The second assault on East Prussia. Insterburg-Konigsberg and Mlavsko-Elbinga operations

8
The winter offensive of 1945 was carried out on a wide front. Soviet troops inflicted powerful attacks on the enemy not only in the southern (Budapest and Carpathian) and central (Silesian, Warsaw-Berlin) directions, but also in the north, east-Prussian direction. At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, the 3rd Belorussian Front, Army General Ivan Chernyakhovsky, (from February 20 - Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky) in cooperation with the formations of the 1st Baltic Front, Army General Ivan Baghramyan and the Baltic fleet under the command of Admiral Vladimir Tributs they solved a task of enormous operational-strategic scale.

On January 13, 1945, the strategic offensive East Prussian operation began. The purpose of the operation was to defeat the Wehrmacht strategic grouping in East Prussia and Northern Poland in order to open the way to Berlin. East Prussia had a huge for Germany historical, military-strategic and economic importance. Prussia was the historical core of the German Empire, the Prussian nobles have long been the military aristocracy of the state. The territory of Prussia was a kind of military bridgehead, which was used for aggression against the eastern neighbors of Germany - in 1939 and 1941. After Germany began to lose the war, East Prussia became a powerful stronghold, a huge fortress on the north-eastern borders of the Third Reich, which was supposed to stop the enemy.



East Prussia had developed communications for the transfer of troops, as well as a developed airfield network, which made it possible even with a lack of aircraft to create a significant aviation grouping on the desired site. East Prussia itself, by its natural conditions, was convenient for defense. This region of Germany was saturated with natural obstacles, especially water borders, including the famous Masurian Lakes. This narrowed the enemy’s ability to maneuver the war, slowed down the pace of movement and allowed the Germans to quickly organize defense at a new frontier. In addition, in East Prussia, which was a stronghold of the Teutonic knights in the Middle Ages, there were both old, medieval, and relatively new fortifications of the period of the First World War. After the defeat of the German Empire in World War I, the victorious powers forced Berlin to destroy the fortified borders in the west, but they were allowed to leave them in East Prussia. Germany was seen as a natural adversary of Russia. As a result, the old defenses were not only preserved, but also significantly expanded. Since 1922, the Germans resumed work on the construction of fortifications in Prussia and continued them until 1941.

In the 1943 year, after crushing defeats at Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, the German command launched large-scale construction work to restore the old and build new fortified positions. East Prussia, according to the plan of the German High Command, entered the strategic defense zone, which included a vast territory from East Prussia to Hungary, with a system of fortifications to a depth of 600 km. As the situation on the Eastern Front deteriorated and Soviet troops approached the borders of Germany, this work was carried out more and more intensively. For equipment defensive lines used a special building organization Todt, field troops, the local population and prisoners of war. As a result, East Prussia represented one huge fortified area. The depth of defense reached 150-200 km. On the main, Gumbinnen-Konigsberg direction, the Germans equipped nine fortified lanes. The most powerful defenses were created in the Ilmenhorst, Hejlsberg and Königsberg fortresses. In the direction of Mlavskoe, the German troops had three defensive lines, which included five fortified areas — Heilsberg, Lettsensky, Allenstein, Torunsky and Mlavsky, fortresses — Modlin, Mlawa, Torun, Marienburg, and Elbing.

Therefore, the first assault on East Prussia by Soviet troops ended in failure. During the Gumbinnen-Goldap operation (16 — 30 of October 1944), the Soviet troops were able to break through several powerful defensive lines of the German troops, took Stallupen, Goldap, Suwalki and several other important strongholds of the enemy, advanced 50-100 km. It was not possible to crush the East Prussian grouping. However, the 3 Belorussian Front was able to create a springboard for a second strike on East Prussia, the Soviet troops gained invaluable experience, which was used in subsequent offensive operations (The first assault on East Prussia; The first assault on East Prussia. Part of 2; The first assault on East Prussia. Part of 3).

