To blow the Horn of Africa
Another Middle East crisis is gaining momentum - between Djibouti and the monarchies of the Gulf
The Middle East is a zone of military-political crises, most reminiscent of an active volcano. The rules of interstate relations, adopted in Europe after its territory was redrawn by two world wars, are not valid in this region.
The struggle of Saudi Arabia and Iran is gaining momentum as the influence of the United States, remaining the only superpower, but overestimating its potential, weakens in their zone of interests after the withdrawal from the Middle East arena of the Soviet Union. Their current gradual retreat is caused not only by the fact that the States no longer consider it necessary, in the absence of the USSR, to take part in solving the problems of an unstable region for which they were previously prepared not to give it to their rival, but rather by understanding that the losses inadequate results.
Simply put, as recently as possible, America does not want to fight at full strength and, it is possible, cannot. It takes diplomatic efforts (over and over again, less effective), supplies weapons (seized from the governments it is intended for, by terrorist movements and the opposition - the Islamic state in Iraq and the Hossites in Yemen), and organizes military training of the units it intends to rely on (however , most of them in a fairly short time goes over to the side of forces hostile to the United States). Finally, it shares with the Allies the collected intelligence information, the value of which is not great for those, since Washington does not rely on an agent network, but on technical means with very limited capabilities, and in the worst case organizes targeted air strikes using aviation and UAV.
In addition, the Americans keep in touch with the sheikhs of those tribes that they relied on in Iraq in the 2000. But special operations such as those that were undertaken to eliminate Bin Laden in Pakistan and the financier of the IG Abu al-Sayaf in Syria, now represent a unique phenomenon. This is taken into account by all local players as evidence that the process of leaving the United States from the region is irreversible - as a result, those who are ready to play their own party act more aggressively (like Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar), and weaker states looking for reliance on forces other than Washington (including building relationships with Beijing). The reader, obviously, drew attention to the fact that the author did not mention Israel among the leading players of the BV. However, Jerusalem, despite the widespread opinion in the region, is not interested in directly participating in regional conflicts, or in influencing them, and is limited to monitoring the situation, simply speaking - intelligence.
In our opinion, djibouti
Returning to the regional conflicts of BSV, one of the most sensitive among them is the Shiite-Sunni confrontation (the Islamic Republic of Iran is the indisputable leader of the Shiite camp, while the Sunnis are different rival forces, among which Qatar and Saudi Arabia stand out) the situation in the part of the region that, as a rule, is of little interest to experts and the media: the Horn of Africa.
World news agencies, paying attention to this part of the world, usually report Somalia. Local pirates that pose a threat to shipping in the west of the Indian Ocean, and the Al-Shabab Islamists, who have won fame with the resonant attacks in Kenya, have become the hallmark of this country. Its northern neighbors - the tiny port of Djibouti and the breakaway from Ethiopia militarized Eritrea are mentioned much less frequently. But the crisis that takes place around the struggle of Iran and the Arabian monarchies for them can change the situation in the most fundamental way.
Following the expert of the Middle East Institute A. Bystrov, who analyzed the situation in this part of the Horn of Africa, let us pay attention to a public (which is not typical for relations between Middle Eastern states), the altercation of the commander of the Air Force Djibouti Wahib Moussa Kalinleh and the Vice-Consul of the United Arab Emirates in Djibouti Ali al-Sheehi 27 April, which resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations between these two countries (at the initiative of the Emirates). The decision was formalized by 4 of May of this year, although the consulate was closed on April 28. On the same day, a military contingent of countries members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who arrived in the country earlier this month to evacuate a military base in the Haramus region, was evacuated from Djibouti. According to observers, this indicates a serious shift in the formation of regional alliances.
Using the strategic geographical location of Djibouti, the country's president, Ismail Gelle, has recently sharply intensified ties with Beijing. Gelle does not hide his plans to turn Djibouti “into the second Singapore”, and therefore makes efforts to attract investments from the Chinese state funds into the economy. Beijing, in turn, is ready to take on the financing of the construction of a large seaport, airport and railway sidings, although it does not promise serious investments in the social sphere. This practice, which resonates in Djibouti, certainly influences the alignment of forces in the region. Especially since the traditional rival and adversary of Djibouti - Eritrea has recently sharply intensified its ties with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries of the GCCAH. This circumstance explains the political scandal described above.
