Battle for Seelow Heights

12
Plan of the operation of the 1 of the Belarusian Front

The overall plan of the 1 operation of the Byelorussian Front under the command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov was to deliver a crushing blow to the Wehrmacht grouping covering Berlin from the east, developing an offensive on the German capital, bypassing it from the north and south, followed by storming the city and leaving our troops to the river. Elba.

The troops of the 1 of the Byelorussian Front occupied a sector of the front 172 km wide, from Nippervise to Gross-Gastrose. The main shock grouping of the front unfolded on the 44-kilometer stretch of Gustebiz, Podelzig. The right flank of the front was deployed in the Nippervise and Gustebiz area. The left flank of the front turned on the 82-kilometer stretch of Podelzig, Gross-Gastrose.

The main blow was delivered by the forces of 4 combined arms and two tank armies from the Kustrin region. The troops of the 3rd Shock Army under the command of Vasily Kuznetsov, the 5th Shock Army of Nikolai Berzarin and the 8th Guards Army of Vasily Chuikov, deployed in the center of the Küstrinsky bridgehead, had to break through the German defenses, ensure the entry of tank formations into the breakthrough and advance on the German the capital. On the sixth day of the operation, they were to be on the eastern shore of Lake Havel (Havel) in the Hennigsdorf-Gatow area. The 47th Army of Franz Perkhorovich received the task of bypassing Berlin from the northwest, advancing in the general direction of Nauen, Rathenov and on the 11th day of the operation to reach the Elbe. In addition, in the second echelon of the front in the main direction, the 3rd army of Alexander Gorbatov was located.

Tank armies were in the second echelon of the attack force and were to develop an offensive bypassing Berlin from the north and south. The 1-I Guards Tank Army commanded by Mikhail Katukov was not to march from the north with the 2 Guards Tank Army, as previously planned by the Supreme Command, but from the south to take the southern part of Berlin. The offensive of Katukov’s army was also supported by Ivan Yushchuk’s 11 tank corps. This change in the task of Katukov’s army was proposed by Zhukov, and the Supreme Commander Stalin approved. The northern part of the bypass group was very powerful, it included: Pavel Belov's 61 Army, 1 Army of the Polish Army S. Propulsion Poplavsky, 47 Army of Perhorovich, 2 Army Guards Tank Army of Semen Bogdanov, 9- Ivan Kirichenko’s tank corps and Mikhail Konstantinov’s 7 Guards Cavalry Corps.

In order to ensure the advance of the main attack force of the front in the center on the flanks, two auxiliary strikes were launched from the north and south. In the north, the 61-I Army of Belov and the 1-I Army of the Polish Poplavsky Army advanced. They struck in the general direction of Liebenwalde, Vulkau, and on the 11 day of the offensive were to reach the Elbe in the regions of Vilsnack and Zandau.

In the south, the second strike, which ensured the attack of the main strike force, was inflicted by Vladimir Kolpakchi's 69 Army, Vyacheslav Tsvetayev's 33 Army, and the 2 Guards Cavalry Corps. The Soviet armies attacked the Podelzig and Briskov sectors in the general direction of Fürstenwalde, Potsdam and Brandenburg. Army Kolpakchi and Tsvetaeva were to break through the German defense in the Frankfurt direction and, advancing to the west, with access to the southern and south-western parts of Berlin, cut off the main forces of the German 9 from the capital.

In total, the 1st Belorussian Front had 9 combined arms and 2 tank armies, one air army (the 16th air army of Sergei Rudenko), two tank corps (the 9th tank corps of Ivan Kirichenko, the 11th tank corps of Ivan Yushchuk ), two guards cavalry corps (the 7th guards cavalry corps of Mikhail Konstantinov, the 2nd guards cavalry corps of Vladimir Kryukov). The 1st Belorussian Front was also supported by the 18th Air Army of the Chief Marshal aviation Alexandra Golovanova (long-range aviation) and the Dnieper military flotilla V. Grigoriev. The 1st Belorussian Front had at its disposal more than 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 18,9 thousand guns and mortars.

Armed with three brigades of the Dnieper flotilla were 34 armored boats, 20 minesweepers, 20 air defense boats, 32 hydroplanes and 8 gunboats. The boats were armed with 37-, 40-, 76- and 100-mm guns, 8-M-8 launchers for firing 82 mm caliber missiles, large-caliber machine guns. The flotilla received tasks to support the advancing troops, to assist in forcing water obstacles, to protect water communications and ferries; destroy enemy mines installed on rivers; carry out breakthroughs into the depths of the enemy defense, disorganize the German rear, and land assault forces. The 3 Brigade was to capture the hydraulic structures in the Fürstenberg area, preventing their destruction.

