Ukraine: fighting without rules
At the beginning of the year, it seemed that the participants in the conflict in Ukraine and around it were able to approach the agreements on the settlement of armed confrontation. Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, played a role in this. He played the role of mediator in negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Western counterparts. The relationship between the latter was very unimportant since the meeting in Brisbane, Australia, where Putin was given the most cold reception.
At the end of 2014 of the year, during the visit of President Hollande to Kazakhstan, he unexpectedly decided to call in Moscow, where he met with Putin at Vnukovo Airport. Before this, negotiations were held by telephone of the Kazakh and Russian president, which made this meeting possible.
In the development of the negotiation process, the idea arose of holding a meeting on January 15 in Astana, where final agreements should have been reached. But in the end the meeting did not take place. And in mid-January, a new aggravation of the situation in Ukraine began.
The question arises: what happened in the period between the end of last year and January 15, why didn't it work out? Most likely, we can assume that the problem was not in Ukraine itself. The main issue was related to Western sanctions in connection with the annexation of the Crimea and military actions in the South-East of Ukraine. It is quite possible that the Russian president expected that the sanctions would be lifted due to reaching agreements on Ukraine. That is, Moscow wanted to exchange its consent to the settlement of the conflict in the Donbass for the lifting of sanctions, which turned out to be very sensitive for the Russian economy.
However, the West clearly refused to consider the issue in this context. German Chancellor Angela Merkel in January said that the sanctions appeared in connection with the annexation of the Crimea. That is, the West has unequivocally stated that it is ready to consider only the issue of settling the conflict in the Donbas, and not the whole range of relations with Russia.
Accordingly, it turned out that Moscow cannot count on legitimizing the annexation of the Crimea and on lifting the sanctions, at least for the most part. If we recall that the restrictions on trade with the USSR, introduced during the Cold War years under the Jackson-Vannik amendment, were lifted only in 2000-s, for Moscow this meant that she would have to live with sanctions for a very long time. Thus, the reason for adopting the Jackson-Vannick amendment was restrictions on the departure of Soviet Jews from the USSR. However, the amendment continued to operate even when all who wanted, and not only Jews, left Russia.
For Moscow, it was a very bad situation. Despite all the demonstrated confidence in their abilities, sanctions have a heavy impact on the Russian economy. The biggest problem is the actual closure of foreign capital markets. It is theoretically possible, of course, to use this situation in order to get away from dependence on Western capital, to start allocating domestic financing to banks and the economy. Many Russian non-liberal economists, who say that the state should allocate money, as it happens in the same West, call for this. But the liberals are against this decision, because the allocation of money at rates lower than inflation will lead to pressure on the national currency. In addition, the increase in de facto financing means an additional issue, the money supply will grow, and inflation will eventually increase. Basically, this was happening in stories Russia in the 1990-x under the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin.
It is possible to argue long who is right and who is not in this situation, but it is obvious that a change in the course of economic policy from neoliberal to governmental will be a real revolution for Russia. This will require the introduction of partial state regulation of the economy, a directive solution to the problems of import substitution, in the most general sense it will be necessary to move on to the policy of autarky. That is, in the most general sense - the policy of self-reliance. Ideally, such a policy should lead to complete self-sufficiency with all the necessary products. To some extent this was almost achieved in the USSR, but such a policy leads to isolation and requires a different model of economic management.
Accordingly, Moscow faced a difficult dilemma. She could either do nothing and hope to reach an agreement with the West after reaching an agreement on Ukraine or try to do something to change the situation. As a result, Moscow clearly preferred the second option, and from mid-January the offensive of the Donetsk insurgents began.
Among the possible motives for such a decision, it was probably first of all to sharply raise the degree of confrontation in the South-East of Ukraine, in order to try to reach an agreement with the West. That is, it’s still possible to exchange the removal of tensions for agreement, if not to legitimize the annexation of Crimea, then at least lift the sanctions.
In addition, in Russia, obviously, they were afraid that Ukraine, which on the eve of the proposed date of the 15 agreement of January was increasing the number of its army, in particular, Kiev, was declared a new mobilization, will try to solve the issue of the rebellious territories with one blow. This development scenario created obvious problems for Russia. It is clear that Moscow could not constantly keep its troops in the Donbass, and the local militia probably would not have stood the well-prepared strike from different directions.
