Chaps in response to calls
Military doctrine remained a declaration unsuitable for practical use.
In July 2014, in accordance with the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, the process of clarifying the national Military Doctrine was launched. The need for its processing, and radical, noted by many military experts. As a result, after semi-annual work, minor and sometimes dubious changes were made to it. Mountain gave birth to a mouse.
The edition of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (VD RF), introduced in 2010, did not meet the requirements for documents of this level, neither in structure nor in content. Therefore, its revision, initiated by the president, was perceived as one of the most important steps towards the re-establishment of an effective system of ensuring the military security of our country.
In accordance with the indication of the head of state, the new edition of the RF VD should have been submitted for approval by December 2014. At the appointed time, the document was developed and submitted to the president, who put it into operation on December 26. But, as the analysis shows, unfortunately, the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs has not undergone serious processing either in content or in structural terms. Conceptually everything remained the same. The modification covered only some aspects. At the same time, along with the really relevant, some changes were momentary and opportunistic in nature, sometimes having a very remote relationship to the problems of the military security of the country.
Among the most important, it is worth mentioning, first of all, additions related to non-nuclear deterrence. The corresponding concept was introduced in the first section of the VD: "The system of non-nuclear deterrence is a complex of foreign policy, military and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggression against the Russian Federation by non-nuclear means." However, it is not quite correct to call a complex of measures a system, since it is usually understood as a set of material, informational and other elements, objects and organizations, but not processes, which are measures. In addition, this definition covers almost all the diversity of foreign policy and military activities to prevent, counter and neutralize military threats. Whereas a fundamentally new opportunity to create a system that allows strategic non-nuclear deterrence to be carried out with highly accurate weapons long-range, the reflection in the RF VD did not find. Although relevant work is underway, we have all the necessary technological base. Meanwhile, in the United States, the concept of a fast global strike has long been enshrined in the relevant guidelines.
Probably, it would be worthwhile to introduce the concept of a strategic non-nuclear deterrence system (as long as Russia has embarked on its creation), which should be understood as the combination of high-precision long-range weapons on land, sea and air-based, their carriers, their management and comprehensive support.
The definition given in the RF VD is not significant for the document. This is confirmed by the fact that later in the text it is never mentioned. That is, there are no indications of how the system of strategic non-nuclear deterrence should evolve and improve, in the doctrine there is no.
Another important change is the introduction to the text of the definition of the country's mobilization readiness. This means "the ability of the Armed Forces, other troops and agencies, the economy of the state, as well as federal government agencies, government agencies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, local governments and organizations to implement mobilization plans." In the text of the previous edition of this concept was not. Mobilization readiness was considered in relation to individual elements of the state’s military organization - the Armed Forces, other troops and the defense-industrial complex, but not to the country as a whole. Accordingly, the section “Mobilization preparation of the economy, state authorities, local self-government bodies and organizations” was replaced by “Mobilization preparation and mobilization readiness of the Russian Federation”. This, of course, is a step forward, because the whole country must possess mobilization readiness, and not only its individual components, even the most important ones. However, the content of the section has remained virtually unchanged. In particular, the provision on the creation of “special formations intended for announcing mobilization for transfer to the Armed Forces or use in the interests of the economy of the Russian Federation” has not been clarified. What kind of formations are these, what are their status and position in the state’s military organization, the basis for staffing and functioning in peacetime and in wartime? This is not said. But in order for them to be able to perform the functions assigned to them, they should be formed in peacetime. The requirement to create them was contained in the previous wording (in slightly different wording). However, no one has ever heard anything like this in the legal, or even more so in the organizational field over the past five years. That is, an item in the VD was turned on, and they did not even think about executing.
