicating the caliber of the missiles hit. The total result of the hits showed that 42 shells of 12-inch caliber hit the battleship, and in most cases the explosions of these shells turned out to be paired. They were launched in one volley from one tower.
                        The number of hits of 8– and 6-inch shells reached 102, and in total, therefore, the “Eagle” withstood 144 projectile from 6– to 12-inch caliber and remained in service, retaining the course, control and half of the artillery. This can serve as evidence of its sufficiently high combat survivability and stamina. The armor protection system, formed by two armor belts from bow to stern with a total height of 11 1/2 feet in the middle and two solid armored decks adjacent to the lower and upper edges of the belt defense, was fully justified. However, the design of mounting the armor plates to the hull was clearly unsatisfactory. Even with a cursory inspection of the ship after the battle, I had to find armor plates torn from bolts and displaced from their places due to the disorder of their fastenings to the hull. When a heavy high-explosive shell is hit at the edge of the plate and it explodes, the plate rotates around its center of gravity, the edge closest to the point of impact is pressed into the side, and the opposite side comes off detachments when I see a gap in bolts and gujones ...

                        Where's 300?
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 June 2015 14: 43 New
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                        Quote: sevtrash
                        As a result of my report, the flag captain of admiral Nebogatov turned to me and asked me to visit their camp, since my conclusions and observations would be extremely interesting for the admiral

                        Let's clarify :)) After Kostenko’s report, in which he stated the need to “collapse” on Japanese ships according to Kostenko himself
                        My report provoked a heated debate among officers of the headquarters of Rozhestvensky, who denied the admiral’s maneuver at the time of the start of the battle.

                        Which, in fact, is not surprising, because this maneuver was not possible.
                        Well, why did you need this report to Nebogatov ... Generally speaking, Nebogatov handed over the Russian ships, so the search for the person to blame for the defeat of the squadron made great sense to Nebogatov.
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        therefore, the Eagle withstood the 144 shell from 6– to 12-inch caliber

                        From 6 inches and above. And lower?:))
                      3. sevtrash 20 June 2015 17: 35 New
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                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        My report provoked heated controversy on the part of officers of the headquarters of Rozhdestvensky, who denied the fatal role of the admiral’s maneuver at the time of the start of the battle.

                        Which, in fact, is not surprising, because this maneuver was not possible.
                        Well, why did you need this report to Nebogatov ... Generally speaking, Nebogatov handed over the Russian ships, so the search for the person to blame for the defeat of the squadron made great sense to Nebogatov.


                        It is not surprising that the report provoked a heated polemic among the officers of Rozhestvensky’s headquarters, as they showed / proved the possibility of a different option than a complete rout / disaster, that is, the mediocrity of their boss who did not see a chance in a hopeless situation. In general, probably this distinguishes the real naval commander / commander from mediocrity - to find a chance to win where others do not see. And then others saw it.
                      4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 June 2015 18: 04 New
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                        Quote: sevtrash
                        It is not surprising that the report provoked a heated polemic among officers of the headquarters of Rozhestvensky, as he showed / proved the possibility of a different option than a complete rout / disaster

                        Sorry, but here again there are three errors in one text.
                        Firstly, the Russians simply did not have time to rush into the ranks of the front and arrange porridge-mala. Even if the 1-th squad really would have 17 speed nodes.
                        Secondly, if ignoring p. 1. - it is completely incomprehensible with what joy you took that the attackers of the 5 EDB front formation (i.e. with a minimum of heavy artillery in salvo) under the dagger fire of a dozen Japanese armored ships firing all overboard, could lead to the victory of the battle.
                        Thirdly, at the time of Togo’s loop, neither Rozhdestvensky nor the officers of the fleet could know about the impending defeat. They could wait for the battle by analogy with Shantung.
                      5. sevtrash 20 June 2015 23: 58 New
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                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Sorry, but here again there are three errors in one text.

                        And why aren't you making these mistakes?
                        Firstly, not everything comes down to an alternative to throwing 4 newest battleships (and not at all in the heap, read the source, Kostenko, the point was to change the distance of the battle, why - read Kostenko). The options were in the division of the squadron into separate units - again, read the source.
                        Secondly - well, all this is written by Kostenko !!! - there were reasons laid down in the design of new battleships for the success of this attack, especially what kind of dagger fire you are talking about when the Togo squadron was in a consistent turn due to which, in fact, this version of the attack appeared.
                        Thirdly - what, in the 2nd and 3rd Pacific gathered solid fools who could not calculate the chances of victory and defeat? Another thing is that Rozhdestvensky, who you defend, even with admirals did not hold meetings on the strategy and tactics of the battle, and indeed the options for the actions of the squadron.

                        Lord! Read Kostenko! Of course, others too, but Kostenko is obligatory. If only because this person was a participant in the battle, discussed with the officers and admirals of the squadron possible options for action, analyzed them, as well as the outcome of the battle.
                      6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 June 2015 00: 23 New
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                        Quote: sevtrash
                        Firstly, not everything comes down to an alternative to throwing 4 newest battleships (and not at all in the heap, read the source, Kostenko, the point was to change the distance of the battle, why - read Kostenko). The options were in the division of the squadron into separate units - again, read the source.

                        Listen, well, do not hide behind the source! What does Kostenko write?
                        What was necessary to isolate the "high-speed" battleships in a separate unit and then
                        the tactical advantage of the Japanese would be reduced to zero, and the rapid coverage of the head of the Russian column would become impracticable.

                        Of course, Kostenko does not write anything about how a detachment of 5 warships will battle 12 enemy ones. And you do not write anything about this either.
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        moreover, what kind of dagger fire are you talking about when the Togo squadron was in a consistent turn, due to which, in fact, this version of the attack appeared.

                        Sometimes you need to include your head in addition to reading sources. Togo loop became apparent when? At the end of the Mikas maneuver, i.e. when he turned around and lay down on a new course. From this moment, Rozhestvensky had 15 minutes to react, i.e. roughly 1,3 minutes per ship. Those. The first Japanese combat detachment turned fully in line in less than 1 minutes. Even if the battleships of Rozhestvensky would have been able to rush 6,8 knots from the quarry (a fancy fantasy, but let's say), then in the mentioned time 18 head EBRs, even without taking into account the turn time (and it also takes time), could pass only 5 miles and would be 2 kb from the pivot point.
                        Moreover, the total nose salvo of 5 Russian EDBs is 8 305 mm, 2-254 mm, and a maximum of 35 152 mm (32 - Borodintsy and 3 - Oslyabya). And the total airborne salvo of the 1st armored detachment that had developed at that time was 16-305 mm, 1 mm, 254 - 6 mm, 203 - 42 mm.
                        And the most important thing. Who, well, who told you that if the Russians had rushed forward with the Japanese front, Kamimura would have led his ships after Togo?
                      7. sevtrash 21 June 2015 09: 17 New
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                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Of course, Kostenko does not write anything about how a detachment of 5 warships will battle 12 enemy ones. And you do not write anything about this either.

                        (Another heavy sigh). It seems to me that I have already quoted half of Kostenko’s book. The whole book will not fit !!! Can you read it yourself? But still:
                        ... Our fast battleships, attacking the enemy at the first moment of battle, had every chance of causing frustration in the enemy’s convoy and connecting its actions, knocking out some of his ships at close range. This would make it possible to pull up to the battlefield the remaining, less rapid battleships and deploy all their forces for a general battle ...
                        ... Given the weakness of the forces of the Russian squadron, the only chance of success was the Makarov combat tactics: being the weakest, compensate for the lack of forces with the decisiveness of their actions and fall down with excellent forces on part of the enemy column. Only by such tactical device could combat success be achieved. When giving the initiative to attack the enemy, a quantitative superiority of his forces would inevitably be reflected.
                        The battle plan, based on a bold attack by our new and strong battleships before they were damaged in battle, arose on the squadron and debated on many ships during the campaign. To implement this bold plan, special training was needed so that the new battleships confidently maneuver at full speed. It was necessary to work out their mechanisms, to unload the ships from excessive ballast and from combustible materials ...
                        But since the attack was not undertaken by the commander, the battle from the very first moment turned into an artillery contest of five Russian ships with twelve Japanese at a distance pre-selected by the enemy. All the advantages of Japanese high training in long-range shooting affected, when the incendiary effect and the destructive power of Japanese high-explosive shells, opposed to the poor explosive properties of Russian shells, appeared
                        ... The officers of the 2nd squadron who spoke at the meeting not only agreed on the correctness of reporting tactical conclusions from the course of the maneuvers of the Russian and Japanese squadrons in the Tsushima battle, but for their part even more sharply emphasized the improper use of battleships of the 1st detachment at the time of the start of the battle, which had a fatal effect on the outcome of the battle ...

                        I repeat once again - this is not only / maybe not so much Kostenko’s thoughts, these are the thoughts of other squadron officers who “turned on” the head long before you and, I dare say, I don’t think that their heads and experience were worse than yours.
                      8. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 June 2015 14: 41 New
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                        Quote: sevtrash
                        Can you read it yourself?

                        Yes, I read it. So you, it seems, did not read, but listened.
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        ... Our fast battleships, attacking the enemy at the first moment of battle, had every chance of causing frustration in the enemy’s column

                        Listen, well, you give chesslovo :))) Kostenko, who has never been an officer moves a "brilliant" idea. This idea of ​​his is quite rightly criticized by the flagship officers of Rozhestvensky. You do not care, you declare them interested parties. But faceless
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        The officers of the 2nd squadron who spoke at the meeting not only agreed on the correctness of reporting tactical conclusions from the maneuvers of the Russian and Japanese squadrons in the Tsushima battle, but for their part even more sharply emphasized the improper use of battleships of the 1st detachment at the time of the start of the battle, which had a fatal effect at the end of the battle.

                        This is from the words of Kostenko. And now the question is - where is this evidence? Why are they not in the reports of the Commission of Inquiry? Why are they not in the reports and descriptions of the battle on May 14-15? Why are they nowhere other than Kostenko’s? Why, no, WELL WHY Kostenko himself, while making testimony of the Investigative Commission, is silent about his "archigenic" idea? :))
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        I repeat once again - this is not only / maybe not so much Kostenko’s thoughts, these are the thoughts of other squadron officers

                        Exclusively from the words of Kostenko.
                      9. sevtrash 21 June 2015 19: 11 New
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                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        This idea of ​​his is quite rightly criticized by the flagship officers of Rozhestvensky. You do not care, you declare them interested parties. But faceless

                        Equally, you can declare the faceless flag officers of Christmas. Interestingly, you quote Kostenko, or rather, accept those words that suit you and do not accept, those that diverge from your ideas. Already quoted "... As a result of my report, the flag captain of admiral Nebogatov turned to me and asked to visit their camp, since my conclusions and observations would be extremely interesting for the admiral ...", for you, it seems that this is also faceless .

                        In general, this is understandable, an article is planned with a certain meaning and ending, if something contradicts this sense, you can not take this into account. Actually, this is your business.

                        For me, as I think for many others, the value of Kostenko’s work is incomparably higher than yours or someone else’s from the couch strategists that we are all. Another 100 years will pass, no one will remember the couch strategists, and the books of Novikov-Priboy, Semenov, and especially Kostenko will still be relevant.
                      10. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 June 2015 19: 39 New
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                        Quote: sevtrash
                        For me, as I think for many others, the value of Kostenko’s work is incomparably higher than yours or someone else’s from the couch strategists that we are all. Another 100 years will pass, no one will remember the couch strategists, and the books of Novikov-Priboy, Semenov, and especially Kostenko will still be relevant.

                        I regret that the works of Novikov-Priboy and Kostenko are NOT considered relevant today, and to be sure it’s enough to look at the “Tsushima” where most of the modern Russian naval historians happen to be, which neither you nor I are good for.
                        And Semenov - yes, he will be relevant. Including because it has its own opinion on the issues disputed by you, different from Kostenko
                      11. sevtrash 21 June 2015 20: 42 New
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                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        the works of Novikov-Priboy and Kostenko are NOT considered relevant today.

                        What nonsense, sorry. People collected factual material, witnessed the battle, questioned and learned the opinion of contemporaries and participants in those events. Well, has other factual material been collected today? Can indicate equivalent work?
                      12. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 22 June 2015 00: 13 New
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                        Quote: sevtrash
                        What nonsense, sorry. People collected factual material, witnessed the battle, questioned and learned the opinion of contemporaries and participants in those events. Well, has other factual material been collected today? Can indicate equivalent work?

                        You know, I wouldn’t put up such illiteracy in your place for universal accusation. ACTUAL material contains HERE

                        and here

                        and in other similar collections of documents.
                        And the memoirs of Novikov and Kostenko are precisely MEMOIRS and the price is appropriate for them.
                    2. sevtrash 21 June 2015 21: 17 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      and to be convinced of it, it’s enough to look at “tsushima” where most of the modern Russian naval historians happen in one way or another


                      Here you are from the site http://tsushima.su/
                      ... A logical solution for Z.P. Rozhestvensky was to attach the fifth fast battleship Oslyabya and attack Togo battleships at a distance advantageous to Russian guns (about 20-25 kb). The heavy damage to one or two battleships could make the Japanese refuse to continue the battle ...
                    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 22 June 2015 00: 24 New
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                      Listen, well, are you not ashamed to quote Gribovsky 11 years ago? And so-quote to the end
                      With the findings of official descriptions, worn until 1917. secret nature, were mostly in agreement and the authors of the most serious open works on the war at sea are the captains of the 2nd rank N.L. Klado and M.I. Smirnov.

                      And where is the eternal genius Kostenko? :))
                      In general, I suggest you end this senseless argument - it’s obvious to me personally that you can’t bear the attacks on your personal iconostasis in the person of Kostenko, and I’m already tired of laughing at your attempts to justify it.
                      If you want revenge - you will have them, in the comments to the next article you can refute those inconsistencies that Kostenko contains - i.e. places where he specifically contradicts himself.
                    4. sevtrash 22 June 2015 09: 09 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      It’s obvious to me personally that you can’t stand the attacks on your personal iconostasis in the person of Kostenko, and I’m already tired of laughing at your attempts to justify it.

                      Andrei, I respect your work on creating an article, like the work of anyone here who finds the strength and time to create an article.
                      But nevertheless, this work is completely incomparable with the one that Kostenko or Novikov-Priboy, for example, carried out at one time. And they may not be geniuses, but they are absolutely extraordinary people for sure. Everyone is mistaken, and they and even you. You never called Kostenko the equivalent of modern work, and I don’t think you will find one.
                      This is your constant attacks on Kostenko - “yesterday’s schoolboy”, “300 hits”, etc.
                      Well - and in the end - I hope you don’t consider yourself the ultimate truth, infallible and unconditional and not subject to criticism.
  6. Pilat2009 25 June 2015 20: 50 New
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    Quote: sevtrash
    and from the very beginning of the battle gave the enemy the opportunity to carry out a plan to cover our head

    Actually, he had no options. For the Japanese, everything was calculated in advance:
    http://vivovoco.astronet.ru/VV/PAPERS/HISTORY/TSUSSIMA.HTM
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 June 2015 13: 56 New
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    Quote: sevtrash
    It doesn’t really correlate with yours "... yesterday’s schoolboy who has no experience in designing and / or operating landing gears ..."

