What in Yemen is mine to you?
Saudi Arabia’s “backyard” has become a battleground for leadership in the Gulf region
Before 25 in March, when the “Storm of Determination” military operation was announced in Riyadh, the purpose of which was to launch air strikes against the positions of the Housits advancing in the south of Yemen, few of the leaders of the “international community” were interested in the events taking place in this country.
Yemen was secretly considered the “backyard” of Saudi Arabia, and the presence on its territory of the United States military and the American UAV base operating against “Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula”, which occupied the place of the Soviet military advisers, was mostly limited to the largest port of Aden, the capital of Sana'a and the island of Socotra.
Babelmandeb key
While Yemen occupies a strategic position in the region, controlling the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and the adjacent waters of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, it is controlled by the United States and other Western countries from the African coast. For this, the United States, France, and, more recently, Japan are holding military bases in Djibouti. To a large extent, this is explained by the instability that is usual for Yemen: its South for centuries was a territory independent of the North, where the Zeidith Imamate was located until the 60 of the XX century.
Another important reason is the presence of radical Islamist structures controlling entire provinces in Yemen. The standard of living in the country is ten times lower than in neighboring Saudi Arabia - not the richest country of the peninsula. The consequence of this is both “otkhodnichestvo” on the territory of the Saudi kingdom, traditional for Yemen, and the fact that it was here that the “infantry of jihad” against the USSR was recruited into Afghanistan. Yes, and Bin Laden himself had Yemeni roots. The danger from the Yemeni radicals for the US military contingent was once underestimated by Washington, which resulted in a terrorist attack on the Cole destroyer in 2000, causing human casualties.
Traditional Yemen Zaidite Shi'ism and Shafi’s Sunniism are now complemented by radical Salafism of tribal groups that focus on Al-Qaida and, more recently, the Islamic State. At the same time, the tribal factor, which plays a significant role in the Arab world, is dominant in the intra-Yemeni political scenario. Without taking into account the correlation of forces between the tribes and their unions, as well as the dynamics of confrontation of clans within the tribes, it is impossible to navigate in the Yemeni ethno-religious mosaic. This information, with the exception of a narrow circle of specialists, for decades remained the monopoly of the General Intelligence Directorate of Saudi Arabia, which oversaw the situation in the border strip.
Relations between these countries are complicated by the fact that the Yemeni Assir with the Zeidit population was conquered in the early twentieth century and incorporated into the kingdom by its founder, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud. Do not forget about the characteristic for the local tribes model of communication with a rich neighbor: for decades, peace on the border with Saudi Arabia was bought by Riyadh. The attitude of Yemen to neighboring states characterizes its recognition in Iraq’s 1990 annexation of Kuwait, which resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Yemeni residents there from Saudi Arabia.
Based on the analysis of the current situation, made according to the research program of the Institute of the Middle East, P. Ryabov, we state: the current crisis was the result of the short-sighted and inconsistent policies of Saudi Arabia. Initially, in the continuation of the “Arab Spring”, Riyadh relied on the departure of President Saleh, who ruled the united Yemen with 1990 of the year, to stop financing his tribal elite. This led to the transfer of a significant part of it to the maintenance of Qatar, which is competing with the Saudis, after which the KSA "closed its eyes" to the actions of the Housits, which led to the disappearance of the Islamist Islamist party from the political arena, which was one of the important links in the system of internal political balance of forces.
As a result, the Lika Mushtarak coalition, which united the opponents of Salekh, collapsed, and the Khousits intensified and attempted to restore the Zeydi Imamat. Riyadh, in an attempt to reach a compromise between supporters of the ousted president and his successor in the Saudi elite, allowed the clan Saleh to return to power, and therefore put active pressure on the head of state A.M. Hadi to preserve the predecessor's protesters in the country. Which led to the current situation. It was they, not the Khousits, who played the main role in the capture of Taiz, Aden and a number of military bases in the south of the country, where they were stationed. Simply put, Saleh decided to deceive his Saudi allies.
