US Military Professionals: An Inside Look
Significant complication of weapons and military equipment (IWT) and military art at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries required from the officers and especially the generals not only special training, but also a systematic increase of knowledge and expansion of horizons. As a result, the American society began to perceive military professionals differently, paying tribute to them not only as heroes of battles and military campaigns, but also as relatively decently educated people. If in the second half of the XIX century in the US, only a small part of military leaders had a special in-depth education, by the beginning of the First World War, for example, almost three-quarters of the 441 general of the American ground forces were graduates of the West Point Military Academy. In other words, the American officer corps has become truly professional.
But this fact, along with the growing authority of representatives of the middle and higher command personnel of the army and fleet in American society, it did not destroy the artificial barrier that still separated its military and civilian representatives. In many ways, the reason for this, as Samuel Huntington emphasized, was the tendency of a career officer to achieve the desired goal - effectiveness in battle, which is impossible to find an analogue in the civilian field. Hence the difference between the historically formed military thinking and the way of thinking of a civilian person.
Pacifists in the pursuit
Huntington notes that the military professional’s way of thinking is universal, concrete and constant. On the one hand, this rallies the military into a specific environment or group, and on the other, unwittingly makes them outcasts, separated from the rest of society. Moreover, this phenomenon, discovered in principle by Huntington, was developed already in the studies of modern researchers of the Anglo-Saxon model of a military structure. So, Strechen Hugh states that a modern American or British military can not but be proud of a job well done, but the society he serves, evaluating his military representatives, always separates the personal qualities of a particular person in form from the work he serves or from the goal which is trying to achieve (and for which even sometimes dies). Such a dual attitude towards oneself is not conducive to the unity of the military and civilians.
Christopher Cocker, a professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, is even more pessimistic. In his opinion, “at present, the military are in despair at the fact that they are increasingly moving away from civil society, which does not properly evaluate them and at the same time controls their thoughts and actions ... They are removed from society, which refuses them to honestly won glory ". The scientist concludes: "The Western military is in deep crisis due to the erosion in civil society of the image of a fighter as a result of discarding sacrifice and dedication as an example to follow."
However, the isolation of the armed forces from society, says Cocker, is fraught with the danger of the formation of an unhealthy domestic political situation. As a result, civilian control over the military will inevitably be undermined, and the country's leadership will not be able to adequately assess the effectiveness of its armed forces. According to Cocker, it would seem that a simple conclusion suggests itself: the adaptation of professional military men to the values of civil society. But this, says the British professor, is a dangerous way to solve the problem, because the military must view war as a challenge and its purpose, and not as a work of coercion. In other words, they must be prepared for sacrifice.
Meanwhile, Western analysts note, during the period of the “total war” against terrorism, civil society becomes accustomed to constant tension, becomes bitter, but at the same time almost with undisguised pleasure places the duty of its management on professional military men. Especially since in civil society the thesis is very popular: “Professional military cannot help but desire war!”.
In fact, and this is very clearly and logically proved by some Western researchers (albeit mainly from among people in uniform), an expert in military affairs, that is, a professional in this field, very rarely treats war as a boon. He insists that the imminent danger of war requires an increase in the number of weapons and military equipment in the army, but it is unlikely to be agitating for the war, justifying the possibility of doing it by expanding the supply of arms. He advocates thorough preparation for war, but he never considers himself fully prepared for it. Any senior officer of the leadership of the armed forces is well aware of what he risks, whether his country was drawn into a war.
Victorious or lost, in any case, the war shakes the military institutions of the state to a much greater degree than civil ones. Huntington is categorical: "Only civilian philosophers, journalists and scholars, but not the military, can romanticize and glorify war!"
FOR WHAT DO WE FIGHT?
These circumstances, the American scientist continues his thought, subject to military subordination to civilian authorities, both in a democratic and totalitarian society, compelling professional servicemen to "indulge their duty to the fatherland", in other words, to indulge whims of civil politicians. The most instructive example from this area, Western analysts believe, is the situation in which the German generals found themselves in the 30 of the last century. After all, the German senior officers probably realized that Hitler’s foreign policy would lead to a national catastrophe. Nevertheless, following the canons of military discipline (the notorious "ordnung"), the German generals diligently followed the instructions of the country's political leadership and some even gained personal benefit from it, occupying a high position in the Nazi hierarchy.