It should be noted the growing confrontation due to the influence in Djibouti between the United States and China. The results of the negotiations with China on the project of organizing a permanent military base of the PLA in Djibouti, made public by Gelle, made him particularly acute. Washington’s reaction was lightning-fast — four days after the statements of the President of Djibouti and the diplomatic crisis with the UAE, US Secretary of State John Kerry visited the country with a blitz visit. According to official data, Washington was seriously concerned with the sharp cooling of Djibouti’s relations with the Arabian monarchies. It can be assumed that such a scenario is not very satisfactory for Gelle himself, who, according to some experts, put forward the thesis of the “stationary Chinese military base” as a kind of bait for Americans to use their mediation to overcome the crisis.
The Emirates have a choice
To resolve the conflict with the United Arab Emirates, President Gelle sent a delegation led by Chief of the General Staff Zakariy Sheikh Ibrahim and his adviser on investment Fahmi Ahmed Al-Hag to 7 in May in Abu Dhabi. As a result, UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan received an apology from the Chief of the General Staff of Djibouti. But the essence of the contradictions is deeper than the public quarrel of high-ranking officials. The UAE President, due to his personal interest, was “seriously upset” about the loss of the tender by the Emirates firm DP World of the contract for the construction of a container terminal in the port of Djibouti in July 2014. The head of Djibouti, in turn, painfully perceived the fact that 28 was inaugurated in April in Riyadh by President Eritrea I. Afevorki, who is considered a political outcast on the Horn of Africa. Hence the scandal with the closest ally of Saudi Arabia, with which, despite all the official apologies, Gelle is not in a hurry to restore relations.
In this case, the incident involving the commander of the Air Force Djibouti is, of course, a clearly accented signal in the direction of all the Arabian monarchies. There are reasons for this. 29 April synchronously with the incident in Djibouti, Saudi King Salman signed an agreement in the field of security with the President of Eritrea, implying the intensification of military cooperation between the two countries. In particular, Afevorki proposed to use the territory of Eritrea to organize a stationary Saudi military base. Two days later, the military delegations of KSA and the UAE visited Asmara to inspect the conditions for the implementation of this project. In particular, they studied the capital's port and a number of islands in the Red Sea.
Judging by the withdrawal of the Emirates and Saudi contingents from Djibouti, the principal decision on their redeployment to Eritrea has already been made. There was evidence that KSA and the United Arab Emirates gave Asmara an agreement in principle to modernize the capital’s airport and road infrastructure. Correspondingly, critical comments regarding the Afweorki policy in the Saudi press and official press releases disappeared. In this step of the Arabian monarchies there is logic: they intend to withdraw Eritrea from the zone of Iranian influence. Until recently, according to Saudi intelligence, the Iranians used the Eritrean territory for the logistical support of the Yemeni Housits and their training by Iranian instructors. Convincing evidence was not provided, but what is important is that the Saudis, if they implement their plans, minimize the volume of supplies from Iran weapons, including missiles of modern modifications, transit through Sudan to the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. And this is important for Egypt - the main guarantor of the security of the kingdom and Israel, with which Riyadh has established an unofficial dialogue in the situation of aggravating its confrontation with Tehran.
With Khartoum behind
The rapprochement with Eritrea fits into the Saudi strategy of creating a loyal environment in the Horn of Africa and thereby supporting Egypt. Prior to this, Sudan was withdrawn from Iranian influence in the same way, which was in the interests of KSA. In this regard, the crisis with Djibouti is for the Arabian monarchies a lesser evil than the military presence of Iran in the strategically important region of the Horn of Africa and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. As a result, we should expect an appropriate response from Ethiopia, which will not remain indifferent to the unexpectedly arisen sympathy of the “floodplains” towards its traditional foe, like Eritrea. Predictable sharp increase in the combat activity of opposition Eritrean groups supervised by the Ethiopian secret services, and it is already noticeable. For Arabian monarchies, this is a “forced cost”. Especially in connection with the situation in Yemen and the activity of the Iranian Navy in the Red Sea. The presence of Saudi military in Eritrea automatically deprives Iran of the last rear base in the region for its warships.
