The use of EW facilities during the war with Georgia in August 2008
In the recently published collection of articles “Radioelectronic struggle in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - 2015”.
Published material on the use of EW funds in the war with Georgia in August 2008.
It is freely available.
I think the readers of my LiveJournal will be interested. By the way, for the first time, participation in the Su-34 aircraft conflict is probably recognized.
Against the background of the growth of nationalism 10 in November 1989, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region within the Georgian SSR changed its status to an autonomous republic and from 20.09.90 declared independence and the creation of the Republic of South Ossetia. Further over the course of 12 years, relative calm remained in the conflict zone, but since 2003, when, as a result of the “rose revolution,”
M. Saakashvili, the situation around the self-proclaimed republic began to worsen. Already with 2006, there was a “Tiger Throw” plan, according to which the Georgian leadership, relying on the support of the USA and the OSCE, envisaged the seizure of all large settlements of South Ossetia.
On Thursday, 7 in August, 2008, M. Saakashvili, in a televised address, offered to the leadership of the South Ossetian Republic peace talks, and on August 8, in 00.10, Georgian troops began shelling Tskhinvali.
Georgian Parliament 9 August unanimously approved M. Saakashvili's decree on the declaration of martial law
and full mobilization on 15 days. Their motivation was the need to prevent destabilization in the region, armed attacks on civilians and acts of violence in order to protect human rights and freedoms. At the same time, the political leadership of Georgia stated that the actions of its army were a “forced” response to ceasefire violations by Yu. Ossetia.
On the night of August 7-8, 2008, the Georgian armed forces invaded the territory of South Ossetia in violation of an agreement to maintain peace on the borders with unrecognized state entities (the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia). Were inflicted aviation and rocket and artillery attacks on the city of Tskhinvali and a number of other settlements. Under the 12-hour fire of the Grad rocket artillery, hundreds of civilians were killed. Twenty-six rocket launchers fired on residential areas, hospitals, and schools. Well-planned attacks were carried out on units of the Russian peacekeeping forces (shortly before the attacks, Georgian peacekeepers left their places).
In order to curb the barbaric aggression of Georgia, protect the civilian population and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, Russia 9 August introduced its units and subunits into the territory of South Ossetia, thereby launching the operation “to force the aggressor to peace”.
In the conflict, they were used by Yu. Ossetia - up to 3000 v / f .; Russia - to 15000 v / f .; Abkhazia - to 5000 v / f .; Georgia - to 29000 v / sl.
The Georgian armed forces included special units of the DER and EW. The conflict involved a separate electronic intelligence battalion, a mobile electronic intelligence unit deployed 8 km north of Tskhinvali and consisting of standard US-made terminals. The electronic reconnaissance means included in its structure, the radioelectronic control system of the airspace, the data transmission system made it possible to carry out a general assessment of the situation on a time scale close to real. In addition, in the city of Gori, in the immediate vicinity of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone, a separate center of the DER and EW of the USA (OC REG and EW of the USA) was deployed. By its capabilities, this object is able to intercept and record all radio and telephone conversations in the region. The center also received all the intelligence information obtained by EW units, which, after generalization and analysis, were transferred to the Defense Ministry and the joint headquarters of the Georgian armed forces. Formed maneuverable groups of DER and EW operated as part of the military intelligence units of Georgia in the conflict zone. They were equipped with AK-5000 type radio receivers and, presumably, a complex of interception of cellular communication systems.
In South Ossetia, units of the Russian Armed Forces entered into battle with the elite of the Georgian army as part of three infantry brigades, an artillery brigade, a separate armored and three anti-tank brigades. Ten thousand soldiers of these formations underwent "combat practice" in Iraq. Well-equipped and trained Georgian units "copied" the methods of warfare characteristic of the US and NATO armed forces. Aerial bombardment and massive destruction of objects of South Ossetia by rocket and artillery fire according to the initial data obtained with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles, subsequent breakthroughs tanks or “nomadic jeep raids,” a number of other tactics were similar to US tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the breakthrough of elite units into the territory of the attacked object, Georgian Interior Ministry troops entered and carried out “sweeps”.
In the initial grouping of the Georgian Armed Forces, radar detection, warning and control of combat operations of air defense forces and weapons was carried out by combat control and stationary posts armed with radar systems of Soviet and foreign manufacture (mostly French). They were located in the areas of the cities of Poti, Kopitnari, Gori, Tbilisi, Marneuli. To control the fighting used wired communication lines, radio stations operating in a secure mode of transmission of information, means of communication and data transmission for civilian purposes.
Radio and electronic reconnaissance equipment, Hermes-type unmanned aerial vehicles were widely used to identify and open a group of troops of the Georgian armed forces.
