Blitzkrieg bet

Blitzkrieg betNumerous sources on stories The Third Reich testifies that the German economy even by September 1939 was not ready to wage a long war, although absolutely all material and human resources were concentrated on accomplishing this task. Such a situation imperiously dictated to Hitler the choice of the only possible (albeit eventually becoming disastrous) military strategy. The German military-political leadership decided that the opponents should be smashed one by one, one after the other, during short-lived military campaigns, with the involvement of the greatest possible forces and means.

The concept of a transient war (blitzkrieg, which had already shown its ultimate failure during the First World War) found its expression both in the general strategy of the war and in the organization, supply, combat and ideological training of the armed forces. According to Hitler and his entourage, only the blitzkrieg gave Germany the opportunity to simultaneously achieve military objectives, and economically meet the needs of the Wehrmacht, and at the same time maintain industries that provide a very high level of consumption for Reich citizens.


The economic background of aggression

The German military economy largely depended on the use of the military-economic potentials of the occupied countries. From here, she received, for example, more than 40% of all iron ore imported from abroad. From 1 / 2 to 3 / 4 total German imports of important types of strategic materials needed to produce high-quality steel — chromium, nickel, various ferroalloys — came from the occupied countries; Almost 1 / 3 of bauxite came from France, Yugoslavia and Greece, while the import of aluminum from France and Norway was 4 / 5 of the total German import. In 1941, imports from enslaved countries comprised 3 / 4 total copper ore imports, 4 / 5 copper and lead, 1 / 2 tin, and almost all of the zinc imported.

Having adopted in July 1940 a decision to attack the USSR, the Nazi leadership in advance adopted a series of measures of a military-economic nature.
In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of Staff of the OKV Keitel, the OKW Department of Military Economy and Armaments has developed an arms buildup program for the "eastern march". 13 and 14 September 1940, General Thomas, at a meeting with the inspectors of the military districts, outlined the reserves for the implementation of this program.

The Nazi leadership initially took the axiom that the transient nature of the war against the Soviet Union would allow it to limit itself to the planned production of military products without a total mobilization of the entire economy. The Nazi military-political leadership in September 1940 adopted the so-called “B” production program weapons and military equipment for war against the USSR. This program provided for 1 April 1941 to provide all the necessary 200 ground forces divisions, as well as to replenish the arsenals of the Air Force and Navy with more advanced types of military equipment.

Since the second half of 1940, the production of armored vehicles, which has grown twice over the year, has become the priority program of military production. If during the 1940 of the year the 1643 of the light and medium tank was released, then only in the first half of the 1941 of the year their release amounted to the 1621 unit.

In January, 1941 of OKV issued a directive to ensure that monthly production of tanks and armored personnel carriers was brought to 1250 vehicles in the near future. In addition to tanks, wheeled and semi-tracked armored cars and armored personnel carriers armed with 7,62 and 7,92-mm machine guns, 20-mm anti-aircraft guns and 47-mm anti-tank guns and flamethrowers were created. Their release increased from 511 in 1940 to 1332 in 1941.

Much attention was paid to increasing the production of artillery and small arms. The release of some of his samples over 1940 - 1941. almost doubled. The production of explosives, gunpowder, projectiles for anti-aircraft guns, and aerial bombs grew rapidly.

The program of building naval forces was carried out at an accelerated pace. From September 1939 to June 1941, one battleship and two heavy cruisers descended from the German stocks. But the main emphasis was on increasing the submarine fleet. If during the five pre-war years in Germany 57 submarines were built, then from the beginning of the Second World War to June 1941 - 147.

In the first months of 1941, the growth of German weapons reached its apogee. Monthly production, for example, of tanks increased in the second quarter of 1941 to 306 vehicles compared to 109 for the same period 1940. An unprecedented increase in the production of ammunition (others almost 30 times!) Allowed Wehrmacht troops to be fully on the eve of the war with the USSR. To own stocks of weapons, military equipment and ammunition added the richest trophies. From the defeated enemy, the Wehrmacht received the 30 Czechoslovak, Polish 34, French 92, British 12, Belgian 22 and Dutch 9 divisions, as well as huge stocks of various equipment and ammunition.

Thus, the complex of various emergency measures taken by the Nazi leadership allowed him to provide the Wehrmacht with all the necessary weapons and ammunition for the war against the USSR.
But all the calculations, I repeat, were made from the short-term, lightning character of the upcoming campaign in the Soviet territories. It was assumed that in terms of the consumption of weapons and ammunition, the blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union would not differ in principle from the previous campaigns of the Wehrmacht.