Blitzvizit Secretary of State Kerry in Abu Dhabi to resolve the incident ended in failure. This is evidenced by the cancellation of the entry visa to Saudi Arabia by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti, Mahmoud Ali Yusuf, who, together with his relatives, planned to arrive in Saudi territory for Umrah to Mecca and Medina. Informally, the Foreign Minister of Djibouti was authorized by President Gelle to meet with Saudi officials to involve Riyadh in mediating the minimization of the consequences of complicating bilateral relations with the UAE. This step to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia looks absolutely logical, since it was Riyadh and its actions that became the root cause of the crisis. It can be considered a manifestation of the long-standing conflict between Djibouti (and Ethiopia, which stands behind its president) and the Arabian monarchies.
The decision of the KSA to step up military-technical cooperation with Eritrea, the old enemy of Djibouti and Ethiopia, was only its catalyst. The agreement of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to invest in the organization of its military base in Eritrea, the reconstruction of the airport and transport infrastructure is due not only to the favorable geographical position of this country, but also to the relative cheapness compared to the Djibouti variant. In addition, President Afaevorki has long-standing ties with part of the Yemeni elite, which are due to the joint involvement in smuggling, including weapons, and the transfer of illegal migrants, who follow mainly to Saudi Arabia. Control of these flows for Riyadh, which is clearly incapable of using its own resources, despite the support of the Arabian monarchies, to master the situation in Yemen, is of strategic importance.
In addition to all the above reasons for conflict, there are purely internal, Djiboutian. Gelle’s dissatisfaction with the position of the Arabian monarchies on the issue of rapprochement with Eritrea is strengthened by the Emirates’s support of the main opponent of the Djibouti leader - his former associate Abdurrahman Mahamoud Borech. Official Djibouti has been demanding his extradition from the United Arab Emirates for two years now, but so far without success. Moreover, thanks to the lobbying of Abu Dhabi, he was removed from the Interpol “red list”. In Djibouti, Borech is accused of corruption, organizing terror and carrying out "subversive activities." In fact, the crux of the problem lies in the tight political opposition of Borech to the ruling regime and his head, as well as his expressed desire to win the 2016 presidential election of the year. As always, the personality factor in stories should not be ignored, especially if the events unfold in the Middle East, where the balance of power, as a rule, is personalized.
Djibouti initiated several lawsuits against the oppositionist, including in a London court. On March 23, a British court arrested Borekh's accounts in European banks, and after a while his French passport was canceled, which effectively made him restricted to leave the UAE. At the same time, at the direction of Gelle, contracts were concluded with well-known law and security firms (including the British Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Kroll), which are currently searching for the opposition's secret accounts and lobbying in the courts. Whatever the final outcome of this conflict, in the relations between Djibouti and the UAE, or, more broadly, the monarchies of the Gulf "will remain a residue." Moreover, in any case, the current crisis, despite its true background, threatens to seriously change the balance of power in the region. The arrival of an Iranian ship carrying humanitarian aid for Yemen at the port of Djibouti is a clear signal of this.
And China will win
Tehran will certainly try to use the described crisis for its geopolitical purposes. Recall that after the departure of Khartoum, and now Eritrea from the Iranian orbit, the IRI lost the possibility of a stationary stay of the Navy in the Red Sea. This forces her to engage in the rotation of warships, which is expensive and inefficient. Obtaining from Djibouti permission "on the technical parking" of Iranian ships this problem to some extent can solve. The question is how so weak a player like Djibouti is ready for such an option in the long term. Although in the current situation it is likely that the Iranians will get such an opportunity. There is a desire to have Gelle to talk with the Arabian monarchies a significant trump card in the negotiations on overcoming the crisis. After all, it is clear that he will have to establish relations with such large regional players as the “floodplains” anyway. The only question is the price.
