Overseas Sanctions and the START Treaty
5 February 2015 marks four years since the entry into force of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms (the START Treaty).
In Russia, this date was marked by formal statements by officials of the Russian authorities: “The parties are responsibly implementing the START Treaty. The Russian-American Consultative Commission (DCC) sessions were held productively in Geneva, ”etc. The Russian quartet of “wise men” from the scientific community of the Russian Academy of Sciences, known for its disarmament initiatives in the area of strategic offensive arms and tactical nuclear weapons. The architects and “foremen” of the reset of Russian-American relations with reference to the modern conditions of the military-political situation and various sanctions have disappeared somewhere. True, the activity of the so-called independent experts on SNF is noted, who continue to publish articles on the complete degradation and disintegration of the SNF of the RF Armed Forces and the US SNA.
And only Mikhail Ulyanov, director of the Security and Disarmament Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, expresses concern in his interviews: “The United States declares Russia one of its main enemies, imposes numerous sanctions, but in those areas that are of particular interest to Washington, we are urged to cooperate.
This demonstrates ostentatious loyalty - as if nothing is happening. We are talking about the implementation of the START Treaty and the possible withdrawal from it. In this regard, it is high time for Russia to take a tougher position and respond to Washington with its own coin. ”
In this regard, it seems necessary to recall that the special interest of Americans is explained by the beneficial articles of the START Treaty, which create conditions for them to ensure military-technical superiority in the field of strategic offensive arms. This is confirmed by the following conclusions, which were previously cited by the author in articles in the Independent Military Review, reflecting the author’s personal position and considerable experience of military and operational service in the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
THEIR SANCTIONS ARE US - WE HAVE ASSIGNMENTS TO THE START AGREEMENT
Let's start with the fact that the text of the START Treaty and its Protocol contains no articles regulating the reduction in the number of warheads on the American and Russian ICBMs and SLBMs while simultaneously eliminating the old head rearing platform and installing a new one, as was the case in the “old” START Treaty -1.
Back in 2010, the author proposed to include the provision in the text of the Treaty or its Protocol: “The head platform of each ICBM and SLBM, which has a reduced number of warheads, is destroyed and replaced by a new platform under the control of inspection teams.” In the Annex on inspection activities, it would be necessary to determine the composition and procedure for conducting the relevant control and inspection procedures, at the same time solving the problem of tough American covers. The proposals were not taken into account, and as a result, the Americans are engaged in “unloading” breeding platforms with the subsequent storage of warheads and the formation of return potential. As the results of Russian inspections show, the American side continues to use hard covers that do not allow to determine the actual number of warheads on the platforms.
This is a key benefit of the START Treaty for Americans, since it provides an opportunity to quickly increase the combat strength of the US SNA in the event of a complication of the military-political and strategic situation in the world (or region). At the same time, the Russian side is forced to remove from combat duty and eliminate ICBMs and SLBMs with expired service life, and it is more expensive for them to reduce the number of warheads on these missiles. Moreover, the decision to extend the operational resource of the “Voevoda” ICBM is taken by specialists of a foreign state whose leadership is hostile to Russia.
In addition, according to Article II of the Treaty: “The Parties shall reduce strategic offensive weapons to the maximum level within seven years after its entry into force, that is, by February 5 2018. The contract is valid for 10 years, if not replaced earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. ”
From the text of the Treaty it is clear that the intermediate stages, the levels of START and the timing of their reduction, as was the case in the “old” START-1 Treaty, are not defined. As a result, the American side, unlike the Russian side, did not even think about starting disarming and eliminating deployed carriers and launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, since the Treaty does not require this. For four years, the US military leadership has been engaged in the modernization of strategic offensive arms and the destruction of rocket and aircraft scrap metal. The real reduction of their strategic offensive arms is supposed to be done from the 2017 year, stating that there is more than enough time to carry out technical measures to reach the stated level of strategic offensive arms.
It is obvious that the American side can withdraw from the START Treaty at any time, while maintaining the combat strength of the strategic offensive forces at the level of 2010 of the year. The Russian side, as already noted, does not have such capabilities and fulfills contractual obligations by reducing and eliminating unique types of strategic offensive arms that have expired.
The author of this article, still at the stage of the deployment of the negotiation process, proposed to identify three intermediate stages with appropriate levels and terms for reducing and eliminating strategic offensive arms. According to the results of each stage, to exchange notifications and conduct mutual inspections. These cuts would be compulsory for the Pentagon. However, the proposals were not accepted, as a result, the American side acquired another advantage. He does not carry out real cuts in his strategic offensive arms, but he observes and tightly controls the elimination of Russian strategic offensive arms.
