Rostislav Ischenko: Surprise and Shelling
State policy, its strategic plans are always lined up on the basis of forecasts. Without this, harmonious full-fledged work of the state mechanism is simply impossible. When drawing up any plan, even a household plan, a person relies on some kind of reality, seeks to achieve a certain goal, tries to envisage and sensibly evaluate the possibilities and risks on the way to achieving it, arranging the sequence of his actions accordingly. Moreover, an assessment of the prospects for the development of the situation is necessary in the course of foreign policy planning.
In the international arena, the state always faces various kinds of opposition, the possibilities of short-term and long-term alliances, options for their own actions and actions of opponents. All this is necessary, if possible, to foresee, evaluate, and develop an action plan that would simultaneously achieve the set objective and be flexible enough for operational adjustment, in accordance with changing tactical circumstances, but without prejudice to the strategic goal.
Strategic goals are based on projections based on confirmed facts and not allowing double-digit interpretation. For example, it was not difficult long before the fact itself to predict that either Ukrainian nationalists would abandon the idea of building a state titular nation (requiring the creation of this nation) and cave Russophobia directed against tens of millions of Russians and Russian-cultural ones (the same Russians, but with a Ukrainian record in passport) of the citizens of Ukraine, or the country will sooner or later be covered by a civil war. In the same way, without any problems, it could be argued that either Yanukovych would drive out the Maidan, or Maidan would sweep away Yanukovych.
And now you do not have to be an outstanding specialist to state: either Russia will win the USA in Ukraine and further everywhere, or the USA, having defeated Russia in Ukraine, will arrange on its territory that the terror of the Kiev Nazi government and the horrors of the civil war in Ukraine will seem like innocent childish pranks.
But an attempt to concretize these predictions takes us into the area of tactical variations. For example, a civil war, which was discussed in the first case, could have broken out even during the coup of 2004 — 2005. Could in 2007 year, when Yushchenko during the next coup d'etat tried to throw internal troops on Kiev. Could and at any other time. But began in February-March 2014 of the year.
During the three months of confrontation, Yanukovych repeatedly had the opportunity to sweep away the Maidan, and the Maidan could theoretically crush Yanukovych earlier (traitors and saboteurs inside the power team were more than enough to completely drain the situation at any time).
Finally, it is already clear to everyone that the conflict in Ukraine will not be resolved without large-scale hostilities and a forceful displacement of the Kiev regime (in the form of a Russian victory), or suppression of the people's republics (in the version of the American victory). But even the most self-confident "Nostradamuses", each beginning opus, say: "As I had predicted before the coronation of the sovereign-emperor Nikolai Aleksandrovich," they do not undertake to determine the exact date of the beginning of the war.
And in principle, this is correct. Determining the exact date depends on a huge number of factors that are unknown to us, and in the entire totality are unknown even to the main players. Washington doesn’t know exactly what Moscow is going to play, and Moscow is not aware of Washington’s exact tactical intentions. Available data may be interpreted differently. For example, the transfer to Eastern Europe and Ukraine of several units of the US Army can be assessed as preparation for Washington’s open accession to the conflict, as an attempt to provoke Russia into a preemptive strike (until the enemy created an attack fist), but as a means of pressure on those who do not break. with Russia (and necessary) limitrofov and Kiev Nazis.
In fact, the active phase of the civil war could resume in April, may begin in May, maybe in June, and maybe later. Yes, the most likely corridor is the second half of May (even somewhere starting with the number of 12), since this corridor meets most of the conditions that satisfy the goals of both the United States and Russia. But, since we don’t know by what specific considerations the organizers of the next war in Donbass will be guided, a higher probability and a lower probability are a subjective assessment of a particular expert, made on the basis of personal experience, general knowledge, assessment of available information (including possible disinformation) and the masses other factors that can not be correctly interpreted in the framework of a strict logical construction. In fact, here we are dealing with intuition.
But what is intuition?
For example, intuition tells me that Prince Harry of Wales, the second son of Prince of Wales Charles and the late Diane Francis Spencer, may become the last king of Great Britain. Not the last in the Windsor dynasty, and the last in general. Why is this captain of the British Air Force - the fifth in line for the throne, which today has almost no chance that its turn will ever come?
