Military Review

The riddle of the SPB or why the dive bomber did not go into the series

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The riddle of the SPB or why the dive bomber did not go into the series

For the first time, the question of creating a dive bomber in the USSR capable of bombarding angles up to 60 ° was considered by the Air Force in '1934. It was supposed to issue a task for a machine with an M-34FRN motor to VF Rentel, but the plant at which he was working at that time refused the order. The attempt to involve in the work of the team of the VVIA named after N. Ye. Zhukovsky failed.


The ship reconnaissance officer G. M. Beriev KOR-1936 is created in 1. Tactical and technical requirements provided for his use as a dive-gunner. The plan of an experienced aircraft building on 1936 — 1937 years was to build a single-engine PB dive bomber with an M-85 engine at plant No. 1 with a maximum speed of 400 — 450 km / h with a normal range of 800 km. But due to the specialization of this plant for intelligence officers in 1937, the entire reserve of the M-85 PB aircraft was transferred to plant No. 135. How it all ended while it was not possible to detect.

In the same year, N. N. Polikarpov, on his own initiative, began the development of a twin-engine high-speed high-altitude three-seater SVB bomber with M-100 engines. Since it did not provide for the use of pressurized cabs and turbochargers, then we could talk about creating a conventional front-line bomber in accordance with the existing concept. Soon, Polikarpov was allocated a production base at factory number 84 in Khimki. A plant recently transferred to aviation The industry from the Civil Air Fleet was distinguished by outdated equipment and did not have a sufficient number of qualified specialists.



By mid-February 1937, the drawings of the SVB aircraft were completely ready. But he did not get into production, and on its basis a two-engine twin-engine air fighter was developed tanks VIT-1.

At the same time, Polikarpov proposed a twin-engine, multi-seat cannon fighter (MPI).

It should be noted that, having invaded the "Tupolev" theme, Nikolay Nikolayevich not only did not find support in the SUAI, but also ran into direct opposition from the chief engineer of the aviation industry.

The Air Force did not accept the idea of ​​an anti-tank aircraft and recommended that Polikarpov concentrate his efforts on a multi-seat cannon fighter for the speedy implementation of the project. The customer hoped that the MPI would demonstrate the declared flight data and become a kind of accelerator in the creation of promising machines that fit into the concept of the Air Force leadership.

31 January 1937-th worked mock-up commission on the MPI aircraft. On July 25, the government approved the plan for the Air Force in 1934. It was supposed to issue a task for a machine with an M-34FRN motor to VF Rentel, but the plant at which he was working at that time refused the order. The attempt to involve in the work of the team of the VVIA named after N. Ye. Zhukovsky failed. experienced aircraft for the current year, which provided for the construction of two prototypes of a fighter with two M-100 engines and a maximum speed of 500 — 550 km / h.


Alternative projects of the Soviet dive bombers


October 13 Polikarpov presented a draft design of a WIT-2 aircraft with M-103 engines (there were no M-105 engines yet). All worked seven versions of this machine, including a dive bomber. Officially, the VIT-2 in the draft design was presented in three versions: a near-speed bomber (BSB), VIT and DIM. The first option aroused the greatest interest among the military.

The next day, finished assembling the first flight copy of WIT-1 (MPI). His factory tests, which lasted until February of the 1938, were not fully completed due to the mismatch of the flight characteristics given. And still, basically the plane was a success, but due to the lack of support from the GUAP, the car was not brought in and was not transferred to state tests. Since the VIT-1 had a strong weapon for that time - two wing cannon ShFK-37 caliber 37 mm, the Air Force took the car to the joint ground test. In this case, the guns were highly appreciated, and the pilots noted the good behavior of the aircraft during a dive.

On the second copy of the machine (HIT-2) Polikarpov installed two-fin plumage and introduced the third crew member, the navigator. Now, it was possible not to worry about the defense of the rear hemisphere, and to improve the flight data, the designer chose the more powerful M-105 engines. But the engines did not appear in time, and 10 in May 1938-th from the assembly shop rolled out an experienced VIT-2 with old M-103 engines.

The next day, V.P. Chkalov made the first flight on it. All subsequent flights at the stage of factory tests, which ended on July 11, were performed by test pilot of plant No. 84 B. N. Kudrin. With a take-off weight of 6166 kg, HIT-2 at a height of 4500 m developed a maximum speed of 498 km / h, and with a weight of 5310 kg - 508 km / h. Not bad for a start.

After the end of the factory tests, the M-103 motors were replaced by the M-105. Polikarpov was the first to take upon himself the brunt of mastering engines that were completely unfinished by that time. It all started with a scandal. The plant sent completely unserviceable samples, which later played a fatal role in the fate of the modification of HIT-2 - SBP aircraft.



HIT-2 without weapons at the test stage

The second stage of the factory testing of HIT-2 took place from August 2 to 10 September 1938. Considerable time was spent on testing and fine-tuning not so much the aircraft as the engines. Despite the fact that their power increased, the maximum speed reached only 513 km / h. By that time, this was a good result, but the NKAP still did not provide support to Polikarpov in the work on WIT-2.

As the leading engineer of the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force on the plane HIT-2, P. Nersisyan, wrote, Osipenko was banned from plant manager No. 84 from showing the aircraft to the Air Force leadership. And only after Nersisyan's letter to KE Voroshilov was shown the aircraft to Ya. V. Smushkevich. After inspecting the car, Smushkevich interrupted the factory tests and ordered to overtake him at the Chkalovskaya airfield for display to the government. After the show, HIT-2 was left at the Air Force Research Institute for joint testing. In addition to Nersisyan, the test crew included pilot P. M. Stefanovsky, jokermen P. Nikitin and P. Perevalov.

From September 13 to October 4, 1938-th performed 35 flights with a total duration of 13 hours 40 minutes. When the flight weight in 6300 kg at an altitude of 4500 m reached the speed of 483 km / h. The speed obtained at factory tests was overstated by 15 km / h. At the same time, the identified tail vibrations in different modes and the impossibility of a long flight on one motor did not allow to determine the ceiling, range, maneuverability and other characteristics. Before the transfer of the aircraft to the series, it was required to bring it up, and October XITUMN-5 was returned to the plant on October 2.

From 9 to 26 in February, 1939-th successfully passed the secondary state tests of the modified HIT-2. After installing the VISH-2E screws, changes in the canopy of the cockpit canopy of the gunner-radio operator and water radiators obtained the maximum speed at the ground of 446 km / h and at the height of 4600 m - 500 km / h.



As a result, the aircraft had indisputable speed advantages over all existing serial and experienced aircraft of its class. The military insisted on using HIT-2 as a dive bomber, which is why the name SPB (speed diving bomber) appeared. Polikarpov did not agree, believing that he created the SBP — a high-speed bomber, which could, if necessary, be used as a dive-bomber. Such caution is understandable - the SVB aircraft, on the basis of which the VIT-2 originated, was designed as a high-speed bomber, and if it was turned into a dive-bomber meeting more stringent strength standards, it would inevitably have to sacrifice flight performance. It so happened that in the documents of the Air Force the plane was originally called SPB, and in the documents of the NKAP - SBP and only later also SPB.

