After Minsk
Making predictions about the Ukrainian confrontation is a thankless task. All parties have long shown that they are capable of acting not only contrary to national interests, but also to elementary common sense. However, according to the results of the first weeks of hostilities, certain conclusions can be drawn. It is obvious that Kiev did not plan to compromise initially. He expectedly used the truce to strengthen his own positions, replenish troops with equipment and manpower, and create a humanitarian catastrophe. What Strelkov has said many times now has been forced to recognize the top leadership of the Russian Federation. Vain attempts to reach an agreement with Kiev led only to political and economic losses for Russia.
The “party of the plum” in the Russian elite has the last opportunity to once again launch the BCH offensive on the brakes before February 12, although this will be an order of magnitude more difficult than in September. First, the militia gained an offensive gust and it will not be easy to stop him. Secondly, in the case of the next traitorous stop, it is Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky who will have to explain themselves before the furious militiamen, and not at all to their curators in distant cabinets. Thirdly, there are cautious grounds for asserting that the position of the Kremlin “party of war” may have strengthened in the case of curating Novorossia. The “plum party”, which promised to lift the sanctions in exchange for peace, suffered a complete fiasco. The sanctions were only tightened, and the world turned into a nightmare of shelling of the cities of Donbass and, as a result, the fall of Putin’s authority personally, in whose name this “peace plan” was consecrated in September. Against the background of the failure of the policy of appeasement, the “hawks” offered a logical and long overdue path of large-scale assistance to the militia, with a simultaneous artful approach against European sanctions through obstinate Greece. The latter has already proposed the personal lifting of the food embargo and the increase in tourist flow from the Russian Federation as a carrot.
In strategic terms, Moscow has become clear that there is no Crimea without Novorossia. The peninsula depends on the former metropolis in almost everything: from electricity to gas and fresh water. A nightmare of the Ukrainian elite is a land corridor to the Crimea, which will not only ensure the mutual stability of the peninsula and the new state, but will also become an independent value for Moscow. Kiev, on the other hand, will lose even an illusory chance to get some bonuses from Moscow for transit to the peninsula - now Novorossia will have them.
To date, there are two scenarios of developments on the fronts of New Russia. Conventionally, they can be called optimistic and pessimistic. The pessimistic one is based on the assumption that in the January-February battles, the militia loses the most combat-ready units in exchange for illusory successes in taking individual settlements. Ukraine has obviously large human reserves and deliberately grinds the forces of the BCH, trying to force them to go on the defensive. The optimistic scenario is based on the assumption that it is Kiev that is grinding its own reserves, accumulated with such difficulty, and the militia, which is attacking with relatively small forces, has a reserve in 25-30 that has thousands of fighters who are ready to rush into the breached gap. Which of the scenarios closer to reality will become clear in the next month, if not earlier.
The main problem of the APU is the lack of armored vehicles. Production cycle tank T-64 "Bulat" is, according to some reports, more than nine months and nothing is known about the massive deliveries of this equipment to the troops, which most eloquently indicates the absence of such. With the advertised "Holds" things are even worse. But it is known unit purchases of tanks in the Czech Republic and Hungary. We are talking about Soviet-made cars or their licensed and modified versions, which remained in abundance in the countries of the former Warsaw Treaty. Poland is the leader in such reserves (only T-72s with RT-91 modifications in this country number more than 800 units), but it is still unknown whether this country supplied heavy weapons to Kiev and if so, in what quantities. You can definitely say that the production program of our own new Ukrainian armored vehicles failed, even taking into account imported components. The delivery dates were also disrupted, the number of new products was negligible compared to the needs of the armed forces, and the quality of the products leaving the workshops was very criticized by the Ukrainian military. With battle aviation things are even worse - Ukraine itself does not produce it at all, and from the fact that it is able to fly into the air, a part died even over Slavyansk. The desperate situation is indicated, at least, by the fact that the Mig-29 fighters were spotted playing an unusual role for them as attack aircraft and front-line bombers. Although, of course, talking about the complete collapse of Ukrainian aviation is also premature.
Somewhat simpler things with manpower. Two waves of mobilization should bring the number of Ukrainian troops on the fronts of Donbass from 45 thousand to about 150 thousand, but the quality of mobilized civilians on the battlefield is still questionable, and the motivation is extremely low. Professional mercenaries from abroad could solve the problem, but European and North American specialists are expensive, and cheap and familiar to the Soviet equipment militants from Africa would attract too much attention with their frankly non-Ukrainian appearance.
