Russia and America: a slide to war
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Richard Nixon noted that the United States had won the Cold War, but had not yet achieved peace. Since then, the White House has been replaced by three presidents representing the two main political parties in the United States, but none of them managed to solve this problem.
On the contrary, the world appears to be less and less accessible as the threats to the security and prosperity of the United States multiply both at the system level, where a number of dissatisfied states of affairs of major powers pose new challenges to the international order, and at the state and sub-state levels, where dissatisfied ethnic, tribal , religious and other groups destabilize key countries and even entire regions. The most dangerous are differences over the international system and the prerogatives of the major powers in the regions directly surrounding them. Historically, such disputes caused the greatest conflicts. These differences lie at the heart of the tensions between the United States and other Western countries with Russia, and also, more ominously, with China. Currently, the most urgent challenge is the current crisis in Ukraine. There you can hear the terrible echoes of the events that 100 years ago led to the catastrophe, known as the First World War. At the time of this writing, the ambiguous, narrow and inconsistently interpreted agreement “Minsk-2” was still in force, and we can hope that it will lead to further agreements that will prevent the return of “hot war”. But the war has already happened and, probably, will continue, reflecting deep contradictions that America will not be able to resolve if it does not take on them honestly and directly.
In the United States and Europe, many believe that securing Ukraine’s independence is the best way to prevent Russia from resuming it. historical imperial mission. Advocates of this view insist that the West should do whatever it takes to prevent the Kremlin's direct or indirect control over Ukraine. Otherwise, as it seems to them, Russia will again recreate the Soviet empire and will threaten all of Europe. In Russia, on the contrary, many argue that Russia is ready to recognize the sovereignty of Ukraine and its territorial integrity (with the exception of Crimea), but Moscow will require no less than any other great power would demand at its borders. Security on the western border of Russia requires a special relationship with Ukraine, as well as a certain degree of respect, the rendering of which is expected by major powers in their areas of influence. In particular, the Russian establishment believes that a country can never be safe if Ukraine joins NATO or becomes part of a hostile Euro-Atlantic community. From the point of view of representatives of this establishment, the Russian demand for a neutral status of Ukraine is not subject to discussion, at least as long as Russia is able to defend the interests of its national security.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia was on its knees, becoming dependent on Western aid. At that moment, the country was absorbed in its own internal concerns. Given this context, it is not surprising that Western leaders have become used to ignoring the opinion of Russia over the years. But since he came to power in 1999, Vladimir Putin once again led Russia along the path of realizing himself as a great power. Encouraged by the growth in oil production and the price of black gold, which doubled Russia's GDP during Putin’s fifteen-year reign, Russians are increasingly rejecting this attitude from the West. It would not hurt the Americans to recall the sequence of events that led to Japan’s attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor and America’s entry into World War II. In 1941, the United States imposed an almost total oil embargo on Japan to punish it for its aggression on the Asian mainland. Unfortunately, Washington greatly underestimated the reaction of Japan to these actions. As one of the wise men of the post-war period, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, later noted, the US government made a mistake not in predicting the actions of the Japanese in Asia or in the hostility that the American embargo would cause in Japan, but in anticipating what incredible risks General Tojo would take to achieve his goals . Nobody in Washington understood that Tojo and his regime viewed the conquest of Asia not as a realization of certain ambitions, but as a necessary condition for the survival of the regime. For the Japanese, it was a matter of life and death.
Just a few days before Pearl Harbor, Japan’s special envoy Saburo Kurusu said in Washington: “The Japanese people believe that economic measures are much more effective weapons war than military measures; that ... they are extremely pressured by the United States to succumb to American demands; and that fighting is preferable to them than giving in to pressure. ” Despite this warning, Japan’s reaction to the economic war from the United States took America by surprise, killing 2500 people and drowning a large part of the Pacific fleet USA. The study of forecasts of the consequences of the adoption of certain options of important foreign policy moves by recent US administrations should be a bright warning light. The Clinton administration first misinterpreted the long and bloody civil war in Yugoslavia, and then imposed its shaky solution to the participants in this conflict, simultaneously angering Russia and China. At the time of the decision to invade Iraq and change the regime of Saddam Hussein to the democratically elected, George W. Bush considered how he himself said that his actions “will serve as a powerful example of liberty and freedom in that part of the world that desperately needs liberty and freedom” . Bush Jr. and his team adhered to this belief, despite numerous warnings that the war would result in Iraq’s fragmentation by tribal and religious grounds, that Shiites would dominate any elected government in Baghdad and that Shiite Iran would benefit most from weakening Iraq . The Obama administration then joined the United Kingdom and France in a major air campaign in Libya in order to remove Muammar al-Gaddafi. The ensuing chaos played a role in the assassination of the US ambassador and other American diplomats, as well as in turning Libya into a haven of Islamic extremists, threatening Libya’s neighbors and America far more than the Gaddafi regime. At the start of the Syrian civil war, the Obama administration demanded the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, although he never posed a direct threat to America. Neither the Obama administration nor members of Congress took seriously the predictions that it was Islamic extremists, and not moderate fractions, that would dominate the forces of the Syrian opposition, and that Assad would not be easy to dismiss.
Can the US reaction to the actions of Russia in Ukraine provoke a confrontation that will lead to the US-Russian war? This development seems almost unbelievable. However, whenever we judge whether something is “unthinkable” or not, we should remember that such judgments are based not on what can really happen in this world, but on what kind of events we can imagine and which is not. As the cases with Iraq, Libya and Syria have shown, political leaders find it difficult to foresee the development of events if the latter seem to them uncomfortable, disturbing, or inconvenient. The overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Gaddafi had only a limited direct effect on most Americans. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that most politicians and analysts in Washington believe that by challenging Russia in Ukraine and seeking to isolate Moscow at the international level, as well as to cause economic damage, the United States will not incur significant costs, not to mention any real threats. America itself. After all, the most popular refrain in Washington, when it comes to Russia, is the statement that "Russia no longer matters." No one in the American capital is more pleased to try to humiliate Putin than to US President Barack Obama, who has repeatedly included Russia on his list of current disasters along with the Islamic State and Ebola. And there can be no doubt that, being a so-called oil state, dependent on the extraction and sale of black gold, Russia is economically vulnerable and has very few true allies, if any. In addition, many representatives of Russian business and intellectual elites would have responded to Putin’s departure from office with the same enthusiasm as the Washington Post editorial board does. After all, the Ukrainians, who held the same views on Viktor Yanukovych, succeeded in overthrowing him from the post of the President of Ukraine, which means, as it is stated, Putin may also be vulnerable.
Although most politicians and commentators reject the possibility of the Russian-American war, the current course of events causes more concern than ever since the end of the Cold War. We assert this based on the experience of our observations of the Soviet and Russian events throughout the Cold War, as well as the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Our statements are also based on the impressions of one of us, received during a recent weekly stay in Moscow, during which frank conversations took place with representatives of the Putin government, including influential Russian officials, as well as with people close to this government. Another co-author of this article visited China, having the opportunity to get acquainted with the view from Beijing. Our assessment is based on these conversations, as well as on conversations with other public and private sources. There are three key factors that should be considered when considering whether the current conflict can escalate into a war or not: decision-making in Russia, Russian policy and the US-Russian dynamic.
As for decision-making in Russia, Putin is recognized inside and outside Russia as a person who makes decisions alone. All available data show that he relies on a very narrow circle of advisers and not one of them is ready to challenge his assumptions. Such a format is unlikely to help Putin make informed decisions that fully take into account the real costs and benefits. In addition, the political situation in Russia, both at the elite level and at the public level, encourages Putin to escalate demands, not concessions. At the elite level, the Russian establishment is divided into two camps: a pragmatist camp, which currently dominates mainly due to the support of Putin, and a hard-line camp. The Russian public mainly supports hardliners, whom one of Putin’s advisors called “hotheads.” Given the current realities of Russian politics, one can say that Russia's revanchist policy would be more aggressive if not for Putin. Speaking directly, Putin is not the most zealous hardliner in Russia.