However, the proposal to exchange the Iranian presence in Djibouti for one or another set of preferences may play a role, but at present it is clearly not ready to refuse the Eritrean project as such to the Gulf monarchy. This is a serious obstacle to the normalization of their relations with Djibouti, and the matter in this case is not only and not so much in the position of Djibouti itself, as in relation to this perspective from Addis Ababa. It is she who in this case will play a leading role in the decision-making process, including because the Ethiopian special services have firmly established themselves in Djibouti. Currently, they are working to mobilize separatist Afar groups to organize subversive work against Asmara. That is, we are talking about the beginning of the next cycle of hard pressure on the Eritrean leadership, which means a full-scale subversive war.
Note that throughout 2014, Addis Ababa actively cleaned up the country’s territory from the influence of the “Saudi lobby” represented primarily by the inner circle of the Saudi millionaire of Ethiopian origin al-Audi, who with good reason is suspected not only of lobbying the interests of Saudi Arabia, but and in fueling separatist sentiment among Ethiopian Oromo Muslims. A number of pro-Saud imams were expelled from the country. An investigation has begun regarding the structures of al-Audi itself. All this did not go unnoticed in Riyadh, and the turn towards the sworn enemy of Addis Ababa in the face of Afevorki can, among other things, be explained by this factor. Moreover, all that is good for Sudan and Egypt, given the strategic disagreement of these states with Ethiopia on the distribution of the waters of the Nile, is bad for this state. If Cairo and Khartoum are in direct bond with Riyadh (as is currently the case), then Addis Ababa, by definition, will suspect any initiatives emanating from KSA in an anti-Ethiopic orientation. That in the situation with Eritrea is completely obvious to her.
We see, therefore, the emergence in the Horn of Africa of a complex tangle of contradictions, tied to the confrontation of local players, Iran, the monarchies of the Gulf, Sudan and Egypt. These contradictions have an objective geopolitical, economic and personal, personified basis. Resolve them in a short time with the help of the United States failed, despite the attempt made by Secretary of State J. Kerry. Let us suppose that it will not succeed: the crisis has deep roots and is tied to an insoluble conflict of interests. Attention to the described situation of the United States can be explained by the presence of a US military base in Djibouti, which, after losing strong points in continental Yemen, is the only point Washington can rely on in the region. Although, from the point of view of external observers, the main outcome of the conflict could be the emergence of the military base of the PRC in Djibouti ...
The Middle East is a zone of military-political crises, most reminiscent of an active volcano. The rules of interstate relations, adopted in Europe after its territory was redrawn by two world wars, are not valid in this region.
The struggle of Saudi Arabia and Iran is gaining momentum as the influence of the United States, remaining the only superpower, but overestimating its potential, weakens in their zone of interests after the withdrawal from the Middle East arena of the Soviet Union. Their current gradual retreat is caused not only by the fact that the States no longer consider it necessary, in the absence of the USSR, to take part in solving the problems of an unstable region for which they were previously prepared not to give it to their rival, but rather by understanding that the losses inadequate results.
Simply put, as recently as possible, America does not want to fight at full strength and, it is possible, cannot. It takes diplomatic efforts (over and over again, less effective), supplies weapons (seized from the governments it is intended for, by terrorist movements and the opposition - the Islamic state in Iraq and the Hossites in Yemen), and organizes military training of the units it intends to rely on (however , most of them in a fairly short time goes over to the side of forces hostile to the United States). Finally, it shares with the Allies the collected intelligence information, the value of which is not great for those, since Washington does not rely on an agent network, but on technical means with very limited capabilities, and in the worst case organizes targeted air strikes using aviation and UAV.
In addition, the Americans keep in touch with the sheikhs of those tribes that they relied on in Iraq in the 2000. But special operations such as those that were undertaken to eliminate Bin Laden in Pakistan and the financier of the IG Abu al-Sayaf in Syria, now represent a unique phenomenon. This is taken into account by all local players as evidence that the process of leaving the United States from the region is irreversible - as a result, those who are ready to play their own party act more aggressively (like Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar), and weaker states looking for reliance on forces other than Washington (including building relationships with Beijing). The reader, obviously, drew attention to the fact that the author did not mention Israel among the leading players of the BV. However, Jerusalem, despite the widespread opinion in the region, is not interested in directly participating in regional conflicts, or in influencing them, and is limited to monitoring the situation, simply speaking - intelligence.
