Mukden battle

9

110 years ago, 19 February 1905, the Mukden battle began. Mukden was the most ambitious, long-term and most bloody battle of the Russian-Japanese war. About half a million soldiers and officers took part in the battle on both sides. The total casualties of the fighting armies exceeded 160 thousand people, that is, they reached almost a third of the personnel of the opposing forces.

Neither side could win a decisive victory. Militarily, this battle was the last attempt by the Japanese army to achieve victory on the battlefield. Japan was drained of blood and no longer had any human or financial-economic opportunities to continue the war. The Japanese military began to demand from the country's leadership to find a political solution to stop the war, while the Japanese army is still considered the winner. In the war came a radical change. The Russian army was to launch a new offensive and win on land, regain lost ground in North China and Korea. However, a whole chain of failures, including the surrender of Port Arthur, undermined the political will of the Russian government. Mukden was another event that made Petersburg go to the world.

The situation before the battle

After the retreat from Liaoyang, the Russian Manchurian army entrenched in the Mukden region. Russian and Japanese troops were in close proximity to each other and engaged in strengthening positions. Both sides were preparing for a decisive battle, replenished their ranks, strengthened the rear.

The fall of Port Arthur (5 on January 1905) and the unsuccessful offensive of 2 of the Manchurian Army of Grippenberg against Sandepa (25 — 29 of January) created a general unfavorable situation for the Russians before a decisive battle (On the way to defeat: the fall of Port Arthur, the Ynkou raid and the battle of Sandep). At the same time, they raised the morale of the Japanese and instilled faith in the success of the upcoming operation. In addition, the forces of Oyama were replenished with the 3 of the Japanese army of the Foot, which was liberated after the capture of Port Arthur.

The moral situation in the Russian army was not the best. A long retreat and a number of battles in which it was possible to win, but because of command errors that had become defeats, reduced the morale of the troops. Among the generals surrounding Kuropatkin there was an atmosphere of discontent and hostility. General Linevich wrote: “My heart trembles, it hurts, looking at this battle. Under Liaoyan, Skobelev would have won the battle, or lost an army, he was not aware of the palliatives. ... in all battles with the Japanese, our command did not show the necessary firmness, sometimes we retreated without even trying to assess the real strength of the enemy. " And do not blame everything on Kuropatkin. In general, the Russian generals, both in the Japanese campaign and in the future World War I, demonstrated low management literacy, determination and initiative. Decades of negative selection had an effect when “peacetime generals”, skilled careerists and opportunists got to the top.

The revolution in Russia gradually began to influence the army. Retreat, long and monotonous sitting in the trenches, rumors of events in Russia decomposed the army. Massively spread gambling games and drunkenness. There have been frequent cases of embezzlement and theft, especially in the rear. There are more cases of desertion and crossbows. The command had to create special units to apprehend the deserters and return them to their units.

The intelligence work was still unsatisfactory. Real enemy forces did not know. They were afraid of a breakthrough to the rear of large Japanese units. The cavalry could not organize normal combat work. The Cossacks, who, under normal organization, could paralyze the Japanese rear, tried to squeeze them into the framework of army corps. Limited in the manifestation of military initiative, the Cossacks, who, like ordinary soldiers, did not understand the meaning of this war, did not show their numerous combat talents in this war.

Before the battle, both sides exchanged cavalry raids. On the night of February 12, a squadron under the command of Naganuma attacked a railway bridge in 5 km north of Fentszyatun station. The team of Russian border guards (42 man) was pushed aside, but the Japanese demolition could only blow up the bridge deck, which was repaired in less than a day. The retreating Japanese were met by a Russian detachment from 4 of hundreds of border guards and 2 guns, sent to eliminate the enemy's commando group. However, the head of this detachment, after a short bout, not only failed to defeat a small Japanese squad, but also retreated, losing 28 man and 1 gun. The forces of the Japanese squad were greatly exaggerated. The second Japanese squadron achieved even less success. Hasegawa's 18 squad of February attacked Yaomen station, but the Japanese could only inflict minor damage on buildings. Both Japanese squadrons wandered in the Russian rear and joined the main forces during the Mukden battle.

The raids of the Japanese in military terms had practically no benefit. However, given the excessive caution of the Russian command, the raids were very useful for the Japanese army. According to rumors and misinformation, the Japanese forces, which were sent to Russian communications, were greatly exaggerated. It was believed that in the rear may be up to 30 thousand Japanese. As a result, the Russian command carried out a series of measures to strengthen the protection of the rear, which weakened the main forces before a decisive battle. A consolidated brigade was deployed in Fantszyatun area, aimed at strengthening the defense of Vladivostok. At the same time, a number of units and subunits were sent to the rear, with a total of thousands of bayonets and sabers in 25 with 36 guns. That's not counting almost the whole body - 25 thousand people who guarded the rear already before that. These troops did not find any Japanese in the rear, and the Russian army lost additional forces that could change the outcome of the battle.