    It correlates with itself :) You re-read "On the Eagle in Tsushima" :) "Eagle" was the first ship that Kostenko hit and it happened at once after its release :) And - yes, he has no experience in designing ship installations. He is a shipbuilder, i.e. creates ship designs and then builds them. You don’t think, I hope that shipbuilders independently develop shipboard artillery pieces? With boilers and machines - the same thing. Kostenko, of course, had general knowledge in this area, but it was obviously lower than that of the mechanics of the fleet. And - Kostenko had no practice in operating machines.
    Quote: sevtrash
    And who do you think may have the best information about the capabilities / condition of the ship’s machines - from the admiral, the flagship navigator / head of the naval department of the squadron (Semenov), senior ship officer or shipbuilding engineer who spent several months with these same mechanisms

    The engineer the shipbuilder did not spend several months with these mechanisms, they spent time with the mechanics of an armadillo :)) And Semenov writes from the words of the mechanics.
    It seems to you that if Kostenko is an engineer, then he should have thoroughly known the running gear of the battleship Eagle, and this, alas, is not at all
    1. sevtrash 20 June 2015 14: 24 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      It seems to you that if Kostenko is an engineer, then he should have thoroughly known the running gear of the battleship Eagle, and this, alas, is not at all

      And on the basis of what do you have such a conclusion? Surprisingly - Semenov, who served as the flag navigator, head of the naval department of the squadron, you see, talked with mechanics and knew the condition of the machines. But a ship engineer with specific knowledge of equipment and machines, too, you see, didn’t have such knowledge? Probably did not communicate with mechanics?
      Quite a strange idea, as in my opinion. Or do you have proof of this?
      And where are the 300 hits that you mentioned as Kostenko’s mistake if he writes about 144?
      Your attitude towards one of the most authoritative and complete sources of information about Tsushima. I hope you will present a list of those works on which you are based in your presentations and conclusions.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 June 2015 16: 16 New
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      Quote: sevtrash
      And on the basis of what do you have such a conclusion? Surprisingly - Semenov, who served as the flag navigator, head of the naval department of the squadron, you see, talked with mechanics and knew the condition of the machines. But a ship engineer with specific knowledge of equipment and machines, too, you see, didn’t have such knowledge? Probably did not communicate with mechanics?

      Well, the question is legitimate, in the next article I will pay special attention to it and tell you why I came to the conclusions I came to.
      Quote: sevtrash
      And where are the 300 hits that you mentioned as Kostenko’s mistake if he writes about 144?

      Kostenko in "On the Eagle in Tsushima" writes about 144 hits 6– to 12-inch caliber but writes nothing about shells less than 6 inches, and there should have been quite a few of them. Well, I took 300 hits from Kofman http://tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_7/page_18/page_19/Page_32/kofman-analiz/, which refers to Kostenko. I’ll try to find out exactly where Kostenko mentions this.
      But in any case, even if Kofman is mistaken, then Kostenko approximately 7 times overestimated the hits of 305-mm shells and doubled the rest. So what do you want to prove?
    3. sevtrash 20 June 2015 17: 15 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      So what do you want to prove?

      You raised the question about Kostenko’s mistake in 300 hits, I found Kostenko’s mention of 144. Apparently, you should justify where Kostenko indicated 300 hits.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Kostenko in "On the Eagle in Tsushima" writes about 144 hits from 6– to 12-inch caliber but writes nothing about shells less than 6 inches, and there should have been a lot of them.

      And which ones? There were also 76 mm and 47 mm guns on Japanese ships, the task of which was the mine action. Do you think that these guns also participated in a squad battle along with the 6-12 inches? That is, most of the hits are due to 76 and 47-mm guns?
      This is a striking conclusion, given the meaning of using such a caliber, range, and circumstances of the battle. I would like to know the source of such a conclusion.
    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 June 2015 18: 19 New
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      Quote: sevtrash
      And which ones? There were also 76 mm and 47 mm guns on Japanese ships, the task of which was the mine action. Do you think that these guns also participated in a squad battle along with the 6-12 inches? That is, most of the hits are due to 76 and 47-mm guns?

      And you see how many hits the “Eagle” really got :))
      Pekingham indicates "21 small-bore or fragmentation hits"
      Quote: sevtrash
      This is a striking conclusion, given the meaning of using such a caliber, range, and circumstances of the battle.

      And you look at the statistics of hits in the EDB from the time of the REV :) About the range and circumstances of the battle - I don’t know what to say at all, the ships were regularly within the reach of the 75-mm guns. As for the appropriateness of using small calibers, these are all questions for Togo. Generally speaking, for the same Pekingham, only Togo and Kamimura detachments fired over 7,5 thousand three-inch shells in Tsushima.
      Quote: sevtrash
      I would like to know the source of such a conclusion.

      I gave the link above.
    5. sevtrash 20 June 2015 23: 35 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      I gave the link above.

      Is it on Koffman? And why not refer to Ferran who has no data on the hit of 75mm shells in the Eagle?
      Take Pekingham as a model of credibility? Have you heard of the Puckingham effect?
      And what is neglect of Kostenko’s data? I mean, is he the most important myth to fight against? But he analyzed the number of hits himself after the fight, while being in a Japanese hospital having the opportunity to see the Eagle, from photographs of the Japanese.
    6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 June 2015 00: 02 New
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      Quote: sevtrash
      Is it on Koffman?

      (heavy sigh) You asked me for a link to Kostenko, where he writes about 300 hits in Oryol. I explained to you that I didn’t have such a link, because I took data from Kofman, who writes about 300 hits referring to Kostenko.
      Quote: sevtrash
      Take Pekingham as a model of credibility? Have you heard of the Puckingham effect?

      I heard. But what does the perception of enemy fire during the battle have to do with working with documents and diagrams?
      A thorough analysis of the reports of the English and German naval attaches and the study of numerous photographs make it possible to say that the Eagle most likely received 5 12, 2 10, 9 8, 39 6, and 21 small-caliber or fragmentation hits, of which 2 12 ", 5 8", 28 6 "and 11 small-caliber or fragmentation hits fell on the port side.
      (Campbell)
      Do not like Packinham - take Meiji, the Japanese, who got an armadillo and who carried out its repair and modernization, are clearly aware of the shells that got into it better than Kostenko.
      Quote: sevtrash
      And why not refer to Ferrand who has no data on the hit of 75mm shells in the Eagle?

      And what, Ferrand wrote that small-caliber shells hit Oryol? belay You do not confuse the lack of data with the lack of hits.
    7. sevtrash 21 June 2015 09: 30 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      (heavy sigh) You asked me for a link to Kostenko, where he writes about 300 hits in Oryol. I explained to you that I didn’t have such a link, because I took data from Kofman, who writes about 300 hits referring to Kostenko.

      In other words, did you rely on incorrect data? A heavy sigh to what I don’t want to admit? But the Kofman 300 with a question, didn’t it alert?
      Do you interpret "... small-caliber or fragmentation hits ..." solely in favor of small-caliber?
      And yet, why such a rejection of Kostenko’s data?
    8. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 June 2015 14: 54 New
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      Quote: sevtrash
      In other words, did you rely on incorrect data?

      This is possible.
      Quote: sevtrash
      A heavy sigh to what I don’t want to admit? But the Kofman 300 with a question, didn’t it alert?

      I repeat to you again, LAST time. Suppose Kofman was mistaken (which is not a fact, it is simply not clear where he got this figure from). But we nevertheless take it as an assumption that Kofman was mistaken, and did not cite the figures of 300 hits in Orel Kostenko. Accordingly, after Koffman, I was also mistaken.
      Further, you can’t understand in any way that both ours and the Japanese fired from small things at armadillos. I will not prove anything to you here either, since these are the FAMOUS facts described in the heap of monographs, almost any source, reports of Russian commanders of armadillos, Japanese reports, etc. and from a later one - according to 1 TOE and at least Krestyaninov and Molodtsov's "Squadron battleships of the type Peresvet" - all of them report numerous small-caliber hits.
      But here is the FACT that Kostenko’s numbers cherished by you, 42 305-mm hits and a hundred six-inch many times exceed the actual hits in an armadillo - is that how? After all, you have Kostenko - this is a jack of all trades, he knows the chassis and the design of the battleship, he surpassed military science and tactics.
      So what, excuse me, is Kostenko a 3-7 times upsizing in the number of hits of 305 mm “suitcases” and MINIMUM doubled the hits of six-inch shells?
      Quote: sevtrash
      And yet, why such a rejection of Kostenko’s data?

      Because Kostenko regularly contradicts both himself and reliably known facts.
    9. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 June 2015 15: 15 New
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      Yes, by the way ... about the opinion of 2TOE officers.
      A word to Dobrotvorsky, captain of the first rank and commander of Oleg, who valiantly and very successfully fought in Tsushima
      The division of the squadron into slow-moving and high-speed fleets allowed the latter to enter the rear or the head, which, of course, would improve our situation, but again for a short time, because one half of the squadron would move away from the other and still be defeated.
      In the end, without the same shells that the Japanese had, and without an advantage in speed over them (we could walk but more than 13 knots), our pogrom was predetermined, which is why the Japanese were so confidently waiting for us. Whoever commanded us and whatever art we showed, all the same, the terrible fate ahead of us could not be avoided.
    10. sevtrash 21 June 2015 19: 26 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Accordingly, after Koffman, I was also mistaken.

      Bravo, bravo. I’ve made a mistake, but I’m not quite like, and not quite like me. Well, if YOU made a mistake, maybe Kostenko is allowed to make a mistake? Like the data of Meiji, Packinham, Ferrand - which are different for everyone. In this case, what do you take as an ideal, from which you have MULTIPLE recounts?
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Further, you can’t understand in any way that both ours and the Japanese fired from small things at armadillos.

      I don’t have to prove it, it is, don’t believe it, and Kostenko, if you read it carefully, of course. Another thing is that it is difficult to calculate them, and according to Campbell, the effect of 75mm shells can be neglected, not to mention the 47mm guns.
    11. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 June 2015 19: 35 New
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      Quote: sevtrash
      Well, if YOU made a mistake, maybe Kostenko is allowed to make a mistake?

      Allowed, of course, who argues :))) However, by the presence of a LOT of similar errors, Kostenko’s value as a source is very small :))
      Quote: sevtrash
      Like the data of Meiji, Packinham, Ferrand - which are different for everyone. In this case, what do you take as an ideal, from which you have MULTIPLE recounts?

      I believe that the closest to the truth is still Pekingham / Meiji.
      Quote: sevtrash
      Another thing is that it is difficult to calculate them, and according to Campbell, the effect of 75mm shells can be neglected

      You can neglect everything, just compare hits in comparable categories
    12. sevtrash 21 June 2015 20: 58 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      However, by the presence of a LOT of similar errors

      And how do you differentiate heaps of errors? Like, he piled a big pile, but he didn’t? Do you have any heaps?

      Once again I can quote Kofman ... "On the Eagle in Tsushima" is the most interesting of this "trinity" of unofficial sources. Kostenko was one of the few "pure observers" from the Russian side and, perhaps, the only fully qualified ... http: //tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_7/page_1
      8 / page_19 / Page_32
      / kofman-analiz /

      As you can see, Kofman puts Kostenko higher and Novikov-Priboy and, imagine, Semenov.
    13. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 22 June 2015 00: 08 New
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      Quote: sevtrash
      Kostenko was one of the few “pure observers” from the Russian side and, perhaps, the only one quite qualified.

      And where did the "most qualified observer" spend the battle on May 14?
      Quote: sevtrash
      And how do you differentiate heaps of errors? Like, he piled a big pile, but he didn’t?

      But very simple. In the next article - for you personally - an analysis of Kostenko inconsistencies.
      Quote: sevtrash
      Do you have any heaps?

      In addition to those that you are here for me?
  • Trapperxnumx 20 June 2015 20: 54 New
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    Quote: sevtrash
    And where are the 300 hits that you mentioned as Kostenko’s mistake if he writes about 144?


    Tsushima Novikov Surf. Chapter - "We have three hundred holes."

    With such means of self-defense, "Eagle" fought off mine attacks. But this was not limited to his plight. He had up to three hundred large and small holes. True, they were all surface, but they did not cease to sweep the waves.

    http://studopedia.ru/1_59463_u-nas-trista-proboin.html
  • sevtrash 20 June 2015 23: 35 New
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    Quote: Trapper7
    Tsushima Novikov Surf. Chapter - "We have three hundred holes."

    Well, you at least read what it is about.
  • Trapperxnumx 21 June 2015 11: 40 New
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    Quote: sevtrash
    Quote: Trapper7
    Tsushima Novikov Surf. Chapter - "We have three hundred holes."

    Well, you at least read what it is about.

    The fact that the battleship Orel in the evening of May 14 had 300 holes. And about this writes the "close friend of engineer Vasiliev" N-Priboy battalion. which probably himself personally covered in the dark the whole ship counting holes in the hull. You asked where the data on three hundred holes were, here is one of the sources.
    Every hole is a consequence of a shell hit, or not?
    If I am mistaken in something, please correct.
    phrases like "yourself" and "learn to read" are not accepted.
  • sevtrash 21 June 2015 11: 57 New
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    Quote: Trapper7
    If I am mistaken in something, please correct.
    phrases like "yourself" and "learn to read" are not accepted.

    We talked about Kostenko’s “mistake” of 300 hits, which was not found in Kostenko’s book. What does Novikov-Priboy have to do with it? Was it really impossible to read?
    Quote: Trapper7
    Every hole is a consequence of a shell hit, or not?

    And in both directions - no. It seems to be clear too.
  • Tatar 174 19 June 2015 08: 21 New
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    For a long time we will study this Campaign, there will be many different versions, but the feat of the Russian sailors will always be obvious. Eternal memory to the fallen heroes and Glory to the St. Andrew flag! The lesson we will forever remain Tsushima battle.
  • Miner 19 June 2015 08: 23 New
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    Hmm, interesting analysis.

    It does not seem like a frantic attempt to justify Rozhdestvensky ...

