Prior to his appointment as Commissar of Internal Affairs, L. P. Beria’s published biography did not compromise his information. Due to the fact that it is not available to a wide circle of readers, I will cite its full text, published in the historical and revolutionary calendar for 1940: “Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was born 29 in March 1899 in the village of Merheuli, Sukhumsky district (Abkhaz ASSR), in a poor peasant family . He received his initial education at the Sukhumi Higher Primary School, after which he went to study in Baku, where he entered the Polytechnic School and graduated in 1919 with a degree in engineering architect. Ever since his youthful years, Comrade Beria joined the revolutionary movement.
In 1915, he took a leadership role in organizing an illegal student revolutionary group and actively participated in his work. In March, 1917, Mr. T. Beria joined the RSDLP (Bolsheviks) and conducted active underground work during the period when the Musavatists were dominant in Azerbaijan.
In 1920, after the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, Comrade Beria, on the instructions of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (B.) And the XI Army Headquarters, twice traveled to illegal Bolshevik work in Georgia, where the Georgian Mensheviks were then in power. Having contacted local Bolshevik organizations, Comrade Beria did a great job in Georgia in preparing an armed uprising against the Menshevik government.
In connection with the failure of the illegal Central Committee of the Bolsheviks of Georgia in 1920, Mr. T. Beria was arrested by the Menshevik government and put in the Kutaisi prison. After several months of imprisonment, comrade Beria, at the insistence of comrade Kirov, then an authorized representative of Soviet Russia in Georgia, was sent out of Georgia to Soviet Azerbaijan. In Baku, Mr. Beria first worked at the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaijan, and then, in order to strengthen the staff of the Azerbaijani Cheka, was appointed head of the secret-operational unit and deputy chairman of the Azerbaijani Cheka.
In the autumn of 1922, by the decision of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (B.) T. Beria is transferred to work in the Cheka of Georgia as the head of the secret operational unit, with the combination of the post of head of the Special Department of the Army. From this time until the end of 1931, Mr. T. Beria has been continuously in leading KGB work, holding consecutively the positions of the chairman of the Cheka of Georgia, deputy chairman of the GPU Transcaucasian Federation, chairman of the Transcaucasian and Georgian GPU, and plenipotentiary chairman of the GPU in the TSFSR. Over the period of work in the Cheka-GPU bodies, Comrade Beria has done an enormous amount of work to defeat and liquidate the anti-Soviet parties of the Transcaucasus (Georgian Mensheviks, Mussavatists and Dashnaks).
Special mention should be made of the achievements of comrade Beria in the defeat of the counter-revolutionary Trotsky-Bukharin and bourgeois-nationalist gangs, as well as the Georgian Menshevik party, which in the early years of Soviet power in Georgia was a significant counter-revolutionary force that actively fought against Soviet power right up to the organization of armed intervention. At the same time, during this period, Comrade Beria did a great job of exposing the enemies of the people who had penetrated to the party and Soviet leadership in Transcaucasia.
At the beginning of November, 1931 t. Beria was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia and second secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and first secretary of the All-Union Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks). Central Committee KP (b) of Georgia. At the head of the Bolshevik organizations of Georgia and the Transcaucasus, Comrade Beria displays brilliant organizational talent, Leninist-Stalinist persistence and intransigence towards the enemies of the people in the struggle to hold the general line of the party. With his skillful and strong Bolshevik leadership, he directs the work of party organizations to implement the directives of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to correct the grossest distortions of party policy in the countryside, to raise industry, agriculture and culture of the Transcaucasian republics, to cultivate and bolshevik education of cadres.
Much merit belongs to t. Beria in exposing Trotsky-Bukharin falsifiers. stories Bolshevism. His famous work, written in 1935, “To the Question of the History of Bolshevik Organizations in the Transcaucasus”, which was distributed in millions of copies and translated into many languages of the peoples of the USSR, is a valuable contribution to the history of Bolshevism.
For military and revolutionary services, comrade Beria was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Fighting and Labor Orders of the Red Banner of the Republic of Georgia, the Labor Order of the Red Banner of Azerbaijan, two signs of the honorary KGB officer.
In August, 1938, Mr. T. Beria transferred to work in Moscow. Currently, Comrade Beria is the people's commissar of the interior of the USSR. Since the XVII Congress of the Party, T. Beria is a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.). At the first plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), elected by the XVIII Congress of the Party in March 1939, t. Beria was elected a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Tov. Beria - deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ". 
