No patterns

6
During the Great Patriotic War, the tactics of partisan struggle developed widely and comprehensively. Its characteristic feature was an extraordinary variety of methods of action.

No patternsThe partisans, as a rule, attacked the enemy at moments of his least ability to resist, made extensive use of movement in the evening and at night, bad weather, in a very short time they could secretly concentrate forces to strike and in an organized manner took them out of the battle. Not accepting the oncoming blow of superior enemy forces, maneuvering, unexpectedly appearing in the most vulnerable places for the enemy, the partisans disorganized the rear of the occupiers and inflicted significant losses on them.

The methods of military actions of the people's avengers depended on the specific situation, therefore the tactics of partisan warfare were exclusively creative in nature, did not allow any patterns. One of her main rules was: never repeat.

Special schools played an important role in the training of partisan personnel. In addition, combat training classes were held in many partisan formations, the study of manuals, instructions, memos, which were published by the headquarters of the partisan movement.

With all the variety of combat partisan actions, they can be divided into two groups. The first group includes methods of action in which combat missions were accomplished by direct collisions with the enemy. The second group includes methods of action that made it possible to solve these tasks without entering into combat contact with the enemy.

In the first case, the main methods of action of the partisans were ambush and raid. An ambush was a prearranged surprise attack by partisans on a moving enemy: military units, train echelons, convoys, etc. Ambushes were used for both offensive and defensive purposes. Depending on the task, from a group to a detachment of partisans participated in them. As a rule, large convoys of troops and vehicles were ambushed by the forces of one or even several detachments.

The battle formation of an ambush most often consisted of a strike group, support groups and a reserve. Support groups were located in such places where it was possible with the greatest effect to prevent or delay the approach of reinforcements to the place of action of the strike group. They planted mines, set up forest blockages, and when the strike group began operations, if necessary, they entered the battle - they took part in the destruction of the remnants of the defeated enemy, prevented the approach of reinforcements.

The main ambush was the actions of the strike group. Mines were often planted in the area of ​​the alleged collision. The battle began suddenly for the enemy at a specific signal: the partisans who were part of the strike group opened fire from all types weapons, threw grenades at the enemy and, using surprise, often went over to the attack, during which they completed the destruction of the enemy.

If the Germans had superiority in forces and they began to offer organized resistance, the partisans promptly pulled out of the battle. Usually, even before the operation, several options for withdrawal were envisaged and areas of assembly and routes to them were outlined for the groups participating in the ambush.

As a typical example, one can cite the ambush organized by the "Death to Fascism" detachment (commander V.F. Tarunov, commissar I.P. Dedyulya) at the end of November 1942 on the Minsk-Moscow highway in the White Luzhi area, 8 kilometers south-west of Borisov ...

Reconnaissance of the partisans has established that every night two or three enemy convoys, 15-20 heavy trucks each, pass along the highway. As a rule, the head and tail of the column moved Tanks... The command of the detachment decided to set up an ambush in order to destroy a large enemy convoy.
A section of the highway with high embankments was chosen as the site of the ambush of the partisans. The idea of ​​the operation was to lay 12 large-caliber shells with attached tension fuses into ditches on the highway at night. 155-mm artillery shells were captured from the Nazis with the help of local residents. They decided to place the shells at intervals corresponding to the intervals between vehicles during night traffic. As soon as the convoy of the Nazis is drawn into the danger zone, the partisans must detonate the shells, and then destroy the convoy with small arms fire and grenades. An anti-tank crew was prepared to defeat enemy tanks.

According to the plan, two shock groups - No. 1 and No. 2 - were covertly located on both sides of the highway, three cover groups - in the directions of the likely advance of enemy reinforcements, the reserve was concentrated in the rear of the shock group No. 1. In addition, along with the shock group No. 1 there was a group demolitions. Her task was to set the shells and detonate them on signal. From both shock groups, subgroups were allocated for setting fire to vehicles and collecting trophies after the defeat of the enemy column. The convoy, located near the reserve, was supposed to deliver shells to the highway and take out trophies.
Having made a twenty-kilometer march, the "Death to Fascism" detachment approached the ambush site and took up the intended positions. At midnight, when there was a pause in the movement of cars, the demolition men went down the highway, hollowed out transverse ditches in the compressed snow, and in 15 minutes laid all the shells.
It was snowing, a strong wind was blowing, and the partisans, hiding, for two hours passed small groups and single vehicles through the ambush zone. Finally, from the direction of Minsk, a large convoy approached - more than 20 trucks and buses. The column at the head and tail was covered by two tanks.