In our opinion, djibouti
Returning to the regional conflicts of BSV, one of the most sensitive among them is the Shiite-Sunni confrontation (the Islamic Republic of Iran is the indisputable leader of the Shiite camp, while the Sunnis are different rival forces, among which Qatar and Saudi Arabia stand out) the situation in the part of the region that, as a rule, is of little interest to experts and the media: the Horn of Africa.
World news agencies, paying attention to this part of the world, usually report Somalia. Local pirates that pose a threat to shipping in the west of the Indian Ocean, and the Al-Shabab Islamists, who have won fame with the resonant attacks in Kenya, have become the hallmark of this country. Its northern neighbors - the tiny port of Djibouti and the breakaway from Ethiopia militarized Eritrea are mentioned much less frequently. But the crisis that takes place around the struggle of Iran and the Arabian monarchies for them can change the situation in the most fundamental way.
Following the expert of the Middle East Institute A. Bystrov, who analyzed the situation in this part of the Horn of Africa, let us pay attention to a public (which is not typical for relations between Middle Eastern states), the altercation of the commander of the Air Force Djibouti Wahib Moussa Kalinleh and the Vice-Consul of the United Arab Emirates in Djibouti Ali al-Sheehi 27 April, which resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations between these two countries (at the initiative of the Emirates). The decision was formalized by 4 of May of this year, although the consulate was closed on April 28. On the same day, a military contingent of countries members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who arrived in the country earlier this month to evacuate a military base in the Haramus region, was evacuated from Djibouti. According to observers, this indicates a serious shift in the formation of regional alliances.
Using the strategic geographical location of Djibouti, the country's president, Ismail Gelle, has recently sharply intensified ties with Beijing. Gelle does not hide his plans to turn Djibouti “into the second Singapore”, and therefore makes efforts to attract investments from the Chinese state funds into the economy. Beijing, in turn, is ready to take on the financing of the construction of a large seaport, airport and railway sidings, although it does not promise serious investments in the social sphere. This practice, which resonates in Djibouti, certainly influences the alignment of forces in the region. Especially since the traditional rival and adversary of Djibouti - Eritrea has recently sharply intensified its ties with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries of the GCCAH. This circumstance explains the political scandal described above.
It should be noted the growing confrontation due to the influence in Djibouti between the United States and China. The results of the negotiations with China on the project of organizing a permanent military base of the PLA in Djibouti, made public by Gelle, made him particularly acute. Washington’s reaction was lightning-fast — four days after the statements of the President of Djibouti and the diplomatic crisis with the UAE, US Secretary of State John Kerry visited the country with a blitz visit. According to official data, Washington was seriously concerned with the sharp cooling of Djibouti’s relations with the Arabian monarchies. It can be assumed that such a scenario is not very satisfactory for Gelle himself, who, according to some experts, put forward the thesis of the “stationary Chinese military base” as a kind of bait for Americans to use their mediation to overcome the crisis.
The Emirates have a choice
To resolve the conflict with the United Arab Emirates, President Gelle sent a delegation led by Chief of the General Staff Zakariy Sheikh Ibrahim and his adviser on investment Fahmi Ahmed Al-Hag to 7 in May in Abu Dhabi. As a result, UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan received an apology from the Chief of the General Staff of Djibouti. But the essence of the contradictions is deeper than the public quarrel of high-ranking officials. The UAE President, due to his personal interest, was “seriously upset” about the loss of the tender by the Emirates firm DP World of the contract for the construction of a container terminal in the port of Djibouti in July 2014. The head of Djibouti, in turn, painfully perceived the fact that 28 was inaugurated in April in Riyadh by President Eritrea I. Afevorki, who is considered a political outcast on the Horn of Africa. Hence the scandal with the closest ally of Saudi Arabia, with which, despite all the official apologies, Gelle is not in a hurry to restore relations.