Because Harry is clearly ambitious. He no doubt has serious political plans. One of his Afghan epic was a double blow aimed at increasing its positive recognition in society and credibility in the armed forces. Already half-forgotten scandals with his "childish pranks" in his time in the press, indicate that he is no stranger to radicalism, is not afraid to break the law and is close to right-wing views (even the far-right ones).
If the global system had not entered a systemic crisis, but continued to exist in 90's “warm bath” mode, Harry would have been an ordinary enfant terrible without any political prospects. But since the mechanisms of traditional democracy do not provide more interests of the ruling class, and the British monarch in fact has almost no limited (or rather limited only traditions that can be changed) power, for Albion it would be completely in his traditional political style to completely change the system, retaining everything external attributes, and the royal dictatorship is no worse than the dictatorship of the pastry chef. On the contrary, it is much better, the king, in the opinion of the people, is the natural ruler, and the pastry chef is a pitiful upstart.
Harry's dad - Charles, Prince of Wales - a stubborn man in everyday life, but generally weak character, also very old. At his age, if he manages to wait for the throne, he does not make any sudden movements. The family of Brother William is a classic Western European royal family of the “warm bath” era. They can represent, donate and symbolize family values, whatever, just not manage.
Finally, there is a serious political lobby behind Harry. Before our eyes, the attitude to the prince of society and the press was reformatted, and even his business trip to Afghanistan was organized in defiance of the Queen’s academic resistance. Meanwhile, Elizabeth II - the grandmother is extremely stubborn. Her stubbornness is enough for all Windsor (living and dead) combined. And this grandmother is not obliged to anyone to give an account of their actions, and also has the legal right to direct the lives of all members of the royal family. In order to send the boy to Afghanistan against the will of such a grandmother, arguments were needed, whose strength was not in persuasiveness, but in the political weight of the one (those) who gave these arguments.
In general, the boy is led and trained, and where can the royal son be led if not to power? Since his chances to legally take the throne, as mentioned above, tend to zero, relatives can be asked to give him a seat no less convincingly than they asked his grandmother to send him to Afghanistan. How fast? It depends on how long a grandmother lives and how fast a systemic crisis will develop.
Why, the last king? Because dictatorship (and the occupation of the British throne by Prince Harry is possible only if the dictatorship of the monarch is established and through an actual coup d’état, even if formally legalized), can slow down the agony of the system, but cannot abolish the collapse, regardless of happening or in the uk.
Well, for a snack for lovers of characters. If, as expected, after the death of his uncle Prince Andrew, Prince Harry will receive the title of Duke of York, then we have some kind of Richard III looming. It is a pity Shakespeare died long ago.
All this long lyrical digression was necessary for me with only one purpose - to show on what a shaky foundation are made predictions based on intuition, and how easy it is to draw a convincing conspiracy theory simply by interpreting well-known facts, building them into a logical scheme, which is not at all must necessarily correspond to reality.
Well, and having dealt with the weakness of the base of intuitive forecasts, let’s still try to figure out what the parties ’calculations can be based on, which will determine the moment of the resumption of full-scale military operations in the Donbas.
From the point of view of Russia's interests, in principle, the situation is quite transparent - time plays to Moscow, opponents in zugzwang, and if it was a question of a chess game or computer strategy, one could sit for an infinitely long time and wait for the opponent to rush first. However, we are dealing with living people. And people tend to get tired, disappointed, lose confidence, especially when they don’t understand what is happening. Do they not understand? Most people (not only Russian citizens, but the planet’s population) think in a straightforward and straightforward way: either “send Tanks", Or" this does not concern us. " Russian society has already experienced both of these stages, and more than once. “It doesn’t concern us” was a week from the moment of the overthrow of Yanukovych to the moment when “it became clear that Putin decided to take the Crimea”. After that, there was a short stage of “urgently sending tanks”. When it became clear that no one would send tanks to mainland Ukraine, “we saved all the Russians, the Russians lived only in Crimea, only they rebelled, and the rest didn’t concern us.” After the tragedy of Odessa, and especially since the start of the barbaric shelling of the cities of Donbass (as well as Russian territory), the idea of “sending tanks” re-captured Russian society, but was severely chopped off by the first Minsk.
After that, the people continue to believe that at the top they are doing everything right, but they do not understand what they are doing there. In this mode, the authorities cannot maintain the trust of the people for a long time. She should either prove by playing that she played the right game (people should see a concrete material victory, and not on the scale taken by Mariupol or Slavyansk, but as in 1945), or she should prepare for a wave of rumors accusing the government of treason (as in February 1917 of the year - “the queen is German, the generals are Germans, treason is everywhere”) and to a collapse in popularity. Unfortunately, the instability of the people's psyche more than once led to the collapse of the most detailed, beautiful and practically realized political plans.
