Afghan parallels
The current conflict between Russia and the West is often called the Cold War. Of course, this is far from the case. It is hardly possible to compare the epic opposition of the Soviet Union, as well as the whole group of socialist states, with the bloc of Western countries in the second half of the 20th century. This confrontation took place all over the planet, the parties were toughly competing with each other for influence in many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They contained huge armies and fleets, which vigilantly followed the enemy on land and sea. Well, finally, the USSR and the West had different economic and ideological models.
Today is different. Now Russia is much smaller than the former USSR and the entire socialist bloc. There is not much difference between the West and Russia in the principles of economic organization, it is only in its results. Even an ideological conflict is somewhat illogical. Because the actions of Moscow, for example, support many movements in the same Europe - from the far right to the ultra-left. In Russia it is often said that this circumstance allows it to become a kind of leader of the new world, who opposes the West with all its problems and ambitions of its elder brother.
At the same time, in the West, Moscow’s actions are sometimes called a striving for imperial revenge and believe that a second Munich cannot be allowed. Recall that in Munich in 1938, the Western countries actually agreed with the division of Czechoslovakia, which was forced to transfer to Germany the German Sudetenland. It is difficult to say whether such parallels can be made in modern conditions. But the fact is that relations between Russia and the West are very unimportant today, although they still don’t pull into the cold war.
But interestingly, the events of the last year give reason to draw unexpected parallels with the events of the 1980s. If we recall that by the end of 1970, the USSR was at the peak of its military and political power, which was largely based on high oil prices. At the same time, the Soviet Union and the West tried to somewhat reduce tensions in their relations, later it would be called a policy of detente. In 1973, the Treaty on Security Measures in Europe was signed in Helsinki, under which agreements were reached on the inviolability of the postwar borders in Europe. As a result of the Helsinki meeting, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was established. Although all this did not cancel the viscous struggle for influence around the world. Everything changed dramatically in December 1979, when the USSR sent troops into Afghanistan.
In 1980, the Olympiad was held in Moscow, which was boycotted by Western countries. Then the West began to actively support the Afghan rebels. In 1983, the incident occurred with the South Korean "Boeing", which was shot down by a Soviet fighter in the Far East over Soviet territorial waters. This caused a wave of indignation in the world, although in the USSR they argued that the plane was carrying out espionage goals and penetrated deep into Soviet territory.
In 1985, Saudi Arabia sharply increased oil production, which caused a drop in the price of 67 percent to 1986. Moreover, the Saudis then refused all attempts to convince them to reduce oil production in the framework of OPEC. Oil prices have been at a minimum for several years. This led to the emergence of great economic problems for the USSR and, ultimately, to its collapse. It is also characteristic that after the 1985 of the year, the USA delivered Stinger man-portable air defense systems to Afghanistan. With these missiles, the Afghan rebels shot down planes and helicopters in the first year before 100 and thus created enormous difficulties for the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This was one of the reasons for withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in 1988.
What is interesting is the sequence of events of the past year. At the beginning of 2014, the Olympics took place in Sochi. In March, Russia carried out the annexation of the Crimea. In the summer of fighting began in the South-East of Ukraine. In June, a tragic incident occurred with the Malaysian Boeing. In the summer, Saudi Arabia supported a drop in oil prices, refusing to reduce its production and giving Asian buyers additional discounts. As a result, by the end of 2014, the price of oil fell by 60 percent.
There is some impression of deja vu. It's just that everything happens much faster this time. That time it took 10 years, this time about a year. And if we also consider that the United States is considering the issue of the supply of defensive weapons Ukraine, including the Javelin anti-tank missiles, then everything looks even more impressive. The fact is that modern Javelin missiles with a tandem warhead are capable of hitting any type of Soviet and Russian tanks. The tandem ammunition hit the upper hemisphere of the tank, where there is weak armor and there is no dynamic protection. Although the tandem ammunition is able to overcome dynamic protection. If the “Javelins” are delivered to the Ukrainian army, then they can be identical in their influence on the course of the conflict in Ukraine to the impact that the “Stingers” once had in Afghanistan. The rebels then will not be able to carry out tank attacks.
Of course, all these comparisons are very conditional, but nonetheless very indicative. The previous Afghan lessons are still not learned and not rethought. But the main lesson of Afghanistan - as a mighty power, which was at the peak of its power and influence in the world, itself voluntarily fell into the Afghan trap.
