Military Review

Mikhail Alexandrov. The medium-range missile treaty has ceased to meet Russia's interests.

Mikhail Alexandrov. The medium-range missile treaty has ceased to meet Russia's interests.

The aggravation of the international situation caused by the events in Ukraine sharply raised the question of the need to rapidly strengthen Russia's military-strategic positions in Europe in order to neutralize the deployment of NATO’s military infrastructure to Russia's borders. In this context, the expediency of Russia's further participation in the treaty on medium-range and shorter-range missiles (INF) raises some doubts. It is no coincidence that last year the discussions on this topic became noticeably more active both in the expert community of Russia and the United States, and in the political circles of both countries.

In July, 2014, Washington officially accused Moscow of violating the INF Treaty. This was stated in the annual report of the US Department of State on the observance of international treaties in the field of arms control. The reason for the accusation was the alleged non-compliance by Moscow with the provisions of the treaty prohibiting the development and testing of medium-range cruise missiles.

And in December, the issue of Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty was discussed in some detail at a hearing in the US Congress. The hearings were held in the form of a joint meeting of members of the committees of the House of Representatives for Foreign and Armed Forces Affairs. The US government was represented by Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemeller.

The latter again accused Russia of violating the treaty, citing the development of a new ground-based cruise missile of medium range. According to her, President Obama even wrote a letter to Vladimir Putin on this issue, but Russia rejects this claim. Gottemeller did not specify how long the United States intends to still wait before responding to these “violations”. Among possible responses, she cited diplomatic steps, economic sanctions and military countermeasures. In turn, Brian McKeon said that he did not rule out the deployment of American cruise missiles in Europe in response to Russian "violations".

Republican Ted Poe, who was present at the hearing, citing non-public information, called the “violations” on the part of Russia “alarming”. And the chairman of the subcommittee on strategic weapons, Mike Rogers, said he was concerned about the "inability of the administration to respond to the Russian deception." He also threatened to make the appropriate allocations through his committee, even against the wishes of the US administration (1).

These statements by official US representatives were not ignored by the Russian Foreign Ministry. Already, December 12 Foreign Ministry issued a brief comment expressing regret that the US continues to follow "confrontational logic", and it was clearly stated that Russia does not intend to obey "American dictate". “As for the possible military steps that the American representatives hinted at, they would only add tension to an already very complicated situation. This is unlikely to help strengthen the security of the United States and its allies, as discussed at the hearing. It is noteworthy that, speaking with such threats, the United States cannot clearly articulate what their claims actually are, and stubbornly refuse to flesh out their accusations, ”the commentary (2) stated.

In the Russian expert community, at least two people have commented on the hearings in the US Congress - former Lieutenant-General of the Russian Ministry of Defense former treaty international department, Yevgeny Buzhinsky, the former head of the international defense department, and Konstantin Sivkov, president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. Moreover, both experts opposed Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty (3). A little earlier, the author of these lines also spoke on the INF Treaty, but from directly opposite positions (4). It is noteworthy that Sivkov and Buzhinsky turned out to be more ardent supporters of the INF Treaty, than even the Russian Foreign Ministry, in a statement which did not say that this treaty retains lasting value for Russia and that it does not intend to withdraw from it. Sivkov, in particular, noted that “it is extremely undesirable for us that Americans start producing Pershing missile systems again. He explained that these missiles“ could reach our strategic nuclear force control system in 5-7 minutes, and the accuracy the hit was about five meters. ”“ In fact, they could destroy the country's leadership and the strategic leadership of the military forces without some kind of response. ”

Buzhinsky spoke in much the same vein. “If the Americans place medium-range missiles along our borders,” he stressed, “then the flight time to Moscow and the main centers will be calculated in minutes, which was with the“ Pershing ”and ground-based cruise missiles. When they were stationed in Europe, our soldiers immediately realized that we absolutely did not need this. ”

As you can see, these arguments do not shine with novelty. In fact, they boil down to the same thesis - the short flight time of American medium-range ballistic missiles and, accordingly, their ability to quickly destroy the Russian military control system. At the time of Gorbachev, this thesis was used to justify the need to conclude an INF Treaty. Only both experts forgot to mention that this thesis was purely propaganda, used, so to speak, for public consumption. And the true reasons for the consent of the military leadership of the USSR on the INF Treaty were completely different. Just uncover them at that moment was not possible.