If the Russian government takes this into account, and its actions over the past fifteen years show that it closely follows the moods of the masses, then for her the clock on the clock falls somewhere in the month of September (more precisely, the end of August - the beginning of October), when the Ukrainian question should be solved even a stuffed animal, even a carcass. The autumn time trouble of Russia in Ukraine can be canceled only by some kind of global event, which by its scale and consequences for Russia and the world will overshadow the war in Donbass, as the war in Donbass led the war in Syria to the periphery of the attention of Russian society.
So, Russia can wait patiently somewhere until September, and then it will start to get nervous. And what about the USA?
If we say that time is playing against Russia, then it is logical to assume that it is playing against the United States. Firstly, it is necessary to maintain your Ukrainian ally so that it does not die before its time. Secondly, the terrorist nature of the Ukrainian regime is gradually becoming more and more difficult to hide from the world community, and these are enormous moral costs for Washington, which is not so popular in the world as it is. Of course, many people here believe that Americans do not care about the moral costs, but this is not so. If morality did not mean anything in international relations, the parties would not conduct exhausting maneuvers to shift responsibility for the conflict to each other (meaning not only the current situation, but any other, starting with the Hetto-Egyptian wars of the XIII century BC .). Well, stingy Americans would never spend tens of billions of dollars around the world to whiten their image if television channels were not weapons no less effective than strike carrier groups. Thirdly, the USA is finding it harder to keep in check the “Old Europe” - the heart of the EU, and without its participation, even a successful attempt to draw Russia into a confrontation with the Eastern European border countries does nothing. Fourth, the general political situation in Ukraine is so unstable that Washington can lose control over the development of events at any time (many people believe that the United States is omnipotent and can control everything forever, but this is also not true). And it also forces to hurry.
From this point of view, the United States needs war yesterday. But there are other interests requiring the postponement of the hot phase of the conflict. It is clear that in the event of the start of large-scale military operations in the Donbass, the Ukrainian army, enriched by the invaluable experience of catastrophic defeats, despite the gained military experience and assistance with some military materials and advisers (and possibly weapons) received from the US and Eastern Europeans, did not last long will be able. The point here, of course, is not the high combat qualities of the DPR / LNR armies (although it cannot be denied that they have grown noticeably numerically, technically and organizationally), but the time has come for the Kremlin to end with Kiev, but how will the vacationers take shape there? tenth.
That is, the United States can count on the fact that the Kiev regime will be able to keep the front from collapsing for one to three months. Well, after the collapse of the front, the disappearance of the current government in Kiev and the “transition to the side of the people” of local authorities and state structures will take place much faster than after the surrender of Yanukovych. It is clear that even the official declaration of war on Russia by the Baltic dwarfs or even “the most” Poland in the fate of Ukraine will not change anything (and the guys in Warsaw and the Baltic capitals are unlikely to decide this), and even in the case of absolute success (which is doubtful) full-scale involvement of the EU in the sanctions war against Russia will not change anything, except that Moscow, which will have nothing to lose, may unpleasantly surprise Brussels and Washington with its reaction.
That is, the issue of containing Russia from the agenda is not removed, even if all the provocations in Ukraine and in Europe are held in the most favorable mode for the United States. We know the mechanism of deterrence - color coups or the threat of color coups leading to destabilization and diversion of resources to solve internal problems. In Russia (with an unfavorable development of the situation) conditions for the emergence of a strong “patriotic” opposition to Putin, capable of destabilizing the situation, are impossible before the spring of 2016. It is too late for the United States - the issue will either be resolved earlier in favor of Russia, or it is necessary to find a means to reach 2016 for the year, holding down Moscow and not allowing it to quickly and efficiently realize the inevitable victory in Ukraine. Moreover, the mechanism of tying up Russia's resources should work in close connection with the confrontation of Eastern Europe with Moscow organized by the Americans, as well as to bridge a bridge to possible color unrest in Russia itself.
