Moscow and Beijing: a new test
The Russian-Chinese strategic partnership is constantly in the focus of attention of Western analysts, who comprehensively evaluate its advantages and disadvantages, as well as try to determine further possible prospects for its development. In these studies, attention is drawn to attempts to define the framework and limits of this strategic partnership, which some experts characterize as a “marriage of convenience”; this analysis may be of interest to Russian specialists.
MULTILATERAL INTERESTS
Over the past two decades, Russia and China have developed a unique strategic partnership based mainly on deepening economic ties and defending their strategic interests in the face of the West. The gas deal for 400 billion dollars, concluded in May of 2014, is evidence that the main basis in Russian-Chinese relations is still cooperation in the field of hydrocarbon supplies. In addition, Russia and China also cooperate in the field of nuclear energy.
In turn, the visit of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation to China in November 2014 of the year completed the process of registering the “special status” of the PRC as a military-strategic partner and opened to it access to Russian military technologies of the first level. As a result, Beijing will receive such advanced products of the Russian military-industrial complex as the C-400 anti-aircraft missile system, the Su-35 multi-role fighter, Onyx anti-ship missile systems, etc.
There are also active negotiations on the supply of tactical missile systems "Iskander-M" and the MLRS "Tornado-G".
Another strength of Russian-Chinese relations is regional and international cooperation. Russia and China contributed to the creation of several regional and international organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and more recently, the Conference on Interaction and Building Confidence Building Measures in Asia. In addition, they actively cooperate on numerous international and regional problems, including the most significant ones: the six-party talks on Korea, the imposition of a veto on UN intervention in Syria, opposition to the militarization of outer space and sanctions against Iran, etc. It is important to note that cooperation between Russia and China on regional and international problems often translates into a kind of opposition to the West.
However, a number of researchers, especially Western ones, point out that, despite the strengths of Russian-Chinese relations, strategic partnerships are still replete with “pitfalls”. This is mainly due to "historical mistrust ”, conflict of interests in Central Asia and competition for influence in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) as a whole. As a result, we can observe, on the one hand, Moscow’s reluctance to sell its latest weapons to Beijing, and on the other hand, Chinese expansion in the Russian Far East and growing inequality in economic relations. Although these problems undoubtedly complicate bilateral relations, they also provide an understanding of the true nature of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. In addition, an analysis of Russia's position on the islands disputed by China and China's position on the crisis in Ukraine shows pitfalls and reveals the true nature of Russian-Chinese relations.
DISPUTES FOR ISLANDS
Since the outcome of disputes over the islands will have extremely important consequences for China, both internationally and domestically, these disputes have become Beijing's foreign policy priorities. In particular, due to historical problems, sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands is extremely important for China. However, despite this importance, China’s strategic partner, Russia, for the most part holds an unclear position and has never spoken openly in support of China. For example, in 2010, the leaders of the two states, Hu Jintao and Dmitry Medvedev, signed a joint statement stating that both countries "will defend the gains of the Second World War and the post-war order in the world." Given that, in China’s view, the Potsdam Declaration meant that Japan had ceded its rights to the Senkaku Islands, many in China perceived this as Russia's support for China in this dispute. However, this position needs to be re-evaluated in the light of the latest joint statements of both countries.
Today, joint statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping simply mean that both countries will support each other in terms of their “vital interests,” which makes Russia’s position on this issue even more ambiguous. It is interesting, however, that in May 2014, Russia and China conducted joint naval exercises near the contested Senkaku Islands. Although Russia's public stance has remained unchanged, perhaps this means soft support from China. As such, the actions of Russia with respect to the Kuril Islands (Dmitry Medvedev's visit to the islands, building up civil and military infrastructure, etc.) can be considered.
At the same time, Russia maintains a rather neutral position on the issue of disputes over the islands in the South China Sea, which are another priority for China’s foreign policy. Despite China’s efforts to secure international support, Russian officials have been silent on this issue. For the most part, this is due to the rapidly developing relations between Russia and Vietnam, which is one of the main contenders for the islands in the South China Sea. To the displeasure of China, Russia and Vietnam have recently deepened cooperation in the military field, and last year Russia sold Vietnam weapons on 714 million dollars. China’s Russian-Vietnamese joint development projects in the South China Sea also cause concern for China. Although China asked Russia to suspend these projects, it ignored these requests and continued to cooperate with Vietnam in this area. For China, this gives a clear signal that Russia is withdrawing from supporting its position and even, which is even more problematic, seeks to strengthen its relations with its rival.