The real reason was that, given the strategic configuration in Europe that had developed by the 80 years of the last century, the USSR and its ATS allies had a decisive advantage over NATO in the number and armament of general-purpose forces. And if NATO could still count on reflecting the first blow of ATS troops located in Central Europe, then the approach of the armies of the second strategic echelon from the territory of the USSR condemned the alliance to an inevitable defeat. The only thing that could save NATO in that situation was the use of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, NATO planned to use nuclear weapons not only in the combat zone, but also in the form of an attack on the Soviet troops of the second and third strategic echelons moving forward to Europe. Otherwise, these fresh forces, which NATO would have nothing to oppose, would have easily gone to the English Channel without much difficulty. Thus, the concept of a “strike on the second echelons” of the ATS forces has become one of the main elements of NATO’s military doctrine. The most important role in such a strike could be played by American medium-range missiles, which, unlike aviation, were the only reliable means of delivering nuclear weapons to the desired area.

In this situation, the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe was unprofitable for the USSR, and if he had such an opportunity, the Soviet leadership would then go to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the European theater. But NATO, realizing its vulnerability, categorically refused to do so. However, the deployment of the Soviet ultra-modern medium-range missiles Pioneer pushed the West into serious negotiations to reduce an entire class of nuclear weapons in Europe. As a result, the removal of medium-range and shorter-range missiles from NATO’s arsenal significantly improved the strategic configuration for the USSR in the European theater. So in that situation the INF Treaty was generally in the interests of the USSR, although we had to reduce a much larger number of missiles than the United States.

However, now the strategic situation on the European continent has changed dramatically. Russia and its allies not only have no advantage in the general-purpose forces that existed during Soviet times, but, on the contrary, they are significantly inferior to NATO in this area. And although Russia may temporarily create a regional military superiority in Eastern Europe and conduct offensive operations in this region, any protracted war with NATO (and the other cannot be) will require the use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia. Otherwise, NATO’s numerical superiority in personnel and armaments will not work.

That is, unlike the USSR, Russia has not the slightest interest in eliminating TNW in Europe. And the addition of medium-range nuclear missiles to Russia would further enhance our country's ability to contain a potential aggressor. And under these conditions, references to the arguments of the period of Soviet military domination in Europe to justify the continuation of Russia's participation in the INF Treaty look rather strange. References to propaganda arguments of that period look even more strange.

Meanwhile, the question of small flight time was precisely the propaganda argument. After all, it was necessary to somehow explain our Soviet public, at first glance, unacceptable concessions to the Americans in terms of the number of missiles being reduced. Therefore, there was a rationale that we lose in quantity, but we win in quality. However, an objective analysis of the strategic situation shows that the short flight time of US medium-range missiles from Europe does not provide NATO with any qualitative advantages. Strictly speaking, it was clear even in Soviet times, but now it is even more obvious.

The fact is that Russia's strategic security is not based on the speed of reaction to the first nuclear strike, but on the guaranteed possibility of a nuclear response to the aggressor. In Soviet military planning, a retaliatory strike was always considered only as a desirable, but not at all obligatory condition for causing unacceptable damage to the enemy. Therefore, the strategic forces of the Russian Federation are built in such a way as to be able to absorb the first nuclear strike from the United States and at the same time preserve the potential for a retaliatory strike.

Under these conditions, the small flight time of the US INF does not fundamentally change anything compared to the existing strategic configuration. In fact, the main danger in terms of the first sudden strike is not the conditional Pershing in Europe, but the American Trident II SLBMs, which have only slightly lower accuracy of impact. Moreover, the launch of such a rocket along a flat trajectory from the sea area in the region of the west coast of Denmark will only exceed the range of the “Pershing-700”, released from the central region of Poland, by 2 km. That is, the flight time of the Trident 2 SLBM will only exceed the time of a medium-range missile by a couple of minutes.