The second assault on East Prussia. Insterburg-Konigsberg and Mlavsko-Elbinga operations

The artillery of the 2 of the Byelorussian Front is firing at East Prussia

Plan of operation

According to the initial plan of the operation, the task of defeating the East Prussian grouping was to be solved mainly by the troops of the 3 of the Byelorussian Front. The main purpose of the 2 troops of the Byelorussian Front, led by Rokossovsky, was to deliver a cutting blow in order to cut off the forces of the East Prussian group from East Pomerania and Danzig. The troops of Rokossovsky had to work closely with the formations of the 1 of the Byelorussian Front advancing on the Warsaw-Berlin direction. In general, the Soviet troops, with the support of the Baltic Fleet, were to cut off the East Prussian group from the rest of the Wehrmacht, simultaneously deliver a frontal attack from the east, break through the enemy defenses in the Königsberg sector, and then dismember and eliminate the Center group of armies.

The troops of the 3 of the Byelorussian Front under the command of Chernyakhovsky delivered the main attack north of the Mazury marshes in the Insterburg-Königsberg area. The 2 Belarusian Front, under the command of Rokossovsky, was given the task of developing an offensive along the southern border of East Prussia, bypassing the Masurian swamps and other obstacles, with access to the Baltic Sea coast in the Marienburg-Elbing area. The 43 Army of the 1 Baltic Front struck the Tilsit-Königsberg line. The Baltic Fleet was tasked with assisting ground forces with artillery fire and aircraft, landing tactical assault forces and operating on enemy sea lanes.


The command of the 3 of the Byelorussian Front at headquarters. From left to right: Chief of Staff A.P. Pokrovsky, front commander I.D. Chernyakhovsky, a member of the Military Council V.E. Makarov

The forces of the parties

In East Prussia and Northern Poland, the Army Group Center defended its defense under the command of Colonel General George Reinhardt. German troops defended on a wide front of 555 km, from the mouth of the Neman to the Vistula in the area north of Warsaw. The composition of the German strategic group included: 3rd tank Army of Erhard Routh, 4th Army of Friedrich Hossbach (from January 29, 1945 - Friedrich-Wilhelm Müller), 2nd Army of Walter Weiss (from March 12, 1945 - Dietrich von Saucken). The German group included 41 divisions, many separate garrison battalions, and special forces, including Volkssturm units. In total, about 580 thousand soldiers and officers, about 200 thousand militia (Volkssturm), about 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 8,2 thousand guns and mortars and more than 500 combat aircraft opposed the Soviet troops.

It should be noted that the German command with the help of repression and enhanced propaganda, which described the "horrors of the Bolshevik-Russian occupation", was able to maintain a rather high morale of soldiers and officers of the East Prussian group. Many soldiers, officers and especially the militia in the Army Group Center were natives of East Prussia and prepared to fight to the last drop of blood.

The German command planned to hold East Prussia at any cost. The region was an important springboard, which had not only defensive significance, but could also be used for delivering counterattacks. The East Prussian group hung over the Belarusian Fronts 2 and 1, which, under favorable conditions, allowed them to launch a counteroffensive and create a serious threat to the Soviet forces in the Warsaw-Berlin sector.


Column of German infantry and SAU JagdPz IV / 70 (V) moving along the road in East Prussia

The Soviet command took into account the mistakes of the first assault on East Prussia, when only the troops of the 3 Belorussian Front participated in the operation. Only in the 2-th and 3-th Belarusian fronts were 14 combined arms and one tank army, 5 tank and mechanized corps, one cavalry corps, 1-I and 4-I air armies. The offensive was also supported by the aviation of the 1 of the Baltic Front - 3-I Air Army. The troops of the two fronts numbered with the rear of 1,6 million, 21,5 thousand guns and mortars (caliber 76 mm and above), 3,8 thousand tanks and SAU, more than 3 thousand aircraft.

Thus, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in manpower (without taking into account the militia) by almost 3 times, by artillery - by 2,6, by tanks - by 4,6 and by aircraft - by 4 times. At the same time, in the break-through areas, the advantage of the Soviet troops was overwhelming: in manpower 5 times, in artillery - 7-8 times, in tanks - 7-9 times.