It is noteworthy that in subsequent published biographies of L. P. Beria, this information is either absent or reduced to a minimum.
In recent years, LP. Beria has written a lot of publications. Most authors attempt to unravel the phenomenon of this ambiguously perceived political figure. The man in the street is so sure that L.P. Beria was a political demon and a bloodthirsty murderer, that he does not want to hear anything about the opposite assessment of his contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the preservation of the independence of the Soviet state. In connection with this denial, the author has set a goal: to find out the true face of L. P. Beria.
In the previous article, The Mystery of Beria, the author made an attempt to prove that LP Beria was not only not the organizer of mass repressions, but was also an active opponent of the illegal methods of investigation. Over the years of his leadership, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR released 185 thousand. 571 people convicted for counter-revolutionary activities under article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. After the death of I. V. Stalin, he initiated a large-scale amnesty and other democratic reforms.
During the war years, L. P. Beria led the entire military economy of the country and led the nationwide work to create a domestic nuclear power plant. weapons.
Let us try to analyze the chronology of events and assess the contribution of L. P. Beria to the implementation of the Soviet atomic project.
The first intelligence department of the NKVD, beginning in the autumn of 1941, received information about the work on the creation of atomic weapons in the United States, Britain and Germany through the foreign agent network created. Having received the information, L. P. Beria, not convinced of its complete authenticity, was in no hurry to report this to JV Stalin. This is confirmed by the fact that L. P. Beria was writing a draft letter to J. V. Stalin about the content of reconnaissance materials and the need to organize work on the creation of atomic weapons. The draft letter was written between 10 October 1941 and 31 March 1942, but it was never sent.
LP Beria decided to report only on 6 of October 1942 in October, suggesting to JV Stalin to work out the creation of a scientific advisory body from the authorities of the State Defense Committee (GKO)  to coordinate, study and direct all the works scientists, research organizations of the USSR, dealing with the issue of atomic energy of uranium. Provide a secret acquaintance of prominent uranium specialists with the materials of the NKVD of the USSR for the purpose of their evaluation and further use.
The letter also reported that from top-secret materials obtained by agents of the NKVD of the USSR from England by agents, it followed that an office had been set up at the British Military Cabinet to study the problem of uranium for military purposes and to manufacture uranium bombs of great destructive power. [ 3]
The start date for the implementation of the Soviet atomic project is 28 in September of 1942. On this day, an order of the State Committee of the USSR was signed No. 2352ss "On the organization of work on uranium" . The order noted that the USSR Academy of Sciences (AS) should “resume work on the feasibility study of using atomic energy by nuclear fission and submit a report on the possibility of creating a uranium bomb or uranium fuel to 1 on April 1943 in April” .
Until May 1944, the activities of state bodies and scientific organizations on the uranium problem were supervised by the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee, V. M. Molotov, who at the same time served as First Deputy Prime Minister and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. However, due to his workload, in fact, these duties were assigned to the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (SNK) and at the same time the People's Commissar of the chemical industry M. G. Pervukhin.
19 in May 1944 of Mr. M. G. Pervukhin wrote a note addressed to J. V. Stalin “On the problem of uranium”, where he proposed that these functions be entrusted to L. P. Beria to raise the status of management of the use of intra-atomic energy on behalf of the state.
In the note, this proposal was amended as follows: “To create, under the State Defense Committee, the Uranium Council for day-to-day monitoring and assistance in carrying out work on uranium is approximately as follows:
1. t. Beria L.P. (Chairman of the Council); 2. V. Molotov; M. 3. M. Pervukhin, G. (Vice-Chairman); 4. Academician Kurchatov I. V. ”
This proposal indirectly looked at the personal interest of M. G. Pervukhin in raising his status in project management. This was manifested in the fact that the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was assigned the role of an ordinary member of the council, and he offered to appoint himself to the position of deputy chairman of the council. Violation of subordination was the very appeal of M. G. Pervukhin to I. V. Stalin, bypassing V. M. Molotov. Most likely, he himself understood this, so the next day, 20 of May 1944, sent a letter of similar content to V. M. Molotov and L. P. Beria. 
16 May 1944 g. I. V. Stalin appointed L.P. Beria the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee and the Chairman of the Operations Bureau, whose task was to supervise the work of all the Commissariat of Defense Industry, Railway and Water Transport, Ferrous and Nonferrous Metallurgy, Coal, Oil, chemical, rubber, pulp and paper, electrical industry, power plants. Thus, from this time L. P. Beria began to lead the entire military economy of the country.
