“Tell Putin that we believe him”
"Iran still believes that the contract Defense "The S-300 was legitimate, it was in no way subject to sanctions," said Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanaei. "Firstly, it was signed before the sanctions were imposed, and secondly, it is a defensive, not an offensive system. Iran is waiting for the supplies to be delivered." …A street vendor in Mashhad, whom I approached to buy batteries for my camera, was leisurely laying out his wares. “Where are you from?” he asked, hearing an unusual accent for a city that receives up to five million pilgrims a year from all countries where there are at least a hundred Shiites. “From Russia, sir,” I answered. My composure disappeared, a small, hot palm squeezed mine: “From Russia… Tell Putin, be sure to tell him that we trust him. He will not allow a war to be unleashed against us. Tell them there in Moscow that we are waiting for your anti-aircraft guns. missiles, then the Zionists and Americans will choke on their threats to bomb us." There was faith in the eyes of this little man on a sunlit street in an Iranian city...
So for people in this country looks like a contract for C-300. His failure to create a wave of disappointment among our friends and the serious reputational costs of Moscow throughout the Middle East.
Constantly returning to this topic, insisting on the implementation of this particular contract, the Iranians want to get guarantees that this will not happen again.
Recall the circumstances of this ill-fated contract is not superfluous. To once again understand: what turns liberalism in Russian foreign policy, and what are the consequences of a pro-Western orientation for our country.
History With a contract for C-300 stuffed with spicy details, like a good homemade cake - raisins. As if in a mirror, it reflected some of the “birthmarks” of Russian diplomacy: the desire to “sit on two chairs” at once, the inability to determine priorities and calculate the consequences, the inadequacy in assessing the promises of third countries and the neglect of the needs of the domestic defense industry in favor of Western partners .
To begin with - some generalizations. The final point of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy was an event that occurred already under D. Medvedev - the war in South Ossetia and the victory over Tbilisi. Operation Peace Enforcement became the final point of Putin’s efforts to change attitudes in Russian society, to change attitudes toward his own army, to change foreign and defense policies.
Russia's ability to provide an extremely harsh forceful response to hostile activities and unfriendly expansion has also become a "cold shower" for the West. The march-throw across Georgia, militarily unconvincing, looked more than weighty in foreign policy. Russia has shown the whole world that in certain circumstances, in case of treacherous violation of obligations, in case of threat to its interests, it is ready to respond tank the column. The West found itself in a new situation for him: now, the statements and opinions of Moscow should have been treated in a completely different way than it was under "friend Boris."
For the first time after M. Gorbachev, Russia had a leader who had a fairly holistic sum of views on the character of the state that emerged after the 1991 year. And these views, no matter how hard they tried to convince us of the opposite, were the liberals, shared by a significant majority of the Russian population, responded to their ideas about the foreign policy of the president.
In which, I note, Iran occupied a rather important place.
For V. Putin, at least three things were obvious. First, the fact that the United States, having occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, now see Iran as its main target. And in the event of an operation against him, there is a threat of destabilization not only of the Middle East and Central Asia, but also of Russia.
Secondly, even the very weakened positions of foreign intelligence and the GRU were enough to give an exhaustive conclusion: Iran does not seek to possess nuclear weaponsand all the hype around this is purely artificial.
And finally, the third: the strengthening of relations with Iran is necessary for the Russian defense industry, on the development of which V. Putin relied.
There was one more circumstance. V. Putin, much better than other representatives of the Russian political elite, knew the details of the Russian tragedy in the Caucasus - and about those who supported the separatists, who sponsored the terror, in which countries the militant leaders took refuge. And about the pro-Russian position of Iran on Chechnya, which helped Russia prevent more disastrous developments.
Attention of V. Putin to the Middle East and Central Asia at the end of his second presidential term, his attempts to conduct not реакт reactive ’but meaningful policies there, gave Russia a certain amount of trust in the region, created a foundation for further work, formed a rather wide corridor of opportunities ". In a sense, it was a worthy finale of eight years “on the galleys,” it was a victory.
Having received an inheritance with such "groundwork", D. Medvedev decided to use this victory in a political game. How did it turn out?
In the eyes of the liberals, the tasks of Russian foreign policy were two. First: “We need to decide, cooperation with which countries will give the greatest return for the development in Russia of relevant technologies and markets for the entry of domestic high-tech products to regional and global markets.” And the second: “Strengthening the institutions of Russian democracy and civil society. We must promote the humanization of social systems everywhere in the world, and, above all, at home. ” But if for the USA “democracy” and “humanization” all over the world is only a tool for achieving geopolitical domination, a brilliant wrapper in which “soft colonialism” is wrapped, then our liberals were sincerely convinced that foreign policy is based on such concepts. ..
A commercial approach to foreign policy issues predetermined the attitude to the issue of the importance of Russian-Iranian relations. The West did not hide for a minute: it was extremely necessary for Russia to support the Western vision of the "final solution of the Iranian issue." Consequently, he did not stint on the promises that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu undertook to voice.
Why precisely he? For at least two reasons. The desire for partnership with Israel is, in my opinion, a kind of indicator of the true foreign policy intentions of the Russian ruling class. Friendly relations with Israel that do not bring visible economic benefits, depending on relations with a third party - the United States, are evaluated in Washington as evidence of loyalty, are considered as confirmation of their readiness to follow in the wake of American foreign policy.