In this case, the incident involving the commander of the Air Force Djibouti is, of course, a clearly accented signal in the direction of all the Arabian monarchies. There are reasons for this. 29 April synchronously with the incident in Djibouti, Saudi King Salman signed an agreement in the field of security with the President of Eritrea, implying the intensification of military cooperation between the two countries. In particular, Afevorki proposed to use the territory of Eritrea to organize a stationary Saudi military base. Two days later, the military delegations of KSA and the UAE visited Asmara to inspect the conditions for the implementation of this project. In particular, they studied the capital's port and a number of islands in the Red Sea.Judging by the withdrawal of the Emirates and Saudi contingents from Djibouti, the principal decision on their redeployment to Eritrea has already been made. There was evidence that KSA and the United Arab Emirates gave Asmara an agreement in principle to modernize the capital’s airport and road infrastructure. Correspondingly, critical comments regarding the Afweorki policy in the Saudi press and official press releases disappeared. In this step of the Arabian monarchies there is logic: they intend to withdraw Eritrea from the zone of Iranian influence. Until recently, according to Saudi intelligence, the Iranians used the Eritrean territory for the logistical support of the Yemeni Housits and their training by Iranian instructors. Convincing evidence was not provided, but what is important is that the Saudis, if they implement their plans, minimize the volume of supplies from Iran weapons, including missiles of modern modifications, transit through Sudan to the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. And this is important for Egypt - the main guarantor of the security of the kingdom and Israel, with which Riyadh has established an unofficial dialogue in the situation of aggravating its confrontation with Tehran.
With Khartoum behind
The rapprochement with Eritrea fits into the Saudi strategy of creating a loyal environment in the Horn of Africa and thereby supporting Egypt. Prior to this, Sudan was withdrawn from Iranian influence in the same way, which was in the interests of KSA. In this regard, the crisis with Djibouti is for the Arabian monarchies a lesser evil than the military presence of Iran in the strategically important region of the Horn of Africa and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. As a result, we should expect an appropriate response from Ethiopia, which will not remain indifferent to the unexpectedly arisen sympathy of the “floodplains” towards its traditional foe, like Eritrea. Predictable sharp increase in the combat activity of opposition Eritrean groups supervised by the Ethiopian secret services, and it is already noticeable. For Arabian monarchies, this is a “forced cost”. Especially in connection with the situation in Yemen and the activity of the Iranian Navy in the Red Sea. The presence of Saudi military in Eritrea automatically deprives Iran of the last rear base in the region for its warships.
Blitzvizit Secretary of State Kerry in Abu Dhabi to resolve the incident ended in failure. This is evidenced by the cancellation of the entry visa to Saudi Arabia by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti, Mahmoud Ali Yusuf, who, together with his relatives, planned to arrive in Saudi territory for Umrah to Mecca and Medina. Informally, the Foreign Minister of Djibouti was authorized by President Gelle to meet with Saudi officials to involve Riyadh in mediating the minimization of the consequences of complicating bilateral relations with the UAE. This step to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia looks absolutely logical, since it was Riyadh and its actions that became the root cause of the crisis. It can be considered a manifestation of the long-standing conflict between Djibouti (and Ethiopia, which stands behind its president) and the Arabian monarchies.
The decision of the KSA to step up military-technical cooperation with Eritrea, the old enemy of Djibouti and Ethiopia, was only its catalyst. The agreement of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to invest in the organization of its military base in Eritrea, the reconstruction of the airport and transport infrastructure is due not only to the favorable geographical position of this country, but also to the relative cheapness compared to the Djibouti variant. In addition, President Afaevorki has long-standing ties with part of the Yemeni elite, which are due to the joint involvement in smuggling, including weapons, and the transfer of illegal migrants, who follow mainly to Saudi Arabia. Control of these flows for Riyadh, which is clearly incapable of using its own resources, despite the support of the Arabian monarchies, to master the situation in Yemen, is of strategic importance.
In addition to all the above reasons for conflict, there are purely internal, Djiboutian. Gelle’s dissatisfaction with the position of the Arabian monarchies on the issue of rapprochement with Eritrea is strengthened by the Emirates’s support of the main opponent of the Djibouti leader - his former associate Abdurrahman Mahamoud Borech. Official Djibouti has been demanding his extradition from the United Arab Emirates for two years now, but so far without success. Moreover, thanks to the lobbying of Abu Dhabi, he was removed from the Interpol “red list”. In Djibouti, Borech is accused of corruption, organizing terror and carrying out "subversive activities." In fact, the crux of the problem lies in the tight political opposition of Borech to the ruling regime and his head, as well as his expressed desire to win the 2016 presidential election of the year. As always, the personality factor in stories should not be ignored, especially if the events unfold in the Middle East, where the balance of power, as a rule, is personalized.
