Aerospace attack
Scientific and technical and technological progress in recent decades has significantly accelerated the improvement and expanded the types of aerospace attack (SVKN), as well as stimulated the search for new forms and methods of their combat use.
“FAST GLOBAL IMPACT” - DESTABILIZING CONCEPT
The successes achieved during the aggression against Yugoslavia, including the effectiveness of the use of highly accurate weapons (WTO) and the effectiveness of reconnaissance-strike combat systems, served as a kind of stimulus for the subsequent development in the US of the concept of a “fast (instantaneous) global strike” (BSU). The essence of BSU is to disrupt the existing balance of strategic nuclear deterrent forces (SNF) even before the start of the aggression or at its very beginning by destroying most of the SNF with long-range high-precision weapons in conventional (nuclear-free) equipment.
At present, large-radius high-precision cruise missiles (CR) flying in the combat zone at extremely low altitudes are considered the main striking means at BSU. Carriers of such missiles can be not only aviation and naval facilities. It is not ruled out the deployment of missile launchers on land launchers.
Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, President of the International Center for Geopolitical Analysis, commented on the situation with BSU and today's “parity” in the Strategic Nuclear Forces in one of the materials of the NVO: “... Our strategic nuclear potential has ceased to be a guarantor of security ... nuclear weapons, can be destroyed up to 70% of our nuclear missiles. "
In the medium and long term, the effects of BSU can be even more tangible when used at BSU except for subsonic cruise missiles of hypersonic means of destruction.
So, it became known that in the 2014 year, the United States (by the way, and China) conducted test launches of the so-called rocket-planning weapons. Rocket-planning system is launched as a conventional ballistic missile. Soon after launching, the carrier enters the atmosphere again, after which the planning apparatus separates. This device, without having its own engine, is capable of covering a distance of several thousand kilometers at hypersonic speed in a planning flight. The American rocket-planning apparatus AHW, which had already been covered in 2011 in the course of testing during the test, had a distance of 3800 km, and is precisely one of the promising areas for increasing the combat capabilities of the US BSU program.
The expansion of the scale and range of the use of the WTO, the development of methods for creating and using reconnaissance-strike combat systems, as well as the concept of BSU, did not go unnoticed by the leadership of Russia and its Armed Forces. Thus, in a Address to the Federal Assembly in 2013, President Vladimir Putin noted: “The emergence of non-nuclear fast global weapons in combination with a missile defense system can negate all previously reached agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, lead to a violation of the so-called strategic balance forces ... "
But the WTO itself, especially the two-echelon method of hitting targets with its help (SVKN + WTO or Navy + WTO) - although highly effective, but too costly and in fact only by economically well-developed countries.
Less wealthy countries rely on medium and shorter range ballistic missiles, which are considered to be a weapon of intimidation and a preemptive strike. Such missile systems in production and operation are significantly cheaper than modern manned SVKN with the WTO, and therefore are quite widely used.
The proliferation of the WTO, the development of new forms and methods of its combat use, the development of a large number of countries of missile technologies in general, radically change the nature of the armed confrontation, which requires an appropriate response from the defending side. Outdated weapons, traditional organizational and staff structures of troops, and traditional methods of conducting combat operations under these conditions are ineffective.
Thus, the Yugoslav air defense system, which was not modernized for a number of years, built on the classical principles, turned out to be completely helpless in the fight against the massive use of the KR and was completely incapacitated by the air defense suppression level of the air defense system and EW equipment. Almost every source of radio emission, as a rule, was destroyed by anti-radar missiles (PRR), the scale of the use of which also acquired an unprecedented scale.
PROTECTION OF SPECIAL IMPORTANT OBJECTS
Analysis of local and regional conflicts confirms that at the present stage, the course and outcome of hostilities is fundamentally affected by the capabilities of air defense systems to counter the strikes of modern SVKNs. Air defense and missile defense systems have also become the most important operational and strategic factor in deterring aggression.
