Ukraine is not Europe, Donbass is not Iraq
There were quite a lot of analytical materials comparing the ATO forces and the militia opposing Kiev, as well as evaluating the operational situation, predicting its possible development. However, there was no description of the actions in the battalion unit. There is no data on the real staffing, armament and military equipment, tactics used. Though so-called company tactical and battalion tactical groups APU, the Interior Ministry and the National Guard of Ukraine is the main tool solutions are not only tactical and operational-tactical and even operational tasks guidance ATO.
During the summer fighting in the so-called southern Ukrainian boiler grouping of forces and means it was estimated at no more than five or six battalion tactical groups, of which only two or three operated on focusing the direction of the main effort.
Organizational structures
At the moment, the following units and subunits are operating in the ATO zone: battalion tactical and company tactical groups from tank, mechanized, airmobile brigades, territorial defense battalions, operational and reserve battalions of the National Guard, as well as special purpose battalions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
But only 25-I airborne brigade and two special-purpose regiments are deployed in full force. During the battles for Mariupol in August last year, the 1-I brigade of operational assignment of the NSU was transferred to the city for a short time.
Company tactical groups in the mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are formed on the basis of a mechanized infantry company, which is reinforced by one or two tank platoons, a howitzer artillery battery, a sniper detachment, reconnaissance detachment, and units for troop repair and brigades' logistical support units. RTG tank brigades are formed on the basis of tank companies, which are attached to infantry platoons.
It should be noted that at the end of July, in preparation for the offensive and the experience of fighting in the "southern boiler", the organizational structure of the RTG was changed. Each already consisted of one company of mechanized infantry and one tank company. Part of the RTG instead of howitzer batteries was reinforced by artillery battalions and Grad MLRS batteries. This structure is preserved to this day.
Currently, the RTG is approximately 250 (in some cases up to 450), personnel, 20 – 25 BMP / BTR, 10 – 12 tanks, 6 – 12 self-propelled or towed howitzers, up to 6 multiple launch rocket systems.
The battalion tactical groups of the mechanized brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were formed on the basis of an infantry battalion assigned to a tank company, a howitzer battalion, an MLRS battery, a sniper platoon, a reconnaissance company, a consolidated repair and restoration company with evacuation means and a company of material support. In the BTG tank brigades were formed on the basis of tank battalions.
In August, part of the BTG (1 otbr, 24 mehbr, 30 mehhbr and a number of others) switched to a new structure when the battalion tactical group consisted not of one battalion with attached parts and subunits, but of the three (tank, mechanized, reconnaissance) and company snipers plus artillery and rocket battalions, anti-tank battery, as well as repair agencies and logistics.
The reason for the mass formation of BTG and RTG was the lack of personnel in combined arms brigades, which make up not even allowed to mobilize, and lack of trained reserves. The actual manning of most combined-arms brigades at the time of the outbreak of hostilities was estimated at 30 – 50 per cent of peacetime. Only in 25-st Airborne, 80-1 airmobile and-Tank Brigade was 70-80 percent of the civilian staff time.
In the course of the first and second wave of mobilization, combined-arms brigades received no more than 30 per cent of the personnel required for the transition to the wartime state. In particular, in 30-th Mechanized Brigade after the transition to the "military states," according to some, not enough of 1000 to 1500 people.
In fact, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine collected from each brigade all combat-ready units and subunits (Ukrainian battalions and divisions were not linear, but separate military units) and formed RTGs or BTGs from them (for which equipment and people were enough), while leaving some equipment and personnel in points of permanent dislocation to compensate for losses, as well as current and temporary incomplete.
It is worth noting that in all BTG or RTG there is a large shortage of equipment in the repair and rehabilitation departments and logistics departments, which reaches 70 – 80 percent of the staff size. But if the problem of car delivery is largely solved by the supply of civilian vehicles, then with the lack of means of evacuation (BREM, KET-L, etc.), specialized mobile workshops (MTO-AT, etc.) yet. In particular, in most BTGs, there are no more than one or two BREMs and two or three mobile repair shops. As the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine itself recognizes, troops can only perform routine maintenance and troubleshooting. Repair associated with the replacement of electronics, complex systems and even small weapons, almost impossible.