Clans and plans
Despite Riyadh’s formidable statements against the Housits, the experience of military clashes with them by the Saudi National Guard in November 2009 does not give grounds for optimism if the KSA military units are brought into Yemen. Prospects for resolving the crisis lie in a financial rather than a military field. After all, from the time of the 1962 revolution to the 1984, the leaders of the Housits lived at public expense in Saudi Arabia. After that, Riyadh made a bid for Saleh (and then passed it, but "not to the end" - for which it is currently paying).
Note that the ex-president, whose physical (and not political) survival is questionable, states that he is ready to negotiate with everyone. The question is whether Riyadh will want to speak with him after his intrigues lead to the transformation of Yemen into a potential bridgehead of Iran into the “soft underbelly” of the kingdom. Moreover, the United States, having lost Yemen in favor of Iran, wrote off Saleh from the accounts. He, however, was preparing for this: his real estate in the States was sold ahead of time, and personal funds were transferred from the UAE to Yemen. What provided him financial security: Washington’s sanctions, if they are imposed on his assets, do not threaten him. This is an important circumstance in the conditions of the attempt to return the clan (in the person of the sons) to power - contrary to the US bet on the ousted and fled the country as a result of the actions of the alliance with the Abish Rabbo Mansur Hadi.
By the way, the leaders of the Housewits from Tehran receive at their headquarters in Germany, outside the sphere of influence of Saudi Arabia: there will be no quarrel with Tehran over Riyadh Berlin, which has significant interests in Iran. Especially since the union of the Housits and Saleh is clearly temporary in nature and is due to the overall task of removing President Hadi. It is characteristic that most of the Khousit forces at the first stage of the attack on the south were deployed under Taiz, but then hastily returned to Saad. And the reason for this is not the beginning of the military operation of the Arabian monarchies (it was not planned yet), but Saleh’s attempt to control the important from a military-strategic point of view, Amran, with the help of loyal forces that the Housits had tore.
The tasks that temporary allies set for themselves are diametrically opposed. Saleh wishes his son Ahmed to come to the presidency. Housits suggest to establish a state system in Yemen according to the Iranian model with the central role of the clergy as the supreme arbiter. Obviously, if story with the overthrow of Hadi and the seizure of Aden ended according to the original plan, soon a clash between them would be inevitable. It is the actions of the Arabian monarchies with their attempt to bring Hadi to power by force that give the union of Saleh and the Housits a chance to exist for some more time.
President Hadi, overthrown by this alliance, is unpopular in Yemen. Most of the political elite and the tribal elite will not fight for it. After he surrendered one of the leaders of the Islah party, Hamid al-Ahmar, to the Khousits, the tribal alliance Hashad refused to support him. The Harakat movement, which Hadi created in Abyan’s homeland, also did not provide him with military assistance, largely due to the position of T. al-Fadli’s al-Qaeda-recognized authority in this region, who was influenced by Saudi Arabia. The population of South Yemen believes that Hadi did nothing useful for his countrymen during his presidency. Why and showed indifference in the seizure of Aden by Saleh supporters from among the former Republican Guard. So even if the international coalition can restore the formal presidency of Hadi, strengthening its regime is not in its competence.
At present, the Khousit and Salekh detachments are dispersed into small groups in order not to become an easy target for the Air Force of the Arabian monarchies. The Housits will be drawn north to their traditional mountain areas of influence, where they have the support of the population. It’s unrealistic to knock them out; any military operation there will lead to significant losses for the attacking side. So, most likely, the main center of their confrontation with the coalition forces will be concentrated in the north of Yemen. It can be assumed that in the near future there will begin an offensive against Islamists and Salafi radicals from Marib - a natural move from Riyadh, which plans to localize the Housits in the mountainous regions and give an advantage in the struggle for power to a loyal force to bring it ultimately to authorities.
The formation of the land coalition, in spite of the scale of its information coverage by the Arab media, how matters are completely resolved, is questionable - just like the actual participation of Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, and especially Pakistan. This is due to the fact that this de facto coalition will be anti-Shiite in nature, and this is rather dangerous for Pakistan bordering Iran and its significant Shiite population. However, the direct participation of Iran or Lebanese Shiites from Hezbollah in the upcoming Yemeni battles is unlikely due to the absolute Saudi air superiority, even if we forget about the Syrian-Iraqi priority for Tehran, which is focused on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and main reserves its "external support". It is unlikely due to the inevitability of heavy losses and the march-throw of the Housits on the oil-bearing deposits of CSA in an attempt to raise a Shia uprising in the Eastern Province.