After discussing the note of M. G. Pervukhina with the invitation of I. V. Kurchatov, V. M. Molotov decided to report the problem of uranium to I. V. Stalin, who agreed with the proposal to entrust the management of all work to L. P. Beria. Already since June 21, 1944 from V.M. Molotov addressed L. P. Beria the first draft resolutions of the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR related to the nuclear project. Since that time, all scientific, industrial and other issues on the uranium problem were solved with the knowledge and with the direct participation of L. P. Beria.
After the appointment of L.P. Beria as the person responsible for the work on uranium, 29 September 1944, I.V. Kurchatov sent a note to his name “On the unsatisfactory state of work on the problem”. In it, he informed about the large-scale work abroad and the high concentration of scientific and engineering forces involved in the uranium problem. In addition, I. V. Kurchatov expressed serious concern about the development of similar works in the USSR, especially in the area of raw materials availability and separation issues, and asked LP Beria to give instructions on the organization of such works. 
The result of the appeal of I. V. Kurchatov from September 29 1944 was the adoption of the decree of the State Defense Committee No. 7102ss / s from December 8 on 1944 “On measures to ensure the development of mining and processing of uranium ores” . This resolution provided for the organization within the structure of the NKVD of the USSR, which continued to be headed by L.P. Beria, Uranium Research Institute - “Institute of Special Metals of the NKVD” (the future scientific research institute-9  in Moscow).
3 December 1944 g. I. V. Stalin signed the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 7069SS “On Urgent Measures to Ensure the Deployment of Works Conducted by Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences”, the final point of which was to supervise the development of work on uranium. This item has already legally secured the responsibility of L. P. Beria for the further fate of the atomic project. 
Having received broad powers, L. P. Beria gave the whole work a more organized and dynamic character. In order to ensure the secrecy of the tasks to be solved, the access of the participants to the work was limited only to the amount of information that is necessary for the performance of their duties. L.P. Beria appointed experienced leaders from among the NKVD of the USSR to key positions in organizations dealing with the tasks of creating atomic weapons.
The search, mining and processing of uranium ores was also transferred to the NKVD of the USSR. Responsibility for this section was assigned to Colonel General A. P. Zavenyagin, Deputy L. P. Beria. In addition, the Commissariat directly participated in the solution of the tasks of the Soviet atomic project: carried out intelligence activities, allocated the necessary number of GULAG prisoners in the required quantity for the objects under construction and provided security at sensitive sites.
One of the veterans and leaders of the nuclear industry, A. M. Petrosyants , writes about the reasons for the appointment of L. P. Beria as the head of all work on the atomic problem: “Among all the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and other top leaders of the country, Beria was the most prepared in matters of technical politics and technology. I know all this not by hearsay, but by personal contacts with him on many technical issues related to tank-building and nuclear issues. In the interests of historical justice, it is impossible not to say that Beria, this terrible person, the head of the punitive organ of our country, was able to fully justify Stalin’s confidence by using the entire scientific potential of nuclear scientists (Kurchatov, Khariton and many, many others) in our country. He gave all the work on the nuclear issue the necessary scope, breadth of action and dynamism. He possessed tremendous energy and efficiency, was an organizer who was able to bring all the work begun by him to the end. Often traveled to objects, acquainted with the course and results of work, always provided the necessary assistance and at the same time sharply and strictly dealt with careless performers, regardless of rank and position. In the process of creating the first Soviet nuclear bomb, its role was in the full sense of the word immeasurable. His efforts and opportunities to use all types and trends of the country's industries in the interests of creating a nuclear industry, scientific and technical potential of the country and vast masses of prisoners, his fear of him provided him with complete freedom of action and victory for the Soviet people in this scientific and technical epic. ”[ 13]
20 on August 1945 of the USSR GKO issued Order No. 9887ss / op “On the Special Committee at the GFCS” (from 4 September 1945 of the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) of the USSR, from 15 in March 1946 under the Council of Ministers (SM) of the USSR).
The Special Committee (SC) was entrusted with "the management of all work on the use of uranium intraatomic energy." L.P. Beria was appointed chairman of the SC. In this order, the T-bills 13 item was stated as follows: “I’m instructing comrade Beria to take measures for organizing offensive intelligence work to obtain more complete technical and economic information about the uranium industry and atomic bombs, entrusting it with all intelligence work in this area, conducted by intelligence agencies (NKGB , ARM , etc.) ”
In connection with the reorganization of the People's Commissars that began in the country and transforming them into ministries, as well as being very busy in carrying out the most important secret assignments of special state significance on December 29 1945, L. P. Beria was relieved of the post of people's commissary of internal affairs. In March 1946, he was elected a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party and appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Since then, L.P. Beria began to oversee the work of the Ministry of the Interior (MIA), the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of State Control.