BTO unfolded in the event of the outbreak of hostilities on the basis of each military commissariat by decree of the President of Ukraine. Each battalion consists of three rifle companies, without a mortar battery and an anti-tank platoon. BTR and BMP are not provided, automotive equipment is intended only for the transportation of material stocks. The task of the battalion during the war - the fight against saboteurs, help law enforcement and local authorities. In all, the state in the BTO should be an 200 – 300 man of personnel.
In fact, during the spontaneous deployment of battalions in May-August of last year, the BTO was staffed only with volunteers, while their assigned personnel went to complete the staffing of the Armed Forces brigade.
The first six BTOs (24 BTO "Aydar", 11 BTO "Kievan Rus", 40 BTO "Krivbas", etc.) were staffed by state. At the expense of sponsorship, they received modern equipment, communications and surveillance equipment, personal protection, etc. It is noteworthy that, despite the losses they suffered, the staffing of these units was constantly maintained at the level from 60 to 80 percent.
The second and third wave BTOs were staffed with no more than 20 – 30 percent, almost did not have communication and observation equipment, even outdated, and automobile equipment was taken mainly from the national economy, such as scheduled buses and even route taxis.
In March, 2014, the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine were renamed the National Guard. In the ATO zone from NSU, both regular operational battalions and two reserve (volunteer) battalions operated simultaneously. It is worth noting that both the reserve (Donbass and Kulchytsky Name) are deployed in the state of special-purpose units. In particular, each battalion consists of two special-purpose companies and one reconnaissance and sabotage company. NSU operational battalions in their organizational structure - a mechanized battalions in the APC (by the way, they are the first to receive the latest BTR-4 and BTR-3). At the same time, their main task is not to conduct an all-arms battle, but to maintain the rule of law regime, targeted checks and the fight against the enemy DRG.
We should also mention the so-called special purpose police battalions. Their exact number is unknown, according to various sources - from 25 to 40. Until the beginning of August, the troops did not have the legal status as formed randomly from volunteers who self-select themselves commanders and inventing state, decreases in the ATO zone. With rare exceptions, in such battalions of personnel there were no more than 100 – 200 people, while by order of Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, weapons were issued to personnel against a receipt from the warehouses of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Later the legal status was assigned to the battalions and even an organizational structure was developed. In July - early August, a part of the new BON was formed at the expense of the ministry officials, in particular the patrol battalions. True, the combat missions that these battalions must carry out have not yet been determined. There is not even a temporary instruction on the combat use of BON, as well as a single program of combat training. It is noteworthy that two battalions of the “Right Sector” belong to BON MIA, and BON “Azov” relatively recently became a regiment.
In the entire ATO grouping, at present, the most ideological "svidomye" servicemen serve in the BON of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the BTO and two NSU volunteer battalions.
Wrong rebels
In the first clashes in late May - early June, the Ukrainian command largely acted on the basis of the American experience of conducting counterinsurgency fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. And not only in the headquarters of the ATO, but also in the commands of the sectors there were a lot of officers who had been trained in the universities of the NATO countries. According to the experience of the participation of the Ukrainian contingent in the hostilities in Iraq, several training and methodological manuals on marching, blocking settlements, establishing control over the roads and carrying out inspection activities at roadblocks were published and distributed among the troops. At the front line, translated US field manuals and instructions for intelligence support in the context of local conflict, assault, city combat, etc., appeared.
In early June, after the capture of Slavyansk, the anti-terrorist operation headquarters decided to strike in the south in the direction of Sverdlovsk, and then exit to the Izvarino checkpoint and capture the city of Krasnodon.