In favor of this, such advantages as the full staffing and rationalization of the armed forces, the abundance of modern weapons and military equipment, and its testing in Western campaigns spoke. In addition, the economic headquarters of OKV hoped to capture about 75% of the entire Soviet industry, as well as the necessary raw materials and food.


The leaders of the German economy put on a quick "occupation of the wheat fields of Ukraine and the Caucasian oil fields," the seizure of innumerable trophies.

Also in the operational plans of the Wehrmacht great attention was paid to the remote regions of the Soviet Union (the Caucasus, the Urals), as well as the marginal zones (the Baltic and Black Sea).

Planning blitzkrieg

18 December 1940, Mr. A. Hitler signed the directive No. 21, in which, under the heading “Top Secret. Only for command! ”The plan of an attack on the Soviet Union was outlined in the most general terms. He was given the coded name "Barbarossa". Such a nickname (translated from German “Redbeard”) was worn by the medieval German king Frederick I, (in combination with the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation). But Hitler either forgot or didn’t want to remember that this warlike ruler ended badly - during the next crusade he drowned in some small river in Asia Minor ...

Hitler's directive began with a fundamentally important statement that “the German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia during a short-term campaign even before the war against England is over. I will give an order on the strategic deployment of armed forces against the Soviet Union eight weeks before the scheduled start date of operations, if necessary. Preparations that require more time, if they have not yet begun, should begin now and finish with 15.5. 41.

The appearance of the Barbarossa directive in fact summed up the first stage of the preparation of aggression against the USSR, which was actively pursued since the summer of 1940, and marked the beginning of its final stage.
By this time, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and France had fallen under the iron heel of the Wehrmacht. The last unconquered bastion on the European continent remained the USSR. In fact, all the previous campaigns of Nazi Germany served as a bloody prelude to crushing, wiping out the Soviet Union.

With appeals to destroy the USSR, Hitler spoke from the beginning of his political career. In his book “My Struggle,” repeatedly reprinted from the second half of the 1920-s up to the German attack on the USSR in 1941, it was stated that the Germans allegedly lacked a “living space”, which could be solved only by conquest and the Germans settled "the lands of Russia and the outlying states subordinate to it", which only in this way could Germany be granted the status of a "world power" capable of waging a struggle for world domination.

The man-hating Nazi theory

The Nazis justified their global malice, entirely on the basis of their racist, misanthropic outlook. After all, Hitler, without the slightest doubt, argued that the vast Russian empire allegedly existed solely due to the presence of "state-forming German elements among the inferior race", that without the "German core" lost during the revolutionary events at the end of the First World War, it fully matured for decay.

According to their criminal racial theory, the Russians and Slavs in general were regarded by the Nazis as an inferior race unworthy of having their own statehood and sovereignty. A. Rosenberg and other ideologists of the Nazi movement spread speculation that Bolshevism in Russia is nothing more than a “Mongoloid uprising against the Nordic culture”, which set the goal of “appropriating the whole of Europe”.

As Soviet political intelligence reported to Moscow, shortly before his 30 appointment in January 1933 by the Reich Chancellor, when discussing issues related to future seizure and division of the USSR with his closest associates, he solemnly declared:

“All Russia must be dismembered into its component parts. These components are the natural imperial territory of Germany. ”
A few days after the appointment of the Reich Chancellor, at the very first meeting with the High Command of the Reichswehr, the German armed forces, Hitler announced that his program goal was to “seize the new living space in the East and his merciless Germanization”.

The conclusion by Germany and Italy of a military alliance with Japan, which had long been carrying out plans to seize Soviet Siberia right up to Lake Baikal, by itself created a threat to the USSR at a certain stage to find itself in the grip of two fronts: with Germany and Italy in the west and Japan in the east. True, Hitler and his generals after the defeat of France and up to the Smolensk battle of July 1941 did not see the need to involve Italy and Japan in the campaign against the USSR, not wanting to share trophies with them. They were completely confident that they would succeed in crushing the Soviet Union with their own forces in one lightning campaign. To their allies on the Pact of the Three Powers, they initially assigned the role of covering Germany during the campaign against the USSR with flags and rear.

Italy was to serve as a counterweight to Britain and divert its forces in the Mediterranean basin, while Japan would perform the same function against Britain and the United States in the Pacific.