The return of ideological confrontation
Undoubtedly, it is important to recognize the fact of growing ideological and interfaith confrontation. In the new edition, it is designated very carefully - as "the rivalry of values and development models." Since the core of any ideological or theological construct remains the system of values and the model of development and life of society that follows from them, such a provision speaks of the recognition of the fact of the growing ideological confrontation in the world. After all, the developing current conflict between our country and the West is based on a rather serious ideological component, which is based on the discrepancy between the value systems of the Russian and liberal societies. Recognizing the "rivalry of values and development models" as a factor determining the growth of military tension, it is absolutely unacceptable to remain without a clearly formulated system of values of its own, enshrined as the spiritual foundation of the state. This means being unprotected in the most important area of information warfare. What is especially important, and in the new edition of the RF Internal Affairs Directorate, one of the most important military dangers is noted “activities aimed at information impact on the population, primarily on young citizens of the country, aimed at undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions in the field of Fatherland defense ”. But then it becomes completely unacceptable an article in the Russian Constitution that enshrines the ban on state ideology - it must be removed from the country's Basic Law.
A rather dubious innovation of the new edition of the RF Internal Affairs Directorate is the inclusion in the number of external and internal military dangers of the destructive activities of foreign special services and non-profit organizations working on them in the information and socio-political spheres. We can agree that such an activity can lead at a certain stage of its development and under favorable conditions for this to the emergence of an internal armed confrontation in Russian society. However, informational and socio-political actions alone cannot bring the matter to a real armed conflict — an economic component is necessary. Why, then, did not the clause on corruption, other economic crimes, foreign economic sanctions, deliberate sabotage or incompetence of certain officials as factors of a military threat be included in the RF Internal Affairs Department? After all, such activity is extremely dangerous for the country. It should be recognized that neutralization of this threat goes beyond the competence of the military organization, referring to the sphere of responsibility of political and public security systems. The same applies to the activities included in the number of internal military dangers, aimed at violently changing the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, destabilizing the internal political and social situation in the country, disrupting the functioning of government bodies, important state facilities and the information infrastructure of the Russian Federation, as well as provoking ethnic and social tensions, extremism, incitement of ethnic and religious hatred or enmity ”.
It is doubtful whether the inclusion in the RF VD as a separate task “ensuring the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” is a separate task. The domestic Armed Forces and the military organization as a whole are designed to protect the national interests in all regions of the world where they have a place to be. Selection of the Arctic in this sense is opportunistic in nature and does not have significant political or military-strategic sense.
Obviously trivial and, therefore, useless for the doctrine is the provision that "the use of the Armed Forces, other troops and agencies is carried out decisively, purposefully and comprehensively on the basis of an advance and constant analysis of the evolving military-political and military-strategic situation."
Thus, a review of the main, most significant changes shows that they are either not quite correct, or very trivial, or have a distant relationship to the subject. Meanwhile, the really necessary innovations have not been made. Let us dwell on the most problematic moments.
The main thing is not defined
First of all, the sources of military threats have not been identified anywhere in the RF VD, without which it is impossible to correctly determine the methods of ensuring military security. It is not necessary to list them by name. You can give a system of criteria and indicators. As an example of an indirect formulation of one of the signs of a source of threats, the inclusion in the number of military dangers of the item “Establishment of regimes in the states adjacent to the Russian Federation ... whose policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation”.
Highlighting "participation in military actions of irregular armed formations and private military companies", as well as "using political forces and public movements funded and controlled from outside, as an important feature of modern armed conflicts and wars," the Russian Internal Affairs Department says nothing about how the Russian military the organization will fend off their destructive activities. There are no references to this topic either in the tasks of using the Armed Forces and other troops, nor in the priorities of their development.
Having adopted from the previous edition the provision on “the formation of territorial troops for the protection and defense of military, state and special facilities, facilities providing the livelihoods of the population, the functioning of transport, communications and communications, energy facilities, and facilities representing an increased danger to the life and health of people” , the new text does not disclose such essential aspects as the place in the structure of the military organization, subordination, control and support.
An extremely serious drawback of the new edition of the RF VD is the lack of clear requirements (at least on a qualitative level) for the ability of the Armed Forces to ensure the country's military security. This is not about enumerating tasks - this is all right. It is necessary to determine the conflicts of what scale and how the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can resolve in a way that is favorable for Russia. In all countries of the world such criteria are present. Thus, in the United States in the National Security Strategy there is a provision stating that the Armed Forces of this country must be able to simultaneously wage two local wars and win them. Prior to 2010, Russian doctrinal documents included a provision stating that our Armed Forces are obliged to use general-purpose forces using conventional weapons only to peacefully manage two armed conflicts at the same time, and with full firing, to two local wars. At the same time, the escalation of a local war into a regional war was supposed to be stopped by the threat of the use (or direct use) of nuclear weapons (primarily tactical). The nuclear weapons factor was intended to deter potential aggressors from the direct unleashing of large-scale wars against Russia.