The tasks of the commanders of the units and subunits involved in the absence of brigade headquarters (except for the 25 airborne assault command) were set directly by the sector command. Initially, it was based on the American experience of fighting militants in the west of Iraq in 2004 – 2005. Then the mechanized groups with a decisive maneuver along the roads made a march to the designated objects and occupied them, simultaneously setting up roadblocks on the routes. The attacks of the enemy were reflected by BMP and tank fire on the move, and, if necessary, by attached artillery units (mortar platoons, individual mortars). Such actions allowed not only to take control of the main roads, settlements, intersections and heights, but also significantly hold down the enemy, limiting his movement to certain areas. In 2004 – 2005, the US military, albeit with difficulty, but fulfilled all the assigned tasks.
The ATO command planned to use the RTG and BTG in the same way as the American mechanized groups. In this case, the routes of the groups, as in Iraq, were planned along the roads. During the march, in most cases only one road with the highest capacity was used to move company tactical and battalion tactical groups, and in places where it intersected with country roads and congresses, checkpoints were deployed to the settlements, which were equipped and equipped by personnel from BTO units and volunteer battalions. NSU, occasionally BOP MIA.
At the same time, the settlements were to be blocked by roadblocks on all access roads. During the march from the composition of the RTG and BTG, only the head and back marching gates stood out. Since the command did not expect active opposition from the enemy, equipped with modern means of destruction, the side marching posts were not exposed, their task was to be solved by units that occupied roadblocks. In fact, the calculation was based on the fact that, as in Iraq, the Ukrainians will be confronted by rebel detachments armed with machine guns and hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers.
The Ukrainian command did not take into account when planning that in Iraq the American mechanized groups consisted of only two or three reinforced infantry platoons plus one or two platoons for setting up roadblocks. At the same time, they operated in a desert area characterized by a long range of view, and the marches took place mostly at night, using their advantage in night vision devices and thermal imagers. The supply of mobile groups was carried out mainly by helicopters, and only after the installation of roadblocks and the blocking of settlements did the centralized supply by road begin.
The command of the Supreme Court of Ukraine has identified cumbersome RTGs and BTGs with dozens, if not hundreds of vehicles, requiring maneuverable permanent supply of all types of property as maneuver groups.
The operation was planned in two stages. On the first stage - taking control of settlements along the axis of Berezovoye, Novy Svet, Starabeshevo, Kuteynikovo, Stepanovo and Amvrosiyivka, representing almost continuous urban agglomeration, and blocking in the area with the help of roadblocks of militias with their subsequent destruction by BTO, NSU and BON MVD .
At the second stage, after leaving the urban agglomeration in the area of Torez, Snezhny, Bondarev, the Ukrainian BTG and RTG, using relatively flat terrain that starts right behind the Donetsk ridge and the Mius river, were to make a breakthrough towards Zelenopolya and then turn to Sverdlovsk. As in the first stage, it was planned to establish control over settlements and terrain with the help of roadblocks. They were not originally intended to repel an enemy attack with heavy weapons. Accordingly, the sector commanders considered that only certain roadblocks should be stationary, in particular, at settlements and at crossroads, and the rest - temporary, set up only to ensure the unimpeded movement of supply columns.
For action on the southern flank, BTG and RTG were separated from the 79 airborne, 24, 28, 30, 51 and 72 mechanized brigades, as well as individual platoons and companies of the BTO, BON MVD and NGU. To conduct reconnaissance, the 3 th special regiment was included in the group. True, his fighters were not to be displayed in the rear of the enemy as part of regular RDG, but acting on UAZ and BTR vehicles, conducting reconnaissance of the area before the main forces of the Ukrainian group making the march. Such use of intelligence agencies is tracing from the American experience of invading Iraq in the spring of 2003, when the Green Berets groups performed similar tasks.
To sum up the brief, neither the headquarters of the anti-terrorist operation, nor even the sector commanders, expected a significant resistance from the militia. In fact, the usual march was planned in the conditions of local conflict with a weak opposition of the enemy or his absence.
Initially, the task of organizing and conducting combat operations to block the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk republics in the south was assigned to the headquarters of sector D deployed in May. At the same time, an operational group of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was deployed to the sector headquarters.