Afghan trap for the USSR
It should be noted that Afghanistan in the 1950-s and 1960-s conducted a very flexible policy, maneuvering between the interests of the great powers. Today it would be called a multi-vector policy. At the same time, all the powers provided financial assistance to Kabul in carrying out its modernization policy. Most of the funds were provided by the Soviet Union. It was then that a tunnel was built under the Salang Pass, as well as the main roads from Herat to Kandahar and from the Soviet border to Kabul. The government of Mohammad Daud, cousin of Emir Zahir Shah, adopted Soviet five-year development plans. Most officers of the Afghan army were educated in the USSR.
So the USSR was the main partner of monarchical Afghanistan. However, simultaneously with the development of modernization processes, communist movements also developed in the country. There were quite a few of them in Afghanistan. The two factions of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Khalk and Parcham, as well as the Maoists, the movement of communist officers in the army led by General Kadyr and some others. In the USSR, the two factions of the PDPA were considered as ideologically close allies.
The Afghan authorities had to take this fact into account, because they depended on the USSR for financing development programs, as well as arms supplies. In 1963 – 1973, it was a time of a democratic experiment, the communists were represented in parliament. In 1973, they supported the coup, which was organized by Daud, who was removed from the post of prime minister since 1963. For this, the Communists received a number of posts in the new government.
However, compared to the times of his premiership, Daoud became dependent on the USSR. In Moscow, they tried to dictate conditions to Daud, for example, they demanded to send foreign advisers. Afghan communists in power also began to more actively promote their interests. But the most difficult thing for Daud was that the officer corps of the Afghan army were mostly pro-Soviet and supported the Communists.
Daoud attempted to seize the initiative. He dismissed members of the government associated with the Communists, dismissed a number of senior communist officers. For example, Communist General Kadyr, who was the deputy commander of the Air Force, was sent to lead army slaughterhouses. And Daud began trying to build relations with Pakistan and the United States.
In 1977, Daud paid a visit to Moscow, where General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev told him what he should do. Dowd responded very sharply for such an ultimatum. In April, 1978, the Afghan Communists in the army organized a coup, Daoud and his family members were killed. It is still unclear whether there was an order from Moscow to organize the overthrow of Daud or members of the Khalk faction revolted because of the arrest of their leaders. But in any case, the Afghan Communists came to power.
However, almost immediately after he came to power, a struggle for power began between the two factions, during which supporters of Parcham lost to supporters of Khalq and in August 1978, many prominent Parchamists were arrested. Then the contradictions between the two leaders of the victorious Halk faction Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin sharpened. In this situation, Moscow decided to support Taraki. 1 September 1979 Chairman of the KGB Yuri Andropov and his deputy, Vladimir Kryuchkov, submitted a memorandum to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU that Amin should be removed from power.
September 10 Taraki was passing through Moscow, returning from Cuba. Here he met with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Brezhnev, who told him that Amin had gained too much power and this posed a threat to the Afghan revolution and to Taraki personally. Apparently, during the conversation, agreements were reached on actions against Amin. Further almost detective begins story. Among the entourage of Taraki were people devoted to Amin. Some of them called in Kabul and reported on the secret negotiations with Taraki Brezhnev. By the time Taraki returned from Moscow, Amin had replaced the airport security with loyal people.
13 September Amin demanded from Taraki the dismissal of people close to him from the government of Afghanistan - the ministers of security, internal affairs, communications and border affairs. On the same day, the ministers fled to the Soviet embassy, stating that Amin was a CIA agent. On September 14, the Soviet ambassador Puzanov, accompanied by three Soviet generals, arrived at the residence of Taraki and asked Amin to come for talks. At the entrance to the residence, an exchange of fire began during which the adjutant Taraki Colonel Tarun, who met Amin, died. It was also quite a detective story. Because during the shooting on the stairs only Tarun was killed. If there had been an attempt, then Amin would have been definitely killed. All observers then agreed that it was Amin’s provocation.
After that, he arrested Taraki and accused the Soviet representatives of organizing an attempt on his life. It is unlikely that the Soviet representatives would organize such an ineffective provocation. But it is quite characteristic that since the summer of 1979, a special group of the KGB Zenit has been at the Soviet embassy in Kabul. Her task was to kidnap Amin, if he could not do it, he should have been killed. September 15 squad was brought to combat readiness, but the order was not given. Because by this moment Amin had already seized Taraki and took power into his own hands. Then Taraki was killed by security officers Amin.