Moreover, the Pershingi-2, with a maximum range of 1800 km, is not able to hit objects even in the Urals, not to mention the more remote regions of Russia. Meanwhile, spare command posts for managing strategic nuclear forces are not only in the European part of the USSR. Therefore, Sivkov’s assertion that the conditional Pershing is capable of reaching our strategic nuclear force control system within 5-7 minutes is incorrect. Even if these missiles are deployed in Poland and Romania, they can only get command posts that are located in the European part of the country. But they will not be able to fly to objects in the Urals and beyond.

Thus, the claim that the Russian military government will be instantly beheaded by a medium-range missile attack is not true. Especially when you consider that a war, especially a nuclear war, cannot begin with a bay-swagger. It is only in a science fiction film that one can imagine that the President of the United States, having woken up in the morning in a bad mood, suddenly decided to “strike on these Russians.” In reality, any war is preceded by a period of aggravation of the situation, which makes it possible to disperse the country's military-political leadership in such a way that it cannot be destroyed in any way with the first blow.

In addition to the limited range of damage, medium-range missiles are much more vulnerable to Russian air defense / missile defense systems than ICBMs or SLBMs. Since Soviet times, the level of development of these systems in Russia has increased significantly. Modern Russian air defense systems C-300 and C-400 can effectively deal with well-known US medium-range missiles. It is characteristic that the United States, when testing its THAAD and Patriot PAC-3 theater missile defense systems, use Hera missiles that use control and guidance devices taken from the Pershing-2. And Hera missiles are successfully intercepted by the indicated American systems. Meanwhile, the Russian air defense / missile defense systems C-300 and C-400 are not only not inferior, but even surpass the Patriot PAC-3 in a number of parameters. For them, intercepting American Pershing-2 missiles will not pose a serious problem.

In addition, it must be borne in mind that the Russian command centers and mines of ICBMs are covered with means of destroying missile warheads at the closest approach. These means are rapid-fire artillery systems, including volley fire, with a range of up to several kilometers. Moreover, the probability of their destruction of warheads of medium-range missiles flying at a slower speed is much higher than the probability of hitting ICBM and SLBM warheads. Thus, the use of US-assisted USMDs for a counter-force strike on Russian mines of ICBMs in the European part of the country is likely to be less effective than the strike of the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Finally, in the “Pershing-2”, a head-end guidance system was applied to the final leg of the flight using a radar map of the terrain. However, modern powerful EW systems are capable of suppressing the guidance radar at a considerable distance from the object, which makes it difficult to accurately hit the missile at the target.

And one more thing, US-based INF in Eastern Europe will be very vulnerable to our non-nuclear-powered cruise missiles or Iskander missiles. The fact is that the areas where they are based will be known in advance, and it will be quite difficult to change these areas, as they are located in foreign countries and this will require a complex system of approvals. Therefore, it will be possible to observe the routes of the movement of American INF in Europe both by electronic means and agent intelligence. And this makes an accurate strike on these missiles is not so difficult.

Thus, US-made Preschool-2, if placed in Europe, will not give the United States any significant advantages over the current situation. They are not able to deal a decapitating blow to the Russian military control system, their counter-force potential is rather limited, they are highly vulnerable to modern air defense / missile defense and electronic warfare weapons, and can also be destroyed by a non-nuclear missile preventive strike by Russian tactical missiles. Well, since Russia does not plan a large-scale invasion of Europe, and does not have the potential for such an invasion, the topic of a NATO strike on the second echelon of the advancing Russian troops is not relevant now.

By the way, it’s not a fact that the United States will be able to quickly restore the production of Pershing-2 missiles. It is possible that technology and scientific schools have already been lost. Well, it will be very difficult for Americans to create a new, more advanced rocket. Unlike Russia, they were not engaged in the development of highly mobile missile systems designed to overcome missile defense systems like Topol M and Iskander. And to create such missiles quickly they fail. They even have difficulty creating a new rocket for a flight into space, although this topic, unlike the INF, has always been in the focus of their attention. Theoretically, the United States, of course, can solve this problem, but it will take a lot of time and money. Meanwhile, the budget funds of the United States the further, the more they will be limited by the objective parameters of the national debt, which continues to grow. And the less allocations go to this area, the longer the whole process will be delayed. Therefore, let them try, spend money and time on research and development of a new rocket. Let them set up its production and demonstrate its effectiveness. But the Russian side will be able to evaluate all this and, on the basis of the new strategic situation, decide whether it needs a new INF Treaty. Then it will be possible to talk about the specific parameters of the restriction of this type of weapon. And then only if the benefits of such a contract are greater for us than for its absence.