The Ukrainian actions in the south were strongly influenced by the defense of Slavyansk by the Strelkov group. Thus, according to the original plans, by the time the offensive began in the south, the city should have been cleaned up, the militia destroyed. After the capture of Slavyansk, the liberated Ukrainian units and subunits intended to launch an offensive against Donetsk, holding down the remaining resistance forces and not allowing them to use against units and subunits of sector D. advancing in the south. But by early June, Slavyansk was not taken, and besides the captured light armored vehicles appeared tanks.
It should be noted that during Operation Freedom to Iraq, even in Fallujah, where the most difficult battles were fought, the rebels did not have any artillery, much less armored vehicles, not even light ones. In the Donbass in early June, it became obvious that it was not anti-anti-terrorist actions that should be planned and organized, but a general combat battle.
But the headquarters of the ATO and the General Staff of Ukraine decided to launch an offensive in sector D, probably in the belief that although Slavyansk has not yet been taken and the Strelkov group has not been destroyed, the militia are securely blocked and will soon be broken. In fact, the operational situation prevailing at that time in the north-east of the ATO zone did not favor such optimism.
Unexpected breakthrough
By 12 June, the tasks of the first stage of the southern offensive were mainly accomplished, but at the same time there were objective reasons that made subsequent actions difficult. In particular, the Ukrainian command found that the forces of the militia occupied the village of Dmitrovka, where there are three road bridges across the Mius river, capable of withstanding vehicle and tracked vehicles and badly needed to advance company and battalion tactical groups. Another bridge of the same capacity was available only in the far north of Miusinsk, which was also controlled at the time by the militia.
The height of 27, or the then famous Saur-Grave mound, was already occupied by self-defense units. It is noteworthy that according to the original plan, even before the first stage of the offensive, it should have been taken by the special purpose battalion of the Azov Interior Ministry. But on June 4, the volunteers unexpectedly clashed at the height of the militia, who had already defended there. The personnel of the "Azov" was advanced to Saur-Grave on ordinary minibuses, which were destroyed in the first minutes of the battle near the memorial service buildings.
In addition to the 5 mound of June, the militia detachments of the Donetsk Republic occupied Snezhnoye located a few kilometers from Saur-Mohyla, thereby blocking the M-21 highway.
In fact, before the start of the southern offensive, the militiamen revealed the enemy’s plan and, at the first stage of his plan, preferred, without getting involved in the battle, to take important positions that did not allow the Ukrainian side to proceed to the second.
In addition, the unreadiness of the involved Ukrainian units and subunits to make long marches was revealed. The technology with the almost complete absence of resistance from the militias constantly broke down, not only because of breakdowns, but also as a result of traffic accidents caused by low discipline on the march. As was to be expected, the largest number of defective weapons and military equipment models fell on vehicles carrying material and technical equipment. According to some reports, the BTN 24 and 72 th mechanized, 79 th airmobile brigades lost up to 60 percent of the existing fleet, and about 20 percent of cars required long-term repairs or could not be restored. Note that even before the onset of the offensive, these units were already equipped with the means to deliver everything from 30 to 50 percent. Even before the beginning of the second stage, the units and subunits of sector D participating in the offensive were left without support vehicles.
The headquarters of the ATO, led by Lieutenant-General Viktor Muzhenko, decided to launch the second stage of the southern 12 offensive in June by assault on the Saur-Grave high ground. The operation's management considered that Dmitrovka, the number of militias in which was estimated by Ukrainian intelligence in 400 – 600 people, reinforced by infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and according to some sources, and tanks, will not work on the go. And since the DPR forces controlled the M-21 track and Snezhnoye, it was also not possible to take Miusinsk. Therefore, the headquarters of sector D was tasked to find a convenient place for crossing with the help of pontoons in the south of Dmitrovka. The choice fell on a ford, located in a wooded area near the village of Kozhevnya, discovered by special purpose reconnaissance groups of the 3 regiment.
June 12 for the capture of Saur-Grave was allocated RTG from the 79-th airmobile brigade. Simultaneously with the storming of the mound, the Ukrainian military tried to circumvent it from the north, cutting off the Snowy and M-21 tracks.