17 September Amin met with US Chargé d'Affaires in Afghanistan Bruce Amstetz. In New York, Foreign Minister Shah Wali met with Under-Secretary of State Eric Newsom. In the USSR, worried. Although these contacts did not lead to any results, Moscow considered that there was a risk of losing Afghanistan.
On November 29, a number of Politburo members, including Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Chairman of the National Security Committee Andropov, prepared a note. It emphasized that “there have recently been signs that the new leadership of Afghanistan intends to pursue a more“ balanced policy ”in relations with the Western powers. It is known, in particular, that representatives of the United States on the basis of their contacts with Afghans come to the conclusion that it is possible to change the political line of Afghanistan in a direction favorable for Washington ... Considering the above, and proceeding from the need to do everything possible to prevent the victory of the counterrevolution in Afghanistan or political reorientation X. Amina to the West.
December 8 held a meeting in the office of Leonid Brezhnev, which was attended by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU: Y. Andropov, A. Gromyko, M. Suslov and D. Ustinov. “They have long discussed the situation in Afghanistan and around it, weighed the pros and cons of the introduction of Soviet troops there. As reasons for the need for such a step on the part of Y. Andropov and D. Ustinov, they cited: the efforts undertaken by the CIA of the United States (Anzara resident Paul Henzi) to create the “New Great Ottoman Empire” with the inclusion of southern republics from the USSR; the lack of a reliable air defense system in the south, which, if American Pershing missiles are deployed in Afghanistan, puts many vital facilities at risk, including the Baikonur cosmodrome; the possibility of using the Afghan uranium deposits by Pakistan and Iraq to build nuclear weapons; the establishment of opposition power in the northern regions of Afghanistan and the accession of this region to Pakistan, etc. ”
For the times of the Cold War, such an assessment of the situation by one of the parties to the conflict was quite natural, although obviously excessive. Rather, it reflected all sorts of phobias of the Soviet leadership, especially with regard to the "new Ottoman Empire." But the main cause of concern was related to the fact that Moscow could feel more or less calm only when it controlled the situation inside the country which was strategically important for itself. In this sense, Amin caused the Soviet leadership the most serious concern. Despite the fact that all the time he turned to Moscow with a request to send soldiers to help him.
In the end, this request Amin was fatal for him. In the USSR, there was a reason to send the Soviet military to Afghanistan, who ultimately ensured the success of the conspiracy to overthrow Amin and the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
The USSR did not see any particular risks in its invasion of Afghanistan. In addition, their main opponent of the United States has just, in 1975, lost the war in Vietnam. At the beginning of 1979, there was an Islamic revolution in Iran, during which the United States lost influence in that country. 4 November 1979, the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran took place. The events in Iran created the impression that the United States is gradually losing ground. This impression was intensified by the fact that the democrat Jimmy Carter was in power in Washington, who would later be called the most unpopular US president. It’s a paradox, but on the eve of the current crisis in relations between Russia and the West, the current head of the White House Democrat Barack Obama was called the most unpopular US president.
Moscow was convinced that the Americans would not be able to undertake anything, that for the USSR, which was at the peak of its power, the operation in Afghanistan would be a cakewalk. In the end, Afghanistan was conditionally in the “backyard” of the Soviet empire and was too important for it to lose.
It is obvious that it is not easy to organize a military coup using a foreign military contingent in a sovereign country. It's one thing when a rebellion takes up parts of its own garrison, as it was in April 1978 of the year and even earlier during the coup of Daoud. But another thing when it comes to foreign soldiers who need to act in a foreign country without documents and support their own troops. Especially since after two coups and a permanent power struggle in Afghanistan, Amin created impressive forces to ensure his security. So getting Amin was not easy.
There could be no talk of open invasion. Then the troops would have to fight their way through Afghan territory and engage in combat with units of the local army, which the USSR had well armed at this point. And here Amin himself helped Moscow. He always asked to send troops, and in the end, Moscow responded to the call of the Afghan president. From November 29, airborne troops were airlifting to Kabul at the Bagram airbase. From 9 to December 12, a special group of the KGB arrived under the command of Colonel Boyarinov and the so-called "Muslim" battalion formed from the inhabitants of Central Asia. The latter was intended for the hidden protection of Amin.
