The threat of war in Karabakh: the causes of new exacerbations
In 2015, the “subversive war” in Transcaucasia and the shelling of border villages on the contact line of the Azerbaijani and Karabakh forces, as well as on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, took a new level. If earlier the sides used large-caliber small arms to the forward maximum. weapon, since August 2014, the use of mortars and grenade launchers has returned to normal.
Baku game
Not wanting to make concessions, official Baku has for several years been expressing discontent with the fact that the negotiation process is in a deadlock. In his opinion, this situation is in the interests of the Armenian side, the purpose of which is supposedly to freeze the conflict - so that the world community will get along with the existing realities.
Moreover, the Azerbaijani authorities considered that the confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine was playing into their hands. On the one hand, for the West, which is trying to weaken its dependence on Russian energy resources, the role of Azerbaijan (as an exporter and transit country) has dramatically increased. On the other hand, Russia, a military ally of Armenia, is bogged down in the Ukrainian crisis, and it does not need a new conflict, to which it will be forced to respond.
Moreover, Baku decided that a favorable international situation contributes not only to more aggressive steps in the conflict zone, but also to the final tightening of the screws inside the republic. And, judging by the rather mild reaction of the West to the arrests of human rights activists, to the ban on working in the republic of Western foundations and searching the Baku bureau of Radio Liberty, these calculations turned out to be correct.
The position of the West with respect to Azerbaijan may change dramatically if the US’s relations with Iran are settled and the sanctions against Tehran are lifted, which has been actively discussed in recent months. In this case, the West may recall the priority of protecting democratic values and human rights, which threatens to exert serious foreign policy pressure on Baku.
Moscow between Yerevan and Baku
In turn, Russia, which leaves no hope to involve Azerbaijan in the process of Eurasian integration, is trying to avoid any harsh statements about Baku. This explains the lack of condemnation by Moscow of the shelling of territories and sabotage against its ally, which resulted in the death of several Armenian soldiers.
In the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group dealing with the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the Russian co-chair, along with his American and French colleagues, makes general statements to the parties to the conflict. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is pursuing the same line, making general statements about the need to resolve the conflict exclusively by peaceful means.
Given the position of Moscow, the CSTO is silent. Speaking about the reasons for the lack of reaction to aggression against one of the members of the bloc, the CSTO, in the person of its secretary-general, confines himself to the phrases that “The organization in this matter cannot react by military measures, since this contradicts the main statement of the Collective Security Council, according to which The Karabakh problem is solved exclusively by peaceful means. "
Another argument of the Russian authorities and representatives of the CSTO is that Yerevan has not officially applied to the Organization for support. In turn, the military-political leadership of Armenia explains the lack of appeal to the CSTO by being able to cope with the enemy without the support of the allies.
It should be noted that the CSTO for its participants has long been turned into a peculiar format of bilateral relations with Russia. Representatives of the Armenian authorities in the backroom conversations do not hide that in the event of a resumption of war, they expect support only from the Russian Federation. The President of Armenia has already expressed several times at meetings of the Collective Security Council that, despite the existing agreements and duties, a number of CSTO members support anti-Armenian resolutions within other organizations (the Organization of Islamic Cooperation).
However, not everything goes smoothly in relations with Russia. Yerevan is particularly dissatisfied with the sale of Baku’s arms to Moscow under conditions when the United States, China and the EU countries refused military supplies to the parties to the conflict. In recent years, 80% of weapons Azerbaijan has acquired from Russia (another major supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan is another ally of Armenia in the CSTO - Belarus). At the same time, the Russian Federation helps Armenia maintain the balance of power, selling weapons to the CSTO as a member of the CSTO at below-market prices.
Yerevan and Stepanakert ready to answer
Although the Armenian authorities for a long time tried not to touch on this topic, but last year, for the first time in his interview to foreign media, President Serzh Sargsyan expressed dissatisfaction with this fact. But at the same time, without raising publicly within the framework of the CSTO the issue of an attack on its territory, Yerevan helps Moscow to continue its game and not to designate a clear position on the issue of aggression against its ally.