Soviet soldiers in battle on the outskirts of Gumbinnen

Course of operation

January 13 The 1945 of the year went over to the offensive of the 3 of the Belarusian Front, and on January 14, the troops of the Belarusian 2. The strike force of the 3 of the Byelorussian Front at the first stage of the operation was to strike north of Gumbinnen and destroy the enemy's Tilsit-Insterburg grouping. The front shock group consisted of: 39-I army of Ivan Lyudnikov, 5-I army of Nikolai Krylov, 28-I army of Alexander Luchinsky and 11-I Guards army of Kuzma Galitsky (in the second echelon). The offensive was supported by the 1 and 2 tank corps.

Other front troops delivered auxiliary strikes. On the coastal flank, the 39 Army supported the attack of Athanasius Beloborodov’s 43 Army in the Tilsit direction. On the left flank of the 2-I Guards Army Porfiry Chanchibadze was advancing on Darkkemen direction.



The beginning of the offensive did not foreshadow quick success. The start of the operation could not be kept secret. The German command learned about the preparation of the Soviet offensive and managed to take preemptive measures. In addition, weather conditions did not contribute to the use of all the capabilities of artillery and aviation. As Marshal Rokossovsky recalled, the weather was disgusting, "everything is hidden by the captivity of fog and sleet." I had to cancel all flights of aviation. Bomber and assault aircraft throughout the day could not strike at the enemy. The effectiveness of artillery preparation also fell heavily. As noted by Colonel A.D. Kharitonov in his book “The Gumbiennnian Breakthrough,” because of poor visibility, artillery fire was not corrected, and “even guns set for direct fire could fire only within 100-150 m”. Then there were no targets, no shell explosions.

All this affected the slowdown of the onset. Soviet troops could not suppress the fire system and the command and control system. The German infantry, located in the second and third trenches, did not suffer serious losses and put up fierce resistance. In some places the Germans turned into counterattacks. There were stubborn fights. Some settlements changed hands several times. As a result, the troops of the shock group of the front had to slowly “gnaw” the enemy defenses. Unfavorable conditions persisted for several days. Only on January 18, Chernyakhovsky’s troops broke through the enemy’s defenses, creating a gap as wide as 65 km and a depth of 30-40 km. By this time, due to improved weather conditions, Soviet artillery and aviation were able to operate at full power.

On January 19, at the junction of the 5 and 39 armies, the 11 guards army was brought into battle. On the same day, Soviet troops took Tilsit. At night, the troops of the 43 Army, which was transferred from the 1 of the Baltic Front to the 3 of the Belorussian Front, forced the Neman across the ice and took Tilsit. During the 19-22 battles of January, the Insbourg group was surrounded. The battles were still extremely violent. So, only on the approaches to Gumbinnen the 28-I army of Lucinschi repulsed 10 large counterattacks of the German troops. January 21 Soviet troops took Gumbinnen, January 22 - Insterburg. 23-25 January 1945, the troops of the right wing of the front crossed the rivers Deyme, Pregel and Allah, broke through part of the structures of the Heilsberg fortified area. The floodplain zone of the Mazury Canal was overcome and the northern part of the Letzen fortified area was captured. 26 January Soviet troops reached the outer defensive perimeter of Konigsberg. At this stage of the first operation was successfully completed.

Thus, in the course of the Insterburg-Konigsberg operation, the troops of the 3 of the Byelorussian Front managed to defeat the enemy’s Tilzi-Insterburg grouping. However, the Soviet troops failed to encircle and destroy the German grouping. The main forces of the German 3-th tank and partly 4-th field armies retreated to the line of the river Deim, Allais, to the area of ​​the Heilsberg fortified area, occupied defenses along the western bank of the rivers and on the Samlandsky peninsula north of Königsberg.

It must be said that, advancing deep into East Prussia, the Soviet troops initially almost did not meet the local population. The civilian population received an order for evacuation. Germans who did not want to flee were declared traitors. In addition, people frightened by Hitler's propaganda, which portrayed the Red Army as a “horde of wild butchers and rapists,” themselves fled to the interior of Germany, to Konigsberg and to the Zemland peninsula. The onset of the Soviet troops caused a panic. Only in Elbing hundreds of thousands of refugees congregated. Evacuation was poorly organized. Railway trains moved without a schedule, stood at stations for a long time, were driven into dead ends. Crowds of refugees scored roads, interfering with the maneuver of the German troops.