The SC operated for incomplete 8 years and was eliminated on 26 on June 1953, immediately after the arrest of L. P. Beria. At the meetings of the SC, the documents relating to the atomic project, resolutions and orders of the GKO, SNK, USSR Council of Ministers of the USSR, which were submitted for approval to I. V. Stalin, were discussed, corrected and approved. Over the period of the UK operation, more than 140 meetings were held.
The approximate amount of minutes of meetings of the IC is 1000 typewritten lists. In general, the office work SK contains about 1700 cases containing more than 300 thousands of typewritten pages. These documents include materials from meetings of the Technical and Engineering-Technical Councils, as well as correspondence with organizations and enterprises on the atomic project.
By the decision of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 26 in January 1953, the management of special works on the atomic problem instead of the SC was entrusted to a “troika” consisting of: L. P. Beria (chairman), N. A. Bulganina and G. M. Malenkov. By the Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers on 16 in March 1953, No. 697-335cc / op, the SC was formed again and operated until 26 in June 1953, after which it was abolished due to the formation of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR.
Only the researcher or reader, who at least just looks through all the 12 books of the three-volume collection “The Atomic Project of the USSR. Documents and Materials ”and will read diagonally the headings of declassified government documents, letters, references, memoranda, etc., will get an idea of the amount of information LP Beria had to receive. Every day, taking full responsibility for himself, he made government decisions.
If you carefully read the texts of these documents and official correspondence, the resolutions that LP Beria made, then this will give a more complete picture of the enormous workload that he faced, holding in his hands all the threads of this multifaceted work. Indeed, each of the most serious state documents of L. P. Beria did not simply sign, he thoroughly understood it, the work of entire research teams stood behind each number and term. All these documents and draft government decrees were then submitted for signature to JV Stalin.
In his book “Beria. The fate of the all-powerful People's Commissar "Boris Sokolov quoted the deputy I. V. Kurchatov, Professor I. V. Golovin, who noted that" Beria was an excellent organizer - energetic and corrosive. If he took papers for the night, then by morning the documents would return with reasonable comments and practical suggestions. He was well versed in people, checked everything personally, and it was impossible to hide mistakes from him ... ”
Then Boris Sokolov gives the impressions of the head of the C department of the NKVD (NKGB) of the USSR, acting simultaneously as the head of the K department of the NKGB of the USSR (counter-intelligence support of the Soviet atomic project) P. A. Sudoplatov, who repeatedly participated in the meeting of the SC: “The meetings of the Special Committee are usually held in the office of Beria. These were hot discussions. I was surprised by the mutual claims of members of the government. Beria intervened in these disputes, called for order. And for the first time I saw that everyone in this particular government body considered themselves equal in official position, regardless of who was a member of the Central Committee or the Politburo ... Beria, rude and cruel in communicating with his subordinates, could be attentive, courteous, provide everyday support people involved in important work, defended these people from all sorts of intrigues of the NKVD or the party instances. He always warned business leaders about their personal responsibility for the rigorous performance of the task, he had the unique ability to inspire people with both fear and encouragement to work ... It seems to me that he took these qualities from Stalin - strict control, exceptionally high demands and so the ability to create an atmosphere of confidence in the head that, in the case of successful implementation of the task, support is provided to him ”.
Contemporaries and colleagues who participated together with L. P. Beria in this work, noted his high physical performance, energy, dedication and responsibility in the process of managing the work on the uranium problem. He was not limited to office work only, often traveling on business trips directly to enterprises. He delved not only into organizational and economic problems, but also was well versed in technical issues requiring special knowledge.
N. S. Khrushchev called him "a smart, business-like and resourceful organizer." Similar assessments were given to him by the leaders of the military-industrial complex, nuclear scientists. This is how Yu. B. Khariton spoke about L. P. Beria in his memoirs: “It is known that at first the general leadership of the Soviet atomic project was exercised by V. M. Molotov. The style of his leadership and, accordingly, the results were not particularly effective. I. V. Kurchatov did not hide his dissatisfaction.