CRISIS IN UKRAINE
If disputes over the ownership of islands are the highest priority for China, the crisis in Ukraine has the same priority for Russia today. Interestingly, similarly to the position of Russia on the islands, China adheres to an ambiguous position regarding the Ukrainian crisis. Following the decision to vest Russian President Vladimir Putin with the right to use military force in Ukraine, Chinese officials reaffirmed China’s position on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, while stating that China respects “Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Although it may look like China’s reluctance to support the Russian rally in Crimea, official representatives also said: “There are reasons why the situation in Ukraine has become the same as today.” This implies the existence of justifications for Russia's actions in the Crimea, including military intervention. Given that China is proud to fight terrorism and protect territorial integrity, especially in light of domestic problems with the Uygur and Tibetan people, its neutral and even ambiguous position on separatism in Ukraine looks logical.
The ambiguity of China’s position on the Ukrainian crisis was further demonstrated during the vote on the UN Security Council resolution on a referendum in the Crimea, when China abstained. According to the Chinese, the draft resolution would lead to a further escalation of the situation in Ukraine and therefore could not be approved. Chinese officials were very determined to avoid measures that could escalate and made it clear that they would condemn any actions that would complicate the situation. Although they did not specify which types of actions, in their opinion, could complicate the situation, it seems that these statements were intended for both Russian and Western audiences. In the ensuing vote on the resolution of the UN General Assembly concerning the Crimean referendum, China again abstained, citing the same reasons. However, it is important to note that, unlike China’s neutral position on the referendum, the Chinese immediately voted against imposing any sanctions against Russia.
As well as the Russian position on the disputed islands, the position of China on the Ukrainian crisis demonstrates that Russian-Chinese relations are fully consistent with the strategic partnership. Given the emphasized non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, which China adheres to in its foreign policy, as well as the importance of preventing separatist movements in China’s domestic policy, it is obvious that Russia's role in the Ukrainian crisis is not an area of mutual interests. The fact that China takes a neutral position by abstaining from voting in the UN does not contradict its strategic partnership with Russia.
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE “TURNED TRIANGLE”
According to other researchers, the “marriage of convenience” between Russia and China is based on a mutual tacit agreement to support (to a certain extent) the positions of each of the parties internationally.
Such relationships have developed in the 1990-s. After the Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, tried to "make friends" with the West, hoping that the ideological barriers had been removed, the West responded by expanding NATO. At the same time, the failure of the “shock therapy” in Russia also led to a turn of the Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin towards the Far Eastern neighbor. It can be said that it was under Yeltsin that the two great powers began to establish normal interstate relations. Having common strategic interests, each of both great powers considered each other as its strategic rear and supported its peaceful development. The most significant phenomenon under Yeltsin was the creation of the Shanghai Five in 1996.
The emergence of China as a great power causes rejection and protests from a number of its neighbors. Reuters Photos
After the Cold War, the logic of development of international relations forced Russia to establish closer cooperation with China. The USA took advantage of the difficulties of Russia and tried to narrow its strategic space in Eastern Europe. Under these conditions, Russia was in dire need of strategic allies that had sufficient weight in the system of international relations. China also needed strategic allies among the great powers to withstand Western sanctions after the 1989 year. This alignment contributed to the establishment of strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing and led to a strategic balance in the US-Russia-China triangle.
There is no doubt that the top of this triangle was the United States. In addition, in the face of the West’s arms embargo, China began to purchase advanced weapons and military technology in Russia. This was beneficial for Russia, since the processes of reforming the economy demanded external investments. Therefore, Russian foreign policy in East Asia has put economic cooperation in the first place for the development of the country. The basis of Russian-Chinese cooperation was Russia's long-term national interests and a common position on the issue of the modern world order. Thus, Russia and China formed the SCO, and also took a coordinated strategic position on North Korea, Afghanistan, Iran and other issues.
On the other hand, according to Western analysts, as a trans-regional great power, Russia has always been wary of the rise of China. The Russian economy also grew rapidly due to the rapid rise in hydrocarbon prices, which gave Moscow the opportunity to solve internal problems. Under Putin and Medvedev, Russia's national revival began. The country's leadership also managed to stabilize its relations with European countries. The United States was preoccupied with the war on terrorism and financial reform, and therefore halted its attack on Russian interests. At the same time, under Hu Jintao, China achieved amazing success in development and by the year of 2010 became the second economic power of the world. This gave rise to the idea of creating a “two” (G-2) - the American-Chinese alliance. The Kremlin also shocked China’s rapid buildup of military power.