In the six prewar years, Nazi Germany, which, according to the Versailles Treaty, was forbidden to have tanks, heavy artillery, aircraft, anti-tank artillery, etc., turned its armed forces into the strongest army in the world. This was largely the result of the policy of appeasement, which was carried out by influential forces in Britain, France and the United States in the prewar years, generous financial assistance, which led to the rapid "initial accumulation" of military-industrial potential by Germany.

Destroy the "vital force" of the USSR in 5 months!

After the capitulation of France, the military and political leadership of the Third Reich set the destruction of the USSR as the most important goal. On July 21, at a meeting with Hitler, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, outlined his thoughts in a detailed report. According to him, there are allegedly only 50 – 70 “good divisions” in the Red Army and their defeat “will require no more than 80 – 100 German divisions, concentrating and deploying which at the Soviet border will take only 4 – 6 weeks”. Hitler took note of this report and ordered the future planning of the war against the Soviet Union to be strictly on schedule.

At the beginning of July, 1940 planning for a new Blitzkrieg was also taken over by the management (from August 1940 - Headquarters) of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW). His chief, Colonel-General A. Jodl, believed that the defeat of the Red Army would require not 80 – 100, as Brauchitsch believed, but 120 divisions, which would not take 4 – 6 weeks for their concentration and deployment, which will lead to a delay in the transition to the offensive and the emergence of difficulties due to the autumn thaw and winter cold. After Jodl’s talk with Hitler 29, the Führer decided to postpone the beginning of the attack on the USSR the following year.

The disagreements among the German military leaders were removed by Hitler at the July 31 meeting with Brauchitsch, Halder, Keitel and Jodl. Hitler announced his decision to attack the USSR not in 1940, but in May, 1941.
He also established a period of "destruction of the vital force of Russia" - five months, necessarily before the onset of the autumn Russian thaw.

Hitler agreed with Jodl’s proposal to allocate 120 divisions from the 180 for the attack on the USSR.

The immediate goal of the struggle for the expansion of the German "living space" in the East, in his opinion, was the rapid capture of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states.

To interest Finland in participating in anti-Soviet aggression, the Fuhrer tried to promise to transfer to it a part of Soviet territory north of the White Sea.

On the basis of these instructions of Hitler, work began on drawing up new plans of war in the East at the General Staff of the ground forces and the management of the operational leadership of the OKW.

31 January 1941, the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH), in fulfillment of the Barbarossa plan, issued a directive on the strategic deployment of the ground forces. The main task, according to the directive, was to "carry out extensive preparatory measures that would have allowed the defeat of Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign before the war against England was over." To achieve this, it was planned to deliver quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat marshes in order to divide and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops in the western part of the USSR, not allowing their combat-ready parts to retreat into the vast interior regions of the country. This directive, said in the directive, will be promoted by attempts by large units of Soviet troops to “stop the German offensive on the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers”.

3 February 1941 Brauchitsch and Halder submitted this directive for consideration by Hitler, who approved it in general terms. Then the directive was sent to the headquarters of the three army groups, air force and naval forces. The headquarters of army groups in accordance with the directive developed the operational plans of their associations and February 20 presented them to Halder.

Reorganization and increasing the strength of the Wehrmacht

In parallel with the development of the plan of attack on the USSR, long before its approval, reorganization, rearmament and training of the Wehrmacht proceeded rapidly, taking into account the new task assigned to it. It must be admitted that the command of the Wehrmacht saw in the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces a stronger enemy than the Anglo-French coalition. Therefore, it decided to bring the number of ground forces to 1941 divisions (including reserves) by the spring of 200.

In order to prepare the Eastern theater of military operations in June 1940, a nationwide program was adopted to expand the carrying capacity of railways and highways from Germany to the borders of the USSR (the Otto program).

For the reinforcement of the armed forces with personnel in the Reich, reservists were called in, which made it possible to increase the number of German armed forces from 5765 thousand people in June 1940 to 7329 thousand in June 1941.

The Hitler leadership, taking measures to increase the number of manpower, made the main emphasis on the qualitative superiority of military equipment over the USSR.
To this end, a whole set of measures was taken to raise the level of training of troops, equip them with new equipment, retrain commanders and improve the organizational structure of the units and formations.

Of exceptional importance for the qualitative improvement of the German armed forces was the creation of 23 new mobile divisions, which in the Wehrmacht included tank, motorized and light divisions.

By June 1941, the maximum degree of Wehrmacht motorization was reached. The total number of motor vehicles increased from 420 thousand in March 1940 to 610 thousand in June 1941.