With the transfer of the atomic project into the hands of Beria, the situation has changed dramatically. Although P. L. Kapitsa, who at first took part in the work of the Special Committee and the Technical Council on the atomic bomb, in a letter to Stalin spoke of the methods of the new leader in a sharply negative way.
Beria quickly gave all the work on the project the necessary scope and dynamism. This man, who was the personification of evil in the modern history of the country, possessed at the same time enormous energy and efficiency. Our specialists, entering into contact with him, could not help but note his intelligence, will and determination. We made sure that he is a first-class organizer who knows how to carry things through to the end. It may seem paradoxical, but Beria, who did not hesitate to show sometimes frank rudeness, knew how to be a polite, tactful and just normal person. It is not by chance that one of the German specialists N. Ril, who worked in the USSR, had a very good impression from his meetings with Beria.
The meetings held by him were businesslike, always productive and never delayed. He was a master of unexpected and unusual solutions .... Beria was quick in work, did not neglect site visits and personal acquaintance with the results of work. When conducting our first atomic explosion, he was the chairman of a state commission. Despite his exceptional position in the party and the government, Beria found time for personal contact with people interested in him, even if they did not have any official distinctions or high titles. It is known that he repeatedly met with A. D. Sakharov — then still a candidate of physico-mathematical sciences, as well as with O. A. Lavrentiev, who had just been demobilized by a Far Eastern sergeant.
Beria showed understanding and tolerance if this or that specialist was required to perform the work, but did not inspire confidence in the staff of his staff. When L.V. Altshuler, who did not hide his sympathy for genetics and antipathies for Lysenko, the security service decided to remove from the object under the pretext of unreliability, Yu. B. Khariton directly called Beria and said that this employee was doing a lot of good for the work. The conversation was limited to the only question of an omnipotent man, which followed a long pause: “Do you really need him?”. Having received an affirmative answer and saying: "Well, okay," Beria hung up. The incident was settled.
According to the impressions of many veterans of the nuclear industry, if the country's nuclear project had remained under the leadership of Molotov, it would have been difficult to count on quick success in carrying out such a grandiose scale of work. ”
As is known, I. V. Stalin was a very cautious man. In many documents on the atomic project (including draft government decrees on testing the first atomic bomb), his signature was missing. For example, the draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the Testing of the First Atomic Bomb" of August 18 1949 remained unsigned by JV Stalin. Moreover, only one meeting on atomic topics was held with the participation of JV Stalin. It passed 9 on January 1947. According to the logbook of visitors to the Kremlin cabinet of Joseph Stalin, V. M. Molotov, L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, A. N. Voznesensky, V. A. Malyshev, as well as leading scientists and leaders involved in the atomic project. A year earlier, January 25 1946, I. V. Stalin, in his Kremlin office, heard a report by I. V. Kurchatov.
L. P. Beria's subsequent proposals for hearing reports or holding meetings V. V. Stalin did not accept,  therefore L. P. Beria was forced to take responsibility for himself. Before leaving for the testing ground of the first copy of the atomic bomb 26 of August 1949 at a meeting of the SC at the USSR Council of Ministers consisting of L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkova, B. L. Vannikova, M. G. Pervukhina, A. P Zavenyagin, I. V. Kurchatov and V. A. Makhnev adopted a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the Testing of the Soviet Atomic Bomb", which was not signed by I. V. Stalin. In the statement to the draft resolution, the member of the Investigation Committee V. A. Makhnev wrote by hand: “The Chairman of the Investigation Committee returned both copies and said that the matter was discussed in the Central Committee and the Decision would not be made.” 
Despite this, the test of the atomic bomb RDS-1, in which the members of the UK L. P. Beria, M. G. Pervukhin, A. P. Zavenyagin, I. V. Kurchatov and V. A. Makhnev took part, took place 29 August 1949 at the site number 2, in 170 km. west of Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR.
30 August 1949 from the test area L. P. Beria and I. V. Kurchatov wrote a report which was presented to J. V. Stalin 31 August 1949. The preliminary test results were set out in it:
“We report to you, Comrade Stalin, that with the efforts of a large team of Soviet scientists, designers, engineers, executives and workers in our industry, as a result of 4's years of hard work, your task to create a Soviet atomic bomb has been fulfilled. The creation of the atomic bomb in our country has been achieved thanks to your daily attention, care and help in solving this task ... ”
28 October 1949. L. P. Beria presented to JV Stalin the final report on the results of the atomic bomb test. The report was signed by L.P. Beria individually. Attached to it was a draft resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers “On the use of test results at test site No. 2.” 
