Coalition Forces Network Tactical Information Systems

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Information is the most powerful catalyst for the approach to the conduct of hostilities, based on the joint work of the so-called "system of systems"

Information moves forward information gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), activates command and control (C2) and a multifunctional information management system (C4I), enhancing the capabilities of all joint combat units and expanding their tactical boundary of the combat space. Network tactical information systems provide information superiority, which allows the military to expand its situational awareness across the entire strategic spectrum of combat operations, make time-limited decisions based on aggregate multimedia and multispectral data in real time, accurately plan combat missions, conduct target designation and estimate battle losses ( all this strengthens and maintains the critical rate of operations) and evaluates reliable distributed mobile communications at the level e theater of military operations (TVD) and below.

According to Lieutenant General Charles E. Groom, director of the Joint Operations Directorate for Work in the global information management network of the Department of Defense (DISA) in Arlington: “Information is the most formidable weapons America. "

“When information does not focus on action,” Groom thinks, “then solutions do not work.” Consequently, information is the most powerful catalyst for the approach to the conduct of hostilities based on the joint activity of the “system of systems” (or the global system). It supports network-centric combat operations, which are key to the successful implementation of transforming defense initiatives, including the network-centric common combat space of the global system (SOSCOE).

Information flow is important

Like control, monitoring and communications (C3), combat automation, such as remote control of UAVs and other unmanned systems, relies on the timely and free flow of information to end users at all levels, from stationary tactical operations centers (TOC) to active and mobile forces on TVD. Difficulties can arise where there are gaps in the network coverage or loss of connectivity, creating dead zones and reducing the effectiveness, speed and reliability of the network coverage, usually between headquarters and dispersed and forward forces, such as field commanders and dismounted infantry. When the access to the mobile network is denied to the troops in motion, in order to continue their combat missions, they often have to resort to narrow-band, low-resolution communications and solutions when they lose contact with tactical control centers.

Such measures to eliminate gaps can essentially transfer in one instant the end users of information flows from the digital era to tactical decisions of the Vietnam War era, as soldiers are forced to switch to default maps for printed cards instead of digital displays in order to establish communications. radio instead of broadband multichannel systems that are available to command echelons with large resources of stationary network systems. Operational concepts like information superiority mean little if they cannot be successfully applied across the entire strategic range of military operations, including operations in which often widely distributed troops below the divisional level need access and use of coordinated and integrated tactical capabilities and functions in the overall framework of operational interdependence .

In order to expand and deepen network-centric combat operations (BMS), mobile combat information equipment, tactical network communications and dismounted operational controls integrated with rapidly adjustable, survivable and user-transparent global networks, must be consistent with the “soldier as a system” philosophy, which is central to the doctrine and implementation of the network-centric war. Network services and information equipment allow personnel to conduct combat operations within the non-linear combat space based on impact, facilitate and facilitate the use of a transformational network-centric military strategy and provide an opportunity to conduct combat operations in the entire range of general digital combat.

According to a representative of the Public Relations Office of the Office of Naval Research (ONR - Office of Naval Research), Colin Bubba, the strategic plan presented by the Marine Corps Warfare Laboratory MCWL (Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory), is designed for mobile information systems operations with armed forces at different levels in an asymmetrical combat space. The MCWL plan is one such initiative, both in the US and around the world, as the military seeks to become fully network-centric in its operations and these initiatives continue to use the architectures inherent in the information sphere. Key concepts were tested during the development of the actions of the armed forces such as the JEFEX 2012 (Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment), which was completed in April of the 2012 year and which focused on cooperation and connectivity throughout the strategic, operational and tactical spectrum in order to plan and execute global combat operations based on information. A recent practice of multinational information operations MNIOE (Multinational Information Operations Experiment Experiment), conducted by 20 partners in the European Union under the leadership of the German Ministry of Defense, also confirmed the effectiveness of network-centric information operations in a joint multinational common-arms space. In addition, the operation “Iraqi Freedom” itself confirmed for designers of the security system the correctness of the regional test model, the correct path for the development of military affairs since the epoch of the first Gulf War, which was followed by the Americans and their partners in the multinational coalition.

Coalition Forces Network Tactical Information Systems

IRobot Game Boy Controller and PCC Laptop


Data Specialist at the 31 Expeditionary Division sets up a SWAN satellite system during a Camp Hansen communications exercise

The role of information equipment

While information excellence is a key driving force, information equipment is needed to facilitate management, connectivity, service integration and data management, coalitional accessibility, key information products, service discovery, information detection, and data visibility. Indeed, the aggregate of mobile, network information equipment, scalable architecture and high-level services are needed to expand the global information coordinate network (GIG) directly into the hands of soldiers in combat space, which daily determine tactical boundaries.

