New Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation

5
At the end of December last year, the Russian Security Council approved, and President Vladimir Putin approved amendments to the existing Military Doctrine. In connection with a number of changes in the international military-political situation observed recently, the Russian leadership has been forced to take appropriate measures and edit the existing documents underlying the state’s defense strategy. Since December 26, the basis of the country's defense is the updated Military Doctrine. The previous version of the document was adopted in February 2010.

The nature of the amendments made is such that most of the points of the document remain unchanged. However, some provisions of the Doctrine have been moved within the document, as well as to some extent changed, supplemented or shortened. Although the changes made seem small, they have a great influence on both the Military Doctrine and the various features of its implementation. Consider the updated document and the amendments that distinguish it from the previous Doctrine.

The first section of the updated Military Doctrine, "General Provisions", has undergone minimal changes. Its structure has slightly changed. Thus, the list of strategic planning documents that underlie the Doctrine has been modified and placed in a separate paragraph. Almost all definitions of terms used in documents remained the same, although some were revised. For example, the terms "military security", "military threat", "armed conflict", etc. it is proposed to be interpreted in the old way, and the definition of the term “regional war” now omits mention of the possible use of nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as combat in the territory of the region, in the adjacent water areas and in the air or outer space above it.

Two new concepts are introduced in the revised Military Doctrine: the mobilization readiness of the Russian Federation and the non-nuclear deterrence system. The first term refers to the ability of the armed forces, the economy of the state and the authorities to organize and carry out mobilization plans. The system of non-nuclear deterrence, in turn, is a complex of military, military-technical and foreign policy measures aimed at preventing aggression by non-nuclear measures.

Very remarkable changes are observed in the second section of the Military Doctrine, “Military Dangers and Military Threats of the Russian Federation”. Already in the first paragraph of this section (it was previously 7, but due to some changes in the structure of the document became 8) changes in the geopolitical situation in the world are reflected. Previously, a characteristic feature of world development was the weakening of ideological confrontation, the decline in the level of economic, political and military influence of some states or groups of countries, as well as the growing influence of other states.

Now the authors of the document consider the main trends to be increased global competition and tension in various areas of interregional and intergovernmental cooperation, rivalry between value orientations and development models, as well as the instability of economic and political development at various levels, observed against the background of a general deterioration of relations in the international arena. The influence is gradually redistributed in favor of new centers of political attraction and economic growth.

Recent events have led to the appearance of the point 11, according to which there has been a tendency to shift military dangers and threats into the information space and the internal sphere of Russia. It is noted that while reducing the likelihood of a large-scale war against the Russian Federation in some areas, the risks increase.

The 8 clause of the new Military Doctrine lists the main external military hazards. Most of these hazards remained unchanged, but some subparagraphs are changed, as well as new ones. For example, the sub-item on the threat of international terrorism and extremism has been seriously expanded. The authors of the Doctrine argue that such a threat is growing, and the fight against it has insufficient effectiveness. As a result, there is a real threat of terrorist attacks with the use of toxic and radioactive materials. In addition, international organized crime, primarily trade weapons and drugs.

In the updated Military Doctrine there are three new external military dangers that were absent in the previous version of the document:
- the use of information and communication technologies for military-political purposes for the implementation of actions against political independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as posing a threat to regional and global stability;
- a change in the ruling regime in neighboring countries (including through a coup d'état), as a result of which the new authorities are beginning to pursue a policy that threatens the interests of Russia;
- subversive activities of foreign intelligence services and various organizations.

The item “Main internal military hazards” has been added, revealing potential threats that have no direct connection with foreign military aggression. Internal military hazards include:
- activities aimed at violently changing the constitutional system of Russia, as well as destabilizing the social and domestic situation, disrupting the work of state authorities, military facilities or information infrastructure;
- the activities of terrorist organizations or individuals intending to undermine the sovereignty of the state or violate its territorial integrity;
- informational impact on the population (first of all, on youth), aimed at undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions associated with the defense of their country;
- attempts to provoke social and interethnic tensions, as well as incitement of hatred on ethnic or religious grounds.