Battle for Seelow Heights

A battery of Soviet 152-mm howitzer cannons ML-20 near Berlin. 1 Belarusian Front

Preparation of the operation

On the main line of attack, an artillery grouping was formed with a density of about 270 guns on the 1 km of front (excluding 45-mm and 57-mm guns). In order to ensure the tactical surprise of the onset, they decided to carry out the artillery preparation at night, 1,5-2 hours before dawn. To illuminate the terrain and dazzle the enemy, 143 focused the searchlight installations, which should have been earned from the beginning of the infantry attack.

For 30 minutes before the start of the artillery bombardment, night bomber aircraft should have hit the headquarters of the enemy’s communications centers. Simultaneously with the artillery preparation, the assault and bomber aircraft of the 16 Air Army launched massive strikes against enemy strongholds and firing positions to a depth of 15 km. After the introduction of mobile units into battle, the main task of aviation was to suppress the anti-tank defenses of the German forces. Most of the assault and fighter aircraft switched to direct support of the combined-arms and tank armies.

14-15 April, our troops conducted reconnaissance by force in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the German defense, its firing positions and force the enemy to tighten reserves to the front edge. The main events took place in the 4 zone of the combined-arms armies of the main attack force of the front. In the center, the offensive was conducted by reinforced rifle battalions of the first echelon divisions, on the flanks by reinforced companies. The advance units maintained strong artillery fire. In different directions, our troops managed to penetrate the enemy’s battle formations on 2-5 km.

As a result, our troops overcame the strongest strip of minefields and violated the integrity of the enemy’s first line of defense, which facilitated the advance of the main forces of the front. In addition, the German command was misled. According to the experience of previous operations, the Germans thought that the main forces of the front would go over to the offensive for the reconnaissance battalions. However, neither 14 th, nor 15 th April, our troops in a general offensive did not go. The German command made the erroneous conclusion that the offensive of the main forces of the 1 of the Byelorussian Front was postponed for several days.


Soviet bombers are heading for Berlin

Soviet soldiers cross the river Oder

Breakthrough Enemy Defense

At 5 on the morning of April 16 on April 1945, artillery preparation began in total darkness. At the front of the main attack force, the artillery suppressed enemy targets to 20-6 km and in places to 8 km for 10 minutes. In such a short period, about 500 thousand projectiles and mines of all calibers were fired. The effectiveness of the artillery strike was great. The first two trenches were disabled from 30 to 70% of the personnel of the German units. When the Soviet infantry and tanks went on the attack in some areas, they advanced 1,5-2 km without encountering enemy resistance. However, soon the German troops, relying on a strong and well-prepared second line of defense, began to show fierce resistance. Fierce fighting broke out all over the front.

At the same time, the bombers of the 16 Air Army attacked headquarters, communications centers, 3-4 trenches of the enemy’s main line of defense. The 18-I Air Army (heavy aircraft) also took part in the attack. For 40 minutes, 745 machines bombed the targets. In just one day, despite the unfavorable meteorological situation, our pilots made 6550 sorties, including night 877. More than 1500 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. German aircraft tried to resist. During the day, 140 air combat took place. Our falcons knocked down 165 German cars.

The 47 Special Purpose Division that defended the offensive zone of Perkhorovich’s 606 Army suffered heavy losses. German soldiers were caught in artillery preparation in the trenches and many died. However, the Germans had stubborn resistance, our troops had to attack, reflecting numerous counterattacks. By the end of the day, our troops advanced to 4-6 km, capturing a number of important strongholds deep in the enemy’s defenses. More than 300 prisoners were captured.

The 3 th shock army of Kuznetsov was successfully advancing. Troops launched an offensive by the spotlights. The greatest success was achieved in the offensive zone of the right-flank 79 Infantry Corps of General SN N. Perevertkin. Our troops fought off several enemy counterattacks and captured the important strongholds of Gross Barnim and Kline Barnim. To strengthen the pressure of the 79 corps in the line of its occurrence in the 10 hour. introduced the 9-k tank corps Kirichenko. As a result, our infantry and tanks advanced 8 km and reached the intermediate defensive zone of the enemy. On the left flank, the 12 th Guards Rifle Corps of General A. F. Kazankin advanced a day by 6 km. Particularly stubborn fighting here went behind the Lechin stronghold. German troops fiercely repelled the frontal attack of the 33 th division of General V. I. Smirnov. Then the 33-division and the 52-division of General N. D. Kozin bypassed Lechin from the north and south. So the strong point was taken. Thus, on the day of the heavy battle, the troops of the 3 Shock Army broke through the main enemy defensive zone and with the right wing reached the intermediate zone. About 900 prisoners were captured.