The attack on Saur-Mogila was repelled, militia units that came up from Snezhniy repelled an attempt to bypass the height from the north. At the same time, the first Ukrainian units that had begun the march from the Amvrosiyivka region reached the village of Kozhevnya by the end of the day and the next day began to hover the pontoons.
As a result, the forces of sector D were able to start crossing the Mius River and reach a relatively flat steppe area, which allowed to realize all the capabilities of the mechanized brigades. But it was not possible to establish control over the Donetsk ridge, which hangs over the northern flank of sector D. A ferry at Kozhevni did not have sufficient capacity.
Although the plan of the militia to keep the enemy on the north bank of Mius as long as possible and cause great losses to him failed.
Best time
The ATO leadership and sector D headquarters immediately after forcing the river assumed to continue the offensive towards Dyakovo and immediately seize this town. Then the group was divided in two. The first group, acting along the Bobrikovo-Zelenopole-Verkhnetuzlovo axis, was to take Dolzhansky, where the border crossing with Russia was, then turn north, go to the Sverdlovsk area and capture the Gukovo border crossing. The second operational group was to reach the highway M3 and strike north to the area of Rovenek. In fact, the militia did not have the forces and means to stop the breakthrough of sector D forces.
After completing the tasks of the second stage of the southern offensive, the Ukrainian side established control over two border crossings and took control of the М3 highway connecting Lugansk and Donetsk with Russia. At the third stage, the headquarters of the ATO planned with joint actions of the units A and units in the south and Lugansk’s forces in the south to capture Krasnodon and Izvarino border crossing with the subsequent blockade of Lugansk.
Already, the 15 – 16 of June of the 3 regiment of the Special Forces regiment went not only to the area of Dyakovo and Zelenopolya, but also, according to some sources, even to the area of Dolzhansky. True, the Ukrainian special forces did not have enough forces to capture and hold these settlements.
A successful force Mius 12 June Ukrainian side failed because of problems with the organization of marches. Permanent breakdowns of weapons and military equipment disrupted all terms. In addition, the low carrying capacity of the ferry near Kozhevnya led to the accumulation of Ukrainian equipment, which was waiting in line to force Mius.
Only by 22 of June were units and subunits of the Armed Forces of Ukraine able to accumulate enough forces and means on the southern bank of the river to continue the offensive. But the militia of the Lugansk People’s Republic has already begun to concentrate its troops in the area to organize resistance.
June 25 Ukrainian units was taken Dyakovo, and July July 1 - Dolzhansky. On June 21, reconnaissance groups of the 3 regiment of Special Forces, according to some data, carried out reconnaissance by force of the militia positions in Izvarino, while others attempted to bypass the village and take the checkpoint by storm at the border. In any case, the special forces failed, but already on June 28 the units of the 30-th mechanized brigade went to the settlement.
After the capture of Dolzhansky, the Ukrainian units and subdivisions turned south and reached the Sverdlovsk area. And although the task force operating in the direction of Rovenky could not take this town, in fact, the ATO forces began to implement the third stage of the offensive.
Beginning of the End
An important factor that influenced the actions of sector D was the successful withdrawal of 5 July from Slavyansk Strelkov group. The breakthrough was a complete surprise for the headquarters of the ATO and the command of the task force that led the units and subunits of the armed forces, the National Guard and the SBU assigned to take the city and liquidate the militias.
In early July, the Ukrainian side began to suffer significant losses from the actions of the mobile militia units, who struck with mortars and MLRS. Despite the fact that at the second stage, the ATO units were able to advance to the Izvarino, Sverdlovsk, Krasnodon and Dolzhansky districts, it was not possible to localize the resistance of the militia with the help of roadblocks, as envisaged by the original plan. The fallacy of the use of the Iraqi experience of Americans across the south-east of Ukraine became obvious.
The personnel of the BTO and BON MIA did not have enough to issue the planned number of temporary roadblocks. Moreover, the headquarters of sector D had to abandon the equipment of some of them, and the necessary fortification works were not carried out on the already installed ones. Mainly local means (tires, boards, bricks, etc.) were used, the equipment was practically not dug in, and if it was dug in, it was not enough depth. No staff shelters, firing positions, etc. were equipped. In addition, roadblocks could not prevent the actions of militia units equipped with long-range artillery systems - MLRS and howitzers.