None of the “hotheads” criticizes Putin, even in private conversations. But at the same time, the number of employees in the military and national security departments of Russia is growing, professing a much tighter approach to the United States and Europe on the issue of Ukraine. This is evident from the attacks on such relatively moderate members of the government as Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. From the point of view of these employees, supporters of the moderate line do not understand the seriousness of the American-European challenge to Russia and in vain hope that things can change for the better without Russia's surrender in the face of an unacceptable and derogatory foreign dictate. They recommend moving the game to the area where Russia is strong, using military force to advance Russian interests, as Putin did in the Crimea, and put pressure on the West to accept Moscow on its own terms. The more nationalistic Russian public also supports this approach, which boils down to "challenging the main enemy." This approach is consonant with the rhetoric of the former Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is his views that inspire the adherents of this approach. Putin undoubtedly contributes to the growth of nationalist sentiment through his patriotic rhetoric and harsh judgments about the West. But his rhetoric easily found wide support in Russia because of widespread disappointment at the fact that the West regarded Russia as the side that lost the cold war, and not as an ally in building a new world order. Moreover, ordinary Russians may have gone even further than Putin in his belligerent views. Not so long ago, the Russian mass media received a wide coverage of the warning voiced by the recently fired rebel commander Igor Strelkov. Strelkov said that, being too indecisive, Putin risks not satisfying anyone's aspirations and can be apprehended by the same fate as Slobodan Milosevic, namely, both liberals and nationalists will reject him. Since then, however, Strelkov hung a portrait of Putin in an important place in his office. He reportedly explained this by saying that, in his opinion, the Russian president "understood that all this compromise with the West was fruitless," and that the Russian president "was restoring Russian sovereignty." Strelkov is often exaggerated, but his views reflect the frustrations of Russia's influential nationalist coalition.
Among the supporters to play with the muscles more and more military personnel and civilians who believe: Russia could shake its nuclear weapons for better effect. They believe that Russia's nuclear arsenal is not only the main shield protecting the country, but also a sword that could be taken out of its scabbard in order to force those who do not have nuclear weapons, as well as those who are not ready to think about unthinkable, namely the actual use of nuclear weapons. Putin seems to have supported this view of nuclear weapons in his controversial speech in Sochi last September. In particular, he said: “There were such bright political figures as Nikita Khrushchev, who was pounding with the boot of the UN. And everyone in the world, above all in the United States, at NATO, thought: yes, well, in FIG, this Nikita and others like him, they will take the dolbanut, they have full missiles - it is better to treat them with respect. The Soviet Union did not become, what situation arose and what temptations: but you can not reckon with Russia, it is very dependent, underwent a transformation during the collapse of the Soviet Union, we will do what we want, without regard to any rules at all. ” Director of the Russia Today Information Agency, Dmitry Kiselev, spoke out even more frankly, repeatedly warning that "Russia is the only country in the world that can really turn the United States into radioactive ash."
The Russian Military Doctrine of 2014 emphasizes that Russia will use nuclear weapons not only in response to nuclear strikes, but also in the “case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons.” And in a recent report by the European Leadership Network, it is noted that almost 40 incidents happened last year, during which the actions of the Russian Armed Forces were so provocative that if they continued, the consequences could be “catastrophic.”
Although this may seem illogical, but the weakening of the Russian economy is also unlikely to set the Russian public on concessions. On the contrary, damage to Russia's already stagnating economy, suffering from low energy prices, will in fact make Putin’s foreign policy less flexible. The president of Russia needs to be shown that his country suffered for good reason. The retreat can seriously damage Putin’s carefully cultivated image as a strong personality, and it is such a leader that Russians historically value, and lead to a loss of support among the super-nationalist-minded public that makes up his political base. They are outraged by the sanctions, which, as they see, harm ordinary people much more than Putin’s entourage, and they want their leaders to resist, not capitulate. In the eyes of many of them, Russia's national dignity is at stake. All this was clearly expressed in a recent conversation with a senior Russian official. When asked why his government would not try to negotiate a deal based on the principles that had already been formulated (for example, the exchange of Russian guarantees of Ukraine’s territorial integrity with the exception of Crimea and Ukraine’s right to move towards the European Union to Western guarantees that Ukraine would not joining NATO, as well as the fact that the United States and the European Union would weaken the sanctions), he said: “We have pride and we cannot allow the impression that we are putting pressure on the rebels m, so that the sanctions were relaxed. "
Putin also tried to hide the scale of Russia's intervention in order to drag out time and play on the contradictions between the US and Europe, as well as on intra-European contradictions. For the time being, pragmatists are winning, not least because Putin has kept his team almost untouched in the government and in the presidential administration. Being loyal to Putin and ready to follow his instructions, this team consists mainly of officials, whose development took place at the time of establishing economic interdependence between Russia and the West and Russia's attempts to get a decisive vote in the world order, mainly formed by the United States and its allies. Foreign Minister Lavrov and those who support his more pragmatic approach argue that Russia will be able to do business with the United States and especially with Europeans until it closes the door. And the “hot heads” adhere to the opposite point of view, stating that the West will view any moderation in Russian politics as a sign of weakness. Representing themselves as realists, they say: NATO intends to overthrow Putin, bring Russia to its knees, and perhaps even dismember the country.
“Many are wondering if President Obama will risk losing Chicago, New York and Washington to protect Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius.”
Putin’s unwillingness to change the course sharply explains his hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, in which he helps the separatists without Russia officially entering the conflict. This reluctance also lies at the basis of unconvincing refutations of military support for the separatists from Russia, which at the same time turns Moscow into a subject of valid criticism and gives rise to unfounded hopes in Washington and European capitals that Russia will not be able to accept more numerous losses of its citizens in the war because that she claims not to be involved in this war. Yet Putin’s attempts to follow the common goals of pragmatists, while simultaneously taking into account the position of “hotheads” in Ukraine, cannot continue indefinitely. Among Putin’s advisors, the prevailing view is that the hope of restoring cooperation with the West is hopeless, because the United States and Western leaders will not accept any solution that meets Russia's minimum requirements. They are ready to urge Russia to swallow their pride and reconcile if the United States and the European Union lift a significant part of the sanctions and everything returns to normal. But if Russia continues to punish, expelling it from the financial markets and denying Western technologies to it, then, in their opinion, Russia should go its own, independent way. For Putin, the decisive moment has not yet come when he will be required to make a fateful choice between concessions to the requirements of the West and more direct involvement in the conflict, possibly accompanied by the use of force against Western interests outside Ukraine. And if this moment comes, it may well be that his choice will not please us.
In addition to sanctions, two more factors may emerge that will force Putin to force things. One of them is the prospect of a military defeat of the separatists. The second is Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In an interview with ARD Germany 17 on November 2014, Putin drew a bright red line, excluding the possibility that Russia would put up with the defeat of the separatists. In this interview, he asked a rhetorical question: Does NATO want "the central authorities of Ukraine to destroy everyone there, all their political opponents and opponents" in Eastern Ukraine. If so, then "we do not want and will not allow," Putin stated categorically. Every time the Ukrainian military seemed to be close to gaining the upper hand in the struggle, Putin raised his stakes to ensure the success of the separatists on the battlefield, despite American and European warnings and sanctions. Although the Russian president spoke less of the second red line, there can be no doubt that the potential membership of Ukraine in NATO is a matter of the greatest concern for the Russians. One of the important reasons why Moscow is not opposed to the return of Donetsk and Lugansk under the control of the central Ukrainian authorities on conditions of considerable autonomy is the Kremlin’s desire to give the pro-Russian population of Eastern Ukraine the opportunity to vote in the general Ukrainian elections, as well as in the elections of autonomous local governments so that they were able to slow down the promotion of the country in NATO. The political mainstream of Russia overwhelmingly opposes the emergence of a hostile Ukraine under the NATO security umbrella less than 400 miles from Moscow.