Taking into account the peculiarities of the terrain in the conflict area, the Georgian leadership paid special attention to the combat effectiveness of the grouping of air defense forces and equipment. To the strengths of the air defense system
Georgia should include:
- high mobility of air defense systems and its separation (the presence of short-range and short-range air defense missile systems, MANPADS, FOR);
- the presence of professionally trained combat crews of the Buk-M, Osa-AKM;
- the discrepancy between the frequency range of the RES of the air defense system of Georgia (Soviet production) with the operating range of the GOS UR of the air-radar class of Russian aviation (since they are mainly intended to work on the frequencies of the NATO air defense warning system);
- the presence of the Osa-AKM air defense missile with an optical channel for missile guidance and the absence of Russian aircraft
staff EW equipment for individual and group protection in the operating frequency range of this air defense system;
- the presence of a passive warning system and targeting from the means of Ukrainian RTR ("Mail")
and American (Skynet) production.
Weaknesses include the relatively low immunity of the Buk-M and Osa-AKM air defense systems, which did not allow them to conduct effective combat operations under active and passive interference, as well as relatively low spatial characteristics of the Osa-AKM air defense system (distance to 10 km, height to km 5).
In addition, the following means could counteract our aviation on the flight routes and in the areas of attack:
- aircraft of the Georgian Air Force of the SU-25 and L-29 type, which had cannon armament, NURS and air-to-air missiles - P-60С;
- C-125 anti-aircraft missile systems in the districts of the cities of Tbilisi, Marneuli, Poti, and also deployed to cover the most important state and industrial facilities and transport communications of the air defense missile system, Buk;
- “Strela-2, - 3”, “Needle”, 57 mm C-60, 23 mm ZSU “Shilka” anti-aircraft artillery guns, which were used mainly in the tactical zone, as well as dominant heights on the flight routes.
The tactics of using short-range and medium-range air defense systems were quite diverse and included actions from ambushes, alternate work with movement, the use of target designation from RTR complexes
and radar air traffic control.
The reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the eve of this conflict led to the fact that the Air Force had practically no operational radio and radio intelligence intelligence to start it. Moreover, due to the help of the GRU GSH, the Air Force intelligence agencies could not receive it. In this position, the Air Force could not have reliable data on the location of active air defense systems of Georgia and the organization of their management. This was the main cause of combat losses of our aircraft.
Under these conditions, the radio intelligence equipment of the EW-Air Force played a positive role. Already on the first day of hostilities, the operation of the Osa and Buk radio electronic systems in the area of the cities of Gori and Tbilisi was revealed.
Since the beginning of hostilities, up to five combat air defense systems Osa-AKM, up to three combat elements of the Buk air defense system, as well as the C-125 air defense system, were detected and suppressed by air forces of the Air Force aviation. All the anti-aircraft systems were either completely suppressed, or made unsuccessful attempts to target the missiles, which was recorded according to the operating modes and parameters of the radar systems of the anti-aircraft systems.
It should be noted that the pilots of the aviation group deployed in the area, well mastered the area
He is fighting and flying in the mountains. At the same time, the crews of other helicopters deployed to the combat area were not prepared for flights in mountainous terrain, and therefore their mission was associated with the risk of losing crews. In addition, the Mi-8 SMW-PG helicopters (jammers) were not equipped with personal protective equipment, including against MANPADS.
It should be emphasized that EW facilities of airplanes and helicopters planned for combat use on the territory of Georgia did not fully meet the requirements for providing protection against air defense weapons. Moreover, the cover by EW aircraft (helicopters) of the combat formations of strike aircraft from jamming zones throughout the entire flight route was virtually impossible due to the peculiarities of the mountainous terrain. It was necessary to take into account both the short operating time of the Buk air defense system and the possible inclusion of reconnaissance and targeting equipment in the infrared (UV) and optical-electronic ranges.
The greatest efficiency in the course of the fighting was demonstrated by the onboard complex of electronic warfare
Su-34 aircraft.
The electronic warfare radar of Georgia П-36Д6, П-37, 5А87, П-18, 19Ж6, PRV-9, - 11, - 13, АSR-12 in the cities of the regions, in the areas of the ghosts, should be carried out by the EW radar of Georgia. At the same time, during the enemy's REP, the interference was also observed in our radar types A84, 5А87, П-18, П-37, located at a distance 100 - 120 km from the jamming zones of AN-12P aircraft.
An analysis of the combat use of aircraft in the first days of hostilities in the South Ossetian and Abkhaz areas showed that the primary planning for the provision of hostilities was carried out without due regard for the capabilities of Georgia’s air defense and the specifics of using its EW aviation equipment
suppression. The results of this analysis make it possible to identify the following significant shortcomings in ensuring the survivability of aviation:
- the absence of reconnaissance aircraft capable of conducting detailed radio reconnaissance in real time with high accuracy in determining the coordinates of the radar;
- the discrepancy between the frequency ranges of the RGS missiles of the class "air-radar" and the radar air defense missile systems of Soviet production, the absence of control equipment and target designation;
- insufficient number of jammers;
- the small flight ceiling of the helicopter jammers, as a result of which their use in the mountainous terrain of South Ossetia was difficult;
- Lack of means of the RAP group protection of aviation from the combat formations.