There were also clear quantitative indicators of the scale of military conflicts. So, in addition to the target and spatial-temporal indicators, the distinctive feature of the armed conflict was the participation in hostilities in each of the 40 – 100 thousands of people. Local war on this indicator involved the involvement of thousands of up to a million or more people from the 400 – 800 groups in the fighting. Armies numbering several million people (from 3 – 4 to 6 – 7 and more) could already take part in a regional war.
Such indicators and requirements, taking into account clearly defined methods and methods of countering predicted military threats, made it possible to accurately and reasonably determine the required number and combat composition of the RF Armed Forces, their structure and weapons system. One could argue about whether the selected methods and methods were effective or not (often various “experts” demanded the creation of fundamentally new ways of neutralizing all threats, accusing military professionals of routine). However, there was a clear basis for substantiating the required indicators of the Armed Forces. After 2010, these criteria were excluded from the RF Internal Affairs Code. They did not appear in its new version either. It is unlikely that such criteria exist in the closed part of the RF Internal Affairs Code, since this is a poor object for classification - a potential aggressor must understand well that the Russian Armed Forces are built according to clear criteria and are guaranteed to repel aggression of any scale with the infliction of unacceptable damage. This aspect was not a secret even in the USSR - everyone knew well that the Soviet Army and fleet capable of waging a large-scale war without the use of nuclear weapons and winning it. The vagueness of officially declared criteria of this kind or their absence only tempts a potential aggressor to "try his luck."
Thus, the presidential instruction to rework the Military Doctrine has been fulfilled, as they say, carelessly. Insignificant changes, sometimes of a conjunctural nature, did not transform the essence that needed radical revision. The doctrine remained unsuitable for practical use, a purely declarative document. It remains only to wonder - what did such a number of responsible people do for almost half a year?
In July 2014, in accordance with the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, the process of clarifying the national Military Doctrine was launched. The need for its processing, and radical, noted by many military experts. As a result, after semi-annual work, minor and sometimes dubious changes were made to it. Mountain gave birth to a mouse.
The edition of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (VD RF), introduced in 2010, did not meet the requirements for documents of this level, neither in structure nor in content. Therefore, its revision, initiated by the president, was perceived as one of the most important steps towards the re-establishment of an effective system of ensuring the military security of our country.
In accordance with the indication of the head of state, the new edition of the RF VD should have been submitted for approval by December 2014. At the appointed time, the document was developed and submitted to the president, who put it into operation on December 26. But, as the analysis shows, unfortunately, the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs has not undergone serious processing either in content or in structural terms. Conceptually everything remained the same. The modification covered only some aspects. At the same time, along with the really relevant, some changes were momentary and opportunistic in nature, sometimes having a very remote relationship to the problems of the military security of the country.
Among the most important, it is worth mentioning, first of all, additions related to non-nuclear deterrence. The corresponding concept was introduced in the first section of the VD: "The system of non-nuclear deterrence is a complex of foreign policy, military and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggression against the Russian Federation by non-nuclear means." However, it is not quite correct to call a complex of measures a system, since it is usually understood as a set of material, informational and other elements, objects and organizations, but not processes, which are measures. In addition, this definition covers almost all the diversity of foreign policy and military activities to prevent, counter and neutralize military threats. Whereas a fundamentally new opportunity to create a system that allows strategic non-nuclear deterrence to be carried out with highly accurate weapons long-range, the reflection in the RF VD did not find. Although relevant work is underway, we have all the necessary technological base. Meanwhile, in the United States, the concept of a fast global strike has long been enshrined in the relevant guidelines.
Probably, it would be worthwhile to introduce the concept of a strategic non-nuclear deterrence system (as long as Russia has embarked on its creation), which should be understood as the combination of high-precision long-range weapons on land, sea and air-based, their carriers, their management and comprehensive support.