Backbone services underlie all network interconnectivity. Backbone services can be said to include the totality of the entire network interconnection, which can be defined in various ways as a “network” or “grid” for communication lines and throughput. Regardless of how, where, or in what context they are used, trunk services form integral and fundamental combat information and impact-based military operations, creating the possibility of supporting combat operations from the point of view of combat units and providing the means for an exact course of action in real time. Network processes that allow for backbone services range from operations such as laptop laptops, such as secure email, intranet and tactical Internet services based on the Web 2.0 protocol, and to complex C4ISR operations (command, control, communications, computers, collection information, observation and reconnaissance), such as those consistent with the management of strategic UAVs like GLOBAL HAWK.

Integral with respect to dynamic network-centric operations for mobile troops are special networks (MANET). These are scalable, adaptable, broadband networks conforming to common operational standard protocols that provide a tactical broadband backbone for reliable, distributed C2 (operational control), C4 (command, control, communications and computing equipment), C4I and C4ISR operations of all types. Such networks can be of various forms and be based on various system architectures and deployed topological diagrams. Wireless mesh networks, for example, consist of transmitting nodes organized in a mesh topology (network topology in which there are two (or more) routes to any node) that does not rely on fixed or static terminals, but can use information equipment, for example, combat radio stations, individual nodes, forming networks on a specialized basis. The coverage area of ​​radio centers operating as a single network is sometimes called a “cellular cloud”. Access to this “cellular cloud” depends on radio centers working synchronously with each other in order to create a dynamic radio network. Redundancy and reliability are key elements of such networks. When any single node no longer works, the functional nodes can still communicate with each other, directly or through intermediate nodes. Such dynamic, self-forming networks are also described as self-recoverable.

The WAND program (Wireless Adaptive Network Development - Wireless Adaptive Network Development) currently uses the principles of a mesh network in a project aimed at producing tactical radio stations using commercial components that are self-tunable to the electronic space in which they are deployed, automatically switching frequencies and bypassing jamming and improving network performance in a wide range of tasks. MOSAIC (Multifunctional On-the-Move Secure Adaptive Integrated Communications) is conceived as an initiative to demonstrate the 2.0 web-based multi-functional mobile adaptable radio network, Internet protocols supporting wireless access that can be connected to terrestrial and satellite networks for global connectivity. with a high degree of information security guarantees due to the built-in programmable encryption and self-healing characteristics. WIN-T (Warfighter Information Network –Tactical - Army Tactical Communication System) is a high-speed tactical network wireless architecture based on a web 2.0 implementation and a transition concept to develop Wireless Network Next Architectures (WNaN) that will be combined with XG radio stations (Next Generation), for example, developed by the standards of the JTRS (Joint Tactical Radio System Network) program - reprogrammable radio stations using a single communication architecture based on a programmable, multi-transceiver architecture, a cat Oray will allow them to quickly adapt and reconfigure when operational conditions change, including jamming, listening, and hacker attacks.


Network servers for the global computer network (division level)

Protocol development

Protocols for tactical networks are many and constantly evolving:
C2OTM (Command-and-Control On the Move - operational control in motion). Dynamic protocols use the SIPRNet (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network - a secure network based on an Internet router) and the NIPRNet (Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network - an unsafe network based on an Internet router), broadband Internet Defense Department, and mobile connectivity.

DAMA (Demand Accessed Multiple Access - Network Access Multiple Access) on demand. These standards are used in flexible, user-configured satellite terminals that transmit data and voice.

FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below - 21 control system of the brigade level of the century and below). Standards for performing dynamic combat control of a mobile tactical network.

JAUS (Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems - a unified architecture for unmanned systems). It is a general operating system protocol for performing robotic combat operations within the framework of the global system concept.

JTRS (Joint Tactical Radio System - a network based on reprogrammable radio stations using a single communication architecture). The evolving communication protocol of the cellular ad hoc network defines a new class of military radio transceivers (transceivers).

MBCOTM (Mounted Battle Command On The Move - mobile control of the battle on the move). Facilitates the reception and transmission of data for SINCGARS devices (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System - a single system of single-channel radio communications of ground forces and aviation) in BRADLEY and SRYKER combat vehicles, helping to increase situational awareness on top of the existing army combat command system (ABCS).