This feeling is based both on the desire to ensure the security of Russia, and on almost uncontrollable feelings towards Ukraine and its Russian-speaking population. The growing popularity of the slogan “Russia is not abandoning its own” reflects these feelings and brings back memories of Russia’s pan-Slavic relations with Serbia on the eve of the First World War. One of us saw a vivid example of these emotions while watching a talk show devoted to Ukraine, which was broadcast live on one of the Russian channels. A discussion participant declared to the thunder of applause: "Our cause is just and we will win." It is important to note that Vyacheslav Nikonov, who said these words, is not only a member of the pro-Putin United Russia party and the chairman of the State Duma Education Committee. He is also the grandson of former Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, who spoke these very words after Hitler attacked the USSR in 1941 year. Nikonov is known for reflecting the point of view of the Russian establishment. Something similar was observed at the beginning of the 19th century in Russia by a French diplomat and conservative philosopher Joseph de Maistre. “No one is able to desire anything so passionately as Russian. If we were able to lock the Russian desire into a fortress, then this fortress would soon have exploded, ”said this native of Savoy. Russian nationalism today is just such an explosive force. It does not require a particularly rich imagination to imagine what could provoke a change in Putin's position. The most immediate trigger for such a change would be the US decision to arm the Ukrainian military. Who knows, maybe in the Putin government there are, in fact, those who are trying to gradually push the United States to take such a decision? Although this seems far-fetched at first glance, yet another of our Russian interlocutors argued quite reasonably that this is precisely the plan of some of Putin’s entourage, and they may act with the consent of the Russian leader. According to this theory, this trick has both tactical and strategic rationale.
Obama’s tactical statement that the United States is sending weapons to Ukraine will allow Putin to easily get out of a situation in which it’s harder and harder for him to deny the obvious. Putin and his government unequivocally and repeatedly assured their fellow citizens: Russia is not a party to the conflict, despite the fact that pro-Russian government politicians and separatist leaders praise Moscow for help on television. Even after a Malaysian airliner was shot down in July last year and almost three hundred people died, despite the fact that Western countries made public all new facts, Putin did not back down from these assurances.
If Washington makes a statement that it will arm Ukraine, then Putin is allegedly using this as an argument in favor of the correctness of his version of events. Putin claims that the United States first organized a coup on the Maidan, which led to the removal of the democratically elected President Yanukovych from power, and now support the war of the current government in Kiev against his Russian compatriots in eastern Ukraine. Thus, according to this logic, the open supply of American arms to Ukraine will break the cover from the secret actions of the United States and will serve as an excuse for Russia's response, which will consist in sending weapons or even troops, which in turn will initiate an escalation game in which Putin will be able to take advantage of his positions. If we use chess terminology, then strategically this situation would represent a trap. Transferring the competition from an economic chessboard (on which the United States and Europe have strong pieces) to a military one, Putin would have moved from a weak position to a strong one. In the military sphere, Putin controls the commanding heights. It is unlikely that the United States will provide Kiev with such weapons, to whose deliveries Russia will not be able to respond with supplies either equal in capabilities or superior weapon systems. Putin can deliver weapons by taking road, rail, sea, and air routes across the porous border with Ukraine, while the United States is on another continent. Russia has hundreds or even thousands of agents and employees in the ranks of the armed forces of Ukraine. And most importantly, Putin has already demonstrated that the Russian military is ready not only to advise the separatists, but also to fight side by side with them, killing and dying. Putin believes that the United States will never send American soldiers to Ukraine. In the camp, hard-liners believe: the more intelligible Putin can bring all this to the Europeans, the more respect he can achieve.
Hardliners see this as the best chance for Putin to snatch what they call a strategic victory, right from the mouth of defeat. In their opinion, Russia's comparative advantage in relations with Europe and the United States is based not on the economy, but on deployed military power. Europeans essentially disarmed themselves and show little desire to fight. Americans, of course, have the most powerful military machine on the planet and are often ready to fight. But even winning all the battles, they seem unable to win the war, as it was in Vietnam and Iraq. “Hotheads” hope that Russia will teach Europeans and Americans some harsh truths. A professionally conducted operation in the Crimea, as a result of which it was annexed with practically no shot, was only the first step. Russian hawks believe that the deeper the United States gets bogged down in Ukraine, and the more visible the US commitment to achieving such unattainable goals as the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the better. On the battlefield in Ukraine, Russia has what the Cold War strategists called escalation dominance, allowing it to prevail at each of the escalation stages. The United States will not win this mediated war, and Russia will not lose it. Is that America itself will enter the war.
The target audience of all this drama, of course, is Europe. Russia hopes that in the minds of postmodern Europeans it will be asserted that neither the European members of NATO, nor the United States will be able to save Ukraine. In accordance with this logic, as soon as this awareness comes, a skillful combination of intimidation and encouraging hints should allow Russia to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, thereby ensuring the easing of the most burdensome sanctions and access to European financial markets. Initially, Putin will try to take advantage of the expiration of the EU sanctions, expected in July. If this fails and the European Union joins the United States to introduce additional economic sanctions such as excluding Russia from the SWIFT financial clearing system, then Putin will be tempted not to back down, but to put an end to any cooperation with the West. Russian mobilization against a new, “apocalyptic” threat to Mother Russia. In a conversation with us, one of the leading Russian politicians said: “We stood alone against Napoleon and against Hitler. It was our victories over the aggressors, not our diplomacy, that led to the split of the coalitions of the enemy and provided us with new allies. ”
If the situation gets exactly this kind of development, then Putin will most likely change his team and the direction of his foreign policy. As the high-ranking official said: “The president appreciates loyalty and consistency, so it can be difficult for him to part with people and fundamentally change politics. But he is a resolute man, and if he has already made a decision, he does everything possible to achieve a result. ” This means that the Russian leadership will pursue a much more militant policy on all those issues that are driven by the interpretation of events as a western campaign aimed at weakening the regime or even the collapse of the country. Among other things, this is likely to lead to the end of cooperation on projects such as the International Space Station, the supply of strategic metals, including titanium, the resolution of the problem of Iran’s nuclear program and the stabilization of Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, it will be possible to expect not only pressure on the states of Central Asia to curtail their cooperation with the United States in the field of security, but also games on political differences in the ruling Afghan coalition to support the remnants of the Northern Alliance.
As soon as relations between the United States and Russia enter a phase of hot confrontation, high-ranking officers will inevitably begin to play a large role on both sides of the confrontation. On the eve of World War I, the world witnessed how, facing a security dilemma, one of the parties began to undertake what it considered to be reasonable precautions, but these measures are perceived by the opposite side as evidence of aggression being prepared against it. As Clausewitz wrote, the inexorable logic pushes each side to a re-emerging "competition that implies an aspiration for extremes in its very concept." Commanders are forced to think of opportunities, not intentions. This pushes them to steps that, while being sensible from a tactical point of view, can be misinterpreted at the strategic level. And the leaders of the countries, and their military advisers are likely to also make miscalculations. Before World War I, Kaiser Wilhelm II did not believe that Russia would dare to enter a new war, because the defeat inflicted on her by Japan less than ten years earlier showed the inconsistency of the Russian army. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov assured the tsar that Russia was ready for battle and that Germany had already decided to attack. In the 1912 year, Sukhomlinov said: “War is inevitable, and it is beneficial for us that it start earlier, and not later ... His Majesty and I believe in the army and believe that war will bring us only benefits.” At the same time, in Berlin, the German General Staff insisted on quick action, fearing the imminent completion of the construction of a new network of railway lines that would allow Tsar Nicholas II to quickly transfer Russian divisions to the border with Germany. The murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand exacerbated the crisis, and the commanders in both Russia and Germany rushed to race to mobilize. At that moment, the Russian General Staff assured Nicholas II that only immediate and full-scale mobilization could prevent a short-term defeat, if not Russia itself, then at least France, whose long-term support is necessary for Russia in order to withstand the German attack.