The Japanese command responded calmly to similar raids by the Russian cavalry. So 20 February 4 Cossack hundreds under the command of Gillenschmidt from the Mishchenko squad attacked the bridge in 6 km north of Heichen. The Japanese guard was dropped, the bridge was slightly damaged. The Cossacks, pursued by the enemy, successfully returned to their own. The Japanese command did not take any emergency measures.

Mukden battle

Intelligence of the Russian cavalry near Mukden

Plans and strengths of the parties. Location of troops

Russian army. Kuropatkin headquarters did not invent anything new. Since the battle of Sandepu, all attention has been focused on the “key position” - the village of Sandepa. Although, according to General Grippenberg, this village was no different from other neighboring villages. However, Kuropatkin insisted on seizing the "key" of the Japanese positions, which allegedly interfered with the defeat of the Japanese army. Errors of the January offensive against Sandepa were not taken into account and the plan of attack provided for the frontal attack of Sandepa by the center of the 2 Army with the support of the formations located on the flanks. The start of the offensive was set for February 25 1905.

By mid-February, the Russian army numbered about 330 thousand people in its ranks with 1266 guns and 56 machine guns. The troops occupied the front in 150 km (together with the detachments guarding the flanks). On the right flank, on the front in 25 km, stood the 2-I army under the command of Alexander Kaulbars. It consisted of 8 th, 10 th army corps, 1 th Siberian corps, a total of about 100 thousand people, 439 guns and 24 machine guns. The 1 of the Gerngross Siberian Corps was assigned to the army reserve. The right flank of the 2 Army was covered by Mishchenko’s cavalry unit.

In the center of the Russian military formations on the 20 km area was located Alexander Bilder's 3 Army. The Bilderling army included the Dembovsky 5 Siberian Corps, Volkov's 17 Army Corps, and the 55 6 Siberian Corps 68 Insignia. Total 266 thousand people, 10 guns and XNUMX machine guns.

On the left flank, the 1 Army held a defense under the command of Nikolai Linevich. Linevich's army was the largest and occupied a front of about 45 km. The 1 Army was composed of: 1 Army, 4, 2 and 3 of the Siberian corps and Qinghechensky squad. It consisted of 107 thousand people, 370 guns and 22 machine guns. The left flank was provided by the Maslov detachment.

In addition, there were large forces in the reserve of the commander-in-chief - Topnin's 16 Corps (25 and 41 Divisions) and 72 Division of the 6 Siberian Corps — a total of 40 thousand people with 144 guns. Due to rumors about the threat to Vladivostok, the Japanese dispersed misinformation about the advancement of the 3 Army. Legs for the siege of Vladivostok, and the dangers of the railway from Mongolia, considerable forces remained in the rear. A specially formed consolidated brigade was dispatched to Vladivostok, the 41 division brigade, the Cossack regiment and 15 thousands of soldiers from the arriving reinforcements were allocated to guard the rear of the Russian army.

Even before the start of the battle, the Russian command made a number of mistakes that worsened the army’s combat potential. So three Russian armies were greatly stretched along the front, having different density of battle formations. Alexei Kuropatkin, fearing the enemy’s bypass actions, sprained his troops, trying to cover as wide a front as possible. As a result, the army refused to concentrate, having lost its strike power and the ability to quickly maneuver and regroup forces if necessary. In the rear were left large units that did not take part in the battle.

Japanese army. Japanese commander Oyama Iwao was preparing for a decisive battle and planned to surround the main forces of the Russian army. The length of the defensive orders of the Russian army prompted the idea of ​​reaching the left flank by attacking the 5 Army in the Fushun direction. The attack of the 5 Army on Fushun was to divert the reserves of the Russian command and ease the bypass attack of the 3 Army on the left Japanese flank. 3-I Army Feet had to bypass the right flank of the Russian army and intercept its communications. At the second stage, the battle was planned to unite the armies of Foot and Kawamura in the Russian rear. The remaining three Japanese armies were to bind the main Russian forces in combat.

The 5 Army of Kawamura, in the distracting offensive of the Kuroki 1 Army, was to start the February 23 movement. The rest of the troops were supposed to start attacking 27 February, when the main attention of the Russians would be drawn to the left flank.

The forces of the Japanese army, after the arrival of the 3 Army of Legs and reinforcements from Japan, reached 270 thousand people, 1062 guns and 200 machine guns. The Japanese command deployed troops based on the possibility of bilateral Russian coverage in the upcoming battle.

On the right flank was the newly formed 5-I army of Kawamura Kageaki. The new army was made up of the 11 th division of the 3 th army and one reserve division, about 30 thousand people and 84 guns. Kawamura's army was located on the right flank of the Kuroki 1 Army.