It is important to consider that the specialists of the services were not sufficiently involved in the planning of aviation operations.
EW. Radio reconnaissance was carried out irregularly and not by all available forces, without the necessary setting of passive and active interference to clarify the electronic situation, system state
communications and control, the deployment of the RTV and ZRK radars, the air bases of the Georgian Air Force.
Space control of combat areas, command and control points, identified radar positions, and air defense systems of the Georgian armed forces were not properly implemented.
These shortcomings required immediate intervention in the leadership of aviation by representatives of the Air Force General Command, taking urgent measures to reduce the combat losses of our aircraft (6 aircraft were lost in the conflict). The main of them were attributed:
- exclusion of participation in the strikes of aircraft that do not have personal protective equipment;
- exit from the attack of Su-25 aircraft with a massive shooting of heat traps and a minimum of operating time at maximum thermal conditions;
- the use of strike aviation only under the guise of group protection from the zones of aircraft
and EW helicopters (An-12PP, Mi-8PPA, Mi-8 SMV-PG) and from combat formations with Su-34 aircraft with EW complexes;
- implementation of the tasks assigned by combat aircraft at maximum speed and at altitudes precluding the use of MANPADS and antiaircraft artillery of Georgia.
Taking into account the recommendations that have been worked out, aviation flights began to be carried out along routes with a detour of areas covered by air defense weapons, or over sections of the terrain where they were suppressed. Flight altitude, as a rule, is more than 3,5 km at speeds that provide optimal conditions for overcoming the counteraction of air defense weapons. In this case, repeated attacks were carried out from different directions using the terrain and smoke screens. Often carried out such a tactical technique, as a sudden flight through the zone of fire while simultaneously performing a quick anti-aircraft maneuver.
Found a fairly widespread use of the attack of the target "on the move" in the shortest possible time, taking into account the natural thermal background when leaving the target (in the direction of the mountains, clouds illuminated by the sun). The flight along different routes to the target and back was mastered using demonstrative and distracting groups of airplanes and helicopters. The pilots tried to prevent re-entry from the same course and flying the same route to the destination and back.
The performance of combat missions using EW and SAB was carried out, as a rule, under the cover of specially selected groups of aircraft (helicopters). At the same time, whenever possible, the crews tried to eliminate the operation of engines at maximum speed and afterburner. Under the threat of the use of air defense weapons, anti-aircraft, anti-missile maneuvers were carried out while shooting
EW funds spent in the areas of possible use of MANPADS or when detecting a missile launch. Also, when approaching the object of impact and leaving the attack, shooting of PPI was widely used in series of several rounds with a minimum interval between shots.
In the course of the conflict, in order to cover attack aviation from air defense weapons of the Georgian armed forces, the following were used:
Mi-8pp helicopters with Azalea jamming stations for suppressing radar stations OCU, Mi-8 SMV-PG with stations
interference "Smalt - PG" to suppress the radar control weapons Buk-М1 and С-125. Hacking
The EW AN-12 aircraft was mainly carried out in the following zones: above the Black Sea coast in the south of Abkhazia, in the region of the main Caucasus range above North and South Ossetia. Over the territory of Georgia itself, they carried out jamming on the flight directions of our aircraft when it strikes objects.
The intensity of the use of EW-Air Force was extremely high.
Helicopters of jammers in the air were on duty almost around the clock, with the exception of half-hour breaks for refueling and rest of operators, and jamming planes were on alert for up to 12 - 16 hours per day.
Through the efforts of this grouping, the combat capabilities of Georgian air defense were significantly reduced.
In particular, the detection range of our aircraft radar OTSU P-37, 36D6 and ASR-12 through the use of
The Azalea SAP was reduced in 6 ... 10 times (from 300 km in a noiseless situation to 30 ... 50 km in the conditions of interference). The radar coverage of the C-125 and Buk-М1 missile systems when using Smalt-PG was reduced by 1.5 ... 2.5 times (from 25 ... 30 km in a noiseless situation to 10 ... 15 km under interference conditions, which is equivalent to reducing the number of rocket launches is approximately 2 times).
The degree of equipment of aircraft with personal protective equipment is characterized as follows.