    We are waiting for the continuation.
  • tomket 19 June 2015 08: 42 New
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    wait for the conclusions about the defeat. It will be especially interesting to read about the "myths" of the surrender of Russian ships and the squad of Nebogatov.
  • anip 19 June 2015 08: 49 New
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    so that two parts force the straits - Tsushima and Sangarsky - simultaneously

    This is how to "force the straits"? From coast to coast? Maybe, after all, you don’t have to be clever where it doesn’t work out, but to write simply “passed the straits”?
    1. Serg65 19 June 2015 09: 10 New
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      Quote: anip
      This is how to "force the straits"? From coast to coast? Maybe, after all, you don’t have to be clever where it doesn’t work out, but to write simply “passed the straits”?

      laughing Oh, this stuff! For the gifted ... Explanatory dictionary of Ushakov. The verb forcing comes from the French "forcer" and means;
      1-strengthen, speed up.
      2 - to make a battle over the river, gorge ... force, river, force pass, force the strait.
      So, Andrey IvanYch, I wish you success in the study of explanatory dictionaries bully
  • vlad73
    vlad73 19 June 2015 09: 14 New
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    An unambiguous PLUS to the author! Even if someone does not agree with the conclusions, you can at least evaluate the work done and scrupulous analysis with an understanding of such details that other Tsushima analyzers and interpreters are silent about for some reason. I read the whole material with lively interest , I’ve been trying for a long time to understand with the help of various sources what happened? I didn’t doubt the heroism of the Russian sailors for a minute, but I always wondered what was the reason / reasons then? Whoever says that, but the work done deserves all respect! I look forward to not only continuation, but also other similar "marine" articles. Regards from Chelyabinsk.
    1. iury.vorgul 19 June 2015 09: 52 New
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      I wanted to write a comment, but you did it before. Totally agree with you.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 20 June 2015 00: 37 New
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      Thank you, dear vlad73!
  • unknown 19 June 2015 09: 20 New
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    But what about the famous "shimoza"?

    The Europeans had their complete analogues of explosives based on the same picric acid. And the English are liddit, the French have menlit.
    The explosives on the basis of picric acid were four times superior in explosives to black powder used to fill shells earlier, which, however, did not prevent the British from using black powder shells in the Battle of Jutland.
    And Germany used pyroxylin to fill the shells,
    Its explosiveness is 1,45 times higher than that of shimosa (lidit, menilitis).
    Russia also used pyroxylin.
    There is a strong opinion that pyroxylin in VTE shells was waterlogged, which sharply reduced its explosiveness. And this was allegedly done on the advice of the British. It is possible. But there is information that some of the shells of the squadron received from Germany. Perhaps these are German tricks.
    1. V.ic 19 June 2015 11: 04 New
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      Quote: ignoto
      analogues of explosives based on the same picric acid. And the English are liddit, among the French - menilitis.

      Maybe you mean Melinitis?
      "Melinite. An explosive blasting normal power. Chemical names are trinitrophenol, picric acid."
      http://www.saper.etel.ru/mines/melinit-a.html
  • Banson 19 June 2015 09: 23 New
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    Put a minus. For speed and other rough blunders. Another tsarist defender and admirer of the “wisest” ZPR. The author - the wise do not shame so mercilessly. Let us bring to your discourse refuting the "myth" about the shameful escape of Rozhestvensky from "Suvorov" and the shameful surrender of him to a serviceable destroyer. Let's. And you can do it. Prove to us that this was in fact not just surrender but a certain mystery of military policy with the deepest meaning. Such here as you clog the heads of citizens with a hawn.
    1. Serg65 19 June 2015 09: 34 New
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      Quote: Banson
      Put a minus. For speed and other rough blunders. Another tsarist defender and admirer of the “wisest” ZPR. The author - the wise do not shame so mercilessly. Let us bring to your discourse refuting the "myth" about the shameful escape of Rozhestvensky from "Suvorov" and the shameful surrender of him to a serviceable destroyer. Let's. And you can do it. Prove to us that this was in fact not just surrender but a certain mystery of military policy with the deepest meaning. Such here as you clog the heads of citizens with a hawn.

      what Even my remarks remind me of my distant kindergarten childhood ... snot, tears and the promise to complain to mom crying
      1. Banson 19 June 2015 09: 40 New
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        Quote: Serg65
        Even my remarks remind me of my distant kindergarten childhood ... snot, tears and the promise to complain to mom

        Why? I just expressed my attitude to the article. Which is written with gross errors. The tendentious logic of which is based on some “facts” that for some reason you need to believe (well, for example, how can you not believe the same Rozhdestvensky statement that ships of the Borodino type cannot give speeds more than 13 knots? It’s decidedly not how. We’ll believe. This is a Marsoflot which he didn’t go down below the first tier of the nasal superstructure, but he considered it quite humiliating to understand the technique). And the complete silence and denial of other facts that cannot be trusted in no case. For they are contrary to the logic of this article.
        1. Serg65 19 June 2015 09: 51 New
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          Quote: Banson
          This is Marsoflot, which is lower than the first tier of the nasal superstructure and did not descend.

          Have you been near the admiral? Or your friends? Where does knowledge come from?
          Quote: Banson
          And the complete silence and denial of other facts that cannot be trusted in no case.

          What exactly are the facts in question?
          Quote: Banson
          Prove to us that this was in fact not just surrender but a certain mystery of military policy with the deepest meaning.

          Do you want me to tell you about the surrender of the commander of the Red Baltic Fleet, tell how he raised his arms up in front of the shaving ?? at the same time was in good health bully
          1. Banson 19 June 2015 10: 07 New
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            Quote: Serg65
            Where does knowledge come from?

            Well, a famous person. He "deserved" her. Therefore, the biography, character, "knowledge" and habits of this person are widely known to the public. It is also known that this comrade prosralized our entire naval base in the composition of the world's best ships without causing almost any damage to the Japanese fleet. After such a thing, he certainly will not be.
            Quote: Serg65
            What exactly are the facts in question?

            Yes, about many. For example, the testimonies of others that are much more worthy of attention than Rozhdestvensky witnesses regarding the speed of ships, combat formation, preparation of equipment for battle, the battle plan and other factors, not counting the rest of the correspondence in Kolya.
            Quote: Serg65
            Do you want me to tell you about the surrender of the commander of the Red Baltic Fleet, tell how he raised his arms up in front of the shaving ??

            Give it a try. But first, I am waiting for your comments on the actions of your "sages" at least in the following positions:
            1. Escape and surrender - how so?
            2. His ban on the destruction of old Japanese ships with the "Chin-Yen" at the head of the morning that appeared before 2? After all, they were on a silver platter. How so?
            3. His ban on the auxiliary cruiser Ural delivering radio interference to the Japanese cruisers, who, thanks to this, quietly passed Togo all the information on 2TOE? How so? Explain.
            4. His ban on carrying out a set of measures proposed by the Orel engineers to prepare ships for battle? Phrase: "Eagle officers are too fond of playing war ..." WHAT is all this ??! Explain.
            This is just the SMALL part conscious your pet's actions. Let's be respected - either begin to insult me ​​and make fun of me because nothing else remains for you (as usually everyone does). Or wriggle like a snake in a frying pan and explain to your fools the brilliant orders of your pet aimed, of course, on the "victory" of 2TOE.
            1. avt
              avt 19 June 2015 10: 24 New
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              Quote: Serg65
              What exactly are the facts in question?

              Quote: Banson
              Yes, about many.

              laughing good Classics of the genre! Continued -
              Quote: Banson
              For example, the testimonies of others that are much more worthy of attention than Rozhdestvensky witnesses regarding the speed of ships, combat formation, preparation of equipment for battle, the battle plan and other factors, not counting the rest of the correspondence in Kolya.

              Here is a clear answer of an intellectual, unlike an intellectual, that is, nothing concrete, but about everything at once, otherwise God forbid they catch on a banal illiteracy and ignorance of the subject under discussion - a little worm of fear under the cranium rotates and gnaws - well, how I suck . The main thing is to speak in a telling style. Well, according to the well-known definition of a true intellectual, everyone knows everything, judges everything, and ABSOLUTELY without evidence, giving out his own glitches for facts, and categorically, because there are two opinions - one is his, the other is stupid.
            2. Alexey RA 19 June 2015 16: 51 New
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              Quote: Banson
              3. His ban on the auxiliary cruiser Ural delivering radio interference to the Japanese cruisers, who, thanks to this, quietly passed Togo all the information on 2TOE? How so? Explain.

              It was dismantled in the "Gangut".
              “Ural” physically could not interfere with the Japanese talks due to the different operating range of the radio station. In those days, an increase in the power and range of the radio station was accompanied by a departure to the Far East region.

              It was on this divergence of ranges that already after REV, Rengarten built a system of intra-frame communication of the Baltic Fleet. His calculations were confirmed at the exercises in 1912, when three kilowatt radio stations of the cruiser squadron could not drown out the 100-watt transmitter of intranuclear communication.
              1. THE_SEAL 21 June 2015 02: 05 New
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                Quote: Alexey RA
                Quote: Banson
                3. His ban on the auxiliary cruiser Ural delivering radio interference to the Japanese cruisers, who, thanks to this, quietly passed Togo all the information on 2TOE? How so? Explain.

                It was dismantled in the "Gangut".
                “Ural” physically could not interfere with the Japanese talks due to the different operating range of the radio station. In those days, an increase in the power and range of the radio station was accompanied by a departure to the Far East region.

                It was on this divergence of ranges that already after REV, Rengarten built a system of intra-frame communication of the Baltic Fleet. His calculations were confirmed at the exercises in 1912, when three kilowatt radio stations of the cruiser squadron could not drown out the 100-watt transmitter of intranuclear communication.

                Well, what for nonsense? Do you have any relation to radio communications? The range of the HF range or CB? At that time, everything was transmitted by the morse cub - the simplest type of modulation. And you could hammer it with the most ordinary transmitter simply by transmitting the same morse code. Modulation was the same. No interference protection. The sensitivity of the receivers is the same. Do not write more bullshit on this topic.
                1. Alexey RA 22 June 2015 10: 29 New
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                  Quote: THE_SEAL
                  Well, what for nonsense? Do you have any relation to radio communications? The range of the HF range or CB? At that time, everything was transmitted by the morse cub - the simplest type of modulation. And you could hammer it with the most ordinary transmitter simply by transmitting the same morse code. Modulation was the same. No interference protection. The sensitivity of the receivers is the same. Do not write more bullshit on this topic.

                  Are you planning a long-wave radio station to score negotiations on HF and NE? Drive the morse code even if you turn blue - the Japanese stations just won’t hear you and will continue to work quietly.
              2. THE_SEAL 21 June 2015 02: 05 New
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                Quote: Alexey RA
                Quote: Banson
                3. His ban on the auxiliary cruiser Ural delivering radio interference to the Japanese cruisers, who, thanks to this, quietly passed Togo all the information on 2TOE? How so? Explain.

                It was dismantled in the "Gangut".
                “Ural” physically could not interfere with the Japanese talks due to the different operating range of the radio station. In those days, an increase in the power and range of the radio station was accompanied by a departure to the Far East region.

                It was on this divergence of ranges that already after REV, Rengarten built a system of intra-frame communication of the Baltic Fleet. His calculations were confirmed at the exercises in 1912, when three kilowatt radio stations of the cruiser squadron could not drown out the 100-watt transmitter of intranuclear communication.

                Well, what for nonsense? Do you have any relation to radio communications? The range of the HF range or CB? At that time, everything was transmitted by the morse cub - the simplest type of modulation. And you could hammer it with the most ordinary transmitter simply by transmitting the same morse code. Modulation was the same. No interference protection. The sensitivity of the receivers is the same. Do not write more bullshit on this topic.
            3. Serg65 20 June 2015 08: 33 New
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              Quote: Banson
              I am waiting for your comments on the actions of your "sages" at least in the following positions:

              Well then, I’ll try to answer your questions based on my stupidity. what
              1. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was seriously wounded in the head and could not give the order for surrender, because he was unconscious. But Admiral Nebogatov in his right mind ordered to lower the Andreevsky flag!
              2: The destruction of old Japanese ships would certainly raise the spirit of the Russian sailors, but did not play any role in the future battle! Shells were needed for other things.
              3. Here I honestly admit I cannot answer this question. I often think about this error myself.
              4. Carrying out a set of measures to prepare ships for battle. The ban on these events. what
              There is a ship commander! Second after god on the ship! His duty is to prepare the ship for battle! If the superior orders something else, there must be an entry in the ship's logbook! Of course, I understand that during the battle the ship's magazine could die, but you say that the proposal was for all the ships of the 2th TOE. On the ships breaking into Vladivostok and on the ships itinerated in the Philippines, this 100% magazine was preserved, because this is the most important document for the commander! In addition to Kostenko and Novikov, do any of the commanders report this ban?
              From your words, I was surprised to learn that Rozhdestvensky is my "favorite" wassat . I dare say that this is not so! Admirals to whom I have sympathy for this; N.G. Kuznetsov, N.S. Mankovsky, S.G. Gorshkov
            4. Serg65 20 June 2015 09: 06 New
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              Banson Now I want to talk about the unsurpassed authority of the Tsushima tragedy comrade Novikov.
              I directly declare that the conductor-bater Novikov is a LIAR and the ATTENDANT !!! And I will try to prove it.
              "Tsushima" chapter 6-I "King and Kaiser"
              "It was crowded on the bridge. In addition to the visitors who arrived, the ship's commander and Admiral Rozhestvensky were here with their headquarters. I also stood there, sheltered in a corner. It was my responsibility to watch for the shells to fall and to note in the notebook their shortfalls, flights and hits." Who is a battalion? The land language is a resurrector! What side does the factory observer observe when the shells fall? What on the “Minin” all the signalmen, artillery officers died at the same time ???
              On board there are two great persons, accompanied by less great persons, i.e. amicably planned buffet reception! The food factory, instead of distributing products, wines, cognacs, etc., records the fall of shells at this time. bully
              “Rozhdestvensky did not seem to notice either the tsar or the Kaiser and only watched his ships intensely. Sometimes he shouted:

              - Shoot more often!

              And when he noticed that one vessel made some mistake, he, as usual, became angry and, not embarrassed by the presence of the highest persons, threw binoculars overboard. Captain 2 of the rank of Clapier de Colong gave him his. The king, noticing this, smiled. "Is this how? Is this about that?
              "In the evening, when the clerk from the destroyers came to us for mail, we learned interesting news from them. They told us that the towed shields were, as they say, sewn onto a living thread and fell from air shocks if a shell flew close to them." - I.e. from the unrest of the sea and from the wake of the destroyer, the shield does not fall, and from a shell flying next to it, it immediately falls ???
              Chapter 5-I “The Highest Look”
              "From afar, he very carefully started pumping me up with politics. He spoke more in hints, but I understood him. It turned out that if we defeat the enemy, we will only strengthen our government more. I heard the same thing on the shore from the intelligentsia. All the progressive people rejoiced in our failures. It seemed that this part of Russian society was never so enveloped in defeatist ideas as in this war, for it heated the people, revealing to them all our state ulcers "
              How can I believe a person who constantly lies and calls for the death of the state ???
          2. avt
            avt 19 June 2015 10: 10 New
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            Quote: Serg65
            Do you want me to tell you about the surrender of the commander of the Red Baltic Fleet,

            Yes, you cho! The bright image of Raskolnikov, the protege of Trotsky, whom the Angles pulled out potatoes from under the bags and did not shoot, like other Bolsheviks from the teams of the captured destroyers, was taken away on a cruiser in a warm cabin in London! ?? This ... how his .... voluntarism !
            Quote: Serg65
            at the same time was in good health

            Only dressed as a sailor.
            Quote: Banson
            . Which is written with gross errors.