True, in the Anglo-Saxon strategic management system, with formally tight civilian control over the Armed Forces, from time to time there are failures when the generals withdraw from the subordination of their civilian bosses. In American theoretical and journalistic writings, an example is usually given of General Douglas MacArthur, who allowed himself to express disagreement with the presidential administration regarding its military-political course during the period of hostilities in Korea. For this he paid with dismissal.
Behind all this lies a serious problem, realized by all, but not solved in any state to this day, according to Western analysts. This is a conflict between the obedience of military personnel and their professional competence, as well as the closely related contradiction between the competence of people in uniform and legality. Of course, a military professional must first of all be guided by the letter of the law, but sometimes the “higher considerations” imposed on him put him in a blind alley and condemn him to actions that, at best, contradict his internal ethical attitudes, and at worst, trivial crimes.
Huntington notes that, on the whole, the ideas of expansionism were not popular among American servicemen at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many officers and generals considered the use of the armed forces as the most extreme means of solving foreign policy problems. Moreover, such conclusions, modern Western political scientists emphasize, were characteristic of the American military on the eve of the Second World War and are expressed by them at the present time. Moreover, the US generals not only openly feared the forced involvement of the country in the coming Second World War, but also subsequently strongly opposed the dispersal of forces and resources between two theaters, urging them to be guided by purely national interests and not go all about the British.
However, if the US generals and the officer corps he led (that is, the professionals) perceive the upcoming or starting military conflict as something “sacred,” they will go to the end. This phenomenon is explained by the deep-seated idealism in American society, which is inclined to turn the just (in his opinion) war into a "crusade" into a battle waged not so much for national security, but for "universal values of democracy." It is precisely this point of view that the US military adhered to regarding the nature of both world wars. It is not by chance that General Dwight Eisenhower called his memories “The Crusade to Europe”.
Such sentiments, but with known costs of a political and moral character, reigned among the American military in the initial period of the "total struggle against terrorism" (after the terrorist attacks in September 2001), which led to the invasion, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. This cannot be said about the wars in Korea and Vietnam, when the military was not listened to very much and the “halo of holiness of the cause”, for which sometimes we had to die on the battlefield, was not observed.
The relative failure of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years is indirectly reflected in society. It realizes that the goals set can hardly be achieved due to a number of reasons, including the inadequacy of the training of commanding personnel, moreover, the winners and heroism not marked by fame in the past decades. Nowadays, the famous American military scientist Douglas MacGregor directly indicates the obvious exaggeration and artificiality of the successes of the US Armed Forces in conflicts after World War II. In his opinion, the hostilities in Korea ended in a dead end, in Vietnam - in defeat, the intervention in Grenada and Panama - "bustle" in the face of the enemy who was virtually absent. The incompetence of the American military leadership forced the retreat from Lebanon and Somalia, objectively formed in Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the luck of the Americans simply could not contribute to the fact that they were essentially lightened, with a guarantee of success for non-combat peacekeeping operations. Even the outcome of the Gulf war in 1991 can only be conditionally called successful because of the unexpectedly weak resistance of a demoralized adversary. Accordingly, the outstanding courage and exploits of servicemen on the battlefield, and even more so about the merits of the generals, allegedly cannot be said.
SOURCES OF ONE PROBLEM
However, the problem of the incompetence of a certain part of American officers and especially generals is not so straightforward and simple. It sometimes goes beyond the framework of a purely military professional activity and in many aspects is rooted in a retrospective, in fact, in the first years and decades of the US military machine, largely determined by the specifics of civilian control of the military.
The founders of the United States and the authors of the American constitution, sensing the general mood of society, initially determined that the country's civilian president is at the same time the supreme commander of the national armed forces. Consequently, he has the right to lead the troops "in the field." The first American presidents did just that. As for the commander of the lower level, it was considered unnecessary for the chief clerk to have a special education, it was quite enough to read special literature and possess the appropriate moral-volitional qualities.
Not surprisingly, Madison engaged in the direct organization of the defense of the capital during the Anglo-American War 1812-1814, the Regiment during the war with Mexico (1846-1848), although it did not manage the troops in the battles directly, personally drew up a campaign plan and constantly intervened in the leadership parts and divisions. The latest example of this kind is the development by Lincoln of the strategy to combat the Confederates and his “leading” participation in the maneuvering of the troops of the northerners during the initial period of the Civil War (1861-1865). However, after two years of sluggish fighting, the president realized that he himself could not cope with the role of commander ...
