Military Review

Duel of two admirals


On March 31, 1904, on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur, the flagship of the Russian Pacific Ocean exploded and sank. fleet battleship "Petropavlovsk". This sea tragedy became the prologue to the crushing defeat of Russia in the war with Japan in 1904-1905, because among the seven hundred dead sailors was the fleet commander, Vice Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov. It was with him that Emperor Nicholas II and all Russian public opinion pinned their hopes for the implementation of a strategic plan that would make it possible to win the war in the Far East.

It is clear that the death of the Russian admiral was beneficial to the enemy. But was it the result of a deliberate sabotage Japanese intelligence or a successful attack by a Japanese submarine? Or maybe the death of Makarov was the final chord in a series of ridiculous accidents and mistakes? It cannot be ruled out that Admiral Makarov became a hostage to the mine war tactics that he himself had incorrectly chosen - all these versions and assumptions will become the subject of research in our program.

The Searchers will try to prove that on March 31st, 1904, Japanese intelligence carried out an unprecedented operation. In the military stories there have not yet been examples when the commander of the enemy army won the battle and the whole war not on the battlefield, but with the help of a secret weapons... Which one exactly? You will find out about this by watching our new program.


Subscribe to our Telegram channel, regularly additional information about the special operation in Ukraine, a large amount of information, videos, something that does not fall on the site:

Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. evilzorg
    evilzorg April 3 2012 13: 03
    there were people once
  2. Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 9 August 2012 15: 15
    But maybe the death of Makarov became the final chord in a series of ridiculous accidents and errors?

    That's for sure - as if some kind of fate gravitated over Russia in that war. First Makarov, then kills Vitgeft with a shell and incapacitates the Tsarevich, as a result the squadron was unable to break through from Port Arthur. During Tsushima, the battleship "Fuji" received a "suitcase" in the main battery turret and detonation of charges in the turret itself, and only RANDOMITY saved it from death (three British battle cruisers in the Jutland battle were killed precisely from such hits). In general - one to one. Without diminishing the significance of the mistakes made by the Russian command and such a thing as "luck" cannot be ruled out. The Japanese were not only better prepared - they were also very lucky throughout the war.
  3. seafarer
    seafarer 5 December 2012 00: 33
    With all due respect to the memory of the outstanding naval commander S.O. Makarov, one cannot fail to notice in his actions an element of adventurism that is incomprehensible to a commander of this level. Let me explain: going out to sea to the rescue of the "Guarding" destroyer on board the "Novik" (an armored cruiser of the 2nd rank). In my opinion - the act is clearly public. After all, Makarov knew perfectly well how he was treated in the squadron, in addition, the commander of the Novik was then NO Essen, who had already established himself as a decisive and proactive commander.
    And the exits to the raid by the entire squadron and maneuvering in view of the approaching Japanese fleet in the same area?
    It is not surprising that after several such exits of the Russian squadron, H. Togo decided to plant mines in this area. And he achieved strategic success - depriving the Pacific Squadron of the best of all possible commanders at that time. I still can’t understand why the already recognized world theoretician of mine war, S.O. Makarov, didn’t give a command to clear the fairway and the place where the suspicious destroyer dangled the night before? Where was the rush? After all, the squadron of H. Togo was not the first time to approach the Port Arthur raid. And the area of ​​concentration and maneuvering of the Russian squadron was covered by coastal batteries.
    Indeed, some kind of rock in this war was against the Russian fleet ... Experienced sailors launch their ships on their own mine banks, admirals make decisions as if the enemy does not exist at all, mine war theorist Makarov acts directly contrary to his own theoretical calculations.
    And about the transfer, there are many inaccuracies: the admiral was not the highest rank in the fleet, minesweepers did not exist in nature in 1904-05 (mines were trawled then with steam mine boats from armadillos), just as the Japanese did not have during siege of P-Arthur no submarines. And the location of the ammunition cellars along with the storage of sea mines on armadillos is an open secret: such an arrangement of artillery cellars was then universally accepted and is still preserved.

    PS Our fleet, by the way, had submarines, though in Vladivostok, and in Arthur Naletov already then began to build a prototype of the "Crab".
  4. YaMZ-238
    YaMZ-238 11 March 2015 15: 58
    It was not destined to come true plans .... alas!
  5. The comment was deleted.
    1. The comment was deleted.