The low carrying capacity of the crossing at Kozhevnya not only did not ensure the stable delivery of material and technical equipment and military equipment, but also led to the fact that some Ukrainian units and divisions were broken. In particular, the BTG 24 command of the mechanized brigade was forced to leave part of the motorized infantry company, almost all the artillery and vehicles with stocks of materiel on the west coast of Mius. Ship everything else happened only a few days.
The first bell for sector D sounded on July 11, when the BTG field camp of the 79 airborne and 24 motorized brigades was destroyed by a sudden fire attack. According to the official reports of the headquarters of the ATO, 19 military personnel were lost, about 100 were injured. According to others, the losses amounted to more than 200 people and several dozen units of automotive and armored vehicles. Ukrainian checkpoints located nearby were unable to prevent militia actions.
Large losses of units and subunits of the ATO can be largely attributed to inadequate work of commanders and personnel when deployed on the spot. The features of the possible actions of the militia were not taken into account, the engineering equipment of the locations was not carried out, the equipment was put up crowded, often in general “board to board”, without observing the intervals, etc. During the march, there was no technical closure. The broken machinery was either taken to tow by other machines in the convoy, or it remained with its staff for repair, and in some cases was simply destroyed.
The liquidation of the column under Zelenopol and the sudden shelling of the camps of the Ukrainian units and subdivisions that started following it halted the offensive of sector D. Moreover, on the east bank of the Mius, the ATO troops lost contact with each other and broke up into separate weakly interacting, almost unconnected groups.
The largest of them, consisting of several BTGs (in particular 79 oaembra, 24 and 72 mehbr), operated in the north in the area of Krasnodon, Izvarino, Sverdlovsk and Chervonopartisanska. The second group was under Rovenki, and the third - in the area of Dolzhansky. The route of the M3 passing in the north by the Ukrainian military, in spite of the outposts, was never taken under control.
Due to the impossibility of delivering material resources in the required volumes, the ATO headquarters attracted army helicopters to organize the supply of troops operating on the eastern shore aviation and military transport aircraft.
At the same time, the Donetsk militia began active operations, redeploying the 10 in July to the first detachments in the Ilovaysk area and immediately began striking the Ukrainian units. The next day, the self-defense forces significantly strengthened their units in the area of Snezhniy, near Saur-Grave, Dmitrovka and Stepanovka. The leadership of the DPR militia planned to strike in the direction of Kozhevnya and Marinovka in order to surround the enemy grouping on the eastern bank of Mius.
Despite the popular belief that the so-called southern boiler was formed with the beginning of the offensive of the militias on Kozhevnya and Marinovka, this is not so. The Ukrainian command revealed the enemy’s plan and promptly retaliated by putting in additional forces and means. 13 and 14 July were the days when the maximum number of departures for the transfer of material assets to units and units of sector D on the eastern bank of the Mius was made. Cargo was delivered by helicopters with landing at temporary sites, dropped by military transport aviation.
On July 12, by the sector headquarters, the commanders of units and subunits were tasked with selecting areas for the organization of temporary runways capable of receiving An-26 and An-32 aircraft. But on July 14 after the destruction of the An-26 transport militias in the Krasnodon area by air defense weapons, the air bridge was curtailed.
The July 12 militia offensive was unsuccessful. Ukrainian units and units were able to repel the offensive and keep Marinovka and Taran. But already on July 15, the command of sector D was forced to order the units and subunits on the east bank to go on the defensive. Worked out a plan for the withdrawal of a recently advancing group. It was assumed that at the first stage, the Krasnodon and Dolzhansky groups depart to Zelenopol, and those operating in Rovenek go to Egorovka and Dyakovo to ensure protection of the crossing at Kozhevni.