MOSAIC (Multifunctional On the Move Secure Adaptive Integrated Communications - a multifunctional mobile adaptable network). Another dynamic mobile network standard.

NCES (Net-Centric Enterprise Services - network centric division services). Web-based divisional web services 2.0 for the US Department of Defense, developed by DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency, a structure in the US DOD responsible for the introduction of computer technology).

TACSAT. The protocols utilize a tactical satellite communications network, the JWS (Joint Warfighting Space) orbital initiative, also known as the Roadrunner (marathon runner) with built-in intelligence support for fighters during network-centric hostilities.

WIN-T (Warfighter Information Network –Tactical - army tactical communication system). High-speed, broadband network protocols for mobile communications of the American army.

VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocols - Voice over IP). This well-known technology involving the transmission of enterprise-level data in the commercial domain has also been modified for use in military cellular and broadband communications networks.

All of these protocols support "soldier as a system" integration policies, networking between vehicle electronics and interface with high-level architectures such as satellites, strategic UAVs and combat Robots. In addition, all use open operating standards and layered architectures that allow systems to be upgraded rather than "rebuilt" by adding or removing layers of a system based on advanced technology implementations.

The provided interconnectivity confirms the fact that information is the most important factor for the principle of the system of systems (global system), which includes the creation of a network in combat space, customizable, scalable networks that include the "friend or foe" technology and keep the soldier connected to other soldiers . This factor acts to support systems, including robots, throughout the combat space.

Nevertheless, even if information superiority is key to the strategy of prevalence, the information has no value without data processing equipment, prioritization and distribution to end users in theaters and in remote areas. Therefore, there are numerous initiatives in the development of prototypes, field assessment and the establishment of the production of such equipment.



Northrop Grumman Systems Engineer shows a combat network connection using the Soldier Ensemble, which includes a small computer

System Overview

As a tactical network should offer high transparency and scalability for the user from the services, so devices that allow information to be shared between people should offer transparent, soldier-friendly interoperability, high degrees of compactness, ultimate reliability, survivability and mobility in combat space. End-users of such systems will be distributed across all combat echelons from mobile tactical control control centers to dismounted infantrymen. One of the main goals of system designers of equipment for tactical information, including, for example, combat portable computers, is how easily these systems will be coordinated with the right soldier who has grown today in a common culture and is literally immersed in information technology at every level. Consequently, starting points for many, if not all, are products that were originally developed at the enterprise level for commercial use and modified by upgrading firmware and software that are consistent with military use and packaged in special hardened, “foolproof” cases. , and complying with military standards, such as MIL-STD-810E of the US Department of Defense. For example, these include the Panasonic Toughbook portable computer and the PDA handheld computer Paq Compaq, both widely used by coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. A strengthened version of the latter is known as RPDA or CDA (Commanders' Digital Assistants - Digital Commander Assistant). Recently, hardened plates for military and paramilitary forces have become widespread.


WIN-T Network Architecture (Warfighter Information Network-Tactical - Army Tactical Communication System)


The commander of the special operations unit calls the operations center to inform the location of its group.


The car of the second stage of the WIN-Tactical network is waiting for instructions on how to move during a demonstration of WIN-T technology at the Navy air base in Lakehurst


Canadian Signals Tactical Network Management Console

Other off-the-shelf systems, such as joypad-type handheld controllers, including GameBoy and Sony PlayStation controllers with joysticks and pushbuttons, were modified for military use, especially for remote control of combat robots, such as the iRobot's PACKBOT and the small-size ground-based SUGV armed with the American army. This is what happened with the WiiMote controllers, originally designed for the Wii game consoles and the Apple iPhone cell phone, both with Wi-Fi wireless connectivity. In the case of the iPhone, control devices based on reconfigured iPhone and iPhone-type platforms running on Wi-Fi protocols were modified to control the PACKBOT robot and the larger CRUSHER ground unit developed by the Carnegie Mellon University Robotics Institute as part of the DARPA technology initiative (Office of Advanced Research and Development, US Department of Defense). Among such devices there is a JAUS-compatible universal robot control unit SURC (Soldier Universal Robot Control), which was developed by Applied Perception Corporation for the research laboratory of the American army.