            Well, specifically ONE MISTAKE in the studio, but confirmed by very specific links to specific documents, archival, scrap, instead of intellectual delirium.
            1. Serg65 20 June 2015 09: 08 New
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              Quote: avt
              voluntarism!

              I’ll ask you not to express yourself on the pages of VO !!! laughing
        2. alicante11 19 June 2015 11: 55 New
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          why do you need to believe (well, for example, how can you not believe the same Rozhdestvensky who stated the investigation that ships of the Borodino type cannot give speeds of more than 13 knots?


          Well, do not want to believe, turn on your head. Except for the eccentrics of Borodino or Oleg’s top hat, only the one who knows nothing about Tsushima at all. And even Silych says that Borodino rolled out of order even on the day of the battle. Considering that Borodinians were already inferior to the Japanese near the speed knot, we should add to this the fouling of the bottoms of our ships with algae during the transition, while the Japanese were cleaning at the docks. In addition, the cars of that time were very moody and often needed minor repairs, which our ships had nowhere to make. The Kamchatka floating workshop is still not a full-fledged ship repair plant. As a result of the accumulation of small problems in the mechanisms, the speed could also drop. Take these problems in total and get the required 13-14 knots.
          1. Banson 19 June 2015 12: 13 New
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            Quote: alicante11
            Well, do not want to believe, turn on your head.

            No - I do not want to believe. And everything seems to be in order with the head.
            Quote: alicante11
            Except for the eccentrics of Borodino or Oleg’s top hat, only the one who knows nothing about Tsushima at all.

            First of all, do you know what eccentrics are? This is generally being repaired. Well, God bless them - Borodino and Oleg. At the “Eagle”, “Suvorov”, “Alexander-3” and “Oslyaby” the eccentrics did not warm themselves.
            Quote: alicante11
            Given that Borodinians were already inferior to the Japanese near the speed knot,

            Not near the site, but 0,5-0,7uz. And Oslyabya was quicker and faster than the Japanese.
            Quote: alicante11
            to this we must also add the fouling of the bottoms of our ships with algae during the transition, while the Japanese were cleaning at the docks.

            This has almost no effect at given speeds. A tractor or truck can be hung with spoilers that improve aerodynamics - they won’t go faster from this.
            Quote: alicante11
            In addition, the cars of that time were very moody and often needed minor repairs, which our ships had nowhere to make.

            Which during the campaign was carried out several times. According to the testimony of the same Silych, the Orel boiler-and-machine installations worked perfectly before and during the battle. With the exception of one burst tube, there were no problems.
            Quote: alicante11
            Take these problems in total and get the desired 13-14 nodes.

            I took these problems in total (some of which are clearly contrived), added to this the machines that worked out during the trip and the elimination of other childhood diseases, and got about 18 nodes. "Glory" and after 10 years after the construction in the PMV issued its 18 nodes. Together with "Citizen". And here is the news.
            1. Lex
              Lex 19 June 2015 20: 11 New
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              About the repair laughed)
              Repair on the ship as in the apartment, it cannot be finished, it can be suspended ... especially after a round-the-clock in closed ports.
              And Novikov-Priboy’s reasoning is closer in spirit to “Sharikov Polygraph Poligrafovich” - yes, every sailor with us can “divide everything in half,” and the sailor is certainly more visible than the officer.
            2. Pilat2009 21 June 2015 11: 41 New
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              Quote: Banson
              It has almost no effect at given speeds

              It even provides, allows you to win 1-2 knots
              The cleaning of Cochren’s bottom in the Peruvian War allowed him to catch up with Huascar, who had previously surpassed him in speed.
              Quote: 11 black
              because if the squadrons could move at the same speed

              Comrade means the speed of the latest armadillos, squadron speed equals the speed of the least fast ship
              Apologists Novikov stubbornly want to fight only five ships and do not want to remember the retreat of Retvisan
          2. THE_SEAL 21 June 2015 01: 17 New
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            How clean were the Japanese at the docks? Can you imagine the scope of this type of work?
          3. THE_SEAL 21 June 2015 01: 17 New
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            How clean were the Japanese at the docks? Can you imagine the scope of this type of work?
        3. 97110 19 June 2015 21: 39 New
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          Quote: Banson
          This is Marsoflot which is below the first tier of the nasal superstructure and did not go down

          Where is the nose superstructure on the battleship of the Borodino type? Did he carry sand along the Neva without wiring?
    2. THE_SEAL 19 June 2015 10: 53 New
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      Quote: Banson
      Put a minus. For speed and other rough blunders. Another tsarist defender and admirer of the “wisest” ZPR. The author - the wise do not shame so mercilessly. Let us bring to your discourse refuting the "myth" about the shameful escape of Rozhestvensky from "Suvorov" and the shameful surrender of him to a serviceable destroyer. Let's. And you can do it. Prove to us that this was in fact not just surrender but a certain mystery of military policy with the deepest meaning. Such here as you clog the heads of citizens with a hawn.

      I just don’t understand one thing. If both the Christmas genius and the commandants had time to train, then why was the 2nd squadron completely destroyed? After all, Rozhdestvensky should have been well aware of the capabilities of the Japanese fleet. Intelligence should have worked. About crew training - during the transition from Kronshtad to the Pacific Ocean, you can even make sea wolves from noble maidens. It reminds one of the younger Klitschko’s long-standing fight - where, in response to his defeat from an unknown South African boxer, he said that he said he had pasta before the fight - that’s why it wasn’t fartanul in the ring.
      As Sergey Shnurov sang - people don’t like other people's failures, they gave the ball - ... I really want to hear the “real” reasons for the defeat. And then the author may go so far as to write in the next article that the 2nd squadron was specially drowned so that the star of diplomat Witte would emerge at peace talks and the Admiralty allocated huge funds for the development of a new battleship fleet, on which officials could receive bold kickbacks.
      1. Banson 19 June 2015 11: 11 New
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        Quote: THE_SEAL
        I just don’t understand one thing. If both the Christmas genius and the commandants had time to train, then why was the 2 squadron completely destroyed?

        Because there was no training. There was no preparation. There was no plan. As for the "testimony" of witnesses. Pay attention to one pattern. The British admirals after the German battleship Bismarck scornfully sent the Hood to the bottom and almost drowned the Prince of Wales immediately screamed that Bismarck was the best battleship in the world, which actually was not quite so. And even if it is so - this is not a reason to win one against two in battle. So it is here. When you listen to the testimonies of ordinary 2TO engineers who knew their ships very well, they knew what they were capable of and in their souls after the battle there naturally remained bitterness, indignation and indignation - so damn with speed and with other BTXs everything is all right. The chief engineer of Orel, Kostenko, said at night that Oryol had suffered severe injuries in five hours of battle, with a curved stove on its nose, and a boiler that had been decommissioned and a bunch of holes in the 16,5 units, we can give no problems .. There is no doubt that before the fightBeing still in excellent condition, “Eagle”, having received an appropriate order, could issue its passport 18 nodes. And now attention - we read the testimony responsible for the defeat persons - officers. And we immediately see how the characteristics of our ships "go out" before our eyes. In the opinion of Rozhestvensky (who pissed all the 2TOE and surrendered) - no more than 13 nodes. According to the Swede (who captured in particular the "Eagle") - no more than 15-16 nodes. well, like this NATURALLY. It always has been. And it always will be. People needed to JUSTIFY their own non-professionalism, mediocrity, dullness, cowardice ... And it was NATURAL that everything was bad, but not them. And therefore, consider the testimony of Rozhestvensky and other persons responsible for the rout of the 2TOE or surrender of Nebogatov’s detachment to be objective and honest. in no case impossible. Moreover, such articles cannot be written based on the “truthful” testimonies of these people. Do you need honest data about the capabilities of our ships? Please - engineers, machinists, kachegars, electricians. But not the “wise man” of ZPR.
        1. 11 black 19 June 2015 21: 15 New
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          Quote: Banson
          According to the Swede (who captured in particular the "Eagle") - no more than 15-16 nodes.

          Quote: Banson
          In the opinion of Rozhestvensky (who pissed all the 2TOE and surrendered) - no more than 13 nodes.

          Again he "pissed off" - yes, he was wounded in the first hours of the battle, you see, he was wounded in the head ...
          The question is, if 2TOE was so fast, then how did the Japanese manage to make their loop overtake our squadron, covering it from the head - because if the squadrons could move with equal speed, such a maneuver is impossible - but it WAS.
        2. 97110 19 June 2015 21: 58 New
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          Quote: Banson
          The chief engineer of "Orla" Kostenko said at night
          , which the head of the planning and economic department objected to in the morning ... In any attempt by the "grandfather" to say that he was taken up by the "chief engineer" on the ship, the "Marsflots" who did not descend below the first tier of the NOSA superstructure. Of course, I am a technically illiterate person and almost a land person, but the abundance of terms that do not at all match the armadillos of the beginning of the 20th century and are quite consistent with the realities of the SZRP, pumping sand from the marquise puddle, raises suspicion of the competence of the protector of “maslopups”.
        3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 22: 16 New
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          Quote: Banson
          Chief Engineer of Orla Kostenko

          BANSON, did you finally decide to kill me with laughter?
          Are you a squadron battleship "Orel", with a sausage shop LLC "Orel and Co." are not confused? What is the chief engineer of the "Eagle"? !!
          You take Kostenko, who was not an officer at all (civilian rank of the fleet), who was not even a mechanic (he is a shipbuilding engineer), who had just graduated (that is, in fact, a student), who did not have a permanent job with the "eagle" (unlike those mechanics) and take his words for an axiom? :))
          Quote: Banson
          In the opinion of Rozhestvensky (who pissed all the 2TOE and surrendered) - no more than 13 nodes. According to the Swede (who captured in particular the "Eagle") - no more than 15-16 nodes

          By the way, there is no contradiction, because The Swede spoke of 15-16 nodes as the maximum under ideal conditions. And Rozhdestvensky spoke about real speeds.
          Quote: Banson
          People needed to justify their own non-professionalism

          And now turn on the logic at last and realize that this reason is perfect for Kostenko too :)
      2. avt
        avt 19 June 2015 11: 12 New
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        Quote: THE_SEAL
        I just don’t understand one thing. If the Christmas genius

        I don’t understand either - but where in the article and in the first part, too, does it say that he is a genius? He is the same product of the era and a participant in the same sea voyages as Makarov. The author is not the ultimate truth, he draws attention to the specific facts and conditions that Rozhdestvensky was placed in and how he actually, without piculence with her really alternative history and outright distortion, and sometimes inventing facts, acted in these conditions.
        Quote: THE_SEAL
        After all, Rozhdestvensky should have been well aware of the capabilities of the Japanese fleet. Intelligence should have worked.

        Yah !?? Do you really have information about what was mishandled, with plastic surgery, then Stirlitz with radio operator Kat is directly surrounded by Togo ?? wassat Do not share the knowledge?
        1. sevtrash 19 June 2015 13: 04 New
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          In relation to Rozhdestvensky one can use the term “led to the slaughter” or, if you like, “zugzwang” or something else, but the essence of this will not change - he did nothing to turn the tide both before the battle and during it, and after too. Nothing!!! If he knew and understood everything, all the more he had to do something that went beyond the limits of ordinary inaction, as a commander he simply had to do it. And so - was likened to a meaningless animal going to slaughter, and leading to slaughter.
          Well, how can you evaluate it after that?
          1. 97110 19 June 2015 22: 01 New
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            Quote: sevtrash
            And so - was likened to a meaningless animal going to slaughter, and leading to slaughter

            The author, as far as possible, tries to explain that this is an erroneous point of view. Rozhdestvensky did not have much information to
        2. THE_SEAL 19 June 2015 13: 35 New
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          Quote: avt
          Yah !?? Do you really have information about what was mishandled, with plastic surgery, then Stirlitz with radio operator Kat is directly surrounded by Togo ?? Do not share the knowledge?

          The composition of the Japanese fleet. His command staff. Battle tactics. level of training, etc. one could also draw from the account of the battles of the 1st squadron and the defense of Port Arthur. The enemy must be thoroughly studied And his weaknesses. Humor is not entirely appropriate here.
          1. avt
            avt 19 June 2015 14: 51 New
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            Quote: THE_SEAL
            The composition of the Japanese fleet. His command staff. Battle tactics. level of training, etc. one could also draw from the account of the battles of the 1st squadron and the defense of Port Arthur. The enemy must be thoroughly studied And his weaknesses. Humor is not entirely appropriate here.

            laughing My dear, when you understand the difference between the intelligence department and the operational department, then we will seriously talk from where and what they draw thoroughly, originally .....
            1. The comment was deleted.
            2. THE_SEAL 19 June 2015 18: 53 New
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              Quote: avt
              Quote: THE_SEAL
              The composition of the Japanese fleet. His command staff. Battle tactics. level of training, etc. one could also draw from the account of the battles of the 1st squadron and the defense of Port Arthur. The enemy must be thoroughly studied And his weaknesses. Humor is not entirely appropriate here.

              laughing My dear, when you understand the difference between the intelligence department and the operational department, then we will seriously talk from where and what they draw thoroughly, originally .....

              Why such a vyser? Speak plainly.
              1. avt
                avt 19 June 2015 19: 52 New
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                Quote: THE_SEAL
                Speak plainly.

                What is it that if you confuse green with sour, this is not for me - to a specialist in medicine. fool From scratch I do not work as a distance education.
          2. Pilat2009 21 June 2015 19: 57 New
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            Quote: THE_SEAL
            The composition of the Japanese fleet. His command staff. Battle tactics. level of training, etc. one could also draw from the account of the battles of the 1st squadron and the defense of Port Arthur.