Djibouti initiated several lawsuits against the oppositionist, including in a London court. On March 23, a British court arrested Borekh's accounts in European banks, and after a while his French passport was canceled, which effectively made him restricted to leave the UAE. At the same time, at the direction of Gelle, contracts were concluded with well-known law and security firms (including the British Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Kroll), which are currently searching for the opposition's secret accounts and lobbying in the courts. Whatever the final outcome of this conflict, in the relations between Djibouti and the UAE, or, more broadly, the monarchies of the Gulf "will remain a residue." Moreover, in any case, the current crisis, despite its true background, threatens to seriously change the balance of power in the region. The arrival of an Iranian ship carrying humanitarian aid for Yemen at the port of Djibouti is a clear signal of this.
And China will win
Tehran will certainly try to use the described crisis for its geopolitical purposes. Recall that after the departure of Khartoum, and now Eritrea from the Iranian orbit, the IRI lost the possibility of a stationary stay of the Navy in the Red Sea. This forces her to engage in the rotation of warships, which is expensive and inefficient. Obtaining from Djibouti permission "on the technical parking" of Iranian ships this problem to some extent can solve. The question is how so weak a player like Djibouti is ready for such an option in the long term. Although in the current situation it is likely that the Iranians will get such an opportunity. There is a desire to have Gelle to talk with the Arabian monarchies a significant trump card in the negotiations on overcoming the crisis. After all, it is clear that he will have to establish relations with such large regional players as the “floodplains” anyway. The only question is the price.
However, the proposal to exchange the Iranian presence in Djibouti for one or another set of preferences may play a role, but at present it is clearly not ready to refuse the Eritrean project as such to the Gulf monarchy. This is a serious obstacle to the normalization of their relations with Djibouti, and the matter in this case is not only and not so much in the position of Djibouti itself, as in relation to this perspective from Addis Ababa. It is she who in this case will play a leading role in the decision-making process, including because the Ethiopian special services have firmly established themselves in Djibouti. Currently, they are working to mobilize separatist Afar groups to organize subversive work against Asmara. That is, we are talking about the beginning of the next cycle of hard pressure on the Eritrean leadership, which means a full-scale subversive war.
Note that throughout 2014, Addis Ababa actively cleaned up the country’s territory from the influence of the “Saudi lobby” represented primarily by the inner circle of the Saudi millionaire of Ethiopian origin al-Audi, who with good reason is suspected not only of lobbying the interests of Saudi Arabia, but and in fueling separatist sentiment among Ethiopian Oromo Muslims. A number of pro-Saud imams were expelled from the country. An investigation has begun regarding the structures of al-Audi itself. All this did not go unnoticed in Riyadh, and the turn towards the sworn enemy of Addis Ababa in the face of Afevorki can, among other things, be explained by this factor. Moreover, all that is good for Sudan and Egypt, given the strategic disagreement of these states with Ethiopia on the distribution of the waters of the Nile, is bad for this state. If Cairo and Khartoum are in direct bond with Riyadh (as is currently the case), then Addis Ababa, by definition, will suspect any initiatives emanating from KSA in an anti-Ethiopic orientation. That in the situation with Eritrea is completely obvious to her.
We see, therefore, the emergence in the Horn of Africa of a complex tangle of contradictions, tied to the confrontation of local players, Iran, the monarchies of the Gulf, Sudan and Egypt. These contradictions have an objective geopolitical, economic and personal, personified basis. Resolve them in a short time with the help of the United States failed, despite the attempt made by Secretary of State J. Kerry. Let us suppose that it will not succeed: the crisis has deep roots and is tied to an insoluble conflict of interests. Attention to the described situation of the United States can be explained by the presence of a US military base in Djibouti, which, after losing strong points in continental Yemen, is the only point Washington can rely on in the region. Although, from the point of view of external observers, the main outcome of the conflict could be the emergence of the military base of the PRC in Djibouti ...
Information