The Su-34 aircraft has an airborne defense complex (BS) of the Khibiny type. On the Su-25 (assault aviation) aircraft, automatic shooting of false heat targets ASO-2 W were installed. Su-24 M aircraft
(BA airplanes) and reconnaissance aircraft - Su-24 MR had both KKO "KPATI" and assault rifles of expendable means APP-50 m. Long-range aircraft Tu-23 М3 were armed with UKO-M, direction finders "Mak-UT" "And automatic shooting of expendable funds of APP - 50А (including one of them was SAP" Lilac ").
Objectively, it should be noted that, in general, the tactical and technical characteristics of onboard EW equipment left much to be desired. The capabilities of the Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft to conduct radio and optical reconnaissance were also insufficient. At the same time, the onboard complex of the Khibiny defense system on the Su-34 aircraft showed high efficiency in the conduct of the RTR, ensuring the opening of a significant part of the RES of the Georgian air defense force.
There were shortcomings in the organization of interaction. Thus, since the transfer of the control of the EW consolidated squadron to the Gudauta airfield, the Sukhumi task force has ceased to receive information about identified and repressed REFs of the Georgian air defense forces in the Abkhaz sector to the Air Force and Air Defense 4A.
Unfortunately, during the conflict, continuous jamming of the Georgian air defense radar could not be achieved. The level of effectiveness of the group defense of aviation was also low.
In this conflict, the following tasks were assigned to the EW Ground Forces forces and equipment: opening (detecting) the radio-electronic situation in the combat zone; radio-electronic suppression of systems and means of command and control of troops, weapons, reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the armed forces of Georgia; decrease in the effectiveness of the use of electronic countermeasures by the enemy; conducting integrated technical monitoring of the state of protection of weapons, military equipment and military facilities against the technical means of reconnaissance of the enemy and countering them; ensuring electromagnetic compatibility of radio-electronic means.
By using ground-based EW equipment at the tactical level, it was possible to reduce the effectiveness of the work of the leading aircraft gunners and spotters of the enemy artillery fire.
Successfully acted in armed conflict 1077-th separate battalion of EW. With the passage of Roki
the tunnel by its EW facilities suppressed the radio links of the UAV control with the loss of three vehicles by the Georgians.
Both sides actively used EW systems, and as a result, the connection was often simply absent. At the same time, the Georgians were in a more advantageous position - satellite communications partly worked for them. It got to the point that negotiations were going on mobile phones, and both parties used such a connection. And auditioned too.
Counteraction against the technical means of enemy intelligence was provided by:
- by radio electronic destruction of the identified airborne radar and radio reconnaissance equipment of Georgia, destruction of the Hermes UAV;
- maintenance of the daily operation of radio electronic equipment in the preparation and conduct of the operation at the locations of the troops and airfield bases of aviation;
- the introduction of restrictions on the operation of radio electronic devices with radiation in new areas;
- by radio means suppression of transmission channels by means of parts
intelligence, radio communications and administration of Georgia;
- special protection of technical means of information transmission and processing;
- identifying technical channels of information leakage and carrying out measures to eliminate them.
Analysis of the effectiveness of the actions of the EW forces and means during the conflict revealed a number of shortcomings in their organization, the main of which are:
- lack of initial intelligence information on the grouping of the armed forces of Georgia before the outbreak of hostilities;
- insufficient capacity of the available jamming stations for
reconnaissance of electronic equipment produced by the leading NATO countries that are equipped with the armed forces of Georgia and, as a result, a low degree of autopsy (detection) of the REO during combat operations;
- the lack of protection of objects of automotive technology on the march (when moving in columns or individually), as well as personnel when it is in the places of use of radio-controlled explosive devices;
- deployment of radio electronic equipment of the armed forces group in violation of the EMC requirements. Frequent outages
REB equipment under high temperature conditions (Р-330 and Р-934 УМ);
- the lack of reliable cover for their troops and the most important objects from airborne radar reconnaissance and targeted strikes by aviation of the armed forces of Georgia;
- poor organization of the restoration and repair of failed REP equipment;
- low maneuverability capabilities of REB equipment in the conditions of short-term combat;
- The EW equipment that was in service did not have the ability to effectively conduct radio intelligence and REP in motion;
- the absence at the initial stage of the conflict of the REB facilities of satellite radio navigation equipment,
installed on the reconnaissance drone of the armed forces of Georgia.
A comprehensive assessment of the results of EW management in a given conflict can be expressed
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Colonel-General Nogovitsin A. A.: “We used EW systems, but they are of the Soviet type. Georgian troops used the Buk and Thor missile systems to fight Russian aviation. When opening their positions as targets (and these are our Soviet designs), our aircraft experienced certain difficulties. At the same time, we first suffered losses and only then made the appropriate conclusions. ”
In general, the organization of electronic warfare and the effectiveness of EW facilities used in the course of a peace enforcement operation can be considered satisfactory. Although late, additional measures allowed us to exclude further losses of aviation and contributed to ensuring air supremacy of our aircraft.