In a letter to the People's Commissar of the aviation industry M. Kaganovich, the head of the Red Army Air Force Loktionov noted:

“The aircraft has reserves up to 50 km / h to increase speed, which consists in: a) installing a more powerful and high-altitude motor M-105; b) radical improvement of the outer surface of the aircraft; c) the best selection of screws.

It was noted that the control of the aircraft was normal (it was unacceptably heavy). Vibrations of the tail in all modes, including the ultra-maximum speed of 650 km / h, have disappeared. It became possible to fly on one engine. Despite the high wing loading (up to 157 kg / m2), HIT-2 was available to pilots with a moderate qualification for piloting techniques, and even easier for SB-2 and DB-3 in take-off and landing properties, requiring a smaller landing pad.

March 9 The head of the Red Army Air Force A. D. Loktionov wrote M. Kaganovich to 1939:

"The Military Council of the Red Army Air Force considers it appropriate:

Make a decision on the provision of the SPB aircraft (HIT-2) for launch into serial construction.
Simultaneously with the development of drawings and the preparation of production of mass-produced airplanes, force the construction of 2-x control samples of airplanes (...) with the expectation of passing the NII VVS for state testing no later than IX. 1939 and the head series of aircraft for military trials no later than IV. 1940
Continue testing of the existing HIT-2 aircraft under the full state testing program and eliminate the defects identified during serial construction. ”
28 in March K. Ye. Voroshilov and M. Kaganovich prepared and sent to B. M. Molotov and I. V. Stalin a memorandum on the organization of serial production of SBPs at plant No. 124. The next day, Molotov signed the corresponding decree, but soon it had to be canceled.

April 27 X. NUMX M. Kaganovich after a trip together with Polikarpov and the Deputy Chief of the Air Force Institute I. Petrov at the 1939 plant wrote to Stalin and Molotov:

“Comrade. Polikarpov categorically objected to the production of the SBP aircraft at this plant, since the drawings of the aircraft that had passed state tests are currently being completely reworked constructively and technologically, which will require the manufacture of two prototype machines for static and flight tests. how these cars will be completely different from cars that have passed state tests.

Me in coordination with the head of the Department of Internal Affairs, comrade. Loktionov appointed a commission to determine the technical condition and the possibility of implementation in a series of SBP.

In the resolution KO at SNK of the USSR from 5 in May 1939, “On the introduction of modified aircraft into mass production and the creation of new aircraft in 1939 — 1940. of the type of bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft, prepared under the leadership of Smushkevich, it was noted that the organization of the production of SPB (HIT-2) at plant number 124 is impossible

"Because of the unpreparedness of the technological base of the plant to the new aircraft"

and the establishment of serial production of the TB-7 bomber.

In the same year, a meeting of representatives of the Air Force Research Institute and the industry was held on the establishment of the tactical and technical characteristics of an SPB aircraft launched into production at plant No. 22. The meeting participants, after hearing the report of Polikarpov, approved the changes made to the aircraft by the SBP, in comparison with the WIT-2с drawings (the letter “c” means serial - approx. Author), as contributing to obtaining greater speed, simplifying assembly technology and a quick transition to another motor.


Aircraft WIT-2 with ShVAK guns


The response to this decision followed immediately. Two days later, resolutions of the CP of CPC No. 221 and 249 on the organization of mass production of SPB at plant No. 22 appeared. The first two aircraft for flight tests and one in aggregates - for statistical tests, it was required to hand over 1 before 1940 in January. The document prescribed that plant No. 22 should be released from the introduction of the MMN aircraft in the series (the last modification of the SB).

This decision created the preconditions for the aggravation of Polikarpov's relations with the chief designer of the 22 plant, A. A. Arkhangelsky, and the director, Okulov, which later affected the construction of the SPB.

The Resolution stated:

"Work on the introduction of SPB aircraft at the plant number 22 (...) Comrade. Polikarpov considered priority ... "

By the resolution of KO SNK, Polikarpov was entrusted with the task of designing and building, on the basis of SBP-1, two PB-1 airplanes (diving bomber) with two M-120 or M-71 engines, presenting the first 1 prototype in July of 1940.

October 25 1939-th draft design of a SBP dive bomber with M-71 and M-81 engines was sent to M. Kaganovich. In a memorandum, Polikarpov noted: “SBP is a promising aircraft and has large speed and strength reserves.” It was proposed to provide a quick transition to other engines without a major alteration of the aircraft design. In order to further develop the SBP and increase its flight and combat data, install M-106, M-81 or M-71 engines (including with turbo-compressors) on it.

To reduce the speed of the dive to 500 km / h and improve maneuverability when taxiing, it was planned to install reversing screws. In the future, SBP could be built with M-82A and M-82FN motors, which allowed to reach speeds of 600 — 620 km / h. Air Force Institute gave a positive conclusion on the draft design of the SBP (PB-1) with M-71 and M-81. But the leading engineer for HIT-2 Nersisyan believed that Polikarpov should not be given a task on PB-1 in order not to be distracted from the completion of SPN 2М-105, the layout of which was approved by October 26.



It seemed that there were no obstacles for the work of the Polikarpov team. In reality, it was different. In November, 1939-th, sending the chief designer to Germany, M. Kaganovich ordered to create a design bureau at the plant No. 1 for maneuverable fighters headed by A. I. Mikoyan. How it ended is well known. At the same time, an experimental design department (EAD) was created at the same plant, where designers were transferred from the Polikarp Design Bureau to 80, including those who worked on the “D” machine (factory designation SBP).

In fact, the defeat of the Polikarpov Design Bureau began. It is surprising that one of the most talented aviation designers constantly moved from the factory to the factory and by the beginning of the 1940-s did not receive its production base. This, naturally, affected his moral state at such a crucial moment as the completion of experimental work and the conduct of SPB tests.

Shortly before the New Year, Polikarpov sent a letter to the NKAP with a message about the financial difficulties of the OKB due to the incompletely paid work of 1939 and the lack of programs and credits for 1940.

There he also recalled that the response to the draft draft PB-1 from either the NCAP or the GUAS (Main Department of Air Supply) has not yet been received. But the last day of 1939 was a little pleased: the plant built the first copy of the SPB aircraft No. 2,5 / 1 for the month of 0.

At the same time, Polikarpov’s competitors were also active. 14 of April S. A. Kocherigin sent to the customer a preliminary design of the original single-engine single-seat high-speed dive bomber of the OPB with the M-90 engine, and 20 in May presented its model.

From 11 April to 10 in May, state tests of the 100 aircraft (the predecessor of the famous Pe-2 — Ed.) In the variant of the high-altitude fighter were held. In the conclusion of the report of the Institute of Air Force noted:

“In order to use the high aerodynamics of the 100 aircraft and create on its base a mass diving bomber without a pressurized cabin, with a maximum speed at an altitude of 5000 and at least 550 km / h with a bomb load inside 600 kg and outside 1000 kg to require the design bureau to develop an 100 aircraft "In the form of a dive bomber. Present a model for 1 June 1940. According to the approved model, build a military series. ”

28 May approved a report on state tests of the aircraft SB-RK with the recommendation after fine-tuning to launch it into a series in the version of a dive bomber.

1 June, Resolution KO No. 239 on the construction of three prototypes of A.N. Tupolev's 156 airplane with AM-103А or M-35 engines at 120 No. 30, and its draft design was approved on XNUMX August.