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania form the Achilles heel of NATO. They are protected by the 5 article of the North Atlantic Treaty, which ensures that an attack on one of the members of the alliance will be considered as an attack on all. Thus, the United States bears an unequivocal and undisputed responsibility for deterring and protecting the Baltic countries from attack. This is not an easy task, given their size, proximity to Russia and the presence of significant Russian-speaking minorities. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which the actions of either the United States or Russia will set in motion a chain of events that may end in that the American and Russian soldiers begin to kill each other. Currently, there is a lively discussion among Russian “hawks” about how Russian dominance in conventional armed forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Central and Eastern Europe can be used to gain Russia an advantage. Putin spoke publicly of his readiness to use nuclear weapons to repel any attempts to take the Crimea back, noting that he relied on Russia's nuclear arsenal during the Crimean operation. In the course of this discussion, many wonder: Will President Obama risk losing Chicago, New York and Washington for the sake of defending Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius? This is a painful question. If you want to either daze those sitting at a nearby table in a restaurant in Washington or Boston, or silence them, then ask your compatriots what they think about the following questions. If, acting quietly, the Russian Armed Forces take control of Estonia or Latvia, what should the United States do in this case? In such a situation, should the dispatch of Americans be fought for the survival of Estonia or Latvia?
Imagine, for example, the following sequence of events: the Russian uprising in Estonia or Latvia, either spontaneous or initiated by the Russian special services; tough response from weak local police and military forces; Putin’s call to Putin to respect the “Putin’s doctrine”, which includes the statement he made during the liberation of the Crimea that he would come to the defense of ethnic Russians, no matter where they were attacked; an attempt to play a hybrid war, tested against Ukraine; confrontation with a battalion of 600 soldiers of the US Armed Forces or NATO forces, which are currently rotating in the Baltic States. Some of the Russians went so far in their thoughts that they suggested that all this would be enough to provoke Moscow to use tactical nuclear weapons. For example, the Russian ambassador to Denmark recently threatened that Denmark’s participation in the NATO missile defense system would make it a target for Russian nuclear weapons. Moreover, Russia is exploring the possibility of deploying Iskander in Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave located between Lithuania and Poland, while intelligence from Sweden has publicly stated that it considers Russian intelligence operations to be a preparation for a “military operation against Sweden.”
In an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, fed from both sides by the ups and downs of domestic politics, assurances of good intentions are rarely enough. In his book The Lunatics, published in 2013, Professor Christopher Clark gives a convincing description of the days that preceded World War I, when both alliances scornfully rejected each other’s explanations and assurances. Of course, alliances are now Putin’s weakest point. Russia has no ally committed to supporting Moscow in the war. Nevertheless, one should be careful in hopes of isolating Moscow in a long-term confrontation with the West. One of the reasons why Kaiser Wilhelm II presented the ultimatum to Russia was because he did not believe that Britain would join Russia in the war because of the crisis in the Balkans, where London traditionally opposed Russian influence. In addition, few expected that France would offer strong resistance without the support of England. Those who are counting on isolating Russia today do not properly take into account the fact that the existence of a powerful and assertive alliance that is ready to pursue its own interests and promote its values inevitably stimulates the appearance of certain antibodies. It was the understanding of Germany’s intention to change the geopolitical balance in Europe and in the world that prompted Britain to abandon its age-old policy of being in “brilliant isolation” and become so involved in allied relations that, as it turned out, when the war began, she had no choice but to enter into her. The same understanding is driving China today in its efforts to expand ties with Russia during its conflict with the United States.
We consider it necessary to clarify: there is practically no chance that China will enter into an alliance with Russia against the United States and Europe in their confrontation over Ukraine. China is also not ready to help out Russia with finances or to risk its profitable economic integration with the West in order to support the revanchist ambitions of Moscow. But at the same time, Beijing cannot remain indifferent when it comes to a possible political, economic or (especially) military defeat of Russia by the Western alliance. Many in Beijing fear that if the United States and its allies manage to defeat Russia, in particular, to achieve a regime change in Moscow, then China may well become the next target. The fact that the Chinese leadership views this as a serious threat may eventually push Beijing closer to Moscow, which in turn could lead to a fundamental change in the global balance of power. In addition, you should think about what actions the Chinese could take, should the Russian-American war, against Taiwan, or to punish their neighbors, such as Japan or Vietnam, who, according to Beijing, are cooperating with Washington in order to contain China’s ambitions .
China and Russia are not the first in the history of the state to oppose a powerful and growing alliance. The United States is also not the first power in history to receive enthusiastic petitions from potential allies that, if satisfied, will add little to common resources and at the same time bind this power with obligations that make other countries unable to feel safe. Thucydides wrote the following in one of the immortal passages of his “History of the Peloponnesian War”, which tells about Athens’s response to Sparta’s concern: “We didn’t get this empire by force ... Our allies came to us of their own free will and begged to lead them.” Needless to say, Sparta did not find such an explanation encouraging, and this excuse did not prevent the thirty-year war, which ended in the defeat of Athens. However, the winner in this war had to pay a price that far exceeded any benefits from the victory. In order to recognize the potential catastrophic consequences of the war with Russia, it is not at all necessary to focus on how to respond to the challenge posed by a resurgent but wounded Russia.
The United States has a vital interest in maintaining its superpower reputation and in ensuring the survival and security of NATO, and therefore of each member of this alliance. In addition, in international politics, the appetite is growing rapidly among those who are allowed to feed on easy victories. The limited goals that the Russian president is currently pursuing in Ukraine may expand if Russia does not face serious resistance. After all, the smooth annexation of the Crimea led to a surge of triumphant reasoning in Moscow about the possibility of creating a new subject - Novorossia, which would include the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine and stretch to the Romanian border. The combination of local resistance, the readiness of the Ukrainian government to fight for its territory, and sanctions by the US and the EU quickly convinced the Russian leadership to abandon these thoughts. If a nation is ready to fight for its important interests, then a clear understanding of this readiness usually cools the ardor of a possible aggressor.
Nevertheless, the United States should be careful not to give the impression to allies and friends like Kiev that they have received a blank check on the confrontation with Moscow. During World War I, even such a staunch supporter of the war, like Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov, who was first the leader of Russia's constitutional democrats, and later became the foreign minister of the Provisional Government, was shocked at what tricks the British foreign secretary Sir Edward Gray was ready to take in order not to recognize even part of the blame for the outbreak of war for the Serbs. “Listen, the war has begun because of the complacency of the Serbs. Austria considered itself in danger. Serbia at least sought to destroy the country, ”he told Gray. However, according to Sir Gray, the ally simply could not do anything wrong. The Balkan crises that broke out a few years before the First World War deserve careful study. Few at that time could have imagined that they would become the spark that would ignite the hellish fire on the continent. But that is exactly what happened. Responding to a challenge from an angry but weakened Russia today requires a delicate combination of firmness and restraint. When it comes to the vital interests of the United States, we must be ready to fight, kill and die.
For effective deterrence, three things are required: a clear understanding by all, where our red lines are drawn, which cannot be crossed (for example, an attack on a NATO member), the ability to respond to the aggressor so that his losses outweigh all the expected benefits, and the conviction of our commitment to fulfill our obligations. At the same time, we should recognize that if American and Russian troops start firing at each other, this will violate one of the main restrictions that both sides have diligently adhered to during the four decades of the Cold War, and may lead to an escalation that will end in a war in which there will be no winners. Military force and economic warfare methods such as sanctions are indispensable tools of foreign policy. However, if you use the tools of coercion without a strategic vision and skillful diplomacy, then such an application can become an end in itself, starting to dictate its own logic of the development of events. President John F. Kennedy was able to resolve the confrontation with Moscow, which began because of the USSR’s attempt to deploy nuclear warheads in Cuba. Subsequently, Kennedy spent many hours reflecting on the lessons of the crisis he had passed, which, he then believed, could have ended in a nuclear war with a probability of one to three. The most important of these lessons Kennedy formulated for subsequent leaders of the United States as follows: "The nuclear powers, in defending their interests, must avoid situations in which the enemy will have to choose between humiliating retreat and nuclear war." The statesmen should apply this lesson when choosing ways to respond to the challenge that Russia's actions in Ukraine represent.