Such a mechanism the United States can launch in November. On November 1, parliamentary elections are to be held in Kyrgyzstan (a parliamentary republic, therefore elections are of key importance), and on November 15, elections for Lukashenka in Belarus (no need to explain the value). It is clear that a successful coup in Minsk is much less likely than in Bishkek, but on bezrybe and cancer is a fish, besides the United States, any destabilization is suitable, and an attempted coup also destabilizes the situation.
Thus, the United States needs to solve the triune problem:
1. Start a new war in the Donbass before the Kiev regime finally loses its capacity.
2. Save the front in the Donbass and the regime in Kiev before the start of an active color campaign in November.
3. To keep tensions at all points, nowhere without allowing a tangible preponderance of Russia until the spring of 2016, when you can count on the appearance of internal problems in Russia.
These three things are difficult to combine, primarily because the too early start of hostilities, which is necessary because the Kiev regime is spreading before our eyes, does not allow us to keep the front for the required time. As I wrote above, the tensile strength of the Ukrainian army (taken with a huge margin) is three months. This means that in order to keep it until November, one must begin not earlier than the middle of August, but better in September. But the state of the regime in Kiev requires war already, and in this case, the funeral of today's Ukraine cannot take place later than July-August, after which any color activity in the EEU becomes meaningless.
Apparently, the Americans tried to find a way out of the situation, provoking the DNR / LC army to attack, by analogy with the winter campaign. To this end, the barbaric shelling of cities began again, accompanied by periodic attacks (sometimes quite strong) of the militia positions. If the DPR / LPR will not be able to resist (they also serve people who do not understand the complexity of the strategic game) and are forced to respond with an attack on the artillery positions of the Kiev troops, then under the conditions of the Kiev army’s employment of defensive positions and the presence of strong reserves guaranteed. So far, the tactics of the DPR / LNR armies have been based on exhausting the attacking enemy, being defensive, pulling away his reserves and only after this transition to the counteroffensive. Donetsk and Lugansk can expend the offensive potential of their troops without breaking through the defenses (Kiev victory), and will be forced to take a pause to restore combat capability.
In any case, even if the DPR / LNR offensive develops successfully, the fact that they launched the offensive will make it possible to demand negotiations and seek Minsk -3 before the front collapses.
All together: the intensification of hostilities, negotiations and a period of post-negotiated calm, with a gradual new increase in military activity, will just give the United States the 3-4 missing from the month and bring them in equal with Russia and even partially winning conditions regarding the time factor.
Well, now again about intuition. It is unlikely that the Kremlin did not count all this for twenty times (I do not mean the political prospects of Prince Harry). That is, they should understand that the development of events according to the American scenario either leads to a loss of positional advantage, or else forces Moscow to play actively and risk breaking relations with the EU, which she deftly avoided for over a year. So they should have found an antidote.
Since for Putin, for some unknown reason, it is extremely important that at least the heads of state and government declared for the parade should arrive and the anniversary parade take place exactly as planned, and also so that Merkel does not change her mind to come on 10 on May to lay a wreath at the graves of the Unknown Soldier, Moscow will try to stretch this week without excesses at the front, and therefore keep Donetsk and Lugansk from responding (except for the actions of artillery and repelling attacks). But intuition tells me that since May 12, surprises can be expected. Putin loves all sorts of strategic surprises. He almost always does that when he is not expected.
14 February 2014 (a week before the coup) my colleagues and I talked to Russia's Ambassador to Ukraine Zurabov. Mikhail Yuryevich is not popular in Russian patriotic circles (and not only). His personal relationship with Petro Poroshenko today is not discussed only by the lazy, but I must say that Ambassador Zurabov, though complicated, as a person, has always been an interesting, well-informed interlocutor who adequately assesses the situation and knows how to convey his thoughts to the audience succinctly and aphoristically.
So at that time, without denying that Ukraine had already begun the deadly fight of Russia with the United States, Mikhail Yuryevich, describing the positions of the parties, said something like the following (I’m not quoting simply because I don’t have a transcript of the conversation, and I’m responsible for every comma in a year I cannot take it upon myself, but for a minimum of 90% compliance of the italicized text to the original I can certify). You know, in cycling there is such a term “surprise”, when cyclists stand still and wait, who will make the first mistake. Here we are with our American friends now frozen in such a surprise around Ukraine. And we are waiting for the first to make a mistake.
So, it seems to me that the surprise, about which Mikhail Yuryevich spoke, dragged on unexpectedly for both sides, but his time came to an end. Just about someone rushes to the finish.
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