The center consisted of three armies: the KNUKX XI Army (against Linevich’s army), Nozu’s 1 Army (against Linevich and Bilderding’s troops), and Oku 4 Army (against Kaulbars ’army). The KNUKX 2 Army included 1, 2 and Guards divisions, two reserve brigades, about 12 thousand in total, thousand and 60 guns. The Nozu 170 Army included 4 and 10 divisions, two reserve brigades, about 6 thousand in total, and 50 guns. The 204 Army of the Oka consisted of 2-I, 4-I and 5-I divisions and a reinforced reserve Tamioko brigade, only about 8 thousand people with 50 guns.

The 2-I Army of Legs was secretly concentrated by the ledge behind the left flank of the 3 Army. It consisted of 1-I, 7-I and 9-I divisions, one reserve brigade, only about 50 thousand people and 268 guns. The left fang of the 3 Army was covered by the 2 Cavalry Brigade. In the reserve Oyama 3-I division and reserve brigade, only about 30 thousand people.

Not having a general advantage in strength, the Japanese command was able to create some superiority on the flanks. On the right flank of 30-th. The 5 Army of Kawamura opposed the 13-th. Qinghechensky detachment, which was later reinforced by Maslov and Danilov detachments. On the left flank two Japanese armies were opposed by one 2-I Russian army. In addition, the Japanese reserve could be transferred here.

In general, the location of the Japanese army showed the active offensive spirit of the Japanese command. The grouping of the Japanese army reflected the idea of ​​covering the main forces of the Russian army, which was the main idea of ​​the operational art of the Japanese command throughout the war. The Japanese, trained by German advisers, dreamed of a “Sedan” (in the battle of Sedan, the Prussian army surrounded and forced the French army led by Emperor Napoleon III to surrender).



Battlefield

The battlefield was divided by railway into two parts: the western - flat and eastern - mountainous. On the western side, the terrain was a plain with many small Chinese villages with mud houses and similar fences. The abundance of settlements hampered the work of artillery. In addition, there were stone shrines and cemeteries, which were convenient strongholds. To the east, the terrain that the mountains and their spurs crossed was poorly populated and had few roads.

Back in the spring of 1904, on the order of Kuropatkin, in the Mukden area, fortified lines were built. By the beginning of the battle, four fortified positions were prepared. Shahay positions stretched for about 90 km from Syfantay to Gaotulinsky pass. To the north was the 13-kilometer Mukden position. For the delay of the enemy, there was a rear Telinskaya position, which skirted the city of Mukden from the south-west, south and east. The Kaulun position was intended to provide crossings over the Liaohe River near the village of Kaulitun. All positions had artificial obstacles in the form of barbed wire, spotted, wolf holes and land mines, forts, various field fortifications, batteries. Villages were turned into strongholds. In addition, the defense of the left flank was provided by a separate Qinghechen position.


Russian soldiers in Mukden

Battle

The first stage. The first to attack the Japanese troops. On the night of February 19, the advanced units of the 5 of the Japanese army of Kawamura came in contact with the vanguards of the Tsinhechensky detachment under Alekseev’s command (he temporarily replaced Rennenkampf). The Japanese pushed the advanced Russian detachments from Khabalin and Suidun (Sindun). Russian counterattacks were not successful. The threat of flank coverage forced the Russian troops to withdraw to the main Qinghechen position.

On the morning of February 23, under the cover of a snowstorm, the Japanese attacked again. However, the attacks of the 11 and 1 backup divisions on this day did not succeed. The commander of the 1-th Manchurian army Nikolai Linevich, seeing the deceptive passivity of the Japanese troops in front of his front, sent to help Alekseev Danilov’s squad as part of the reinforced brigade of the 6-th Siberian division and a number of other units. On the morning of February 24, the Japanese troops attacked again. They were able to take the Bersenevsky hill, towering east of Qinghechen. Fearing that the enemy would go to the rear, General Konstantin Alekseev withdrew his troops to Dahlin.

February 26 Kawamura's army continued the offensive. 27 February the Japanese brought the troops in order, limiting themselves to artillery shelling. February 28 again launched an offensive, but the Russian troops held almost all positions.

The success of Kawamura accelerated the offensive of the 1 Army Kuroki, located against the 3 Siberian Corps under the command of Nikolai Ivanov. The Japanese attacked with the forces of two divisions —12 and 2 (battalion 33, 6 squadrons and 88 guns), and a reserve brigade. The 3 th Siberian Corps, weakened by the allocation of troops in support of the Alekseev detachment, had 13 battalions, 11 hundreds and 52 guns. When the battles began, they managed to return one regiment advanced to the Fushan sector. On the morning of February 24, Japanese troops began to move to the Gaotulinsky Pass. The Siberian Cossack division of Baumgarten, located ahead of the Russian positions, began to retreat. February 25 Japanese troops continued to move. In the following days, the 1-I army continued the offensive, but the resistance of the Russian troops intensified, as the Linevich army was reinforced by reserves.