In the construction of the Air Force was great proportion of fighter aircraft. It was considered as the main means of conquering and maintaining dominance in the air; it was not by chance that it accounted for about half of all German combat aircraft. By June, the 1941 in the German Air Force had about 10 thousand aircraft, including 6 thousand combat aircraft (bomber 2642, naval aviation aircraft 286, fighter jets 2249, reconnaissance 823). It was also 719 transport aircraft and 133 communication aircraft.

By the time of the attack on the USSR, German aviation was inferior to the Soviet in quantitative terms, but significantly surpassed it from the organizational and staff point of view, in tactical and technical characteristics and the level of professional training of personnel. It was not by chance that on the very first day of the attack, up to 40% of combat aviation, ZOVOVO was destroyed at the airfields.

The German Navy by June 1941 included 4 battleships, 4 heavy and 4 light cruisers, 15 destroyers, 18 torpedo boats, 40 torpedo boats, 122 submarines, 6 auxiliary cruisers, and a significant number of small warships and ski ships and a number of small warships and hatching ships. The coastal artillery of the German Navy had 25 heavy gun batteries and 99 medium-sized gun batteries.

The special forces of the SS subordinated to the main directorate of the SS belonged to the armed formations in the Reich. Organizationally, they consisted of separate divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies. These units were formed from the number of persons fanatically loyal to the fascist regime, active members of the Nazi party, and later from volunteers from among the conquered peoples (such was, for example, the SS division "Galicia"). These troops were better provided, representing, in fact, the Nazi military elite.

Everything was subordinated to the main task - a surprise attack on the USSR

In order to give the training of troops the greatest focus for the fight against the Red Army in the autumn of 1940, the OKW prepared a review of the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war. It analyzed the tactics of the Soviet troops in the offensive and defense, gave specific examples of their actions, and gave an assessment. Poor camouflage and reconnaissance, inept use of the terrain, a small depth of defense, and the lack of a clear interaction between the troops were noted.

In February-April, 1941 issued a series of directives on personnel training from the pen of von Brauchitsch. The Hitlerite military leader drew attention to the difficulties of waging war on the territory of the USSR in off-road conditions and communicated to commanders of all levels the requirement of organizing comprehensive combat and logistical support for the troops.

The OKW and OKH directives required troops to be trained in effective ways to achieve surprise.

Having the correct data on the Soviet numerical superiority in tanks, the German command paid primary attention to the saturation of its troops with anti-tank weapons. From the end of the 1940, new, 50-mm anti-tank guns and heavy anti-tank rifles of the 28 mm caliber began to come into service with anti-tank units and subunits. The number of anti-tank guns in the troops increased by more than 20 times.

Taking into account the previous experience of the actions of tank forces for blitzkrieg against the USSR, four tank groups were created, which were equated with armies.

The theory of lightning war, developed by Prussian strategists, envisaged the achievement of a quick and complete victory over the enemy in one campaign. For her success, it was considered necessary by all means to achieve surprise attacks, to have “his supporters” in enemy countries and skillfully use their subversive and agitational activities.

The surprise of the attack was achieved by carrying out secret mobilization, covert concentration and deployment of armed forces groups, active disinformation, concluding treaties with the countries to which the attack was supposed to take place, non-aggression treaties and broadcasting statements about peace-loving intentions.
High rates of offensive were provided by the massed use of tanks and aircraft, which were considered the main means of overcoming the resistance of the enemy and his defeat. The most effective and universal method of defeating the enemy was considered to be the encirclement of his troops, carried out by circumventing the flanks or breaking through defenses and subsequent deep penetration in converging directions by specially designed strong attack groups of tank and motorized forces for this purpose.

Prussian strategists attached decisive importance in the victorious outcome of the war to a strong initial strike, the offensive was considered the main type of combat. The main method of strategic offensive was the breakthrough of the defense in two sectors with its subsequent development in converging directions: the army, as a rule, broke through the defense in one sector, developing a strike in depth or towards the flank in order to surround the enemy in cooperation with the neighboring army.

Tank groups were intended both to break through enemy defenses with their own forces and to further advance, and to develop tactical success in operational operations, but always their main purpose was to rapidly advance the enemy defenses in order to encircle his troops.

Thanks to active military intelligence, the German command at the beginning of the attack very accurately revealed the deployment of Soviet troops in the border districts, the degree of their combat capability, the state of defensive lines and structures, the location of Soviet airfields and landing sites. The resulting intelligence helped the German troops quickly break into the depths of the Soviet defense.