The very same Russia exit from the INF Treaty can give a number of immediate benefits. We already have an almost finished rocket. It is enough to remove one step from the "Topol M". You can also increase the range of Iskander missiles to 1000 km and more. The United States will be able to respond to this only by deploying its Tomahawk cruise missiles in Europe. But this will not give them any principal advantages, since they can still fire these missiles at our territory from the waters of the Mediterranean, Baltic and Norwegian seas.

It should also be borne in mind that the main military threat for us stems from the territory of Europe, and not from the territory of the United States. Indeed, it is from Europe that a military invasion of Russian territory is possible. The main warehouses, military contingents and infrastructure for war with Russia are located precisely in Europe. To invade our territory, bypassing Europe, the United States can not. That is, the main objects for our counterstrikes are precisely in Europe. If these objects are destroyed, the troops located in the United States will not be able to do anything to us, since even if they so wish, they will not be able to get in contact with our troops. For the transfer of new large contingents to Europe and the creation of a new military infrastructure there, the United States will take years. Meanwhile, we ourselves deprive ourselves of the most effective weapons for the destruction of objects in Europe.

Thus, the deployment of medium-range missiles would only increase the deterrent role of Russian nuclear weapons to prevent NATO aggression against Russia. These missiles would make it clear that all the strategic facilities of NATO in the center and in the west of Europe can be guaranteed to be destroyed in the first hours of the conflict. Now this can be done only by striking strategic nuclear forces. But what then will remain with us for a retaliatory strike on the United States?

Moreover, our use of strategic missiles to strike NATO facilities in Europe significantly lowers the threshold for a limited nuclear war in a European theater to develop into an all-out nuclear war. After all, the launch of Russian strategic missiles will inevitably provoke the Americans into a retaliatory strike on our territory. They will not have confidence that we strike only in Europe. On the other hand, Americans will be able to distinguish the launch of medium-range missiles from strategic Americans. And in this case, most likely, they will not launch a nuclear strike on the territory of Russia. After all, this is certainly followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on the territory of the United States. Thus, the presence of medium-range missiles in our country will inevitably confront the United States with a difficult choice: whether to respond to our nuclear strike on NATO facilities in Europe with a nuclear strike on the territory of Russia. In words, of course, the United States loudly declares its allied solidarity with Europe, its readiness to use nuclear weapons to protect NATO countries. But it is in words. And when they are really faced with the question of whether they are ready to go for self-destruction for the sake of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Italy or even Germany, Washington may have very serious hesitations and doubts.

And this element of uncertainty and doubt significantly increases the deterrent role of Russian medium-range missiles in Europe, even if NATO has similar systems. Indeed, Russia doesn’t care if it hits medium-range missiles from Europe or US strategic missiles on its territory. The answer will be unequivocal - a total blow to the enemy in Europe and the United States. But with a similar strike by Russia on the European allies of the USA, with the exception of Britain and France, which have their own nuclear forces, there is no such unambiguity.

Under these conditions, both the Americans and their European allies will be more cautious about the possibility of unleashing aggression against Russia. The United States will not be confident that NATO will win over Russia, as they will understand that Russian medium-range missiles will quickly destroy a significant part of key NATO military facilities such as airfields, naval bases, radar stations, weapons depots and fuel and lubricants, bases of storage of military equipment, concentration of troops, command centers, control and communications. Under these conditions, the victory of NATO in the war with Russia becomes unreal.

Well, the European allies of the United States will not be sure that American nuclear deterrence in Europe will work, given that the territory of the United States itself will be safe from a nuclear strike. That is, they will consider the likelihood of a Russian nuclear strike on Europe as very high. And this will immediately diminish their willingness to flex their muscles and intimidate Russia with military exercises and the deployment of new bases near its borders. Not to mention the possibility of starting a real war with Russia.

But that's not all. At the present level of development of Russian military technology, medium-range missiles can dramatically change the balance of power in Europe in our favor, even if they are not equipped with nuclear weapons. The accuracy and power of missile warheads has increased so much that it allows to solve a number of military tasks, mentioned above, with conventional missiles. Such missiles will not be effective only for well-fortified targets and troop congestions. All other objects can be destroyed in the same way, even if not by one, or by several conventional warheads.