Even in the case of fully proprietary, specialized control units designed for military use, such as the Wireless Portable Controller (PCC) controller for the PACKBOT 510, the familiar user interface defines the system configuration. He and similar controllers (control devices) for other military robots, including the DRAGON RUNNER and SWORDS, have a similar design, a laptop computer, LCD or plasma flat-panel displays, keyboards that are not afraid of spills on them, and joypad controls. An example is the special direct control unit DCU (Direct Control Unit) for telecontrol robot TALON-3 SWORDS, which was deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Wearable information devices can free up hands for operational management applications, and also serve as useful assessment tools for the “soldier as a system” concept. These devices are based on wearable displays, whose user interface is semi-immersive (immersive - creating an effect of presence), a “transparent” virtual space in which tactile control mechanisms can also be used, such as hand and finger exoskeletons instead of pointing devices like mice and input devices type of keyboard.

A preferred user interface is a HMD (Head Mounted Display) binocular or monocular helmet display. These displays, as a rule, are conventional OLED microdisplays (organic LEDs), they are very light, especially compared to previous designs. Such devices use standards and protocols that are consistent with the concepts of "soldiers as a system," for example, a subroutine on the helmet displays of the WACT program of the future soldier FFW (Future Force Warrior). Typical systems developed are the Liteye 450 system from Liteye Corporation, the ProView S035 HMD and the Thermite Wearable PC from Rockwell Collins Optronics. Other systems include the Virtralis system manufactured by Polhemus Corporation from California. Virtralis, which uses an OLED micro display and a tactile wrist control exoskeleton (like the Cyberforce tactile handheld controller from Polhemus Corporation), is currently being evaluated by the British Air Force.

In addition to dismounted operational management applications, such as ground, air, and sea robotic systems, tactical information devices play important roles in all combat-based “soldier-system” initiatives related to connectivity anywhere that affects effective in-flight coordination of combat activities. battle space. Systems in support of mobile operational management applications such as the FBCB2 program include C4 transportable highly reliable systems (Command, Control, Communications and Computers) similar to TWISTER, which can be turned into mobile control centers with reliable broadband communication lines and get tactical networks on TVD, for example Trojan SPIRIT (Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal) satellite communications network and a special remote data collection terminal.


The picture shows the onboard terminal of the automated data transmission M-DACT (Mounted Data Automated Communications Terminal). It is a combat portable computer that connects to an exact location transmission system to receive wireless Internet, also works as a high-precision GPS receiver. With the help of M-DACT wireless internet, it can access the network with a secure Internet protocol in order to establish communication with other departments.

The C4 systems installed on the machines use portable computer terminals, sometimes called “add-on” terminals, which can be installed in combat vehicles for mobile network communication lines, data exchange, target definition and other network-centric information operations. An example of a terminal system deployed by the US Army in Iraq and Afghanistan and a standard interface for a FBCB2 transportable system is DRS Technologies' robust RVS 3300 transportable system that is fully compatible with the MIL-STD-810E standard for optimal interaction with a mobile tactical end user . It includes a sealed membrane keyboard, a touchscreen LCD display with anti-reflective coating and high resolution, wireless integration with existing tactical networks, as well as built-in standards support for communication and installation in a vehicle. Other systems that are suitable for similar tasks and usually installed in vehicles include the already mentioned Toughbook in portable configuration and the robust SCORPION RVT hardened terminal used in tandem with PPPU (Platform Digitization Processor Unit - a data processing unit compatible with the platform), a processor for mobile applications that meet military standards and provide for work in extreme conditions.

Estimates and forecasts

Since the construction of a network of combat space becomes a model for network-centric operations, applications for them will continue to develop. This development is guaranteed due to the fact that in the 21 century information will continue to serve as a critical factor in the successful conduct of hostilities. Even a superficial study of the budgetary allocations of the joint defense ministry headquarters in 2009 - 2013 shows that constantly growing allocations to important components of all types for network-centric warfare and initiatives to transform American defense such as the Future Years Defense Plan confirmed that the armed forces will increasingly be based on information and will be equipped with various highly intelligent robotic systems (ground, air, sea ) by the end of the second decade of the 21 century. Over time, all military operations will become mostly information operations!

While specifications and requirements have evolved and will continue to evolve, basic service components have been well defined over the past few decades. Improvements and upgrades will continue, but the core components of any reliable military network, such as connectivity and bandwidth, information reliability, and scalability and flexibility, will remain well-known elements built into both future and existing systems. It is necessary to consistently use ready-made elements and a multi-tier architecture in the future, as is happening today.