It can be assumed that Saudi Arabia will involve in the ground operation mainly the national guard (including in case of failure, once again demonstrating the failure of its commander, the political rival of King Salman, Prince Mutaib, to justify the upcoming reorganization of this military structure) and the Egyptian units as real combat force. The presence of Cairo in the coalition is primarily due to this consideration - despite the fact that the Egyptian army was already noted in Yemen during the civil war of 1962 – 1969. Moreover, Nasser supported the Republicans against the supporters of the overthrown Zaidit monarchy (the same Housits), while Saudi Arabia acted on the side of the monarchists, providing them with financial and military-technical assistance.
The beginning of a massive military intervention in Yemen will unambiguously lead to a serious strengthening of the Salafi radical wing in the political segment of the country, with the help of which they plan to solve several important problems for Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. These include “fine polishing” of the agreement on disputed territories, Yemen’s refusal to operate oil fields in the 15-kilometer border zone and reduce to zero the influence of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood represented by the Islah party. The flip side will be the flourishing of Islamist radicalism with all the negative consequences, including for the kingdom itself, but this most likely will not stop King Salman before the temptation of the “final solution to the Yemeni problem” (hardly successful).
The possible directions of the invasion of Yemen’s troops of the coalition KSA coalition, which will take place on the initially declared scale, are not known yet to even the Saudi military leadership. The most preferred option for conducting a ground operation remains the South Yemeni direction, since the population of the South will not fight for anyone (which may change after the invasion of the Saudi forces). A more likely option is to use for the war with the Khousits of the Intra-Yemeni forces represented by the Islamists from Marib and the detachments of the stepbrother of the former President Saleh and his enemy Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. The last 26 of March already held a meeting with A. M. Hadi and the Saudi military in Riyadh. He is well aware of the north of Yemen, because prior to emigration he commanded the Northern Military District and fought three times with the Khousits, representing the Salekh regime (however, to no avail).
The war with them in the north in Saad and Sana'a, where the majority of the population are Zeidites and mountains predominate, precluding the use of fully heavy equipment, is an extremely unprofitable scenario for Saudi Arabia. She could not defeat the Howsites. The capture of the capital does not guarantee the onset of calm and the creation of conditions for overcoming the crisis - rather, it will be the beginning of a national liberation war against the invaders. As a result, the kingdom and its allies will so far confine themselves to a sea blockade of the coast, so as not to allow Iran to transfer weapons and advisers to Yemen and to secure the passage of the tanker fleet through the strait of Bab el Mandeb. In parallel, the bombardment of the ground positions of the Howsites and supporters of Saleh will continue.
Get for Baloch
Note that the theses promoted in the expert community about the presence in Yemen of military specialists from Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah on a permanent basis, as well as the threat from the Shiite alliance to the freedom of navigation (first of all to the passage of tankers) through the Bab el-Mandeb strait to the general logic of the propaganda justification of the operation conducted by Saudi Arabia and the members of the Sunni coalition formed by them to curb “Shiite expansion” in the south of the Arabian Peninsula. However, so far, besides the Shiite symbolism itself and the structure of the Zaydit military hierarchy, which copies Iranian counterparts in the form of the IRGC, the Saudis have nothing to do with the Housits or Iran. There are no obvious facts of the Iranian military presence in Yemen, documented.
At the same time, the “breakthrough” of the Housits to Aden clearly makes the leadership of the kingdom wait for the worst, which explains Riyadh’s reaction to what is happening, bordering on panic. From where the unprecedentedly sharp, to the point of permissible, reaction of the head of the Saudi Foreign Ministry, Prince Saud al-Faisal, to the letter of the Yemeni crisis devoted to the letter of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The tone of his statements was clearly influenced by the myth prevailing in the highest echelons of power of the kingdom about the existing anti-Sunni alliance of Russia and Iran (more commonly, Russia and Shiites): the call to abandon the military solution was perceived by Saudi leaders as an attempt to tie their hands and delay time, giving Tehran an opportunity to gain a foothold in the rear of KSA.