But the units and divisions of sector A, located in the north of Lugansk from the side of Happiness and the village of Lugansk, by this time could not connect with the group of sector D operating under Krasnodon and Izvarino. DPR units on the west bank continued to actively attack Taran and Marinovka in order to complete the encirclement of Ukrainian units and subunits. And by July 20 – 22, the militiamen, having inflicted significant losses on the Ukrainian military in Marinovka, were able to ensure an almost continuous fire attack on the supply routes of the group on the eastern shore. A little later, abandoning the assault on Kozhevni, the DPR units began a continuous bombardment of the crossing itself.
In this situation, the headquarters of the ATO and sector D attempted to strike a counterstrike with forces urgently deployed to the south of the 51 th mechanized (one BTG), 25 airborne (one BTG and one RTG) and 95 th airmobile (one BTG) brigade. The focus of the main effort was chosen Saur-Tomb. According to the Ukrainian military leadership, the fall of this height would allow to clear the Donetsk ridge from militia units and subsequently to build on success in the Dmitrovka area.
The Ukrainian command planned to inflict a second blow on Stepanovka. To ensure the protection of the flanks and rear of the task force, it was decided to deliver an auxiliary blow to Shakhtersk.
Take the Saur-Grave and attack Shakhtersk with the 25 and 79 brigade (with the support of the 51 brigade tanks). And to advance to Stepanovka - the 51 Brigade, with the support of the units and subunits already operating there. The counter-strike began on July 25.
If in the area of Stepanovka and Shakhtersk, the strikes of the Ukrainian units and subunits were repelled, then on July 27 the fighters of the 25 airborne brigade were able to gain a foothold at the top of the mound for some time, but were still forced to withdraw. The militias were able to hold previously occupied positions and at the same time inflict sensitive damage on the enemy.
On the eastern bank of the Mius, detachments of the Lugansk People’s Republic, using the current difficult situation in the Ukrainian units and units with ammunition and fuel and lubricants, began to cause constant disturbing blows. But the main efforts were focused on the elimination of Ukrainian roadblocks, which did not have enough strength to defend, and could not count on help.
On July 25, Ukrainian units and subunits on the east bank were ordered to retreat according to a previously developed plan. If the Izvara group, albeit with casualties, was able to move away and almost merge with the Dolgan in early August, the Rovenian group was partially dispersed. Using the highway МХNUMX, the militia not only pressed the remaining Ukrainian troops to the Russian border, but also actually cut them into two parts.
In early August, using the situation in the north of the ATO zone, where units and units of sector A were able to surround Lugansk, the Ukrainian command tried to re-launch a counterstrike and remove the remnants of units and units from the east coast. This time, the BTN of the 25 airborne, 79 and 95 of the airborne mobile, 51 of the mechanized brigades, and recently transferred to the south from the permanent deployment station of the BTN 30 mehbr. The assault of Saur-Mogila was led by the commander of the BTG 51 mehbr Pavel Protsyuk.
As a result of the counterblow that began on 6 in August, Saur-Grave failed again, for which Protsyuk was removed. The BTN 30 Brigade was able to take Stepanovka and even launch an offensive against Miusinsk in order to cut off the militia units in the Donetsk Ridge and Saur-Graves from Dmitrovka and Marinovka.
According to the official representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, thanks to a new counterblow, they managed to withdraw from the east bank all units and units of sector D. surrounded there. Although in fact only remnants of the Rovenian group, not finally destroyed, were transferred to the western bank of Mius, because the main part of the militias went to the north under the Lugansk.
Separate subdivisions of the Izvarino-Dolzhan group were able to reach the eastern coast and broke through the М3 highway. But due to the low carrying capacity of the crossing, the subunit units abandoned almost all the tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery guns, etc.
On August 9, the Ukrainian paratroopers of the 25 brigade reoccupied the Saur-Grave, and the BTN of the 30-th mechanized brigade broke into Miusinsk and started a battle there. On the same day, the militia released Stepanovka after a fire defeat, after which the units of the 30 Brigade were forced to retreat from Miusinsk in battle. On this the fights in the “southern boiler” ended. But before sector D, the “southern boiler 2.0” and the rout near Ilovaisk already loomed.
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