Before the attack on the USSR, the German Wehrmacht was the most numerous and most powerful army in the world.

Already in July, 1940 was in full swing the transfer of German troops to the Soviet western borders.
According to the prepared by the quartermaster-general of the ground forces General E. Wagner 15 in November 1940, the plan “Logistics during the eastern march” stipulated that the supply should be organized taking into account that 3 million troops, 500 thousand vehicles will be involved in this campaign , 300 thousand horses. In accordance with this calculation, by the beginning of the war against the USSR, fuel reserves of 700 – 800 km for vehicles and military equipment, two ammunition sets of ammunition for each infantry division, and three ammunition sets for tank divisions were created. This was enough for the first 10 days of hostilities.

By order of Keitel from 12 in May 1941, with the introduction of 22 in May 1941, the schedule for the maximum transfer of German troops to the western border of the USSR, the efforts of all responsible Wehrmacht instances were aimed at presenting the deployment of troops on the Soviet border in the form of large diversion before the landing of the German troops on the British Isles. Rumors about “covering the rear of Russia” and “about distracting concentration in the East” were actively spread among the personnel of the transferred formations. In many units, false orders were issued to transfer them to the West. The landing of the German assault on the island of Crete by order of Keitel and with the active personal assistance of the Reich Minister of Propaganda J. Goebbels was presented in the world media as the “dress rehearsal of the landing in England.”

To hide the truth about their true intentions with regard to the USSR, the command of the Wehrmacht until the last moment kept in ignorance of them the vast majority of Wehrmacht personnel. By order of the OKN from 8 in May, 1941 was informed of the upcoming attack on the USSR only eight days before its commencement of the commanders of the units, and non-commissioned officers and privates were literally on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities.

30 April 1941 at the meeting of Hitler with the command of the ground forces was finally approved the decision to start operation "Barbarossa" 22 June 1941 g.

Not a war, but a struggle of ideologies

The Hitlerite leadership in advance developed plans for waging a war against the USSR, not the usual, but merciless war of annihilation, its economic exploitation and dismemberment, as well as a plan for the colonization of its European part.

Hitler has repeatedly stated that the war against the USSR will be "the complete opposite of a normal war in the West and North of Europe", that its ultimate goal is "total destruction" and "the destruction of Russia as a state."
The upcoming war, the Fuehrer proclaimed, would not be an ordinary war, but a “struggle of two ideologies” with “the use of the most severe violence” that in this war it was necessary to defeat not only the Red Army, but also the “management mechanism” of the USSR, “destroy the commissars and the communist intelligentsia” , party functionaries, and in this way destroy the “ideological bonds” of the Russian people.

It should be emphasized that almost all representatives of the Wehrmacht top commanders (with the exception of a handful of oppositionists who considered Hitler an adventurer and preparing an assassination attempt) for the beginning of the war against the USSR were guided by the Nazi worldview, perceived Hitler not only as their supreme commander, but also as an ideological leader , almost messiah. His instructions they put in the form of orders to the troops. And although later some of the military leaders criticized Hitler (mostly for strategic and tactical blunders), in 1941, almost all of them only welcomed the instructions and orders emanating from the Imperial Chancellery or the Fuhrer Stakes in Rastenburg.

And it is not by chance that 28 on April 1941 of Mr. Von Brauchitsch issued an order “The procedure for the use of the security police and the SD in ground forces”. This izuversky order emphasized that troop commanders, together with the commanders of the special punitive formations of the Nazi Security Service (SD), were responsible for carrying out actions to destroy communists, Jews and "other radical elements" in the frontline rear areas.

In turn, 13 in May 1941, the Chief of Staff of the OKV, Field Marshal V. Keitel, issued a decree “On Special Jurisdiction in the Barbarossa Region and Special Authorities of the Troops”. This document was generally removed from the soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht any responsibility for future criminal offenses in the occupied territory of the USSR. They were instructed to be ruthless, to shoot on the spot without a trial all those who would show even the slightest resistance or sympathize with the partisans.

Further, 6 June 1941, the headquarters of the OKW issued a "Instruction on the treatment of political commissioners" ("Order of the Commissioners"). The soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht were ordered to exterminate on the spot captured all the political workers of the Red Army.

"To extort from the country all that we need ..."

The Hitler elite attached great importance to the development of plans for the use of the Soviet economic potential for waging war. At a meeting with the command of the Wehrmacht 9 in January 1941, Hitler said that if Germany "gets into her hands the innumerable riches of the vast Russian territories", then in the future she will be able to fight against any continents.