In the light of the searchlights, the 5 th Berzarin shock army launched an offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the central 32 th infantry corps of General D. S. Zherebin. Our troops advanced 8 km and by the end of the day they reached the right bank of the Alt Oder river, to the second line of the enemy’s defense in the Scarves, Guzov sector. On the right flank of the army, the 26-th Guards Rifle Corps, overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, advanced by 6 km. The forces of the left-flank 9 Infantry Corps also advanced 6 km. At the same time, units of the 301 Infantry Division of Colonel V. S. Antonov took an important strong point of the enemy - Verbig.

In the battle for Verbig station, the Komsomol of the 1 th battalion of the 1054 Infantry Regiment distinguished himself Lieutenant Grant Arsenovich Avakian. Having found the enemy detachment that had prepared for the counterattack, Avakian, taking the fighters with him, headed for the house. Hiding stealthily to the enemy, Avakian threw three grenades out the window. The Germans, in panic, jumped out of the house, and came under concentrated fire from machine gunners. During this battle, Lieutenant Avakian, along with his fighters, destroyed 56 German soldiers and captured 14 people, captured 2 BTR. 24 April Avakian once again distinguished himself, while seizing and holding a bridgehead across the Spree River in the streets of Berlin. He was badly wounded. For their courage and heroism, Lieutenant Avakian was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Thus, by the end of the day, the troops of the 5 st shock army, breaking down the resistance of the enemy, advanced by 6-8 km. Our troops broke through all three positions of the main line of the German defense, and went into the offensive zone of the 32 and 9 of the rifle corps to its second line of defense.

The troops of 8 of the Chuikov Guards Army moved to the attack in the light of the 51 searchlight. It should be noted that their light stunned the Germans and at the same time illuminated the road to our advancing troops. In addition, the German night vision systems were put out of action by a powerful flash. Almost simultaneously with the infantry, the forward brigades of the 1 Guards Tank Army of Katukov moved. The intelligence units of the advanced brigades engaged in battles in the ranks of the infantry. Having broken through the enemy's defenses and having beaten off several counterattacks of the 20 th motorized and 169 th infantry divisions, our troops advanced 3-6 km. The main line of defense of the enemy was broken. By 12 watch, Chuikov’s guards and the advance units of the tank army reached the Seelow Heights, where the enemy’s second powerful defense line passed. Began fighting for Seelow Heights.



Start storming Seelow Heights. Zhukov's decision to enter into battle tank armies

The German command managed to withdraw to this line of defense part of the forces of the 20-th motorized division, and also transferred from the reserve tank division "Müncheberg". The anti-tank defense of the Zeeul direction was reinforced by a significant part of the artillery of the Berlin air defense zone. The second strip of the German defense had a large number of wood-and-earth firing points, machine-gun platforms, firing positions for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In front of the heights there was an anti-tank ditch, the steepness of the slopes reached 30-40 degrees and the tanks could not overcome them. The roads that armored vehicles could pass were mined and shot through. The buildings were turned into strong points.

The rifle corps of the 8 Guards Army reached the heights at the same time, therefore the 15-Mingny fire attack envisaged by the offensive plan was carried out as they approached. As a result of a simultaneous and powerful artillery strike. The German fire system was not suppressed and our troops were met with strong artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. Repeated attempts by guards infantry and advanced tank units to penetrate the enemy’s defense were unsuccessful. In this case, the Germans themselves repeatedly switched to counterattacks by forces from the battalion to the infantry regiment with the support of 10-25 tanks and self-propelled guns, and strong artillery fire. The fiercest battles were along the Seelow-Müncheberg highway, where the Germans installed anti-aircraft guns (up to half the 200-mm anti-aircraft guns) around 88.