Paragraph 12 Doctrines lists the characteristics of modern military conflicts. In a number of subparagraphs, this part of the Military Doctrine corresponds to its previous version, but it has significant differences. Thus, subparagraph "a" previously looked like this: "the integrated use of military force and non-military forces and means." In the new edition, it mentions political, economic, informational and other non-military measures. In addition, such measures can be implemented using the protest potential of the population and special operations forces.

The list of threatening weapons systems presented in subparagraph b has been expanded. In addition to high-precision and hypersonic weapons, electronic warfare systems and systems based on new physical principles, the updated Doctrine includes information control systems, as well as robotic weapons systems and equipment, including unmanned aerial and autonomous naval vehicles.

The further list of characteristics of modern conflicts has been seriously changed. Now it looks like this:
- Impact on the enemy throughout the depth of its territory, at sea and in aerospace. In addition, impact is used in the information space;
- a high degree of destruction of targets and selectivity, as well as quickness of maneuver both by troops and by fire. Of great importance are mobile force groups;
- reduction of preparation time for combat operations;
- the transition from a strictly vertical system of command and control of troops to global networked automatic systems, which leads to increased centralization and automation of force management;
- the creation of a permanent zone of armed conflict in the territories of the opposing sides;
- active participation in conflicts of private military companies and various irregular formations;
- the use of indirect and asymmetric actions;
- funding of political and social movements used to achieve certain goals.

Despite the change in the appearance and nature of modern armed conflicts, nuclear weapons remain and will be an important factor in the prevention of armed conflicts using conventional and nuclear weapons. A similar thesis is reflected in paragraph 16 of the updated Military Doctrine.

Section III of the new Military Doctrine is devoted to the military policy of the Russian Federation. The previous edition of 17 was divided into two. The new 17 paragraph specifies the procedure for determining the main objectives of the state’s military policy. They must be determined in accordance with federal legislation, the National Security Strategy, etc.

Paragraph 18 states that Russia's military policy is aimed at deterring and preventing military conflicts, improving the armed forces and other structures, as well as increasing mobilization readiness to defend the Russian Federation and its allies. An interesting fact is that in the previous version of the Military Doctrine, one of the goals of military policy was to prevent an arms race. The new document does not have such a goal.

Item 21 specifies the main tasks of Russia to contain and prevent conflicts. The new version of this paragraph has the following differences from the previous version:
- sub-item “d” requires maintaining mobilization readiness of the economy and authorities at different levels;
- subparagraph “e” implies uniting the efforts of the state and society in protecting the country, as well as developing and implementing measures to increase the effectiveness of the military-patriotic education of citizens and preparing young people for military service;
- subparagraph “g” is a modified version of subparagraph “e” of the previous version of the Doctrine and requires expanding the circle of partner countries. An important innovation is the expansion of interaction with the countries of the BRICS organization;
- sub-item “h” (former “d”) concerns the strengthening of the collective security system within the framework of the CSTO, as well as the strengthening of cooperation between the CIS countries, the OSCE and the SCO. In addition, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are first mentioned as partners.

The following subclauses of 21 are completely new:
k) creating mechanisms for mutually beneficial cooperation in countering probable missile threats, up to and including the joint development of anti-missile defense systems with the equal participation of the Russian side;
l) counteracting attempts by states or groups of states to ensure their military superiority by deploying strategic missile defense systems, deploying weapons in space, or deploying strategic high-precision non-nuclear weapons;
m) the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting the deployment of any weapon in outer space;
o) harmonization within the UN framework of regulatory systems for the safe implementation of activities in outer space, including safety of operations in space from a technical point of view;
n) strengthening Russian capabilities in the field of observation of objects and processes in near-Earth space, as well as cooperation with foreign countries;
(c) The establishment and adoption of mechanisms to monitor compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons;
s) creation of conditions aimed at reducing the risk of using communication and information technologies for military-political purposes.

The 32 point of the Military Doctrine defines the main tasks of the armed forces, other troops and agencies in peacetime. The new Doctrine has the following improvements:
- Subparagraph “b” mentions strategic deterrence and prevention of military conflicts with the help of both nuclear and conventional weapons;
- in subsection “and” the approach to the creation of military infrastructure was changed. It is now proposed to create new and modernize existing facilities, as well as to select dual-use facilities that can be used by the armed forces for defense purposes;
- in the updated sub-clause “o” there is a requirement to combat terrorism in the territory of Russia, as well as to curb the activities of international terrorist organizations outside the state;
- added sub-clause "y", according to which the new task of the armed forces is to ensure the national interests of Russia in the Arctic.