LIQUIDATION WITHOUT LIQUIDATION
It should be pointed out that the content of a number of liquidation articles of the Treaty and its Protocol ensures the incomplete elimination of the American ICBMs and SLBMs (only for the first stage of missiles) with the creation of a return potential for missiles. Thus, paragraph 4 of Article III of the Treaty defines: “For the purposes of this Treaty, including the counting of ICBMs and SLBMs: c) for ICBMs or SLBMs that are serviced, stored and transported in steps, the first step of an ICBM or SLBM of a certain type is considered as ICBM or SLBM of this type. "
It is important to note that Russian liquid and solid-fuel ICBMs and SLBMs are serviced, stored, transported and liquidated as a whole (without dilution steps). In this regard, paragraph 2 of Section II of Chapter III of the Protocol is beneficial to Americans: “The elimination of solid-state ICBMs and solid-propellant SLBMs is carried out using any of the procedures provided for in this paragraph: a) the first stage is destroyed by an explosion, a notification is provided; b) the fuel is removed by burning and in the case of the first stage rocket engine one hole is cut or punched with a diameter of at least one meter, or the case of the first stage rocket engine is cut into two approximately equal parts; (c) The fuel is removed by a washout method, and the body of the first stage rocket engine is crushed, flattened or cut into two approximately equal parts. "
Thus, the START Treaty and its Protocol do not require the elimination of the 2-th and 3-th stages of American missiles, and their fate is not regulated by the Treaty. Therefore, the Americans are forming a return potential for missiles, as happened with the Peacekeeper ICBM and Minuteman-2, whose stages are used to manufacture target missiles during anti-missile tests. Moreover, according to the rules of counting imposed on us, the fact of the elimination of the first stages of the American rocket is considered the elimination of the missiles entirely. At the same time, the deduction of Russian missiles is recorded only after the complete destruction of all stages.
It is important to emphasize that by the time the START Treaty entered into force, the Americans had completed a program to re-equip all three solid fuel stages with new ones and concentrated on the production of Minuteman-3 type ICBMs at one enterprise. In essence, by the date of the entry into force of the START Treaty, the American side created a new missile system. The author predicted that it is unlikely that the Pentagon will rush to destroy the updated Minuteman-3 type missiles and the Trident-2 type SLBM, the purchases of which continue. It was proposed to reformulate the content of these articles in order to eliminate all levels of US ICBMs and SLBMs under the control of Russian inspectors. However, these proposals were rejected.
For the American side, the 2 clause of Article X of the Treaty turned out to be a “find”: “The obligation not to use masking measures includes the obligation not to use them at test sites, including measures leading to the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or their launchers during testing. " It must be admitted that the content of this article is written off from the “old” START-1 Treaty, and it continues to harm us, since the measures of disguise should not be used in the preparation and conduct of combat training and test rocket launches of the Topol and Topol -M ”,“ Yars ”,“ Frontier ”and“ Barguzin ”, including during strategic exercises.
Thus, on the one hand, the directives of the higher military command bodies on the strict implementation of operational camouflage measures at the landfills apply, on the other hand, there are contractual requirements for the exclusion of masking measures.
Consequently, the content of paragraph 2 is one-sided, since the Americans do not have mobile missile systems. At the same time, the American side has the possibility of opening the protected characteristics of existing and prospective PGRK. Moreover, we are implementing a set of technical measures to counter the US global missile defense system and its regional segments. Since the Americans do not plan to develop new ICBMs and SLBMs during the contract period, monitoring of launches of ICBMs of the Minuteman-3 type and SLBM Trident-2 and the acquisition of telemetric information are of no interest to us.
Washington, in violation of the treaty, takes an active part in the modernization program of the British Vangard-type SSBNs and delivers ballistic missiles for them.
Photos from www.nationalarchives.gov.uk
Photos from www.nationalarchives.gov.uk
PRO - STONE OF INTERVENTION
Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on Security and Disarmament Issues, constantly declares the possibility of the Russian Federation withdrawing from the START Treaty, "if the United States continues to develop the missile defense system to a level critical for Russia's security." However, the mechanism for determining the critical level of security has not yet been developed.