Marshal Zhukov, in view of the complexity of the upcoming battle, decided to push the mobile units closer to the first echelon. K 12 hour. On April 16, the tank armies were already fully on the Kystrin bridgehead in full readiness to join the battle. Assessing the situation in the first half of the day, the front commander came to the conclusion that, despite the powerful artillery and aviation training, the enemy’s defense in the second lane was not suppressed and the offensive of the four combined-arms armies slowed down. The army clearly did not have time to complete the task of the day. In 16 hour. 30 min. Zhukov gave the order to enter into battle the Guards tank armies, although according to the original plan they were planned to be brought into battle after the breakthrough of the enemy’s second line of defense. Mobile units, in cooperation with the infantry, were to break through the enemy’s second line of defense. The 1-th Guards Tank Army was deployed in the offensive zone of the 8-th Guards Army. The 2-th Guards Tank Army of Bogdanov with its 9-th and 12-th Guards Tank Corps began to move in order to advance in the general direction on Neuhardenberg and Bernau. However, going out in 19 hour. on the line of the advanced units of the 3 and 5 of the shock armies, the tank army could not go further.



Soviet 122-mm howitzer battery M-30 firing on Berlin

Fighting on auxiliary directions

The 61 Army April 16 regrouped for a new direction and prepared for the next day’s attack. The troops of the 1 th Polish Army launched an offensive with three divisions. The Poles forced the Oder and advanced on 5 km. As a result, Polish troops by the end of the day broke through the first line of defense of the enemy. In the evening, the Oder began to force the second echelon of the Polish army.

The left-flank shock group - the 69-I and 33-I armies went on the offensive at different times. 69-I army Kolpakchi went on the offensive in the early morning by the spotlights. Our troops advanced 2-4 km, breaking the fierce resistance and fighting off the enemy’s violent counterattacks. Our troops were able to break through into the Lebus-Schönflies highway. The army by the end of the day broke through the main line of defense and reached the line Poelzig, Shenfis, Wuste-Kunersdorf. In the area of ​​the station Shenfis our troops went to the second line of defense of the enemy.

The 33 Army Tsvetaeva launched an offensive a little later. Our troops, in a wooded and swampy area, advanced 4-6 km, breaking through two positions of the enemy’s main line of defense. On the right flank, the 38 Rifle Corps reached the defensive perimeter of the Frankfurt fortress by the end of the day.

Thus, on the first day of the offensive, with the powerful support of artillery and aviation, our troops broke through only the main enemy band, moving in different directions 3-8 kilometers. It was not possible to completely complete the task on the first day - to break through the second zone of the enemy’s defense, which ran along the Seelow Heights. The underestimation of the defense of the enemy played its role. The powerful defense of the enemy and the remaining unsuppressed system of fire required the regrouping of artillery and new artillery and aviation training.

Zhukov, in order to speed up the offensive, brought into battle both of the main mobile units - the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov. However, they began to take up positions in the evening and could not change the situation. The Soviet command on the evening of April 16 ordered to continue the offensive at night and in the morning of April 17 to break through the second line of defense of the German army. To do this, they decided to conduct a second 30-40-minute artillery preparation, concentrating artillery barrels on the 250 kilometer of the front to 270-1. In addition, the army commanders were ordered not to get involved in protracted battles for enemy strongholds, to bypass them, transferring the tasks of eliminating the surrounded German garrisons to the last units of the second and third echelons of the armies. Guards tank armies were instructed to organize interaction with the infantry.

The German command hastily took measures to strengthen the defense of the Berlin sector from the east. From 18 to 25, April, from 3 and 4, tank armies and remnants of the East Prussia army into 9, the 2 control and corps and 9 divisions were redeployed. So 18-19 of April from the 3-th tank army arrived 11-I motorized rifle division of the SS "Nordland", 23-I motorized rifle division of the SS "Netherlands"; The 19 of April from the 4 Tank Army arrived at the headquarters of the 56 Tank Corps and the 214 Infantry Division. Then came the 5 Army Corps and other units. The Germans tried to stop the offensive of the 1 of the Byelorussian Front with all their might.