For example, medium-range missiles would be particularly effective for destroying components of the global US missile defense currently deployed in Romania and Poland. Intended for intercepting Russian ICBMs in the middle segment of the trajectory, this system will not be able to effectively resist highly maneuverable Russian short-range and medium-range missiles, as well as low-flying ground-based cruise missiles. Thus, in the event of Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the European echelon of the global missile defense system will immediately become meaningless, still not being deployed. Of course, one could wait until the Americans fully deployed this echelon, spending significant resources. But this is a question of tactics.

Finally, medium-range missiles are important for Russia not only in a European context. They could be a reliable deterrent to Japan, which in recent years has begun to forcefully build up military power. The deployment of a certain number of such missiles on Sakhalin, even in non-nuclear equipment, would greatly impede the implementation of any Japanese plans to seize the Southern Kuriles even if Japan could gain an advantage over Russia in the ratio of naval forces. These missiles would be an effective means of quickly and reliably hitting Japanese airfields, seaports, control centers and communications. Moreover, this efficiency would be obtained with the lowest cost and possible losses compared, for example, with the use of strategic aviation. And most importantly, Japan would have no illusions about the ability to fend off such a blow.

Well, finally, medium-range missiles could be an effective weapon against international terrorists and their territorial entities, such as ISIL, and even states that provide support to terrorists. Ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a large throwing weight, are quite able to destroy the bases of terrorists and their political leadership. Do not use expensive strategic systems for these purposes, which are also limited by the START-3 agreement? Moreover, such strikes can be applied instantly, in real time, significantly increasing the probability of hitting the selected targets. It would also be much more politically acceptable than air strikes or sending sabotage groups.

Despite the obvious advantages that Russia gives way out of the INF Treaty, the country's leadership is not in a hurry to take this decisive step. It can be seen that fears that such a move will cause another wave of criticism in the West. However, as the aforementioned congressional hearings showed, Russia is already accused of non-compliance with the treaty, although there are no formal violations on the Russian side. After all, the tested cruise missile, which the Americans are talking about, most likely has a range of more than 5500 km and is not covered by the agreement. However, there is no doubt that the American side will continue its accusations of “violations”, despite all the arguments. Since the deployment of this new missile will give Russia enormous strategic advantages, the United States will seek to prevent this by any means, including threatening with the deployment of its cruise missiles in Europe, that is, de facto withdrawal from the INF Treaty. And why should we abandon this new, breakthrough type of weapon?

And if not, what are we waiting for? We want the United States to be the first formal violators of the treaty? But what will it give in practice? Influencing Western public opinion, we still can not. There we have already been declared guilty. Our partners in Asia are not parties to the treaty. Most of them have their own medium-range missiles. Why would they complain about our withdrawal from the treaty? Therefore, it seems that the basic ordeals of our diplomacy in connection with the INF Treaty have a psychological character, consist in the desire to prove to ourselves that we are the most honest and decent people. They say they held the contract to the end, although he did not meet our interests, and only the actions of the other side led to the collapse of the contract. I remember how this psychological factor made it difficult to make a decision on a moratorium on Russia's participation in the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, although it was already obvious to everyone that this treaty was unacceptable for Russia. Is it not time, finally, to transfer our policy in the field of arms control to a more detailed basis, connected not with psychology, but with constant analysis and forecasting of the development of the military-political and strategic situation around Russia? And on the basis of this analysis, it is already up to us to decide which agreements on arms control we need and which ones should be abandoned. With regard to the INF Treaty, such an analysis shows that this agreement has exhausted itself, it no longer meets the Russian security interests and must be left out of it.

1) Gertz, Bill. Pentagon Considering Deployment of Nuclear Missiles in Europe.

2) Commentary by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the continuing US allegations of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. Doc 2861-12-12-2014

3) “Pershing” returns to Europe // Free Press, 11.12.2014.