Published material on the use of EW funds in the war with Georgia in August 2008.
It is freely available.
I think the readers of my LiveJournal will be interested. By the way, for the first time, participation in the Su-34 aircraft conflict is probably recognized.
Su-34 over Rostov. (c) i
Against the background of the growth of nationalism 10 in November 1989, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region within the Georgian SSR changed its status to an autonomous republic and from 20.09.90 declared independence and the creation of the Republic of South Ossetia. Further over the course of 12 years, relative calm remained in the conflict zone, but since 2003, when, as a result of the “rose revolution,”
M. Saakashvili, the situation around the self-proclaimed republic began to worsen. Already with 2006, there was a “Tiger Throw” plan, according to which the Georgian leadership, relying on the support of the USA and the OSCE, envisaged the seizure of all large settlements of South Ossetia.
On Thursday, 7 in August, 2008, M. Saakashvili, in a televised address, offered to the leadership of the South Ossetian Republic peace talks, and on August 8, in 00.10, Georgian troops began shelling Tskhinvali.
Georgian Parliament 9 August unanimously approved M. Saakashvili's decree on the declaration of martial law
and full mobilization on 15 days. Their motivation was the need to prevent destabilization in the region, armed attacks on civilians and acts of violence in order to protect human rights and freedoms. At the same time, the political leadership of Georgia stated that the actions of its army were a “forced” response to ceasefire violations by Yu. Ossetia.
On the night of August 7-8, 2008, the Georgian armed forces invaded the territory of South Ossetia in violation of an agreement to maintain peace on the borders with unrecognized state entities (the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia). Were inflicted aviation and rocket and artillery attacks on the city of Tskhinvali and a number of other settlements. Under the 12-hour fire of the Grad rocket artillery, hundreds of civilians were killed. Twenty-six rocket launchers fired on residential areas, hospitals, and schools. Well-planned attacks were carried out on units of the Russian peacekeeping forces (shortly before the attacks, Georgian peacekeepers left their places).
In order to curb the barbaric aggression of Georgia, protect the civilian population and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, Russia 9 August introduced its units and subunits into the territory of South Ossetia, thereby launching the operation “to force the aggressor to peace”.
In the conflict, they were used by Yu. Ossetia - up to 3000 v / f .; Russia - to 15000 v / f .; Abkhazia - to 5000 v / f .; Georgia - to 29000 v / sl.
The Georgian armed forces included special units of the DER and EW. The conflict involved a separate electronic intelligence battalion, a mobile electronic intelligence unit deployed 8 km north of Tskhinvali and consisting of standard US-made terminals. The electronic reconnaissance means included in its structure, the radioelectronic control system of the airspace, the data transmission system made it possible to carry out a general assessment of the situation on a time scale close to real. In addition, in the city of Gori, in the immediate vicinity of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone, a separate center of the DER and EW of the USA (OC REG and EW of the USA) was deployed. By its capabilities, this object is able to intercept and record all radio and telephone conversations in the region. The center also received all the intelligence information obtained by EW units, which, after generalization and analysis, were transferred to the Defense Ministry and the joint headquarters of the Georgian armed forces. Formed maneuverable groups of DER and EW operated as part of the military intelligence units of Georgia in the conflict zone. They were equipped with AK-5000 type radio receivers and, presumably, a complex of interception of cellular communication systems.
In South Ossetia, units of the Russian Armed Forces entered into battle with the elite of the Georgian army as part of three infantry brigades, an artillery brigade, a separate armored and three anti-tank brigades. Ten thousand soldiers of these formations underwent "combat practice" in Iraq. Well-equipped and trained Georgian units "copied" the methods of warfare characteristic of the US and NATO armed forces. Aerial bombardment and massive destruction of objects of South Ossetia by rocket and artillery fire according to the initial data obtained with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles, subsequent breakthroughs tanks or “nomadic jeep raids,” a number of other tactics were similar to US tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the breakthrough of elite units into the territory of the attacked object, Georgian Interior Ministry troops entered and carried out “sweeps”.
In the initial grouping of the Georgian Armed Forces, radar detection, warning and control of combat operations of air defense forces and weapons was carried out by combat control and stationary posts armed with radar systems of Soviet and foreign manufacture (mostly French). They were located in the areas of the cities of Poti, Kopitnari, Gori, Tbilisi, Marneuli. To control the fighting used wired communication lines, radio stations operating in a secure mode of transmission of information, means of communication and data transmission for civilian purposes.
Radio and electronic reconnaissance equipment, Hermes-type unmanned aerial vehicles were widely used to identify and open a group of troops of the Georgian armed forces.