On the contrary, the world appears to be less and less accessible as the threats to the security and prosperity of the United States multiply both at the system level, where a number of dissatisfied states of affairs of major powers pose new challenges to the international order, and at the state and sub-state levels, where dissatisfied ethnic, tribal , religious and other groups destabilize key countries and even entire regions. The most dangerous are differences over the international system and the prerogatives of the major powers in the regions directly surrounding them. Historically, such disputes caused the greatest conflicts. These differences lie at the heart of the tensions between the United States and other Western countries with Russia, and also, more ominously, with China. Currently, the most urgent challenge is the current crisis in Ukraine. There you can hear the terrible echoes of the events that 100 years ago led to the catastrophe, known as the First World War. At the time of this writing, the ambiguous, narrow and inconsistently interpreted agreement “Minsk-2” was still in force, and we can hope that it will lead to further agreements that will prevent the return of “hot war”. But the war has already happened and, probably, will continue, reflecting deep contradictions that America will not be able to resolve if it does not take on them honestly and directly.
In the United States and Europe, many believe that securing Ukraine’s independence is the best way to prevent Russia from resuming it. historical imperial mission. Advocates of this view insist that the West should do whatever it takes to prevent the Kremlin's direct or indirect control over Ukraine. Otherwise, as it seems to them, Russia will again recreate the Soviet empire and will threaten all of Europe. In Russia, on the contrary, many argue that Russia is ready to recognize the sovereignty of Ukraine and its territorial integrity (with the exception of Crimea), but Moscow will require no less than any other great power would demand at its borders. Security on the western border of Russia requires a special relationship with Ukraine, as well as a certain degree of respect, the rendering of which is expected by major powers in their areas of influence. In particular, the Russian establishment believes that a country can never be safe if Ukraine joins NATO or becomes part of a hostile Euro-Atlantic community. From the point of view of representatives of this establishment, the Russian demand for a neutral status of Ukraine is not subject to discussion, at least as long as Russia is able to defend the interests of its national security.When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia was on its knees, becoming dependent on Western aid. At that moment, the country was absorbed in its own internal concerns. Given this context, it is not surprising that Western leaders have become used to ignoring the opinion of Russia over the years. But since he came to power in 1999, Vladimir Putin once again led Russia along the path of realizing himself as a great power. Encouraged by the growth in oil production and the price of black gold, which doubled Russia's GDP during Putin’s fifteen-year reign, Russians are increasingly rejecting this attitude from the West. It would not hurt the Americans to recall the sequence of events that led to Japan’s attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor and America’s entry into World War II. In 1941, the United States imposed an almost total oil embargo on Japan to punish it for its aggression on the Asian mainland. Unfortunately, Washington greatly underestimated the reaction of Japan to these actions. As one of the wise men of the post-war period, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, later noted, the US government made a mistake not in predicting the actions of the Japanese in Asia or in the hostility that the American embargo would cause in Japan, but in anticipating what incredible risks General Tojo would take to achieve his goals . Nobody in Washington understood that Tojo and his regime viewed the conquest of Asia not as a realization of certain ambitions, but as a necessary condition for the survival of the regime. For the Japanese, it was a matter of life and death.
Just a few days before Pearl Harbor, Japan’s special envoy Saburo Kurusu said in Washington: “The Japanese people believe that economic measures are much more effective weapons war than military measures; that ... they are extremely pressured by the United States to succumb to American demands; and that fighting is preferable to them than giving in to pressure. ” Despite this warning, Japan’s reaction to the economic war from the United States took America by surprise, killing 2500 people and drowning a large part of the Pacific fleet USA. The study of forecasts of the consequences of the adoption of certain options of important foreign policy moves by recent US administrations should be a bright warning light. The Clinton administration first misinterpreted the long and bloody civil war in Yugoslavia, and then imposed its shaky solution to the participants in this conflict, simultaneously angering Russia and China. At the time of the decision to invade Iraq and change the regime of Saddam Hussein to the democratically elected, George W. Bush considered how he himself said that his actions “will serve as a powerful example of liberty and freedom in that part of the world that desperately needs liberty and freedom” . Bush Jr. and his team adhered to this belief, despite numerous warnings that the war would result in Iraq’s fragmentation by tribal and religious grounds, that Shiites would dominate any elected government in Baghdad and that Shiite Iran would benefit most from weakening Iraq . The Obama administration then joined the United Kingdom and France in a major air campaign in Libya in order to remove Muammar al-Gaddafi. The ensuing chaos played a role in the assassination of the US ambassador and other American diplomats, as well as in turning Libya into a haven of Islamic extremists, threatening Libya’s neighbors and America far more than the Gaddafi regime. At the start of the Syrian civil war, the Obama administration demanded the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, although he never posed a direct threat to America. Neither the Obama administration nor members of Congress took seriously the predictions that it was Islamic extremists, and not moderate fractions, that would dominate the forces of the Syrian opposition, and that Assad would not be easy to dismiss.
Can the US reaction to the actions of Russia in Ukraine provoke a confrontation that will lead to the US-Russian war? This development seems almost unbelievable. However, whenever we judge whether something is “unthinkable” or not, we should remember that such judgments are based not on what can really happen in this world, but on what kind of events we can imagine and which is not. As the cases with Iraq, Libya and Syria have shown, political leaders find it difficult to foresee the development of events if the latter seem to them uncomfortable, disturbing, or inconvenient. The overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Gaddafi had only a limited direct effect on most Americans. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that most politicians and analysts in Washington believe that by challenging Russia in Ukraine and seeking to isolate Moscow at the international level, as well as to cause economic damage, the United States will not incur significant costs, not to mention any real threats. America itself. After all, the most popular refrain in Washington, when it comes to Russia, is the statement that "Russia no longer matters." No one in the American capital is more pleased to try to humiliate Putin than to US President Barack Obama, who has repeatedly included Russia on his list of current disasters along with the Islamic State and Ebola. And there can be no doubt that, being a so-called oil state, dependent on the extraction and sale of black gold, Russia is economically vulnerable and has very few true allies, if any. In addition, many representatives of Russian business and intellectual elites would have responded to Putin’s departure from office with the same enthusiasm as the Washington Post editorial board does. After all, the Ukrainians, who held the same views on Viktor Yanukovych, succeeded in overthrowing him from the post of the President of Ukraine, which means, as it is stated, Putin may also be vulnerable.
Although most politicians and commentators reject the possibility of the Russian-American war, the current course of events causes more concern than ever since the end of the Cold War. We assert this based on the experience of our observations of the Soviet and Russian events throughout the Cold War, as well as the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Our statements are also based on the impressions of one of us, received during a recent weekly stay in Moscow, during which frank conversations took place with representatives of the Putin government, including influential Russian officials, as well as with people close to this government. Another co-author of this article visited China, having the opportunity to get acquainted with the view from Beijing. Our assessment is based on these conversations, as well as on conversations with other public and private sources. There are three key factors that should be considered when considering whether the current conflict can escalate into a war or not: decision-making in Russia, Russian policy and the US-Russian dynamic.
As for decision-making in Russia, Putin is recognized inside and outside Russia as a person who makes decisions alone. All available data show that he relies on a very narrow circle of advisers and not one of them is ready to challenge his assumptions. Such a format is unlikely to help Putin make informed decisions that fully take into account the real costs and benefits. In addition, the political situation in Russia, both at the elite level and at the public level, encourages Putin to escalate demands, not concessions. At the elite level, the Russian establishment is divided into two camps: a pragmatist camp, which currently dominates mainly due to the support of Putin, and a hard-line camp. The Russian public mainly supports hardliners, whom one of Putin’s advisors called “hotheads.” Given the current realities of Russian politics, one can say that Russia's revanchist policy would be more aggressive if not for Putin. Speaking directly, Putin is not the most zealous hardliner in Russia.