4) Chance for a breakthrough or again about medium-range missiles // TsVPI website, 29.10.2014:

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  1. Vasily Ivashov
    Vasily Ivashov 20 January 2015 21: 43 New
    The Americans forgot some of the agreements with the USSR, while others successfully forget.
    And it is time for us to do the same. Moreover, America has indicated to the whole world that Russia is the main threat, i.e. Russia is an enemy of NATO and America, Obama said this.
    So let them roll as they say ...
    1. Ibrahim Botashev
      Ibrahim Botashev 20 January 2015 22: 07 New
      Quote: Vasily Ivashov
      The Americans forgot some of the agreements with the USSR, while others successfully forget.
      And it is time for us to do the same. Moreover, America has indicated to the whole world that Russia is the main threat, i.e. Russia is an enemy of NATO and America, Obama said this.
      So let them roll as they say ...

      Mikhail Alexandrov. The medium-range missile treaty has ceased to meet Russia's interests.

      Notice that it only reached them that we already need rockets reaching Mars, and they are about medium range. We need rockets that are as fast as Washington to the toilet, that is, quickly and with pleasure. I apologize for indecentness, but I seem to have explained my point clearly. hi
      1. crazyrom
        crazyrom 20 January 2015 22: 52 New
        Since the contract has ceased to be in the interests of - fttopku! And anyway, did he ever meet our interests? Or planed a bunch of good rockets for needles in vain?
        1. Wheel
          Wheel 20 January 2015 23: 18 New
          Quote: crazyrom
          Since the contract has ceased to be in the interests of - fttopku! And anyway, did he ever meet our interests? Or planed a bunch of good rockets for needles in vain?

          This treaty never met our interests, as did the START treaty, which was also signed by Gorbach.
      2. The comment was deleted.
    2. Yura
      Yura 20 January 2015 22: 13 New
      Quote: Vasily Ivashov
      So let them roll as they say ...

      That's right, and there’s nothing to break the contract, and there’s nothing to violate, and the cries on this topic will decrease because there will be no time to do this, they will need to build resistance from scratch.
    3. Giant thought
      Giant thought 20 January 2015 22: 42 New
      It is not necessary to withdraw from this agreement yet, but it is necessary to organize the production of short- and medium-range missiles, and when we produce a sufficient number of them, then we can exit, and now we need to stop all discussions on this topic, for disguise.
      1. Vladimir 23rus
        Vladimir 23rus 21 January 2015 02: 39 New
        Just to disguise it is necessary to discuss in full. To "suck" this topic from all sides because silence on this topic to an understanding person will say too much. And so, "These russkie" are engaged in talking, not business. And to rivet a couple of thousand missile systems in Tihari and someday in 2020 to show all 2000 complexes at the victory parade. Utopia of course. But I would like to look at the faces of our "partners" when, within two or three hours on Red Square, but under "This victory day smells of powder" good Oh dreams, dreams.
    4. The comment was deleted.
    5. tilovaykrisa
      tilovaykrisa 20 January 2015 23: 18 New
      here you need to be careful, otherwise they will collect their perchs and not in Germany as it was, but in the Baltic States they will deliver them with a flight time to Moscow in 2-3 minutes.
      1. Vladimir 23rus
        Vladimir 23rus 21 January 2015 02: 42 New
        to Moscow in 2-3 minutes.
        The system "Dead Hand" to help us, and the enemy to intimidate. And they can wipe their two or three minutes if the answer is guaranteed.
      2. LvKiller
        LvKiller 21 January 2015 13: 57 New
        A handle will lift PLARK immediately after? Not scary? There are at least a hundred missiles, the United States and its friends will be far away.
    6. zao74
      zao74 20 January 2015 23: 29 New
      So let them roll as they say ...
      And with them those who in our country impede the strengthening of the defense capabilities of our armed forces.
    7. The comment was deleted.
  2. carabiner sks
    carabiner sks 20 January 2015 21: 47 New
    And what, once this agreement was in the interests of Russia?
    1. wanderer987
      wanderer987 20 January 2015 23: 44 New
      Yes, not when I didn’t answer, but NATO’s eastward progress with the missile defense system is leveled by all previously signed treaties in the light of recent events. I believe that Russia’s hands are now completely untied, and we have every right to any arrangements for deploying and manufacturing medium and short-range missiles, especially on our territory!
      1. Manul
        Manul 21 January 2015 01: 18 New
        Quote: wanderer987
        Yes, not when I didn’t answer, but NATO’s eastward progress with the missile defense system is leveled by all previously signed treaties in the light of recent events. I believe that Russia’s hands are now completely untied, and we have every right to any arrangements for deploying and manufacturing medium and short-range missiles, especially on our territory!