Soviet sappers walking down the street of burning Insterburg in East Prussia

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front dealt the main blow from the Ruzhany bridgehead initially to the Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) direction (during the offensive they turned to the Marienburg direction). The front's main strike force included: Ivan Fedyuninsky’s 2nd Shock Army, Alexander Gorbatov’s 3rd Army, Nikolai Gusev’s 48th Army, Vasily Volsky’s 5th Panzer Army, Alexander Firsovich’s 5th Mechanized Corps, and 8th Guards Army tank corps of Alexei Popov. Front forces also delivered two auxiliary strikes. Units of the 65th army of Pavel Batov, the 70th army of Vasily Popov and the 1st Guards Tank Corps of Mikhail Panov were attacking Torun from the Serotsky bridgehead, on the left flank of the front in a northwest direction, in a general direction on Torun. The center and the left flank of the front were to contribute to the advance of the Soviet troops in the main, Berlin direction. On the right flank of the front, Ivan Grishin’s army inflicted an auxiliary strike on the Musynets direction. It provided the main strike force of the front from the north. The 50th army of Ivan Boldin at the beginning of the operation was to defend a section of the front from Augustow to Novogrud, and then, together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, take part in the defeat of the Letzen group of the enemy.



During the first day, Rokossovsky's troops were able to penetrate the enemy’s defense to a depth of 2-7 km. The German command in the very first days of the battle threw all its reserves into battle. The offensive of the 2 of the Byelorussian Front slowed down, but was not stopped. Three days were fierce battles. As a result, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. Rokossovsky, to finally turn the tide of battle, threw tank formations into the breakthrough. On the morning of January 17, units of the 5 Guards Tank Army, which was to attack Marienburg, were thrown into battle. In the direction of Allenshteyn the 3-th Guards cavalcade of Oslikovsky was sent to the breakthrough. For mobile connections rushed infantry. January 18 took Modlin, January 19 - Mlava. Soviet troops breached the front in 110 km and in depth on 60 km. The main forces and reserves of the 2 of the German army suffered a complete defeat.

On January 20, when Rokossovsky's troops were already on the way to the Vistula and were preparing to force a water barrier, the Headquarters ordered the main grouping of the front to the north and north-east, to the sea, for the speedy elimination of the East Prussian grouping. The troops of the main front group made a turn to the north.

Oslikovsky’s cavalry broke into Allenstein and, with the support of the units that had arrived in time, Gusev defeated the enemy’s garrison. On January 48, Allenstein was taken, the defensive lines of the Allenstein fortified area were torn. Faced with the threat of encirclement, German troops from the area of ​​the Masurian marshes began to withdraw to the northwest. Units of the 22th German army were forced to retreat through the crowds of refugees and undergo strong blows by Soviet troops. On January 4, Soviet tankmen reached the Frishes Huff Bay in the Tolquemito area and blocked Elbing. At the same time, units of the 26nd strike army of Fedyuninsky reached Elbing, on the approaches to Marienburg and captured the bridgehead on the right bank of the Vistula. Parts of the 2th army also entered the Elbing and Marienburg area. January 48 Marienburg took.

On the flanks, the advance of the front also developed successfully. Parts of the 50 Army overcame the area of ​​the Mazury marshes. The 70-I army forced the Vistula on the move, on January 23 took Bydgoszcz, and blocked Torun.


Broken German StuG assault gun on the streets of Allenstein

Thus, most of the army group "Center" was cut off from the main forces of the Wehrmacht and lost ground communications with the rest of Germany. Hitler, angered by the defeat of the East Prussian group, removed Reinhardt from command and appointed Commander Army Group Center (it was transformed into Army Group North, the group blocked in Latvia became known as Kurland) Lothar Rendulich. Soon, the commander of 4 Army General Hossbach was dismissed, he was replaced by Mueller.

The German command, trying to restore the land corridor, organized a counterattack from the region west of Heilsberg in the direction of Marienburg. The 6 Infantry, 1 Tank and 1 motorized divisions took part in the counterstroke. On the night of January 27, German troops struck a sudden blow at the 48 Army units and pressed it. During the stubborn 4-day battles, German troops advanced westward to 40-50 km. However, soon Rokossovsky's troops not only stopped the enemy, but also threw him back to the initial positions, at that the first stage of the operation was completed.