When the tail of the column reached the mined area, artillery shells were detonated at the signal of the detachment commander. Most of the vehicles were out of order. The lead tank was damaged by a shell explosion, the tail tank was hit by anti-tank fire. Strike Group No. 1 unleashed a barrage of machine guns, machine guns and rifles on the German soldiers. The Nazis rushed to the other side of the highway and tried to climb the embankment. But here they were met with fire by strike group No. 2. Then, at the command of VF Tarunov, both strike groups rushed into the attack and completed the defeat of the enemy.
Detachment "Death to Fascism" burned 22 enemy trucks and buses, blew up two tanks, destroyed about 80 and captured 20 Nazis, captured many weapons, various military equipment, medicines and food. The partisans had no losses.

The People's Avengers have also successfully used double and triple ambushes. In particular, during triple ambushes, the task of the middle of them was, attacking the enemy, to force him to call for reinforcements ("lure"), which were then attacked by more powerful extreme ambushes.
To capture and destroy small groups of fascists, mobile ambushes were organized. The partisans walked or drove along the road under the guise of peasants, policemen or German soldiers and suddenly attacked the oncoming Nazis or overtaking them. Such ambushes were used, for example, by partisans from the special forces detachment of the NKGB-USSR D. Medvedev.

When organizing ambushes to capture vehicles, the partisans often stopped them, giving signals with red lights, and threw up thorns. They blocked the roads with stretched wire and in other ways. In order to selectively capture or destroy an enemy vehicle or any one Hitlerite, the partisans in a number of cases deployed their "traffic controllers" in enemy uniforms on the highway, and sometimes set up "checkpoints" at the communications. Such ambushes were successfully carried out by partisans from the unit under the command of V.P. Chepiga, operating in the spring and summer of 1944 in Poland.

Another common way of guerrillas solving combat missions by direct collision with the enemy was a raid. It was a sudden short blow at stationary objects with the aim of destroying, capturing or incapacitating them. The specific objectives of the raids were very different: the destruction of enemy garrisons, the disabling of transport or industrial facilities, the defeat of enemy headquarters, saving people from destruction or hijacking for forced labor in Germany, seizing warehouses with food, weapons, ammunition and other property, etc. ...

The battle formation of the partisan forces during the raid usually consisted of a shock (assault) group, support groups (cover and distraction) and a reserve. If one of the objectives of the raid was the destruction of man-made structures, then quite often detonation groups were also created. Often a group was allocated from the strike group to eliminate the protection of the target of the attack.

When raiding an object located over a large area, or a large bridge, the strike group was often divided into parts. The task of the cover group was to hold back the enemy reserves until the strike group completed its task and left the danger zone. During raids on poorly guarded objects, when the task was solved in a very short time, often within 3-5 minutes, the partisans, as a rule, acted without separating cover groups. In these cases, direct combat outposts were posted on nearby roads. Distraction groups were usually created in those cases when stubborn enemy resistance was expected and a significant amount of time was required to complete the task. In various ways - sabotage, ambushes, demonstrative "noise" and other actions - these groups distracted the enemy's attention from the main target of the attack.

An example of such an operation is the raid of the Bryansk partisans on the railway bridge across the Desna River near Vygonichi station on March 8, 1943. This bridge was extremely important for the enemy. In an effort to stop the offensive of the Central Front troops, the Nazis actively used the Gomel-Bryansk railway for the transportation of important military cargo and carefully guarded it. A well-armed garrison of 200 soldiers and officers was guarded at the Vygonichsky bridge. In addition, 200-250 soldiers and officers were garrisoned at the Vygonichi station and in the nearby settlements of Vygonichi and Lopush. The neighboring settlements were also occupied by the enemy. The approaches to the bridge were covered by bunkers, minefields and barbed wire.