Of course, Tehran keeps track of the events taking place in the “soft underbelly” of its adversary, not limited to political and informational support of the Housits, although their throw to the south most likely turned out to be a surprise. The recent terrorist attacks in Sana'a were a turning point in the intra-Yemeni crisis, when a significant number of leaders of the “moderate wing” of the Housits died as a result of explosions in Shiite mosques, which triggered the announcement of “general mobilization” and an attack on the south. Forces in this movement came to power, which were set up exclusively for a military solution to the problem. In this case, it is appropriate to speak about actions to “clear the ground” of not Iran, who was in favor of an evolutionary solution to the crisis, but Saleh and his supporters from among the “hawks” -Housits.
In any case, Tehran considers the current situation in Yemen as a response of Saudi Arabia to its attempts to open against it a “second front” (in addition to the Syrian-Iraqi) in the “zone of the Baluchi tribes” on the border of Iran and Pakistan. Recall that with the help of the Pakistani intelligence community, Riyadh in 2014 created the front of instability in areas of Pakistan adjacent to Pakistan with the help of radical Baloch groups. This posed a problem for the Iranian security forces, but did not solve the Saudi strategy: organizing a hotbed of instability on the eastern borders of its enemy to divert it to this direction in order to weaken Tehran on more important fronts, primarily in Syria and Iraq.
The “Yemeni response” of Iran’s Saudi Arabia promises to be effective. Solving this problem will require more significant and painful costs for Riyadh than the Baluchi activity on the Pakistani-Iranian border. In itself, the conduct of air strikes and the withdrawal of warships in the area of the Yemeni coast to block the logistical supply channels of the Housits is expensive, especially since Riyadh will have to pay for everything. The ground operation, if it takes place, will be even more expensive, even without taking into account the subsidies that need to be provided to the Yemeni tribes in order to purchase their loyalty.
What is especially important for him - Riyadh is forced to disperse efforts and seriously ease the pressure on the Syrian-Iraqi direction. It is clear that right now Yemen has become the number one priority for him, which leads to a proportional increase in the influence of Iran in Iraq and Syria, which Washington is already worried about. The cost of Tehran in this case is not an example less. Moreover, Yemen is the largest black market in the Middle East weapons Various modifications and the issue of supplying them with the Housits is not on the agenda ...
Before 25 in March, when the “Storm of Determination” military operation was announced in Riyadh, the purpose of which was to launch air strikes against the positions of the Housits advancing in the south of Yemen, few of the leaders of the “international community” were interested in the events taking place in this country.
Yemen was secretly considered the “backyard” of Saudi Arabia, and the presence on its territory of the United States military and the American UAV base operating against “Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula”, which occupied the place of the Soviet military advisers, was mostly limited to the largest port of Aden, the capital of Sana'a and the island of Socotra.
Babelmandeb key
While Yemen occupies a strategic position in the region, controlling the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and the adjacent waters of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, it is controlled by the United States and other Western countries from the African coast. For this, the United States, France, and, more recently, Japan are holding military bases in Djibouti. To a large extent, this is explained by the instability that is usual for Yemen: its South for centuries was a territory independent of the North, where the Zeidith Imamate was located until the 60 of the XX century.
Another important reason is the presence of radical Islamist structures controlling entire provinces in Yemen. The standard of living in the country is ten times lower than in neighboring Saudi Arabia - not the richest country of the peninsula. The consequence of this is both “otkhodnichestvo” on the territory of the Saudi kingdom, traditional for Yemen, and the fact that it was here that the “infantry of jihad” against the USSR was recruited into Afghanistan. Yes, and Bin Laden himself had Yemeni roots. The danger from the Yemeni radicals for the US military contingent was once underestimated by Washington, which resulted in a terrorist attack on the Cole destroyer in 2000, causing human casualties.
Traditional Yemen Zaidite Shi'ism and Shafi’s Sunniism are now complemented by radical Salafism of tribal groups that focus on Al-Qaida and, more recently, the Islamic State. At the same time, the tribal factor, which plays a significant role in the Arab world, is dominant in the intra-Yemeni political scenario. Without taking into account the correlation of forces between the tribes and their unions, as well as the dynamics of confrontation of clans within the tribes, it is impossible to navigate in the Yemeni ethno-religious mosaic. This information, with the exception of a narrow circle of specialists, for decades remained the monopoly of the General Intelligence Directorate of Saudi Arabia, which oversaw the situation in the border strip.