As a result, in the system of international relations, the American-Chinese-Russian isosceles triangle, in which the United States occupied the top, turns into an inverted triangle, in which Russia occupies the lower vertex of the triangle. For Russia as a trans-regional great power, this situation is unacceptable.
At present, the Russian-American rivalry is the main threat to the national security of Russia, but Russia also views the Russian-Chinese rivalry as another major threat to its national security. Russia has a strong mood of mistrust in China among political and academic circles. According to Western researchers, the interests of Russia and China in many cases overlap and come into conflict. After 2000, China’s rapid growth has increasingly troubled Russia, forcing it to carefully rethink its policy toward China. This explains why the SCO does not have enough incentives to develop.
VIEWS OF CHINA ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA
According to Western analysts, China has evolved its views from ideological concerns about the "capitalization" of Russia and its possible anti-Chinese policy to revolutionary idealism, when the possibilities of cooperation in Russian-Chinese relations have been overestimated. In particular, in connection with the “quirks” of the Russian policy regarding the construction of an oil pipeline in the Far Eastern District, China saw that, in strategic terms, Russia is distrustful of its policy. By the arrival of Hu Jintao, the Chinese leadership finally adopted a normal weighted point of view on their national interests and the need to regulate their ties with Russia.
China appreciates Russia's international status. In the diplomatic strategy of China, relations between the two countries are in second place after cooperation with the United States. But only relations with Russia have been given the status of not just “strategic partnership”, but “strategic partnership and coordination.” For China, this means “cooperation, when one of the parties plays a leading, and the other - a supporting role.” It is believed that Russia played a leading role on the Kosovo issue, and China secretly supported it, on China’s North Korea issue was a leading player, and Russia provided strategic support. Currently, the problem of Afghanistan is becoming increasingly acute. China regards it as an object of economic investment and transport projects and at the same time considers Russia to be the main partner in finding solutions to stabilize the situation in this country after the withdrawal of the US and other NATO countries.
China has expanded its relations with Russia to promote mutual understanding and strategic trust. Politically, Beijing is pursuing a friendly and coordinated policy towards Moscow, which has become the core of China’s foreign policy. At the same time, China, to the maximum extent possible for it, is observing the national interests of Russia. This concerns Central Asia and is carried out with the help of the SCO. A regular exchange of visits of the leaders of the two countries, as well as meetings on a multilateral basis. From 1996 to 2012, 16 meetings were held at the Prime Minister level.
Second, China has expanded its economic relations with Russia. Under Yeltsin, trade between Russia and China fluctuated within 5 – 8 billion dollars. After the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborhood in 2001, the volume of trade quickly increased and amounted, according to the General Customs Administration of China, 88,16 billion dollars in 2012 and 95,28 billion dollars in 2014 year. According to the Ministry of Economic Development of China, China occupies the 1-place among Russia's trading partners, and Russia among the partners of China is in the 9-th place in terms of turnover.
The growth of economic ties stimulates cooperation and interaction at all levels, forms a common vision of common interests and strengthens China’s political ties with Russia.
At the same time, it should be understood that for China it is extremely important that Russia does not suffer a political defeat in the new conflict with the West. The Chinese are ready to assist to keep it, to pursue its independent political line. On the other hand, according to Russian analysts, China has a set of tasks related to ensuring its energy, resource security, as well as diversification of foreign economic relations. Therefore, he will be interested in investing in raw materials, infrastructure and in the acquisition of some industrial assets in Russia. This is mainly about investments that will come largely from large state-owned Chinese companies.
It is clear that Beijing sees itself as a major player in relations with Russia, including within the framework of the US-Russia-China strategic triangle. The Chinese understood that in the “two” proposed by the United States, they had the role of a junior partner, and this does not suit them.
RUSSIAN VIEWS ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH CHINA
From the Russian point of view, the importance of developing relations with the PRC is determined by the following considerations: common interests and concerns about the international situation; the need to provide a peaceful environment for economic development; concern about the fate of the Russian Far East; and the benefits of trade and economic cooperation with Asia’s fastest growing economy.
Russian views on relations with China are presented differently in different groups, political trends and individual experts. Based on these ideas, one can expect that in the foreseeable future Moscow will develop closer relations with Beijing.
According to Russian analysts, in Russia at present there are three different approaches to relations with China: close friendly relations or an alliance with China; a balanced policy toward China without a close rapprochement, but with an emphasis on joint development, or a "Chinese threat" and a "demographic invasion of the Chinese."