Another circumstance was connected with the fact that a large-scale defeat of the Ukrainian army, like the one that occurred in August-September, was inflicted. Such a defeat could weaken the position of President Poroshenko and create a negative impression in Ukrainian society. In addition, in the case of the defeat of the Ukrainian army from the Donetsk rebels, naturally, with Russian help, the operational scope for action in any direction was opened. This could create a threat to many cities in eastern Ukraine, including in the Crimean sector. It’s not a fact that this threat would have been realized, but it would be a sufficient basis for further peace negotiations from a position of strength.
Although the Russian propaganda emphasized that Ukrainians were responsible for exacerbating the situation on 15 in January, and Donetsk separatists were only defending themselves, it is clear that the latter acted as the attacking side. In the air of the Russian channel RBC with its more skeptical attitude to what is happening, the presenter asked his interlocutor from among the supporters of the official line of Moscow: how is it that if the aggressor is the Ukrainian side, why then are the rebels? Actually, it was a rhetorical question.
First of all, the rebels occupied the Donetsk airport, which the Ukrainian military had been holding since spring 2014 of the year. It was the ongoing fighting around the airport that was one of the reasons for the actual failure of the agreements reached in Minsk in September 2014. Then the main blow was dealt to the so-called Debaltsevsky bridgehead.
This city, occupied by the Ukrainian army during the August 2014 offensive, was on the highway between Donetsk and Lugansk and theoretically allowed to threaten another important city for the rebels - Gorlovka. But he was very vulnerable to defense, because he was surrounded on all sides by the territory of the unrecognized Donetsk Republic. It was connected to Ukraine by a narrow corridor along the road to Artyomovsk.
Naturally, for the Donetsk rebels, Debaltseve was a strategically important object. Moreover, it was easy to attack and at the same time very difficult to defend. Although the Ukrainian army since the last truce certainly prepared for the defense of Debaltseve.
And this is where the fun begins. The troops of the Donetsk insurgents stormed Debaltseve from about January 20's up to the conclusion of the new Minsk 12 agreements in February of February 2015. They tried to cut him off from the rest of the Ukrainian troops. For this, large forces were used, a large number of armored vehicles, artillery and multiple launch rocket systems were concentrated. The question remains all the time whether Russian troops were there or not, but in any case Russia provided the rebels with ammunition. There is no doubt that for three weeks of active offensive ammunition there should have been a lot.
Although the Donetsk rebels may not have counted on such a long offensive. The calculation was clearly made on a kind of blitzkrieg. This was due to the vulnerability of the position of the Ukrainian army on the bridgehead in Debaltseve and the military superiority of the rebel army, which was demonstrated during the August counteroffensive. Another question: due to what was achieved this superiority? Evil tongues still claim that through the use of regular units of the Russian army. But be that as it may, all the circumstances that ensured the victory in August 2014 of the year, by January 2015, didn’t go anywhere.
But the blitzkrieg nonetheless failed. The rebel forces and their allies had to break into the defense of the Ukrainian army. Moreover, the loss of advancing in technology was very large. On the network, you could watch videos and photos with many black tanks advancing separatists. Some paintings resembled photos from tank battlefields.
But the most interesting thing about this war was that the most fierce battles were precisely for Debaltseve and the road connecting it with the rest of Ukraine. In other sectors, the sides fired at each other, but did not undertake offensive operations. The only exception was the area of Mariupol.
Here the rebels launched an offensive, which was announced loudly by the so-called DNR Prime Minister Zakharchenko. But almost immediately, on January 24, there was an incident involving the shelling of Mariupol with Grad missiles, as a result of which many civilians were killed. After that, this question was submitted to a meeting of the UN Security Council, where Russia blocked a veto on a decision condemning this incident.
The argument of Moscow was that if you condemn the shelling of Mariupol, then why no one raises the question of condemning the shelling of Donetsk. It seemed quite logical, especially since during the current war in southeastern Ukraine both sides are not shy about using heavy weapon for shelling settlements. But for Moscow, this shelling, like the earlier incident with the shelling of the village of Volnovakha, still had negative consequences. Because, although Russia unequivocally wins the information war at home, in the West it is undoubtedly losing this war.
But in general, outside the Debaltseve active offensive military operations were not conducted by either Donetsk rebels or the Ukrainian military. Although for the latter it would be more natural. Because in the absence of a solid front line, the Ukrainians could, using strikes from different directions and subsequent actions by maneuverable groups, pose a threat to the forces of the DPR and LPR. This could markedly ease the position of the defenders in Debaltseve, because the rebels do not have so many troops to keep the whole line of confrontation with the Ukrainian army.