Relations between these countries are complicated by the fact that the Yemeni Assir with the Zeidit population was conquered in the early twentieth century and incorporated into the kingdom by its founder, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud. Do not forget about the characteristic for the local tribes model of communication with a rich neighbor: for decades, peace on the border with Saudi Arabia was bought by Riyadh. The attitude of Yemen to neighboring states characterizes its recognition in Iraq’s 1990 annexation of Kuwait, which resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Yemeni residents there from Saudi Arabia.
Based on the analysis of the current situation, made according to the research program of the Institute of the Middle East, P. Ryabov, we state: the current crisis was the result of the short-sighted and inconsistent policies of Saudi Arabia. Initially, in the continuation of the “Arab Spring”, Riyadh relied on the departure of President Saleh, who ruled the united Yemen with 1990 of the year, to stop financing his tribal elite. This led to the transfer of a significant part of it to the maintenance of Qatar, which is competing with the Saudis, after which the KSA "closed its eyes" to the actions of the Housits, which led to the disappearance of the Islamist Islamist party from the political arena, which was one of the important links in the system of internal political balance of forces.
As a result, the Lika Mushtarak coalition, which united the opponents of Salekh, collapsed, and the Khousits intensified and attempted to restore the Zeydi Imamat. Riyadh, in an attempt to reach a compromise between supporters of the ousted president and his successor in the Saudi elite, allowed the clan Saleh to return to power, and therefore put active pressure on the head of state A.M. Hadi to preserve the predecessor's protesters in the country. Which led to the current situation. It was they, not the Khousits, who played the main role in the capture of Taiz, Aden and a number of military bases in the south of the country, where they were stationed. Simply put, Saleh decided to deceive his Saudi allies.
Clans and plans
Despite Riyadh’s formidable statements against the Housits, the experience of military clashes with them by the Saudi National Guard in November 2009 does not give grounds for optimism if the KSA military units are brought into Yemen. Prospects for resolving the crisis lie in a financial rather than a military field. After all, from the time of the 1962 revolution to the 1984, the leaders of the Housits lived at public expense in Saudi Arabia. After that, Riyadh made a bid for Saleh (and then passed it, but "not to the end" - for which it is currently paying).
Note that the ex-president, whose physical (and not political) survival is questionable, states that he is ready to negotiate with everyone. The question is whether Riyadh will want to speak with him after his intrigues lead to the transformation of Yemen into a potential bridgehead of Iran into the “soft underbelly” of the kingdom. Moreover, the United States, having lost Yemen in favor of Iran, wrote off Saleh from the accounts. He, however, was preparing for this: his real estate in the States was sold ahead of time, and personal funds were transferred from the UAE to Yemen. What provided him financial security: Washington’s sanctions, if they are imposed on his assets, do not threaten him. This is an important circumstance in the conditions of the attempt to return the clan (in the person of the sons) to power - contrary to the US bet on the ousted and fled the country as a result of the actions of the alliance with the Abish Rabbo Mansur Hadi.By the way, the leaders of the Housewits from Tehran receive at their headquarters in Germany, outside the sphere of influence of Saudi Arabia: there will be no quarrel with Tehran over Riyadh Berlin, which has significant interests in Iran. Especially since the union of the Housits and Saleh is clearly temporary in nature and is due to the overall task of removing President Hadi. It is characteristic that most of the Khousit forces at the first stage of the attack on the south were deployed under Taiz, but then hastily returned to Saad. And the reason for this is not the beginning of the military operation of the Arabian monarchies (it was not planned yet), but Saleh’s attempt to control the important from a military-strategic point of view, Amran, with the help of loyal forces that the Housits had tore.
The tasks that temporary allies set for themselves are diametrically opposed. Saleh wishes his son Ahmed to come to the presidency. Housits suggest to establish a state system in Yemen according to the Iranian model with the central role of the clergy as the supreme arbiter. Obviously, if story with the overthrow of Hadi and the seizure of Aden ended according to the original plan, soon a clash between them would be inevitable. It is the actions of the Arabian monarchies with their attempt to bring Hadi to power by force that give the union of Saleh and the Housits a chance to exist for some more time.