LSWAN (Logistics Support Wide Area Network) global logistics support network allows you to set up a wireless network on a theater and create an insecure Internet router (NIPR), a secure Internet router (SIPR), or work together with other logistics systems


Accounting software for personnel and contractors in theaters under the acronym DTAS (Deployed Theater Accountability Software)


Signalers on their knees write a preliminary order during the annual competition of non-commissioned officers


WIN-T is a century 21 tactical telecommunications system of the army consisting of infrastructure and network components from battalion level to theater. The WIN-T network provides C4ISR capabilities (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance - command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) that are mobile, secure, highly resilient, seamless. and capable of supporting multimedia tactical information systems.
The network’s ability to support the reorganization of subunit tasks and real-time task changes are essential for the operational concepts of the army. The WIN-T network allows all army commanders and other users of the communication network at all echelons to exchange information inside and outside the theater, using wired or cordless telephones, computers (Internet-like features) or video terminals. Soldiers and communications units deploy their standard WIN-T systems to integrate global and local combat networks into a commercial information technology based tactical network.


Information guaranteeing issues will continue to pose tasks as systems become more complex and more complex and more distributed throughout the global information network, as the increasing proliferation of systems and architectures supporting network-centric operations means increased risks from sabotage, including attacks on services, malware distribution and other forms of information attacks. This is especially true, as in military systems, the trend continues to be used as with the predecessors in the basis of Web technology. This increases the risk of being exposed to threats such as those that are constantly tormented by systems designed for the private sector.

In short, increasing application and increased complexity are added to the increasingly complex tasks of improving security. Technologies such as embedded device encryption, IT-based security policies and remote locking are currently proposed countermeasures that can reduce the likelihood of threats, but reliability measures for developing future systems will require significantly more attention to proactive risk management than this. is being declared for the current generation of tactical network system architecture, and, in addition, even more attention may need to be taken directly ikam of such systems.

As can be seen from the above, there is an ever-increasing need to ensure better and more integrated integration with robots in the combat space. Implementing the concept of “soldier as a system” requires the robotization of about a third of the US military by 2020. The transformation of the robotization process foreshadows more than just an increase in the number of robots in the combat space or increasing their presence; it also heralds an increase in the number of tasks in the entire growing spectrum of conflicts. All this creates much higher requirements than the current ones. This exceptional increase in bandwidth will require tomorrow’s tactical information systems and broadband networks to be much faster, much smarter and more dynamically tunable than existing ones, including the evolving WNAN network.

It can be assumed that the tendency of transition of technologies developed by the commercial sector to the defense sector can be supplanted by the development of parallel systems entirely for the defense sector in order to meet emerging tasks, although this has not been defined in any way.

The future merger of the “friend-foe” technology is another area where new systems can help dispel the old fog of war and solve problems that have not been solved in the past.

Finally, there were some imbalances between the vision of the planned and current critical stages achieved in developing the technologies of next-generation tactical networks, as well as on critical issues of interoperability and interconnection within the army. These problems lead to interference with the receipt of services and systems in the hands of the military in a war zone, an example being the introduction of extensions for the IEEE 802.11v (Wi-Fi) standard of coalition forces compatible with wireless mesh networks. Another such example is JTRS-compatible radios with built-in compatibility with MANET.

Some issues of communication in the field of communications are still unresolved in connection with the use of a wide range of operating frequencies, which overloads specialized specialized services organized by coalition partners. Sometimes this forces some system functions to be transferred to civilian cellular operators, as happened with the leading Iraqi cellular provider Zain, whose services were used by both civilians and the military, due to the well-known high reliability of this commercial network. Despite these and similar growing problems, network tactical information systems have already fundamentally changed combat operations, they advanced the transformation doctrine to the forefront of tactical combat operations, and also added energy to general and special combat operations. As Shakespeare once wrote in his play The Tempest: “The past is only a prologue. The rest is usually story».