One of the main considerations of supporters of the “Chinese threat” theory is that many of the Russian weapons requested by Beijing are promising developments in recent years and are capable of significantly disrupting the balance of forces along the entire perimeter of the Chinese border, including its Russian part. According to some experts, the Kremlin is forced to go on such conditions, because our country has fallen into long-term economic dependence on China. In fact, the Eastern partner enjoys an unfavorable geopolitical situation for Moscow.
Another important consideration is the following. Yes, now in the conditions of sanctions from the West, help from China would be very helpful. However, the consequences of this assistance can be ambiguous and will predetermine the place of Russia in the world, in particular, the place that it will take in playing up the US-China rivalry in Asia. According to experts, there will not even be any options when you have giant Chinese state-owned companies among the key projects, and these are actually Chinese ministries, and you will directly interact with China on all economic issues. If this process starts, there will be certain political and economic consequences, the main of which may be that in the Russia-China bond, only the slave will be the first to be prepared.
Of course, Asia is big, and you need to remember about other countries. For us, relations with Japan are very important (and the Russian leadership understands this). Under strong US pressure, she was forced to support certain anti-Russian sanctions to a limited extent, but she didn’t like it very much. And, for example, such an ally of the United States as South Korea did not support anything at all. Even if we talk about America’s allies in Asia, they are much more independent, reliable and promising players than Europe. Therefore, it is strange for now to talk about some kind of dependence on China. Russia still has a big dependence on Europe, with which it has 50% turnover, and so it would be possible to continue to build and develop relations with Japan, India, Vietnam, Korea, Turkey and other countries.
On the other hand, now the situation has changed dramatically. If earlier it was possible to adhere to the line of maneuver, to discuss this or that project for years, to calculate options for cooperation with other partners, now there is no need to choose for a long time, problems need to be solved. During the sanctions period, China will not have serious competitors, and the Chinese understand this well.
Analysts, of course, have expressed doubts about Russia's capabilities in the East, since it cannot provide such security guarantees as the United States provides, and has “not enough economic forces” to maintain a long and stable presence in Asia. However, despite all alarmist theories, it seems that Russia's policy will be balanced, and relations with China will undoubtedly be one of Russia's top priorities.
PARTNER OR ALLY?
Although skeptics may perceive Russia's position on the issue of the disputed islands as evidence of the weakness of Russian-Chinese relations, this viewpoint is unfounded. In international relations, strategic partnership is increasingly used by states that want to deepen economic, political, military, or potentially even cultural ties with another country. Due to the fact that this partnership is “strategic” in its essence, relations between countries focus on areas of mutual interest. Russia's cautious stance on the disputed islands does not contradict strategic partnership, since it is not an area where both countries have mutual interests. In fact, in both island disputes, Russia has its own conflict of interest: it is necessary to avoid escalation of tensions with Japan and maintain growing cooperation with Vietnam in the energy field, which directly contradicts the need to support China. In any case, Russia's cautious stance reinforces the character of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership by demonstrating that in the event of a conflict of interests, Russia will refrain from both resolute support and condemnation of its ally in strategic partnership.
The same goes for China’s position on the crisis in Ukraine.
But then what does this mean for Russian-Chinese relations as a whole? In fact, these two cases demonstrate, as in many strategic partnerships, the shortcomings of the absence of a formal military alliance, whose members must strictly follow their commitments. For some, this may seem to be a flaw inherent not only in Russian-Chinese relations, but in the strategic partnership itself as such as a whole. However, this flaw turns out to be an advantage, since this kind of relationship gains extreme flexibility with minimal risk of falling into the trap of tight commitments that could lead to undesirable consequences. Moreover, as historical experience shows, treaties alone cannot define practical relations between Russia and China. That is why the Chinese emphasize that Russia is for them a strategic partner - not an ally, but a partner.
The current rapprochement between Russia and China is very far from the creation of an anti-American bloc. Obviously, both countries are still looking for opportunities for cooperation with the United States and other countries, including in the West.
Therefore, Russia and China have to balance between their own national interests and each other’s national interests.
It should be borne in mind that, in the Russia-China bundle, the latter is today more free to make decisions. It would seem that in Moscow they could breathe a sigh of relief when the new leadership of China did not accept the US proposal to form a “dual center”. But this may mean not only and not so much China’s consideration of the interests of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership, but rather shows that it can do without allied relations with both the United States and Russia. In China, they are very cautious about the prospect of attracting the United States as a third force in resolving existing contradictions in the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia-Pacific regional security concept in China is seen as the “Asian Community of Common Destiny”, with China's indisputable leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and its economic dominance in the region.
Information