Soviet artillery preparation in the area of ​​Seelow Heights

To be continued ...
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  1. +10
    April 24 2015 05: 59
    On the front of the main strike group, artillery suppressed enemy targets for 20 minutes
    Zhukov, by his decision, reduced (!) The artillery preparation at 30-40 mines, assuming that the main goals were suppressed. And he was right, thereby saving dozens of echelons of ammunition. The Red Army and its commanding staff of all degrees were at the peak of power, but God it was hard to go on the attack: in the spring ... near Berlin, at the end of the war.
    1. +4
      April 24 2015 17: 49
      In his "memoirs" Zhukov writes that looking back, he came to the conclusion that there was no need to take the Seelow Heights. You could just bypass them. With what ease he pronounces this phrase. But these are 100 thousand dead soldiers, 100 thousand widows, six Afghans.
      1. +5
        April 25 2015 10: 24
        Quote: Mahmut
        In his "memoirs" Zhukov writes that looking back, he came to the conclusion that there was no need to take the Seelow Heights. You could just bypass them. With what ease he pronounces this phrase. But these are 100 thousand dead soldiers, 100 thousand widows, six Afghans.

        Looking back, Hitler would say that it wasn’t worth starting a war at all, it’s easy to judge looking back, and you yourself imagine yourself in Zhukov’s place, everyone imagines himself a strategist seeing the battle from the side, and even more so everyone (excuse me), etc. .t. may blame for some shortcomings after its completion, and none of the living people can judge Zhukov because no one has managed to command such large groupings of troops in the (possibly) most fierce war of mankind, whom you imagined yourself allowing yourself to give him ratings .. .
        1. +1
          April 26 2015 19: 17
          who are you interested in imagining yourself allowing yourself to give him ratings ...


          And who are you to shut up my mouth. Before you blame someone for an IDO, take the trouble to reread the text. This is not me who gives an assessment of Zhukov’s actions. He himself evaluates his actions in his memoirs. He wrote memoirs, not me. Got it now?
      2. 0
        April 26 2015 09: 34
        Do you think it is not special? see comment above.
      3. +5
        April 26 2015 12: 35
        And how do you like this point of view on the assault on the Zeelov Heights - I quote the historian A. Isaev:
        In our post-perestroika literature and in modern liberal journalism, it is customary to assert that the head-on assault on the Seelow Heights was unnecessary from a military point of view, a bloody massacre staged by the "butcher" - Marshal Zhukov. He, they say, started it only in order to get ahead of his other colleague, the "butcher", Marshal Konev, who was advancing on the capital of the Third Reich to the south in seizing the laurels of the winner of Berlin. Proponents of the theory of the appropriateness of surrounding Berlin, overlook the obvious question of the qualitative and quantitative composition of the garrison of the city. Standing on the Oder, the 9th German Army numbered 200. They could not be given the opportunity to move to Berlin. Zhukov had before his eyes a chain of assaults on the surrounded cities, declared by the Germans as "festungs" (fortresses), both in the zone of his front and among the neighbors. Isolated Budapest defended itself from the end of December 1944 to February 10, 1945. Therefore, Zhukov came up with a simple and ingenious plan. If the tank armies manage to break into operational space, then they must go to the outskirts of Berlin and form a kind of cocoon around the German capital, which would prevent the reinforcement of the garrison due to the 200th 9th army or reserves from the west. Entering the city at this stage was not intended. With the approach of the Soviet combined-arms armies, the "cocoon" was opened, and Berlin could already be stormed by all the rules. In many ways, the unexpected turn of Konev's troops on Berlin led to the modernization of the "cocoon" to the classical encirclement of two adjacent fronts by adjacent flanks. The main forces of the 9th German army stationed on the Oder were surrounded in the forests southeast of Berlin. This was one of the major defeats of the Germans, undeservedly left in the shadow of the storming of the city itself. As a result, the capital of the "millennial Reich" was defended by Volkssturmists, members of the Hitler Youth, policemen and the remnants of the units defeated on the Oder front. They totaled about 100 people, which was clearly not enough for the defense of such a large city. Berlin was divided into nine defense sectors. The garrison of each sector according to the plan was to be 25 people. In reality, there were no more than 10 - 000 people. There was no question of any occupation of each house; only the key buildings of the blocks were defended. The entrance to the city of the 400th group of two fronts did not leave the defenders any chance. This led to a relatively quick assault on Berlin - about 10 days. Losses at the Zeelovsky Heights, Isaev notes, are often confused with losses throughout the Berlin operation. And it recalls that the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops in it amounted to 80 people, and the total - 000 people. These are the losses of three fronts advancing in a strip 300 km wide, - t. e. 1st Belorussian (commander - Zhukov), 1st Ukrainian (commander - Konev) and 2nd Belorussian (commander - Rokossovsky). Narrowing these losses to a patch of Zeelovsky heights is simply stupid. It is stupid only to turn 300 total losses into 000 killed. Actually, the total losses of the 8th Guards and 69th Armies during the offensive in the area of ​​the Zeelovsky Heights amounted to about 20 people, and irretrievable losses - about 000 people.
        I have the honor.
        1. +2
          April 26 2015 16: 25
          Was suppressing these heights also part of some cunning plan?
          When they don’t let go, they just surround and don’t storm on the forehead.
          1. 0
            17 February 2019 09: 24
            Suddenly, but the Zeelow Heights were on the northern flank of the 9th Army. They broke through them just to surround her.
      4. 0
        17 February 2019 09: 19
        What are you talking about? One hundred thousand corpses will not be typed in all three fronts and for the entire Berlin operation, and here only Zeelov ...
    2. 0
      April 26 2015 09: 30
      Yeah, yes ... Looking back at the article:
      The German fire system was not suppressed and our troops were met with strong artillery-mortar and machine-gun fire.