Item 33 (formerly paragraph 28) specifies the main tasks of the armed forces, other troops and agencies during the immediate threat of aggression. In general, it corresponds to the previous wording, but has a new subparagraph. The updated Military Doctrine contains a sub-item on the strategic deployment of the armed forces.

Paragraph 35 reflects the main tasks of the military organization. Like other provisions of the new Doctrine, this item is slightly different from the previous version and has the following innovations:
- in subparagraph "c" instead of improving the air defense system and creating an aerospace defense system, the improvement of the existing aerospace defense system is indicated;
- a new sub-item “n” indicates the need to develop a mobilization base and ensure the mobilization deployment of the armed forces;
- also, the new sub-clause “o” requires improving the system of radiation, chemical and biological protection of troops and civilians.

The new edition of the military doctrine paragraph 38, which speaks of the prerequisites and the construction and development of the armed forces, differs from the previous one in two subparagraphs:
- in subparagraph "d" the need to improve the interaction of both types and types of troops, and the armed forces and government bodies is noted;
- sub-paragraph “g” made the need to improve the system of military education and training, training and military science in general.

Item 39 reveals the methods and methods of building and developing the armed forces and other structures. 39 differs from the previous edition by the following features:
- in subparagraph "g" instead of creating a civil defense force of constant readiness, the development of this structure is indicated;
- the new sub-item “h” implies the formation of territorial troops for the protection of objects of the armed forces and civilian infrastructure;
- the sub-item “n” instead of the previously optimized number of military educational institutions, suggests improving the structure of the personnel training system.

The points of mobilization training and mobilization readiness of the Russian Federation are almost completely reworked. In addition, these provisions are transferred from the fourth section of the doctrine to the third, defining the military policy of the state.

According to the new doctrine (Section 40), the mobilization readiness of the country is ensured by preparation for the implementation of the mobilization plans in a timely manner. A given level of mobilization readiness depends on the projected threats and the nature of the potential conflict. The target level should be achieved through mobilization training activities and the renewal of the equipment of the armed forces.

The main objectives of the mobilization training in paragraph 42 defined:
- ensuring sustainable government in wartime;
- the creation of a legislative framework governing the work of the economy, etc. in wartime;
- ensuring the needs of the armed forces and the population;
- the creation of special formations that, when announcing mobilization, can be transferred to the armed forces or are engaged in the interests of the economy;
- maintaining industrial potential at the level necessary to meet all needs;
- providing the armed forces and economic sectors with additional human and material and technical resources in wartime conditions;
- organization of restoration work on objects damaged during the hostilities;
- the organization of providing the population with food and other goods in conditions of limited resources.

Section IV, Military-Economic Support of Defense, is devoted to the specifics of the economic aspects of the construction and modernization of the armed forces. In view of the implementation of a number of programs and projects, the section on military-economic defense provision is seriously different from the corresponding points of the previous version of the Military Doctrine. Consider the innovations of the updated Doctrine.

The difference between the old and the new editions of section IV is visible from the first points. It becomes especially noticeable in paragraph 44, “Tasks of the Military-Economic Support of Defense”. The new Doctrine defines the following tasks:
- equipping the armed forces and other structures with modern weapons and military equipment created using the military-scientific potential of the country;
- timely provision of the armed forces with funds for the implementation of construction and use programs, as well as training of troops;
- development of the military-industrial complex through the coordination of the military-economic activities of the state;
- improvement of cooperation with foreign countries in the military-political and military-technical fields.

Points 52 and 53 are devoted to the development of the military-industrial complex. It is noteworthy that in the new edition they received minimal changes. For example, paragraph 53, which describes the tasks for the development of the military-industrial complex, includes an additional sub-item, according to which it is required to ensure the production and technological readiness of the defense-industrial complex organizations to create and manufacture priority weapons and equipment in the required volumes.

Russia conducts active military-political and military-technical cooperation with various foreign countries. This partnership is also reflected in the updated Military Doctrine. Item 55 (formerly paragraph 50) describes the tasks of military-political cooperation and received the following differences from the previous version:
- the fulfillment of international obligations is made in a separate subparagraph “g”, and subparagraph “a” speaks of strengthening international security and strategic stability at the global and regional level;
- In addition to the CSTO and CIS countries, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are included in the list of states with which they are invited to cooperate;
- it is proposed to develop a dialogue with interested states.