            Firstly, all of this was studied, Semenov was present at the squadron, who participated in that battle, Klado also wrote articles from scratch. The directives "go to Vladivostok" and "follow the head one" didn’t come from nothing
            Secondly, everyone knew the composition of the Japanese fleet by heart
            Thirdly, combat training of the fleet was higher than in the Yellow Sea
            In the fourth, the combat personnel of the First Squadron was more uniform

            Now all the dogs were let down on Rozhdestvensky, but somehow they forgot that the First squadron did nothing to help the Second, and its level of training was assessed as higher. The first squadron was supposed to die in battle, causing maximum damage to the Japanese, and not drown in the harbor. that decisions were made there by voting, it’s generally funny

            Andrey, it would be nice to write an article about the First Pacific Squadron
      3. Pilat2009 21 June 2015 14: 09 New
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        Quote: THE_SEAL
        About crew training - during the transition from Kronshtad to the Pacific Ocean you can even make sea wolves from noble girls

        No, in terms of fusion, no. To do this, you need to make more than one trip
        In terms of firing, it is possible if the ammunition allows, but then you will have to change the barrels of the guns.
    3. Pilat2009 19 June 2015 18: 00 New
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      Quote: Banson
      about the shameful escape of Rozhestvensky from "Suvorov"

      Would you like him to fall “Death of the brave?” According to any canon, salvation is not forbidden if all possibilities are exhausted .... If there was a possibility, they would have removed the whole team, but Suvorov was under fire, and Baranov ignored orders
  • unknown 19 June 2015 10: 04 New
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    About Speed.
    There is an opinion about the significant speed advantage of the Japanese.
    Of the four Japanese battleships, the Fuji was built according to an outdated project, with unarmoured ends, low-rate main-caliber installations, virtually unprotected half of medium-caliber artillery, and a speed that in practice did not exceed 15 knots.
    Armored cruisers are even more fun. On tests of 20-22 knots.
    Is it real?
    The last two, with modern boilers, confidently held 18 nodes.
    German-built Yakumo walked up to 17 nodes.
    "Azuma", a French-built, could hold 16-15 nodes for a long time.
    The Italians also did not go more than 17-18 knots. And then, with difficulty.
    What are the forerunners of battlecruisers?
    Causes ? The super-project of armadillo cruisers in practice was unsuccessful. It did not work to fit the powerful armor, weapons and CMU into a limited displacement. The CMU turned out to be lightweight and gave maximum power only during tests. slow british.
    And the weapons did not allow fighting the battleships on equal terms. The Japanese understood this quickly, and in their first (Japanese) series they increased the displacement and raised the caliber to 12 ".
    The fact that the armored cruiser with 8 "guns is not able to fight the enemy armed with 12" guns proved the battle at the Falkland Islands. Aspect ratio: two by two. Main caliber: eight. The average caliber is a complete advantage for the Germans. By booking parity.
    Result: both German armored cruisers sunk.
    In fact, eight combat units, the construction cost of which was equal to the cost of building 5-6 armadillos, could be used only in bulk (the Askold armored deck broke through two armored cruisers in succession) and to finish off the damaged enemy.
    Tactics, tactics, and again tactics ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 18: 35 New
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      Quote: ignoto
      There is an opinion about the significant speed advantage of the Japanese.

      And there is
      Quote: ignoto
      Is it real?
      The last two, with modern boilers, confidently held 18 nodes.
      German-built Yakumo walked up to 17 nodes.
      "Azuma", a French-built, could hold 16-15 nodes for a long time.
      Italians also did not go more than 17-18 nodes. And then, with difficulty

      Correctly. But this did not stop the Japanese from keeping the squadron speed 14-15 bonds, unattainable for the Russians
  • ABM
    ABM 19 June 2015 10: 39 New
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    in general, much is true - two points!
    Russian ships couldn’t “shoot at the turning point of Togo” - this term was introduced by one well-known researcher, apparently the phrase was repeated - but fire control devices at that time in no fleet of the world allowed them to shoot (and aim) at a point in the sea.

    the second, Admiral Rozhestvensky gave two orders - the first forced to lower the flagship “Prince Suvorov” move, not making sure that the 23st detachment completely stood in the head of the column (which indirectly led to the death of Oslyaby at the very beginning of the battle) and gave the order for the squadron "course NOXNUMX "- straight to Vladivostok. Everything - there was no more tactics already (for him)
  • Andrey77 19 June 2015 11: 44 New
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    It would be interesting to hear the opinion of the Japanese side. Admiral Togo wrote the same reports. He has a secrecy stamp not 100 years old? And even if 100 - all the deadlines are over. It's time to learn Japanese ... and climb into the Japanese archives.
    1. Pilat2009 19 June 2015 17: 39 New
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      Quote: Andrey77
      Admiral Togo wrote the same reports.

      He only wrote them in a peculiar way; he won’t write that he made a mistake with the deployment in Tsushima and burst in the Yellow Sea
  • Nehist 19 June 2015 12: 27 New
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    Unfortunately, Rozhdestvensky did not have any “fast wing”. Yes, his 4 “Borodin” and “Oslyabya” could indeed have given a slightly greater turn than the old battleships of the second and third detachments, but their speed would still be inferior to the armored armies of the Japanese. The controversial opinion is that the Japanese did not develop speeds of more than 1 knots in battle with 2 TEO and with 15,5, for the same reasons as the Russian squadron, and the fatigue of their machine commands came much earlier. Further, no more than three ships can simultaneously fire at one ship at a time, otherwise they will interfere with each other. The breakthrough of the squadron to Vladivostok did not play a decisive role in the strategic nuclear forces, everyone would decide to fight on land, where the IA finally got an overwhelming advantage. And what would the fleet do in Vladivostok with its weak repair base?
  • Taoist 19 June 2015 12: 36 New
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    A good article, although not without excesses which, incidentally, is explained by the author’s desire to strengthen the emotional component ...
    Summarizing, we can formulate the following points:

    1) The Russian and Japanese squadrons did not have any serious advantages relative to each other. The combat value and power of the ships were comparable. Technical data is the same. Of the major advantages for the Japanese, there was superiority in squadron speed, but it also did not have an overwhelming character. If you estimate the time that the Japanese needed to maneuver, it was unlikely to be more than the 1,5-2 nodes.
    2) The commanders of both squadrons were quite experienced, but at the same time, "there weren’t enough stars from the sky." But the Japanese had a certain superiority in combat experience.
    3) The Russian squadron, guided by the available information, did not make any gross errors in assessing the enemy’s forces or in pre-battle maneuvering.

    Accordingly, in Tsushima we should have had an enlarged version of the battle in the Yellow Sea. Those. the squadrons converge and inflicting serious damage on each other, spreading to the bases, which under Tsushima’s conditions should have caused great losses to the Russian side (to Vladivostok much further than to Sasebo) but it didn’t promise the defeat that we received.

    The reasons for this defeat (and its apparent illogicality) are the subject of fierce disputes that will probably last forever (well, at least until the invention of the time machine).
    And questions that have no rational explanation here are generally 2.

    1) Why did Russian ships lose their combat capability so quickly? Indeed, during the battle in the Yellow Sea, not a single ship of the squadron was completely incapacitated having survived no less number of hits.
    2) Why the shooting of our ships did not have a sufficiently destructive effect on the Japanese. It is unlikely that the number of hits was much smaller ...

    I’m afraid that we won’t get any sane answers to these questions ...
    1. sevtrash 19 June 2015 13: 18 New
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      Quote: Taoist
      I’m afraid that we won’t get any sane answers to these questions ...

      The question is different - What answer do we want to get? or else - And what answer will suit us? The interpretation of the facts varies depending on the desired result.
      You can read Kostenko, in particular his report to the Marine Technical Committee: "... The Japanese destroyed the Russian squadron as a result of their persistent use by the command of the developed combat tactics: covering the head of the Russian squadron of five new battleships and consequent destruction by concentrating fire on one ship. This tactic they were able to use because of the superior squadron speed of all their twelve ships, having developed up to 16 knots, while the Russian squadron, connected by a convoy of old slow-moving ships and transports, spent the whole battle, having a turn of only 9-10 knots ... "
    2. THE_SEAL 19 June 2015 18: 52 New
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      Quote: Taoist
      1) Why did Russian ships lose their combat capability so quickly? Indeed, during the battle in the Yellow Sea, not a single ship of the squadron was completely incapacitated having survived no less number of hits.
      2) Why the shooting of our ships did not have a sufficiently destructive effect on the Japanese. It is unlikely that the number of hits was much smaller ...

      There is an opinion that everything was ascetic on Japanese armadillos - no tree and everything that could burn. Unlike ours. After all, while the fires were extinguishing - water was walking along the upper decks - stability was deteriorating.
    3. Pilat2009 27 June 2015 21: 58 New
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      Quote: Taoist
      1) Why did Russian ships lose their combat capability so quickly? Indeed, during the battle in the Yellow Sea, not a single ship of the squadron was completely incapacitated having survived no less number of hits.
      2) Why the shooting of our ships did not have a sufficiently destructive effect on the Japanese. It is unlikely that the number of hits was much smaller ...

      1-As far as I know, there was no such concentration of fire in the Yellow Sea on the head battleships, the number of hits in the Russians was less, and the filling of shells was probably not that (see Semenova). Togo analyzed the reasons and tried to tighten the tactics and shooting
      2 - in terms of tactics, Togo took an advantageous position, which he did not have in the Sea, and part of the Russian shells that didn’t explode - the Japanese managed to consistently knock out our ships
  • Nehist 19 June 2015 13: 45 New
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    Quote: Taoist
    A good article, although not without excesses which, incidentally, is explained by the author’s desire to strengthen the emotional component ...
    Summarizing, we can formulate the following points:

    1) The Russian and Japanese squadrons did not have any serious advantages relative to each other. The combat value and power of the ships were comparable. Technical data is the same. Of the major advantages for the Japanese, there was superiority in squadron speed, but it also did not have an overwhelming character. If you estimate the time that the Japanese needed to maneuver, it was unlikely to be more than the 1,5-2 nodes.
    2) The commanders of both squadrons were quite experienced, but at the same time, "there weren’t enough stars from the sky." But the Japanese had a certain superiority in combat experience.
    3) The Russian squadron, guided by the available information, did not make any gross errors in assessing the enemy’s forces or in pre-battle maneuvering.

    Accordingly, in Tsushima we should have had an enlarged version of the battle in the Yellow Sea. Those. the squadrons converge and inflicting serious damage on each other, spreading to the bases, which under Tsushima’s conditions should have caused great losses to the Russian side (to Vladivostok much further than to Sasebo) but it didn’t promise the defeat that we received.

    The reasons for this defeat (and its apparent illogicality) are the subject of fierce disputes that will probably last forever (well, at least until the invention of the time machine).
    And questions that have no rational explanation here are generally 2.

    1) Why did Russian ships lose their combat capability so quickly? Indeed, during the battle in the Yellow Sea, not a single ship of the squadron was completely incapacitated having survived no less number of hits.
    2) Why the shooting of our ships did not have a sufficiently destructive effect on the Japanese. It is unlikely that the number of hits was much smaller ...

    I’m afraid that we won’t get any sane answers to these questions ...

    So you wrote it right, I completely agree!
  • ABM
    ABM 19 June 2015 13: 55 New
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    Quote: Banson
    Quote: Serg65
    Where does knowledge come from?

    Well, a famous person. He "deserved" her. Therefore, the biography, character, "knowledge" and habits of this person are widely known to the public. It is also known that this comrade prosralized our entire naval base in the composition of the world's best ships without causing almost any damage to the Japanese fleet. After such a thing, he certainly will not be.
    Quote: Serg65
    What exactly are the facts in question?

    Yes, about many. For example, the testimonies of others that are much more worthy of attention than Rozhdestvensky witnesses regarding the speed of ships, combat formation, preparation of equipment for battle, the battle plan and other factors, not counting the rest of the correspondence in Kolya.
    Quote: Serg65
    Do you want me to tell you about the surrender of the commander of the Red Baltic Fleet, tell how he raised his arms up in front of the shaving ??

    Give it a try. But first, I am waiting for your comments on the actions of your "sages" at least in the following positions:



    1. Escape and surrender - how so?
    2. His ban on the destruction of old Japanese ships with the "Chin-Yen" at the head of the morning that appeared before 2? After all, they were on a silver platter. How so?
    3. His ban on the auxiliary cruiser Ural delivering radio interference to the Japanese cruisers, who, thanks to this, quietly passed Togo all the information on 2TOE? How so? Explain.
    4. His ban on carrying out a set of measures proposed by the Orel engineers to prepare ships for battle? Phrase: "Eagle officers are too fond of playing war ..." WHAT is all this ??! Explain.
    This is just the SMALL part conscious your pet's actions. Let's be respected - either begin to insult me ​​and make fun of me because nothing else remains for you (as usually everyone does). Or wriggle like a snake in a frying pan and explain to your fools the brilliant orders of your pet aimed, of course, on the "victory" of 2TOE.





    I will objectively try to answer, I do not take anyone's side:

    1. wounded surrender was allowed by the charter;
    2. it was necessary to drape very quickly, without being distracted by the nonsense that had no effect on anything;
    3. at WRC Ural there was a powerful radio station! BUT DRY, for the army headquarters in the Dismantled view !;
    4. set of measures - I do not understand what it is about, write more specifically.
  • barbiturate 19 June 2015 13: 59 New
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    I read with interest and think how a respected author will explain such a rout of the Russian fleet) Now, if the command was at the level and the sailors were trained properly, then what happened? Shells? maybe of course.
    It’s just that the facts don’t fit in my head, here Semenov announced the battle of the 1st squadron, that he recorded every hit in the “Tsesarevich”, and in the Tsushima battle shells rained down in the “Prince of Suvorov” and “he never saw such a shooting”. The guns were the same, but the difference was significant, and most importantly, it FIGHTED with the result of the battle. (as Gleb Yegorych said, “The gun, Volodya, will outweigh 100 thousand other evidence”) smile
    But the allegedly poor shooting in battle at Shantung in the summer of 1904 DOES NOT FIGHT with the result of the battle, the squadron could well break through if it were not for the loss of control and the Japanese would not drown anyone smile

    You can trust the quotes of some people, but you can others, I prefer to believe the quotes that explain the defeat of the squadron, for example, about the management and initiative of naval officers. The destroyer commander "Fast" captain 2nd rank O. Richter wrote: "There was no initiative and could not be, because we were brought up like that. ... For eight months, do not remake people. The admiral himself was thinking about every little thing, but if he hadn’t thought, no one would have thought. ”
    And what to do with the statement of Bukhvostov, the commander of "Alexander III" before the campaign, the man bluntly said that there would be no victory. But, for example, the Order of January 14, 1905 for No. 42, characterizing the REAL level of training, is evaluated by Rozhdestvensky himself:
    “Yesterday's shooting from the anchors of armadillos and cruisers showed that the 4-month combined voyage did not bear the proper fruit. Filmed for about an hour ... But even in an entire hour, 10 ships did not manage to take their places with the smallest head course. In the morning everyone was warned that at about noon there would be a signal - to suddenly turn everyone by 8 degrees R and, in the front line, stop the machines for lowering the shields. Nevertheless, all the commanders were bewildered and instead of the front depicted a bunch of ships alien to each other.
    Particularly sharply stood out in the XNUMXst detachment by the inattention of the commanders Borodino and Oryol. The second detachment, of three ships, fell to the left with one Navarin on the beam of the Suvorov, and then for a minute ...
    "Oslyabya" and "Nakhimov" sailed each separately.
    The cruisers did not even try to build. Donskoy was a mile behind the others. Called back to the wake column, for firing, the ships stretched so that there were 55 cable ones from Suvorov to Donskoy (this distance should not have been more than 26 cable ones).