Thus, in the second half of the 19th century, a situation arose in the United States where the head of state could no longer competently lead the military, even if he himself had some military experience. In fact, the presidents did not have the opportunity to qualitatively perform this task without sacrificing their main functions, political and economic ones. Nevertheless, later attempts by the White House to intervene in the purely professional affairs of the military were repeatedly noted.
For example, during the US-Spanish war of 1898, Theodore Roosevelt more than once gave “recommendations” to the military on how to carry out certain operations. His distant relative Franklin Delano Roosevelt initially decided to personally lead the armed forces. He believed that he was brilliantly versed in military affairs and naively considered himself equal in discussions with the generals on operational and tactical issues. However, after the tragedy of Pearl Harbor, the American president, I must give him his due, instantly orient himself and was “happy” to fully trust in military affairs to professionals, first of all, to be surely a gifted military leader, General George Marshall.
Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt in the presidency and almost immediately showed himself as a tough and decisive leader in the international arena, nonetheless with his “corrective” instructions during the Korean War caused an outburst of indignation among the generals, allegedly “stealing” his victory over the Communists, which in eventually led to the above-mentioned resignation of the influential combat general Douglas MacArthur. But the next president, Dwight Eisenhower, the general, hero of the Second World War, had unconditional authority among military professionals of all levels, and therefore, despite frequent interference in the affairs of the armed forces, he avoided conflicts with their command.
John Kennedy to this day remains one of the most popular US presidents. But even though he had combat service experience as an officer in the Navy, he nevertheless gained fame as a leader who at least twice with “soft” decisions, contrary to military recommendations, neutralized the situation that had begun to develop according to the American scenario during the invasion of Cuba in the spring of 1961 year and during the Caribbean crisis in the fall of 1962.
Under presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, who were trying to adequately escape from the impending catastrophe of the Vietnam War, attempts to intervene with senior civilian officials in purely military matters were also noted. However, there was no explosion of indignation regarding a “stolen victory,” as during the Korean War. General William Westmoreland, commander-in-chief of US forces in Vietnam, being unwilling to agree with the content of instructions from the White House each time, was quietly transferred to a high post. To another, more intractable and tougher opponent of the methods of warfare imposed from civilian bodies, Lieutenant-General of the Marine Corps Viktor Krulak was denied promotion under pressure from Johnson.
Most of the dissenting military commanders (like the commanding general of the 1 Infantry Division, General William DePithey), limited themselves to presenting their views on the pages of specialized media, during scientific discussions, etc. American analysts emphasize that scandals, accusations involving the intervention of civilian officials in the control of troops "in the field", after Vietnam was not noted. But this does not mean that the civilian leadership of the United States once and for all managed to “crush” the military, depriving them of their right to an opinion different from the presidential administration. An example of this, incidentally, is the discussion that erupted on Capitol Hill on the eve of the introduction of American troops into Iraq in 2003, during which Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki allowed himself to disagree with the plans developed by the Bush administration, which in the end served the reason for his resignation.
Sometimes, as an argument in disputes about the reasons for the incompetence of servicemen in their professional affairs, such a thesis as “putting civilians on military functions” emerges, which, they say, distracts the latter from fulfilling their direct duties. This fact was noticed at the time by Huntington. In particular, he wrote that from the very beginning and in its essence the task of the military professional was and is preparation for war and its conduct, and no more. But progress entails an avalanche-like complication of hostilities associated with the increasing use of more and more weapons and various equipment. Consequently, more and more specialists are involved in the military sphere, who at first glance have very remote relations with it. Of course, the scientist continues, you can get the military to study the nuances of the production of weapons and military equipment, methods of their procurement, business theory and, finally, the features of economic mobilization. But whether people need to do this in the form, that is the question.
The complete lack of business interest in these problems forced the US leadership back in the 30 years of the last century to take all this burden on the shoulders of the military itself. Since then, to this day, little has changed. Thousands of professionals trained to fight are distracted from the performance of their direct functions, and the ministries and headquarters of the Armed Forces, the Pentagon’s central offices, the offices of the Secretary of Defense and the KNSH are essentially involved in purely commercial affairs: building up and monitoring the execution of the defense budget, pushing orders for weapons and military equipment etc.
An alternative to this vicious order of things, emphasize American analysts, in the framework of the same Anglo-Saxon model of military governance is another, more pragmatic system, established in the UK, according to which "military planners are only indirectly related to the economy, social and administrative problems ". This whole set of questions has been referred to specialized agencies, offices, etc., which provide the British military with everything they need.
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