15 June approved the layout of the aircraft "100" in the version of the dive bomber PB-100. After 8 days, the KO Decision No. SNN 275 on the introduction of the 100 aircraft into serial production in the version of a diving bomber based on a high-altitude fighter was issued.

On August 7 KO No. 342 was issued on the construction of two prototypes of the OP-B M-90 aircraft.

On September 21, the NKAP commission reviewed the draft design for the modernization of the A. S. Yakovlev BB-22 aircraft into the short-range dive bomber BPB-22, developed at the plant No. 81 by L. P. Kurbaloy. Despite the fact that the Air Force did not approve the project, BPB-22 began to build. A month later, he took to the air in the version of the short-range bomber BB-22bis.

October 15 Air Force reviewed the cockpit mock-up of a diving bomber B-2 designed by A. A. Arkhangelsky.

On November 18, a commission composed of S. N. Shishkin, I. F. Petrov and A. V. Chesalov, after conducting a comparative assessment of PB-100, SB-RK and B-2, and BB-22, gave recommendations on the choice of aircraft for mass series. Really existing SPB aircraft for unknown reasons was excluded from the competition. Of these machines were built only SB-RK and B-2.

The commission’s conclusions stated that, according to tactical flight and combat data, the best plane among those examined was PB-100, as it had the greatest bomb load, the greatest range, the best fire protection and speed, with the possibility of further increasing it by modifying the aircraft, as well as highest strength.

The main disadvantages of PB-100 were its relative high cost and the use of duralumin. Therefore, it is necessary, when introducing the PB-100 aircraft into the mass series, to be saved in the production of the BB-22, as a cheap aircraft from non-deficient materials, suitable for training and training crews, as well as for use on certain sectors of the front. As for the SB-RK, it was inferior to the PB-100 and did not have the prospect of a significant improvement in flight data. The decision on the aircraft "B" was postponed until the tests.

December 2 built the lead production aircraft PB-100 (Pe-2). December 14 approved the conclusions on draft designs of two-engine escort fighters Polikarpov - TIS and Mikoyan and Gurevich DIS-200 with engines AM-37. Both aircraft were designed with the possibility of using them as dive bombers.

The TIS, being a direct development of the SPB, had the option of dropping four FAB-100 bombs from the internal suspension using a special exhaust cassette. Up to two bombs with a caliber of no more than 500 kg could be suspended on the outer suspension.

DIS-200 to some extent was also the development of SPB, since Gurevich participated in its development, taking into account the accumulated experience. For the DIS-200, only the option of the external suspension of a single bomb FAB-1000 was provided.

During 1940, the customer was presented with a number of still unimplemented projects of diving bomber.

3 January 1940-th in conclusion on the draft design of PB-1 (SPB) with M-71 engines, it was noted that it meets the requirements for a dive bomber. In particular, a twelvefold safety margin is required to ensure dive bombing at an angle of 90 °. Bombing was to be carried out with internal hangers. Note that the later adopted Pe-2, the German U-88 and Pre-217, allowed dive-bombing only from external hangers. In addition, bombing with angles greater than 70 ° had no practical meaning and, therefore, the strength declared by Polikarpov turned out to be quite sufficient.

By January 10 built a second prototype of the SPB No. 2 / 0. After 8 days, pilot B.N. Kudrin and flight engineer I.S. Popov made the first flight in car no. 1 / 0. March 26 began flight tests SPB number 2 / 0. April 17 made the first flight of the first production aircraft number 1 / 1.

April 26 began flight tests of the first production aircraft number 2 / 1, and the next day he, piloted by test pilot P. G. Golovin, crashed. The mission was to determine the controllability and stability of the aircraft at an altitude of 2000 — 3000 m in the zone of the Central Aerodrome. The flight was watched by Polikarpov and his deputy Zhemchuzhin, as well as the head of the technical bureau of the Usachenko plant.

Half an hour after takeoff, the plane broke into a corkscrew and fell on the airfield of the Research Institute of the Civil Air Fleet, burying the crew.

After inspecting the remains of the aircraft and the crew, the commission chaired by A. V. Lyapidevsky, the chief of the 8 division of TsAGI, concluded that at the time of the accident, the ailerons and tail unit were in good condition, and the landing gear was in a clean position. The absence of metal chips in the oil filters seemed to indicate the normal operation of the motors. The commission noted that the cause of the catastrophe was the transition of the aircraft into a flat spin. The cause of the breakdown could be the hit of an aircraft with insufficient longitudinal stability in the clouds. The breakdown could also occur due to rough piloting.


The first prototype SPB No. 1 / 0


All these versions have practically not been proved by objective facts and are largely subjective. Let's pay attention to some circumstances missed by the commission. 26 April Golovin overtook the SPB No. 2 / 1 from the factory to the Central Airfield. When asked how the car behaves and what its impressions are, Golovin replied that the car was fine, only the right engine has a temperature of water and oil on 15 ° more than the left one. And Shishmarev, in his testimony, noted that M-105 motors had seized up earlier.

We have already mentioned the absence of metal chips in the oil filters, on the basis of which it was concluded that the engines were operating normally. But from the text of the act it follows that only the left engine oil filter was investigated, as the right one was burned. Hence, the conclusion about the correct operation of both motors was not confirmed. And the most interesting, in the emergency act is a photo of the remains of the destroyed right motor, on which the whole blade of the screw is very clearly visible! This could happen if even before the crash of the aircraft the right engine was jammed. Why the commission did not pay attention to this circumstance is not clear.

Most likely a catastrophe occurred due to a motor failure followed by a loss of spatial orientation by the pilot. Of course, a certain role was played by the insufficient experience of Golovin in flights to St. Petersburg and the small reserve of the longitudinal stability of the aircraft on critical conditions.

As a result, the commission recommended:

“1) Factory flight tests of SPN 2 / 0, 1 / 1 and 3 / 1 airplanes to continue, avoiding flights in the clouds and behind the clouds.

2) Approve the decision of the plant manager No. 22 Comrade. Okulov on the prohibition of test flights of the machine № 1 / 0 due to the identified tendency on the machine to dive at high speeds until significant deviations are eliminated in the leveling.

3) Oblige the chief designer Polikarpov to immediately blow the SPB plane in kind in the wind tunnel for longitudinal stability, get the TsAGI's opinion and make all the necessary design changes.

4) Oblige Chief Designer Polikarpov to calculate the SPB plane with a tailspin and get a TsAGI opinion. ”

During the tests of the first two St. Petersburg prototype aircraft No. 1 / 0 and 2 / 0 and the serial aircraft No. 1 / 1, the engines continuously failed. The oil was thrown out of the prompters, its pressure dropped sharply, there were instances of engine spells. Recall that Polikarpov first mastered the still “raw” at that time M-105. There were forced landings and breakdowns associated with poor quality manufacturing aircraft at the plant number 22.

At the same time, the commission did not give any recommendations to the engine builders and CIAM, as well as from plant number 22.

In early May, 1940-th Smushkevich informed Stalin that the question of choosing an 100 or SPB aircraft would be decided in the coming days.


SPB schemes


On May 15, the head of the GUAS KA Alekseev, in a letter to the People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, noted that

“Go to the SB-RK, but do not reduce the program for the SPB ...”