Taking into account the peculiarities of the terrain in the conflict area, the Georgian leadership paid special attention to the combat effectiveness of the grouping of air defense forces and equipment. To the strengths of the air defense system
Georgia should include:
- high mobility of air defense systems and its separation (the presence of short-range and short-range air defense missile systems, MANPADS, FOR);
- the presence of professionally trained combat crews of the Buk-M, Osa-AKM;
- the discrepancy between the frequency range of the RES of the air defense system of Georgia (Soviet production) with the operating range of the GOS UR of the air-radar class of Russian aviation (since they are mainly intended to work on the frequencies of the NATO air defense warning system);
- the presence of the Osa-AKM air defense missile with an optical channel for missile guidance and the absence of Russian aircraft
staff EW equipment for individual and group protection in the operating frequency range of this air defense system;
- the presence of a passive warning system and targeting from the means of Ukrainian RTR ("Mail")
and American (Skynet) production.
Weaknesses include the relatively low immunity of the Buk-M and Osa-AKM air defense systems, which did not allow them to conduct effective combat operations under active and passive interference, as well as relatively low spatial characteristics of the Osa-AKM air defense system (distance to 10 km, height to km 5).
In addition, the following means could counteract our aviation on the flight routes and in the areas of attack:
- aircraft of the Georgian Air Force of the SU-25 and L-29 type, which had cannon armament, NURS and air-to-air missiles - P-60С;
- C-125 anti-aircraft missile systems in the districts of the cities of Tbilisi, Marneuli, Poti, and also deployed to cover the most important state and industrial facilities and transport communications of the air defense missile system, Buk;
- “Strela-2, - 3”, “Needle”, 57 mm C-60, 23 mm ZSU “Shilka” anti-aircraft artillery guns, which were used mainly in the tactical zone, as well as dominant heights on the flight routes.
The tactics of using short-range and medium-range air defense systems were quite diverse and included actions from ambushes, alternate work with movement, the use of target designation from RTR complexes
and radar air traffic control.
The reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the eve of this conflict led to the fact that the Air Force had practically no operational radio and radio intelligence intelligence to start it. Moreover, due to the help of the GRU GSH, the Air Force intelligence agencies could not receive it. In this position, the Air Force could not have reliable data on the location of active air defense systems of Georgia and the organization of their management. This was the main cause of combat losses of our aircraft.
Under these conditions, the radio intelligence equipment of the EW-Air Force played a positive role. Already on the first day of hostilities, the operation of the Osa and Buk radio electronic systems in the area of the cities of Gori and Tbilisi was revealed.
Since the beginning of hostilities, up to five combat air defense systems Osa-AKM, up to three combat elements of the Buk air defense system, as well as the C-125 air defense system, were detected and suppressed by air forces of the Air Force aviation. All the anti-aircraft systems were either completely suppressed, or made unsuccessful attempts to target the missiles, which was recorded according to the operating modes and parameters of the radar systems of the anti-aircraft systems.
It should be noted that the pilots of the aviation group deployed in the area, well mastered the area
He is fighting and flying in the mountains. At the same time, the crews of other helicopters deployed to the combat area were not prepared for flights in mountainous terrain, and therefore their mission was associated with the risk of losing crews. In addition, the Mi-8 SMW-PG helicopters (jammers) were not equipped with personal protective equipment, including against MANPADS.
It should be emphasized that EW facilities of airplanes and helicopters planned for combat use on the territory of Georgia did not fully meet the requirements for providing protection against air defense weapons. Moreover, the cover by EW aircraft (helicopters) of the combat formations of strike aircraft from jamming zones throughout the entire flight route was virtually impossible due to the peculiarities of the mountainous terrain. It was necessary to take into account both the short operating time of the Buk air defense system and the possible inclusion of reconnaissance and targeting equipment in the infrared (UV) and optical-electronic ranges.
The greatest efficiency in the course of the fighting was demonstrated by the onboard complex of electronic warfare
Su-34 aircraft.
The electronic warfare radar of Georgia П-36Д6, П-37, 5А87, П-18, 19Ж6, PRV-9, - 11, - 13, АSR-12 in the cities of the regions, in the areas of the ghosts, should be carried out by the EW radar of Georgia. At the same time, during the enemy's REP, the interference was also observed in our radar types A84, 5А87, П-18, П-37, located at a distance 100 - 120 km from the jamming zones of AN-12P aircraft.
An analysis of the combat use of aircraft in the first days of hostilities in the South Ossetian and Abkhaz areas showed that the primary planning for the provision of hostilities was carried out without due regard for the capabilities of Georgia’s air defense and the specifics of using its EW aviation equipment
suppression. The results of this analysis make it possible to identify the following significant shortcomings in ensuring the survivability of aviation:
- the absence of reconnaissance aircraft capable of conducting detailed radio reconnaissance in real time with high accuracy in determining the coordinates of the radar;
- the discrepancy between the frequency ranges of the RGS missiles of the class "air-radar" and the radar air defense missile systems of Soviet production, the absence of control equipment and target designation;
- insufficient number of jammers;
- the small flight ceiling of the helicopter jammers, as a result of which their use in the mountainous terrain of South Ossetia was difficult;
- Lack of means of the RAP group protection of aviation from the combat formations.