None of the “hotheads” criticizes Putin, even in private conversations. But at the same time, the number of employees in the military and national security departments of Russia is growing, professing a much tighter approach to the United States and Europe on the issue of Ukraine. This is evident from the attacks on such relatively moderate members of the government as Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. From the point of view of these employees, supporters of the moderate line do not understand the seriousness of the American-European challenge to Russia and in vain hope that things can change for the better without Russia's surrender in the face of an unacceptable and derogatory foreign dictate. They recommend moving the game to the area where Russia is strong, using military force to advance Russian interests, as Putin did in the Crimea, and put pressure on the West to accept Moscow on its own terms. The more nationalistic Russian public also supports this approach, which boils down to "challenging the main enemy." This approach is consonant with the rhetoric of the former Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is his views that inspire the adherents of this approach. Putin undoubtedly contributes to the growth of nationalist sentiment through his patriotic rhetoric and harsh judgments about the West. But his rhetoric easily found wide support in Russia because of widespread disappointment at the fact that the West regarded Russia as the side that lost the cold war, and not as an ally in building a new world order. Moreover, ordinary Russians may have gone even further than Putin in his belligerent views. Not so long ago, the Russian mass media received a wide coverage of the warning voiced by the recently fired rebel commander Igor Strelkov. Strelkov said that, being too indecisive, Putin risks not satisfying anyone's aspirations and can be apprehended by the same fate as Slobodan Milosevic, namely, both liberals and nationalists will reject him. Since then, however, Strelkov hung a portrait of Putin in an important place in his office. He reportedly explained this by saying that, in his opinion, the Russian president "understood that all this compromise with the West was fruitless," and that the Russian president "was restoring Russian sovereignty." Strelkov is often exaggerated, but his views reflect the frustrations of Russia's influential nationalist coalition.
Among the supporters to play with the muscles more and more military personnel and civilians who believe: Russia could shake its nuclear weapons for better effect. They believe that Russia's nuclear arsenal is not only the main shield protecting the country, but also a sword that could be taken out of its scabbard in order to force those who do not have nuclear weapons, as well as those who are not ready to think about unthinkable, namely the actual use of nuclear weapons. Putin seems to have supported this view of nuclear weapons in his controversial speech in Sochi last September. In particular, he said: “There were such bright political figures as Nikita Khrushchev, who was pounding with the boot of the UN. And everyone in the world, above all in the United States, at NATO, thought: yes, well, in FIG, this Nikita and others like him, they will take the dolbanut, they have full missiles - it is better to treat them with respect. The Soviet Union did not become, what situation arose and what temptations: but you can not reckon with Russia, it is very dependent, underwent a transformation during the collapse of the Soviet Union, we will do what we want, without regard to any rules at all. ” Director of the Russia Today Information Agency, Dmitry Kiselev, spoke out even more frankly, repeatedly warning that "Russia is the only country in the world that can really turn the United States into radioactive ash."
The Russian Military Doctrine of 2014 emphasizes that Russia will use nuclear weapons not only in response to nuclear strikes, but also in the “case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons.” And in a recent report by the European Leadership Network, it is noted that almost 40 incidents happened last year, during which the actions of the Russian Armed Forces were so provocative that if they continued, the consequences could be “catastrophic.”
Although this may seem illogical, but the weakening of the Russian economy is also unlikely to set the Russian public on concessions. On the contrary, damage to Russia's already stagnating economy, suffering from low energy prices, will in fact make Putin’s foreign policy less flexible. The president of Russia needs to be shown that his country suffered for good reason. The retreat can seriously damage Putin’s carefully cultivated image as a strong personality, and it is such a leader that Russians historically value, and lead to a loss of support among the super-nationalist-minded public that makes up his political base. They are outraged by the sanctions, which, as they see, harm ordinary people much more than Putin’s entourage, and they want their leaders to resist, not capitulate. In the eyes of many of them, Russia's national dignity is at stake. All this was clearly expressed in a recent conversation with a senior Russian official. When asked why his government would not try to negotiate a deal based on the principles that had already been formulated (for example, the exchange of Russian guarantees of Ukraine’s territorial integrity with the exception of Crimea and Ukraine’s right to move towards the European Union to Western guarantees that Ukraine would not joining NATO, as well as the fact that the United States and the European Union would weaken the sanctions), he said: “We have pride and we cannot allow the impression that we are putting pressure on the rebels m, so that the sanctions were relaxed. "
Putin also tried to hide the scale of Russia's intervention in order to drag out time and play on the contradictions between the US and Europe, as well as on intra-European contradictions. For the time being, pragmatists are winning, not least because Putin has kept his team almost untouched in the government and in the presidential administration. Being loyal to Putin and ready to follow his instructions, this team consists mainly of officials, whose development took place at the time of establishing economic interdependence between Russia and the West and Russia's attempts to get a decisive vote in the world order, mainly formed by the United States and its allies. Foreign Minister Lavrov and those who support his more pragmatic approach argue that Russia will be able to do business with the United States and especially with Europeans until it closes the door. And the “hot heads” adhere to the opposite point of view, stating that the West will view any moderation in Russian politics as a sign of weakness. Representing themselves as realists, they say: NATO intends to overthrow Putin, bring Russia to its knees, and perhaps even dismember the country.
“Many are wondering if President Obama will risk losing Chicago, New York and Washington to protect Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius.”
Putin’s unwillingness to change the course sharply explains his hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, in which he helps the separatists without Russia officially entering the conflict. This reluctance also lies at the basis of unconvincing refutations of military support for the separatists from Russia, which at the same time turns Moscow into a subject of valid criticism and gives rise to unfounded hopes in Washington and European capitals that Russia will not be able to accept more numerous losses of its citizens in the war because that she claims not to be involved in this war. Yet Putin’s attempts to follow the common goals of pragmatists, while simultaneously taking into account the position of “hotheads” in Ukraine, cannot continue indefinitely. Among Putin’s advisors, the prevailing view is that the hope of restoring cooperation with the West is hopeless, because the United States and Western leaders will not accept any solution that meets Russia's minimum requirements. They are ready to urge Russia to swallow their pride and reconcile if the United States and the European Union lift a significant part of the sanctions and everything returns to normal. But if Russia continues to punish, expelling it from the financial markets and denying Western technologies to it, then, in their opinion, Russia should go its own, independent way. For Putin, the decisive moment has not yet come when he will be required to make a fateful choice between concessions to the requirements of the West and more direct involvement in the conflict, possibly accompanied by the use of force against Western interests outside Ukraine. And if this moment comes, it may well be that his choice will not please us.
In addition to sanctions, two more factors may emerge that will force Putin to force things. One of them is the prospect of a military defeat of the separatists. The second is Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In an interview with ARD Germany 17 on November 2014, Putin drew a bright red line, excluding the possibility that Russia would put up with the defeat of the separatists. In this interview, he asked a rhetorical question: Does NATO want "the central authorities of Ukraine to destroy everyone there, all their political opponents and opponents" in Eastern Ukraine. If so, then "we do not want and will not allow," Putin stated categorically. Every time the Ukrainian military seemed to be close to gaining the upper hand in the struggle, Putin raised his stakes to ensure the success of the separatists on the battlefield, despite American and European warnings and sanctions. Although the Russian president spoke less of the second red line, there can be no doubt that the potential membership of Ukraine in NATO is a matter of the greatest concern for the Russians. One of the important reasons why Moscow is not opposed to the return of Donetsk and Lugansk under the control of the central Ukrainian authorities on conditions of considerable autonomy is the Kremlin’s desire to give the pro-Russian population of Eastern Ukraine the opportunity to vote in the general Ukrainian elections, as well as in the elections of autonomous local governments so that they were able to slow down the promotion of the country in NATO. The political mainstream of Russia overwhelmingly opposes the emergence of a hostile Ukraine under the NATO security umbrella less than 400 miles from Moscow.