Materials used:
www.monch.com
www.disa.mil
www.northropgrumman.com
www.military.com
www.jtnc.mil
en.wikipedia.org
www.defensenews.com
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8 comments
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  1. Evil dan
    0
    23 December 2014 11: 15
    Information moves forward the collection of information, observation and reconnaissance ... what kind of high-quality intelligence from the United States and NATO can we talk about when a bunch of NATO-Americans were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of the wars from "friendly fire" and why, having such sophisticated intelligence, they hammered home in which, according to "American intelligence", was Saddam Hussein while Saddam himself was quietly sitting in his palace? that's really intelligence so intelligence ... the main thing is that when the war begins in Washington, the Americans themselves do not shy away at the Pentagon, otherwise intelligence can report that it is there that Putin is sitting)))
    1. +1
      23 December 2014 13: 41
      Keep statistics of casualties from friendly fire.
      In the first Iraqi 1, the losses were significant (helicopter strikes
      and attack aircraft in their armored vehicles). In the 2nd Iraq 2003
      such losses have been reduced many times. Learned the lessons.
      In Afran, strikes in their own way were mainly due to poor training in
      logistics and communications of the Afghan army, which acted along with the troops
      coalitions.
      We can say: intelligence is mistaken now, but comp. technical means
      reduce errors and losses.
      1. 0
        23 December 2014 16: 27
        Here we are really lagging behind, and quite seriously (to be honest) About the "friendly fire" - how many times have you covered your own in the 1st Chechen war? Nobody thought it easy. It is not the system that is bad, but the people at the control panel, that is, the operators. A highly specialized fighter will be lost in non-standard situations IMHO. Here Russian universality will be useful. And in general, the overseas "sworn friends" will tighten up the stress-resistance of the personnel, and will make the enemy worse. In general, you should not relax the rolls - you need to develop effective opposition. Weaknesses are known in principle.
  2. +1
    23 December 2014 11: 20
    The future and present of military operations is increasingly shifting towards network-centric wars. Either soon or now the main thing in the manufactured equipment is how much it is adapted to action in a specific / any network as a carrier of weapons, or as a source / generator of information. Perhaps soon the war will begin and end at the level - "hey, we have blocked the data transfer protocol in the toilets, it's time to give up." Joke. Actually, a similar war has already taken place, the Iranian centrifuges are witnesses to this, and how many more such, but unknown wars have passed - they are probably innumerable.
  3. +2
    23 December 2014 11: 50
    When you have real-time information about allies, not to mention enemies, it's just gorgeous.
    But how do they plan to protect this information from the technical intelligence of potential opponents?
    If you can still come up with tricky safeguards from remote data collection (and this is not always, and not for a long time), then there are still no reliable controls against equipment hijacking. The enemy captured some of the headquarters and all? Change equipment to tvd or refuse to use?
    1. +2
      23 December 2014 13: 33
      It is not hardware that is changed, but passwords, frequencies, codes.

      And how now, when they capture the enemy’s radio station?
      Or before, when they captured the headquarters with the phones?
      Such cases are inevitable in the war, but do not cancel either the radio or the telephone.
      1. +1
        23 December 2014 17: 46
        I don’t agree with the capture of maps and telephones of the enemy’s headquarters, I gave information on this site, now everything is integrated into a global system, these are already higher-level accesses, until you understand, take measures, you will suffer significant damage
    2. Borman
      0
      24 December 2014 14: 01
      Have you heard anything about encryption? Keys with different cryptographic strengths can provide reliable channel closure, so there are ZERO problems.
      Capturing equipment does not give anything at all, modern encryptors are an ordinary computer with a program for encryption, so only keys have value, and in a combat situation, keys can be entered at least every day hi
    3. The comment was deleted.
  4. +2
    23 December 2014 14: 55
    And then there’s just a double edged sword, a lot of what can be changed software is soldered hard for security reasons, remember the same hamviks captured in the eighth year and a little commotion about this.
  5. +1
    23 December 2014 16: 03
    I don’t understand, are you going to fight as before by the fronts, armies? Think about the vulnerability of these bombs yourself, an example of seizing one battalion center, for example, and working for the enemy will lead to disaster, everywhere you need a measure, even with advanced technologies
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Borman
      0
      24 December 2014 09: 44
      an example of the capture of one admissible battalion center and its work on the enemy will lead to disaster

      And what if not a secret? Do you seriously think that this will remain unnoticed? And you can work on behalf of the enemy? Or how to influence other nodes from his equipment?
      So you are dear, you’re very mistaken, even with us it’s impossible to get to the higher level from the lower-level equipment, and the second password is entered every day in a combat situation so that sad
      1. 0
        6 June 2017 02: 17
        Everything has already been done wisely. They will even capture it if the equipment is protected against tampering. No one will break the encryption keys of the battalion weather level to the enemy, the battalion bus is protected and has one encrypted channel to the higher command and so on and there is not one subsystem, there are duplicate links in the frequency hopping modes in including. And no one will be able to break a key with a 128-bit encryption system of even the same division on the battlefield, and in a week, if they break it, it will become irrelevant to use. since in a combat situation with the threat of interception this is done regularly and most teams will already be executed. These systems are protected and thought out than it might seem at first glance.

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