Thus, in a very short time, under the leadership of L. P. Beria, an enormous amount of research, development, production, and economic work was carried out in the country, which resulted in the successful testing of an atomic bomb. All work was carried out in strict compliance with the regime of state secrets.
For the successful implementation of a special task of the government, more than 800 scientific, engineering, technical and executives of research and development organizations and industrial enterprises were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. Only 29 of October 1949 was signed by four award decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, one separate decision of the Council of Ministers (CM) of the USSR and one joint decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
The signing of decrees and resolutions was preceded by a discussion of their projects at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of 29 in October 1949.  Following the meeting, a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the USSR Council of Ministers No. 5039-XNUMHCC was adopted, in which all projects were approved decrees PVA USSR. Decrees were not subject to publication and were kept in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the PAS of the USSR in accordance with the procedure established for the storage of secret documents.
At the same meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of October 29 1949, it was decided to award the Heroes of Socialist Labor B. L. Vannikov, B. G. Muzrukova and N. L. Dukhova with the second Sickle and Hammer gold medal. The Decree of the PPS of the USSR from October 29 1949 noted that they were awarded "for exceptional services to the state in carrying out the special assignment of the government, giving the right to be awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor." Awarded the certificate in the prescribed form.
B. L. Vannikov was Head of the First Main Directorate at the USSR Council of Ministers, B. G. Muzrukov - Director of Plant No. 817 (now the Mayak Production Association in Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-40, Chelyabinsk Region), N. L. Dukhov - Deputy Chief Designer of KB-11 (now Russian Federal Nuclear Center All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics in the city of Sarov (Arzamas-16), Nizhny Novgorod Region). Before signing decrees on awarding the participants of the atomic project in the USSR, there were no precedents for re-awarding Olot star of Hero of Socialist Labor.
By the following Decree of the PPS of the USSR from 29 in October 1949, 33 to scientific, engineering and managerial personnel of research, design organizations and industrial enterprises, who participated in solving the problems of the Soviet atomic project, “for exceptional services to the state in performing a special task,” including the German scientist Nikolaus Ril, he was awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Sickle and Hammer gold medal.
By a separate Decree of the PPS of the USSR from 29 of October 1949, the most distinguished were awarded in the performance of the special assignment of the government of 808 to scientific and engineering workers. Among them: the Order of Lenin - 260 people, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor - 496 people, the Order Badge of Honor - 52 people. 
General A.S. Aleksandrov, who worked in L. P. Beria’s office, who was later appointed deputy B. L. Vannikov at PSU and then head of KB-11 (Arzamas-16, now Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod region), recalled the preparation rewarding documents: “Once Beria instructed me to prepare a draft decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on measures to encourage the development of atomic energy issues ... When preparing a project, I had an idea: what would these comrades do with money - you cannot buy anything in them our conditions! I went with this question to Beria. He listened and said: “Write down - let them build at the expense of the state with a full atmosphere. Build cottages or provide apartments, at the request of the recipients. Give them a car. ” In general, what I intended to allow them to buy, all this was now provided at the expense of the state. This project has been approved. ”
In addition to the decrees of the USSR PWC, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I. V. Stalin signed the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR 29 dated 1949 dated 5070-1944ss, in which it was noted that “as a result of the joint efforts of a large team of scientists, designers, engineers builders and workers of the Soviet industry successfully completed the task of a practical solution in the USSR of the problem of the use of atomic energy ”. Especially distinguished Soviet and German scientists and specialists were awarded. Among the list of government awards are orders, Stalin prizes, summer cottages, cars, the lifetime right to free travel on all types of transport within the USSR, free education of children in any educational institutions of the country at the expense of the state, etc. 
The German scientist, Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, the head of the laboratory of the plant number 12 and the head of development and implementation of pure metal uranium manufacturing technology was awarded the highest Soviet award “for exceptional services to the state when performing a special task.”  He was also awarded the title of laureate Stalin Prize of the first degree, set a double salary for the entire period of work in the USSR. In addition to 350 thousand rubles and the Pobeda car received in 1947, a bonus in the amount of 350 thousand rubles was allocated and, if it so desired, a detached house in Moscow with furnishings.
And what was the contribution to the implementation of the atomic project of its immediate supervisor - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L. P. Beria? By a joint Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, he expressed his gratitude and issued a diploma. In addition, by a separate decree of the PAS of the USSR he was awarded the Order of Lenin and he was awarded the title of laureate of the Stalin Prize of the first degree. 