This feeling is based both on the desire to ensure the security of Russia, and on almost uncontrollable feelings towards Ukraine and its Russian-speaking population. The growing popularity of the slogan “Russia is not abandoning its own” reflects these feelings and brings back memories of Russia’s pan-Slavic relations with Serbia on the eve of the First World War. One of us saw a vivid example of these emotions while watching a talk show devoted to Ukraine, which was broadcast live on one of the Russian channels. A discussion participant declared to the thunder of applause: "Our cause is just and we will win." It is important to note that Vyacheslav Nikonov, who said these words, is not only a member of the pro-Putin United Russia party and the chairman of the State Duma Education Committee. He is also the grandson of former Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, who spoke these very words after Hitler attacked the USSR in 1941 year. Nikonov is known for reflecting the point of view of the Russian establishment. Something similar was observed at the beginning of the 19th century in Russia by a French diplomat and conservative philosopher Joseph de Maistre. “No one is able to desire anything so passionately as Russian. If we were able to lock the Russian desire into a fortress, then this fortress would soon have exploded, ”said this native of Savoy. Russian nationalism today is just such an explosive force. It does not require a particularly rich imagination to imagine what could provoke a change in Putin's position. The most immediate trigger for such a change would be the US decision to arm the Ukrainian military. Who knows, maybe in the Putin government there are, in fact, those who are trying to gradually push the United States to take such a decision? Although this seems far-fetched at first glance, yet another of our Russian interlocutors argued quite reasonably that this is precisely the plan of some of Putin’s entourage, and they may act with the consent of the Russian leader. According to this theory, this trick has both tactical and strategic rationale.
Obama’s tactical statement that the United States is sending weapons to Ukraine will allow Putin to easily get out of a situation in which it’s harder and harder for him to deny the obvious. Putin and his government unequivocally and repeatedly assured their fellow citizens: Russia is not a party to the conflict, despite the fact that pro-Russian government politicians and separatist leaders praise Moscow for help on television. Even after a Malaysian airliner was shot down in July last year and almost three hundred people died, despite the fact that Western countries made public all new facts, Putin did not back down from these assurances.If Washington makes a statement that it will arm Ukraine, then Putin is allegedly using this as an argument in favor of the correctness of his version of events. Putin claims that the United States first organized a coup on the Maidan, which led to the removal of the democratically elected President Yanukovych from power, and now support the war of the current government in Kiev against his Russian compatriots in eastern Ukraine. Thus, according to this logic, the open supply of American arms to Ukraine will break the cover from the secret actions of the United States and will serve as an excuse for Russia's response, which will consist in sending weapons or even troops, which in turn will initiate an escalation game in which Putin will be able to take advantage of his positions. If we use chess terminology, then strategically this situation would represent a trap. Transferring the competition from an economic chessboard (on which the United States and Europe have strong pieces) to a military one, Putin would have moved from a weak position to a strong one. In the military sphere, Putin controls the commanding heights. It is unlikely that the United States will provide Kiev with such weapons, to whose deliveries Russia will not be able to respond with supplies either equal in capabilities or superior weapon systems. Putin can deliver weapons by taking road, rail, sea, and air routes across the porous border with Ukraine, while the United States is on another continent. Russia has hundreds or even thousands of agents and employees in the ranks of the armed forces of Ukraine. And most importantly, Putin has already demonstrated that the Russian military is ready not only to advise the separatists, but also to fight side by side with them, killing and dying. Putin believes that the United States will never send American soldiers to Ukraine. In the camp, hard-liners believe: the more intelligible Putin can bring all this to the Europeans, the more respect he can achieve.
Hardliners see this as the best chance for Putin to snatch what they call a strategic victory, right from the mouth of defeat. In their opinion, Russia's comparative advantage in relations with Europe and the United States is based not on the economy, but on deployed military power. Europeans essentially disarmed themselves and show little desire to fight. Americans, of course, have the most powerful military machine on the planet and are often ready to fight. But even winning all the battles, they seem unable to win the war, as it was in Vietnam and Iraq. “Hotheads” hope that Russia will teach Europeans and Americans some harsh truths. A professionally conducted operation in the Crimea, as a result of which it was annexed with practically no shot, was only the first step. Russian hawks believe that the deeper the United States gets bogged down in Ukraine, and the more visible the US commitment to achieving such unattainable goals as the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the better. On the battlefield in Ukraine, Russia has what the Cold War strategists called escalation dominance, allowing it to prevail at each of the escalation stages. The United States will not win this mediated war, and Russia will not lose it. Is that America itself will enter the war.
The target audience of all this drama, of course, is Europe. Russia hopes that in the minds of postmodern Europeans it will be asserted that neither the European members of NATO, nor the United States will be able to save Ukraine. In accordance with this logic, as soon as this awareness comes, a skillful combination of intimidation and encouraging hints should allow Russia to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, thereby ensuring the easing of the most burdensome sanctions and access to European financial markets. Initially, Putin will try to take advantage of the expiration of the EU sanctions, expected in July. If this fails and the European Union joins the United States to introduce additional economic sanctions such as excluding Russia from the SWIFT financial clearing system, then Putin will be tempted not to back down, but to put an end to any cooperation with the West. Russian mobilization against a new, “apocalyptic” threat to Mother Russia. In a conversation with us, one of the leading Russian politicians said: “We stood alone against Napoleon and against Hitler. It was our victories over the aggressors, not our diplomacy, that led to the split of the coalitions of the enemy and provided us with new allies. ”
If the situation gets exactly this kind of development, then Putin will most likely change his team and the direction of his foreign policy. As the high-ranking official said: “The president appreciates loyalty and consistency, so it can be difficult for him to part with people and fundamentally change politics. But he is a resolute man, and if he has already made a decision, he does everything possible to achieve a result. ” This means that the Russian leadership will pursue a much more militant policy on all those issues that are driven by the interpretation of events as a western campaign aimed at weakening the regime or even the collapse of the country. Among other things, this is likely to lead to the end of cooperation on projects such as the International Space Station, the supply of strategic metals, including titanium, the resolution of the problem of Iran’s nuclear program and the stabilization of Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, it will be possible to expect not only pressure on the states of Central Asia to curtail their cooperation with the United States in the field of security, but also games on political differences in the ruling Afghan coalition to support the remnants of the Northern Alliance.
As soon as relations between the United States and Russia enter a phase of hot confrontation, high-ranking officers will inevitably begin to play a large role on both sides of the confrontation. On the eve of World War I, the world witnessed how, facing a security dilemma, one of the parties began to undertake what it considered to be reasonable precautions, but these measures are perceived by the opposite side as evidence of aggression being prepared against it. As Clausewitz wrote, the inexorable logic pushes each side to a re-emerging "competition that implies an aspiration for extremes in its very concept." Commanders are forced to think of opportunities, not intentions. This pushes them to steps that, while being sensible from a tactical point of view, can be misinterpreted at the strategic level. And the leaders of the countries, and their military advisers are likely to also make miscalculations. Before World War I, Kaiser Wilhelm II did not believe that Russia would dare to enter a new war, because the defeat inflicted on her by Japan less than ten years earlier showed the inconsistency of the Russian army. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov assured the tsar that Russia was ready for battle and that Germany had already decided to attack. In the 1912 year, Sukhomlinov said: “War is inevitable, and it is beneficial for us that it start earlier, and not later ... His Majesty and I believe in the army and believe that war will bring us only benefits.” At the same time, in Berlin, the German General Staff insisted on quick action, fearing the imminent completion of the construction of a new network of railway lines that would allow Tsar Nicholas II to quickly transfer Russian divisions to the border with Germany. The murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand exacerbated the crisis, and the commanders in both Russia and Germany rushed to race to mobilize. At that moment, the Russian General Staff assured Nicholas II that only immediate and full-scale mobilization could prevent a short-term defeat, if not Russia itself, then at least France, whose long-term support is necessary for Russia in order to withstand the German attack.