The process of rapprochement between Russia and Turkey also causes concern of the Armenian authorities and society. Although Moscow and Ankara publicly talk about cooperation only in the energy sphere, in which the planned gas pipeline project will strengthen their positions in the dialogue with the EU, in Yerevan they fear that the Karabakh conflict may also become one of the issues of cooperation. In Armenian society, there are still strong memories of how the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, sacrificed the interests of the Armenian people for the sake of an alliance with Kemalist Turkey. By the way, this did not bring any dividends to the Bolshevik Russia: winning the war with Greece with the help of the weapons and money provided by the Bolsheviks (and at the same time gaining the lands of Western Armenia), Atatürk went over to the West, and Turkey became an anti-Soviet outpost in the region.
As for the aggravation of the situation in the conflict zone, the events on the front line in July-August of last year showed that Yerevan and Stepanakert are ready for tough retaliatory actions. It is also noteworthy that in January 2015 for the first time the Armenian side declared that in response to the “sabotage war” it reserves the right to take preventive measures, since the international community is unable to influence the policy of Baku.
The inability of the mediators from the OSCE Minsk Group to implement at the moment the consolidated policy and the readiness of Armenia and the NKR to respond rigidly to the attempts of Azerbaijan to “play muscles” threaten to further increase tensions on the front lines. And although Baku hardly plans to resume the war now (the balance of forces is far from desired), but the flywheel of violence spun by it is gaining momentum, and the events on the front lines may well get out of the control of the central authorities.
***
Therefore, a lot of things in the further development of events will depend on whether Russia and the West can, against the background of their confrontation in Ukraine, find compromises around other conflicts in the post-Soviet space, in particular the Karabakh conflict. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the resumption of war is not in their interests, which can serve as a basis for cooperation in this matter.
For Russia, maintaining the status quo is beneficial, which gives it the opportunity to influence both Armenia and Azerbaijan’s policies. If the war resumes, Moscow will have to make a painful choice, the result of which is likely to be the support of its only ally in the region, Armenia, and the final loss of Azerbaijan.
In turn, the West, expressing dissatisfaction with the preservation of the status quo, which plays into the hands of Moscow, fears that the war could jeopardize multibillion-dollar investments in Azerbaijan and the large energy projects connected with it. And do not underestimate the influence of the Armenian communities in the United States and France, which to a certain extent balances the factor of the Western energy interests in Azerbaijan.
Baku game
Not wanting to make concessions, official Baku has for several years been expressing discontent with the fact that the negotiation process is in a deadlock. In his opinion, this situation is in the interests of the Armenian side, the purpose of which is supposedly to freeze the conflict - so that the world community will get along with the existing realities.
Moreover, the Azerbaijani authorities considered that the confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine was playing into their hands. On the one hand, for the West, which is trying to weaken its dependence on Russian energy resources, the role of Azerbaijan (as an exporter and transit country) has dramatically increased. On the other hand, Russia, a military ally of Armenia, is bogged down in the Ukrainian crisis, and it does not need a new conflict, to which it will be forced to respond.
Moreover, Baku decided that a favorable international situation contributes not only to more aggressive steps in the conflict zone, but also to the final tightening of the screws inside the republic. And, judging by the rather mild reaction of the West to the arrests of human rights activists, to the ban on working in the republic of Western foundations and searching the Baku bureau of Radio Liberty, these calculations turned out to be correct.
The position of the West with respect to Azerbaijan may change dramatically if the US’s relations with Iran are settled and the sanctions against Tehran are lifted, which has been actively discussed in recent months. In this case, the West may recall the priority of protecting democratic values and human rights, which threatens to exert serious foreign policy pressure on Baku.
Moscow between Yerevan and Baku
In turn, Russia, which leaves no hope to involve Azerbaijan in the process of Eurasian integration, is trying to avoid any harsh statements about Baku. This explains the lack of condemnation by Moscow of the shelling of territories and sabotage against its ally, which resulted in the death of several Armenian soldiers.
In the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group dealing with the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the Russian co-chair, along with his American and French colleagues, makes general statements to the parties to the conflict. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is pursuing the same line, making general statements about the need to resolve the conflict exclusively by peaceful means.