Specific plans for plundering the wealth of Russia were developed by the economic organization Vostok, established in March of 1941.
She was supposed to be in charge of all questions of the economic use of the occupied regions of the USSR. The supreme leadership of this organization was exercised by the General Commissioner for the implementation of the four-year plan, Reichsmarschall G. Goering, through the Eastern Headquarters of Economic Management he created in Berlin, headed by his representative, State Secretary P. Kerner. For the purpose of camouflaging this governing body, before the start of Operation Barbarossa, this governing body was called Oldenburg. To enforce its decisions, the Eastern Economic Headquarters was also established in advance, which during military operations was supposed to work closely with the quartermaster general of the land forces.

The “general instructions” of the Vostok organization of 23 in May on 1941 on agricultural policy in the Nuremberg process stated that the goal of the military campaign against the USSR was “to supply the German armed forces and also provide German civilians with food for many years population. " This goal was realized in the most cannibalistic way: by “reducing Russia's own consumption” by “cutting off any supply of surplus products from the southern black earth regions to the northern non-chernozem zone,” including to industrial centers such as Moscow and Leningrad.

At one of the meetings of the Vostok headquarters, it was directly admitted: “If we manage to pump out all that we need from the country, tens of millions of people will be doomed to hunger.”

"... do not stop if you have an old man or a woman, a girl or a boy ..."

The Reichsführer SS and the head of the police G. Himmler, appointed “Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Nationality”, and the head of the NSAAP foreign policy department A. Rosenberg, who was appointed by 1941 in April XNUMX in April, were in charge of detailed plans for the dismemberment of the USSR and the establishment of German rule in its territory. centralized development of Eastern European issues ". It was they who first of all made plans to include in the Third Reich almost the entire European part of the territory of the Soviet state, to destroy or slave its population.

Two days after the start of the attack on the USSR, 24 June 1941, Reichsführer G. Himmler instructed the head of the planning department at the Reich Commissar to strengthen the German nationality, SS Oberhührer, director of the Institute for Agrarian Business and Agrarian Policy of the University of Berlin, Professor K. Meyer-Hetling to prepare a plan for expelling the Slavs and Jews from Central and Eastern Europe in order to "free up space for the Germans to settle." This plan, later called the Ost General Plan (“East”), was already ready for July 15 1941. It envisaged from the territory of the Czech Republic, Poland, the Baltic republics, Ukraine and Belarus, where, according to Meyer’s calculations, 45 million people lived to evict the “undesirable in terms of racial indicators” 31 million people from the Urals, and the rest to “Germanize”, that is, turn the slaves of German masters into slaves. Thus, it was planned to settle the 840 thsd. Of Germans who had proved their thoroughbredness immediately after the war cleared of the “defective” racially indigenous inhabitants of the land, and then two more German waves of 25 and 30 million people in 1,1 – 2,6 years.

One of the developers of the Ost master plan, Dr. E. Wetzel, racial adviser at the Eastern Ministry of Rosenberg, presented Himmler with a document in which he categorically asserted that “without complete destruction” or weakening by any means of the “biological force of the Russian people” to establish “German domination in Europe "will not succeed.
And it was not by chance that the soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht on the eve and during the “eastern campaign” were handed out memos, which said: “... kill every Russian, Soviet, do not stop, if you are an old man or woman, girl or boy - kill, you will save yourself from death, you will secure the future of your family and you will become famous forever. ”

Believing in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, German strategists obsessed with delusions of grandeur, even before the attack on the USSR, began to develop further plans for the struggle for the establishment of German world domination. Calculating in the near future "to eliminate the influence of the Anglo-Saxons in North America", they were already in 1940 nurtured plans to seize Iceland and a number of other islands in the Atlantic in order to transform them into military bases for a war against the United States in alliance with Italy.

The draft OKW Directive No. 32 “Preparing for the period after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan of 11 in June 1941 provided that after the end of the war against the USSR, the Wehrmacht would start to conquer Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, and Turkey, if she dares to resist Gibraltar and British possessions in West Africa, and then resume the "siege" of England by the naval and air forces and still prepare the landing on the British Isles (which Stalin waited in vain) in order to force the UK to capitulum ii. And it is not by chance that the day of the attack on the USSR - 22 June 1941 - turned into a nationwide, truly great holiday for the British: they have passed, thank God, this cup!

Starting from that day, during the Second World War, an armed struggle unprecedented in scope and bitterness unfolded, the outcome of which depended the life and destinies of the peoples of the whole world.
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