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania form the Achilles heel of NATO. They are protected by the 5 article of the North Atlantic Treaty, which ensures that an attack on one of the members of the alliance will be considered as an attack on all. Thus, the United States bears an unequivocal and undisputed responsibility for deterring and protecting the Baltic countries from attack. This is not an easy task, given their size, proximity to Russia and the presence of significant Russian-speaking minorities. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which the actions of either the United States or Russia will set in motion a chain of events that may end in that the American and Russian soldiers begin to kill each other. Currently, there is a lively discussion among Russian “hawks” about how Russian dominance in conventional armed forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Central and Eastern Europe can be used to gain Russia an advantage. Putin spoke publicly of his readiness to use nuclear weapons to repel any attempts to take the Crimea back, noting that he relied on Russia's nuclear arsenal during the Crimean operation. In the course of this discussion, many wonder: Will President Obama risk losing Chicago, New York and Washington for the sake of defending Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius? This is a painful question. If you want to either daze those sitting at a nearby table in a restaurant in Washington or Boston, or silence them, then ask your compatriots what they think about the following questions. If, acting quietly, the Russian Armed Forces take control of Estonia or Latvia, what should the United States do in this case? In such a situation, should the dispatch of Americans be fought for the survival of Estonia or Latvia?
Imagine, for example, the following sequence of events: the Russian uprising in Estonia or Latvia, either spontaneous or initiated by the Russian special services; tough response from weak local police and military forces; Putin’s call to Putin to respect the “Putin’s doctrine”, which includes the statement he made during the liberation of the Crimea that he would come to the defense of ethnic Russians, no matter where they were attacked; an attempt to play a hybrid war, tested against Ukraine; confrontation with a battalion of 600 soldiers of the US Armed Forces or NATO forces, which are currently rotating in the Baltic States. Some of the Russians went so far in their thoughts that they suggested that all this would be enough to provoke Moscow to use tactical nuclear weapons. For example, the Russian ambassador to Denmark recently threatened that Denmark’s participation in the NATO missile defense system would make it a target for Russian nuclear weapons. Moreover, Russia is exploring the possibility of deploying Iskander in Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave located between Lithuania and Poland, while intelligence from Sweden has publicly stated that it considers Russian intelligence operations to be a preparation for a “military operation against Sweden.”
In an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, fed from both sides by the ups and downs of domestic politics, assurances of good intentions are rarely enough. In his book The Lunatics, published in 2013, Professor Christopher Clark gives a convincing description of the days that preceded World War I, when both alliances scornfully rejected each other’s explanations and assurances. Of course, alliances are now Putin’s weakest point. Russia has no ally committed to supporting Moscow in the war. Nevertheless, one should be careful in hopes of isolating Moscow in a long-term confrontation with the West. One of the reasons why Kaiser Wilhelm II presented the ultimatum to Russia was because he did not believe that Britain would join Russia in the war because of the crisis in the Balkans, where London traditionally opposed Russian influence. In addition, few expected that France would offer strong resistance without the support of England. Those who are counting on isolating Russia today do not properly take into account the fact that the existence of a powerful and assertive alliance that is ready to pursue its own interests and promote its values inevitably stimulates the appearance of certain antibodies. It was the understanding of Germany’s intention to change the geopolitical balance in Europe and in the world that prompted Britain to abandon its age-old policy of being in “brilliant isolation” and become so involved in allied relations that, as it turned out, when the war began, she had no choice but to enter into her. The same understanding is driving China today in its efforts to expand ties with Russia during its conflict with the United States.
We consider it necessary to clarify: there is practically no chance that China will enter into an alliance with Russia against the United States and Europe in their confrontation over Ukraine. China is also not ready to help out Russia with finances or to risk its profitable economic integration with the West in order to support the revanchist ambitions of Moscow. But at the same time, Beijing cannot remain indifferent when it comes to a possible political, economic or (especially) military defeat of Russia by the Western alliance. Many in Beijing fear that if the United States and its allies manage to defeat Russia, in particular, to achieve a regime change in Moscow, then China may well become the next target. The fact that the Chinese leadership views this as a serious threat may eventually push Beijing closer to Moscow, which in turn could lead to a fundamental change in the global balance of power. In addition, you should think about what actions the Chinese could take, should the Russian-American war, against Taiwan, or to punish their neighbors, such as Japan or Vietnam, who, according to Beijing, are cooperating with Washington in order to contain China’s ambitions .
China and Russia are not the first in the history of the state to oppose a powerful and growing alliance. The United States is also not the first power in history to receive enthusiastic petitions from potential allies that, if satisfied, will add little to common resources and at the same time bind this power with obligations that make other countries unable to feel safe. Thucydides wrote the following in one of the immortal passages of his “History of the Peloponnesian War”, which tells about Athens’s response to Sparta’s concern: “We didn’t get this empire by force ... Our allies came to us of their own free will and begged to lead them.” Needless to say, Sparta did not find such an explanation encouraging, and this excuse did not prevent the thirty-year war, which ended in the defeat of Athens. However, the winner in this war had to pay a price that far exceeded any benefits from the victory. In order to recognize the potential catastrophic consequences of the war with Russia, it is not at all necessary to focus on how to respond to the challenge posed by a resurgent but wounded Russia.
The United States has a vital interest in maintaining its superpower reputation and in ensuring the survival and security of NATO, and therefore of each member of this alliance. In addition, in international politics, the appetite is growing rapidly among those who are allowed to feed on easy victories. The limited goals that the Russian president is currently pursuing in Ukraine may expand if Russia does not face serious resistance. After all, the smooth annexation of the Crimea led to a surge of triumphant reasoning in Moscow about the possibility of creating a new subject - Novorossia, which would include the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine and stretch to the Romanian border. The combination of local resistance, the readiness of the Ukrainian government to fight for its territory, and sanctions by the US and the EU quickly convinced the Russian leadership to abandon these thoughts. If a nation is ready to fight for its important interests, then a clear understanding of this readiness usually cools the ardor of a possible aggressor.
Nevertheless, the United States should be careful not to give the impression to allies and friends like Kiev that they have received a blank check on the confrontation with Moscow. During World War I, even such a staunch supporter of the war, like Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov, who was first the leader of Russia's constitutional democrats, and later became the foreign minister of the Provisional Government, was shocked at what tricks the British foreign secretary Sir Edward Gray was ready to take in order not to recognize even part of the blame for the outbreak of war for the Serbs. “Listen, the war has begun because of the complacency of the Serbs. Austria considered itself in danger. Serbia at least sought to destroy the country, ”he told Gray. However, according to Sir Gray, the ally simply could not do anything wrong. The Balkan crises that broke out a few years before the First World War deserve careful study. Few at that time could have imagined that they would become the spark that would ignite the hellish fire on the continent. But that is exactly what happened. Responding to a challenge from an angry but weakened Russia today requires a delicate combination of firmness and restraint. When it comes to the vital interests of the United States, we must be ready to fight, kill and die.
For effective deterrence, three things are required: a clear understanding by all, where our red lines are drawn, which cannot be crossed (for example, an attack on a NATO member), the ability to respond to the aggressor so that his losses outweigh all the expected benefits, and the conviction of our commitment to fulfill our obligations. At the same time, we should recognize that if American and Russian troops start firing at each other, this will violate one of the main restrictions that both sides have diligently adhered to during the four decades of the Cold War, and may lead to an escalation that will end in a war in which there will be no winners. Military force and economic warfare methods such as sanctions are indispensable tools of foreign policy. However, if you use the tools of coercion without a strategic vision and skillful diplomacy, then such an application can become an end in itself, starting to dictate its own logic of the development of events. President John F. Kennedy was able to resolve the confrontation with Moscow, which began because of the USSR’s attempt to deploy nuclear warheads in Cuba. Subsequently, Kennedy spent many hours reflecting on the lessons of the crisis he had passed, which, he then believed, could have ended in a nuclear war with a probability of one to three. The most important of these lessons Kennedy formulated for subsequent leaders of the United States as follows: "The nuclear powers, in defending their interests, must avoid situations in which the enemy will have to choose between humiliating retreat and nuclear war." The statesmen should apply this lesson when choosing ways to respond to the challenge that Russia's actions in Ukraine represent.
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