Item 56 discloses a list of the main partners of the Russian Federation, and also indicates the priorities for cooperation with them. The Military Doctrine identifies priorities for cooperation with the Republic of Belarus, the countries of the CSTO organizations, the CIS and the SCO, as well as with the UN and other international organizations. For certain reasons, these subclauses of paragraph 56 have not changed in comparison with the previous edition of the Doctrine. At the same time, a new sub-item appeared in paragraph 56, which is devoted to the cooperation of Russia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The priority direction of military-political cooperation with these states is mutually beneficial work in order to ensure joint defense and security.

As before, the tasks of military-technical cooperation should be determined by the president in accordance with existing federal legislation (para. 57). The main directions of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries should be formulated by the president in his Annual Message to the Federal Assembly.

As before, the updated Military Doctrine contains a separate paragraph, according to which the provisions of this document can be refined and clarified due to the changing nature of potential threats and the tasks of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation.


Text of the Military Doctrine of the Year 2010:
http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461

Text of the Military Doctrine of the Year 2015:
http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf
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5 comments
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  1. +22
    13 January 2015 06: 53
    too many points, one would be enough: in case of aggression, Russia reserves the right to destroy the aggressor by all available means.
    1. +3
      13 January 2015 07: 26
      Well, it’s been with us for a long time already, there is probably no 300. This is a standard rule type, you don’t even need to include it in the doctrine, everyone knows it anyway laughing
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. +2
      13 January 2015 10: 12
      in case of aggression, Russia reserves the right to destroy the aggressor by all available means.

      VOLUME AND WEIGHT!
    4. +2
      13 January 2015 10: 19
      Do not be shy to use these funds, in which case. And then again they will start playing nobility.
    5. The comment was deleted.
    6. +1
      13 January 2015 13: 48
      Yeah. I also did not see the creation of such small nuclear weapons for such small evil neighbors. laughing Military doctrine is more clear to experts, no doubt. But the fact that it has been redesigned under the current threats to the security of the Russian Federation is already a big plus.
  2. +4
    13 January 2015 07: 04
    Our doctrine is to protect the country from a global mess organized by the Americans.
  3. +1
    13 January 2015 07: 14
    The West uses its armed forces to protect its political and economic interests outside its own countries. In the USA, for example, the whole world has a zone of their vital interests.
    And for us, the main thing is not to get involved in foreign military conflicts "for ideological reasons", as the Union often did.
  4. +2
    13 January 2015 07: 53
    What is especially pleasing is the point "The main internal military dangers"... The most important thing is that it works, and does not go under the shelter, as it sometimes happens. recourse
    1. dmb
      0
      13 January 2015 14: 05
      And you can specifically say what the Armed Forces should do in relation to the last paragraph of the listed threats. "attempts to provoke social and interethnic tensions, as well as incitement to hatred for ethnic or religious reasons." At the same time, enlighten, who is it that provokes social tension in our country?
      1. 0
        1 March 2018 21: 36
        Quote: dmb
        At the same time, enlighten who this provokes social tension in us?

        Dear, here in the Crimea, for example, people who provoked leadership positions in Ukraine or who held positions in the mainland and did business in Crimea provoke social tension. For example, the former Minister of Defense of Ukraine Lebedev - he is now a developer in Sevastopol. Is it not a secret for you that those who have invested a lot of money in Crimea have remained in their places, changing parties and positions? Well, those who have money and who, out of habit, decided to earn as much money as possible from the people, do this to this day. Prices for food, logistics, construction, housing and communal services, etc. are regulated and dispersed by them, the former they are the real "owners" of Crimea. About the newcomers Varangians who were sent by managers to Moscow, there’s no question at all, they behave like elephants in a china shop! Forgetting that Sevastopol is not Moscow and everyone is in sight. This is where social tension comes from! People didn’t expect that when they went to the referendum. This is one, but understandable, I hope, an example. But on the question of what the armed forces can do with it, I myself do not understand. hi
  5. +1
    13 January 2015 09: 19
    And where is the definition of a likely opponent. That besides terrorists and our own people, we have no enemy, are there only partners?
  6. pahom54
    +1
    13 January 2015 09: 22
    The document is good and finalized in accordance with the current situation. The main thing in Russia is that the adopted plans and laws are FULFILLED ...