        In fact - they wrote correctly. My minus. Explain why?
  3. Vadim237
    Vadim237 20 January 2015 22: 02 New
    We need medium-range hypersonic missiles, which would be fast and sure.
  4. The comment was deleted.
    1. 31rus
      31rus 20 January 2015 23: 04 New
      You, my dear, think about the EU, in vain NATO is not only the EU, it is also the United States plus Japan, plus Australia, so the threats are quite serious, and only the Russian Railroads, the question can not be solved if only placed again in Cuba
      1. Wheel
        Wheel 20 January 2015 23: 28 New
        Quote: 31rus
        You, my dear, think about the EU, in vain NATO is not only the EU, it is also the United States plus Japan, plus Australia, so the threats are quite serious, and only the Russian Railroads, the question can not be solved if only placed again in Cuba

        And who said that they were the only INF?
        This segment is only one of many, but it completely allows you to control the Middle East, China, Japan, the old Europe and even part of the USA.
        Moreover, the INF Treaty is much more mobile and cheaper than ICBMs.
        1. kuz363
          kuz363 21 January 2015 07: 17 New
          The author of the article is completely right. In addition, RSD is not only cheaper by an order of magnitude, but also easier to mask, the coordinates for the enemy are unknown. Especially if the mobile units will be not only on cars, but also on water vessels of water bodies of Russia, railway transport. Type BRZHK, but not with strategic missiles, but RSD. And let the strategic ones wait for the goals of America.
  5. SSR
    SSR 20 January 2015 22: 19 New
    The fact that the main threat from the United States from Europe is that I agree with the author, the second developed infrastructure is Japan (but maritime provision will be more difficult), and let the specialists think about all the rest, it’s painful this filigree theme to which on a peppy goat doesn’t you will drive up.
  6. Tektor
    Tektor 20 January 2015 22: 23 New
    I like the train of thought of Alexandrov Mikhail Vladimirovich. Pralna, wait, save up the RSD and exit.
  7. Stinger
    Stinger 20 January 2015 22: 32 New
    I do not know. It sounds beautiful. But if you look at the map, at NATO’s capabilities and our capabilities, including financial ones, we can be so equipped with Pershing in a circle that it won’t seem enough. In my opinion no need to fuss. Russia is still far from the military might of the USSR.
    1. wanderer987
      wanderer987 20 January 2015 23: 48 New
      Already furnished mom do not worry, Turkey alone is just what it costs.
  8. 31rus
    31rus 20 January 2015 22: 41 New
    It seems like a respected person, well, to write horror, I’m not a strategist, and I understand that the contract for the last measure is now beneficial for us, one line killed the Americans at all when they saw a blow to Europe, they won’t retaliate, well, complete nonsense that Europe doesn’t have American bases? Trident’s launch will be seen from outer space, but a massive launch from various directions by KR missiles will create difficulties for both air defense and for the infantry and the entire structure will be in jeopardy, adding missiles and intercontinental ones here, so who will be out of the way, again, the area of ​​deployment of cr is known in advance, the same nonsense, who will interfere with loading the transporter and delivering to the right place, I don’t understand why the author needs additional threats, and the budget is not rubber
  9. Throw
    Throw 20 January 2015 22: 42 New
    The analysis is correct. Plus to the above, the INF-class weapons class in which the gap is unacceptable, because These are technologies applicable from the space industry to hypersonic shock rockets.
    In addition to this, in addition to Western partners, we have Eastern "partners" with their interests and overt and covert territorial claims ...
    In general, the "long arm" should be complemented by a short club! bully
  10. Victor-M
    Victor-M 20 January 2015 22: 43 New
    If the United States forgot about some kind of mutually deterrent strategic arms treaty with Russia and ceases to fulfill it due to amnesia, then there is a way to rectify the situation - this is Russia's exit from the same treaty. laughing
    1. 31rus
      31rus 20 January 2015 22: 51 New
      No, I don’t agree. By the way, modern missile defense systems can already use 4 types of guidance, so this is a real threat to the air defense itself, see the old scenario, the first wave is the cr, then the ICBM and the second wave (air based), plus anti-missiles here, I think not much won't seem
  11. zinger
    zinger 20 January 2015 22: 44 New
    it remains to cross the psychological boundary of the last drop of water.
    1. 31rus
      31rus 20 January 2015 22: 58 New
      This reputable is not psychology, this is strategic threat planning, so let’s leave it to the professionals, time will pass and the Russian Railways will not need nuclear warheads at all, hyper sound, here's the future, so why cut the budget, it’s better to focus on the new
      1. Wheel
        Wheel 20 January 2015 23: 38 New
        Quote: 31rus
        This reputable is not psychology, this is strategic threat planning, so let’s leave it to the professionals, time will pass and the Russian Railways will not need nuclear warheads at all, hyper sound, here's the future, so why cut the budget, it’s better to focus on the new

