Not “soft”, but “sluggish force”: Russia loses in Kyrgyzstan
REGNUM: How has Russia's use of “soft power” changed in Kyrgyzstan over the past few years?
In my opinion, the situation with the Russian “soft power” in Kyrgyzstan has never been at a sufficiently high level, but has deteriorated significantly in recent years. Of course, there are weak attempts to implement it, but almost no results. This is especially noticeable against the background of the stormy activities of Western structures, which actively interact not only with the Kyrgyz authorities, but also with civic activists, paying particular attention to young people. I do not think that the reasons for what is happening are rooted in the concept of Russian foreign policy, which is implemented through the Foreign Ministry. But I am sure that in the implementation of this project, one of the main roles should be played by the so-called human factor - the personality of the head of the organization that exercises “soft power”. And not only in Kyrgyzstan. The frequency, and most importantly, the quality of events that take place, for example, in Europe, also completely depend on the personality of the leaders of the embassy, the representation of Rossotrudnichestvo and other similar structures.
REGNUM: How do you assess the interim results of the work of the Russian structures?
The ongoing processes can hardly be called "soft power." This is a "sluggish force" or rather, even an "invisible force." Initially, the global goal was not to create something from scratch. It was necessary to strengthen or at least maintain the existing Russian diaspora in Kyrgyzstan. However, neither the first nor the second failed: in connection with the complete absence of even moral support from Russia, the mass return of Russians to historical homeland, the remaining compatriots in the bulk turned out to be fragmented and inert. The active part of compatriots also did not become any tangible “force”. There are several reasons. Firstly, the consumer attitude of representatives of organizations of compatriots. Secondly, a misunderstanding of the current policy of Russia in relation to Kyrgyzstan. Misunderstanding gives rise to doubts and, as a consequence, general passivity. Uncomfortable questions arise from this: are Russian Russian compatriots important to Russia, how much is Russia interested in Kyrgyzstan? If they are important and interested, then why cannot this powerful power at least copy someone else's successful experience in shaping public opinion ?! After all, such an experience is abundant in Western structures. For example, when a state provides assistance to another state even once a year or even five to ten years, this event is always widely covered. For example, Chinese buses come to Bishkek, and it says in huge letters that it is "a gift from the Chinese people to the Kyrgyz people." And the fact that Russia regularly pours enormous amounts for Kyrgyzstan into the local budget, writes off debts in the health care, education and many other systems - this information is practically only in the official reports, it is not available to the public.
REGNUM: Why is not available?
A few reasons. The first is the inability and unwillingness to learn to contact the press and convey information. After all, the media may begin to ask “uncomfortable” questions, and Russian officials are likely to simply play it safe, fearing that they will violate certain instructions or answer “wrong”. The second is the presence of a corruption component. In such situations, the gaze and control of the public is also not welcome. For example, 500 bags of flour were allocated, and only 400 were delivered. Preference is given to formulations without specifics - “assistance was provided”. One could “do little and say a lot,” but in the strange realization of Russia's “soft power” in Kyrgyzstan, the opposite is true. Russia in Kyrgyzstan does a lot, but due to the lack of information support, few people know about it. This applies to most stocks, with the exception of global ones, which cannot be hidden, for example, writing off half a billion dollars of debt, creating the Kyrgyz-Russian fund, etc., but these messages often flash a couple of times in news tape and forget. At the same time, if this information appeared on large billboards in two languages and throughout Kyrgyzstan, as China and Turkey do, the effect would be completely different.
REGNUM: Where is the ability of Russian leaders to communicate with the press?
He has not yet been. If a charismatic, active, interested diplomat arrives in any country, then the embassy’s cooperation with the public and with the media is improving. When people get to such positions due to kinship or other relationships, rather than professional qualities, then the result will be appropriate. A separate problem is the lack of understanding of the specifics of the region in general and of Kyrgyzstan in particular. If in the country where the diplomat is located, obvious prerequisites for global political and economic changes are created or a conflict has already occurred there, the situation cannot be ignored. It is impossible not to inform about Russia's attitude to these changes - we must somehow make it clear that Russia empathizes, that it will help, that it will not quit. Acting differently means losing the enormous opportunity to form a positive image of Russia. Of course, in more than 20 years of existence of the Russian Embassy in Kyrgyzstan, one could learn to work with the press. But this did not happen. Most likely, the level of control over the execution of the tasks, or the tasks are not the same, affects. Instead of achieving a result, people work “for the sake of a tick.” It does not matter how the event was held, a beautiful report is important. Officials care little about the real effect, the main thing is that the documents are in order. Public opinion and public sentiment are not measured, the response of the media is not monitored, and there is no systematic approach. Perhaps there is better reporting with elements of analytics, but at a different level, when, for example, in the event of a conflict, it is not the civil organizations that are working, but the special services.