Given the position of Moscow, the CSTO is silent. Speaking about the reasons for the lack of reaction to aggression against one of the members of the bloc, the CSTO, in the person of its secretary-general, confines himself to the phrases that “The organization in this matter cannot react by military measures, since this contradicts the main statement of the Collective Security Council, according to which The Karabakh problem is solved exclusively by peaceful means. "
Another argument of the Russian authorities and representatives of the CSTO is that Yerevan has not officially applied to the Organization for support. In turn, the military-political leadership of Armenia explains the lack of appeal to the CSTO by being able to cope with the enemy without the support of the allies.
It should be noted that the CSTO for its participants has long been turned into a peculiar format of bilateral relations with Russia. Representatives of the Armenian authorities in the backroom conversations do not hide that in the event of a resumption of war, they expect support only from the Russian Federation. The President of Armenia has already expressed several times at meetings of the Collective Security Council that, despite the existing agreements and duties, a number of CSTO members support anti-Armenian resolutions within other organizations (the Organization of Islamic Cooperation).
However, not everything goes smoothly in relations with Russia. Yerevan is particularly dissatisfied with the sale of Baku’s arms to Moscow under conditions when the United States, China and the EU countries refused military supplies to the parties to the conflict. In recent years, 80% of weapons Azerbaijan has acquired from Russia (another major supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan is another ally of Armenia in the CSTO - Belarus). At the same time, the Russian Federation helps Armenia maintain the balance of power, selling weapons to the CSTO as a member of the CSTO at below-market prices.
Yerevan and Stepanakert ready to answer
Although the Armenian authorities for a long time tried not to touch on this topic, but last year, for the first time in his interview to foreign media, President Serzh Sargsyan expressed dissatisfaction with this fact. But at the same time, without raising publicly within the framework of the CSTO the issue of an attack on its territory, Yerevan helps Moscow to continue its game and not to designate a clear position on the issue of aggression against its ally.
The process of rapprochement between Russia and Turkey also causes concern of the Armenian authorities and society. Although Moscow and Ankara publicly talk about cooperation only in the energy sphere, in which the planned gas pipeline project will strengthen their positions in the dialogue with the EU, in Yerevan they fear that the Karabakh conflict may also become one of the issues of cooperation. In Armenian society, there are still strong memories of how the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, sacrificed the interests of the Armenian people for the sake of an alliance with Kemalist Turkey. By the way, this did not bring any dividends to the Bolshevik Russia: winning the war with Greece with the help of the weapons and money provided by the Bolsheviks (and at the same time gaining the lands of Western Armenia), Atatürk went over to the West, and Turkey became an anti-Soviet outpost in the region.
As for the aggravation of the situation in the conflict zone, the events on the front line in July-August of last year showed that Yerevan and Stepanakert are ready for tough retaliatory actions. It is also noteworthy that in January 2015 for the first time the Armenian side declared that in response to the “sabotage war” it reserves the right to take preventive measures, since the international community is unable to influence the policy of Baku.
The inability of the mediators from the OSCE Minsk Group to implement at the moment the consolidated policy and the readiness of Armenia and the NKR to respond rigidly to the attempts of Azerbaijan to “play muscles” threaten to further increase tensions on the front lines. And although Baku hardly plans to resume the war now (the balance of forces is far from desired), but the flywheel of violence spun by it is gaining momentum, and the events on the front lines may well get out of the control of the central authorities.
***
Therefore, a lot of things in the further development of events will depend on whether Russia and the West can, against the background of their confrontation in Ukraine, find compromises around other conflicts in the post-Soviet space, in particular the Karabakh conflict. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the resumption of war is not in their interests, which can serve as a basis for cooperation in this matter.
For Russia, maintaining the status quo is beneficial, which gives it the opportunity to influence both Armenia and Azerbaijan’s policies. If the war resumes, Moscow will have to make a painful choice, the result of which is likely to be the support of its only ally in the region, Armenia, and the final loss of Azerbaijan.
In turn, the West, expressing dissatisfaction with the preservation of the status quo, which plays into the hands of Moscow, fears that the war could jeopardize multibillion-dollar investments in Azerbaijan and the large energy projects connected with it. And do not underestimate the influence of the Armenian communities in the United States and France, which to a certain extent balances the factor of the Western energy interests in Azerbaijan.
Information