The high combat effectiveness of modern weapons of various bases and various ranges of ranges, as well as the high cost of their production, storage and combat use led to the emergence of another significant feature of strikes during modern wars and military conflicts: precision-guided weapons began to be used to strike not on areas and large areas, as before, and on specifically selected small-sized, but critically important objects of administrative-industrial and military th structure.
Even the classic weapons, originally developed to destroy area targets, such as multiple rocket launcher systems (MLRS), are now being finalized for the use of high-precision ammunition and the destruction of small-sized targets, especially for combat armored vehicles in tactical depth and on the battlefield.
It is enough, for example, to recall that the MLRS-type MLRS, as well as the tactical RK of the Lance type, which have long been in service with a number of armies, are equipped with missiles with self-targeting combat elements to effectively defeat armored vehicles.
Given the high effectiveness of anti-tank weapons, including the indicated type, in the Soviet Union it was decided to develop an individual active defense system tanks, the first of which ("Drozd") was installed on the T-55A tank back in 1983. Then followed “Drozd-2”, “Arena”. The Israeli army entered the arsenal of active defense in 2009, and is under development in the United States. Thus, the appearance of high-precision weapons required the creation of adequate individual means of defense of attack objects, even such as a separate tank.
All the more acute today is the question of creating special systems for the highly effective protection of critical objects from the blows of modern SVKNs. Objects such as locations of nuclear missile structures, forces and facilities of the Navy, long-range aviation, nuclear power plants, chemical plants, the most important military and administrative facilities, dams with reservoirs, etc., as a rule, have national, strategic or operational importance , much more important than point objects on the battlefield, already equipped with their own means of protection.
“The air war against the enemy’s industry and communications is much more effective than air support ... on the battlefield,” Professor Vladimir Barvinenko concludes at the end of the Second World War and the results of recent military conflicts. Therefore, the first striking blows of SVKN will be concentrated on such critical objects.
Saving money on the creation and development of protection systems for critical objects is fraught with irreversible losses. Thus, Kuwait’s seeming savings in the creation of systems to protect oil and gas fields from strikes by Iraqi EOS, measured in hundreds of millions of dollars, ultimately led to the cost of recovering them after the aggression of hundreds of billions of dollars was completed, the need to eliminate environmental costs and required several years of intensive restoration work.
It should also be noted again that the traditional organizational and staff structures of air defense units and units and the traditional methods of warfare to solve modern tasks of highly effective protection of critical objects from the strikes of modern aerospace attack means are ineffective. Talking about covering such objects in a “general defense system” or identifying obsolete single-channel anti-aircraft missile systems or low-power short-range systems to cover them does not stand up to criticism today, since they are either costly or ineffective, although such opinions continue to hold. In particular, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin believes that to protect, for example, stationary objects of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, measures can be used that "include the protection of stationary objects of the strategic nuclear forces by highly efficient anti-aircraft missile systems like Pantsir-C1 and other air defense systems PRO, counteraction to the Navstar space navigation system by means of EW, frequent change of positions by mobile complexes of the Strategic Missile Forces during the period of danger and the use of false targets (models), dispersal of strategic submarine rocket carriers ...
A very important and relevant proposal for the development and creation of specialized protection systems (CVD) of the most important objects included in the structure of the protected objects themselves, that is, representing the immediate (final) means of protection. And it doesn’t matter at all what type of Armed Forces or branch of service they will be included in. It is important that such systems be highly efficient and be used in a single aerospace defense system, including in theaters of military operations.
TASKS AND STRUCTURE
A highly effective special protection system (CVD) for critical facilities should provide at least the following basic combat missions:
- Autonomous detection of aerospace attack (SVKN), including high-precision weapons (WTO) and the issuance of target designation of means of destruction on them;
- effective defeat of both SVKN - carriers of the WTO, and the WTO themselves for various purposes and basing in flight, used for attacking the concealed object;
- preservation of high efficiency of destruction of SVKN and WTO under the influence of various kinds of interference (noise immunity of means and noise immunity of the system);
- ensuring combat stability ("survivability") when exposed to the system of protection of special weapons to ensure the subsequent reflection of the main attacks of the SVKN and the WTO on the covered object;
- jamming and reducing the effectiveness (range and accuracy) of GPS-based space-based navigation systems and onboard electronic means of SVKN, including by means of functional damage.