It also emerged that the Americans are not fulfilling the provision of the Preamble of the START Treaty on the “relationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons, the growing importance of this relationship in the process of reducing strategic nuclear weapons and the fact that current strategic defensive weapons do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of strategic offensive arms of the parties. " Thus, the first stage of the program “European Phased Adaptive Approach” has been successfully completed and work is underway on the program of the second. Announced plans to deploy the third position area of the anti-missile complex GBI in the United States due to the increasing North Korean nuclear missile threat.
Moreover, paragraph 7 of Article III states: “For the purposes of this Treaty: a) a missile of the type created and tested exclusively for intercepting objects and fighting objects not on the surface of the Earth is not considered as a ballistic missile to which the provisions of this Treaty. This "gift article" permits the production of target rockets by the Americans for working out anti-missile interception tasks and further deploying the US global missile defense system.
It should be emphasized that in the early publications of the author in the "NVO" it was proposed to issue this "interconnection" in a special coordinated statement, which would contain the composition, tactical and technical characteristics, combat capabilities of antimissiles; US missile defense data exchange; the composition and content of notification and control and inspection procedures; the procedure for providing information on the buildup of elements of the US missile defense system and its regional segments, as well as other data. With the help of research organizations of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, this would allow us to formulate reasonable conclusions necessary for making various decisions, including withdrawal from the START Treaty. Suggestions were rejected.
STRATEGIC INSTABILITY
In the author's opinion, for the United States, the position of the preamble to the START Treaty, which provides for taking into account "the impact of ICBMs and SLBMs in conventional equipment on strategic stability," is advantageous. It is known that the development of these missiles in the United States is in full swing, while their destabilizing nature has long been known. Even the US Senate, which does not approve the program of financing the work, agrees with this until the Pentagon provides convincing evidence that launches of these missiles, especially from SSBNs, will not lead to nuclear incidents with Russia and China. In addition, four “Ohio-type” SSGNs were reequipped under SILF “Tomahawk” unit IV in non-nuclear (and possibly nuclear) equipment (up to 154 on each boat), which are periodically on combat patrols. At the same time, the SLCMBs were created in the interests of strengthening the fight against mobile missile systems and have the ability to patrol in the required area, ready to launch rocket attacks on the identified targets.
It should be noted that the US WFD within the framework of the START Treaty has not yet provided information on the purpose and objectives of ICBMs, SLBMs in non-nuclear equipment, as well as Tomahawk cruise missiles. In this regard, it is appropriate to remind the American-NATO colleagues that the new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation has formulated the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in various conditions of the situation, including when launching non-nuclear missile attacks on strategic and critical facilities of the Russian Federation.
It should also be pointed out that Article XIII of the START Treaty, the meaning of which the Americans interpret in their own interests, is extremely advantageous for the United States: “The parties do not transfer strategic offensive arms to third parties falling within the scope of this Treaty ... This provision does not apply to any there was existing at the time of the signing of this Treaty, the practice of cooperation, including commitments, in the field of strategic offensive arms between one of the parties and a third state " .
In this regard, in violation of the START Treaty, the Americans are not selling at the time of signing the START Treaty (8 on April 2010 of the year) selling the Trident 2 submarines of Great Britain, participating in the modernization of the Vangard type and various technical docking activities of the British SSBNs and warheads with American missiles, conducting autonomous and complex tests. In addition to sales of missiles, the American side performs the following activities: the training of British specialists; assisting in the study and development of operational and combat documentation; docking of the Trident-2 SLBM systems with British warheads and SSBNs; participation in alerting missiles on SSBNs, their maintenance, autonomous and complex testing, troubleshooting and maintenance; participation in the preparation and conduct of combat test launches of British SLBMs from the Eastern Missile Range, etc.
In addition, at the time of signing and in violation of the START Treaty, the Americans hid their participation in the Saccessor program (Successor) to create a new British SSBN with the development of a universal rocket compartment (Сommon Missile Сompartment - CMC) for the Trident-2 SLBM . It turned out that the American corporation General Dynamics has been participating in this program since May 2012 of the year, that is, after the signing of the START Treaty.
The United States is also working with the United Kingdom, in violation of Article XIII, to agree on nuclear planning guidance documents; selection of targets; data development for aiming; the distribution of targets between carriers and warheads, taking into account their tactical and technical characteristics and a reduction in the combat strength of the US SNA in connection with the fulfillment of treaty obligations; coordination of the ballistic flight path of carriers through the territory of other states; identification of options for the use of nuclear forces; evaluation of selected options for feasibility, organization of interaction, support and management; execution, coordination and approval of planning documents. Currently, various forms of covert US and French cooperation in the area of strategic offensive arms are being discovered.