President Hadi, overthrown by this alliance, is unpopular in Yemen. Most of the political elite and the tribal elite will not fight for it. After he surrendered one of the leaders of the Islah party, Hamid al-Ahmar, to the Khousits, the tribal alliance Hashad refused to support him. The Harakat movement, which Hadi created in Abyan’s homeland, also did not provide him with military assistance, largely due to the position of T. al-Fadli’s al-Qaeda-recognized authority in this region, who was influenced by Saudi Arabia. The population of South Yemen believes that Hadi did nothing useful for his countrymen during his presidency. Why and showed indifference in the seizure of Aden by Saleh supporters from among the former Republican Guard. So even if the international coalition can restore the formal presidency of Hadi, strengthening its regime is not in its competence.
At present, the Khousit and Salekh detachments are dispersed into small groups in order not to become an easy target for the Air Force of the Arabian monarchies. The Housits will be drawn north to their traditional mountain areas of influence, where they have the support of the population. It’s unrealistic to knock them out; any military operation there will lead to significant losses for the attacking side. So, most likely, the main center of their confrontation with the coalition forces will be concentrated in the north of Yemen. It can be assumed that in the near future there will begin an offensive against Islamists and Salafi radicals from Marib - a natural move from Riyadh, which plans to localize the Housits in the mountainous regions and give an advantage in the struggle for power to a loyal force to bring it ultimately to authorities.The formation of the land coalition, in spite of the scale of its information coverage by the Arab media, how matters are completely resolved, is questionable - just like the actual participation of Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, and especially Pakistan. This is due to the fact that this de facto coalition will be anti-Shiite in nature, and this is rather dangerous for Pakistan bordering Iran and its significant Shiite population. However, the direct participation of Iran or Lebanese Shiites from Hezbollah in the upcoming Yemeni battles is unlikely due to the absolute Saudi air superiority, even if we forget about the Syrian-Iraqi priority for Tehran, which is focused on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and main reserves its "external support". It is unlikely due to the inevitability of heavy losses and the march-throw of the Housits on the oil-bearing deposits of CSA in an attempt to raise a Shia uprising in the Eastern Province.
It can be assumed that Saudi Arabia will involve in the ground operation mainly the national guard (including in case of failure, once again demonstrating the failure of its commander, the political rival of King Salman, Prince Mutaib, to justify the upcoming reorganization of this military structure) and the Egyptian units as real combat force. The presence of Cairo in the coalition is primarily due to this consideration - despite the fact that the Egyptian army was already noted in Yemen during the civil war of 1962 – 1969. Moreover, Nasser supported the Republicans against the supporters of the overthrown Zaidit monarchy (the same Housits), while Saudi Arabia acted on the side of the monarchists, providing them with financial and military-technical assistance.
The beginning of a massive military intervention in Yemen will unambiguously lead to a serious strengthening of the Salafi radical wing in the political segment of the country, with the help of which they plan to solve several important problems for Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. These include “fine polishing” of the agreement on disputed territories, Yemen’s refusal to operate oil fields in the 15-kilometer border zone and reduce to zero the influence of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood represented by the Islah party. The flip side will be the flourishing of Islamist radicalism with all the negative consequences, including for the kingdom itself, but this most likely will not stop King Salman before the temptation of the “final solution to the Yemeni problem” (hardly successful).
The possible directions of the invasion of Yemen’s troops of the coalition KSA coalition, which will take place on the initially declared scale, are not known yet to even the Saudi military leadership. The most preferred option for conducting a ground operation remains the South Yemeni direction, since the population of the South will not fight for anyone (which may change after the invasion of the Saudi forces). A more likely option is to use for the war with the Khousits of the Intra-Yemeni forces represented by the Islamists from Marib and the detachments of the stepbrother of the former President Saleh and his enemy Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. The last 26 of March already held a meeting with A. M. Hadi and the Saudi military in Riyadh. He is well aware of the north of Yemen, because prior to emigration he commanded the Northern Military District and fought three times with the Khousits, representing the Salekh regime (however, to no avail).