    - Of course, the sighting of one of the ships, even the middle one, could not serve the benefit of such an extended column. If after 4 months of swimming together we did not learn to believe each other, then we are unlikely to learn by the time God allows us to meet with the enemy ...
    Yesterday's shooting was extremely sluggish and, to my deep regret, found that not a single ship, with the exception of the Aurora, took seriously the lessons of artillery control when performing exercises according to plans ...

    Valuable 12-inch. shells were thrown without any consideration with the results of hits of different calibers ... Shooting from 75 mm was also very bad; it can be seen that in practice, aiming at optical sights was practiced “approximately” over pipes ... Shooting from 47-mm guns depicting a reflection of a mine attack is a shame to mention: we put people to the guns for this purpose every night, and in the afternoon, the entire squadron, they didn’t make a single hole in the shields depicting the destroyers, although these shields differed from the Japanese destroyers in our favor in that they were motionless ... "
  • Banson 19 June 2015 14: 17 New
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    Quote: ABM
    1. wounded surrender was allowed by the charter;

    What nonsense. He himself was looking for the Japanese to surrender to them. SAM. Although he had all the opportunities for a breakthrough to Vladivostok. This charter is not allowed.
    Quote: ABM
    2. it was necessary to drape very quickly, without being distracted by the nonsense that had no effect on anything;

    Is it really fast to drape while maintaining the speed of 9 nodes? Again nonsense. Sloppy and not convincingly respected. In addition, our fleet of cruisers and destroyers could destroy that detachment of old ships, which in no way would affect the rate of movement of the main forces.
    Quote: ABM
    3. at WRC Ural there was a powerful radio station! BUT DRY, for the army headquarters in the Dismantled view !;

    Doooaaaa ?! So the commander of the Urals was a psychopath and paranoid once I sent a request to Suvorov about jamming a disassembled radio station? And got a clear answer "Do not bother the Japanese to wire!". Tell me - WHOSE DO YOU WANT TO LOOSE THE HEAD? Besides, the order not to prevent the Japanese from telegraphing or how not to relate to the state of the radio equipment in the Urals. It was just an order NOT TO INTERRUPT THE JAPANESE TO TELEGRAPH. But for this Clapier de Colong had to go and shoot that hell in the back of the head.
    Quote: ABM
    4. set of measures - I do not understand what it is about, write more specifically.

    Orla engineers, given the obvious overload of Borodintsev (15275t against normal 14400t) and the upcoming battle, developed a set of measures to prepare the ships for battle. It included:
    1. Removing all wood and flammable materials from the top of the ship.
    2. Deck wood treatment with a special non-combustible composition.
    3. Removal and transfer to transports of all boats and parts of auxiliary cargo.
    4. Device for additional anti-fragmentation protection of combat posts.
    All this was clearly painted and sent as an offer to Suvorov. Admiral Rozhdestvensky banned holding such events, saying that the officers of the "Eagle" are too fond of "playing the war." As a result, some of these activities were implemented quietly on the Eagle. They did nothing at all on other ships. Is he a normal person after that? Where in what clouds did he soar? What did you think? Bum? And you justify this person? Yes, the Japanese had to reward Christmas. He, with his orders, really helped them defeat.
    1. Alexey RA 19 June 2015 17: 00 New
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      Quote: Banson
      Doooaaaa ?! So the commander of the “Urals” was a psychopath and paranoid once he sent a request to “Suvorov” about jamming a disassembled radio station? And he received a clear answer, "Do not stop the Japanese from telegraphing!" Tell me - WHO DO YOU WANT TO LOOSE THE HEAD HERE? In addition, the order does not stop the Japanese from telegraphing or how not to relate to the state of radio technology in the Urals. It was just an order DO NOT DISTURB THE JAPANESE TELEGRAPH.

      “Such a proposal was made by the commander of the Urals. Historians usually repeat the words of many participants in the battle who were convinced that“ there is an apparatus of enormous power in the Urals: its large spark could directly burn through the enemy’s apparatus ”(V. S. Kravchenko) ( “Burn” means jamming.) Unfortunately, this is a common misconception. The radio station of the cruiser Ural, designed to connect the 2nd Pacific squadron with Vladivostok, had a greater range, not only due to high power, but due to the use of a longer-wavelength such a station could not damage the enemy receivers, and the regular radio station of any of the ships of the squadron could successfully solve the problem of suppressing the negotiations of the enemy.
      For more information on this issue, see M. L. Partala. Someone interfered with the negotiations (from the history of the radio wave at sea) // Gangut 1996. Issue. 11. S. 61-67. "

      Plus, any active EW unmasks its host.
      1. Banson 19 June 2015 17: 10 New
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        Quote: Alexey RA
        Plus, any active EW unmasks its host.

        Do not talk nonsense. At that moment, we were already discovered by the Japanese visually. Here the electronic warfare of the Urals did not worsen our situation. And here the Japanese were the first to fly. Our ship radio stations discovered their presence a couple of days before the battle. But Z. Rozhestvensky could not use this advantage in any way. A word in his defense - in that situation, he could not do anything, apart from what he did - he tried to bypass the Tsushima Strait at night.
        1. Alexey RA 19 June 2015 17: 49 New
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          Quote: Banson
          Do not talk nonsense. At that moment, we were already discovered by the Japanese visually. Here the electronic warfare of the Urals did not worsen our situation.

          Did you decide to omit the first paragraph? The Ural radio station was physically unable to drown the Japanese talks - they worked in a different range.

          I already gave an example of the teachings of the Baltic Fleet in 1912: 3 kilowatt transmitters of cruisers clogged the air with all their strength, but they could not drown out the intra-squad connection organized by Rengarten on the basis of 100-watt transmitters.
      2. Banson 19 June 2015 17: 20 New
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        I immediately decided that the speed of the latest battleships "no more than 13 nodes" without even trying to disperse them in reality. And therefore kept the course of 9 nodes.
        I immediately decided that our radio stations could not stop the Japanese from talking, even without trying to test them in reality. And simply forbidding to interfere with the Japanese cable.
        What is it? Sabotage, betrayal, there are many more words. Right? Why is there so much controversy surrounding speed? And because it’s real in battle none of the new battleships even didn't try squeeze full speed. This is a crime, as you do not understand. Now, if Rozhdestvensky would give an appropriate order and our irons would try to squeeze out and squeeze out 13-14 knots in reality - there are no questions for Z. Rozhdestvensky. Really can not. But he didn’t even try to check it, but immediately cut off the latest technology by limiting its speed in his inflamed 13 brains with nodes. That is the crime. This is sabotage. Lies and betrayal.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 18: 25 New
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          Quote: Banson
          Why is there so much controversy surrounding speed? But because really in battle, none of the new battleships even tried to squeeze the full speed. This is a crime as you do not understand

          It would be a crime to give the order "The Most Complete" and get a breakdown in the car of one of the battleships, after which it would remain only to throw it at the mercy of the enemy
          Quote: Banson
          But he didn’t even try to check it, but immediately cut off the latest technology by limiting its speed in his inflamed 13 brains with nodes.

          Banson, at least Semenov and Swede write about 13-14 nodes in addition to Rozhdestvensky. Their brains are also inflamed, right?
          1. avt
            avt 19 June 2015 19: 58 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            It would be a crime to give the order "The Most Complete" and get a breakdown in the car of one of the battleships, after which it would remain only to throw it at the mercy of the enemy

            Not treated. The key is his
            Quote: Banson
            What is it? Sabotage, betrayal, there are many more words. Right? Why is there so much controversy surrounding speed? But because really in battle, none of the new battleships even tried to squeeze the full speed.

            That is, the brain does not even try to at least accept the well-known fact that speed is taken according to the slowest speed. By his logic, Rozhdestvensky was simply obligated to raise the signal - ,, Boys! We’ll dump in Vladik as soon as possible! " wassatAnd here it is loaded with some sort of Swede, Semenov.
          2. Banson 19 June 2015 22: 03 New
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            And again you. You’re kind of like the most sane one (well, one of them), so listen.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            It would be a crime to give the order "The Most Complete" and get a breakdown in the car of one of the battleships, after which it would remain only to throw it at the mercy of the enemy

            Do not argue as a cunning king's saint. You are telling a lie. Do you understand that it is nonsense not to use the capabilities of the military equipment entrusted to you for fear of its breakdown? These are nothing more than words that cowards and traitors like to hide behind. If you care so much about technology or people, you should not go to military admirals, but to military doctors or a repair and diagnostic service. Yes - combat admiral Z. Rozhestvensky in that desperate situation had use all the capabilities of the technology at his disposal. Including high-speed. Even if this led to the breakdown and "tearing apart" of one of the ships, as you say. But the rest would have survived. In any case, even if the breakdowns began, it was impossible to make claims against Rozhdestvensky in this situation. The real guy tried, fought, but the equipment failed and all claims to the factory workers. He did NOT. What he did, trying, according to your version, to save people and technology - led only to the death of these people and technology. And therefore, the fault and non-professionalism of Z. Rozhdestvensky in this case is obvious.
            1. Scraptor 20 June 2015 06: 45 New
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              What does it have to do with it again
              Quote: Banson
              Do not argue as a cunning king's saint.

              On the English kings and queens, someone hangs the loss of East and West India or the defeat of the English fleet that took place?
              Or the Russian Catherine II collapse in the 2nd Battle of Rochensalms almost in view of St. Petersburg?

              let's better about the cat and crowhunting, Ben & Sohn is yours ... bully
          3. Banson 20 June 2015 09: 33 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Banson, at least Semenov and Swede write about 13-14 nodes in addition to Rozhdestvensky. Their brains are also inflamed, right?

            Andrei, what do you not understand? These people, like Rozhdestvensky responsible for war crimes. The Swede captured “Eagle” - what else would he say in the investigation? Well, of course, that the “Eagle” was drowning, he couldn’t, he couldn’t swim himself, and he couldn’t shoot either. Semenov approximate Z. Rozhestvensky and a person dependent on him. Naturally, they all repeated the same thing in chorus. Lies.
  • Legate 19 June 2015 14: 35 New
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    Thanks to the author for the article, undoubtedly +
  • Taoist 19 June 2015 15: 05 New
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    By the way, in defense of the author, I can say that the author is certainly very far from the "alternative" in this case - i.e. parses the real situation.
    The same famous “Quarter Hours for Russian Guns” in this regard deal with reality much more freely and build all their conclusions on a possible hypothetical “gold hit” ... The probability of which is just not difficult to calculate ... The theoretical fire performance of our squadron (which is a tolerance in itself, since the real rate of fire in a battle is always far from ideal) * by the percentage of hits (also a theoretical figure, since shooting at a variable distance and heading angle is itself an ungrateful occupation) * surface area on the side of the target relative to the ellipse of dispersion * on those "golden 15 minutes" - a resulting figure tends to 0 ...
    In our case, the author is more than correct in tolerances.
  • Taoist 19 June 2015 15: 48 New
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    Yes and more:
    In my opinion, one should not write down authors of primary sources in "storytellers" in the heat of controversy. And the creations of N. Priboy and Semenov and "Military operations at sea in the Meiji era" are by and large equivalent as information sources. In any case, an emotional cast of the author’s personality and his subjective attitude to what will happen will lie on them. In any situation, it will always be a look from only one point, as if I would not like the author to claim to be comprehensive. The same N. Surf, giving a very serious and detailed cast of the "life" of the 2 squadron, for completely objective reasons, could not evaluate its combat component. Moreover, since the book was written in a very specific context, then the “socialization” of estimates and judgments was absolutely inevitable.
    Equally similar (only from other sides) all the other "memoirists" sin.
    Therefore, when we want to really understand (and not find confirmation for our own beliefs), it is absolutely necessary to adhere to the rule of "equilibrium of estimates."
    1. Banson 19 June 2015 16: 26 New
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      Let's just say the article has a clear tendency to block Z. Rozhestvensky, which, given his obvious "merit" in the defeat of the 2TOE (including, in fact, direct orders aimed at this), immediately causes rejection. Well, and based on it deceitful testimony findings in the article add fuel to the fire even more. The purpose of the entire trilogy can already be traced. Z. Rozhdestvensky is actually a "genius", and the fault is waterlogging of explosives, either low speed or poor stability, your option. This can not but annoy. Japanese shells also had serious schools and schools, but the Japanese, knowing their strengths and weaknesses, developed tactics for their successful use - the so-called massive fire method. Which we could easily break with counter-tactics, but the orders of the Russian admiral Z. Rozhestvensky clearly contributed to the success of the Japanese battle plan. After all, successfully apply the so-called the method of massive fire was possible only along a slowly moving constant course of the target and not otherwise. That is why this method is more, in spite of its obvious success under Tsushima, never and never been applied.
      1. avt
        avt 19 June 2015 17: 19 New
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        Quote: Banson
        Let's just say the article has a clear tendency to block Z. Rozhestvensky, which, given his obvious "merit" in the defeat of 2TOE (including, in fact, direct orders aimed at this), immediately causes rejection. Well, the conclusions based on his false testimonies in the article add fuel to the fire even more.

        Voooot! Look! ,, That's what I praise you for. "Well, finally! And I'm still waiting for no one who will first howl from the break of the template laid down from Novikov-Surf and not even the number of those, and finally frankly say where and what hurts him. That's all Rozhdestvensky - tyrant, holdimord, satrap, bear, bourbon, monster Well, in general, a classic, charismatic image. laughing And everything else - well, that in general he, like Makarov, Dubasov, Skrydlov, a military officer, well, in his youth, that he is an admiral's rank, like all those mentioned, and Stark, who served in the qualification, and not in battles, as Ushakov and Nakhimov, instantly causes an emetic reaction -
        Quote: Banson
        . The purpose of the entire trilogy can already be traced. Z. Rozhdestvensky is actually a "genius",

        Not a genius - it’s quite a product of an era and views on the tactics of naval combat of those years, put in harsh conditions of navigation almost over three oceans, well, if you count the seas that mate with the Pacific Ocean. This cry of the soul is ABSOLUTELY understandable! Well, right - it’s much easier and more pleasant to make your own “impression according to Novikov-Surf, for,” Okino-san “Pikul and his Cruiser” for three years, rather than Tiring to read, even if a little work by Melnikov ,, Rurik ”was the first "with the tedious enumeration of the technical details of the project as a whole and the ship in particular, and its movement in the ocean, described again not in an artistic style. No, well, where is Pikul interspersed with love stories, but where is the same Melnikov with his digital signature. And then there’s author ..... and even threatens
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Now I’m rewriting the completion (I planned 3 articles of the Tsushima cycle, but ... maybe there will be 4 of them, although we'll see :))

        sadist! Well, here we are!laughing
        Quote: Russian Uzbek
        these maaaaalenky digressions, they then turn the ANALYSIS into fantasy!
        ANALYSIS is analysis - dry numbers and facts, a statement of causes and effects
        and not a single so-called The author didn’t “dispel” MYTH ... dumped a bunch of the same myths that weren’t confirmed by anything, put on facts and “archival documents” taken out of context, and barked everyone!
        but it’s not written badly for Alt.history or ren-tv will do!
        1. Alexey RA 19 June 2015 17: 59 New
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          Quote: avt
          Voooot! Look! ,, That's what I praise you for. "Well, finally! And I'm still waiting for no one who will first howl from the break of the template laid down from Novikov-Surf and not even the number of those, and finally frankly say where and what hurts him. That's all Rozhdestvensky - tyrant, holdimord, satrap, bear, bourbon, monster Well, in general, a classic, charismatic image.