After 10 days, Alekseev abruptly changed his attitude towards Polikarpov’s car and, in a letter to Tymoshenko, suggested launching PB-100 into production, and discontinuing the release of the SPB. I have railed for PB-100 and Smushkevich, reporting in his letter to the people's commissar Shakhurin:

“1. "Weave" to introduce at the plant number 22 only in the version of a diving bomber, it is unlikely that you can squeeze out of the Security Council.

2. SPB remove, stop work. It can be seen, nothing will come of it (like a dive bomber). Instead, "weave."

From the correspondence suggests the conclusion that initiated the "funeral" of the St. Petersburg Alekseev, who was the first to come to the Defense Commissar. Smushkevich after that raised the question at the "home" level.

June 2 due to a drop in oil pressure in the right-hand engine, an accident of an SPB aircraft no. 3 / 1 occurred. Turning off the engine, M. A. Lipkin decided to land at a factory airfield of a very limited size.

Managing the landing plates incorrectly, he did not reach the runway and touched the propeller of the SB standing on the ground with a stabilizer. When falling, the right landing gear broke up, after which the plane took off on the 60 m and, hooking the ground with the right plane, lay down on the “belly”. The machine required a major overhaul.



14 June, the head of the NKAP flight group, M. M. Gromov, having familiarized himself with the results of the tests, materials of the purging and interviews with Kudrin, Lipkin and Zhemchuzhin, in a letter to A. S. Yakovlev gave the following assessment to the aircraft:

"The engine unit was not brought, as a result of which there are forced landings (...)."

This assessment was not paid attention to in the course of the investigation of the flight accidents, making an not entirely justified emphasis on excessive rear (31%) alignment.

In June, 1940, after the reorganization at the plant number 1 KB Mikoyan, OKO "D" lost many of the managers, and with the advent of the new leadership in NCAP, about 135 designers left.

Surprisingly, in the face of the destruction of Polikarpov’s design bureau and a prejudiced attitude toward the car, by a decree of the Committee of Defense on June 1 it was ordered to issue the 15 SPB military series.



Emergency landing of SPB aircraft No. 3 / 12 June 1940

30 July was another disaster. Pilot M. A. Lipkin and engineer G. A. Bulychev died in St. Petersburg number 1 / 1. That day it was necessary, in particular, to test for flutter at the speed of 600 km / h on the device. According to the testimony of witnesses, the car, flying at high speed (as evidenced by the too sharp sound of the motors) at the height of 2000 — 2500 m began to crumble. The emergency commission, having worked for only two days, decided that the flexural-aileron wing flutter was the most likely cause of the catastrophe. There is nothing surprising. The commission consisted of administrators and the only professional was Professor TsAGI V.I. Polikovsky, an expert in the field of engine building.

All the blame for the incident was piled on the deputy chief designer N. A. Zhemchuzhina, who did not follow TsAGI’s instructions on setting weight compensation on the ailerons. According to TsAGI's calculations, the critical speed of the flutter could have occurred when the instrumental speed of 500 km / h was reached. But there was no confirmation of the achievement of this speed, and no one dealt with the commission at the TsAGI.

Even after the SPB No. 2 / 1 catastrophe, the emergency commission demanded to blow the plane in the TsAGI wind tunnel T-101. The next commission again put forward this demand, but made conclusions without waiting for the test results. They did not take into account the fact that no external signs of flexural-aileron flutter were found on the surviving left wing console and aileron. In conclusion, TsAGI, signed on July 23 by Grossman, confirmed that the flexural-aileron wing flutter at speeds up to 800 km / h could not take place.

From the fragments of the left wing, it can be established that the destruction of the wing was due to bending. At the same time, the loss of aileron resistance to compression and its rupture is not explained by the appearance of flutter. In so far known cases of aileron flutter, the wing did not collapse immediately, which is the only argument against this unproven version.

At the same time, the commission did not consider the possible spin-up of the propeller, which very often occurred during a dive, as well as with a rapid increase in speed due to "giving gas". For this reason, there have been many catastrophes, in particular, on the experienced "103" and serial Pe-2.

It was unclear whether the left engine nacelle was left in the air, although eyewitnesses noted a strong roar of the engines and the presence of traces of bright smoke, indicating the screw and the destruction of the VMG.

The probability of this version is very high. The conclusion is that the SPB aircraft was completely unreasonably compromised by the emergency commission.

29 July 1940-th People's Commissar Shahurin signed an order, where, apart from the distribution of punishments, it was said:

“Further factory testing of SPB aircraft will cease. Director of the plant number 22 Okulov and chief designer Polikarpov in three days give me a report on the costs incurred for the construction of prototypes and the zero series of SPB, the status of the reserve and considerations about its use. "

Began a slow funeral "diving bomb". The People's Commissariat at the same time took a wait-and-see attitude, not taking any measures to implement the proposals of the emergency commission. Ended the last prewar year. Polikarpov’s request to send inquiries into catastrophes of Golovin and Lipkina, Director of Plant No. 22, refused.

To the letter of Polikarpov and the plant management No. 22 about the future of the SPB, the people's commissar Shahurin imposed a resolution:

“1. One SPB aircraft should be handed over to TsAGI for purging.

2. The question of the possibility of further flight tests to decide on the results of purging and the conclusion of specialists in strength and other issues. "

However, five days later, the People's Commissariat demanded write-offs for the aircraft at a loss. The remaining equipment was partially used in mass production of Pe-2. In the same year, with the permission of Shakhurin, one SPB was transferred to the MAI. So ended история the creation of the dive bomber Polikarpov, and the Soviet pilots began to master the dive bombing only in 1943, and that was not all.

List of sources:
Wings of the motherland. Vladimir Perov, Nikolay Vasilyev. Mystery SPB
Aviation and Cosmonautics. Mikhail Maslov. SPB
Mikhail Maslov. Bomb Trucks Polikarpov
Shavrov V.B. The history of aircraft structures in the USSR 1938-1950.
Simakov B.L. Aircraft country of the Soviets. 1917-1970
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  1. Su-9
    Su-9 19 October 2013 08: 44
    +6
    The fashion for dive bombers came from Germany. There, even the Vultures strategists had to dive on those instructions.
    Dive bombing is effective at low speeds - since you can even aim well with a simple collimator sight, but there are also munis. It is not dangerous only against vulnerable targets (all at the beginning of the war). After the appearance of the MZA on the battlefield, the dive bombers practically disappeared - since the probability of getting a pair of 20-40mm shells in the ass when leaving the peak is very high. Because of this, even the Germans dive apologists retrained the Stucks as attack aircraft, and with the Yu-188 they took off the brakes.
    Dive players get overloaded, because the design should hold gears, plus brakes, plus propeller control, plus autopilot.
    So it turned out that one dive is like two tactical bomber, or 3-4 IB / attack aircraft.
    With all due respect to Polikarpov, this plane was simply not needed because others were needed (this, of course, taking into account that many other planes were also not a fountain for objective reasons).
  2. Glory333
    Glory333 19 October 2013 12: 42
    +1
    Dive bombers could be used in terms of air supremacy that was won by the Soviet Air Force only in 1944.
  3. Fotoceva62
    Fotoceva62 19 October 2013 13: 14
    +2
    Quote: Glory333
    Dive bombers could be used in terms of air supremacy that was won by the Soviet Air Force only in 1944.