Airborne and sea-based cruise missiles remain the main strike force of the US Armed Forces.
Photo from www.navy.mil
Photo from www.navy.mil
Moreover, such systems may be of interest not only for Russia and our Armed Forces.
The absolute need to parry the threats of a “fast global strike”, of course, puts forward as the first priority the solution to the problem of effectively combating cruise missiles, including a long-range, flying in a combat zone at extremely low altitudes.
Research and experiments, including the conduct of experienced combat firing, show that it is possible to solve this problem quite effectively and with minimal financial and time costs with the help of modern multi-channel anti-aircraft missile system "Buk-M2", and in the short term, Buk-M3.
The Buk-М2 air defense complex consisting of a multichannel illumination and guidance radar (RPN) and launch-charging installations (ROM) provides for the passage of the 8 – 12 shelling zone, and taking into account the self-propelled fire installation (SDU), which is also part of the RPN and ROM. 12 – 18 cruise missiles with their 10 flight altitude and more. All in all, the Buk-M2 (anti-aircraft missile division) implements 24 target channels, that is, it can simultaneously fire at 24 air targets, and during the span of the defeat zone - 32 – 46 air targets.
According to the American standards, developed as a result of the combat use of Tomahawk cruise missiles and estimated estimates, "... to destroy an object of the" medium-sized enterprise "or" airfield "type, 8 – 10 to 15 – 20 cruise missiles are required, taking into account possible counteraction of forces and air defense systems. The required expenditure of these weapons for defeating the areal targets of the “camp of terrorists” type with the destruction of up to 70% of the personnel in it can range from 4 – 5 to 10 – 11 missiles. ”
Thus, the Buk-М2 air defense system is certainly able to reflect the expected level of flight of the Kyrgyz Republic, operating at extremely low altitudes. At the same time, the probability of a single missile defense missile system in the Buk-М2 system is higher than that of the C-300P family of air defense systems, due to the implementation in the RPN (SOU) of the target type recognition mode and the adaptation of the SAM missile to the recognized type of target being hit. The same mode allows to reduce the average consumption of missiles per downed target. In addition, the Buk-M2 SAM missile is cheaper than the main C-300P missile, which is important.
BETTING ON RUSSIAN MANUFACTURER
It makes sense to compare the capabilities of the Buk-М2 air defense missile systems and the С-300П family of anti-cruise missiles because only these tools have special devices that allow raising to a significant height (20 – 30) antenna systems for firing radar systems to extend the zone line of sight and thereby increasing the furthest boundary of the zone of destruction of cruise missiles operating at extremely low altitudes.
According to the maximum range of destruction of these targets, the capabilities of the systems are commensurate (the Buk-М2 missile defense system only 6% loses the C-300МРМNNXX range of missiles in terms of the defeat range). However, the deployment time of the towers for lifting antenna systems in the C-2PM300 air defense system is almost 2 times more, and its cost is 20 times as high as that of the Buk-M7,8 telescopic up-and-down devices. In addition, the towers with which the ZRS C-2PM300 is completed, were serially produced and supplied from abroad (Kramatorsk, Ukraine), and the Telescopic lifting-tilting devices of the Buk-М2 ZRS were produced in Russia.
The Buk-М2 air defense missile system also provides effective combat against tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles and a high probability of their defeat, again due to the implementation in the system of the target-type recognition mode and the adaptation of the SAM missile equipment. In the course of research, experienced combat firing was carried out not only at targets that mimic the indicated ballistic missiles, but even at relatively small rocket projectiles of the Smerch MLRS.