The draft joint decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the USSR Council of Ministers was submitted for approval to JV Stalin, who wrote on the document “For” and addressed it to G. M. Malenkov with a resolution: “For consideration of the five”. G. M. Malenkov, V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich and N. A. Bulganin put their coordinating signatures. L.P. Beria himself was not involved in the discussion of the draft. At least, his surname is not mentioned among the coordinating members of the five. JV Stalin signed the decree as secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.), And the government was signed by the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers G. M. Malenkov.
In the Decree of the USSR AFP on awarding L. P. Beria, the following wording was written: “For organizing the production of atomic energy and successfully completing the testing of atomic weapons.”  The decree was printed in triplicate. One copy was kept in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), one in the PAS of the USSR, and one copy was sent personally to L. P. Beria. 
For some reason, L. P. Beria was not presented with the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for the second time? Who else but he was worthy of it. For whatever reason, he was awarded a separate decree of the PAS of the USSR from 29 of October 1949, in which, apart from his name, there was no one? After all, all decrees were not subject to publication anyway, and the laureates were only introduced to them in the part concerning them.
This suggests another question: did the contributions of B. L. Vannikov, B. G. Muzrukov, and N. L. Dukhova to the atomic project be more than L. P. Beria? Are they more worthy of rewarding, and their merits are more significant than L. P. Beria?
By the time L. P. Beria was awarded, 30 was issued on September 11 by the Decree of the PPSA of the USSR on 1943. He was awarded such a title "for special merits in strengthening the production of weapons and ammunition in difficult wartime conditions".
It is possible to assume such a version as the modesty of the nuclear project manager. In defense of this version says the fact that, after assigning L. P. Beria military rank Marshal, in official documents, his name in conjunction with this title is almost never mentioned. Then why didn't JV Stalin insist or not offer to re-introduce his deputy to the title of Hero of Socialist Labor? While this riddle remains unsolved.
In the Soviet Union and modern Russia, this kind of practice has taken shape: the work manager, who was charged with the entire burden of responsibility for the fulfillment of important state tasks and projects, was awarded the highest and most valuable award after their successful implementation. The encouragement of the other participants who made the greatest contribution to the fulfillment of the tasks set was based on the downward significance of the award, the size of the premiums and the number of privileges. What, then, prevented adequately assessing the work of L. P. Beria?
Of course, the assessment of L. P. Beria’s contribution to the implementation of the USSR’s atomic project can be extremely subjective, since the state has not yet been rehabilitated, but to refute the official negative information about its activities that was circulated on the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev and his inner circle is very difficult without analyzing the originals of archival documents.
In March, 1949 - July 1951. There was a significant strengthening of the position of L. P. Beria in the country's leadership. After the 1952, held in October of the 19th CPSU Congress, L.P. Beria was included in the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.
5 March 1953 G. IV. Stalin died. On the same day, a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers and the PAS of the USSR was held, at which appointments to the highest posts of the party and government of the USSR were approved. L.P. Beria was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR The created ministry united former ministries of internal affairs and state security.
Along with N. S. Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria became one of the real contenders for leadership in the country. A week after the death of I. V. Stalin and by June 1953, Mr. L.P. Beria sent several proposals to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU, initiated a number of legislative and political initiatives that directly or indirectly denounce the repression of 1930-1950- x years Many of his proposals were implemented in the relevant legal acts.
The overthrow of L.P. Beria was prepared long before his arrest. The author makes this assumption, based on the analysis of events that occurred on the day of the arrest and liquidation of L. P. Beria - June 26 1953. Otherwise, how can the IC be abolished and the signing of the Decree of the USSR AFP " this day? The very next day, June 27 1953, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee considered the appointment of the minister and his deputies.
The group of conspirators did everything possible to abolish the omnipotent body, which was headed by L. P. Beria, to erase from memory all the good that was done by him. He was immediately declared the enemy of the people, the fiend of hell, the culprit of the notorious mass repressions. Across the country, misinformation about a bloody hangman and a sex maniac is common. In detail, the version of the elimination of L. P. Beria in his mansion in the center of Moscow was described by Elena Prudnikova, and this version is the most likely. 
2 July 1953 was urgently convened by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The first question on the agenda: "On criminal, anti-Party and anti-state actions of Beria." The speaker on this issue was the member of the IC G. Malenkov. After the plenum, party meetings were organized in all party organizations and labor collectives. The experience of holding such meetings in the country has been accumulated extensively, and the unanimity of the participants is explained by the predictable consequences of the manifestation of any dissent.