    TTX Yu-87 clear-sky aircraft and no more, became obsolete back in 1939. Even a strong fighter cover did not save him from disrupting the performance of a combat mission or serious losses.
    In defense of the Pe-2 with its characteristics, it was quite successfully used during all periods of the Second World War. Losses? After all, the enemy was very serious, and ours did not have any experience. Although we recall Polbin, everything is fine there. We mainly suffered losses in dive-bombers from fighters, because the lack of fighter cover is punishable. The reason for the Yu-88, Do-217, Tu-2 is different. Very expensive airplanes, and the life of a dive player is short and peacetime due to wear and tear; the more the aircraft, the more difficult it is to combine weight, payload and high overload capacity.
    1. allim
      allim 19 October 2013 19: 51
      +1
      was a wonderful dive ar2 proven technology
      speed under 500 km; bomb load under 1500 kg riveting; I do not want to be higher in all characteristics than u87
      1. avt
        avt 20 October 2013 10: 07
        0
        Quote: allim
        was a wonderful dive ar2 proven technology
        speed under 500 km; bomb load under 1500 kg riveting; I do not want to be higher in all characteristics than u87

        C'mon, the alteration of the serial SB, an obsolete machine that no longer had a reserve of modernization. The transition to the Pe-2 was justified and was a step forward, the only thing that upset was that there was no possibility of high-quality training of pilots, there was not enough time.
        1. svp67
          svp67 20 October 2013 10: 14
          0
          Quote: avt
          . The transition to Pe-2 was justified
          No, questions remained ... And the main one, if the St. Petersburg went to the assembly line and troops, would there be any more benefit?
          1. avt
            avt 20 October 2013 10: 25
            0
            Quote: svp67
            And the main one, if St. Petersburg went to the assembly line and troops, would there be no more benefit?

            No, I had occasion to read the memoirs of pilots flying on one and the other. A qualitatively different perception of the Pe-2 in comparison with the SB is in favor of the Pawn, but according to all the memoirs it is very strict on take-off and landing, the machine for the trained pilot is above the average level, and with this was a disaster, especially with wartime graduates. SB is an epoch-making machine, but at that time it was already obsolete, very cramped and uncomfortable. But here is the paradox! According to the memoirs of pilots, DB-3 was better than DB-3F, more comfortable in work, especially in long-distance flights, I read it in Reshetnikov's memoirs.
            1. svp67
              svp67 20 October 2013 10: 35
              0
              Quote: avt
              Not ,

              Yes ... "Pawn" - not only strict, but also as a "bomber" was bad, low bomb load, high speeds, especially landing, all the time increasing forward centering, leading to "nosing", impossibility of flight, without lowering on one engine ... There was no need for Yakovlev to interfere with Polikarpov, this is my opinion, which is very easy to prove. The aircraft produced, even in the "kutz" design bureau, which Polikarpov had left, after the "Yakovlev's defeat" were "of the highest world level" ... And on them our pilots could show better results
              1. avt
                avt 20 October 2013 11: 21
                0
                Quote: svp67
                Yes ... "Pawn" - not only strict but also as a "bomber" was bad, low bomb load, high speeds, especially landing, all the time increasing forward centering, leading to "nosing",

                From the memoirs of Timofey Panteleevich Punev, the SB was "oak" .... everything was controlled by cable drives, the efforts on the steering wheels had to be applied decently. .... the limit ,, Shkasa "400 meters. Absolutely outdated machine. -2! I almost prayed for this Pe-2 ..... When you have only 2-5 hours of arrival, it is very difficult to tame such a powerful "beast" as the Pe-15. Hence the fear ...... Pe-2 simply took 2 kg. This is if we take off from concrete airfields. We, for battle, usually took 1200 kg in "hundred parts" ... And how many bombs do you need to get? One is enough. So I dive into it and hit - one ... Nonsense! In a 800-meter circle, bombs were placed, is that a little accuracy ?! "When my grandfather gave an interview, he swore terribly laughing The 14 pages of the interview are very lively.
                1. svp67
                  svp67 20 October 2013 19: 21
                  +1
                  Quote: avt
                  From the memoirs of Timofei Panteleevich Punev ,, SB was
                  In this regard, no one is going to argue much with veterans ... Pe2 is certainly faster than the SB. But I was talking about the Polikarpovskiy St. Petersburg, which was armed with:
                  one 7.62-mm ShKAS machine gun in the navigator’s cabin and a rear pivot mount with an 12,7-mm BT machine gun
                  Bomb load - 800 kg of bombs in the fuselage and 700 kg from the outside, during overloading on the external mounts it was possible to mount one 1000 kg of bomb

                  Already more than Pe2 ... at the same speed and better crew conditions. And longer range
      2. svp67
        svp67 20 October 2013 10: 11
        0
        Quote: allim
        than u87

        But if you compare with Yu-88?
    2. Denis
      Denis 20 October 2013 08: 40
      +1
      Quote: Fotoceva62
      In defense of the Pe-2 with its characteristics, it was quite successfully used in all periods of the Second World War
      In the initial period as a dive player,namely a dive, not particularly. Often observed cases of removal of the brake grids. But not because of the technical characteristics, there was no experience of diving from a dive. Theory is one thing, but there were no training
  4. Mikhail3
    Mikhail3 19 October 2013 13: 18
    +4
    KB Polikarpov was shaking all the time. Its "destruction" was caused mainly by the fact that the designers enthusiastically wrote anonymous letters to each other and to the team. Apparently, being an outstanding designer, Polikarpov was not an outstanding administrator. Well, they cut the design bureau into pieces, trying to maintain the main directions ... All this could have been avoided by working on the administrative structure.
    This generally was and is the weakest place in our country ...
    1. svp67
      svp67 20 October 2013 20: 56
      +1
      Quote: Mikhail3
      Apparently, being an outstanding designer, an outstanding administrator, Polikarpov was not. Well, they cut the design bureau into pieces, trying to maintain the main directions ...

      Polikarpov was not an "effective manager", in this role, in the best understanding of its meaning, his chief pilot Valery Chkalov played in his design bureau ...
      Chkalov was gone, there was no support, and then another "effective manager" Yakovlev, realizing that in comparison with such "monsters" as Polikarpov and Tupolev, nothing "shines" for him, or rather one thing "shines" - to deal with light aircraft, but here such an opportunity, not just to "dump" "priest", but also to "take his business". There was also Kaganovich, at that time the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry helped him a lot, although first moving his candidacy - a son-in-law, by the name of Silvansky with his "innovative" "I220", how the tests of this aircraft took place is well written by test pilot Mark Gallai
      1. vtur
        vtur 15 November 2013 14: 57
        0
        Quote: svp67
        There was also Kaganovich, at that time the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry helped him a lot, though first moving his candidacy - a son-in-law, by the name of Silvansky with his "innovative" "I220"