      The German fire system was not suppressed and our troops were met with strong artillery-mortar and machine-gun fire.

      Underestimation of enemy defense played a role. The powerful defense of the enemy and the remaining unsuppressed fire system required a regrouping of artillery and new artillery and aviation training.


      yes
      Quote: G.K. Zhukov
      Russian women still give birth

      and he needed trains for another.
    3. +1
      April 27 2015 03: 37
      In 1945, there was no longer a strict need to save ammunition. Industry covered the army's applications in full.
  2. +2
    April 24 2015 09: 22
    The premature entry of tanks means a serious setback.
    1. +6
      April 24 2015 15: 12
      Quote: Angro Magno
      The premature entry of tanks means a serious setback.

      This stick has two ends. smile

      Yes, putting a TA into battle before a "clean breakthrough" is formed means premature losses and a reduction in their capabilities at further stages of the operation.

      But do not forget that entering a breakthrough is not an end in itself. For the mechanized units of the 1st BF, it was extremely important to go to the rear as soon as possible to the 9A units defending under Berlin and, combined with the 1st UV units, cut off the Germans' possibility of moving to the city. By the way, about the same way Paulus and Goth planned to act near Stalingrad - but did not grow together.
      From this point of view, the loss of TA at the initial stage of the breakthrough was justified. The sooner the defense is breached, the fewer units of 9A will have time to retreat to the city and the smaller will be the further losses during the battles in city blocks. And losses in urban battles with a full 9 A would have blocked the losses of mechanical parts during the breakthrough many times - judging by how many problems the only 56 corps brought, having managed to reach Berlin.
  3. 0
    April 24 2015 13: 50
    photo captions
  4. +5
    April 24 2015 17: 39
    It was recalled in 1945, when our troops approached Berlin, the Kukryniksy created a caricature, which Marshak accompanied with poems.

    Conversation of a corporal with a general's uniform

    Goodbye, my uniform, my reliable servant.
    The minute of separation comes.
    Goodbye forever ... Already not set foot
    In your general's trousers!
    I was hoping to conquer the world with you
    Dreamed of prey and glory.
    I entered Paris with you, my uniform,
    I pranced around you in Warsaw.
    In you I once climbed Parnassus
    With a fun, tipsy retinue.
    In you I flew across Europe more than once
    From the Norwegian Fjords to Crete.
    There remains a gap in your sleeve
    The gap is huge - behind
    In memory of the vain desire for Moscow,
    About what happened in Stalingrad ...
    These patches were left by Donbass ...
    Karelia ... Crimea ... Ukraine ...
    Here is Hungary, Poland ... And these now
    Nashita near Berlin.
    Now you miss the dirt and the dust
    Deprived of a satin lining,
    И trembling quietly
    Guns of the Red Army
    .
    With you we waited a rainy day.
    We will live our age apart.
    And they will hang you and me soon
    Harsh, firm hands
    .
    I got chills to my bones
    The guns rumble so much.
    You would be in my coffin, and me in the wardrobe!
    Yes, only the judges will find me ...

    I have prepared my suitcase for a long time,
    Dreaming of flying to Argentina.
    Alas, the ocean is far from me
    And the front is approaching Berlin!
    Goodbye my frock coat, my reliable servant.
    The minute of separation comes.
    Goodbye forever ... Already not set foot
    In your general's pants ...
  5. -4
    April 25 2015 11: 29
    in the Zeelov heights all the bugs ...
    because of the Ponte, laying hundreds of lives of soldiers in the ground ...

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