D. Medvedev very much wanted to prove to B. Obama his sincerity in the "reset", and therefore B. Netanyahu was received in Moscow with open arms. Well, what can he talk about? Only about sore - about Iran.
The Israeli prime minister promised everything: expansion of military-technical cooperation, investments, production technologies for the latest drones...
He was so eloquent that at the negotiations there was not even a desire to ask him at least some unpleasant questions: for example, about the Russian-Israeli competition in the arms market, about the supply of weapons to Georgia and Azerbaijan, about Israeli actions regarding the sale of Russian rough diamonds, about falling purchases of oil from Russia with a general increase in purchases from the CIS countries ...
One more misfortune was added to B. Netanyahu's insistent requests - negotiations between the Medvedev team and the Saudis. And if V. Putin viewed the normalization of relations with the monarchies of the Gulf solely with the aim of neutralizing the expansion of the Saudi kingdom and Qatar to the Muslim regions of Russia, then D. Medvedev primarily saw the monarchy as a source of investment. On what the Saudis played without further ado, by offering Medvedev a billion dollars - according to other sources three billion - “compensation” in the form of a non-repayable loan. Conditions for receipt were as follows:
- Do not sell Iran C-300;
- revise its contracts for the supply of Russian weapons to Syria in the direction of a complete cessation of these supplies;
- Do not impose a veto on the UN resolutions on Syria, which will include “humanitarian interventions”;
- to join the sanctions against Iran or at least not to impose a veto on the UN Security Council resolution providing for their tightening.
Realizing that a billion, or even three, still a few small amount for such a package of "political concessions", the Saudis made it clear that they were also ready to buy Russian weapons: X-NUMX T-150 and 90 Mi-100 and Mi-17 tanks, 35 BMP-100, 3 air defense systems, total - 20 billion dollars.
Well, and besides, the sheikhs promised to provide intelligence information on terrorists, mediate in negotiations with them and "support the interests of Russia" in the Middle East. Plus, and investment in the Muslim regions of Russia - Tatarstan and the North Caucasus.
Only one circumstance hindered the Sheikhs deal. D. Medvedev has already agreed to most of these conditions, but - as the fulfillment of obligations to Israel. Twice to receive money for the same was not possible.
After B. Netanyahu "laid out" another trump card - he promised that Gazprom would have a preferential right to develop fields in the Mediterranean - D. Medvedev finally approved in a decision to impose a ban on the sale of C-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran , combat aircraft, helicopters and ships. Russia's deals with Iran on air defense systems for the total amount of 800 million dollars, as well as the upcoming military-technical cooperation contracts for another 4,2 billion, did not take place. In addition, by his decree, D. Medvedev forbade the use of Russia for the transport of weapons to Iran in transit, to export weapons directly from the territory of Russia, and also to transfer them outside the country under the flag of Russia.
Also, a ban was imposed on entering the territory of Russia to some citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular, Abbas Rezai Ashtiani - one of the leaders of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization for Geological Exploration and Mining, Dr. Mohammad Eslami - Head of the Educational and Research Institute of the Defense Industry, Brigadier General Mohammed Reza Naghdi - the former deputy chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces for logistics and industrial research ...
Simultaneously with the official decree, closed decisions followed. In particular, the agreement was finally buried the beginning of the "zero years" concerning the exchange of intelligence information on terrorist groups between the special services of Iran and Russia. And - signed an agreement on the exchange of intelligence information with Israel.
Bottom line: the construction of a plant for the production of UAVs really began. Only in Azerbaijan. The bold end to the question of the prospects for military-technical cooperation between Russia and Israel was put by the director of the military-political bureau of the Israeli Defense Ministry, Major General Retired Amos Gilad: “The only thing we sold to Russia is Sercher UAV, which is 30- summer obsolete machine with outdated systems ... The Russian side wanted to get it to manufacture its own UAVs. We have fulfilled our part of the agreement on UAVs, but not a single modern system has been sold and will not be sold to Russia. ”
In conversations with the author of this article, military experts argued that the “Iranian” contract for C-300 could well become for our defense industry the same as the “Bushehr contract” for the Russian nuclear industry in the mid-nineties was a serious source of funding and development for the industry. But - did not.
By the way. Two C-300 divisions in the Favorite modification, by order of D. Medvedev, were nevertheless sold out in the 2010 year. For 300 million dollars. To Azerbaijan. The strategic partner of Israel and the United States in the South Caucasus. To a country whose officials in semi-official statements directly say that "Russia is a natural opponent of Azerbaijan." The country that did everything to eliminate the Russian radar station in Gabala.
I have repeatedly said that the attitude towards Iran is an indicator of whether Russia is capable of conducting an independent foreign policy.
And what will be the final in the C-300 story will make it clear to what extent Russia is ready to pursue an independent foreign policy course in the East. After all, there is no definitive clarity on the issue of C-300 Syria supplies either ...
In Tehran, they hope that the problem that has arisen around Russia's deliveries of C-300 complexes to Iran will soon be resolved through negotiations - this was announced by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in the middle of the outgoing week. “We are very pleased that the Ministers of Defense of Iran and Russia held talks on this issue,” he said. - We hope that the problem will get a quick solution. We are for solving the issue through dialogue. ”
Hope lives on.
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