But that did not happen. Only 9 – 10 of February, on the eve of the negotiations in Minsk, reported that the Ukrainian military had launched an offensive near Mariupol. This is another oddity of this war. Maybe the Ukrainian military was not ready for the offensive, although it is strange why? For four months it was possible to prepare for different options. It is possible that Kiev did not want the escalation of the conflict.
If we agree with the fact that the Russian military fought in the Donbass, then this is quite logical. In the Rostov region in the exercises recently there were many Russian units. If the Ukrainians went on the offensive, then theoretically any blow could have been repelled, and moreover, Russian troops could begin active operations on other fronts. In this regard, it is quite logical that the attack of the Ukrainians near Mariupol occurred at the moment when it became clear that there would be negotiations in Minsk. Thus, Kiev tried to save its face.
But then, naturally, another question arises. If Moscow really went to use its troops in South-Eastern Ukraine, then why not use all the available forces and not attack the Ukrainians on all fronts and not achieve a quick victory? Then one could dictate the terms of the world. Actually, what's the difference? Do you have two thousand soldiers or twenty thousand in your Donbas? All the same, you deny everything, and the enemy has no direct evidence. Most likely, this once again proves that Russia was not going to fight with Ukraine. She wanted to designate a threat and force negotiations on her terms not even on the Ukrainian authorities, but rather on the West.
In the end of January, Moscow still had certain reasons that its tactics in the Donbass would lead to some results. There was still the possibility of the defeat of the Ukrainian army under Debaltseve, which should have put Kiev in an extremely difficult position.
In addition, at the end of January, the opportunity arose to split Europe’s common position towards Russia. On January 25, in the elections in Greece, the radical left coalition of SYRIZA won, which also supported the lifting of sanctions against Russia. On January 29, a meeting of foreign ministers took place in Brussels, at which the question of extending sanctions against Russia from March to September was decided. Given the fact that decisions in the EU are taken by consensus, Greece could impose a veto, and then the sanctions would not be extended.
In Russia, certain hopes were clearly pinned on Greece. On the eve of the vote in Moscow, they said they were ready to allocate money to solve its financial problems. However, the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias voted for the sanctions. Moreover, he stated that “we will no longer be the“ bad guys. ”
Obviously, with all the harsh rhetoric of the Greek ultra-leftists, they take into account the capabilities of the parties. The maximum that Russia can help them in the current situation is three to five billion dollars. While the Greeks are at stake is 340 billion euros in loans. And there are still current needs. It is clear that Moscow cannot help Athens. In addition, the Greek government will be trading with a troika of creditors for further relations. If the new government of the left-wing Tsipras still decides to refuse to pay debts and leave the eurozone, it will be a tremendous test for him. In any case, he will then need to interact with Europe.
Whatever the plans of Moscow, the massive offensive of the pro-Russian militia was the most serious challenge in the complex system of its relations with the West. Because in the West they could not draw any other conclusions, except those that Russia is trying to put it in a difficult position. This caused an automatic reaction in Western capitals. In addition to the extension of sanctions against Russia, discussions began on the possibility of introducing new sanctions, including disconnection from the SWIFT bank payment system. The latter circumstance caused serious concern in Moscow. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said that disconnecting from SWIFT would be tantamount to a declaration of war.
But more importantly, in the United States at the beginning of February they began to seriously discuss the issue of supplying Ukraine with weapons for 3 billion dollars. This circumstance transfers the conflict to a fundamentally different level. Especially if the Americans put on modern anti-tank missiles, such as the Javelin system. This missile system is easy to use, works on the principle of "fired and forgotten", has a tandem part, which is effective against all types of Russian tanks. A feature of this system is the fact that a double-charge rocket hits the upper part of the tank. The first charge is designed to enhance dynamic protection, the second pierces the armor. The fact is that on the T-72 and all the old types of protection tanks on top there are none at all.
Thus, the supply of modern anti-tank missiles to Ukraine will deprive the Donetsk insurgents of the opportunity to use tanks. In addition, during the discussion of the issue of supplies to the United States, they talked about counterbattery radars, which can also be bundled with rockets. Consequently, in this case, the rebels will lose their advantage in artillery and rocket launchers.