Thus, in the conditions of the deployment of the European missile defense system, the “triangle” of nuclear allies operates. Meanwhile, all this is a gross violation by the American side of Article XIII, which is not paid attention in Russia. In addition, there are still NATO nuclear forces, armed with tactical nuclear weapons.
As a result, the Pentagon’s leadership may reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads to the level of 1550 warheads and below, since the list of objects of a potential enemy and the composition of nuclear weapons for their destruction are annually updated and redistributed between the United States, Great Britain and France during joint nuclear planning. The Russian side does not have such opportunities, since there are no nuclear allies.
UNIFORM SUPPORT
It should be emphasized that the text of the START Treaty, its Protocol and Annexes to the Treaty contain a significant amount of unilateral concessions that provide Americans with information on the status, location, forms and methods of combat use, the main directions of development of Russian PGRK and the results of their tests.
Thus, the American side is transferred its own identification marks (POPs) for each mobile rocket, which ensures their control throughout the entire life cycle. Coordinates and home areas are reported to Americans for deployed PGRK and Krona stationary facilities; variants, types of missiles and their POPs; location and coordinates of service facilities; loading of ICBMs, facilities for their production, storage sites for mobile launchers and repair of ICBMs.
The Treaty has the following shameful procedure, clearly prompted by Russian experts: “Liquidation of mobile launchers of ICBMs is carried out by cutting the launcher, leveling stops and attachment points of the launcher and launching equipment for launching the missile, including attached instrumental compartments , with launcher chassis. In this connection, the question is quite reasonable: what is the answer that Americans are cutting off and removing, and on what types of strategic offensive weapons?
Another gift to the Americans: “The process of liquidation of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs is carried out by dismantling and removing the superstructure of the fixed structure from the object. No structure or shelter, either permanent or temporary, is not re-installed or rebuilt over the remaining foundation. " Thank you for guessing the exclusion of an article on undermining the foundations of these structures.
Further. With regard to the PGRK, notifications about the exit of mobile missiles from production facilities are transmitted to the Pentagon; about moving missiles to the training ground; about sending them to the arsenal and arriving at the ICBM base; regarding the conversion or elimination of the PGRK. The formations and missile regiments of the PGRK are inspected to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs based on ICBMs; the actual number of warheads mounted on a specific specified deployed mobile ICBM. Moreover, for the reading of POPs, American inspectors are allowed into the holy of holies - the “Kron” structures with combat missiles. The first shows of promising PGRK are held in order to demonstrate the distinctive features and confirm the technical characteristics of each new type, variant or version of the ICBM and launcher. In the part concerning the Yars PGRK, this has already been done. Before the start of American inspections in the compound of the PGRK, pre-inspection procedures are introduced that disrupt the main operational and combat training activities.
This is far from a complete list of the unilateral and degrading articles of the START Treaty with regard to the Topol, Topol-M, Yars and Rubezh PGRK, the content of which, given the deployment of the global missile defense system and its regional segments, does not meet the interests of military security of the Russian Federation. In addition, the orbital constellation of US spacecraft and its allies, which monitor all positional regions of the PGRK in real time, is functioning.
BRIEF RESULTS
About three years are left before the end of the deadline for the parties to reach the declared levels of strategic offensive arms reduction. At the same time, the Russian side is punctually and responsibly fulfilling its contractual obligations by eliminating unique types of strategic offensive arms with a repeatedly extended service life. The American side, unlike the Russian one, did not even think about starting disarming and eliminating deployed carriers and launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. For four years, Washington has been engaged in the modernization of strategic offensive arms, reducing the number of deployed warheads, and the destruction of rocket aviation scrap metal and collapsed mines. In fact, the United States creates a significant return potential for carriers, warheads and launchers and can quickly increase the operational capabilities of strategic offensive forces.
In conclusion of the article, we can agree with Mikhail Ulyanov’s concern that it’s high time for Russia to take a tougher stance and respond to Washington with his own coin. What prevents to do this?
First of all, it is proposed to immediately declare the complete cessation of the notification and inspection activities in relation to the Russian PGRK. The rationale for this is the emergence of a terrorist threat and the need to work out the tasks of anti-terrorism activity. At the same time, extend the validity of this threat until the expiration of the term of the START Treaty (by 5 February 2018 of the year). Other useful recommendations are contained in numerous articles of the author, published in the newspaper "Independent Military Review" and a number of other Russian specialized publications.
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