Separate words worthy of the Ukrainian command. A lot was said about the fact that it is incompetent at almost all levels, however, losing one important point. In any army, you can find a sufficient number of competent officers, but Ukraine today makes the same mistake as the Soviet Union in the first months of the Great Patriotic War. The defense of politically significant positions is placed above the preservation of combat-ready units. The average commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will more readily sacrifice a multitude of soldiers and equipment than the stars on his shoulder straps, which he is guaranteed to lose by surrendering the media-significant object. For politicians in Kiev, it is quite acceptable to sacrifice large-scale units for the sake of a beautiful picture on TV, forgetting that the preservation of the army is the primary task of any war. However, such thinking is an axiom only for the national elite, and not the colonial administration, which, fulfilling the will of Washington, throws new forces into the furnace of the war, forgetting that it is not sitting on the bottomless barrel. If things on the fronts go really badly, the first persons of the Square will be the fastest at the airports, having given the sign of surrender to completely different people.
The results are disappointing. Since Washington needs war for many reasons, Kyiv will be allowed another tactical truce only in the event of a critical defeat on the fronts. The cessation of hostilities will occur along the actual line of contact between the troops, which has already been announced by the DPR and LPR. But terrorist artillery shelling and raids by sabotage and reconnaissance groups will continue in any case. This can only be prevented by the destruction of guns and mortars, as well as the merciless extermination of crews, including those who are captured. The war has long since reached the level where excessive pity for the enemy will simply not be understood by the suffering residents of Donbass, and keeping such a large number of prisoners is simply impractical.
For Moscow, it is extremely important to obtain reinforced concrete trump cards in the upcoming peace talks. Such trumps can be obtained only on the battlefield. Hence, the activation of the “voentorg” and the change in the rhetoric of the central Russian TV channels (Donetsk and Lugansk are no longer referred to as regions, but as people's republics) and even the appearance of Strelkov on the screen. True, the independent Novorossia is also not in question. The ultimate goal of Moscow, apparently, is to return the republics to Ukraine with a status that would guarantee decisive influence on internal Ukrainian affairs, while the DNR and LC themselves will be semi-independent territories, approximately like the Aland Islands within Finland. But in order for Kiev not to have a desire to suppress the republics by force in the future, as it was with the Crimea in the 1990s, it is necessary that there be more than two people's republics. So, the war will inevitably continue.
The “party of the plum” in the Russian elite has the last opportunity to once again launch the BCH offensive on the brakes before February 12, although this will be an order of magnitude more difficult than in September. First, the militia gained an offensive gust and it will not be easy to stop him. Secondly, in the case of the next traitorous stop, it is Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky who will have to explain themselves before the furious militiamen, and not at all to their curators in distant cabinets. Thirdly, there are cautious grounds for asserting that the position of the Kremlin “party of war” may have strengthened in the case of curating Novorossia. The “plum party”, which promised to lift the sanctions in exchange for peace, suffered a complete fiasco. The sanctions were only tightened, and the world turned into a nightmare of shelling of the cities of Donbass and, as a result, the fall of Putin’s authority personally, in whose name this “peace plan” was consecrated in September. Against the background of the failure of the policy of appeasement, the “hawks” offered a logical and long overdue path of large-scale assistance to the militia, with a simultaneous artful approach against European sanctions through obstinate Greece. The latter has already proposed the personal lifting of the food embargo and the increase in tourist flow from the Russian Federation as a carrot.
In strategic terms, Moscow has become clear that there is no Crimea without Novorossia. The peninsula depends on the former metropolis in almost everything: from electricity to gas and fresh water. A nightmare of the Ukrainian elite is a land corridor to the Crimea, which will not only ensure the mutual stability of the peninsula and the new state, but will also become an independent value for Moscow. Kiev, on the other hand, will lose even an illusory chance to get some bonuses from Moscow for transit to the peninsula - now Novorossia will have them.
To date, there are two scenarios of developments on the fronts of New Russia. Conventionally, they can be called optimistic and pessimistic. The pessimistic one is based on the assumption that in the January-February battles, the militia loses the most combat-ready units in exchange for illusory successes in taking individual settlements. Ukraine has obviously large human reserves and deliberately grinds the forces of the BCH, trying to force them to go on the defensive. The optimistic scenario is based on the assumption that it is Kiev that is grinding its own reserves, accumulated with such difficulty, and the militia, which is attacking with relatively small forces, has a reserve in 25-30 that has thousands of fighters who are ready to rush into the breached gap. Which of the scenarios closer to reality will become clear in the next month, if not earlier.
