Problems with training in military specialties in Russia

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The Soviet army ceased to exist a long time ago, the volumes of which were colossal, however, the system of training officers continued to be conducted according to the same principles as 25-30 years ago. The strength of the Russian armed forces is only one-fifth of the strength of the Soviet-era army, but it seems that, so far, military officials have not thought that training in military schools should undergo some changes. In the 90-s for obvious reasons, the training of officers proceeded by inertia, having received an impulse in the Brezhnev years.

More recently, more than half of the graduates of military schools went to commerce, security agencies, and even directly to criminal communities. The lack of housing for Russian soldiers and neither reliable social guarantees frightened the graduates of military schools in our country. Young people, for whom the Ministry of Defense spent enormous amounts of money, said goodbye to the army very easily. These people are quite understandable. Those who remained boiling in this post-Soviet military cauldron realized that modern local conflicts did not go according to the scenarios described in the university textbooks. The enemy, it turned out, did not want to dig trenches and meet our Tanks in open fields, but, for some reason, prefers more and more guerrilla warfare, rear attacks and other things that young lieutenants were not taught for some reason. The first fruits of the complete discrepancy between the methodology and training program of the Russian officer corps we reaped in the first Chechen one. Pavel Grachev with a wide smile announced that Grozny would be taken within a week or two, but the "vile" Chechens, for the most part, apparently did not read Soviet textbooks and therefore were not going to surrender to the arriving federal troops.

Even then, the first words appeared about the fact that the Russian army needs not only upgrading weapons, but also specialists who understand how to conduct combat operations in new realities. Some immediately recalled that most Russian civilian universities have military departments. There were proposals to recruit the Russian army with highly qualified specialists who have technical specialties for managing new combat vehicles, which, in turn, for some reason, did not respond to graduates of military universities. Only now the military officials did not take into account that the lion’s share of graduates from these same departments were not going to become officers, but wanted to apply their knowledge in higher-paid areas of life. This was another step towards revising the approach to the training of cadets of military schools. If the Soviet Higher Military School implied that a young officer, receiving a diploma, automatically becomes the owner of a higher civil education, in the new Russia, with such a diploma further than in the parking lot security guard or as an OBZh teacher, it was almost impossible to get a job. The value of military education has dropped to the most critical point.

The army was supposed to become more compact and modern, and the top leadership of Russia increasingly began to declare a total modernization of the military department. At the same time, the management wishes to transfer the training system of Russian young officers to the rails of the Bologna concept of education. It is believed that at the present stage of the reform, the cadets will be taught under a special program: undergraduate - specialty - magistracy. The system, it seems, should revive the process of training military specialists, but the whole snag is that it is not always possible to make a good officer out of a silly schoolboy in 3 for a year, and he is also well-versed in modern military technology. In this case, the opportunity is given to “expand” the scope of their education in special higher military centers for training officers. As a result, the time of training one class specialist in the military field can take about 6-7 years and cost a lot of money. However, nothing else that could give a new impetus to the Russian armed forces has not yet been invented. Well, not to invite us, after all, also legionaries from among NATO sergeants to command a platoon ...