Eight detachments from partisan brigades (named after Kravtsov, named after Shchors and "Death to the German invaders") with a total strength of more than 1100 took part in the raid on the Vygonichsky bridge. The detachments were armed with five easel and 60 light machine guns, 150 machine guns, 946 rifles, 21 mortars, one 45-mm gun, 950 kilograms of explosives. The operation was led by the commander of the Shchors partisan brigade Hero of the Soviet Union M.P. Romashin.
In accordance with the plan, special battle groups were created. Each of them received specific tasks. Two strike groups, 140 and 120 men, were instructed to suddenly attack the guards on both sides of the bridge and capture it. Blowing up the bridge was part of the task of the demolition group (40 people). Two cover groups (50 and 30 people) were supposed to block the way for the enemy's reserves, two groups of distracting actions (350 and 100 people) were to pin down the enemy garrisons in nearby settlements. A reserve for 250 fighters was located near the area of ​​operations of the strike groups, which, if necessary, was supposed to provide assistance to the strike groups and cover groups.

The operation began at one in the morning. At the same time, shock groups attacked the enemy garrison guarding the bridge, and the distraction groups attacked the Nazi garrisons at the Vygonichi and Poluzhie stations, in the villages of Kresty and Lopush. Distraction groups, having captured the intended lines, blew up the rails, mined highways, destroyed bridges on dirt roads and deprived the Nazis of the opportunity to help the garrison of the bridge. With swift, coordinated actions, the shock groups routed the enemy garrison and captured the bridge. The miners planted explosives under the trusses of the bridge, and the partisans retreated in an orderly manner.

The bridge was blown up. Traffic on the Bryansk - Gomel railway stopped for 28 days. During this operation, the partisans killed about 300 Nazis, and the commandant of the bridge was captured. Participants in the raid lost 12 people killed, 58 partisans were wounded and frostbite.
With the growth of the combat skill of the partisan formations, they more and more often carried out successful raids on large enemy garrisons. So, at the end of August 1942, the Belarusian partisans captured and held in their hands the city of Mozyr for more than two days, in September they took the village of Rossony. In 1943, the Crimean partisans defeated the garrison in the city of Stary Krym, numbering up to 1300 people. During the raid, the partisans destroyed two tanks, 16 vehicles with fuel and ammunition, broke into the building of the commandant's office and the city police, took away all the documents, threw grenades at a restaurant where many German officers and officials were located. One of the groups seized the prison building and freed 46 patriots, many of whom were sentenced to death.

Often, several detachments and formations made raids, and simultaneously on a number of objects. This significantly reduced the enemy's defensive capabilities, led to the dispersal of his forces, and increased the effectiveness of attacks.

Under certain conditions, partisan formations fought offensive battles. Such battles with the field and security units of the Wehrmacht were unprofitable for the partisans, since the enemy had an overwhelming superiority in artillery and mortars, not to mention tanks and aviationwhich the partisans did not have. Therefore, as a rule, partisans fought offensive battles only when breaking through from the encirclement, as well as during the capture of objects and lines in cooperation with the advancing troops of the Red Army.

The order of battle of the partisan forces during these battles was built in such a way as to avoid complex regroupings and provide the units with the necessary independence. Most often it consisted of one echelon and a reserve. Often, the first echelon was divided into an assault (strike) group, performing the main task, and support groups, which covered the flanks of the assault group and pinned down the enemy in secondary directions. The reserve was used to develop success in the main direction, to repel enemy counterattacks and to solve other tasks that arose during the battle. When breaking through from the encirclement behind the first echelon, headquarters and service units with a baggage train and a hospital were concentrated, followed by a special detachment (group) of cover. If the partisans had artillery and mortars, a fire group was created.

Most often, partisans fought offensive battles at night, they did not illuminate the area, they used natural landmarks. At the same time, they tried to attack suddenly and swiftly, achieving a clear interaction of their forces. In many cases, this deprived the Nazis of the opportunity to use tanks, artillery and aircraft.