At the front of the 2-th and 4-th Siberian corps 1-th army was still quiet. The positions of the 1 Army Corps were subjected to heavy artillery shelling, which destroyed the corps fortifications. At the front of the 3 Army Bilderling was an artillery fire. February 25, at the direction of Kuropatkin, Bilderling organized a demonstrative offensive in order to divert Japanese forces and support the 1 Army. However, this offensive was unsuccessful and only led to unnecessary losses.

Thus, the beginning of the Mukden battle was taking shape, as planned by the Japanese command. Kawamura's 5 Army threw back the Tsinhechensky detachment and successfully continued the roundabout maneuver. Russian reserves began to be distracted by the left flank.

Having received information about the appearance on the left flank of the 11 division from the army of the Foot, the Russian command decided that the entire 3 army was concentrated and bypassing it. The Russian command decided that here the enemy was striking the main blow and began to strengthen this direction. In the evening of February 25, the reserve 1 of the Siberian Corps began to be moved to the left flank. Preparing for the transfer and reserve 16-y army corps. In total, Linevich was transferred to the reinforcement of the 1 Army, from the general reserves and the 2 Army, 50 battalions and 128 guns. The Russian command was hoping to repel the blow of the enemy and go on the counteroffensive.



To be continued ...
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9 comments
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  1. +6
    19 February 2015 09: 30
    Then the Russian troops fought normally, lacking only political will at the top.
  2. +4
    19 February 2015 09: 44
    Decades of negative selection affected when “peacetime generals”, skilled careerists, and opportunists fell to the very top.

    I projected onto my dear ones to tears of the Strategic Missile Forces. The same decades (already as many as five!) Of persistent selection of commanders who know how to determine the size of a footcloth thrown up at once, from "nothing" (in this case, "nothing" is, as a rule, the pocket of subordinates) to extract tons of paint, building materials, office equipment , hectares to produce around itself "documentation" of all conceivable and inconceivable kinds.
    Of course, there are exceptions - smart and really active. There is hope for them.
    1. 0
      19 February 2015 12: 53
      hectares to produce around itself "documentation" of all conceivable and inconceivable kinds.
      This is not only for the military, the situation is the same for a citizen. hi
    2. 0
      19 February 2015 12: 53
      hectares to produce around itself "documentation" of all conceivable and inconceivable kinds.
      This is not only for the military, the situation is the same for a citizen. hi
  3. +1
    19 February 2015 13: 49
    The question is debatable.
    For example, have you ever been required to keep on your desktop a swindler charged by some sort of magician ... a photo of the army chief of staff? Well, in the annex to the citizen, a photo of the commercial director?
    And to carry in your pocket an order from the same commander to prevent injuries and suicide, which obliges you to cut down all the coolant drain faucets on the equipment, remove the trouser belts from the fighters, and replace the ropes and chains in the water tank devices with ski ones (damn, I still don’t understand why skiing ?!) poles?
    Still, there is a small factor restricting tyranny and insanity on a citizen: the need for financial and material costs for them.
  4. +1
    19 February 2015 13: 51
    All the efforts of the army and navy in the Russo-Japanese war were pumped up by the tsar-priest, because - revolution. Through I could not squeeze everything back. But it doesn’t happen.
  5. The comment was deleted.
  6. 0
    19 February 2015 15: 13
    Quote: Moore
    Projected on the birthmarks to tears of the Strategic Missile Forces. The same decades (as many as five!) Of persistent selection of commanders

    Well, not five, but only three decades ... [
  7. +1
    19 February 2015 21: 06
    Quote: Moore
    The question is debatable.
    For example, have you ever been required to keep on your desktop a swindler charged by some sort of magician ... a photo of the army chief of staff? Well, in the annex to the citizen, a photo of the commercial director?
    And to carry in your pocket an order from the same commander to prevent injuries and suicide, which obliges you to cut down all the coolant drain faucets on the equipment, remove the trouser belts from the fighters, and replace the ropes and chains in the water tank devices with ski ones (damn, I still don’t understand why skiing ?!) poles?


    Yolypaly, as a youth, and drifts of parallelepipeds. laughing
  8. +1
    20 February 2015 07: 01
    Quote: qwert
    Quote: Moore
    Projected on the birthmarks to tears of the Strategic Missile Forces. The same decades (as many as five!) Of persistent selection of commanders

    Well, not five, but only three decades ... [

    I ask the author of the article for a deviation from the topic. The article is really interesting and informative.

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