        This is a separate and very interesting story - only nowhere did I find confirmation that Sylvansky was a son-in-law - sort of like M. M. Kaganovich was one daughter Julia (1919-1961), who was married to the violinist Fichtenholtz (1920-1985). With the death of Kaganovich himself, not everything is clear either ...
    2. svp67
      svp67 20 October 2013 20: 59
      0
      The day of Grinchik’s first flight on this machine arrived. At first everything was, as always: the cessation of other flights, numerous spectator fans along the edges of the airfield, in the windows of the outbuildings, on the roofs of the hangars, a small group of bosses at the edge of the concrete runway ...
      A little further away from the others was the head of the flight department of the TsAGI flight test department - our first test art teacher Ivan Frolovich Kozlov. When his subordinates or students went on a difficult task - and Grinchik was both one and the other - Kozlov always went out on the field to conduct them. On the face of Frolych for public viewing, a vigorous-confident expression befitting the case was displayed, which did not leave room for the slightest doubt in the indisputable success of the upcoming flight. Another thing is whether it was equally cloudless at that moment in his soul: unconditionally vouching for it would, apparently, be rather reckless. But anyway, the external decorum was fully observed. And as soon as the conversation is about flight ethics, it is worth noting that this also had a direct relation to it: the decision was made, there are no new circumstances that would give rise to the revision of this decision - that means there is nothing to complicate the work of the direct performers with their parades worries!
      However, Grinchik at that moment, even if he was worried, it was only complete satisfaction: he finally reached the flight on an experimental plane! We all thought then not so much about how we would get out of ourselves in a difficult situation, but about how to get to these romantic and spectacular positions closer.
      Painted in defiantly red color, the aircraft stood on the runway, as they say, ready for battle. By the way, at first glance it looked very much like the world-famous I-16 fighter in those years: the same short stub of the fuselage, the same low-lying oval wings, the same round lobed engine hood. However, it has long been noticed that close-to-time aircraft of the same designation always look similar to each other in appearance - it cannot be otherwise: the laws of the development of technology operate in different companies (and even in different countries) more or less the same.
    3. svp67
      svp67 20 October 2013 20: 59
      0
      But as further showed, the similarity of the aircraft in question with the famous "I-Sixteenth" was really only external!
      It was then that I first drew attention to how, in general, it is easy - at the cost of seemingly the smallest changes - to turn a good car into a bad one. Subsequently, I have repeatedly had to wonder at this phenomenon ...
      But Grinchik puts on a parachute, gets on a plane, starts and tries the engine. A characteristic gesture with the brushes of the hands extended from the cockpit to the sides: “Remove the pads”. The starter on duty waved a white flag along the runway forward (there was no radio on single-seat planes then, and flights were so controlled by flags). The car took off!
      At first, everything went fine: the tail was raised smoothly, the engine running at full throttle was buzzing thickly, the plane was running exactly along the axis of the concrete path.
      Running ... running ... Something he has been running for a very long time! Usually they write about such cases: "Before we had time to think about it, how ..." But we managed to think about it. To think, look at each other, again cast a glance at the plane running far beyond the middle of the airfield ...
      Somewhere on the very edge of the airfield, the car finally got off the ground and slowly, meter by meter, reached up. Here it is - the advantage of a large aerodrome with a many kilometers strip!
      “He ran for a long time,” Kozlov threw thoughtfully.
      - Right, long? So it seemed to me, too, ”constructor S, standing nearby, picked up in a secular tone.“ Please, please, Ivan Frolovich, tell him not to run away so long next time. ” Let it come off earlier.
      Frolych’s answer — let’s not reproduce it textually — forced the designer to close his mouth firmly. But those present appreciated and generously commented on this colorful dialogue only later. In the meantime, their attention was riveted to the flight without interruption - things were still going on somewhat strangely: a small red car described a wide circle above the vicinity of the airfield at a height of one hundred and twenty, from the strength of one hundred and fifty meters instead of the usual four hundred to five hundred.
      Long lasted a quarter of an hour of this unpleasant flight. Finally, closing a full circle, Grinchik landed safely.
      “She does not climb, dog, up,” he said, getting out of the cab. - Speed ​​more or less accelerates, and up, on take-off, in flight, not at all! I picked up the best speed, it scratched at least a hundred and a half meters, and in other modes it sucks it down to the ground. Indeed, the apparatus is heavier than air. It is felt - much harder!
      Over the next two weeks, Grinchik made several more flights on the new plane (now I understand - it was hardly reasonable). However, nothing new was revealed in them - the plane still showed a decisive disgust at moving away from Mother Earth.
      Now, today, the reasons for such unworthy behavior of the machine would have been quickly established: the methods of aerodynamic research and even the flight test diagnostics have been improved so much that there can be no doubt about it.
      But then the situation was different, and, as is often the case in the absence of technical explanations, the designer's suspicions spread to the pilot:
      - Grinchik is to blame. Something he does not succeed.
      Well, if the pilot is to blame, the practical measures to eliminate the flaws of the machine are clear: you need to replace the pilot.
      And the energetic S., without thinking twice, quickly agreed with test pilot L., who worked at one of the serial aircraft plants.
      I am afraid that the reader will see in this chapter of my notes a certain overabundance of various S., L., and other mysterious lettering, behind which - like guerrilla commanders in the days of war (although for completely different reasons) - there are real people. There is nothing to be done: each content requires a specific, appropriate form - the head, whatever you say, is about ethics ...
    4. svp67
      svp67 20 October 2013 21: 00
      +1
      So, nevertheless, S. agreed with L. Neither the leadership of our institute, nor the command of the flight unit, of course, took any part in this deal, but they could not oppose the designer’s desire either: distrust of the pilot was at the same time distrust of the whole our company, and according to the unwritten dictates of ethics (again it!), our authorities were obliged to observe the position of demonstrative objectivism. I’m not sure that this time the dictates of ethics were very fair. In any case, they did not meet such a criterion for evaluating any moral and ethical category as conformity to public interests. Rather, the machine designer himself would in this case have to reconcile his actions with the requirements of ethics, not to mention the pilot, who could not resist the prospect of breaking light laurels at the expense of his comrade.
      - I’ll show you such aerobatics now that you are gasping! - modestly promised others L., getting into the car.
      But he did not show aerobatics. His flight made him really scared not only of us, but also of the creators of this amazing airplane.
      With difficulty tearing himself off the ground, L. barely barely drew the trees that grew behind the airfield, and so, on a shaving flight, he disappeared from sight. He did not have Grinchik’s qualifications, which allowed him to quickly find the only flight mode in which the car gained at least one and a half hundred meters in height. From time to time L. pulled the plane up, desperately trying to tear it from its disastrous proximity to the ground, but, as expected, these convulsive jerks did not give any effect - the car immediately sank down again. So, almost touching the ground obstacles, L. finally closed the circle, which by no means became an honor circle for him, and went to the airfield. Having landed (it’s good for him that he just had to not even remove the gas, but just tidy up the gas: the ground was right under the wheels), he raised his glasses to his sweating forehead, unfastened the seat belts with trembling fingers, got out of the cab and, without saying a word, he left the airfield. On this saga and ended ...
      Designer S. was met a few years later in one of the central regions as ... a mill inspector. The news of this was, however, met in our flight room without much surprise:
      - He knows how to grind. So, working in a specialty, public opinion decided.
      And many years later, having learned about the suspiciously brilliant and, of course, turned out to be fake successes of this area in the production of meat, milk and butter, we again (and, apparently, for the last time) recalled S .:
      - Probably, and he put a hand to this linden. Familiar handwriting.
      A peculiar fate befell the ill-fated car itself. She was given ... to the Moscow Aviation Institute, where she stood for many years in full view of students and teachers. Evil tongues claimed that this was done not without common sense: let, say, future aviation engineers learn how to build airplanes.
      But I remembered all this funny (happiness, of course, that it turned out to be funny) story because, talking with Nikashin, I again imagined how Grinchik felt when L. was going to fly in his car.
      “Damn him!” - Lyosha told us later. - It seems that I had no doubt: the car is not going up. It’s as if I tried everything. And suddenly, I think, something did not take into account such that I do not know, but L. knows? That will fly now and really unscrew all aerobatics over the airfield! Where should I go after this: one road - into the loop!
      And Grinchik, craning his neck and building a terrible chapter, clearly showed how he would have to go into the loop if it hadn’t turned out that L. didn’t know any special secrets, but simply boasted of illiteracy.
  5. Jipo
    Jipo 19 October 2013 15: 50
    +1
    Polikarpov was sentenced to death, then after a group of designers completed the I-5 as soon as possible in prison, he was released, but the sentence was not canceled, he died with an unexpired conviction, not to mention even amnesty. In addition, during the tests of his plane, Chkalov and other pilots died, the times were severe to the feeder, young and zealous broke, Mikoyan was given all the drawings and the factory, where they later began to produce the MiG-3, Yakovlev brazenly ignored all the requests and ideas of the designer, with such you don’t bother with a sentence with your elbows. The baiting was slightly reduced by Stalin, saying that Polikarpov made good planes, especially the U-2. They didn’t plant it, but they didn’t let it work, although the fighter projects he had had very interesting I-180s and 185s, but the lack of a base and the lack of engines did not allow to bring these planes.
    1. vtur
      vtur 15 November 2013 16: 34
      0
      Quote: JIPO
      he had very interesting fighter projects I-180 and 185, but the lack of base and lack of engines did not allow to bring these aircraft.