The new generation Buk-M3 SDS adopted into service has even higher characteristics. In our country and abroad, the Buk-М2 and Buk-М3 anti-aircraft missile systems have no analogues. Not yet tested by the Vityaz C-350 in the fight against the above objectives, as analysis has shown, a priori will have lower combat capabilities due to the peculiarities of its technical solutions.
The use of long-range C-300PM2 “Favorite” and C-400 “Triumph” systems in the protection system for particularly important objects is also unpromising and unjustified, since such systems turn out to be expensive, redundant in a number of non-critical characteristics of BSU parry, and as a result, they lose significantly on the basis of the Buk-М2, -Х3 AAMS by the criterion of “cost-effectiveness”.
In this regard, it is necessary to consider the Buk-М2 SDS SD as a basic tool for building highly effective CVDs of particularly important objects (areas) and it is advisable to consider expanding the production of the Buk-M2 SDS and equipping it with air defense forces of the Ground Forces (in modifications "Buk-M2"), and the troops of the East Kazakhstan region (in the modification "Beech-M2-1"). In the near future, these functions should be performed by the Buk-М3 air defense system of various modifications. In the future, it is necessary to entrust the same system with the functions of combating advanced rocket-planning systems and other hypersonic means.
MILITARY STABILITY OF SPECIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS
The system of protection of particularly important objects (areas) should not only be highly effective, but also have high combat stability when exposed to special means of combat assigned to defeat it in the initial period of hostilities (for example, a special echelon of suppressing air defense systems such as Wild Weasel ). The preservation of combat characteristics ("survival") should provide the defense system with a reliable reflection of the subsequent main strikes of the SVKN and the WTO on the covered object. This was vividly confirmed by the war in Yugoslavia.
Studies and practical experiments have shown that it is not possible to achieve high survivability rates of a homogeneous air defense force and its effectiveness. The creation of so-called mixed groups in the classical sense, when heterogeneous air defense systems are used from different positions (positional areas) and are controlled from their own command post, does not solve the problem either fundamentally.
The solution to the problem of the survival of air defense systems and defense systems based on them was found by sharing these tools in a certain combination, that is, creating, on the basis of homogeneous (monogamous) air defense missile systems and air defense systems, combined (polygamous) reconnaissance-fire fighting means (modules).
The polygamous air defense combat modules can significantly increase the resistance against attacks of anti-radar missiles (PRR) and the WTO, retain the ability of the defense system to reliably defend the covered object from subsequent main attacks of SVKN and generally improve the effectiveness of their defeats in typical raids (such as on Iraq, Yugoslavia , Libya) to the level of 0,9 and more.
Naturally, the air defense systems that are part of the polygamous defense system must function in a single information and control space, as part of the automated air defense reconnaissance and fire groups they create and be controlled from a single command post.
Conducted research, full-scale digital modeling and a number of experienced combat firing showed that it is most practical to create a polygamous defense system by introducing the Tor-М2 short-range air defense missile systems into the air defense missile system Buk-МХNUMX of two short-range air defense systems М2 ”instead of two SOU and two ROMs of ZRU“ Buk-М2 ”) and revision of KP ZRS“ Buk-М2 ”to ensure the combat work of the Tor-М2 SAM in a single information and control space. This allows you to significantly increase the self-defense capabilities of the polygamous system while fighting the “Harm” type of anti-personnel weapons, preserving its combat capability and combat potential.
Calculations and fragments of field tests show that polygamous (joint) use of even non-modernized Buk-М1-2 and Tor-М1 air defense systems in a single information and control space allows increasing the effectiveness of a grouping more than 2,5 times, and resistance from anti-radar attacks missiles (PRR) of the “Harm” type - 8 – 12 times. Combined combat use of air defense systems and air defense missile systems with new modifications of the Buk-М2 and Tor-М2 will allow to achieve even better results and preserve the status of modern weapons for such polygamous personnel up to the level of 30 – 35-s.