Andrei Sedykh collage
The definition given in the RF VD is not significant for the document. This is confirmed by the fact that later in the text it is never mentioned. That is, there are no indications of how the system of strategic non-nuclear deterrence should evolve and improve, in the doctrine there is no.
Another important change is the introduction to the text of the definition of the country's mobilization readiness. This means "the ability of the Armed Forces, other troops and agencies, the economy of the state, as well as federal government agencies, government agencies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, local governments and organizations to implement mobilization plans." In the text of the previous edition of this concept was not. Mobilization readiness was considered in relation to individual elements of the state’s military organization - the Armed Forces, other troops and the defense-industrial complex, but not to the country as a whole. Accordingly, the section “Mobilization preparation of the economy, state authorities, local self-government bodies and organizations” was replaced by “Mobilization preparation and mobilization readiness of the Russian Federation”. This, of course, is a step forward, because the whole country must possess mobilization readiness, and not only its individual components, even the most important ones. However, the content of the section has remained virtually unchanged. In particular, the provision on the creation of “special formations intended for announcing mobilization for transfer to the Armed Forces or use in the interests of the economy of the Russian Federation” has not been clarified. What kind of formations are these, what are their status and position in the state’s military organization, the basis for staffing and functioning in peacetime and in wartime? This is not said. But in order for them to be able to perform the functions assigned to them, they should be formed in peacetime. The requirement to create them was contained in the previous wording (in slightly different wording). However, no one has ever heard anything like this in the legal, or even more so in the organizational field over the past five years. That is, an item in the VD was turned on, and they did not even think about executing.
The return of ideological confrontation
Undoubtedly, it is important to recognize the fact of growing ideological and interfaith confrontation. In the new edition, it is designated very carefully - as "the rivalry of values and development models." Since the core of any ideological or theological construct remains the system of values and the model of development and life of society that follows from them, such a provision speaks of the recognition of the fact of the growing ideological confrontation in the world. After all, the developing current conflict between our country and the West is based on a rather serious ideological component, which is based on the discrepancy between the value systems of the Russian and liberal societies. Recognizing the "rivalry of values and development models" as a factor determining the growth of military tension, it is absolutely unacceptable to remain without a clearly formulated system of values of its own, enshrined as the spiritual foundation of the state. This means being unprotected in the most important area of information warfare. What is especially important, and in the new edition of the RF Internal Affairs Directorate, one of the most important military dangers is noted “activities aimed at information impact on the population, primarily on young citizens of the country, aimed at undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions in the field of Fatherland defense ”. But then it becomes completely unacceptable an article in the Russian Constitution that enshrines the ban on state ideology - it must be removed from the country's Basic Law.
A rather dubious innovation of the new edition of the RF Internal Affairs Directorate is the inclusion in the number of external and internal military dangers of the destructive activities of foreign special services and non-profit organizations working on them in the information and socio-political spheres. We can agree that such an activity can lead at a certain stage of its development and under favorable conditions for this to the emergence of an internal armed confrontation in Russian society. However, informational and socio-political actions alone cannot bring the matter to a real armed conflict — an economic component is necessary. Why, then, did not the clause on corruption, other economic crimes, foreign economic sanctions, deliberate sabotage or incompetence of certain officials as factors of a military threat be included in the RF Internal Affairs Department? After all, such activity is extremely dangerous for the country. It should be recognized that neutralization of this threat goes beyond the competence of the military organization, referring to the sphere of responsibility of political and public security systems. The same applies to the activities included in the number of internal military dangers, aimed at violently changing the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, destabilizing the internal political and social situation in the country, disrupting the functioning of government bodies, important state facilities and the information infrastructure of the Russian Federation, as well as provoking ethnic and social tensions, extremism, incitement of ethnic and religious hatred or enmity ”.It is doubtful whether the inclusion in the RF VD as a separate task “ensuring the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” is a separate task. The domestic Armed Forces and the military organization as a whole are designed to protect the national interests in all regions of the world where they have a place to be. Selection of the Arctic in this sense is opportunistic in nature and does not have significant political or military-strategic sense.