        Explain why hypersonic cancel UBF?
        If you are talking about a "global non-nuclear strike strategy," then this is a fairy tale for the naive. The cost of the sea - the result - zilch.
        Not a single more or less equal participant in the confrontation will indifferently observe the mega-concentration of the enemy’s forces and are guaranteed to smash the accumulation of prodigy carriers with banal nuclear weapons in the process of preparation.
  12. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 20 January 2015 23: 14 New
    It’s time to put a pistol at the temple of Euros ford! And then they felt a freemen ... They tell us what to do and how to be ... They shake their rights ... And it would not hurt to clutch this German claus about the inscriptions on the Reichstag ... They don’t want to live humanly, cursed! They’re rattling with glands ...
    And so let’s scare a little to make it concrete, and while we’ll shake out the pants for a couple of years, we’ll recover further after ten years of Yeltsin’s “friendship” with the West ...
    laughing soldier hi
    Otherwise, they’ll eat it, bastards, they know how to do it ...
  13. Yun Klob
    Yun Klob 20 January 2015 23: 30 New
    "In July 2014, Washington officially accused Moscow of violating the INF Treaty"

    Russia must express its readiness, after lifting the sanctions by the United States and the European Union, to start discussing compliance with the INF Treaty.
    1. antonov73
      antonov73 21 January 2015 02: 46 New
      Russia owes you nothing. And some sanctions should not be an instrument of influence on Russia
  14. pofigisst74
    pofigisst74 21 January 2015 00: 42 New
    Decipher abbreviations pzhlst! and then MTU, TSA, ATS. You’ll break your head !!! OVD - Department of Internal Affairs?
  15. antonov73
    antonov73 21 January 2015 02: 45 New
    An interesting article and judgments are pretty well motivated. But then it will be necessary to transfer significant funds for the development in this area of ​​the creation and modernization of medium-range missiles. In principle, I agree that this is necessary in the current realities. But suddenly we already have some kind of new projects and new types of weapons, which will allow us not even to spend money on medium-range missiles
    1. Throw
      Throw 21 January 2015 03: 10 New
      Woodwafer? "Suddenly already"? Can not be ))
  16. MihailK1969
    MihailK1969 21 January 2015 05: 54 New
    Informative article ... However ... Well, I don’t understand how the Author can write this - "... Meanwhile, the Russian air defense / missile defense systems S-300 and S-400 not only are not inferior, but in some respects they even surpass Patriot PAC -3. For them, the interception of American Pershing-2 missiles will not present a serious problem ... "Have the S-300 and S-400 (unlike Patriot) ever been REALLY used? No? Or will the author provide data on at least one aircraft he crashed? Will not lead! But Pershing will be knocked down without question by the Author ... How can I NOT UNDERSTAND ME! In the days of the USSR, we repeatedly managed with our latest weapons (for example, in the Arabian Israeli wars), but then we will knock everything down? What has never fired is not a fact that it will fire as it should ....
  17. lehalk
    lehalk 21 January 2015 06: 42 New
    Definitely, Russia should observe its interests. We (Russia) are all so “guilty”, and therefore look back at anyone .... Why is this "world community" taking a walk somewhere far into the bright ...
  18. Micross
    Micross 21 January 2015 14: 08 New
    Russia is the only country that can be hard to break America !!! Therefore, they are so pissing us, they are building their NATO !!! BE AFRAID)))