By the way, this issue was reported to the Chief of General Staff in 1998 year, it was approved by him, planned for implementation, but later “successfully fired” by military officials.
Further enhancement of the combat capabilities of the critical object protection systems based on the Buk-М2 + Tor-М2 satellite systems is possible by introducing the Buk-М2 (Buk-М3) missile targeting system of the active jammer and homing on it. This proposal has long been worked out and proposed for implementation by us, but it was practically made by Chinese specialists in the C-XNUMPPMU imported from Russia ZRS (FM-ZNXX). The introduction of such a regime in the Buk-M300, -2000 air defense system will dramatically change the ratio of combat potentials in favor of air defense systems and make it problematic to use active interference from the sides of the attacking manned and unmanned aircraft, as the obstacle itself becomes a source of information.
The structure of the air defense system "Tor-M2" (in missile defense) may introduce the means of functional damage (explosive magnetic generators). This will ensure effective combat against such specific targets as ultra-small and small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operating directly above critical objects in the nearest operational and tactical depth.
It should be emphasized that the conducted research, full-scale digital modeling and experimental combat shooting, which was mentioned above, showed that it was possible to significantly increase the survival rate of the protection systems of critical objects with massive impact on them of Harm and other WTO types. the introduction into the composition of these groupings of the BM ZRK "Tor - М2".
MULTIFUNCTIONAL SYSTEMS
As part of the polygamous CVD of particularly important objects on the basis of the Buk-М2 + Tor-М2 SAM system, it is planned to create a multifunctional reconnaissance and target designation center (URC). The communications and data exchange system of the URTS and the GCC as a whole should be of an open type, providing for it with “gateway” means of obtaining information from the missile defense system, regional connections and units of the aerospace defense and air defense military commands.
The structure of the CVD OVO should also include means that provide interference and reduce the effectiveness of space-based navigation systems such as GPS and on-board radio-electronic means of manned and unmanned SVKN (EW). Previously, subdivisions and EW units, although they were part of the Air Defense Forces, were used rather autonomously, and from the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces were withdrawn, incorporated into the Ground Forces as an independent branch of troops, and were also used almost autonomously. This led not so much to an increase in the effectiveness of air defense groups, but rather to the need to solve the additional problems arising in coordination of hostilities.
At the same time, the capabilities of EW facilities for joint control of SVKN, especially with coordinated actions jointly with the air defense missile system (SAM), were not adequately evaluated in a single information and control space, serious integrated research on this issue was not conducted, although the contribution of EW funds to improving the effectiveness of protection systems expect.
However, information on the composition and construction of the EW subsystem, including SVKN using GPS data, is quite confidential and can be considered and discussed when developing tactical and technical tasks for specific protection systems.
The same applies to the subsystem of protection of particularly important objects from terrorist acts and attacks of the ground enemy. But not because of confidentiality, but rather from the peculiarities of building such a subsystem of protection depending on the location of the object itself in a particular region or in a particular country. However, such a subsystem in the defense system of an OBO must exist and function in a single information and control space with other means.
SOME RESULTS
In conclusion, it is necessary to once again emphasize the fact that in modern conditions the creation and deployment of highly effective special protection systems for critical (critical) facilities is extremely important.
This approach is precisely focused on asymmetric counteraction to the development and deployment of expensive high-precision weapon systems, cruise missiles, including long-range ones, and unmanned aerial vehicles (combat drones) in leading foreign countries and the possible infliction of a significant (unacceptable) strike on our strategic nuclear forces and other critical facilities.
Proposals for the creation of special protection systems are based on the use of mass-produced weapons and in fact do not require significant additional financial and material costs.
We would like to hope that the need to create special protection systems for critical (critical) facilities (areas) will be evaluated, proposals for them are in demand and accepted for implementation both in our Armed Forces and foreign customers will be interested in, and the construction, structure, basics of combat use and the functioning of the GCC in the composition of the troops of the aerospace defense and air defense in the theater of operations - to be the subject of discussion in the media.
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