      The I-180 aircraft with the M-88 engine was launched into serial production at the plant. No. 21 in 1939. With the motor itself, they suffered a lot, but brought to mind. But the plane itself, six months before the war, was removed from mass production (by releasing 10 (!!!) production aircraft for more than one and a half (!!!) years) and launched LaGG-3 (the history of which is a separate joke, like La- 5). The I-185 plane with the M-71 (1941-1942) in its character was at the level of 1945 aircraft.
      Polikarpov (and not only him, just him more than anyone else) was "trampled" by the young and energetic (with the connivance of the "father of all nations"). Ask what prize Comrade. Yakovlev for the development of his "Bz-Be" ...
  6. xomaNN
    xomaNN 19 October 2013 18: 50
    +1
    It is difficult to assume that he would have been better in combat than Pe-2. But the nervous situation in the design bureau and the tin indiscriminately, it was clearly not in favor of the work of fine-tuning new aircraft machines.
  7. uzer 13
    uzer 13 19 October 2013 19: 30
    +1
    It seems that the creation of a dive bomber was then an obsession, not supported by a production and technical base. The engines were not reliable, but often came completely unfinished - this was often mentioned in the biographies of Chkalov, Lyapidevsky and stories about aviation of those times. dive should not be forgotten, it was redundant on Pe2 and there was nothing to extinguish it, it is no coincidence that the propellers are mentioned in the article.Therefore, the aircraft was used for a long time as a normal bomber, and only with time they began to master the dive mode, and then without much enthusiasm. If we take the enemy Yu-87 for comparison, then its fixed gear during diving played the role of a natural brake, and it stayed within reasonable speeds - and at the same time it remained quite difficult to pilot an airplane. Pe2's disadvantages also include high landing speed, t .e. he needed a well-trained runway.
    1. vtur
      vtur 15 November 2013 16: 45
      0
      Quote: uzer 13
      If we take the enemy Yu-87 for comparison, then its fixed gear during diving played the role of a natural brake

      Yeah, and "bast shoes" also played the role of a brake in flight (probably so that the pilot would not "accidentally" accelerate to supersonic)
      Why is everyone so caught in the "reversible" screws? Do you compare the complexity with the level of that time? It is the same that now a "reversible" compressor would be used in a gas turbine engine to brake dive aircraft!
      There is a simple and effective method that has been successfully used so far on devices from light gliders to heavy airliners - the general name is AERODYNAMIC BRAKE, otherwise a certain structure released into the air stream to create drag or dampen the lift force of the wing. The execution (and name) may be different ...
  8. Taoist
    Taoist 19 October 2013 20: 13
    +1
    The problem was, first of all, with the fact that the Red Army Air Force then lacked as such a serious concept of combat use, so they rushed about issuing KB TZ to a high-altitude long-range fighter to accompany non-existent strategic bombers (STO), then trying to take on a "two-fighter" concept, then creating a bunch " planes - jackals "(Ivanov) trying to combine both a reconnaissance aircraft and a bomber and almost a fighter in one machine ... Well, as an initiative development, no one really needed it ... so they tried to convert it into a dive bomber - but under a dive bomber he also, in general, it was not good ... In fact, in its original incarnation as a high-speed aircraft with a very powerful small arms cannon capable of delivering bombing strikes, it could be very useful (like the 110th among the Germans), but alas, this is already a "afterthought"
    1. vtur
      vtur 15 November 2013 17: 53
      0
      Quote: Taoist
      the Red Army Air Force then lacked as such a serious concept of combat use, so they rushed around giving out the design bomber TK to a high-altitude long-range fighter to escort non-existing strategic bombers

      Everything falls into place if you accept the concept that everyone understood that a new big war was coming for the redivision of the world, but did not know who with whom ...
      I highly recommend Shubin's book "The World at the Edge of the Abyss" - well, very interesting ...
  9. avt
    avt 20 October 2013 10: 19
    0
    Quote: Taoist
    then creating a bunch of "aircraft - jackals" (Ivanov) trying to combine both a reconnaissance aircraft and a bomber and almost a fighter in one machine ...