It is important to consider that the specialists of the services were not sufficiently involved in the planning of aviation operations.
EW. Radio reconnaissance was carried out irregularly and not by all available forces, without the necessary setting of passive and active interference to clarify the electronic situation, system state
communications and control, the deployment of the RTV and ZRK radars, the air bases of the Georgian Air Force.
Space control of combat areas, command and control points, identified radar positions, and air defense systems of the Georgian armed forces were not properly implemented.
These shortcomings required immediate intervention in the leadership of aviation by representatives of the Air Force General Command, taking urgent measures to reduce the combat losses of our aircraft (6 aircraft were lost in the conflict). The main of them were attributed:
- exclusion of participation in the strikes of aircraft that do not have personal protective equipment;
- exit from the attack of Su-25 aircraft with a massive shooting of heat traps and a minimum of operating time at maximum thermal conditions;
- the use of strike aviation only under the guise of group protection from the zones of aircraft
and EW helicopters (An-12PP, Mi-8PPA, Mi-8 SMV-PG) and from combat formations with Su-34 aircraft with EW complexes;
- implementation of the tasks assigned by combat aircraft at maximum speed and at altitudes precluding the use of MANPADS and antiaircraft artillery of Georgia.
Taking into account the recommendations that have been worked out, aviation flights began to be carried out along routes with a detour of areas covered by air defense weapons, or over sections of the terrain where they were suppressed. Flight altitude, as a rule, is more than 3,5 km at speeds that provide optimal conditions for overcoming the counteraction of air defense weapons. In this case, repeated attacks were carried out from different directions using the terrain and smoke screens. Often carried out such a tactical technique, as a sudden flight through the zone of fire while simultaneously performing a quick anti-aircraft maneuver.
Found a fairly widespread use of the attack of the target "on the move" in the shortest possible time, taking into account the natural thermal background when leaving the target (in the direction of the mountains, clouds illuminated by the sun). The flight along different routes to the target and back was mastered using demonstrative and distracting groups of airplanes and helicopters. The pilots tried to prevent re-entry from the same course and flying the same route to the destination and back.
The performance of combat missions using EW and SAB was carried out, as a rule, under the cover of specially selected groups of aircraft (helicopters). At the same time, whenever possible, the crews tried to eliminate the operation of engines at maximum speed and afterburner. Under the threat of the use of air defense weapons, anti-aircraft, anti-missile maneuvers were carried out while shooting
EW funds spent in the areas of possible use of MANPADS or when detecting a missile launch. Also, when approaching the object of impact and leaving the attack, shooting of PPI was widely used in series of several rounds with a minimum interval between shots.
In the course of the conflict, in order to cover attack aviation from air defense weapons of the Georgian armed forces, the following were used:
Mi-8pp helicopters with Azalea jamming stations for suppressing radar stations OCU, Mi-8 SMV-PG with stations
interference "Smalt - PG" to suppress the radar control weapons Buk-М1 and С-125. Hacking
The EW AN-12 aircraft was mainly carried out in the following zones: above the Black Sea coast in the south of Abkhazia, in the region of the main Caucasus range above North and South Ossetia. Over the territory of Georgia itself, they carried out jamming on the flight directions of our aircraft when it strikes objects.
The intensity of the use of EW-Air Force was extremely high.
Helicopters of jammers in the air were on duty almost around the clock, with the exception of half-hour breaks for refueling and rest of operators, and jamming planes were on alert for up to 12 - 16 hours per day.
Through the efforts of this grouping, the combat capabilities of Georgian air defense were significantly reduced.
In particular, the detection range of our aircraft radar OTSU P-37, 36D6 and ASR-12 through the use of
The Azalea SAP was reduced in 6 ... 10 times (from 300 km in a noiseless situation to 30 ... 50 km in the conditions of interference). The radar coverage of the C-125 and Buk-М1 missile systems when using Smalt-PG was reduced by 1.5 ... 2.5 times (from 25 ... 30 km in a noiseless situation to 10 ... 15 km under interference conditions, which is equivalent to reducing the number of rocket launches is approximately 2 times).
The degree of equipment of aircraft with personal protective equipment is characterized as follows.
