Dangerous Ukrainian games: why are Europeans not aware of the dangers of war? ("Atlantico", France)
At present, the situation is so serious that Mikhail Gorbachev himself issued a warning about the new cold war. However, European and North American leaders are thinking about new sanctions against Russia.
Against the background of the resumption of hostilities between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces on January 29, an emergency meeting of foreign ministers was held in Europe. It focused on extending sanctions against Russia in March for another six months, expanding the black list of managers and the company, and even new punitive measures. Washington, in turn, said on Wednesday that “until Russia ceases so openly to violate its obligations (...), it will have to pay an ever higher price.”
Such a situation prompted the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to say these words: “Now you can only hear from America, from the European Union, about sanctions against Russia. Have they completely lost their heads? America in general “got lost in the jungle” and pulls us there. ” According to him, “if you call a spade a spade, it (America) has already drawn us into a new cold war, trying to openly implement its general idea of triumph.”
Atlantico: Is it worth it for European states to expect that the continuation of sanctions will allow to cope with the situation?
Cyril Bret: The adoption of sanctions does not help to cope with conflicts. At the same time, it means the risk of heightening tension in order to prevent further escalation of violence.
From a structural point of view, the economic, financial and administrative sanctions of the EU against the Russian Federation are aimed at maintaining the balance of power with Moscow. And punitive sanctions against individuals should create pressure on the environment of government circles. The last months of some states of the European Union (first of all, this applies to Poland, the Baltic States and Germany), the growing confidence that Russia understands only force. This explains the use of sanctions, in which it relies on Moscow’s understanding of its interests and the unacceptability of the population of restrictions on lifestyle, investment and consumption.
More specifically, as soon as Moscow or the rebels achieve certain military victories (as, for example, this week at the Donetsk airport or from Mariupol), the Europeans damage them at other levels: financial, monetary, commercial, industrial or administrative. The problem is that the goals of the sanctions may become less and less susceptible to them: nationalist propaganda can help unite around a leader, workarounds or an alliance with China are possible. After all, the continental blockade of Napoleonic France created alternatives in the supply of sugar markets.
Sanctions are like an uppercut in boxing: they can force an opponent to retreat only if he still feels pain. Russia, on the other hand, perceives sanctions and the answer to them is completely different from what the Western public does.
- Barack Obama noted the importance of economic sanctions and the results achieved with their help. Western public opinion does not consider war as a suitable option for themselves, but what does the Russian public think about this? If Vladimir Putin ceases to support the separatists, will not his supporters perceive this as a sign of weakness?
- Stereotypes about Russia as an authoritarian state in the internal plan and aggressive in the external really took deep roots in American political circles. And Vladimir Putin made them only stronger than agressive statements repeatedly heard during the conflict. American public opinion for the most part perceives the current conflict as a deliberate military aggression of Russia against a sovereign state. In addition, this criticism of Moscow will only intensify if the Republicans win the presidential elections in 2016: despite their values of conservatism similar to United Russia, in this case, it’s worth waiting for the deterioration of Russian-American relations without real opportunities for rapprochement besides external factors.
At the same time, the Russian public was amazed at the American interventions in Kosovo and Iraq and does not understand why they are now trying to read the notations. For the most part, she believes that the country acts in its own right. This is largely facilitated by the media, which have created such history: after the collapse of the USSR, many Russian people remained abroad, including in Ukraine, and a number of originally Russian territories, for example, Crimea, dropped out of the country. In addition, public opinion simply cannot imagine Ukraine’s estrangement by political means: the 2004 Orange Revolution of the year became humiliation for Vladimir Putin, who did not foresee the defeat of Viktor Yanukovych because of his inability to falsify the voting results. Ten years later, the Russian leadership had new troubles that could lead to the expulsion of the naval base from Sevastopol and the rapprochement of Kiev with NATO. Therefore, it began to intimidate the authorities, to talk about the fascist coup d'état, which the United States secretly supported. This point of view is shared by the majority of Russians, for whom television is the main source of information. And this does not push Putin to soften the position. Taking into account all these points, it is necessary to recognize that deeply disagreements on these issues will remain in the public opinion of the two countries for a long time.
- If Western states persist in their policy of sanctions, what will be the consequences? Can we say that they embark on a dangerous game without a clear idea of its rules?
Florent Parmantier: The policy of sanctions was a response to the annexation of the Crimea, at the sight of which the Europeans could not sit back, because it was about changing the boundaries of a sovereign state. The Russian authorities claim that they only used the “Kosovo precedent” and emphasize support for the annexation of the peninsula among the population.
There were several rising waves in the sanctions, but so far there is no answer to the next most important question, the question of their abolition. Russia is not going to return the Crimea to Ukraine, because it does not agree with its accession to it during the Soviet Union in 1954. At the same time, it is much more inclined to consensus and concessions on the Donbas. If we tie the lifting of sanctions to Russia's withdrawal from the Crimea, this will create a dead end situation for all parties. Europeans can easily find themselves in a position where it will not be possible to agree on anything besides the status quo. And this is with significant consequences for Europe itself and endlessly protracted in the conflict.
Conflict requires a political solution, which nevertheless does not have to be based on the lowest common denominator. It is a question of deep reforms of the Ukrainian political institutes, association of citizens. In this area, the Europeans are able to offer pragmatic options based on their achievements in technical assistance to the formation of the present legal state.
- What is the logic worth adhering to the West in search of a way out of the crisis instead of a bet on sanctions? So, for example, wouldn't a refusal to admit Ukraine to NATO help reduce the intensity of passions?
Cyril Bret: Today, the path from sanctions to overcoming the crisis is very poorly visible. The differences in the points of view of Russia and the West are such that what the West regards as a neutral position is perceived in Moscow as aggression. So, the vote of the Parliament on the prospect of Ukraine’s entry into NATO is perceived by the West as the right of a sovereign Ukrainian state. At the same time, it is a provocation and a red line for the Russian Federation, which seeks to protect the remnants of its sphere of influence and power in the near abroad, where it recognizes only “limited sovereignty”, as Brezhnev used to say.
The announcement, adoption and application of sanctions is only one aspect of the Europeans ’response to the separatist military actions and the strategic position of the Russian Federation in this conflict.
Europe should not consider sanctions as a means by which repentance can be achieved from Russia. They should be a pointing arrow that will lead the Russian Federation to a way out of the crisis through gradual concessions. So, in exchange for "neutralization" or "Finlandization" of Ukraine, that is, for its non-entry into NATO, the Europeans could bargain for Russia's non-intervention in the Donbas. In addition, the concessions must be made by the United States on the missile defense system and the Ukrainian authorities on the constitutional organization of the south-eastern regions of the country.
The demonstration of power is an important but not sufficient condition for resolving the crisis: the West needs to offer a way out for the Russian authorities, whose position is only harder because of the economic recession, diplomatic isolation and the vertical of political power. The standoff should lead to a joint dance, that is, a coordinated common movement towards the same goal.
Cyril Bree, Lecturer at the Paris Institute of Political Studies.
Florent Parmantier, lecturer at the Paris Institute of Political Studies.
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