The war with them in the north in Saad and Sana'a, where the majority of the population are Zeidites and mountains predominate, precluding the use of fully heavy equipment, is an extremely unprofitable scenario for Saudi Arabia. She could not defeat the Howsites. The capture of the capital does not guarantee the onset of calm and the creation of conditions for overcoming the crisis - rather, it will be the beginning of a national liberation war against the invaders. As a result, the kingdom and its allies will so far confine themselves to a sea blockade of the coast, so as not to allow Iran to transfer weapons and advisers to Yemen and to secure the passage of the tanker fleet through the strait of Bab el Mandeb. In parallel, the bombardment of the ground positions of the Howsites and supporters of Saleh will continue.
Get for Baloch
Note that the theses promoted in the expert community about the presence in Yemen of military specialists from Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah on a permanent basis, as well as the threat from the Shiite alliance to the freedom of navigation (first of all to the passage of tankers) through the Bab el-Mandeb strait to the general logic of the propaganda justification of the operation conducted by Saudi Arabia and the members of the Sunni coalition formed by them to curb “Shiite expansion” in the south of the Arabian Peninsula. However, so far, besides the Shiite symbolism itself and the structure of the Zaydit military hierarchy, which copies Iranian counterparts in the form of the IRGC, the Saudis have nothing to do with the Housits or Iran. There are no obvious facts of the Iranian military presence in Yemen, documented.
At the same time, the “breakthrough” of the Housits to Aden clearly makes the leadership of the kingdom wait for the worst, which explains Riyadh’s reaction to what is happening, bordering on panic. From where the unprecedentedly sharp, to the point of permissible, reaction of the head of the Saudi Foreign Ministry, Prince Saud al-Faisal, to the letter of the Yemeni crisis devoted to the letter of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The tone of his statements was clearly influenced by the myth prevailing in the highest echelons of power of the kingdom about the existing anti-Sunni alliance of Russia and Iran (more commonly, Russia and Shiites): the call to abandon the military solution was perceived by Saudi leaders as an attempt to tie their hands and delay time, giving Tehran an opportunity to gain a foothold in the rear of KSA.
Of course, Tehran keeps track of the events taking place in the “soft underbelly” of its adversary, not limited to political and informational support of the Housits, although their throw to the south most likely turned out to be a surprise. The recent terrorist attacks in Sana'a were a turning point in the intra-Yemeni crisis, when a significant number of leaders of the “moderate wing” of the Housits died as a result of explosions in Shiite mosques, which triggered the announcement of “general mobilization” and an attack on the south. Forces in this movement came to power, which were set up exclusively for a military solution to the problem. In this case, it is appropriate to speak about actions to “clear the ground” of not Iran, who was in favor of an evolutionary solution to the crisis, but Saleh and his supporters from among the “hawks” -Housits.
In any case, Tehran considers the current situation in Yemen as a response of Saudi Arabia to its attempts to open against it a “second front” (in addition to the Syrian-Iraqi) in the “zone of the Baluchi tribes” on the border of Iran and Pakistan. Recall that with the help of the Pakistani intelligence community, Riyadh in 2014 created the front of instability in areas of Pakistan adjacent to Pakistan with the help of radical Baloch groups. This posed a problem for the Iranian security forces, but did not solve the Saudi strategy: organizing a hotbed of instability on the eastern borders of its enemy to divert it to this direction in order to weaken Tehran on more important fronts, primarily in Syria and Iraq.
The “Yemeni response” of Iran’s Saudi Arabia promises to be effective. Solving this problem will require more significant and painful costs for Riyadh than the Baluchi activity on the Pakistani-Iranian border. In itself, the conduct of air strikes and the withdrawal of warships in the area of the Yemeni coast to block the logistical supply channels of the Housits is expensive, especially since Riyadh will have to pay for everything. The ground operation, if it takes place, will be even more expensive, even without taking into account the subsidies that need to be provided to the Yemeni tribes in order to purchase their loyalty.
What is especially important for him - Riyadh is forced to disperse efforts and seriously ease the pressure on the Syrian-Iraqi direction. It is clear that right now Yemen has become the number one priority for him, which leads to a proportional increase in the influence of Iran in Iraq and Syria, which Washington is already worried about. The cost of Tehran in this case is not an example less. Moreover, Yemen is the largest black market in the Middle East weapons Various modifications and the issue of supplying them with the Housits is not on the agenda ...
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