REGNUM: How reliable is the Russian stake on the Kyrgyz elites and is the absence of work with civil society justified?
Now the society is waiting for how the economic union will function, where the country will enter at the beginning of May of this year. Everyone is waiting for what position Kyrgyzstan will find this fall, six months after joining the EEU. At this point, political life will enter the active phase (parliamentary elections will be held in the fall of 2015). Against this background, interim results may be raised: whether the borders will open, whether there will be material relief for domestic businessmen. help, whether the situation of migrants will improve, etc. And if in the right perspective it will not be covered by the Russian Federation, then we can safely say that this situation will be widely covered in another - a provocative perspective.
REGNUM: Are Russian structures in Kyrgyzstan ready for a stream of criticism in the event of a crisis after the republic joins an integration association?
It seems to me that this is not thought out and does not blur. It is possible that scenarios are being developed at the highest level, but the system itself is sharpened to work in the “fire mode”, there will be a fire - we will think how to extinguish. Kyrgyzstan’s almost complete entry into the EEU creates an illusion of success and unjustified euphoria not only among the local population - “there will be pensions and salaries, like in Russia, etc.”, but also among Russian diplomats in Kyrgyzstan - “the Kyrgyz authorities have decided joins the union, and therefore, no need to strain. " Moscow obviously also believes that the leadership of Kyrgyzstan will not flirt with the West, as was the case in 2010. And, then, it is possible to ignore some moments like the ineffective implementation of “soft power”. If everything happens that way, then mistakes are made, because there can be no quick positive results from joining the Union, and Moscow did not agree with the entire Kyrgyz elite, and the impoverished people can consider themselves deceived.
REGNUM: If the organizations of compatriots in Kyrgyzstan are not elements of “soft power” and do not interact with the official Russian structures, then what does the Coordination Council of Compatriots do?
Theoretically, the meaning of this organization is to unite the existing groups of compatriots. According to the REGNUM, more than 80 are listed according to the list of the Russian Embassy in Kyrgyzstan. The Council acts as an intermediary between compatriots' organizations and the Russian Embassy and Rossotrudnichestvo. In fact, the work is reduced to the distribution of aid going through the embassy and Rossotrudnichestvo, the distribution of vouchers, etc. In the Coordination Council, all are torn because of access to resources, because most of the help is received by organizations that are associated with the council. Other organizations are supported on a residual basis. The existing model of work is not aimed at supporting the most efficient organizations, but at meeting one’s own interests. In fact, the coordinating role is aimed at sharing vouchers and gifts. In recent years, the branch office of Rossotrudnichestvo in Kyrgyzstan has practically abandoned the role of coordinator - dictator, although several times this structure was headed by people who had tight control and interference in all the affairs of their compatriots.
REGNUM: Do you have an understanding of what exactly Russia wants to achieve in Kyrgyzstan?
Over the years of our organization's 10, there have never been any attempts at interaction and coordination. No matter how they connect us with the Russian embassy or Rossotrudnichestvo, no one has ever even hinted that we need to support some kind of initiative or event. Therefore, I speak as an indifferent citizen of Kyrgyzstan, who sees the future of the republic in alliance with Russia. In a situation of uncertainty, I wanted to get at least a backlash and listen to recommendations. Lack of interaction leads to gaps in the understanding of strategic goals. It is not known what Moscow needs - to strengthen the diaspora here or to export compatriots to Russia? Or both? But then a clear indication is required of which mechanisms and with the help of which financing these goals can be realized. Indeed, one with the other is inextricably linked: if the diaspora becomes stronger, then the number of departures of compatriots from the country will decrease. People will face less with a very difficult, long, costly and humiliating procedure, which for some reason is called the joyful return of the Russians to their homeland.