    Well, there is no need to repeat Rezunov's nonsense. If you look at the French, for example, they ordered quite the same universal aircraft there - the Potez company did it. Well, what can you say about an English serial two-seater fighter armed with a quad machine-gun mount in a rotating turret, which was put into service at the same time as the Hurricane? It's good to say when the years have passed and the war has put everything in its place. They didn’t order anything that wasn’t in the west, they clearly followed the western “fashion”, from there, legs grow, for example, a four-engine long-range dive bomber, from which the Pe-8 came out. based on the advertising booklet of the French.
    1. Taoist
      Taoist 20 October 2013 11: 28
      0
      I just used his ts. "term" (solely for the purpose of simplifying understanding of your phrase) - and the fact that then not only the Red Army Air Force suffered from "misunderstandings" with the concept of application and as a result, sometimes very "bizarre devices" were designed and built, I know. By and large, only the war has put everything in its place. In this regard, we must pay tribute to the Germans. They found themselves at a "low start" because of Versailles better than others at first thought and then embodied precisely the concept of the Air Force as a separate branch of the armed forces.
    2. Denis
      Denis 20 October 2013 23: 58
      0
      Quote: avt
      long-range diving bomber, from which the Pe-8 left
      How strange it came out
      A serious reason for limiting the use of Pe-8 at the last stage of the war was the revealed structural and technological defect in the design of the aircraft, which began to appear in 1944. It all started with the Pe-8 ╧42611 sortie in February 1944 in Helsinki. After completing a combat mission, the crew performing anti-aircraft maneuver, heard some loud bang somewhere behind the cockpit
      It's just anti-aircraft, what kind of dive is it?
      As it turned out soon, everything was more serious and deeper. Even at the design stage for the center section spar belts, on the recommendation of VIAM, a new high-strength steel ZOKhGSA "Khromansil" was selected at that time, which, according to its characteristics, allowed operation at high specific stresses and gave a significant simplification of the structure. At that time, little was really known about fatigue stresses and their effect on durability, and the airplanes did not have any recommendations from TsAGI and VIAM on these features of the work of materials and structures.
      Yes, and the technical task in the design
      it was noted that during a flight at an altitude of 10000-11000 m the aircraft is not very vulnerable to enemy fighters
      Was there even one dive strategist?
      Ar-2, although Berlin was bombed, were not strategists
    3. vtur
      vtur 15 November 2013 17: 06
      0
      Quote: avt
      English serial two-seater fighter with four-machine gun armament in a rotating turret

      The miracle fighter was called the Boulton Paul "Defiant" (1939) - armament consisted of four 7,7 mm Browning machine guns in a hydraulically driven turret. And although the initial concept of using this aircraft as a day fighter completely failed, but ... until the end of 1941 (that is, before the widespread introduction of radar), squadrons that fought on "Difiants" had the highest percentage of victories in relation to the number of sorties to intercept compared to other types of night fighters.
  10. Fotoceva62
    Fotoceva62 20 October 2013 12: 22
    +1
    Taoist correctly writes that the reason for the development of universal airplanes was a worldwide trend here. Under these airplanes, methods for their combat use were also created, but reality turned out to be more severe airplanes that were unable to operate over the battlefield with due counteraction to ground-based air defense. Pe-2 aircraft of advanced design with the strength of a fighter capable of engaging in air combat with proper training of pilots was, in my opinion, one of the best front-line bombers of the Second World War. I also do not really like its location before the bomb load, but there's nothing to be done about it , but there was no time. For information, the A-20 Boston in general was created under 50 kg. bombs, so that in my view 100 kg. an air bomb is optimal for hitting targets on the battlefield and near the rear.
    1. rubin6286
      rubin6286 1 November 2013 19: 12
      0
      Pe-2 as a front-line bomber was ineffective. The bombing was carried out from a horizontal flight or from a gentle dive. Dived from a height of 2 thousand meters to a height of 1 thousand meters. Typically, the bomb load was approximately 600 kg. those. 4-6 bombs from 50 to 250 kg., Depending on the nature of the target. It was used to destroy artillery positions and other objects in the enemy’s near rear. For air reconnaissance and adjustment. According to pilots, the FABs were not effective and more often tried to use OFAB in combination with incendiary or RRAB. Boston was better than the Pe-2 in all respects, but it was most useful in the Navy as a bomber and torpedo bomber.
    2. vtur
      vtur 15 November 2013 17: 37
      0
      Quote: Fotoceva62
      For information, the A-20 Boston in general was created under 50 kg. bombs

      A-20S armament: six 12,7-mm front-fire machine guns, two 12,7-mm machine guns in an electrically driven turret and one 12,7-mm machine gun for firing through a hole in the bottom of the fuselage; bomb - up to 1814 kg. In fact, it is an aircraft for delivering bombing strikes, capable of "standing up for itself." The aircraft had a large number of modifications with various weapons, for example, a battery of 4x20 mm cannons. Probably, it is not worth comparing with the Pe-2 as a horizontal bomber - it is better with the Tu-2, which began to be produced at a practically created from scratch plant in Omsk and from March to October 1942 the plant set up production in the most difficult conditions and released 7 series (80 aircraft) ... And then NKAP order No. 763 of October 10, 1942 came out:
      "In pursuance of the GKO decree in order to increase the production of fighter aircraft, I ORDER:
      1. Director of the plant No. 166 comrade Sokolov: a) to stop production of Tu-166 aircraft at plant No. 2 ... b) to put production of Yak-166 aircraft at plant No. 9 ... "Here is a story" with a smell "...
  11. Alex
    Alex 22 October 2013 13: 20
    0
    Quote: Denis
    Ar-2, although Berlin was bombed,

    probably Er-2
  12. rubin6286
    rubin6286 1 November 2013 19: 00
    0
    Quote: allim
    was a wonderful dive ar2 proven technology
    speed under 500 km; bomb load under 1500 kg riveting; I do not want to be higher in all characteristics than u87


    Ar-2 is a SB with M-105 motors. This is not a dive bomber, but a front-line bomber. According to the reviews of front-line soldiers with a bomb load of 1500 kg, it was like an iron, the load on the wing was average, there was no automatic exit from the dive, the wing mechanization was primitive, the tanks were unprotected, the view from the cockpit was good only forward and upward, the navigator had cold in the cockpit, blowing through the slot at the paired ShKAS, the turret installed at the shooter freezes in the cold and does not turn .... There are many more "advantages" to list, but there was a war, and if there is nothing better, give at least this. To rivet, you need to have somewhere to rivet. We did not have free aircraft factories at that time. SB and AR-2 burned like matches, pilots near Moscow wrote a letter to Stalin and asked for a Pe-2 as soon as possible. They did not become real dive bombers either, but a number of characteristics were better. The pawn was a good reconnaissance and spotter, bombing mainly from level flight or shallow dive; accuracy depended on the skill of the crew and the number of aircraft attacking the target.
  13. Mushroom
    Mushroom 27 December 2013 20: 29
    0
    Quote: Su-9
    The fashion for dive bombers came from Germany.

    And pursued the German designers like evil rock throughout the war. They tried to dive both the light bomber and the Ural bomber.
  14. Mushroom
    Mushroom 27 December 2013 20: 33
    0
    Quote: rubin6286
    Ar-2 is a SB with M-105 engines.


    I agree that at the beginning of the war this aircraft, like the SB, was obsolete and could be used only if it was completely superior in the air (like the Yu-77).
  15. Mushroom
    Mushroom 27 December 2013 20: 54
    0
    Quote: rubin6286
    Pe-2 as a front-line bomber was ineffective. Bombing was carried out from horizontal flight or from a gentle dive.

    Tryndezh went. Pe-2 perfectly bombed with a dive and was fitted for this with details. There were few dive bombings (just a few, and not dives at all) for 2 reasons: poor preparation of the pilots and bad weather (low cloud cover). The first, by the way, was the reason why an incredible bunch of ineffective IL-2s were being stamped in the country instead of the same Pe-2s.
    The plane itself was quite good for diving.
    Source: A. Smirnov "Falcons washed in blood"

    The disadvantage of Pe-2, I always considered a small bomb load, 1000 kg like Thunderbolt. (However, they were initially both heavy fighters, it’s another matter that the Americans had something to bomb, and we only have Pe-2 after SB and TB-3 sunk in the blood).