In fact, if the United States supplies anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, then direct analogies with the Afghan war of the 1980s can be made. Then the supply of "Stingers" reduced the possibility of using the Soviet aviation. As a result, this brought closer the decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
Naturally, in Russia, this information was taken extremely negatively and most certainly with a high degree of concern. If the West really starts delivering modern weapons to Kiev, then this will be a completely different reality. Although simultaneously with the discussion of the issue of weapons in the United States, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that there would be no weapons to be supplied and it was necessary to look for a diplomatic way out of the situation. Approximately the same was said by Secretary of State John Kerry, who was on a visit to Kiev. He noted that the conflict has no military solution.
There is a classic game of good and bad cop. Merkel, of course, a good cop, and the US congressmen played the role of a bad cop. That is, Russia sent an unambiguous signal, to which, I must say, it immediately responded. On February 5, Merkel and French President Francois Hollande arrived in Kiev, and on February 6 they went to Moscow with peaceful proposals. The point is to once again fix the actual line of demarcation between the Ukrainian troops and the rebels of Donbass. This is the carrot they offer the Russian side. As a result, Moscow retains its face, but at the same time stops the advance of the pro-Russian rebels. All questions about future status are postponed. The parties agree that the Donbass is the territory of Ukraine.
For the Russian president, this was a good way out of this situation. He was offered a compromise and he agreed. Because Moscow is not ready to go for a tough version of confrontation with the West, despite all the tough rhetoric. If the Americans would supply the Ukrainians with weapons, then the war in this country would be long and would force Russia to deplete its resources, as happened in Afghanistan.
February 11 negotiations begin in Minsk, which lasted 16 hours. They resulted in an agreement between Hollande, Merkel, Putin and Poroshenko. True, this decision was not signed by them; the leaders of the unrecognized republics, Zakharchenko, Plotnitsky, as well as the OSCE representative and former President Kuchma, did so. Actually, the leaders of the states gave only oral guarantees, but they are expensive because reputation is at stake.
The situation is very piquant. Because the whole course of the current conflict between Russia and the West is based on mutual distrust and violation of agreements. What is worth only Moscow’s refusal to comply with the Budapest 1994 agreements of the year, which guaranteed the security and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine, as, indeed, Kazakhstan. But Russia also believes that it was deceived when they did not observe the agreements reached through the mediation of Russia and Europe between the former Ukrainian President Yanukovych and the Maidan opposing him.
But if so, then there is nothing formal to sign something there. The agreement itself in Minsk is the most uncertain and not specified. Many conditions may or may not be met. In particular, Kiev should restore pensions and benefits, but it does not say when. In Kiev, they have already announced that they will do it after the elections in the unrecognized republics.
At the same time, the elections themselves must pass under Ukrainian legislation, which means that Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky are already illegitimate. However, they should now be amnestied, like other militants, but in Kiev they said that they would not amnesty everyone. In turn, Ukraine should make changes to the Constitution in order to provide conditions for decentralization, but it is not clear whether this document will pass through the Verkhovna Rada and in what form.
The parties must withdraw heavy weapons from the confrontation line. And the Ukrainians from the current line, and the separatists from the one that was fixed on 19 September 2014 of the year. That is, the Donetsk rebels will have to divert heavy artillery further than the Ukrainian military. It also remains unclear who will control the border of Ukraine and Russia. That is, will this border remain passable for troops and weapons, or will there be no more such opportunity?
In general, a lot of questions. But the main question remained behind the scenes. Does the next agreement in Minsk mean that the issue of sanctions has been resolved? This is the key point in this situation. Theoretically, only the freezing of the conflict in Ukraine does not suit Moscow, it needs to get the lifting of sanctions and a general way out of the current crisis. The Russian authorities are obviously striving for this. But it seems that in this matter to achieve the result they failed. But on the other hand, Moscow had the opportunity to emerge from the crisis without losing face. For this, she needed the ultimate success of the operation under Debaltseve. Then it was possible to say that Russia won by putting a winning point. It is possible that this was the price of the issue. No wonder Putin said in Minsk that the Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve should capitulate.
Now it will be possible for the West and Russia to start looking for a path to settlement. But they still do not believe each other. They are constrained only by their unwillingness to cross the line. Therefore, maybe they will force their proteges in Kiev and the unrecognized republics to fulfill the agreements.
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