December 25 5-I, from the side of the Turkmen SSR, and 108-I motorized rifle divisions, from the Uzbek SSR entered Afghanistan. From the Tajik SSR, the 860 th regiment entered the Afghan territory. All these units were staffed by reservists from the Central Asian republics. Although each division had tank, anti-aircraft missile units, no one was going to seriously fight. The main emphasis was on the use of airborne troops and saboteurs of the KGB.
Amin was a little like a man who decided to change the front line and go over to the side of the Americans. He was actually waiting for the Soviet troops and was ready to bet on them. Although, of course, he was primarily driven by the idea of retaining his power, he hoped that the Soviet troops would help him with this.
At this time, the Soviet representatives were preparing a plan for a coup. Their main advantage was that up to six thousand paratroopers were already in Kabul, and on the way was the 108-I motorized rifle division. The 500 man was in the Muslim battalion, near 60 in the special forces of the KGB Zenit. That is, the Soviet troops were already in Afghanistan.
Even 13 of December, KGB foreign intelligence agent Mikhail Talibov, who worked as a cook at Amin’s residence, tried to poison him with special equipment for the first time. His death was supposed to be a signal to speak. But the special equipment did not work, Kryuchkov ordered to repeat.
The next time an attempt was made to poison Amin on December 27. On this day, he gave a solemn reception at his residence in the palace of Taj Beck in honor of the arrival from Moscow of Politburo member Panj Shiri and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In the midst of dinner, the guests felt bad. Amin's wife called Soviet doctors from the central military hospital. Colonels Alekseev and Kuznechenkov, naturally, were not aware of the plans to kill Amin and pumped him out. Then they reported to their superiors that Amin was poisoned.
When it became clear in the Soviet embassy that the plan for poisoning Amin had failed, a command was given to quickly storm the palace and neutralize parts of the Afghan army. In 18.30 27 December, Soviet saboteurs blew up the main communications center, paralyzing the command and control of troops. At the same time, Soviet advisers in all parts of the Kabul garrison, who had earlier gathered their Afghan colleagues to a friendly reception in honor of the deployment of troops, neutralized the commanders of the Afghan army with the help of Soviet paratroopers.
The palace was stormed by the special forces of the KGB "Zenit" and "Thunder", the 9-i company of paratroopers and the "Muslim battalion." During the assault, five of the paratroopers and fighters of the Muslim battalion were killed, as well as five KGB officers, including the commander Boyarinov. Incidentally, the doctor, Col. Kuznechenkov, was also killed. Amina was also killed.
The Afghan army practically did not resist as a result of an effectively conducted operation, until 5 in January, the 8-I infantry division of the Afghan army fought near Kabul. In general, the effect of surprise has worked. Kabul managed to capture with minimal losses. The capture of the rest of Afghanistan was a success.
But it turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. December 28 US President Carter sent a letter to Secretary General Brezhnev. In response, the head of the USSR wrote that “the statement contained in your message that the Soviet Union had done something to overthrow the government of Afghanistan was completely unacceptable and did not correspond to reality. I must emphasize with certainty that the changes in the Afghan government were made by the Afghans themselves, and only by them. ” Soon Carter was replaced by Republican Ronald Reagan, and US actions became much tougher.
14 January 1980 at the UN General Assembly 104 countries voted to condemn the aggression by the USSR. 18 countries voted against. These were the USSR itself, Afghanistan, the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSR, and the satellites of Moscow in Eastern Europe. China and India abstained. On January 28, the 35 countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference spoke against the seizure of Afghanistan. This was just the beginning, ahead were the incident with the South Korean Boeing, Saudi Arabia’s actions to reduce oil prices, the Stingers, the economic crisis, lack of funds, the sharply manifested inefficiency of the Soviet economy, liberalization and then the collapse of the USSR.
So far, Russia has already had the annexation of the Crimea, the successful Olympiad, the Malaysian Boeing, and the fall in oil prices. The terrible shadow of Javelina hangs over the Ukrainian conflict. But there was still no liberalization, maybe it will not happen, but in any case, there is no easy way out for Russia from the current situation.
Information