Obviously trivial and, therefore, useless for the doctrine is the provision that "the use of the Armed Forces, other troops and agencies is carried out decisively, purposefully and comprehensively on the basis of an advance and constant analysis of the evolving military-political and military-strategic situation."
Thus, a review of the main, most significant changes shows that they are either not quite correct, or very trivial, or have a distant relationship to the subject. Meanwhile, the really necessary innovations have not been made. Let us dwell on the most problematic moments.
The main thing is not defined
First of all, the sources of military threats have not been identified anywhere in the RF VD, without which it is impossible to correctly determine the methods of ensuring military security. It is not necessary to list them by name. You can give a system of criteria and indicators. As an example of an indirect formulation of one of the signs of a source of threats, the inclusion in the number of military dangers of the item “Establishment of regimes in the states adjacent to the Russian Federation ... whose policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation”.
Highlighting "participation in military actions of irregular armed formations and private military companies", as well as "using political forces and public movements funded and controlled from outside, as an important feature of modern armed conflicts and wars," the Russian Internal Affairs Department says nothing about how the Russian military the organization will fend off their destructive activities. There are no references to this topic either in the tasks of using the Armed Forces and other troops, nor in the priorities of their development.
Having adopted from the previous edition the provision on “the formation of territorial troops for the protection and defense of military, state and special facilities, facilities providing the livelihoods of the population, the functioning of transport, communications and communications, energy facilities, and facilities representing an increased danger to the life and health of people” , the new text does not disclose such essential aspects as the place in the structure of the military organization, subordination, control and support.
An extremely serious drawback of the new edition of the RF VD is the lack of clear requirements (at least on a qualitative level) for the ability of the Armed Forces to ensure the country's military security. This is not about enumerating tasks - this is all right. It is necessary to determine the conflicts of what scale and how the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can resolve in a way that is favorable for Russia. In all countries of the world such criteria are present. Thus, in the United States in the National Security Strategy there is a provision stating that the Armed Forces of this country must be able to simultaneously wage two local wars and win them. Prior to 2010, Russian doctrinal documents included a provision stating that our Armed Forces are obliged to use general-purpose forces using conventional weapons only to peacefully manage two armed conflicts at the same time, and with full firing, to two local wars. At the same time, the escalation of a local war into a regional war was supposed to be stopped by the threat of the use (or direct use) of nuclear weapons (primarily tactical). The nuclear weapons factor was intended to deter potential aggressors from the direct unleashing of large-scale wars against Russia.
There were also clear quantitative indicators of the scale of military conflicts. So, in addition to the target and spatial-temporal indicators, the distinctive feature of the armed conflict was the participation in hostilities in each of the 40 – 100 thousands of people. Local war on this indicator involved the involvement of thousands of up to a million or more people from the 400 – 800 groups in the fighting. Armies numbering several million people (from 3 – 4 to 6 – 7 and more) could already take part in a regional war.
Such indicators and requirements, taking into account clearly defined methods and methods of countering predicted military threats, made it possible to accurately and reasonably determine the required number and combat composition of the RF Armed Forces, their structure and weapons system. One could argue about whether the selected methods and methods were effective or not (often various “experts” demanded the creation of fundamentally new ways of neutralizing all threats, accusing military professionals of routine). However, there was a clear basis for substantiating the required indicators of the Armed Forces. After 2010, these criteria were excluded from the RF Internal Affairs Code. They did not appear in its new version either. It is unlikely that such criteria exist in the closed part of the RF Internal Affairs Code, since this is a poor object for classification - a potential aggressor must understand well that the Russian Armed Forces are built according to clear criteria and are guaranteed to repel aggression of any scale with the infliction of unacceptable damage. This aspect was not a secret even in the USSR - everyone knew well that the Soviet Army and fleet capable of waging a large-scale war without the use of nuclear weapons and winning it. The vagueness of officially declared criteria of this kind or their absence only tempts a potential aggressor to "try his luck."
Thus, the presidential instruction to rework the Military Doctrine has been fulfilled, as they say, carelessly. Insignificant changes, sometimes of a conjunctural nature, did not transform the essence that needed radical revision. The doctrine remained unsuitable for practical use, a purely declarative document. It remains only to wonder - what did such a number of responsible people do for almost half a year?
Information