In addition, the troops of the 1 Baltic Front in January 28 took a large port and city of Klaipeda, completing the liberation of Lithuania from the Nazis.


The troops of the 10 Tank Corps of the 5 Guards Tank Army of the 2 Belorussian Front occupy the city of Mülhausen (now the Polish city of Mlynary) during the Mławsko-Elbing operation. The city of Mühlhausen was liberated from Hitler’s 24 troops on January 1945. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/

Results of the first stage of the East Prussian operation

By the end of January, the troops of the 3 of the Byelorussian Front had bypassed Koenigsberg from the south and north, and occupied most of the Zemland Peninsula. The front-left connections of the front occupied the entire area of ​​the Masurian Lakes. The surrounded units of the 4 th field and 3 th tank armies were doomed. They had to conduct bloody battles, restraining the onslaught of the Soviet troops, trying to maintain the last footholds on the coast, to ensure the supply of supplies and cover the flight of the masses of refugees along the Frisher-Nerung spit and by sea.

The situation of the German troops was complicated by the fact that after the Soviet troops reached the sea, the East Prussian group was divided into three isolated parts. On the Zemland Peninsula, 4 divisions defended, in Königsberg - 5 divisions and the fortress garrison, the most powerful group - around 20 divisions, was pressed to the Baltic Sea south-west of Königsberg, in Braunsberg - Hejlsberg. However, the German command was not going to capitulate. The Germans hoped to ensure the long-term defense of Königsberg by combining isolated groups. If successful, they planned to restore land communication along the Koenigsberg-Brandenburg road. The battle was not completed. For the liquidation of the German troops in the Konigsberg area, new efforts were needed by the Soviet armies.

On the whole, during the first stage of the East Prussian operation, the strategic group of armies “Center” was defeated (transformed during the battle into the army group “North”). The main defensive lines of the enemy fell, Koenigsberg lost contact with Germany and was besieged, German troops were divided into three isolated groups. A significant part of East Prussia was in the hands of the Soviet troops. Also, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated the regions of Northern Poland.

The tasks of eliminating the remaining forces of the East Prussian grouping were assigned to the armies of the Belarusian and 3 Baltic Fronts. The efforts of the 1 of the Byelorussian Front were directed at the Pomeranian direction. During the offensive of the troops of the 2 of the Byelorussian Front in the Berlin direction, a large gap arose between the armies of Zhukov and Rokossovsky, which led to the threat of a flank strike from Eastern Pomerania. Therefore, the efforts of 1 of the Byelorussian Front were focused on this direction.

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8 comments
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  1. +1
    19 January 2015 08: 06
    Glory to the soldiers of Russia. hi
    1. +4
      19 January 2015 10: 44
      SOVIET soldiers!
  2. +3
    19 January 2015 11: 35
    The Germans were biting to the last, in East Prussia almost all ethnic Germans fought. A very strong opponent, but ours could no longer be stopped. If there were so many troops in the ardenes, then the Americans would have found themselves only in Washington or in London.
  3. +1
    19 January 2015 15: 07
    Slaughtered the Nazis in full !!!
  4. +1
    19 January 2015 17: 16
    Chernyakhovsky is a genius, such people should be put in charge ....... and if he were in the Donbass, now there would be peaceful silence before the Carpathians.
    1. kantcity77
      +2
      19 January 2015 17: 47
      In those days, there was no fifth column, Stalin in the thirties cut out all of it. Although he picked up weeds along with useful plants. There would be no repression, Chernyakhovskii would be a maximum divisive.
  5. kantcity77
    -1
    19 January 2015 17: 18
    The second Belorussian did not complete the task, he had to cover the right flank of the first Belorussian, Berlin would have been taken already in February, but the Pomeranian group hung on the right above the troops of the first Belorussian, so the military stopped 70 km from Berlin, the 2 Belarussian military got stuck in battles in Pomer
    ania.
  6. 0
    20 January 2015 05: 52
    GLORY TO VETERANS !!! Only here in the photo
    "Broken German assault gun StuG IV on the streets of Allenstein" depicts StuG III

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