The Su-34 aircraft has an airborne defense complex (BS) of the Khibiny type. On the Su-25 (assault aviation) aircraft, automatic shooting of false heat targets ASO-2 W were installed. Su-24 M aircraft
(BA airplanes) and reconnaissance aircraft - Su-24 MR had both KKO "KPATI" and assault rifles of expendable means APP-50 m. Long-range aircraft Tu-23 М3 were armed with UKO-M, direction finders "Mak-UT" "And automatic shooting of expendable funds of APP - 50А (including one of them was SAP" Lilac ").
Objectively, it should be noted that, in general, the tactical and technical characteristics of onboard EW equipment left much to be desired. The capabilities of the Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft to conduct radio and optical reconnaissance were also insufficient. At the same time, the onboard complex of the Khibiny defense system on the Su-34 aircraft showed high efficiency in the conduct of the RTR, ensuring the opening of a significant part of the RES of the Georgian air defense force.
There were shortcomings in the organization of interaction. Thus, since the transfer of the control of the EW consolidated squadron to the Gudauta airfield, the Sukhumi task force has ceased to receive information about identified and repressed REFs of the Georgian air defense forces in the Abkhaz sector to the Air Force and Air Defense 4A.
Unfortunately, during the conflict, continuous jamming of the Georgian air defense radar could not be achieved. The level of effectiveness of the group defense of aviation was also low.
In this conflict, the following tasks were assigned to the EW Ground Forces forces and equipment: opening (detecting) the radio-electronic situation in the combat zone; radio-electronic suppression of systems and means of command and control of troops, weapons, reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the armed forces of Georgia; decrease in the effectiveness of the use of electronic countermeasures by the enemy; conducting integrated technical monitoring of the state of protection of weapons, military equipment and military facilities against the technical means of reconnaissance of the enemy and countering them; ensuring electromagnetic compatibility of radio-electronic means.
By using ground-based EW equipment at the tactical level, it was possible to reduce the effectiveness of the work of the leading aircraft gunners and spotters of the enemy artillery fire.
Successfully acted in armed conflict 1077-th separate battalion of EW. With the passage of Roki
the tunnel by its EW facilities suppressed the radio links of the UAV control with the loss of three vehicles by the Georgians.
Both sides actively used EW systems, and as a result, the connection was often simply absent. At the same time, the Georgians were in a more advantageous position - satellite communications partly worked for them. It got to the point that negotiations were going on mobile phones, and both parties used such a connection. And auditioned too.
Counteraction against the technical means of enemy intelligence was provided by:
- by radio electronic destruction of the identified airborne radar and radio reconnaissance equipment of Georgia, destruction of the Hermes UAV;
- maintenance of the daily operation of radio electronic equipment in the preparation and conduct of the operation at the locations of the troops and airfield bases of aviation;
- the introduction of restrictions on the operation of radio electronic devices with radiation in new areas;
- by radio means suppression of transmission channels by means of parts
intelligence, radio communications and administration of Georgia;
- special protection of technical means of information transmission and processing;
- identifying technical channels of information leakage and carrying out measures to eliminate them.
Analysis of the effectiveness of the actions of the EW forces and means during the conflict revealed a number of shortcomings in their organization, the main of which are:
- lack of initial intelligence information on the grouping of the armed forces of Georgia before the outbreak of hostilities;
- insufficient capacity of the available jamming stations for
reconnaissance of electronic equipment produced by the leading NATO countries that are equipped with the armed forces of Georgia and, as a result, a low degree of autopsy (detection) of the REO during combat operations;
- the lack of protection of objects of automotive technology on the march (when moving in columns or individually), as well as personnel when it is in the places of use of radio-controlled explosive devices;
- deployment of radio electronic equipment of the armed forces group in violation of the EMC requirements. Frequent outages
REB equipment under high temperature conditions (Р-330 and Р-934 УМ);
- the lack of reliable cover for their troops and the most important objects from airborne radar reconnaissance and targeted strikes by aviation of the armed forces of Georgia;
- poor organization of the restoration and repair of failed REP equipment;
- low maneuverability capabilities of REB equipment in the conditions of short-term combat;
- The EW equipment that was in service did not have the ability to effectively conduct radio intelligence and REP in motion;
- the absence at the initial stage of the conflict of the REB facilities of satellite radio navigation equipment,
installed on the reconnaissance drone of the armed forces of Georgia.
A comprehensive assessment of the results of EW management in a given conflict can be expressed
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Colonel-General Nogovitsin A. A.: “We used EW systems, but they are of the Soviet type. Georgian troops used the Buk and Thor missile systems to fight Russian aviation. When opening their positions as targets (and these are our Soviet designs), our aircraft experienced certain difficulties. At the same time, we first suffered losses and only then made the appropriate conclusions. ”
In general, the organization of electronic warfare and the effectiveness of EW facilities used in the course of a peace enforcement operation can be considered satisfactory. Although late, additional measures allowed us to exclude further losses of aviation and contributed to ensuring air supremacy of our aircraft.
Information