Partisans fought defensive battles most often during the enemy's punitive expeditions. In those cases when small partisan units entered such battles, their purpose was not to hold positions for a long time. As a rule, they tried to break away from the enemy, who sometimes has a multiple superiority of forces.

While defending their bases and defending partisan territories, when the partisans were brought together into large groups, they fought stubbornly and held positions for a long time. These battles were in the nature of a mobile defense.

Prepared for the defense of partisan bases and regions in advance. The preparation was thorough. The partisan command developed plans for the protection and defense of the areas where the partisan forces were based. A watchdog service was organized - outposts or posts that allocated patrols, secrets and sentries. The task of the outpost was to block roads, clearings, paths, routes of the enemy's probable movement, to provide circular observation of the terrain.

On the basis of the Thirteen partisan regiment operating in the Smolensk region (commander Hero of the Soviet Union S.V. Grishin) in the Avinitskaya dacha forest in the autumn of 1942, 38 dugouts were built in several rolls. Each of them was designed for 30–35 people. For better organization of defense, dugouts were located along the perimeter of the basing area, which had the shape of a circle. The partisan camp was divided into sectors. Each battalion had its own sector. In the center of the camp there were dugouts of the regiment's headquarters, radio group and commandant's company. In the area adjacent to the camp, in well-equipped and underground warehouses, there were supplies of food and ammunition. A carefully thought-out defense plan, preparation of engineering equipment allowed the regiment in the fall of 1942 to conduct a stubborn defensive battle against the superior forces of punitive forces.
Outside the bases, the partisans focused their efforts on camouflage and the widespread use of various kinds of obstacles.

The battle formations of partisan formations in defensive battles, as a rule, included: the first echelon, a fire group (in the presence of artillery and mortars), a group of distracting actions, sabotage groups for operations in the rear of the advancing enemy, a strong reserve, which was located at several points on threatened directions.

Tanks posed the greatest threat to the partisans during defensive battles. The main means of dealing with them were mines, anti-tank guns, grenades, bottles with a combustible mixture.

In the second half of the war (mainly from the summer of 1943), partisan formations often fought defensive battles in order to provide assistance to the advancing Soviet troops. The partisans seized crossings, passes, road junctions, settlements and held them until the approach of the Red Army units. So, the 1st regiment of the partisan formation "For the Motherland" under the command of A. Shmyrev on September 21, 1943 captured the crossing of the Pripyat River in the Teremtsy region and during the day fought with the Germans. Despite heavy losses, the regiment held the crossing until it was joined with the Red Army.
The main method of solving combat missions in which the partisans did not enter into a combat clash with the enemy was sabotage. The purpose of the sabotage was to disorganize the enemy rear, causing damage to manpower and equipment. This method of struggle had a number of advantages in comparison with others. The sabotage allowed the partisans with small forces and almost without losses to inflict very effective strikes against the enemy. The guerrilla formations, using their high maneuverability, were able to continuously influence the enemy.

In 1941-1942, when the supply of the partisan formations with special mine-explosive equipment had not yet been established, the partisans used the simplest means and methods of sabotage in their combat activities: they undermined and expanded railway tracks, rattled and pulled the rails to the side, scattered metal "hedgehogs" on the roads and all sorts of thorns for piercing car tires, "wolf pits", pulled wires across the roads, set fires, etc.

The role of sabotage increased in the second half of the war, when the partisans were supplied on a large scale with special mine and explosive equipment. It should be emphasized that the regular troops used mines, as a rule, for defensive purposes, while the partisans used them as an offensive weapon. Of great importance for the partisans was the fact that sabotage by mining objects was relatively easy to carry out, while causing great damage to the enemy. The installation of a special high-speed mine took about one minute, and a delayed-action mine was installed by two miners in the thawed ground to a depth of 20–30 centimeters in 8–10 minutes.