          Hehe hehe ... this music will be eternal. Around the article uv. Kofman from the first “Naval” was actively broken by spears 15 years later. smile
  • Taoist 19 June 2015 17: 09 New
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    I did not notice much of Rozhdestvensky’s enclosure in this article. Is that a more balanced approach that does not designate the admiral "extreme for everything."
    Certainly, Rozhdestvensky’s enormous guilt in the defeat of the squadron is present, but he still was not a maniac-fanatic who consciously led his subordinates to the slaughter.
    1. avt
      avt 19 June 2015 17: 55 New
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      Quote: Taoist
      Certainly, Rozhdestvensky’s enormous guilt in the defeat of the squadron is present, but he still was not a maniac-fanatic who consciously led his subordinates to the slaughter.

      Of course ! He didn’t collapse from an oak squadron! The main foundation of the defeat, at sea, of course, on the topic under discussion, was generally the wrongly calculated development of the situation in the Far East by the highest military and political leadership, and Rozhestvensky was not the last person there! The reaction of England to the advance of Russia towards Tibet, where the Angles ended up ahead, and this is a direct threat to India. Without India, they are not an empire at all. Correspondingly, advance financing of the fleet of Japan went, instead of the ice-free Mozanpo, they received the Port Arthur mousetrap, which the Japanese generally took by storm from the Chinese. The very distribution of the ships of the first squadron, regardless of the characteristics, but rather as a tribute to the sailing fleet, as Kostenko did not bad in his memoirs. In general, the Angles were very nervous about the possibility of receiving a non-freezing base in the Pacific Fleet for the Russian fleet. Why is there one epic with a coal station on the Tsushima islands. Pancake ! All the same, it went on laughing .... Then twist it - to unwind the ball and everything will be shoveled from adjacent areas, so from the sea to Yellow Russia, we’ll get there and start over.
      1. Alexey RA 19 June 2015 18: 03 New
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        Quote: avt
        Well, what is one epic with a coal station on the islands of Tsushima.

        And the epic from Mozampo, based on which Dubasov proposed?
        1. avt
          avt 19 June 2015 19: 38 New
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          Quote: Alexey RA
          And the epic from Mozampo, based on which Dubasov proposed?

          Quote: avt
          , instead of the ice-free Mozanpo, they got a mousetrap Port Arthur,

          But there were still ..... HAWAII! And the offer of Miklouhi Maclay to cling to the lands of the Papuans.
  • ABM
    ABM 19 June 2015 17: 20 New
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    1. Removing all wood and flammable materials from the top of the ship.
    2. Deck wood treatment with a special non-combustible composition.
    3. Removal and transfer to transports of all boats and parts of auxiliary cargo.
    4. Device for additional anti-fragmentation protection of combat posts.
    All this was clearly painted and sent as an offer to Suvorov. Admiral Rozhdestvensky banned holding such events, saying that the officers of the "Eagle" are too fond of "playing the war." As a result, some of these activities were implemented quietly on the Eagle. They did nothing at all on other ships. Is he a normal person after that? Where in what clouds did he soar? What did you think? Bum? And you justify this person? Yes, the Japanese had to reward Christmas. He helped them to defeat them with his orders. [/ Quote]


    1. he was only wounded and did not command anyone at the time of his capture - and the commander of Bedovy Baranov received his 10 years in prison. At the commission of inquiry, it was found out that Rozhestvensky confidently nodded his head at Baranov’s proposal to surrender. Rozhdestvensky did not deny this;

    2. this is not nonsense - there are figures for the actual speed of the ships, the distance to the Japanese squad of ships too, compare them if the Japanese departed - it would take three hours or four, this gimmick ... there were large-caliber guns on all the Japanese (on all four ) - any hit would be enough for the death of the cruiser;

    3. in the Urals there was an ordinary radio station, like on the other ships of the squadron - but this heavy duty was carried in the hold, if you do not believe it, google the photo of the Urals on the Internet, there are such photos, for a powerful radio station at the beginning of the century there should be at least design reminiscent of the Eiffel Tower! But this myth went from the pages of the denouncer of the Novikov regime - Surf, a bailer from Oryol ... and received a lot of reprints - in the future do not refer to the ART LITERATURE and Wikipedia in discussions with me;

    4. I am too lazy to search - but on Nakhimov and Aurora almost all of these events were also implemented ... I have already taken part of my archive to the house under construction, I will be there on Sunday, but it's a pity to waste time on the day off! however, I will find this information! I do not condone Rozhdestvensky - rather, on the contrary, I consider one of the main culprits of the defeat! but I don’t want to hang all the dogs on him
    1. Banson 19 June 2015 22: 22 New
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      Quote: ABM
      1. he was only wounded and did not command anyone at the time of his capture - and the commander of Bedovy Baranov received his 10 years in prison. At the commission of inquiry, it was found out that Rozhestvensky confidently nodded his head at Baranov’s proposal to surrender. Rozhdestvensky did not deny this;

      They did not just surrender there when they were pressed against the wall - no. "Bedovy" could calmly walk to Vladivostok. They purposefully sought this captivity. And do not tell me about the findings of the commission of inquiry. This is tsarist Russia respected. The commission of inquiry knew well the extent of its authority. How could one accuse a serious royal pet of something? A senior official? Do not talk nonsense. The entire headquarters from Suvorov acted on the instructions of Z. Rozhestvensky. And such a serious question as the search for the Japanese and surrender to them was naturally resolved primarily by him.
      Quote: ABM
      2. this is not nonsense - figures for the real speed of the ships are available,

      Where did you get these numbers? From the testimony of Z. Rozhdestvensky? Did he try to disperse the ships to full speed? So how can he know? And where did you get what he said the truth, assuring that his latest battleships could not give more than 13 nodes? This is not true. Why are you lying?
      Quote: ABM
      3. in the Urals there was an ordinary radio station, like on the rest of the squadron’s ships -

      I tell you again. "Ural" tried to interfere with the Japanese? NOT. How can you know that his electronic warfare is ineffective? From where. And why did “Ural” not stop the Japanese from conducting radio talks? Therefore, it was forbidden to him by Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky. He gave the order "Do not interfere with the Japanese cable". This is his order. Question - WHY ???
      Quote: ABM
      4. I am too lazy to search - but on Nakhimov and Aurora almost all of these events were also implemented ...

      All that was implemented was done quietly as part of internal training. A large-scale general squadron preparation for the battle within the framework of the list of events approved and signed by Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky was NOT. Although such a list was developed and proposed to the admiral on the eve of the battle. Question - WHY ???
  • Banson 19 June 2015 17: 20 New
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    Quote: Taoist

    Certainly, Rozhdestvensky’s enormous guilt in the defeat of the squadron is present, but he still was not a maniac fanatic deliberately leading subordinates to slaughter.

    It seems like it WAS still. Alas. Maybe not consciously. But he was explicit inadequatethat same thing. He simply didn’t catch up.
  • ABM
    ABM 19 June 2015 17: 28 New
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    By the way, as soon as these accusations became known, in the Baltic Sea, almost immediately after the war, experiments were carried out with a violation of radio communications in this way - it turned out that the three cruisers of our BF did not interfere with such a method of jamming!
    1. Banson 19 June 2015 22: 09 New
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      You are not catching up. Do not enclose your pet. The question is not whether the Urals would be able to fulfill their plans or not (if his CAM commander turned to the flagship for permission to take such actions, one must think that the Urals had the technical means for this). The question is that Z. Rozhdestvensky fundamentally forbidden to do this. He gave a clear order "Do not stop the Japanese from telegraphing." That is, the “Urals” were not even allowed to try to interfere, although it cost us absolutely nothing and did not threaten anything. WHAT DOES IT MEAN? Explain. As a sane person, I can regard such an order either as sabotage and betrayal, or at least as inappropriate behavior of Z. Rozhestvensky (how could any captain of the second rank advise EMU what to do?).
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 June 2015 22: 20 New
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        Quote: Banson
        The question is that Z. Rozhestvensky fundamentally forbade this to be done. He gave a clear order, "Do not stop the Japanese from telegraphing." That is, the “Urals” were not even allowed to try to interfere, although it cost us absolutely nothing and did not threaten anything. WHAT DOES IT MEAN? Explain.

        Yes elementary! In those years, radio communication worked so-so, every third time (don’t believe it - count the number of unaccepted radiograms in Jutland) But an attempt to jam someone turned out to be a good squadron. But in any case, there was no longer any deep sense of jamming radiograms.
        Quote: Banson
        I'm like a sane person

        You flatter yourself insanely
        1. Banson 19 June 2015 22: 27 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Yes elementary! In those years, radio communication worked so-so, every third time (don’t believe it - count the number of unaccepted radiograms in Jutland) But an attempt to jam someone turned out to be a good squadron.

          Which means elementary. We were already visually discovered by then. Moreover, several Japanese ships. Visually detected. Do you understand what it is? What was the point of keeping radio silence in this situation? And why didn’t they stop the Japanese cruisers from transmitting Togo information about 2TOE? What can explain the order forbidding to interfere with the Japanese?
  • The comment was deleted.
  • ABM
    ABM 19 June 2015 17: 30 New
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    Quote: Banson
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Plus, any active EW unmasks its host.

    Do not talk nonsense. At that moment, we were already discovered by the Japanese visually. Here the electronic warfare of the Urals did not worsen our situation. And here the Japanese were the first to fly. Our ship radio stations discovered their presence a couple of days before the battle. But Z. Rozhestvensky could not use this advantage in any way. A word in his defense - in that situation, he could not do anything, apart from what he did - he tried to bypass the Tsushima Strait at night.


    Yes, there was no POWERFUL radio station - this is MYTH !!!
    how to attach a photo of the Urals?
    ok - you will find the auxiliary cruiser Ural here
    where is the powerful antenna of the ultra-long radio station?
    1. THE_SEAL 21 June 2015 01: 33 New
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      A powerful radio station is not needed to drown out an enemy. It is enough at this frequency just to morse sniff the rubbish and that's it. This is even novice hobbyists know. Everything is simple. They did not know other methods of noise-protected modulation then. So do not mislead people.
    2. THE_SEAL 21 June 2015 01: 33 New
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      A powerful radio station is not needed to drown out an enemy. It is enough at this frequency just to morse sniff the rubbish and that's it. This is even novice hobbyists know. Everything is simple. They did not know other methods of noise-protected modulation then. So do not mislead people.
      1. Ruslan67 21 June 2015 01: 38 New
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        Quote: THE_SEAL
        It is enough at this frequency just to morse sniff the rubbish and that's it. This is even novice hobbyists know.

        I'm a radio operator request I can get around this in five ways. yes Do not smack nonsense
        In radio communications this is not the main thing
  • AARP 19 June 2015 20: 36 New
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    Dear Author. Prehistory. When I was in school, 70-80s, NVP (basic military training) taught us cap 3 rank Vitaly Alekseevich Poznakhirev. Former warlord. He was a fanatic of the Sun, in particular the Navy. And he tried in every possible way to breathe in us, students, the spirit of patriotism. Of the ten guys from the class, six, including myself, went to military schools. True with varying success. I did not enter and entered the fleet. After the service, I unexpectedly made friends with V. A. and he told me the following story. His son, the same officer in the Navy, went to the scientific and historical research of Tsushima. The Moscow Region published its monograph in a small edition and marked with particleboard. And V.A. showed me this published study. I did not have time to read it, there were reasons, but I looked at the list of references .... Closed archives of the Republic of Ingushetia and the Navy of the USSR. This is what I am for. Maybe you should try to find this author and he will throw you additional information.
  • ROMAN VYSOTSKY 19 June 2015 20: 46 New
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    Yes, a forest concession on the Yalu River cost the country dearly.
    How many troubles were shaken out of the Pandora's box by the brilliant crooks.
    The Japanese war set the vector of Russian life for a century ahead.
    A century of misfortune and death - because of the "five Christmas trees" on the border with Korea.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. ABM
      ABM 19 June 2015 21: 13 New
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      yes, but as I imagine, what would happen to an army in snow-white uniform, not able to shoot from closed positions (I'm talking about artillery), during the First World War - it becomes terribly! defeat gave nearly 10 years for reform
    3. Scraptor 19 June 2015 21: 53 New
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      Do you think Japan attacked Russia because of five Christmas trees? bully
    4. avt
      avt 19 June 2015 22: 14 New
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      Quote: ROMAN VYSOTSKY
      Yes, a forest concession on the Yalu River cost the country dearly.

      no No - traffic to Tibet. A complete analogy with the reaction of the English to Paul’s order No. 1 to go to India.
  • ABM
    ABM 19 June 2015 21: 11 New
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    Quote: AARP
    Dear Author. Prehistory. When I was in school, 70-80s, NVP (basic military training) taught us cap 3 rank Vitaly Alekseevich Poznakhirev. Former warlord. He was a fanatic of the Sun, in particular the Navy. And he tried in every possible way to breathe in us, students, the spirit of patriotism. Of the ten guys from the class, six, including myself, went to military schools. True with varying success. I did not enter and entered the fleet. After the service, I unexpectedly made friends with V. A. and he told me the following story. His son, the same officer in the Navy, went to the scientific and historical research of Tsushima. The Moscow Region published its monograph in a small edition and marked with particleboard. And V.A. showed me this published study. I did not have time to read it, there were reasons, but I looked at the list of references .... Closed archives of the Republic of Ingushetia and the Navy of the USSR. This is what I am for. Maybe you should try to find this author and he will throw you additional information.



    and we can also read the emigrants' archives ... the ideal situation
  • ABM
    ABM 19 June 2015 21: 28 New
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    Quote: avt
    Quote: Alexey RA
    And the epic from Mozampo, based on which Dubasov proposed?

    Quote: avt
    , instead of the ice-free Mozanpo, they got a mousetrap Port Arthur,

    But there were still ..... HAWAII! And the offer of Miklouhi Maclay to cling to the lands of the Papuans.



    why in New Guinea? it's ... well, not the Crimea, to put it mildly
    1. avt
      avt 19 June 2015 22: 17 New
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      Quote: ABM
      why in New Guinea?