    But in general, the military doctrine of Russia should be expressed in two words: DO NOT TOUCH !!!
  7. +4
    13 January 2015 09: 28
    Yes, write directly, the main enemy is Anglo-Saxon imperialism. And in big red letters on each page of the document should be written: "Russia has two allies, the army and the navy", others will betray at any time and also in big red letters "Do not trust the Anglo-Saxons, he always lie ... ".
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. +1
      13 January 2015 13: 58
      And what, for each individual state to write its own doctrine? laughing For that, it and the doctrine no matter who our enemy is today or who they will be tomorrow. And the rest is the lot of politicians.
      1. AKM9
        +3
        13 January 2015 16: 30
        You are wrong. The military doctrine and the doctrine that the priority threats should be identified (at present it is the United States and the NATO bloc) and threats to the foreseeable and more distant future (in 50 years it will probably be China, which is not overseas, but close by. the power and industrial potential of these countries, human resources, etc. We study their strengths, armies, weapons and why they are especially dangerous.In our case, this is the US and NATO fleet (this is a huge number of cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers, a huge submarine fleet), highly developed aviation, both front-line and long-range, UAV fleet, as well as a myriad of cruise missiles, as well as the fact that their troops can appear from any direction. Scientists are given assignments to create appropriate weapons. Accordingly, this is an antidote against their countless air forces, drones, cruise missiles. Accordingly, it is very effective air defense and will destroy ate interceptors in large numbers (the sample here is the Soviet Union). We need an antidote against their fleet, the underwater component of our fleet is developing, but the surface fleet is practically absent, since we almost completely destroyed it with our own hands, we will have to rebuild it anyway, and it should be a full-fledged oceanic fleet, with destroyers, aircraft carriers and frigates. Without such a fleet, our chances are small and its construction will have to be accelerated, no one will wait for us for 20 years. So the question is why we do not develop fighter aircraft at all, and the air defense only covers Moscow and St. Petersburg. We produce heavy expensive complexes, although they should be built by orders of magnitude less clean fighters (and MiGs and Sushki). In the event of a conflict, thousands and thousands of axes, drones, aviation will fly at us, the complexes will be powerless here. I would like to remind you of the Command Post Exercise that the United States recently conducted, according to the scenario of the exercise, they delivered a massive strike with precision weapons and a small number of low-weight nuclear weapons. Everyone was happy that we were still able to, a small part of our submarine forces were still able to strike at America, but no one wrote that they still managed to destroy all our command units with "axes", drones, aviation, and the fleet. points, bases, naval bases and the fleet itself (except for a small number of boats, which retaliated), air defense, air force, troops, industrial centers, communications. And they managed to create all this, thanks to the lack of a developed air defense system and mass fighter aviation, well, naturally, to the lack of a normal surface fleet. The complexes are good, only they can cover the country. We still rely on the miracle of weapons, but miracles do not happen. We need 31 MiGs and where in larger quantities than those indicated in the development of the Air Force, there are more than one thousand MiG and Sushki fighters. There is no need to rely on a nuclear baton.
  8. The comment was deleted.
  9. +1
    14 January 2015 04: 26
    I agree with AKM9, remember the saying "as the Chinese go to the end of the world", it will go almost all of Siberia under them, where they rent land where they bought it, all types of entrepreneurs, businessmen, partners are shorter, and then all that remains is to hoist the Chinese flag, then it's small, the border is near! Here we have to think about who will incite him on us (like the Tatar-Mongols, Polyakov, French, Germans), the current Sodom Anglo-Saxons are not wars, the ideology of the West is Luciferianism, we must think of a transnational society of Bilderberger, so I think in this vein and we need to build priorities , and for this you must first eradicate the internal enemy.
  10. 0
    14 January 2015 05: 49
    Usually, the Military Doctrine is accompanied by documents under various degrees of secrecy.
    It's like under the USSR, when we have a "defense initiative" everywhere, and after admission, "offensive is the main type of military action, defense is a temporary and forced measure."
    So it’s not worth the trouble

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