In the eyes of the people, it took a little time to demonize the image of L. P. Beria. How much is it necessary to refute all these lies? Our compatriot is too trusting. The primary information for him is decisive, despite the fact that it may be slander. But it remains unclear reluctance to change this distorted information at the state level, even after declassifying a number of important archival documents. If the state does not do this, then the duty of its active citizens, to whom the author of this publication also refers, is to help compatriots to sort out the intricacies of political intrigues that have been, are and always will be.
The book “Heroes of the Atomic Project” was published in 2005, which published biographies of prominent Soviet citizens who made a significant contribution to the creation of national nuclear weapons, and who were awarded the titles “Hero of the Soviet Union”, “Hero of Socialist Labor”, “Hero Of Russia. " L.P. Beria is not among them. Is it fair? Perhaps it is time to pay L.P. Beria for his services to the country, which, unfortunately, is no longer there? Maybe the time has come to declassify all the secrets of the Kremlin coup, which took place on 26 on June 1953, and to disclose all materials related to the personality of L. P. Beria? After all, history books have been compiled on distorted historical facts, according to which more and more new generations of Russians are taught. Who benefits from hiding from their people the truth about the violent seizure of power in a country that is no longer on the world map for more than 20 years? What new history textbook are we prepared for by education officials?
In just five years L.P. Beria was able to organize the work of key industries of the whole state and achieve the necessary result. The country has strengthened its security and maintained independence. And what would the modern world be like if the USA remained the monopoly possessor of nuclear weapons? Would it be on a modern world map such a state as Russia if the United States carried out a plan for the nuclear bombing of the largest cities of the USSR? History, as they say, does not tolerate the subjunctive mood.
The creation of Soviet nuclear weapons today ensures reliable peace on planet Earth. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people were engaged in the Soviet atomic project, and on top of this whole “pyramid” was L. P. Beria, the main character of the atomic project.
 Historical and revolutionary calendar. M .: OGIZ State socio-economic publishing house, 1940. 185-187.
 GKO (GKO) - such an abbreviation of the State Defense Committee was recorded in the texts of resolutions.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T.I. 1938-1945. CH 1. M., 1998. C. 244-245, 271-272.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Prince 1. Moscow-Sarov, 1999. C. 269 — 271.
 Ibid. S. 269.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Prince 6. Moscow-Sarov, 2006. C. 31.
 Ibid. S. 31-32.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T.I. 1938-1945. CH 2. M., 2002. C. 169-175, T. 2, Book. 6. C. 127.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T.I. 1938-1945. CH 2. M., 2002. C. 180-185.
 NII-9 is now the All-Russian Research Institute of Inorganic Materials named after A.A. Bochvara.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T.I. 1938-1945. CH 2. M., 2002. C. 169-175, T. 2, Book. 6. C. 36.
 Petorsyants Andranik Melkonovich, 1947-1953 deputy head of the PGU at the USSR Council of Ministers for equipment and supplies.
 Litvinov B.V. Atomic energy is not only for military purposes. Ekaterinburg, 2004. C. 24.
 NKGB People's Commissariat of State Security.
 The Red Army Intelligence Agency.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Prince 1. Moscow-Sarov, 1999. C. 11-1.
 Myths and reality of the Soviet atomic project. Yu. B. Khariton, Yu. N. Smirnov, Arzamas-16, 1994. C. 40-43.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Prince 1. Moscow-Sarov, 1999. C. 633-634.
 Ibid., C. 638.
 Ibid., C. 639- 643.
 Ibid., C. 646- 658.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Prince 6. Moscow-Sarov, 2006. C. 690.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Prince 1. Moscow-Sarov, 1999. C. 565- 605.
 Ibid. S. 46.
 Ibid. S. 530-562.
 Ibid. C. 564, C. 578, 582, 599. In the Decree text in the list under the number 23, Nikolaus Ril was named as Nikolai Vasilievich.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Prince 4. Moscow-Sarov, 2003. C. 342.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Prince 6. Moscow-Sarov, 2006. C. 691.
 Atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Prince 4. Moscow-Sarov, 2003. C. 745.
 Prudnikova E. Pravda about L. Beria. breaking dogmas and stereotypes. 25.09.2012 G. http://atnews.org/news/pravda_pro_beriju_lomaja_dogmy_i_stereotipy/2013-06-28-8885