The reform of military training also included the development of pre-university training. Already in many large cities, the so-called cadet corps is providing substantial assistance. But here it was not possible to avoid problems. Under the guise of cadet schools, more and more, in the country, classes began to open in ordinary general education schools, which have nothing to do with the military cluster. Children enrolling in such classes do not even assume that they will receive a regular school certificate, which, for obvious reasons, does not give any guarantee of admission to a military college.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the military-pedagogical personnel "lost" their potential during the years of financial turmoil.
In general, the state faces an extremely difficult task: to reconsider its view on the training of competitive military specialists, after conducting a large-scale reorganization of the majority of existing military schools. The main thing is that excessive zeal or half measures do not lead, as we often have to, to the creation of the next Colossus on clay legs instead of the efficient and mobile army of modern Russia.
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  1. Siberian
    +1
    5 September 2011 10: 05
    Where do the authors of such articles come from. Who is Mr. A. Volodin in his specialty, education? As I will see, recently, everyone from a plumber to a deputy has been arguing smartly about the problems of military education.
    The Soviet system of officer training, based on the principles of the tsarist military school, is one of the best in the world. An officer of the Soviet (and then the Russian) army, who graduated from VU within 4 years, was later ready to manage units up to the battalion, inclusive, without additional training. As a last resort, there were 2-4-month refresher courses ("Shot"). Education is given exactly HIGHER, with an all-Russian diploma. Those who did not want to or did not know how to work, or who studied intermittently from two to three, went "to the guard's closet or to the post of OBZh teacher". As the author correctly noted, they did not enter the VU to become officers. Also, problems with employment in civilian life arise mainly among graduates of command general military schools (tankers and motorized riflemen). They (here I agree with the author) have a very funny civilian profession - "engineer for the operation of wheeled and tracked vehicles."
    Now reform is underway at the Higher School, but it’s kind of stupid, unsystematic. There is a lot of talk about the new realities of warfare, but the logistics of the educational process froze at the level of the early 80s, when I myself was a cadet.
    Pre-university training also followed the path of reinventing the bicycle. "Presidential cadet corps" are being created, but why did the good old "Suvorov schools" fail? Almost 100% of them went to VU, but how many will come from these "buildings"?
    Problems will continue to grow, like a snowball, while military education will be led by amateurs, like Ekaterina Gennadyevna Priezzheva.
    Born in 1967. In 2003 - Head of the Department for Monitoring the Turnover of Alcoholic Products KERPPiT (St. Petersburg)
    To March 2005 - Head of the Interdistrict Tax Inspectorate No. 1 of St. Petersburg (the one that A. Serdyukov managed in 2000-2001)
    From March 2005 to June 2007 - head of the department of taxes and duties on alcohol and tobacco products of the Federal Tax Service (head of the Federal Tax Service since July 2004 - A. Serdyukov)
    Since June 2007 - Advisor to the Minister of Defense (since February 2007 - A. Serdyukov) on the social block
    In 2008, it was considered for filling the post of head of the new Federal Service for Regulation of the Alcohol Market.
  2. 0
    5 September 2011 22: 08
    Siberian, but it’s hard to steer a military social group after such a position. lol
    1. LESHA pancake
      0
      7 September 2011 05: 20
      ESPECIALLY WITH A HANGER.
  3. Siberian
    0
    6 September 2011 07: 43
    She took her biography from the Internet. The last item is outdated, as Now her official position is the head of the Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
    And here is her predecessor: Tamara Fraltsova,
    Member of the State Duma of the fourth convocation (2003).
    Born April 2, 1957 in Kemerovo.
    Education:
    In 1979 she graduated from Kemerovo State University.
    Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences.
    Professional activity:
    In 1981, she worked in kindergartens.
    In 1990, the head teacher of the Kemerovo gymnasium No. 89.
    In 1992, the director of gymnasium No. 89.
    In 1996, the department of public education of the Central district of the city of Kemerovo.
    In 2000, the head of the Department of Education of the Administration of the Kemerovo Region.
    In 2003, she was elected as a deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of the fourth convocation from the constituency 089 (Kemerovo region).
    Member of the United Russia faction.
    In 2008, she was appointed director of the Board of Pupils of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
    In 2009, she was appointed head of the Department of Military Education and Science of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
    1. 0
      8 November 2012 16: 19
      what is that this is both stupid creatures! with a gray snout and clever fuck ... oh they climb to where they don't understand nichrome
  4. Volkhov
    -1
    7 September 2011 00: 16
    The problem is not with education, but with integrity - few people are willing to tell the truth with a risk to their careers.
    - where he served, all the warehouses could be burned with a pair of clips from Barret, nobody wanted to see this, but where there were conflicts, everything burned out
    - in Afghanistan it was clear that an order of magnitude more people were needed to protect the roads, but they were embarrassed to demand and drove people to ambush
    - everyone knows about "miracles" in the Caucasus, but that's how it goes
    Need a subject about common sense and the removal of saboteurs not only from above

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