      This is not for me - to Mikluha Mack Lai, whose brother died on Ushakov. But the fact was that he asked the tsar to create a station there, at the current supply point, such as in Tartus. But the Angles extinguished any encroachment to catch on the Russian fleet in any ice-free harbor in the Pacific.
  • Prometey 19 June 2015 21: 51 New
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    There have already been many articles on Tsushima on this site. Most readers scold Admiral Rozhdestvensky for such a rout.
    Of course, everyone has his own opinion. But again I will ask the question - why pour dirt on a person, that he did not become the next Ushakov, de Ruyter or Nelson? In any battle there are winners and losers. The history of Rozhdestvensky was destined to become a complete scapegoat for the adventure into which his own state had thrown. Perhaps there is no fatalism, but incredible things sometimes happen in life. It was like that when a hockey team of students from the USA defeated the USSR “red car” on their own ice.
    The author plus for trying an adequate and emotionally detached analysis of the whole story.
  • Taoist 19 June 2015 22: 31 New
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    By the way, when discussing the maximum speed of the Russian squadron, it is worth considering the fact that this speed is not something that they can squeeze out of cars, but the speed at which the squadron can be synchronously controlled. even a half-node difference in the moves will result in the destruction of the system. And that is why Togo really maneuvered at best on 14-15 nodes, and for the Russian squadron it was really 12-14 ... It should be borne in mind that a triple expansion steam engine is not even a diesel ... i.e. from the moment the command was given to the actual change in the revolutions and speed, it often took 10-15 minutes ... Yes, and then the accuracy of measuring the speed was then far from ideal ... That is to give the command "full speed ahead" theoretically of course you can only execute this command when you get to the very notorious "15 minutes for Russian guns" ...
    1. Banson 19 June 2015 22: 42 New
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      Quote: Taoist
      By the way, when discussing the maximum speed of the Russian squadron, it is worth considering the fact that this speed is not something that they can squeeze out of cars, but the speed at which the squadron can be synchronously controlled. even a half-node difference in the moves will result in the destruction of the system.

      The Japanese used the method of massive fire against us. Which was effective only on a slowly moving one course goal (or rather a dense group of goals). Against actively maneuvering, single and high-speed targets, such a method of firing was completely useless. A tight formation and a clear course is the last thing we had to regret in that situation.
      Quote: Taoist
      It should be borne in mind that a triple expansion steam engine is not even a diesel ... i.e. from the moment the command was issued to the actual change in revolutions and speed, it often took 10-15 minutes ...

      You are not right. If there is the necessary steam pressure generated by the power plant (boilers) then immediately as in a passenger car. At least look at the locomotives. And the “Titanic”, although it did not have time to brake, was able to give the most complete back from the most complete forward in a matter of minutes (seconds).
      Quote: Taoist
      Those. give the command "full speed ahead" theoretically of course you can only execute this command you get

      At once. Like on any other ship with any other power plant. If there is steam pressure (and it was naturally maintained in battle) then there is no problem.
      1. Taoist 19 June 2015 23: 03 New
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        Have you seen the live control of a ship’s steam engine? But I’ve found it ... So it’s not only the matter of steam pressure ...

        And “actively maneuvering single targets” just as well cannot effectively fire back.
        And in general, the method of "massaging the fire" has nothing to do with maintaining the system - because the distance between the vessels at any greater than the dispersion ellipse. It is precisely in tight formation in this case that the ships can support each other with fire and exclude the situation when the enemy’s part of the ships will be in the greenhouse conditions of "unshielded targets." Here it’s rather Rozhestvensky’s mistake that the Russian column was so stretched that the tail of the column practically did not participate in the battle.
        This is of course an admission, but in my opinion the battle was worth fighting without reconstructing in one line, and both columns were leading a ledge with the assumption that the second column was firing into the breaks of the first ... At the same time, heavily battered ships could also partially leave the movement column battle without weakening the fire on the enemy ... (but this is again an "alternative")
        1. Banson 19 June 2015 23: 26 New
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          Quote: Taoist
          Have you seen the live control of a ship’s steam engine? But I’ve found it ... So it’s not only the matter of steam pressure ...

          Yes I saw. He was in the boiler room and engine room of the cruiser Aurora. And if you find it - why talk nonsense about 15 minutes?
          Quote: Taoist
          And “actively maneuvering single targets” just as well cannot effectively fire back.

          They can conduct normal return fire each independently. But they cannot shoot centrally throughout the squadron. That is, there is an equation of opportunity.
          Quote: Taoist
          And in general, the method of "massaging the fire" has nothing to do with maintaining the system - because the distance between the vessels at any greater than the dispersion ellipse.

          It means that the method of massive fire is extremely slow and does not allow you to quickly respond to changes in distance, and even more so to transfer fire from one target to another. There the sight is always constant, and the distance is regulated by the position of the enemy ships themselves. An attack even with a loose formation at maximum speed and the massive fire method could be forgotten. The Japanese would just as well have switched to independent fire by each ship, but the ship’s SLAs and the principles of centralized fire control and central guidance of the ship — we had more perfect.
          Quote: Taoist
          This is of course an admission, but in my opinion the fight was worth leading without being reconstructed in one line, and both columns were leading a ledge formation with the expectation that the second column was firing into the breaks of the first ...

          In this aspect, it would be useless. The Japanese chose the 30-40 cable distance, optimal for using their high-explosive fragmentation shells, and we with our frankly bad OFSs could not oppose them with such a battle tactic. And our armor-piercing shells also practically did not work at this distance. For normal action on the vertical armor of Japanese ships - already too far. For effective action on horizontal armor - still too close. Moreover, again - the method of massive fire. The only chance for was either to arrange a battle in the form of a landfill (to exclude the very possibility of the Japanese shooting using the method of massive fire) and at a distance of 15-20 cable. Opportunities for this were at the initial stage, but Z. Rozhestvensky all failed. And the second option is a battle at the greatest possible distance near 80 cable. But for that option it was necessary to have some kind of practice of shooting at such distances.
          1. Taoist 19 June 2015 23: 34 New
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            Is the Aurora on the go? ;-) I still found when the steamers walked along the Volga and in the car it was on the go ... And not in the museum ... so changing the course on a steam train is not so simple ...

            Well, with regards to everything else ... these are all tolerances. I wouldn’t let Togo arrange a “dog dump” - if I had an advantage in the course I would break the distance and that’s all ... As for the choice of the battle distance ... then I agree - the Japanese have optimally used the advantages of their artillery to negate our ...
            1. Banson 19 June 2015 23: 47 New
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              Quote: Taoist
              Is the Aurora on the go?

              No, but everything is preserved.
              Quote: Taoist
              so changing the course on a steam train is not so simple ...

              Well, of course it’s not to press the gas pedal. But also not 15 minutes. If there is steam - a few levers and valves and he popper.
              Quote: Taoist
              I wouldn’t let Togo arrange a “dog dump” - having an advantage in the course I would break the distance and that’s it ...

              It’s almost impossible to protect yourself from a dog dump. If at the time when the Japanese squadron looped, we would rush into the Japanese system no matter what system (any, at least loose), everyone would at such a speed as they could and would reduce the distance to the 15 cable and closer everything. The dump would start. Powerful piercing strikes of our excellent at close range BB shells, including and in the underwater part. Well, them in our ships too. Torpedo hits would begin. Rolls and trims, loss of travel and loss of controllability would also go immediately. All - would not have torn Togo distance already. And given that we have stupidly more battleships and more armor .... In general, you can guess here for a long time, but one fact remains. The battle would be much more interesting and regardless of which side the victory would be on (if it could have been established at all) - the losses on both sides would be very heavy. And for the Japanese, this meant the death of almost their entire fleet. And we still had a powerful Black Sea Fleet.
      2. Pilat2009 22 June 2015 21: 34 New
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        Quote: Banson
        but could give the fullest back from the most complete forward in minutes (seconds)

        Actually, this is called reverse and only the transmission is switched
        In fact, the ship’s inertia of 15000 tons is huge, why, for example, do ships crash into each other in broad daylight? Take a full turn back and everything will be all right .... the same thing with speed gain
        Quote: Banson
        Though look at the locomotives

        You are still confusing the environment in which the action takes place.
        In general, speed gain does not occur instantly
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Banson 19 June 2015 23: 28 New
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    CMU of the cruiser Aurora
  • Banson 19 June 2015 23: 29 New
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    Connecting rod. Unfinished design.
  • Banson 19 June 2015 23: 30 New
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    Management Post:
  • Banson 19 June 2015 23: 35 New
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    DC generator:
  • Nekarmadlen 20 June 2015 02: 30 New
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    But it’s interesting))) In those days, it was possible to conduct a certain number of ships by the northern sea route? )))
  • DHA
    DHA 20 June 2015 10: 50 New
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    In general, even a combination of many circumstances is not in our direction. In addition to this, the decks with wooden flooring in the Japs seem to be covered with metal, which prevented fire, I read somewhere.
  • Caduc 20 June 2015 15: 03 New
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    Thank you for the article.
    I look forward to continuing.
  • fycom 20 June 2015 23: 45 New
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    The article is carefully and interestingly written. In general, I liked reading, I feel a love for the details of naval military affairs. But I think that Togo rightfully received awards for Tsushima and he won with dignity. When studying military history, one must be able to pay tribute to the enemy and recognize defeat. It’s not for me to judge correctly or incorrectly in one situation or another, Rozhdestvensky behaved, but I can’t forcibly describe the defeat as a great ingenious valor. This will be similar to the ancient Greek historians, where military failures were attributed to anything, even the gods, are clearly not mistakes of command.
    A vivid example of respect for both sides and the recognition of errors without partiality for military historians should be the Second Punic War, where the Romans recognized Hannibal's talent and, in fact, the proud Romans openly fled from him in the future, exhausting and depriving them of supplies. Already with their pride, they recognized the talents of the enemy and their own mistakes.
  • barbiturate 21 June 2015 08: 58 New
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    a little about radio communications and the organization of a radio service from the order of MOST Rozhestvensky - order No. 194 of April 7, 1905 (judging by the date of the order before the battle, it’s already a little bit, you need to summarize the preparations and prepare for battle):

    “The persistent eight-month job of deploying to the squadron of wireless telegraphy was crowned with the following results. Yesterday, April 6, when the battleships were at sea, it was necessary to transfer an emergency order to the head of transport. The flagship station for an hour and a quarter called "Diamond" from a distance of 15 miles and could not call; then the Suvorov station began to try to call Oleg, but everything rested there too. Obviously, the Zhemchug, Emerald, Dnepr and Rion telegraph services were equally negligent, who were obliged to transmit a signal to whom should they call and answer for the faulty one. Today, from 2 pm, telegrams from the Kuban, Terek and Ural squadrons approaching the squadron should have arrived.
    The Suvorov station was trying hard to receive these telegrams that had been previously agreed upon, but ... they received nothing ...
    This state of the “Suvorov” station is a very sad fact, but it seems much sadder that none of the stations of the entire squadron received calls from the “Kuban” and did not report them to the “Suvorov”. Today, they tried in vain from Suvorov to call the Rion who was on patrol. Really the commander of "Rion" did not comprehend how senseless his watch service is when his telegraph apparatuses are in a mess? Gg. flagships and captains! It's time to take the most energetic measures! .. "

    This is not even an order, but some cry of despair ...
    After 8 months of joint sailing, our commanders did not develop HABITS and ABILITY to use elementary radio communications. I don’t know if our signalmen could drown out something there, but the organization of the radio case was clearly not in honor on the squadron))

    But what I thought about the organization of our service in the fleet, A.N. Kuropatkin:

    “The main reason for all the reasons is the unpreparedness of our fleet for war, the general unpreparedness of the administration, military ranks, material and spiritual. We thought that there would be no war and that the fleet existed only for qualifications, ministries and reviews. The best living material of our team in the world, capable, receptive, good-natured and courageous people, were not only trained to act with all the latest war means, such as the latest sights, but even live on ships. ”

    the general was far from the last person in the empire and no one describes him as a fool, he left very sensible work after himself and clearly knew what he was talking about, he watched the whole system of education and combat training from extremely close range for many years, so I would not have dismissed his assessment .
  • stranik72
    stranik72 21 June 2015 18: 23 New
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    ... "So it was. But the" grateful "descendants, on the next anniversary of the battle that died down, will not find any words other than: ..."
    Thank you for the analysis, but about the quotation marks in the word "thankful" I did not quite understand the author’s sarcasm, for which we should be grateful to him for the defeat and humiliation of Russia, but did what we could, that is, heroically died. But the inability to prepare for the battle, the inability to inflict significant damage to the enemy, raising the white flag and surrendering part of the squadron’s ships is not a washable disgrace of the Russian fleet and this is true. And why did this happen and an attempt to find at least something positive in this defeat is not a reason to put quotation marks. The level of combat and tactical training, in the first place, of the squadron’s officers was lower than that of the Japanese, about strategy, and what to say about it there wouldn’t be this massacre (or there would be a different result) then the 1st Russian revolution would not have happened. So, that memory and reverence for the dead yes, shame for those who give up yes, oblivion for the losers, too. And everything else is from the evil one.
  • Taoist 21 June 2015 20: 58 New
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    Guys ... and today is "the longest day of the year" ...

    "Unfired string,
    Unspoken hope
    Kolyma camp melancholy
    I will dress in white clothes.
    I do not pretend, do not seek
    To the battered memory of the question.
    Cruel flux stories:
    On the pride of Great Russia.
    What for? For what? Great God!
    Yes, the dead have no shame.
    We pay a dues conscience ...
    And now we compose hymns.
    And a new circle! Under the boot
    The barbarian lyre crunches again
    And the bell rings. For whom?
    Do not make yourself an idol! "(C)
  • Denimax 22 June 2015 00: 33 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    WHO could Novikov interview? Which of the officers would pour out the soul to the battalion?

    Bataler is a post related to the mat. part. Simple, capter or ensign. And such posts can be appreciated by officers of a very high rank. One can imagine that Novikov was published in Soviet times, and of course they censured those “thieves” in the campaign that he might have had. Then of course it remains only to run and interrogate the captive compatriots.))
  • andrew42 22 June 2015 10: 44 New
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    All these arguments about the right maneuver cost very little in comparison with the "shell question." If there is a loss in speed, if the small cruisers cannot really perform cover during maneuvers of the main forces, then all hope is only for firepower and fire control. Given the absence of gross errors during maneuvering, but there were no such errors! You read the posts and you get the feeling that some sort of sailing regatta is being discussed. The main reason for the defeat is the inability to inflict significant damage to the enemy, even as a result of direct hits. All subsequent maneuvering during the battle ALREADY depends on the damage received by individual ships. If the Japanese were injured by at least 50% of hits in their ships, then the whole dynamics of the battle would be different. One word is a setup.