The main problem of the APU is the lack of armored vehicles. Production cycle tank T-64 "Bulat" is, according to some reports, more than nine months and nothing is known about the massive deliveries of this equipment to the troops, which most eloquently indicates the absence of such. With the advertised "Holds" things are even worse. But it is known unit purchases of tanks in the Czech Republic and Hungary. We are talking about Soviet-made cars or their licensed and modified versions, which remained in abundance in the countries of the former Warsaw Treaty. Poland is the leader in such reserves (only T-72s with RT-91 modifications in this country number more than 800 units), but it is still unknown whether this country supplied heavy weapons to Kiev and if so, in what quantities. You can definitely say that the production program of our own new Ukrainian armored vehicles failed, even taking into account imported components. The delivery dates were also disrupted, the number of new products was negligible compared to the needs of the armed forces, and the quality of the products leaving the workshops was very criticized by the Ukrainian military. With battle aviation things are even worse - Ukraine itself does not produce it at all, and from the fact that it is able to fly into the air, a part died even over Slavyansk. The desperate situation is indicated, at least, by the fact that the Mig-29 fighters were spotted playing an unusual role for them as attack aircraft and front-line bombers. Although, of course, talking about the complete collapse of Ukrainian aviation is also premature.
Somewhat simpler things with manpower. Two waves of mobilization should bring the number of Ukrainian troops on the fronts of Donbass from 45 thousand to about 150 thousand, but the quality of mobilized civilians on the battlefield is still questionable, and the motivation is extremely low. Professional mercenaries from abroad could solve the problem, but European and North American specialists are expensive, and cheap and familiar to the Soviet equipment militants from Africa would attract too much attention with their frankly non-Ukrainian appearance.
Separate words worthy of the Ukrainian command. A lot was said about the fact that it is incompetent at almost all levels, however, losing one important point. In any army, you can find a sufficient number of competent officers, but Ukraine today makes the same mistake as the Soviet Union in the first months of the Great Patriotic War. The defense of politically significant positions is placed above the preservation of combat-ready units. The average commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will more readily sacrifice a multitude of soldiers and equipment than the stars on his shoulder straps, which he is guaranteed to lose by surrendering the media-significant object. For politicians in Kiev, it is quite acceptable to sacrifice large-scale units for the sake of a beautiful picture on TV, forgetting that the preservation of the army is the primary task of any war. However, such thinking is an axiom only for the national elite, and not the colonial administration, which, fulfilling the will of Washington, throws new forces into the furnace of the war, forgetting that it is not sitting on the bottomless barrel. If things on the fronts go really badly, the first persons of the Square will be the fastest at the airports, having given the sign of surrender to completely different people.
The results are disappointing. Since Washington needs war for many reasons, Kyiv will be allowed another tactical truce only in the event of a critical defeat on the fronts. The cessation of hostilities will occur along the actual line of contact between the troops, which has already been announced by the DPR and LPR. But terrorist artillery shelling and raids by sabotage and reconnaissance groups will continue in any case. This can only be prevented by the destruction of guns and mortars, as well as the merciless extermination of crews, including those who are captured. The war has long since reached the level where excessive pity for the enemy will simply not be understood by the suffering residents of Donbass, and keeping such a large number of prisoners is simply impractical.
For Moscow, it is extremely important to obtain reinforced concrete trump cards in the upcoming peace talks. Such trumps can be obtained only on the battlefield. Hence, the activation of the “voentorg” and the change in the rhetoric of the central Russian TV channels (Donetsk and Lugansk are no longer referred to as regions, but as people's republics) and even the appearance of Strelkov on the screen. True, the independent Novorossia is also not in question. The ultimate goal of Moscow, apparently, is to return the republics to Ukraine with a status that would guarantee decisive influence on internal Ukrainian affairs, while the DNR and LC themselves will be semi-independent territories, approximately like the Aland Islands within Finland. But in order for Kiev not to have a desire to suppress the republics by force in the future, as it was with the Crimea in the 1990s, it is necessary that there be more than two people's republics. So, the war will inevitably continue.
Information