BakuToday: Vladimir Putin has repeatedly raised the topic of Rossotrudnichestvo, demanded to increase the scale and efficiency of work. How does this correspond to reality?
It is hard to say. I think that the reason for the inefficient work is the imperfection of the system within the Russian Foreign Ministry. The existing schemes do not allow fully, taking into account the specifics of each individual country, to hold events. There is a very cumbersome clumsy algorithm, the plan of mandatory measures is approved "at the top", without taking into account the situation on the ground. Representatives of Russian structures abroad cannot change anything, since they are completely deprived of their freedom of action. Each step requires coordination. Off-plan initiatives are hacked to the ground.
REGNUM: What events, carried out by the Russian Embassy and Rossotrudnichestvo in Kyrgyzstan last year, were remembered for your efficiency?
(Long silence) Good question, I have no answer. We learn about a lot of events either after the fact or not at all. But if they were effective, they would know for sure.
REGNUM: One of the important points in Moscow’s implementation of “soft power” is the formation of a positive image of Russia and its initiatives. Can you name a brand, face or image of Eurasian cooperation?
There is no such image. At the level of elites, perhaps there is, at the level of the inhabitants there. Perhaps only the images of Putin, Lavrov and Nazarbayev. If you remove them, nothing remains. This is due to the lack of deep understanding among compatriots of integration issues. This happens because the majority of compatriots, not receiving information, not feeling support, not realizing that Russia is interested in them, perceive the processes taking place very passively. This happens only because of the informational passivity of the Russian structures in Kyrgyzstan. People can discuss politics in the kitchen, but do not participate in a wide discussion. Perhaps these issues are due to professional activities of journalists and politicians. But compatriots' organizations on 90% pursue a cultural component - songs and dances.
REGNUM: One of the reference points for Russia in Kyrgyzstan is the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University. Does this university help shape the image of Russia and is it a positive example of Kyrgyz-Russian cooperation?
Perhaps he performed such functions the first few years of its existence. Now there is another trend - Rossosotrudnichestvo works with local Kyrgyz universities, but not with KRSU. Because the leadership of the Russian university is not necessary. It is necessary for teachers, parts of students, but not the administration.
REGNUM: Who is working in Kyrgyzstan to create a positive image of Russia?
About regional organizations, I have not heard anything. Three or four structures can be distinguished in Bishkek and Chui oblast. The Russian cultural center "Harmony" - their profile holidays with invitations for their own, the Orthodox organization "Vladimirsky society", the union of Tatars "Berdemlek". These organizations are members of the Association of Compatriots Guild (AGS), are its leaders and they are members of the political party Zamandash. In this system work corporate-commercial and party strings. They are known among compatriots' organizations, but in the bulk of the Russian diaspora no one is known. Of course, everyone knows about the Russian Embassy, but very few who know what Rossotrudnichestvo is. Frankly, it seems to me that Vladimir Putin is the only one who is working on a positive image of Russia.
BakuToday: "Soft power" of the United States, among other things, is aimed at working with young people. Who of the Russian structures works in a similar direction in Kyrgyzstan?
There are attempts to create youth blocks. No results yet. Since there are no experienced organizers who know how to work with young people. The system of financing such projects has not been established, and it is not promising to work on enthusiasm.
REGNUM: Which of the Russian structures are working to support the media?
There is an internship program for Kyrgyz journalists in St. Petersburg. But these are two or three people a year. The event is a one-time, no further development. The point “working with the media” is in the program of work of Russian structures, perhaps someone supports someone, but I have not heard about it. There are attempts at the work of the Eurasians Foundation New Wave, but this is a drop in the ocean.
REGNUM: Speaking of youth, what is the average age of people actively working in the pro-Russian organizations of Kyrgyzstan?
Older 50 years. If there is a one-time need to gather young people for an event, a friend, brother, and matchmaker are invited. The rest of the time they are left to themselves. A few years ago, a group of young people gathered for May 9 to organize marches around Bishkek. But it was their own initiative. And the next opportunity to work with patriotic youth was missed. So while information is Russia is losing in Kyrgyzstan in all positions. But if there is real funding for organizations, if not only officials come to Kyrgyzstan experienced organizers, image makers, moderators, speakers, advertisers, reporters, then all together they can become real “soft power” capable of uniting the Russian diaspora and creating a favorable image of Russia in Kyrgyzstan.
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