The guerrillas used a variety of mines, both in design (instant and delayed action, controlled, etc.) and for their intended purpose (anti-train, anti-personnel, anti-tank, anti-vehicle, etc.). Special incendiary substances were widely used, especially with delayed action (for the destruction of warehouses, cargo during transportation, arson of industrial and military facilities).
With the help of mines and incendiary substances, it was possible to disable enemy objects without penetrating directly onto the objects. For this, explosive or incendiary substances were loaded into cargo: firewood, peat, limestone, coke, coal, etc.

Most often, partisans disrupted the work of enemy railway transport, without engaging in a combat clash with the enemy. They mined railway tracks and caused train wrecks. Moreover, the partisans strove to lay mines on protracted slopes, high embankments and curved sections of the path - such places where the explosion caused the greatest damage to the enemy. To ensure long interruptions in train traffic, they organized wrecks in deep recesses, on small bridges (which were not guarded or poorly guarded) or on embankments that passed through swamps, where restoration work was difficult.

Those partisan formations, which in their combat activities were focused mainly on sabotage, usually did not have large losses and retained high maneuverability. The sabotage activity expanded the scope and possibilities of partisan struggle. Neither the open area nor the cities were an obstacle to the successful conduct of sabotage by partisan groups and detachments.

Raids occupied an important place in the tactics of partisan formations. This was a peculiar form of armed partisan actions. It was a set of battles, sabotage and reconnaissance and mass political work carried out in the process of movement, when partisan formations left for a long time from their base areas or left them altogether.

In September-October 1942, a detachment under the command of A.K. Flegontov made a raid across Belarus, leaving the territory of the Kalinin region to the Osipovichi area. At the same time, a corps of Kalinin partisans, numbering 2329 fighters, raided the western regions of the Kalinin region. The most typical raids were carried out by small detachments in a relatively limited area. These raids were very effective. For example, a partisan detachment of 22 people raiding in the Leningrad Region, mainly students of the Leningrad Institute of Physical Education, by April 1942 made 24 raids on airfields, derailed 23 enemy echelons, disabled 18 tanks, two aircraft, 143 cargo and 84 passenger cars. cars, captured and handed over to local partisans 97 machine guns, 800 rifles, 7 guns, destroyed a large number of enemy soldiers and officers. The invaders called the detachment "Black Death".

The 1943 partisan raids were much longer. They were already carried out by more numerous partisan formations with the aim of conducting large operations in the enemy's rear. From June to September 1943, the legendary Carpathian raid of the compound under the command of S.A. Kovpak lasted. The connection passed through 13 regions of Belarus and Ukraine to the border of Hungary. The Germans threw seven police regiments, three Hungarian regiments and five separate battalions of the gendarmerie, with the support of aviation, artillery and tanks, against the Kovpakites. The unit was surrounded and escaped 11 times. During the raid, more than 3 thousand invaders were destroyed and wounded, 36 police stations were destroyed, three power plants were destroyed, 19 military echelons were derailed, 14 railway bridges and 38 bridges on highways were blown up. The partisans struck at the Drohobych oil fields, which were one of the sources of fuel for the enemy army.

The raids of the second half of 1943, and especially of 1944, were distinguished by the fact that many of them were carried out in close operational cooperation with the advancing troops of the Red Army. In addition, in 1944, a number of partisan formations carried out successful raids outside the USSR on the territory of Poland and Czechoslovakia.
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  1. LESHA pancake
    0
    6 September 2011 13: 34
    YOUNG PARTIZANS FRITZA FROM THEM A GREAT DISEASE OF THE STOMACH RECEIVED
  2. 0
    6 September 2011 21: 16
    THANKS HUGE TO ALL VETERANS !!! wink
  3. panzersoldat
    0
    8 September 2011 21: 08
    But now I would create special groups for guerrilla warfare.
  4. Priest
    0
    12 September 2011 23: 02
    The guerrilla war is endless (any state winning the war will consider resistance as bandits, and the people as resistance as freedom fighters.
  5. 0
    12 September 2011 23: 14
    The article is great.
  6. Priest
    0
    15 September 2011 13: 02
    Banshee,
    I would say more (but the article is great) smile

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